Thesis.
SECTION XV: ON THE WILL OF GOD AND HIS FREEDOM TO ACT
Thesis.
§ 265. God is in essence a most freely acting agent. As understanding is attributed to God so also is will, which is the ability [facultas] to act freely and the commanding principle of actions. When we attribute will to God, we do not take this to mean an ability to will that is really distinct from the essence of God, which reveals itself through the act of willing (which they call “volition”)65 as distinct from His essence. Instead, God’s will is the very essence of God or God who wills. For as God does not understand through something added to His essence but through Himself and through His essence, so also He does not will through something added to His essence but through Himself. However, we consider the will of God as distinct from His essence because of the weakness of our understanding.
Because the will of God is the very essence of God, therefore it follows that as God (1) is most just and justice itself, (2) is best and goodness itself, (3) is unchangeable, (4) has no efficient cause but is the cause of all things, and (5) is pure and sheer actuality [actus], so also the divine will: (1) Is always just and is, in fact, the rule of all justice, so that whatever God wills is just by the fact that He wills it. (2) Is always best and, in fact, is the rule of all goodness, so whatever God wills is good by the fact that He wills it. (3) Is immutable and unchanging, for as God understands with one, undivided, simple act, so also He wills with one, undivided, simple act, and His will does not change by new acts of volition. (4) Has no efficient cause outside itself but is the cause of all things. (5) Is not idle and ineffective but busy and active, so that whatever He wills happens immediately by the fact that He wills it and just as He wills it. (See our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God)], § 163.)
God’s freedom to act is proved.
§ 266. We prove that the will and ability to act freely belong to God: (I) From Scripture, and that: (1) Affirmatively, when it attributes a will to God. Gen. 45:8: “I have been sent here by the will of God.” (2) Negatively, when it says that one cannot resist God’s will (Rom. 9:19), when it says that there is no one superior to God by whom He could be forced or obligated to will otherwise (Matt. 20:15). Job 9:12: “Who can ask: ‘Why are You acting this way?’ ” (3) Effectively, when it asserts that God does all things freely. Ps. 115:3: “Our Lord is in heaven. He does whatever He has willed in heaven, earth, the sea, and all the depths.” 1 Cor. 12:11: “He distributes His goods as He wills.” James 1:18: “He has voluntarily begotten us by the word of truth.”
(II) From reason: (1) From divine wisdom. Every intelligent and wise nature is endowed with will. But God is an intelligent nature. (2) From perfection. A being endowed with the ability to act freely is more perfect than one lacking such an ability. But God is the highest and most perfect being. (3) From divine blessedness. He who is truly blessed is free and is the master of his actions, bound to no one. But God is truly blessed.
We add the statements of the fathers. Augustine, Confess., bk. 12, c. 15: “God’s will is not outside His essence. Thus He does not will one thing now, something else later, but once and simultaneously and always He wills all things that He wills—not again and again, nor now this and now that, nor does He will later what He previously did not will or not will what He previously willed, because such a will is changeable and no changeable thing is eternal.” The Damascene, Orth. fid., bk. 2, c. 22: “We must understand that in the case of God we speak of ‘will,’ but we are not speaking precisely of ‘choice,’ for God does not deliberate, for deliberating is a mark of ignorance.”
Distinctions of the divine will.
§ 267. Before we go on to the antithesis, we shall have to examine the various divisions of the divine will. There is one will of God, but it is distinguished in various ways, both because of the different kinds of things that He wills and because of the different ways in which He seems to will what He wills.
First, into essential and personal will.
(I) Polanus calls the will of God in one way essential, in another way personal (Syst., bk. 2, c. 19). The essential will, he says, is an essential property of God through which He wills good as an end and through which He wills all things for good from all eternity, from Himself, independently, with one constant act. Personal will, Polanus says, is indeed numerically one in essence but is considered in two ways in person: commonly, according to essence; singularly, according to person and internal relation [relatio ad intra], to which Polanus relates the words of Scripture in which Christ speaks about the will of the Father.
