Chapter 99
God wish this much time to intervene? And this depends on the divine will, which is perfectly free to assign this or any other quantity to time. The same may be noted with respect to the dimensional quantity of the world. No one asks why God located the material world in such and such a place rather than higher up or lower down or in some other position; for there is no place outside the world. 1 he fact that God portioned out so much quantity to the world that no part of it would be beyond the place occupied in some other locality, depends on the divine will. However, although there was no time prior to the world and no place outside the world, we speak as if there were. Thus we say that before the world existed there was nothing except God, and that there is no body lying outside the world.
But in thus speaking of "before" and "outside," we have in mind noth ing but time and place as they exist in our imagination.
Chapter 99 Controversy on the Eternity of Matter However, even though finished products were not in existence from eternity, we might be inclined to think that matter had to exist from eternity. For everything that has being subsequent to non-being, is changed from non-being to being. Therefore if created things, such as heaven and earth and the like, did not exist from eternity, but began to be after they had not been, we must admit that they were changed from non-being to being. But all change and motion have some sort of subject; for motion is the act of a thing existing in potency.
However, the subject of the change whereby a thing is brought into existence, is not the thing itself that is produced, because this thing is the terminus of the motion, and the terminus and subject of motion are not the same. Rather, the subject of the change is that from which the thing is produced, and this is called matter. Accordingly, if things are brought into being after a state of non-being, it seems that matter had to exist prior to them. And if this matter is, in turn, produced subsequent to a period of non-existence, it had to come from some other, pre-existing matter. But infinite procession along these lines is impossible. Therefore we must eventually come to eternal matter, which was not produced subsequent to a period of non-existence.
Again, if the world began to exist after it had first not existed, then, before the world actually existed, it was either possible for the world to be or become, or it was not possible. If it was not possible for the world to be or to become, then, by equipollence, it was im possible for the world to be or to become. But if it is impossible for [70]
a thing to become, it is necessary for that thing not to become. In that case we must conclude that the world was not made. Since this conclusion is patently false, we are forced to admit that if the world began to be after it had first not been, it was possible for it to be or to become before it actually existed. Accordingly there was something in potency with regard to the becoming and being of the world. But what is thus in potency to the becoming and existence of something, is the matter of that something, as we see exemplified in the case of wood relative to a bench. Apparently, therefore, matter must have existed always, even if the world did not exist always.
As against this line of reasoning, we showed above that the very matter of the world has no existence except from God.1 Catholic faith does not admit that matter is eternal any more than it admits that the world is eternal. We have no other way of expressing the divine causality in things themselves than by saying that things produced by God beg an to exist after they had previously not existed. This way of speaking evidently and clearly brings out the truth that they have existence not of themselves, but from the eternal Author.
The arguments just reviewed do not compel us to postulate the eternity of matter, for the production of things in their totality cannot properly be called change. In no change is the subject of the change produced by the change, for the reason rightly alleged by the ob jector, namely, that the subject of change and the terminus of the change are not identical. Consequently, since the total production of things by God, which is known as creation, extends to all the reality that is found in a thing, production of this kind cannot properly verify the idea of change, even though the things created are brought into existence subsequently to non-existence. Being that succeeds to non-beiog does not suffice to constitute real change, unless we sup pose that a subject is first in a state of privation, and later under its proper form. Hence "this" is found coming after "that" in certain things in which motion or change do not really occur, as when we say that day turns into night. Accordingly, even though the world began to exist after having not existed, this is not necessarily the result of some change. In fact, it is the result of creation, which is not a true change, but is rather a certain relation of the created thing, as a being that is dependent on the Creator for its existence and that connotes succession to previous non-existence. In every change there must be something that remains the same although it undergoes alter ation in its manner of being, in the sense that at first it is under one extreme and subsequently under another. In creation this does not take place in objective reality, but only in our imagination.' That is,
1 Chap. 69.
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we imagine that one and the same thing previously did not exist, and later existed. And so creation can be called change, because it has some resemblance to change.
The second objection, too, lacks cogency. Although we can truly say that before the world was, it was possible for the world to be or to become, this possibility need not be taken to mean potentiality.
In propositions, that which signifies a certain modality of truth, or in other words, that which is neither necessary nor impossible, is said to be possible. What is possible in this sense does not involve any potentiality, as the Philosopher teaches in Book V of his Metaphysics.2
However, if anyone insists on saying that it was possible for the world to exist according to some potency, we reply that this need not mean a passive potency, but can mean active potency; and so if we say that it was possible for the world to be before it actually was, we should understand this to mean that God could have brought the world into existence before He actually produced it. Hence we are not forced to postulate that matter existed before the world. Thus
Catholic faith acknowledges nothing to be coeternal with God, and for this reason professes that He is the "Creator and Maker of all things visible and invisible."
2 Aristotle, Metaph., V, 12 (1019b 35).
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut. Translated from the Arabic by S. van den Bergh.
2 vols. London: Luzac, 1954. Introduction, vol. I, pp. ix-xxxvi. de Blic, J., "Les arguments de saint Augustin contre l'etcrnite du monde," Me langes de Science Religieuse, II (1945), 33-34.
-"A propos de 1'eternite du monde," Bulletin de Litterature Ecclesiastique,
XLVII (1946), 162-70.
Boehner, P., "On tire Production of Creatures," in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. 3 vols. New York: Benziger, 1948. Ill, 3174-86.
Chenu, M. D., Introduction a I'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin. Montreal, Paris:
Institut d'etudes medievales, 1950.
De Haes, P., "Creatio in tempore," Collectanea Mechliniensia, XXXVI (1951), 585-90.
Gierens, M., Controversia de aeternitate mundi, Textus et documenta. Series philosophica 6 Romae: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1933.
Gillon, L. B., "Thomas d'Aquin. V. Signification historique de la theologie de saint Thomas," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, XV, col. 663-72.
Gilson, E., The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. With a Catalogue of St. Thomas' Works by I. T. Eschmann, O.P. Translated by L. K.
Shook, C.S.B. New York: Random House, 1956).
_History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York: Ran dom House, 1955).
Grison, M., Problems d'origines: I'univers, les vivants, Vhomme. Paris: Letousey et Ane, 1954.
Landucci, P. C. "Si puo dimonstrare filosoficamente la temporaneita a finitezza dell' universo materiale?" Divus Thomas (Piac.), LII (1949), 340-44.
__"L'infinita dimensiva e temporale dell' universo e veramente assurda,"
Divus Thomas (Piac.), LIV (1951), 60-79.
Mondreganes, A., "De impossibilitate aeternae mundi creationis ad mentern S.
Bonaventurae," Collectanea Franciscana, V (1935), 529-70. de Munnynck, M., "Le commencement du monde," Divus Thomas (Fri.), IV (1926), 33-39.
Pelster, F., "Zur Echtheit der Concordantia dictorum Thomae und zur Datierung von De aeternitate mundi," Gregorianum, XXXVII (1956), 610-22.
Pinard, H., "Creation," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, III, col. 20342201.
Roy, L., "Note philosophique sur 1'idee de commencement dans la creation,"
Sciences Ecclesiastiques II (1949), 220-25.
Sertillanges, A. D., L'idee de creation et ses retentissements en philosophic. Paris:
Aubier, 1945.
Van Steenberghen, F., The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century.
Edinburgh: Nelson, 1955.
