Thesis.
SECTION X: ON THE GOODNESS OF GOD
Thesis.
§ 208. God is truly good, alone good, and the cause of all goodness. He is truly good because He is the highest good [summum bonum] and has nothing bad mixed in. He is alone good according to Christ (Matt. 19:17), because of Himself He is essentially, unchangeably, uniquely, originally, perfectly good. He is the cause of every good, because as the supreme being [ens] He gives being [esse] to all other beings [entibus]. Thus by sharing in that greatest good, whatever good is in creatures is good. (See our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God)], § 136.)
This is proved by: (I) Scripture, (1) affirmatively, when it declares that God is good and commends His goodness. Ps. 25:8: “Good and upright is the Lord.” (2) Negatively, when it says that there is no evil in Him. Ps. 92:[15]: “The Lord is upright, and there is no iniquity in Him.” Deut. 32:4: “The Rock, His work is perfect (complete and without stain), for all His ways are judgment. God is truth and not iniquity, just and right is He.” (3) Symbolically, when it celebrates the richness of divine goodness (Rom. 2:4). Thus 1 John 1:5: “He is light, and there is no darkness in Him.” (4) Effectively, when it declares that all the works of God are good (Gen. 1:31, etc.). (See our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God)], § 137ff.)
(II) Reason: (1) From His supreme entity.54 (2) From the goodness of creatures. (3) From His perfection. The goodness because of which each thing is called good is nothing else but the perfection of each thing, according to Thomas ([ST,] p. 1, q. 6, art. 3). Therefore each thing has as much perfection as it has goodness. (See our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God)], § 140.)
(III) The statements of the fathers are added. Dionysius, De div. nom., c. 4: “God is the good of all things, just as all things subsist from Him.”
Nazianzen, Orat. 2. de Filio: “The greatest good belongs to God alone.”
Augustine, De natura boni, c. 1: “God alone is goodness itself; He alone is unchangeably good; He alone is the good of every good; He alone is the cause of goodness for all things that are good.” In De Trinit., bk. 8, c. 3, after mentioning the various kinds of goodness in creatures, he adds:
Remove this and that and see the Good itself, if you can. In this way you will see that God is good not with another good, but is the good of every good …. There would be no changeable goods without the existence of the unchangeable Good. Therefore when you hear that this or that is good that otherwise can be said to be not good (if without those things that are good by their partaking of the Good you could perceive the Good itself—by the partaking of which they are good), then you will be able to understand the Good at the same time that you hear that this or that is good. Therefore if, those things being removed, you could catch sight of that which of itself is good, you would behold God.
Commentary on Psalm 134: “The Lord is good, but not in the way that the things He made are good. He made heaven and earth and everything in them good. He Himself is properly good; from Him are all other good things. For He has made all things. He Himself is good, whom no one has made. He is good with His own goodness, not with a participated goodness from elsewhere. He needed no one from whom He would become good, but other things needed Him in order to become good.”
The Damascene, Orth. fid., bk. 1, c. 1: “Being good, God is the producer of all good, subject neither to envy nor to any passion, for envy is far removed from the divine nature, which is both passionless and alone good.” In his book 
(f. 510), he calls God “the Holy One and Superholy One countless times without limit.” (For the words of the ancient philosophers who extol the goodness of God, see our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God)], § 141.)
In De monarch. Dei, p. 82, Justin cites from Orpheus the words: “He, from good, gives evil to mortals.” That is: He, being good and overflowing with goods, sends evils upon our race.” On p. 84 he quotes from the Bellerophon of Euripides: “If the gods do evil, they are not gods.”
Antithesis.
§ 209. The goodness of God is undermined by: (I) The Cerdonians, named after Cerdo, who “dogmatize two principles opposing each other and say that the God of the Law and the prophets is not the Father of Christ and is neither a good nor just God, but the Father of Christ is good. But some hold that they said that in their two principles there were two Gods in such a way that one of them was good and the other evil” (Augustine, De haeres. ad Quodvultd., heresy 21).
(II) The Marcionites, who followed Cerdo’s dogmas about the two principles, though Epiphanius relates that Cerdo asserted three principles: “good, just, and wicked” (op. cit., heresy 22).