However, we must not establish three wills in divine matters because of the trinity of persons; rather, as there is one undivided and utterly simple essence of the three persons, so also there is one undivided and utterly simple will. As Nazianzen says: “In divine matters that which acts is the one essence common to the three.” So we are correct in saying, “That which wills is the one will common to the three persons.” John of Damascus, Dict. 1: “The faculty of intelligence is divvied up among hypostases, except the holy, simple, uncompounded, indivisible deity; for there, because the hypostases are differentiated though not altogether divided, neither is that which is willed divided; and there, because the nature is one, so also the natural will is one; and because also the hypostases are inseparable, also that which is willed is one and the motion of the three hypostases is one.”66 The statements in which Christ distinguishes the will of His heavenly Father from His own must be taken as referring either to His human will or to the object of His will, not to the capacity to will nor to the will itself.
Second, into the will of the sign and the will of good pleasure.
§ 268. (II) In one way His will is called “of the sign [signi]”; in another way, “of good pleasure [beneplaciti].” This distinction is employed by both Scholastics and Calvinists, but in a different sense. The Scholastics define “the will of the sign” as the effect of God when He moves outside and acts with us through some covering or through external things that we can grasp, for example, the Word and the Sacraments that He instituted. “The will of good pleasure” they call the essential will of God or the bare, divine majesty, which is God Himself. (See Lombard, 1. Sent., dist. 45.) Suárez, Comm. super primam Thom., bk. 3, De attrib. divin., c. 2, p. 148: “The will of good pleasure is the internal act of the divine will by which He wills something. The will of the sign is not an internal act but an external sign of the divine will by which He indicates that He wills something.” They count five such signs—“precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, operation”—from which comes the little verse: “He bids and forbids, permits, advises, and fulfills.” In this sense of the Scholastics, Luther repeats and approves of this distinction (vol. 6, Wittenberg edition, p. 98, commentary on Genesis 6). He says: “In the New Testament we have Baptism, the Lord’s Supper, Absolution, and the ministry of the Word. These are, as the Scholastics have called them, ‘the will of the sign’ into which we must look when we want to know God’s will. The other is ‘the will of good pleasure,’ the substantial will of God or His bare majesty, which is God. From this we must remove our eyes.”
The Calvinists abuse this distinction when they claim that the will of the sign and the will of good pleasure are directed to one and the same object in opposite ways, and for this reason they assert that the will of the sign opposes the will of good pleasure. (See Beza, p. 2, Resp. ad act. Coll., p. 173; and Piscator, Contra Schaffm., thesis 76.) But in this way: (1) They establish two contradictory wills in God, which conflicts with His utterly simple nature and His immutable truthfulness. (2) They twist that Scholastic distinction and give it a foreign meaning. You see, the Scholastics say that every will of the sign is also the will of good pleasure, of course, not always with respect to that which we see at first glance but nevertheless with respect to that which God actually intends. But they, on the other hand, oppose the will of the sign and the will of good pleasure to each other. (3) They introduce a will of the sign that signs or signifies nothing or something false. It is called “the will of the sign” because it signs something and is the sign of the will in God. Therefore that which it signs either is or is not in harmony with the will of the sign. If the former, then it follows that what God wills with the will of the sign He also wills with the will of good pleasure. If the latter, it signifies falsely and is a false sign. (4) They attribute hypocrisy and pretense to God. (5) They abandon their own comrades. The Remonstrants in Belgium completely reject this distinction. Daneau also disapproves of it and teaches incorrectly that the will of good pleasure, which is unknown to us, is “the acceptable and perfect will” that is revealed in the Word (Oper., p. 1293). (See Maccovius, Disp. 2.) The will of the sign is not God’s will but rather the effect of it. Also, one cannot say that God wills salvation for each and every human with the will of the sign but offers it to the reprobate [only] so they may be without excuse. (See our commonplaces On Providence [Commonplace IX], § 113; On Election and Reprobation [Commonplace X], § 130; and De glor. Dei, disp. 6, § 3.)
Third, into hidden and revealed will.