Vollert, C., "Creation," in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 3 vols. New
York: Benziger, 1948. Ill, 3164-73.
_"Origin and Age of the Universe Appraised by Science," Theological Studies, XVIII (1957), 137-68.
Wolfson, H. A., Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christian ity, and Islam. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1947.
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SIGER OF BRABANT
ON THE ETERNITY
OF THE WORLD
(Dr Aeternitate Mundi) Translated from the Latin With an Introduction BY
LOTTIE H. KENDZIERSKI, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy Marquette University
Translator s Introduction Siger of Brabant's treatise,1 the De Aeternitate Alundi, has been discovered in four different manuscripts.2 Manuscript A is the Paris
Nat. Latin, 16222, discovered by C. Botvin in 1878.3 Manuscript B is the Paris Nat. Latin, 16297, discovered by P. Mandonnet during his preparation of Manuscript A.4 Mandonnet published Manuscript A and added an Appendix which consisted of a short description of Manuscript B, as well as variations in the manuscripts. In a later edition of the text, Mandonnet reversed his method and published
Manuscript B with variations from Manuscript A. In the later edition, Mandonnet considered Manuscript B to be superior; Manuscript A became a report of a student.5 Manuscript C, discovered by F. Pelster in 1925, showed a marked resemblance to Manuscript A.6 This manu script is listed as the Cod. 17. Bibliothecae S. Catherinae Pisarum.
Manuscript D was discovered by F. Stegmiiller in 1931, which showed a similarity to A and C.7 Manuscripts A, C and D expressly mention
Siger as the author of the treatise, whereas Manuscript B makes no mention of the author. It is argued, however, that the doctrinal con tent and literary expression reveals such a resemblance between the four manuscripts that no one could doubt the work to be Siger's.8 de l'Academie Royale des Sciences, 1 The various Averroistic, Dominican, and Augustinian treatises on the eter nity of the world are listed in G. Sajo,
Un traite recemment de convert de Boece de Dacie De Mundi Aeterni tate (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, . . . XLV, (Belgique: 1878), 330-57.
4 P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au Xllle siecle, (1 ed., Fribourg: 1899), p. cli, n. 5; pp. 118-20.
5 P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et Taverroisme latin au Xllle siecle, II ed., Les Philosophes Beiges, VI-VII, Louvain: Editions de Plnstitut Superieur de Philosophic, 1911-1908), pp. iii-iv; 131-142. Mandonnet indi cates that P. Glorieux considered Manuscript B to be a work of God frey of Fontaine. See P. Glorieux, Un recueil scolaire de Godefroid de Fon taines. (Paris Nat. Latin, 16297), Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, III, 1931, pp. 37-53.
1951), pp. 64-65, n. 70.
2 For a summary of the discovery of the works of Siger, see F. Van Steenberghen, Les oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant Bruxelles: Aca demic Royale de Belgique, 1938), XXXIX, p. 10. See also M. Grabmann, Neuaufgef undone Werke des Siger von Brabant und Boetius von Dacien, Sitzungsberichte d e r Bayerischen Akadamie, Philos. Abeilung, 1924; Neuaufgefundene "Quaestionen" Sigers von Brabant zu den Werken des
Aristoteles, Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle, I, 6 F. Pelster, Die Bibliothek von Santa Caterina zu Pisa, eine Buchersammlung aus den Zeiten des hi. Thomas von Aquin, Xenia Thomistica III, (Rome: 1925), III, 249-80.
(Rome: 1924), I, 103-47. On the au thenticity of the text, see the Intro duction to the critical edition of W.
J. Dwyer, VOpuscule de Siger de Brabant "De Aeternitate Mundi,"
(Louvain: Editions de l'lnstitut Superieur de Philosophic, 1937), pp.
3-25.
7 F. Stegmiiller, Neugefundene Quaes tionen Siger von Brabant, Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, III, 1931, pp. 158-82.
8 Dwyer, op, cit., pp. 13-19.
3 C. Potvin, Siger de Brabant, Bulletin
Though the doctrine in the four manuscripts is the same, Manu script B is considered to be superior because of its briefness, order, and style—(revealing Siger in his definitive writing.) Manuscripts A,
C, and D, on the other hand, contain vague formulas, superfluous ex pressions, prolonged development; in addition, all those lack unity.
These manuscripts are believed to be characteristic of an oral teaching or the report of a student. A further point of difference between the manuscripts might be noted. Manuscript B is divided into three parts which form the three sections of the treatise; Manuscripts A, C, and D are divided into four parts.9
The date of the writing of Siger's treatise is not universally agreed upon by scholars. Mandonnet prefers the year 1270;10 Glorieux, who had attributed the work to Godfrey of Fontaine, prefers the year
1272.11 Pelster thinks that it could not have preceded the year 1271;12 and Dwyer's conclusion is that it was written either at the end of 1271 or the end of 1272.13 On the basis of this evidence, St. Thomas Aqui nas' treatise, the De Aeternitate Mundi, was written before Siger's; there is general agreement among scholars that St. Thomas' treatise was written between the years 1270 and 1271, during the Averroist controversy at the University of Paris.14
The De Aeternitate Muncli of Siger of Brabant is written in the style and literary structure of a Quaestio, much like the Opuscula treatises of St. Thomas, and somewhat like the Quaestiones Disputatae. nitate Mundi, and therefore it could not have been written before the year 1271.
13 Dwyer, op. cit., p. 8.
14 Mandonnet dates the treatise 1270; Grabmann and Van Steenberghen date the treatise 1271 See E. Gilson, Le Thomisme (Paris: Vrin, 1945), p. 533. The condemnation of 1270 listed 13 theses attributed to Aristotle and his commentators, one of which concerned the eternity of the world.
See Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, n. 432. The condemnation of 1270 was not effective, and Averroism was still taught at the Univer sity of Paris. In 1277, the "great" condemnation listed 219 theses taken from Aristotle, Averroes, Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, St.
Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Ba con, and certain Neoplatonists. See Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, n. 556.
9 There is no definite resolution of tire relation of the four manscripts, Dwy er, op. cit., p. 12. On the other hand.
Van Steenberghen offers a reserved conclusion: Manuscript A is the work of Siger; Manuscript B is a report of a student. See Siger de Brabant d'apres ses oeuvres inedites. I. Les oeuvres inedites, Les Philosophes Beiges, XII, (Louvain: Editions de l'lnstitut Superieur de Philosophic, 1931), p. 14, n. 3.
10 P. Mandonnet, op. cit., I, p. 114.
11 P. Glorieux, op. cit., pp. 37-53.
12 F. Pelster, Die U ebersetzungen der Aristotelischen Metaphysik in den Werken des hi. Thomas von Aquin, Gregorianum, XVII, 1936, pp. 381 ff.
Pelster notes that St. Thomas cites Book A as Book XI (1270-1271), after which date he calls it Book XII.
This change was due to a new Latin translation of the Metaphysics of Ari stotle by William of Moerbeke. Siger adopted this change in the De Aeter [77]
The authority of Aristotle is dominant in the treatise, and Averroes is also cited. The treatise is, therefore, primarily an elaboration of some points of doctrine taken chiefly from Aristotle's Metaphysics.