(III) The Manichaeans, who claimed that there were two principles diverse from and opposed to each other, both of which were eternal and coeternal, and that “there are two natures and substances, namely, of good and of evil.” They have also introduced a conflict and mixing of these two with each other (op. cit., heresy 46).
(IV) The Calvinists, through various suppositions: (1) The absolute decree of reprobation without any consideration of unbelief. (2) The absolute decree of election through which the good and beneficial will of God, which is serious in seeking the salvation of humans, is restricted to a few. (3) The absolute decree of Adam’s fall. (4) The absolute and fated necessity of all things and actions. (5) The cause of sin being referred to God. (See our De glor. Dei, disp. 5, §§ 20–29.)
(V) The Papists, through their supposition that the corrupt concupiscence in the first man takes its origin from the condition of matter. You see, that which stems from a condition of matter is correctly attributed to God as the originator of nature. Therefore if corrupt concupiscence arises in man from the condition of matter, surely that will be from God, the originator of human nature, who in this way is stated to be the originator of something evil. (See our De glor. Dei, disp. 2, theses 1–2.)
(VI) The Photinians, when they claim God is the cause of sin, regardless of what they cloak it with. Catech. Racov., p. 306: “It was God Himself who wanted to use Pharaoh and Judas in their wicked actions for that purpose.” Schmalz, Contra D. Frantz., p. 426: “Through the devil, God forces people to commit wicked acts.” (Be sure also to see our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God), §§ 136–48] and p. 430.)
Questions about the goodness of God.
§ 210. (I) The question arises: Is God alone good through His essence? It is one thing for the essence of a thing to be good but another for a thing to be good through its essence. The essence of any created thing is good. Consequently, concerning the devil himself, who is the author of all evil, Augustine says: “To the extent that the devil has being, he is good; to the extent that every nature has being, it is good” (De nat. bon., c. 1). However, no created thing is good through its own essence, that is, through itself and of itself. For if it were good through its own essence, then it would be good essentially. If it were good essentially, it would be good by force of its own nature and essence, it would not have goodness shared from elsewhere, and it would not be able to be perfected through accidents—none of which statements can be made about a creature who can be said to be good accidentally, changeably, imperfectly, and by participation. From this the Scholastics are correct in concluding: “God alone is good through His essence.”
Hacker makes this distinction: “Something can be understood to be good through its essence in two ways: (1) In such a way that goodness is not an accident that is added externally to a thing but is intrinsic and essential to itself. (2) In such a way that the thing is not only good with a goodness intrinsic and essential to itself but also that it is such by virtue of its essence alone, without any order of dependency on an extrinsic cause” (Comm. in Thom., vol. 1, treatise 2, q. 6, no. 7). In the prior way creatures are good through their essence, but not in the latter way.
§ 211. (II) The question arises: Are all things good with divine goodness? We respond. Thomas writes that created things are called “good” on the basis of a goodness of their own “intrinsically and formally”; on the basis of God’s goodness as “the efficient, exemplary, and final cause” of all goodness “externally and causally” ([ST,] p. 1, q. 6, art. 4). From this Hacker draws the conclusion that “for anything to be and to be called ‘good,’ it must necessarily have a goodness that befits it formally and is internal.” He says: “We must observe this against the sectarians, who imagine that man is good, holy, and just only with extrinsic goodness, the holiness and righteousness of Christ.” Gregory of Valencia goes on in the same way: “It cannot happen that anyone for a time can be said to be loved anew by God, unless for that same time he begins to have a gift communicated to him by God, because there must be some cause for this new status. However, this is not in God, because He is unchangeable. Therefore it is in man, who is the object of that love. Therefore only those are righteous who are formally righteous, having some gift inherent in themselves” (Disp., vol. 1, disp. 1, q. 20, point 3).
We respond. (1) We, too, acknowledge that in the devout there is an intrinsic goodness and righteousness, but it is imperfect. (2) Because this cannot be set against God’s judgment, perfect goodness and righteousness is certainly required, namely, Christ’s. (3) When Scripture asserts that this is imputed to us through faith, we must by no means think that this imputation is merely an extrinsic and ineffective relation, for it proceeds from God, who “calls the things that are not as being” (Rom. 4:17). It corresponds to that imputation of our sins made to Christ (2 Cor. 5:21) and brings with it real and positive effects, namely, peace of conscience, inner renewal, and eternal life and salvation. (See our commonplace On Justification through Faith [Commonplace XIX], § 234.)