§ 269. (III) In one way His will is called hidden and in another way revealed. (See John 6:40 and Eph. 1:13 concerning the revealed will, and Ps. 36:[6] and Rom. 11:33 regarding the secret or hidden will.) The Calvinists use this distinction also in the worst way, for they oppose the hidden and revealed wills to each other and assert wickedly that in the work of salvation God inwardly wills the contrary of what He outwardly revealed in His Word that He wills. (See Calvin, Instit., bk. 1, c. 17, § 2; bk. 3, c. 20, § 43; Beza, p. 2, Resp. ad act. Coll., p. 173; etc.)
We readily concede that the Lord’s judgments are a great abyss and say with the apostle: “How unsearchable are the judgments of God and how inscrutable are His ways” (Rom. 11:33). However, in those things that concern the work of salvation, we deny with all our might that one should establish a hidden will not only diverse from the one revealed in the Word but even opposed to it. In fact, we declare that this is wicked and blasphemous. (See our De glor. Dei, disp. 6, § 1ff.)
Fourth, into absolute and conditional will.
§ 270. (IV) In one way His will is called absolute and in another way conditional. Absolute will is that which wills something simply and absolutely, without any condition that exists or shall exist in creatures. Conditional will is that by which God wills some things with a condition added. Piscator rejects this distinction (Not. ad Vorst. de Deo tract., at p. 58, note 4). (See also Maccovius, Disp. 3.) There is no conditioned will of God, but it is necessary in order to explain the statements of Scripture correctly.
Concerning God’s absolute will, it is said: “My counsel shall stand, and all My will shall be done” (Isa. 46:10). Rom. 9:19: “Who can resist His will?” [Apocryphal] Esther 13:9: “There is no one who can resist Your will.” Therefore this will of God is always fulfilled. On the other hand, with regard to the conditional will, we read: “I wanted to gather you together, and you would not” (Matt. 23:[37]). Luke 7:30: “The Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God against themselves.” Acts 7:51: “You always resist the Holy Spirit.” Polanus admits the distinction but applies it badly. He says that with His absolute will “God wanted to save the elect alone for eternal life, and with the conditional will He wanted to save all people, even the reprobate, if they would do what He commands us67 in the Law or believe in Christ” (Syst., bk. 2, c. 19). However, God does not will with an absolute will that only the elect be saved in the same sense as Polanus asserts, namely, as if He had elected them to salvation by an absolute decree, without any consideration toward their perseverance in the faith. Furthermore, He does not will merely with a conditioned will that all be saved in the same sense as Polanus asserts, namely, as if the impossibility of the required condition had its cause in God rather than in man. You see, the Calvinists say that the reprobate do not believe in Christ because of an absolute decree of reprobation by which God, in absolute hatred, excluded the reprobate from salvation and from the means of salvation. However, Scripture pronounces that God wills and wills seriously that “all be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore He wills both the conversion of the reprobate and their salvation, and for this reason He offers them, too, the means of conversion and of faith through which He wills to be effective in their hearts if they do not resist the Holy Spirit.
Fifth, into antecedent and consequent will.
§ 271. (V) In one way His will is called antecedent and in another way consequent. The Calvinists reject this distinction. (See Maccovius, Disp. 4.) [They argue:] (1) When He wills that all be saved, either He foreknows that this shall not be achieved or He does not. If not, then He is not omniscient. If He does foreknow it, then He does not will it. (2) Contrary wills are being established in God. (3) This places the causes of our salvation in us. However, it is approved and proved by Chrysostom (homily 1, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, where he calls the former “primary” and the latter “secondary”), by John of Damascus (Orth. fid., bk. 2, c. 29; Contra haeres. Manich., bk. 1, p. 563, where he calls the former “the leading will” and the latter “the following will”), by Anselm (De volunt., who calls the former “the will of mercy” and the latter “the will of righteousness”), and even by Hubert Sturm (De praedest., p. 181) and Polanus (Syst., bk. 2, c. 19).