The main problems handled in the treatise may also be found in other works of Siger, especially in his commentaries on the Metaphysics and Physics of Aristotle.10 The De Aeternitate Mwuli of St. Thomas, on the other hand, has as its prime purpose to establish the possibility of an eternal creation. In his treatise, St. Thomas makes no refutation of Aristotle's arguments for an eternal world as upheld by Averroes and Siger of Brabant.10 St. Thomas is more concerned with disproving the Augustinian theologians at the University of Paris who professed a temporal creation.17 These Augustinian theologians are the "murmurers," of whom St. Thomas is extremely critical when he says that they speak as though wisdom originated in their own minds.18 St.
Thomas was convinced that these Augustinians were teaching Pla tonic doctrine in the name of St. Augustine.19 lf> See F. Van Steenberghen, Les Editions de l'lnstitut Superieur de Philosophic, 1948).
10 St. Thomas' treatise is not a direct attack on Siger's position since St.
Thomas wrote his treatise before Siger. Nor does Siger make mention of St. Thomas' arguments for the possibility of an eternal creation.
Siger's treatise is predominantly a reaffirmation of Aristotelian princi ples, and more especially the neces oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant, pp. 82-83, for a chronology of the works of Siger. The chief works of Siger may be found in the following editions. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et Vaverroisme de Xllle siecle, 2nd ed. This edition contains the Quaestiones de Anima Intellectiva; Tractatus de Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum; Quaestio utrurn haec sit vera: homo est animal nullo homine existente; Quaestiones Naturales. F. Van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant d'apres ses oeuvres inedites. I. Les oeuvres inedites. This edition contains the In de Generatione et Corruptione; In Libros Tres de Anima. C. Baeumker has edited sity of eternal generation. St. Thomas' criticism of the necessity of eternal generation may be found in Sum.
Theol., I, 46, 1-2; Contra Gentiles, II, 31-38; De Potentia, III, 17; Quodlibet., Ill, q. 14, a. 2; In Metaph., XII, lect. 5; In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5.
17 For example, see St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 1, pars 1, a. 1, q. 2, conch, Opera Omnia, Quaracchi, the Impossibilia in Die "Imp os sib ilia" des Siger von Brabant. Eine philosophische Streitschrift aus dem XIII Jahrhundert, Beitrage, II, 6, (Mini ster: 1898). Siger's commentary on Aristotle's Physics may be found in P. Uelhaye, Siger de Brabant, ques tions sur la physique d'Aristote, Les Philosophes Beiges, XV, (Louvain:
Editions de l'lnstitut Superieur de Philosophic, 1941.) The commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics may be found in C. A. Graiff, Siger de Bra bant, questions sur la metaphysique, Philosophes medievaux, I, (Louvain:
1902, Vol. II, p. 22; In Hexaem., VI, 4, Quaracchi, Vol. V, p. 361; Breviloquium, II, 1, 3, Tria Opuscula,
Quaracchi, 1911, p. 61.
18 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Aeternitate Mundi, in S. Thomae Aquinatis Opus cula Philosophica; ed. Marietta, n.
307, p. 108.
10 On the Franciscan and Dominican controversy and the literature writ ten in the 13th century, see P. Glorieux, Le Correctorium Corruptorii
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There are at present four different published editions of the treatise: the two editions of Mandonnet already mentioned; an edition of P. Barsotti;20 and the edition of W. J. Dwyer.21 In his edition of the treatise, Dwyer used Manuscript B in a corrected version, indi cating the errors of the copyists, and supplying at the bottom of the page the variations from Manuscripts A, C, and D. The critical edition of Dwyer was used for the English translation of Siger's De Aeternitate
Mundi.
The basic question of Siger of Brabant in the De Aeternitate Mundi, is whether the human species or any species can begin to be. Siger proposes two arguments which would lead one to conclude that every species must have a beginning. The first of these arguments is based on the fact that no species has existence except in singulars. If, there fore, any individual of some species has been created when it had not existed before, the species must be created when it had not existed before. The second argument is based on the fact that universals have no existence except in singulars, and since God created singulars, He also created universals which must therefore have had a beginning.
In his refutation of these two arguments, Siger proposes three questions which constitute the three divisions of the De Aeternitate
Mundi. (1) How is the human species caused? (2) How do universals exist in singulars? (3) Does potency precede act, or does act precede potency in duration?
The first question dealing with the way in which the human species is caused begins with the statement that the human species, according to philosophers, is made by God through generation.22 Siger then dis tinguishes between essential and accidental generation.23 Essential generation proceeds from determined and individual matter, through 18; Venetiis apud Junctas, 1562, fol.
143; Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Inco herence of the Incoherence), Disc.
I, nn. 61-63; 101-102; tr. S. Van den Bergh, (Oxford: University Press, 1954), I, 35-36; 59-60. See also Siger, In de Gen. et Corrup., 1, "Quare," Bibliotheque Thomiste, Vol.
IX, (Belgique: Kain, 1927).
20 P. Barsotti, Siger de Brabantia De Aeternitate Mundi, Series scholastica, XIII, (Munster: Aschendorff, 1933).
This edition reproduces Manuscript A with variations and corrections taken from Manuscripts B, C and D; and for the first time the four manu scripts of tire treatise are found in a critical edition.
15; ed. Van Steenberghen, I, 273; 1, 20, p. 274; I, 21, p. 275; II, 9, p.
287; In Metaph., Ill, 16; ed. Graiff, pp. 145-46; In Phijs., Ill, 6; ed. Delhaye, p .199.
23 See Averroes, In Metaph., XII, com.
8, fol. 140; com. 18, fol. 143. See also Siger, In de Gen. et Corrup., I, 16; Van Steenberghen, Vol. I, p.
273; In Metaph., Ill, 15; Graiff, p.
135; III, 16, p. 150; VII 7, p. 372.
21 Dwyer, op. cit.
22 There is no production outside of generation. See Aristotle, De Gener. et Corrup., I, 3, 317b 16; II, 9, 335a 25; De Caelo, I, 10, 2 7 9b 12; Metaph., Ill (B), 4, 999b 5; VII (Z), 8, 1033b 5; IX (©), 8, 1049b 24; Averroes, In Metaph., XII, com.
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the transmutation of a thing from non-being to being, or from priva tion to form. Species cannot be caused through an essential generation because determined matter is not applied to species.24 Though not generated essentially, the human species is generated accidentally through the generation of any individual, and not through the genera tion of only one determined individual.25 The human species is eternal and caused,26 according to philosophers, because in the individuals of the human species one is generated before the other eternally. In this way the species can be and be caused only through an individual's existing and being caused.27 To say that species was at one time non existent, would be impossible and would amount to saying that a cer tain individual began when there was no previous individual.28
The notion of time is similar to the notion of species. Aristotle says that although eveiy second is finite, in time there is a then before the then to infinity.29 On the basis of this reasoning, what is composed of things finite in quantity yet infinite in number has to be infinite.30
Siger, therefore, concludes that just as past time has to be through a 24 See Aristotle, Metaph., VII (Z), 8, 1033a 23-1033b 29. See also Siger, In Metaph., VII, 8; Graiff, pp. 37374.
See also Aristotle, De Gener. et Corrup., II, 10, 336a 28; Siger, De Nec. et Cont. Causarum; ed. Mandonnet, pp. 111-12; Impossibilia, I; ed Baeumker, p. 5; In Metaph., V, 1011; Graiff, pp. 301-305; III, 16, p.
142; In Phys., I, 37; Delhaye, p. 75; III, 6, p. 199.