§ 212. (III) The question arises: How is the goodness of creatures in God? We respond. (1) Formally, if the most common reason for good is considered, which is simple and absolute perfection. (2) Eminently, if created good is considered specifically, that is, restricted to a certain species of being. (3) Effectively, as God is the cause of every good and comprehends the entire breadth of good. (4) As example, because the norm and rule of goodness is set forth in that supreme divine goodness. (5) As end, because God, as the highest good, attracts rational creatures to a hunger and desire for Himself and “has made all things for Himself” (Prov. 16:4).
§ 213. (IV) The question arises: Is the Son good through His essence? We respond. Yes, indeed, because through His essence, or essentially, He is one true God with the Father. Against this, the Photinians infer: That which is good through participation is not good through its essence, as is clear in created things. But the Son is good through participation, because through His eternal begetting the Father communicates to the Son His goodness, just as He communicates His essence. Therefore.
Concerning the major premise, we respond by distinguishing between internal participation or communication (which is the eternal communication of His essential goodness made in an indescribable and incomprehensible way through begetting to another who is not diverse according to nature and essence but the same), and external participation or communication by which God in time causes the streams of His goodness to flow through creation into His creatures, which are diverse from Him according to nature and essence. In the first manner of communication, the Son has a participated goodness, but not in the second. But now from the first manner it can by no means be inferred that the Son is not good through His essence. For as among humans, a son is man through his essence, though he has humanity communicated from his father, thus all the more in divine things is the Son good through His essence, though He has a goodness communicated by the Father through His begetting.
§ 214. (V) The question arises: How does it agree with the goodness of God that He is said to show Himself crooked to the crooked [perverso] (Ps. 18:[26])? We respond. He is crooked with the crooked not by changing His essential goodness but by avenging and punishing the crookedness of the wicked and by treating them in such a way that they consider Him crooked. Jerome on Ecclesiastes 6: “God is crooked with that person who by his own will was first crooked according to what is written in Leviticus 26: ‘If they walk contrary to Me, I shall also walk contrary to them, crooked in My fury.’ ” He explains this with the example of the sun whose operation causes wax to melt and mud to dry. This he takes from Origen, homily 2 on Song of Songs, where that simile is explained in greater detail: “The Sun of righteousness illumines and surrounds with brightness those whom He finds of an upright heart. But those who walk contrary to Him, He necessarily does not so much look at them contrarily as much as He despises them. This happens to them by their own instability.” Augustine, on Psalm 72: “A crooked person will think Him crooked, not that God is crooked in any way.”
The practical use of the doctrine of the goodness of God.
§ 215. (I) Consoling. God is good, good through His essence; therefore He will not forget His goodness. He forgets our sins, but His own goodness He cannot forget because it is His very essence. God is good and the fount of every good; therefore whatever comes down to us from God cannot but be good. To those who love God, even all those adversities sent by a good God “work together for good” (Rom. 8:28). Why, then, in divinely sent adversities do we not acknowledge from Ps. 119:71 that “it is good for us that the Lord rebukes us”? Lam. 3:25: “The Lord is good to those who wait for Him, to the soul that seeks Him.” Nah. 1:7: “The Lord is good, a stronghold in the day of trouble; He knows (understands and cares as a Father, because words of knowing connote affection) those who hope in Him.” Exod. 33:19: God is “every good” and the highest good, therefore “those who fear the Lord will not lack any good thing.” Ps. 34:[9]: “Those who seek the Lord will not lack any good thing.”