The antecedent will is that by which God as a kind Father wills that all humans be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. The consequent will is that by which God as a just judge wills that those who finally are impenitent and unbelieving be condemned. “By His primary will, God wills that man be saved according as he is human. By His secondary will, He does not will that a just man be reprobate according as he is a just man” ([Albertus Magnus,] Comp. theol. veritat., bk. 1, c. 30). Therefore this distinction has its foundation in the miraculous temperament of God’s justice and mercy, something that Tertullian expresses in brief but emphatic language: “God is best concerning His, just concerning ours” (De resurr. carnis).
Maccovius (Disp. 1) perverts our meaning and says:
They claim that because God had foreseen from eternity that the human race would fall, He took pity on all and decreed to send Christ into that world that whosoever would believe in Him would not perish…. But later He foresaw that some people—in fact, the majority of humans—would reject Christ. As a result, He changed this will and decreed to give life only to those who would believe in Christ and persevere in this faith. From this, then, they deduce a distinction of the divine will into antecedent and consequent.
However, none of us claims a change of will in God. Rather, we say that the consequent will is subordinate to the antecedent. This distinction can be demonstrated with various examples: (1) Of a father who is kindly disposed to all his children equally and wants them all to be the heirs of his estate but who excludes from the inheritance those who are stubbornly unyielding in their baseness. (2) Of a magistrate who wants all his subjects to be safe and unharmed, but if some disturb the civil society with terrible crimes, he wants these to be removed. (3) Of a gardener who takes care of all the little plants and works carefully so that they mature, but if some of them wither away, he cuts them out. (4) Of a physician who offers his precious medicine to all who are afflicted with plague and seeks their cure, but if some of them reject the means he has offered, he allows them to perish by their own fault. (5) Of a potter who wishes to shape out of every lump of clay some useful vessel, but if something breaks between his hands, he throws it away. (6) Of a minister of the Word who seeks the salvation of all his hearers, but if any continue stubbornly in their sins, he delivers them over to the devil. (7) Of a father of a household who prepares a great supper and seriously wants all to come and enjoy his bounty, but if some of them reject this invitation and refuse to come, he decides to exclude them. (See our commonplace On Election and Reprobation [Commonplace X], § 75ff.)
Sixth, into effectual and ineffectual will.
§ 272. (VI) In one way His will is called effectual [efficax] and in another way ineffectual. In Enchir., c. 100, Augustine calls it “the effectual or unconquered” and most powerful “will of God,” by which He decides to reward those who do good and to punish sinners and which he asserts is always fulfilled. He calls that the ineffectual will by which He wants all to live well and no one to sin. The Calvinists apply this distinction badly, for they seek the cause of that inefficacy, so to speak—that not all people believe in Christ, live devoutly, and attain salvation—in the absolute decree of reprobation, though it should be sought only in the vice of humans.
Seventh, into the will performed toward us and by us.
§ 273. (VII) In one way God’s will is toward us, which He wills to do concerning us and other creatures. In another way it is that which He wills to be done by us, which is revealed in the Word. Augustine writes (op. cit.):
The will of God is always fulfilled either concerning us or by us. It is fulfilled concerning us, but we do not fulfill it when we sin. It is fulfilled by us when we do good. However, God always fulfills His will concerning man because man does nothing with regard to which God does not work what He wills. For God does not will that man should sin. If he has sinned, however, God wills to spare the repentant that he may live. On the other hand, God wills the punishment of those who persevere in their sins so that the sinner may not escape the power of His justice.
Eighth, into legal and evangelical will.
§ 274. (VIII) In one way the revealed will of God is legal; in another way, evangelical. The legal will is revealed in the moral law, and its summary is set forth in the Decalogue. The evangelical will is revealed in the Gospel, and its summary is set forth in John 3:16. We shall discuss this distinction elsewhere in greater detail.68
Ninth, into effecting and permitting will.
§ 275. (IX) In one way God’s will is said to be effecting [efficiens]; in another way, permitting. The effecting will is that according to which God brings about only good things, either through Himself or through others. (See Eph. 1:11.) Tertullian calls this the “pure, greater, and more powerful will” (Exhort. ad castit.). The permitting will is that by which God permits His creatures to do evil and does not stand in their way, though He could. Tertullian calls it “the will of indulgence” and “the lesser will.” Others call it “the permissive will.” Therefore we disapprove of what Daneau writes: “Those things that the reprobate and wicked do, God wants done not only with His permissive will but also with His effective will; not only (as others want it) with His consequent will but also with His antecedent will, just as [He wills with His antecedent will] the existence of the wicked themselves and the creation of the world” (Ench. August., p. 878).