25 Siger is opposing those who say that the human species is not able to have been made eternal by God unless it had been made or created in some determined or eternal individual, as the species of heaven was made eternal. Siger argues that just as man can be abstracted in thought from individual matter and from the indi vidual, so he can be abstracted in existence. Socrates is this man and he is also a man. Aristotle's example, to which Siger appeals on this point, is that generating a brass sphere generates a sphere, because a brass sphere is a sphere, Metaph., VII (Z), 8, 1033a 30-1033b 9. See Averroes, Tahafut Al-Tahafut, Disc. I, n. 21, p. 11. See also Siger, In Metaph., 27 The perpetual generation of indi viduals thus insures the eternity of species. See Averroes, In Phys., VIII, com. 46, fol. 176. See also Siger, In Metaph., Ill, 13; Graiff, p. 119.
28 To ask whether it is true that man is an animal when no man exists presupposes an impossible conclu sion because there are always men and humanity, Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: homo est animal nullo liomine existente; ed. Mandonnet, p.
69. See Aristotle, Metaph., IV (r), 2, 1003b 25: man, a man, an exist ing man are one.
Ill, 15; Gaiff, p. 136; VII, 9, p. 374.
29 Aristotle, Phys., IV, II, 219b 9; 22a 5; IV, 13, 222a-222b 8; VIII, 1, 251b 10; VIII, 8, 263b 20; VIII, 10, 266a 10. See Averroes, In Phys., VIII, com. 11, fol. 157. See also Siger, In Phys., VIII, 10; Delhaye, pp. 206208.
2(1 Since the human species is generated eternally, it cannot be caused in the sense that it can proceed directly from God. Siger is following Avicen na's principle that from unity only unity can proceed. See Avicenna, Metaph., tr. IX, c. 4, ad fin., in Metaphysica Avicenna e sive eius prima philosophia, (Venice: 1495).
30 Aristotle, Phys., Ill, 4, 203b 15; III, 6, 206a 25. See Siger, In Phys., I, 40; Delhaye, pp. 80-81.
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certain then, so also species has to be through the existence of any one of its individuals.
The second question of the De Aeternitate Mundi deals with the universal. The problem arises because of one of the two objections proposed in the beginning of the work, in which it was stated that universals have their sole existence in singulars. Siger argues that, according to Aristotle, universals in themselves exist in the mind.31
Themistus, too, says that concepts are universals which the mind col lects and stores within itself;32 and the genus is a certain concept gathered from the slight similitude of the singulars.33 On the other hand, universals are universal things or they could not be said of par ticulars, and in this sense universals are not in the mind. Siger's effort in this question will be to explain the meaning of the universal as uni versal, and the relation of the universal to particulars.
The universal as universal, and because it is a universal, is not a substance.34 The universal can be spoken of in two ways: something which is denominated universal, e.g., a man or a stone which exists universally in the nature of things, and which is not in the mind; and the intention of universality which is in the mind, and which is un derstood universally and abstractly. Man is a universal because he is known universally and abstractly from individual matter; the ab stracted comprehension of things, though a common understanding of particulars, is not a thing in itself but is in the mind because it is universal. Universals, as universals, therefore, according to Averroes, have their sole existence as intelligibles and not as being,35 and that is why Themistus says that universals are concepts.36 Further, the universal in actuality is intelligible in actuality, and the intelligible in actuality is also the intellect in actuality.37 The universal in actu18, p. 440; In Metaph., XII, 2, fob 292; VII, 24, fol. 174; VII, 43, fob 196; VIII, 6 fob 214; Tahafut AlTahafut, Disc. I, nn. 110-11, pp. 6566; Disc. Ill, n. 185, p. 111. Aristotle does not explicitly say that universals exist only in the mind, but that knowledge always refers to tire uni versal, Metaph., VII (Z), 6, 1031b 20. See also Siger, In de Anima, I, 8; ed. Van Steenberghen, Vol. I, pp.
34-37; In Phys., I, 7; Delhaye, pp.
27-28; II, 6, pp. 89-91; In Metaph., Ill, 13; Graiff, pp. 117-19; III, 15, pp. 128-34; VII, 15, pp. 379-81.
36 Themistius, Paraphrases Aristotelis, De Anima, II, 5; Spengel, II, 103, lines 9-11.
37 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4, 430a 31 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 5, 417b 23.
32 Themistius, Paraphrases Aristotelis, De Anima, II, 5; ed. L. Spengel, (Leipsig: Teubner, 1866), II, 103, lines 9-11.
33 Themistius, Paraphrases Aristotelis, De Anima, I, 1; ed. L. Spengel, II, 6, lines 14-18.
34 Aristotle, Metaph., VII (Z), 13, 1038b 9; VII, 10, 1036a 8; III (B), 6, 1003a 5. Aristotle is arguing against the Platonists who place uni versality in things.
35 Averroes, In de Anima, I, 8, in Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Mag num in Aristotelis de Anima Libros; ed. F. S. Crawford, (Cambridge:
The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), pp. 11-12; In de Anima, III, [81]
ality, therefore, need not exist before it may be known. Only the intelligible in potency precedes the understanding of it, and this is universal in potency.38 The universal is not a universal before the concept and act of understanding;39 universals, as universals, are en tirely in the mind and are generated neither essentially nor acciden tally. The nature which is understood universally is in particular things and is generated accidentally. Though universals as universals are understood universally and abstractly, there is nevertheless a conceptual unity and persistence of universals because of their ex istence in particulars, and as long as there are particulars, there is a continuous potential understanding in particulars.
In the third question of the treatise, dealing with the priority of potency and act, Siger attempts to explain Aristotle's treatment of the problem.40 In line with the reasoning of Aristotle, the priority of potency and act in the order of generation and in the order of time is resolved in the following way. Potency is prior to act in generation, because generation proceeds from potency to act and from the im perfect to the perfect. Thus, in considering something numerically the same which has existence at some time in potency and sometimes in act, potency precedes act. Act precedes potency in time, however, because before the being in potency there is another of the same species in act, educing it from potency to act. When act and potency are referred to species, both are eternal;41 neither simply precedes the other in time, but one comes before the other to infinity, e.g., man is always in act and is always able to be man.42 Thus, according to Aris totle, the prime mover and prime matter are eternal; just as God always exists, so does the potential man since he is regarded as in prime matter.43 Siger's conclusion is in line with the reasoning of Aristotle and Averroes. The universe of caused being must be eternal.44
4; a 22; III, 7, 431b 17; Averroes, In de Anima, III, 15; ed. Crawford, p. 434; III, 36, p. 480; Siger, In de Anima, III, 4; Van Steenberghen, p.
In Metaph., Ill, 27; Graiff, pp. 17881.
41 The eternity of act and species was treated by Siger in his answer to the first question. See Aristotle, Metaph.,
VII (Z), 8, 1033b 16; IX (©), 8,
128.
38 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4, 429a 12; a 22; III 5, 430a 1; a 20; Averroes, In de Anima, III 5; Crawford, pp.
387-88; Siger, In de Anima, III, 5; Van Steenberghen, pp. 128-29.
30 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5, 429a 24; Averroes, In de Anima, III, 5; Craw ford, pp. 387-88; III, 14, p. 429; III, 18, p. 437; Siger, In de Anima, III, 18-19; Van Steenberghen, pp.