(II) Exhorting: (1) To love this highest good. God is every good; therefore it is useless to seek the good to which you should cling outside of Him. If you love a small ray of divine goodness in a creature, if you passionately desire a drop from this fountain, why will you not love the Sun itself and the never-ending Fountain of goodness? Every creaturely good is imperfect, changeable, particular. God is perfect, unchangeable, and universal good. Therefore neglect the imperfect, changeable, and particular good and love the perfect, unchangeable, and universal good in whose love no weariness, no satiety, no sorrow can be found. Anselm, Prosol., c. 25: “Love the one good in which all good things exist, and it is enough for you.” Once you have found and perceived that greatest good, the desire for other good things ceases because “when the perfect comes, the imperfect ceases” (1 Cor. 13:10). Augustine says, De Trinit., bk. 8, c. 3:
One must seek good for his soul—not the one above which he would fly by judging, but the one to which he would cling by loving—and what is this except God? … If you could remove those things that are good by participating in goodness and perceive that which is good through itself, then you would have perceived God. If you cling to Him in love, you will always be blessed. But let it be shameful to love other things only because they are good, to cling to them, and not to love the Good itself from which they are good.
If individual good things are delightful and lovable, how sweet, how delightful will that good be which contains the sweetness of all good things? Ps. 34:[8]: “Therefore taste and see how good the Lord is! Blessed is the man who hopes in Him.” Why do we wander about through creatures to collect some drops of goodness with which to please ourselves, when in God there is an inexhaustible sea of every good, which alone can quench the thirst of our soul? Whoever enjoys this good will lack no good thing. His soul will be satisfied with good (Ps. 17:15). He will cry out with joy: “How good is the God of Israel to those of an upright heart” (Ps. 73:1). Briefly we conclude from Augustine, De morib. eccl. cathol., bk. 1, c. 8: “God is the sum of good things for us. God is the highest good for us. We must not stay within nor seek outside; for the one is dangerous, the other is nothing.”
(2) To praise that highest good. Out of our love of and desire for the highest good comes the proclamation of it, for what the heart loves the mouth tells. Therefore let us say with all the saints: “Confess to the Lord, for He is good and His steadfast love endures forever” (2 Chron. 5:13; Ezra 3:11; Ps. 106:1). Ps. 135:3: “Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good; sing to His name, for it is pleasant.” Augustine comments on these words:
Because God is good and has made all good things, let Him who created be much better than the things He created. You will not discover something better to say about Him except that the Lord is good, if nevertheless you understand that He who created the other good things is properly good …. I am held by an ineffable sweetness when I hear: “The Lord is good.” After looking over and considering all things that are on the outside, I do not praise them [alone] without anyone. But I find that He is perfect without them, in need of nothing, unchangeable, seeking the good of nothing by which He would be increased, fearing the evil of nothing by which He would be diminished. Therefore if we praise anything else because it is good, then no greater, better, and firmer reason to praise God can be given to you besides the fact that He is good.
God has put traces of His goodness in all creatures so that they might all stir us to sing praise to God. As we do not know God perfectly in this life, so also we do not love Him perfectly. As we do not love Him perfectly, so also we do not praise Him perfectly. However, in eternal life there will be perfect knowledge, perfect love, perfect praise of this highest good. Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. 22, c. 30:
He who has given virtue will be the reward of virtue, and to him He has promised Himself, than whom nothing can be greater or better. What else does that mean which He said to the prophet: “I shall be their God, and they will be My people,” but “I shall be the source of their satisfaction. I shall be whatever humans desire honorably—life, salvation, food, plenty, glory, honor, peace, and every good thing”? For this is the way we understand—correctly—what the apostle says, “that God may be all in all.” He will be the goal of our desires. He will be seen without end, loved without contempt, praised without weariness.
(3) To avoid sin. God is the highest good; therefore let us be careful not to offend Him with our sins. It is surely most wicked to refer evil to Him from whom every good comes down to you because the law of nature teaches that grace must be compensated with grace and good with good. The damned in hell will experience the most terrible anxieties of heart from Him because with their sins they have so recklessly and obstinately offended that good God, from whom they received every good thing. As the consideration of the supreme goodness in God should move us to avoid every sin, so it should especially call us away from envy. From God all good things come down to us and to our neighbor. Whoever envies his neighbor is against God—who is Himself the bestower of gifts—and thus truly is one who fights against God (Matt. 20:[15]).
Finally, our meditation on the goodness of God should rouse us not only to avoid evil but also to imitate good. The good God is both the rule and the example of all good, and we approach Him only with good actions. His goodness can be spread out and communicated. If we desire to be like our good God, we must also share our goodness with others. Augustine says, sermon 5, De verb. Dom.: “Do good with the good from which you are not truly good, so that you may acquire the things that are truly good.”