However, it must be noted carefully that God permits sin not by compulsion but freely, namely, because He knows how to elicit good from it, and in this sense we can concede voluntary permission or the permissive will concerning sin. Nevertheless He does not will nor approve of sin itself, according as it is sin, nor does He drive anyone to it. Consequently, will and permission are related to diverse objects. Permission is related to sin itself; will, to the useful end that He knows how to elicit from it on behalf of His own purpose. For this reason our people say that sin does not happen simply, God being unwilling [nolente] or reluctant, for no one can compel God nor can anything be done when God hinders or opposes it. Nor does it occur, God simply willing [volente], because God neither wills nor approves of sin. But it does occur, God not willing [non volente]. The difference between “unwilling” and “not willing” is that the former has “a privation of will and of active principle along with opposition and contrary action,” while the latter has only “the deprivation without violent reluctance.” (See Peter Lombard, 1. Sent., dist. 45.)
Therefore lest anyone abuse this distinction in order to undermine orthodoxy regarding the cause of sin, we prefer to speak in this way: God wills some things, as goods, and permits some things, as evils. Maccovius, Disp. 9: “A distinction between the permissive and effective will of God is good, for God does not bring about all things that He wills but permits some things to happen, such as sin.” However, he applies this poorly, for a little later he tries to prove that “God with His permissive will wills not permission but sin itself,” and he tries with three arguments:
(1) The Lord decreed and willed that thing [sin] without which He could not declare His punishing justice and His mercy, and He did this with His permissive will. But He could not do this without sin. (2) Whatever God foreknows shall happen, this He has willed and decreed. But He foreknows that sin shall happen. Therefore He has willed and decreed sin. (3) God either has willed or has not willed [noluit] sin or He has neither willed nor not willed it. He cannot be said to have not willed it because nothing takes place when God is unwilling [nolente]. He cannot be said to have neither not willed nor willed it because He does not concern Himself with that which He neither wills nor does not will [non vult], and therefore sin would be outside the providence of God. Therefore He has willed it.
The first two arguments, however, rely on false hypotheses, and we have already responded to the third.
[Tenth, between willing from the necessity of nature and freely willing.]
§ 276. (X) God wills some things from the necessity of nature and some things freely. He wills from the necessity of nature whatever He wills concerning Himself, moved by nothing either within or without Himself. In this way He wills Himself, His goodness, and His glory. He wills freely whatever He wills concerning His creatures according to the good pleasure of His will, things He could both will and not will. He wills these without any necessity, except for the hypothetical necessity that is proper to immutability. Thomas, Contra gent., bk. 1, c. 83: “God wills whatever He wills not by necessity. But given that He wills something, it is necessary, because God’s will is immutable.”
Antithesis.
§ 277. This orthodoxy is undermined by: (I) Vorstius: (1) When he asserts that “there is something in God that is not God, because the essence of God is simply and absolutely necessary, but His decrees are free and contingent” (Apol. exeg., c. 10, p. 41). p. 42: “Unless a true and real distinction between the essence and will of God is established in God Himself, God is left with no freedom of choice.” In his book De attrib. div., p. 207, he writes: “The decrees of God are accidents quite diverse from His substance.”
We respond. The act of will by which God freely decides anything regarding creatures is considered in two ways: absolutely and relatively, internally and externally, with respect to its beginning and effect. Considered in the first way, it is the very essence of God, for as God’s knowledge is the very essence of God (because God knows through Himself), so God’s will is the very essence of God (because God wills through Himself). Considered in the latter way, the act of His will is distinguished with respect to its diverse objects without any change or multiplication of the divine essence.
The decrees of God are considered: (a) Objectively, and in this way they are various and many because their objects are various. (b) Actively, and in this way they are not many and various because the decreeing will or substantial deciding act in God is not many but one.