1050b 1. Siger, In Metaph., VII, 8-9; Graiff, pp. 373-74. The eternity of potency refers to prime matter. See Aristotle, Phtjs., 1, 5, 188a 18; 1, 9, 192a 25-33; Metaph., VII (Z)), 3, 1029a 20-25.
42 See p. 80, n. 29.
43 Aristotle, Metaph., IX (©), 8, 1049b 24.
44 Aristotle, Phys., I, 8, 191b 12; Aver roes, Tahafut Al-Tahafut, nn. 99, 104149-51.
40 For Aristotle's position, see Metaph., IX (©), 8, 1049b ff. See also Siger, 105, pp. 58, 61-62.
If the universe of caused being were not at some time, then potency would precede act, which is impossible. Further, if everything were in potency, and there were no being in act, all being would be in potency, and matter of itself would come into act; which is also im possible. Aristotle, therefore, had to explain the order of generation by appealing to prime movers as causes of the species of things which are educed from potency to act by them.45
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Father Gerard Smith, S.J., and Dr. John O. Riedl for their encouragement and in spiration throughout the years. I am also grateful to Dr. James H.
Robb for his careful checking of the manuscript and for many helpful suggestions. To Miss Astrid Richie, formerly of Marquette University,
I am indebted for her assistance in the preparation of this text.
45 See Aristotle, Metapli., XII (a), 6, Siger, In Metaph., Ill, 27; Graiff, 1071b 3-1072a 18; Averroes, In pp. 178-81.
Metaph., XII, com. 54, fol. 339; [83]
Siger of Brabant Question on the Eternity of the World The first question is whether the human species and in general the species of all individuals began to exist only by way of the propagation of generable and corruptible things when it had no previous existence whatsoever; and it seems that this is so.
That species of which any individual began to exist when it had had no previous existence at all is new and began to have existence since it universally and entirely had had no previous existence. The human species is such, and in general the species of all individuals generable and corruptible, because every individual of this type of species began to exist when it had had no previous existence. And, therefore, any species of such things is also new and began, since in all cases it had not previously existed. The major is stated thus: be cause the species does not have being nor is caused except in singu lars and in causing singulars. If, therefore, any individual of some species has been created when it had not existed before, the species of those beings will be such a kind.
Secondly, this same conclusion is also able to be reached in a different manner thus: universals, just as they do not have existence in singulars, so neither are they caused. Every being is caused by God. Therefore, if man has been caused by God, since he is some being of the world, it is necessary that he come to exist in a certain determined individual; just as the heaven and whatever else has been caused by God. Because, if man does not have an individual eternity, as has the sensible heaven according to philosophers, then the human species will have been caused by God so that it began to exist when it had not existed before.
To prove this one must consider, in the first place, how the human species was caused, and in general any other universals of generable and corruptible things; and in this way an answer should be made to the question and the aforementioned argument.
Secondly, since the foregoing argument admits that universals exist in singulars, one must seek or consider how this may be true.
Thirdly, because some species began to exist when it had surely not existed before, and because it follows that potentiality precedes act in duration, it should be seen which of these preceded the other in duration. For, this presents a difficulty within itself.
I Concerning the first, therefore, we should know that the human species has not been caused, according to philosophers, except through [84]
generation. Now, because in general the being of all things is in matter which is in potency to form, they arc made by a generation which is either essential or accidental. From this, however, that the human species has been made by God through generation, it follows that it does not proceed directly from Him. The human species, how ever, and in general the species of all things which are in matter, since it is made through generation, is not generated essentially but acci dentally. It is not generated essentially, because if any one were to study those things which are made universally, then every thing which is made is made from this determined and individual matter.
For, although arguments and knowledge are concerned with universals, yet operations are regarding singulars. Now, however, deter mined matter does not pertain to the meaning of species, and there fore is not generated essentially; and this is held by Aristotle in VII Metaphysicae.1 The same reason why form is not generated is also the reason why the composite which is species is not generated. And I call the species a composite, just as Callias in his own nature is this soul in this body, so also animal is soul in body. The common nature of form and species that they are not generated essentially is because individuated matter pertains to the consideration or reasoning of neither of the things from which generation essentially comes, through the transmutation of the thing from non-being to being, or from pri vation to form. The human species, however, although not generated essentially has nevertheless been generated accidentally, because it thus happens if man, just as he has been abstracted in thought from individual matter and from the individual, so he might be abstracted in existence. Then, just as he is not generated essentially, it might be thought that he is also not generated accidentally; but, because man in his being is this man, Socrates or Plato, then Socrates is also a man, as Aristotle says in VII Metaphysicae,2 that generating a brass sphere generates a sphere because a brass sphere is a sphere. And since just as Socrates is a man, so is Plato, and so with the others. Hence it is that man is generated through the generation of any individual, and not only of one determined individual.
Now, from the explanation it is clear in what way the human species is considered by philosophers eternal and caused. For, it is not to be thought of as eternal and caused as if it existed abstracted from individuals. Nor is it eternally caused in the sense that it exists in an eternally caused individual, as the species of heaven or an intelligence; but rather because in the individuals of the human species
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII (Z), 8, 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII (Z), 8, 1033b 5. 1033a 30.
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one is generated before the other eternally, and the species has to be and to be caused through an individual's existing and being caused.
Hence it is that the human species always exists and that it did not begin to be after previous non-existence. For, to say that it began to be after it had not existed before is to say that there began to be a certain individual before whom no other individual of that species had existed. And since the human species has not been caused other wise than generated through the generation of individual before indi vidual, the human species or that which is called by the name of man begins to exist because universally everything generated begins to exist—begins, nevertheless, to exist when it existed and had previ ously existed. For, man begins to be through the generation of Socrates who is generated; he exists, nevertheless, through the ex istence of Plato of the previous generation. Those things are not con tradictory about the universal; just as there is nothing repugnant for a man to run and not to run. Indeed, man runs in the person of Socrates, and man does not run in the person of Plato. From the fact, nevertheless, that Socrates runs, it is not true to say that man uni versally and entirely does not run. So also, in the fact that Socrates is generated man begins to be, is not to say that man begins to be in such a way that he had not in any wise previously existed.
From the previous discourse the solution to the aforementioned argument is clear.
And first, it must be said that this argument as just stated, namely, that that species is new and began to exist when it had not previously existed, must be denied. Any individual of this kind began to be when it did not previously exist because even though it be true that no individual man began to be after not existing, yet no individual of this kind begins to be unless another one had previously existed.
Species does not have existence so much through the existence of one of its individuals as another, and so the human species does not begin to be when it had not existed before. For, to admit that the species is such is to say that not only a certain individual of it began to be when he had not been before, but any individual of it began to be when neither he nor another individual of that species had existed before.
And the given reason is similar to the reasoning by which Aristotle speculates in TV Physicorum,3 whether past time is finite. All past time whether near or remote is a certain then, and the certain then has a measured distance to the present note; therefore all past time is finite. And each of the aforementioned propositions is clear from 3 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 13, 222a 10.
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the meaning of that then which Aristotle speaks of in IV Physicorum.* 1 lie solution of this reasoning, according to Aristotle, is that although every second is finite, nevertheless since in time there is a then before the then to infinity, therefore not all past time is finite. For, what is composed of things finite in quantity yet infinite in number has to be infinite. So also, although there is no individual man but that he has begun to exist when he had not existed before, yet there is an indi vidual before the individual to infinity; it is thus that man does not begin to be when he had in no wise existed before, and neither does time. And the case is similar—just as past time has to be through a certain then, so also species have to be through the existence of any one of its individuals.
Finally, as regards the form of the reasoning as proposed in the second way, it must be said that the universal does not have existence nor is caused except in singulars; since it is also said that all being has been caused by God, it must be conceded that man also exists as a being of the world and caused by God. But, since it is brought in the discussion and inferred that man has come into existence in some determined individual, it must be said that this conclusion is in no wise to be drawn from the premises; indeed, that reasoning is a hin drance to itself. For, it is accepted in the first place, that man does not have existence except in singulars nor is caused except in singulars; and it is clear that according to this reasoning he has existence and is created through one or through another. For this reason, therefore, it must be concluded that it is reasonable that man has come into existence in some determined individual. Indeed, the human species comes and came into being accidentally by the generation of indi vidual before individual to infinity. This is not to say, however, that it (the human species) comes into existence only in some determined individual and when it had not existed before. Whence we should wonder about those arguing thus since they want to argue that the human species had begun through its being made; and yet that it was not made essentially but rather by the making of the individual, as they confess. To show their intention they ought to show that individual has not been generated before individual to infinity. This, however, they do not show but they propose one false theory, that the human species is not able to have been made eternal by God unless it had been created in some determined and eternal individual, just as the species of heaven was made eternal; and when they find no eternal being among the individuals of man, they think that they have demonstrated that the whole species began to exist when it had not been at all before.
4 Aristotle, Ibid.
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II The second question is whether universals are in particulars, and it is clear that they are not since Aristotle says in II De Anima,5 6 that universals in themselves exist in the mind. And Themistius in a similar book,0 says that concepts are similar things which are uni versals, which the mind collects and stores within itself. And the same
Themistius, in super principium De Anima,7 says that genus is a cer tain concept gathered from the slight similitude of the singulars; the concepts however are in the conceiving mind, and universals, since they are concepts, are also in the mind.
But on the other hand, universals are universal things for otherwise they might not be said of particulars; and for this reason universals are not within the mind.
Moreover, the thing itself, which is the subject for universality, the man or the stone, is not in the mind. Also, the intention of uni versality must consist in its being called and denominated universal; and hence man and stone since they are called universals, the inten tion of universality is in these. Either both, the thing and the inten tion, or neither is in the mind. Because, if man and stone in respect to the fact that they are, are not in the mind, it seems that neither are they there in respect to the fact that they are universals.
The solution. The universal, because it is a universal, is not a substance, as Aristotle states in VII Metaphysicae.8 And so this is clear. The universal, in that it is a universal, is different from any singular. If, therefore, the universal, in that it is universal, would be a substance, then it would be differing in substance from any of the singulars, and each (singular) would be a substance in act, both singular and universal; the act however, would be distinguished.
Therefore universals would be distinct substances and separated from particulars; on this account with Aristotle it amounts to the same thing to say that universals are substances as to say that they are separated from particulars. And if the universal, in that it is universal, is not a substance, then it is evident that there are two things in the uni versal, namely, the thing which is denominated universal, the man or stone, which is not in the mind, and the intention itself of uni versality, and this is in the mind; so that the universal in that it is universal does not exist except in the mind, as is evident in this way.
For, nothing is called a universal because it exists of its own nature commonly and abstractly from particulars, or by the work of the inThemistius, Paraphrases Aristotelis,
De Anima, I, 1; ed. L. Spengel, II, 6, lines 14-18.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII (Z), 13, 1038b 9.
5 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 5, 417b 23.
6 Themistius, Paraphrases Aristotelis, De Anima, II, 5; ed. L. Spengel, (Leipsig: Teubner, 1866), II, 103, lines 9-11.
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tellect in the nature of things; because if in its own nature, in its very being, it were to exist abstractly from particulars, it would not be spoken of them since it would be separated from them and we would not need an active intellect. Moreover, the active intellect does not give things any abstraction in existence from individual matter or from particulars, but gives to them an abstraction according to in tellection by producing an abstract intellection of those things. If, therefore, the man or stone are universals, it is not except that these things are known universally and abstractly from individual matter.
These things do not exist thus in the nature of things because if understood, those things, the man and the stone, do not have ex istence except in the mind. Since the abstract comprehension of these things is not in things, then those things, because they are universals, are in the mind. And this can also be seen in like cases.
A certain thing is said to be known because there is a knowledge of it and it happens that it is understood. The thing itself, however, with respect to what it is, although it be outside the mind, yet in respect to its being understood, that is, insofar as there is under standing of it, exists only in the mind. Because, if universals are uni versals, and they are understood as such, namely, abstract and com mon to particulars, then the universals as universals do not exist ex cept in the mind. And this is what Averroes says in super Ilium De
Anima 9 that universals as universals are entirely intelligibles; not as beings but as intelligibles. The intelligible, however, as intelligible, that is, insofar as there is an understanding of it, is entirely in the soul.
Thus also Themistius says that universals are concepts.10
But it must be observed that the abstract and common under standing of any nature, although it be something common, as a com mon understanding of particulars, yet is not common according to its being predicated of particulars in that it has to be abstracted from particulars; but that which is abstractly and commonly understood and of consequence is so signified, is spoken concerning particulars.
For this reason: because that very nature which is spoken of and comprehended as a general thing is in things and is therefore spoken concerning particulars. Although those things are known and under stood abstractly and commonly, they do not exist as such; therefore things of this kind are not predicated of particulars according to the ideas of genus and species.
And one must also consider that it is not necessary that the uni versal exist in actuality before it may be known because the universal
9 Averroes, Super Ilium De Anima, 10 Themistius, Paraphrases Aristotelis, cap. 3, n. 18; ed. Venetiis apud De Anima, II, 5; ed. L. Spengel, II,
Junctas, 1562, fol. 16. 103, lines 9-11.
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in actuality is intelligible in actuality. Now, it is one and the same actuality whether of the intelligible in actuality or of the intellect in actuality; just as it is one motion whether of the active or of the pas sive, although they be different. But the intelligible in potency cer tainly precedes the understanding of it; however, such a thing is not universal also except in potency, and so it is not necessary that the universal have to be universal except in potency before it is under stood.
Nevertheless, some have held the contrary in this discussion be cause the very activity of understanding precedes in the natural order the object causing that act. Now, however, the universal, in that it is universal, moves the intellect and is the object which causes the act of understanding; on this account it seems to them that the universal is not universal in that it is so understood, indeed, because the uni versal in the natural order is universal before it is so understood and is the cause of that understanding of it.
But the solution of this is that that nature by which is caused the act of the intelligible and of the intellect, which is the intellect in act, is the active intellect and also the phantasm which naturally precede that act. In what manner, however, those two concur to cause the act of understanding must be sought in super Ilium De Anima.11 But this must be said that the universal is not a universal before the concept and the act of understanding, as at least that act is of the active intellect. For, the understanding of the thing which is in the possible intellect, since it is possible as regards the subject, belongs to the active intellect as efficient. Thus the universal does not have formally that which is universal from the nature which causes the act of un derstanding. Indeed, as has been mentioned before, it is the concept and the actuality from which the universal receives its universality.
Therefore universals, in that they are universals, are entirely in the mind. On this account they are not generated by nature inasmuch as they are universals, neither essentially nor accidentally. For, the nature which is stated and understood universally is in particular things and is generated accidentally.