The Scholastics say that three things in a free decree of God must be observed: (a) The essence of God as signified by the mode of vital action,69 which is simply necessary and is necessarily terminated in the uncreated goodness of God. (b) The termination of that essence upon creatures that are to be produced and governed, which is simply free. (c) The relation of reason70 resulting from that determination, which is partly necessary and partly free, for it results necessarily, given the determination. Nevertheless it has the capability of not resulting if the determination does not precede.
(2) Vorstius denies in his treatise De Deo that God’s decrees are simply eternal: “The free decrees of God were produced before the creation of the world” (p. 27). p. 207: “These same decrees are not simply eternal.” He provides this rational argument: “Every free cause precedes its effect in the order of time or of duration. For the free action of the will necessarily presupposes a deliberation in the intellect, for whoever freely decides to do anything first deliberates before deciding. But God is the free cause with respect to His free decrees. Therefore He precedes His decrees in time or duration, and as a consequence, they cannot be coeternal with God.”
We respond. Vorstius is confusing the divine understanding and will with the human understanding and will. God does not understand successively nor will deliberatively. Rather, He understands and wills with one utterly simple and undivided act of intellect and will without reasoning and deliberating. Consequently, He does not produce within Himself new actions of intellect and will as do humans and angels, actions that would be accidents distinct from His essence. Rather, the act of intellect and will is the very essence of God. Therefore it is false to say that every free cause precedes its effect in the order of time or of duration if this is applied to the eternal and infinite cause, because eternity and infinity exclude every succession of time and duration. Therefore to think that a free eternal cause precedes its immanent effects in the order of time is to claim a succession of time in eternity and in this way to deny the definition of eternity. And what of the fact that Vorstius himself writes (p. 66): “It is certain that a decree of God to arrange all things toward their end and to bring about good things while permitting evil ones was made already from eternity and remains the same forever. In this sense it is certain that such a decree never finds a beginning nor an end”? But if that decree could be simultaneously free and eternal, why should it not be possible to say the same thing about the rest of His decrees to the extent that they are considered as they exist in God Himself?
(3) He claims that the decrees of God are changeable. In his treatise De Deo (p. 112), he writes: “God’s will is the principle of a mutability in God.” p. 65: “God actually wills some things in time that He previously did not will.” However, this conflicts with the immutability of the divine essence, which we confirmed earlier. For because God wills through His own essence, if changeability is established in God’s will, a mutability shall also be established in God’s essence. The will or decree of God considered in and according to itself does not change, though the object or thing that is decided may change.
§ 278. (II) The Calvinists, who set the freedom to act, or God’s free will, against the rest of the divine attributes. That is, because of His freedom to act, they attribute to God the sort of things that conflict with His goodness, righteousness, and wisdom. They say, for example, that “God drives people to sin,” that “God has made an absolute decree of reprobation,” etc. But if we say that this conflicts with the righteousness and holiness of God, they flee for refuge to the idea that “God is a an utterly free agent and is subject to no laws.” Yet God acts freely in such a way that He still does not act contrary to His own natural righteousness and goodness.
Questions about the will of God.
§ 279. (I) The question arises: Does the divine will behave in the same way toward all its objects? The object of God’s will is good, but there are two “goods”: the uncreated, which is God Himself, and the created, which are His creatures. The divine will does not behave in the same way concerning these two objects, for God wills Himself as the end and His creatures as means. (See Prov. 16:4.) He wills Himself necessarily with the necessity of nature because He is the highest good. (They claim that necessity both as it concerns specification—for because God is the greatest good, He cannot hate Himself—and as it concerns its exercise—because He cannot cease from this act.) But He freely wills all other things.
Consequently, the will of God is borne to its own object either according to the mode of nature or according to the mode of freedom. According to the mode of nature, it extends to its first object, which is proper and exactly suited to nature. According to the mode of freedom, it extends to all other things. Nevertheless here they distinguish between two considerations of created goodness: (1) As regards possible being, and in this way it is loved by God necessarily with the love of simple complacency. (2) As regards actual being, and in this way it is loved freely with His effectual will.