To the first objection it must be said that the fact that universals are universal things can be understood in two ways; either because they exist universally or because they are understood universally. Uni versals, however, are not universal things in the first manner as if they existed universally in the nature of things, for they then would not be concepts of the mind. But universals are universal things in a 11 Siger of Brabant, In III De Anima, III, 14; ed. Van Steenberglren, p.
172.
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second manner, that is, they are understood universally and abstractly; in this way universals, insofar as they are universals and since they are concepts, cannot be spoken of particulars as such. For, the idea of genus or species is not said of them, but the very nature which is thus understood as that which is itself included, is not in the mind, and is said of particulars.
In regard to another point, it must be said that things are rightly named after something which does not exist in reality. For, a thing understood is named from the understanding of it which is not in it but in the mind; and so also the universal is named from the universal and absti'act understanding of it which is not in it but in the mind.
Ill Consequently we must investigate the third question. Although act precedes potency in thought, for potentiality is defined through act, as we say the builder is able to build, potency nevertheless is prior to act in substance and in perfection in a thing which proceeds from potency to act because the things which are later in generation are, in substance and perfection, prior, since generation proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect and from potentiality to act. Act is also before potentiality in substance and perfection in the respect that potentiality and act are looked at in different ways; because eternal things are prior to corruptible things in substance and perfection. But nothing eternal, in respect that it is such a thing, is in potentiality. In cor ruptible things, however, there is an admixture of potency.
The question is whether act precedes potentiality in time, or po tentiality the act.
And it seems that the act does not precede potentiality in time be cause in eternal beings one is not before the other in time. But when the act of a certain species and the potentiality to that act are looked upon according to the species, they are both eternal. For, man is always in act and is always able to be man. Therefore the act thought of in relation to the species does not precede potentiality in time.
Moreover, in this matter in which one is to come from the other in a cycle to infinity, there is none which is first in time. But the seed is from the man and the man from the seed to infinity. Therefore, in those things the one does not precede the other in time. Just as in the case of the seed from which a man is generated there is another generating man previously existing, so also previous to that generat ing man, since he himself was generated, there must have been a seed from which he was generated.
What is first in the order of generation is first in the order of time.
But potentiality is prior to act in the order of generation since gener al]
ation proceeds from potentiality to act, and therefore it is prior in the order of time.
Moreover, there is no reason why act should precede potentiality in time except that by a power a being is made in act through some agent of its own kind existing in act. But, although from this it follows that the act of the agent precedes in time the act and perfection of the generated thing by that agent, nevertheless, it does not seem to happen that the act of the one generating precedes in time that which is in potentiality to the act of generation. Nor from this also does act simply precede potentiality in time, although some act precedes some potentiality to that act. For, just as being in potentiality comes into actuality through something of its own species in act, so also the thing existing in act in that species is generated from something existing in potentiality to the act of that species. For, just as that which is in potentiality, namely a man, is brought into act by a man in act, so also the man generating is generated from the previous seed and from a man in potency; and so in that reasoning the hen has preceded
(he egg in time and the egg the hen, as people argue.
On the other side is Aristotle in IX Metaphysicae,12 For, he holds that although what proceeds from potentiality to act is the same in number, yet potentiality precedes the act in time, nevertheless, the same being in relation to species and existing in act precedes poten tiality.
Moreover, everything existing in potentiality is brought into actu ality through something existing in act and at length is brought into the order of moving things by a mover existing completely in act who did not previously have in his power to be anything except in act.
Therefore, according to this, act is seen simply to precede potency in time.
To prove this we must first consider that something numerically the same which has existence at some time in potentiality and some time in act is able to be prior in time than it is. But because this potency is preceded by act in another, since every being in potentiality comes into actuality by that which is in some way of its species, therefore it is not proper to say simply that potentiality precedes act in time.
Secondly, one must consider that if the whole universe of caused beings were at some time not being, as certain poets, theologians, and natural philosophers claimed, Aristotle says in XII Metaphysicae,13 then potentiality would precede act simply. And also if some entire species of being, as the human species, would begin to exist when it had never existed before, just as some think they have demonstrated,
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX (©), 8, 13 Aristode, Metaphysics, XII, (a), 6, 1049b 5. 1071b 24.
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the potentiality for the actuality of that species would simply precede the act. But each of these is impossible, as is evident from the first consideration.
For, if the whole universe of beings at some time had been in potentiality, so that none of the beings would be totally in act—always an agent in act and the mover—then the beings and the world would not now be except in potentiality, and matter of itself would come into act, which is impossible. Thus Aristotle says in XII Metaphysicae,14 and so does his Commentator,15 that for things to be at rest in an infinite time and afterward to be in motion is the same as for matter to be self-moving.
From the second question it is evident that this is impossible.
For, since the prime mover and agent is always in act, and something in potency is not prior to something in act, it follows that it always moves and acts and makes anything or does anything without an intermediate movement. From this, however, that it is always moving and so acting, it follows that no species of being proceeds to actuality, but that it has proceeded before, so that the same species which were, return in a cycle; and so also opinions and laws and religions and all other things so that the lower circle around from the circling of the higher, although because of the antiquity there is no memory of the cycle of these. We say these things as the opinion of the Philosopher, although not asserting them as true. One, nevertheless, should notice that a certain species of being is able to go into act when it did not exist except in potentiality, although at another time it also was in act, as is evident. For, it happens in the heavens that a certain spec tacle and constellation appear in the heavens previously not existing, the effect of which is properly another species of being here below, which is then caused and which yet previously existed.
Thirdly, it must be considered that when it is taken that the potency to an act and the act educing that potency are of the same kind in the generator and thing generated, it is not said in so taking them that act precedes potentiality simply nor potentiality act, unless the act is taken according to the species and the proper potentiality is taken according to the individual. For, a man in act, and a certain man in act, inasmuch as he is generating, precedes in time that which is being in potency, namely, man generated. But because in this order, just as being in potency proceeds into act through something existing in act, and so act precedes any given potentiality, so also everything existing in act in this species goes from potentiality to act, and so potentiality
14 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII (a), 6, XI (12) Metaph. Arist., cap. 1, n.
1072a. 29; ed. Venetiis apud Junctas, 1562, 15 Averroes, Commentaria in Librum fol. 313.
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in this species precedes any given act. Therefore neither simply pre cedes the other in time, but one comes before the other to infinity, as was stated.
In the fourth question we must consider that in a certain order of moving and acting beings it is necessary that that thing which pro ceeds from potentiality to act come to some act that educes that poten tiality to actuality, and this act does not have to go from potentiality to act. Therefore, since every being in potentiality goes to actuality through some being of its own species in act, not all being, however, in actuality and generating proceeds from potentiality to act. Hence it is that in any given being in potentiality to some act, the act of the species in a certain way, although not entirely for the same reason, precedes that potentiality in time; not however in any given being in act does potentiality from which it proceeds to act, precede. And, therefore, the act is simply said to precede potentiality in time, as has been explained, namely, because the first mover leading into act all being in potentiality does not precede in time the being in potential ity, since the being in potentiality is regarded in the rank of prime matter. For, just as God always exists, according to Aristotle, so also does the potential man, since he is regarded as in prime matter. More over, the prime mover does not precede in time the being in potenti ality, since it is looked upon as in matter properly considered in re lation to species, as man is in the seed. For, it is never true, according to Aristotle, to say that God existed, unless potential man existed or had existed, as in the seed. But in a third manner from what has been said, act simply precedes potentiality in time because in any being in potentiality, as given in proper matter, the act of that potentiality having to educe the potency to act, precedes in time. It is not thus with any given being in act that the potentiality to that act precedes it in time, as is evident in prime movers educing to actuality all beings in potentiality. In the aforementioned we utilize, as also does
Aristotle, prime movers as species of things which are educed from potentiality to actuality by them; and unless they were the beings of a certain kind in act which do not proceed from potentiality to actu ality, the act would not simply precede the potentiality in time, as Aristotle has said in IX Metaphysicae,16 saying that act precedes po tentiality in time, adding the reason, because one act is always taken as before another up to the one which is always the prime mover.