§ 280. (II) The question arises: Does the immutability of the divine will conflict with its freedom? It seems so to Vorstius, because immutability is a necessity that seems to conflict with freedom. However, he is in error, for neither type of immutability—neither a priori nor a posteriori immutability—conflicts with freedom of the will. God immutably wills Himself as the highest good with an a priori immutability, and He wills good in creatures immutably with an a posteriori immutability. For it was not simply necessary that this good be in creatures or that creatures exist, but it was necessary with the necessity of hypothesis, that is, presupposing the will of God, who decides that good for His creatures. This immutability does not conflict with freedom because it is not an extrinsic and violent necessity but a natural, intrinsic, and utterly voluntary one, which is not an imperfection but the highest perfection. In this way the angels, after their confirmation in good, and the blessed in eternal life unchangeably will the good. Yet they will the good freely. It is a far more perfect freedom to be unable to will evil than to be able to will good and evil.
§ 281. (III) The question arises: Is evil an object of the divine will? One must distinguish between the evil of punishment and the evil of fault. God wills the evil of punishment, that is, the punishment for sin, in the order of justice. However, that is properly and of itself not evil, because it is the work of divine justice punishing sins, and thus it is opposed to evil. Amos 3:6: “Will there be evil in a city that God has not caused?” God does not will the evil of fault, to the extent that it is such, because that is opposed to His righteousness and goodness. Ps. 5:[4]: “You are not a God who wills iniquity.”
(Dionysius, De div. nom., c. 4: “No one acts aiming at evil.” Thomas, [ST,] part 1, q. 19, art. 9: “It is impossible for a power to be carried, of itself and formally, to that which is opposed to the formal of its own object. But evil as evil is opposed to the formal consideration [ratio] of whatever object and to every appetitive power, and thus also to the divine will.” Therefore.)
I say “to the extent that it is such,” that is, as the evil of fault is considered formally, because it can also be considered materially or subjectively and consequently. The material or subject of sin is good, namely, the nature of man with respect to original sin or the action of man with respect to actual sin, for no evil exists except in a good. God sustains this subject of sin lest it be reduced to nothing, not because He delights in evil but so that the rational creature may be converted from evil to good in this life and so that it may become satisfactory to the righteousness of God in the next life. The consequence of sin is good (which God knows how to elicit from sin) and punishment (by which God punishes sin in the stubbornly wicked). God wills this good, but nevertheless He does not, for this reason, will the sin itself, because between sin as the means and that good as the end there is no essential link. And that good should not be attributed to sin but only to divine goodness.
§ 282. (IV) The question arises: Do all things occur necessarily because of the immutability of the divine will? We respond. God wills some things absolutely and some things conditionally. The things that God wills absolutely occur by necessity, but what He wills conditionally does not happen unless the condition is fulfilled. Therefore God’s will does not exclude man’s freedom of choice in external matters, because it does not exclude the lesser causes but includes them (among which is also freedom of choice), nor does it predetermine human will with a physical necessity toward one part, but it leaves to human will its naturally inherent freedom and does not provide the movement of human will with an antecedent and a priori necessity. Instead, with general concurrence for acting, it grants and preserves the power to act. Thomas, [ST,] p. 1, q. 19, art. 7: “Although on His part God immutably wills all things that He wills, nevertheless He objectively wills the variability and mutability of events, just as God’s knowledge of variable and changeable matters is invariable.”
§ 283. (V) The question arises: Does God will one thing for the sake of something else, or can a cause for the divine will be given? We respond. When we say that man wills one thing for the sake of another, this manner of speaking can signify something that is related to the imperfection of man or something that pertains to his perfection. Related to imperfection: By this manner of speaking one is indicating that one act of the human will is the cause of a second act of the human will toward another object, which has some respect to the object of the first act. In fact, this happens in the same way as one act of the intellect is also said to be the cause of the next, just as agreement with the premises is said to be the cause of agreement with the conclusions. Pertaining to perfection: By that way of speaking we are signifying that man wills what he wills not rashly nor without understanding, but with a definite reason and plan. (See Gregory of Valencia, disp. 1, In Thom., q. 19, point 5.)