From this the solution of the reasoning of those opposed is clear.
To the first problem, therefore, it must be said that being in po tentiality is not eternal unless when it is regarded as in prime matter.
For, when taken as in its proper matter, according to which anything 16 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX (w), 8, 1050b 3.
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is said to exist properly in potentiality, as is said in IX Metaphysicae,17 it is new, unless it were taken according to species. For, just as nothing generated is corruptible in infinite time, so also nothing generable is not generated in infinite time since the generable has been taken as in proper matter and in a position near to generation, as the Com mentator says in super linn Caeli et Mundi,18
To the second problem it must be said, as has been mentioned, that in the order of things generating existing in act which also pro ceed from potentiality to act, there is no being in act before the being in potentiality, but one there is always before the other to infinity.
Because every being in potentiality in the essential order of moving and acting beings at length comes to some being existing in act which does not go from potentiality to act; hence it is that on account of that order the act is said simply to precede that potency.
To the third problem it must be said that it is well established that in a being which is the same in number proceeding from potency to act, potency precedes act; but that, nevertheless, before the being in potency there is another of the same species in act, educing it from potency to act.
To the last problem we must say that it is truly spoken that act precedes potentiality, because all being in potentiality goes into actu ality through something existing in act. Nor do those two things which are contradictory hinder one another. In the first place, this is not so because the being in act educing that which is in potentiality into act precedes in time not only the act in the being generated, but also the potentiality proper to the actuality of the being generated be cause of the fact that not only is the act of the generated being from the one generating, but also the being in potentiality to the act of the generated being is also from the one generating, as the seed from the man. And universally, proper matters are from the prime mover educing each thing from potentiality to act. In the second place, what is opposed does not hinder, as is evident from what has been said above. Although in the order of moving beings, on the basis of which the argument is made, it is necessary to admit that before being in act, there is a being in potency from which it proceeds into act, so also before being in potency there is a being in act which educes itself from potentiality to act; nevertheless, in another order of moving things it is necessary to hold that there is a being in act which educes into act what is in potency, since the being in potency from which it is made does not precede it, as is evident.
17 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX ((-)), 8, Caelo et Mundo, cap. II, pars quarta, 1049a 7. n. 121; ed. Venetiis apud Junctas, lsAverroes, Commentaria in Lib. 1 De 1562, fol. 82.
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ST. BONAVENTURE
SELECTED TEXTS
ON THE ETERNITY
OF THE WORLD
Translated from the Latin With an Introduction BY
PAUL M. BYRNE, L.S.M., Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Marquette University
Translator s Introduction John Fidanza, who was to become St. Bonaventure, was born in 1221 in the small town of Bagnorea, near Viterbo in Italy.1 The exact date of his entry into the relatively new religious order founded by St. Francis of Assisi, the Order of Friars Minor, is uncertain. It is known that he was quite young, and the year 1238, at the age of seventeen, is most probable. It is known, however, that he was a student at Paris prior to 1245 since he studied under Alexander of Hales who died in that year.
In 1248, St. Bonaventure began his own public teaching in the ology. lie had been since 1245 a baccalaureus, teaching under the di rection of a master. The secular masters in the University of Paris were attempting at that time to exclude the new orders, the Fran ciscans and Dominicans. Thus, although Pope Alexander IV on Oct.
23, 1256 had ordered the University to receive both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas as Doctors within the University, they were not accepted as such until a year later, in October, 1257. By this time
St. Bonaventure's teaching career had ended and he had entered on a new one as Minister General of His Order. For the remainder of his life, he devoted himself chiefly to this work of administration. In 1273 he was appointed Bishop of Albano and made a Cardinal of the Church. He died July 15, 1274 while attending the Council of Lyons.
The chronology of his principal works may be conveniently divided into two periods: an early one, from 1250 to 1259, covering his teach ing career; and a later period, from 1267 to his death, a time of great controversy within the University of Paris.2 His earliest work, com posed about 1250-1255, is the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard. The Breviloquium dates from about 1255-1257. In 1257 he published the De Mysterio Trinitatis and the De Scientia Christi.
One of his best known works, the Itinerarium Mentis in Deurn was composed in 1259. During the later period, the period of controversy arising out of the spread of Averroism within the Faculty of Arts as well as out of the "innovations" of St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure gave a series of conferences or meditations at Paris. These included the Collationes de Decern Praeceptis in 1267-1268, the De Decern
Donis Spiritus Sancti, and most important of all for his position on the eternity of the world, the Collationes in Hexaemeron in 1273, a year before his death.
1 For the life and thought of St. Bona venture, see E. Gilson, La philosophie de S. Bonaventure (3rd ed.,
Paris: J. Vrin, 1953); English trans lation: The Philosophy of St. Bona venture (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938).
2 For the dating of the works listed, see Fr. Jules D'Albi, O.F.M. Cap., S. Bonaventure et les luttes doctrinales de 1267-1277 (Tamines: Duculot, 1922), pp. 60-62, pp. 145 ff.
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These two periods in the works of St. Bonaventure coincide with two different phases of the story of Aristotle in the thirteenth cen tury. Some twenty years before St. Bonaventure began to teach, the influence of Aristotle's philosophy within the University of Paris had begun to grow. In spite of various prohibitions and regulations in 1210, 1215, and 1231, the Stagirite's works in physics and metaphysics permeated everywhere and did not cease to gain ground, along with the works of the Arabian commentators.: By 1250 when St. Bonaven ture began his Commentary on the Sentences, all the works were well known to him and used by him. It has been estimated that in that Commentary, there are over one thousand references to the Aristo telian works, covering the whole range of his writings.3 4
It was, of course, also well known to the Franciscan theologian that Aristotle, in teaching the eternity of motion, taught the eternity of the world. Accordingly, as he is commenting on the second book of the Sentences, he asks the question: Has the world been produced in time or from eternity?5 In this early period it is merely a matter of another error to be refuted, and the principal opponent is Aristotle.
Seventeen years later, in 1267, the situation is quite different. The Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle had so taken hold in the Faculty of Arts that it was no longer a question of the errors of an ancient pagan philosopher, but of the very possibility of a Christian phil osophy, as Bonaventure understood it, that was at stake. In that year,
1267, St. Bonaventure pointed out, in his Collationes in Decern Praeceptis, the three philosophical errors at the heart of the Averroist con troversy: that the world is eternal, that there is one intellect for all men, and that it is impossible for a mortal to attain immortality.6 In that same work he refers to the change that had occurred since his youth: "When I was a student I heard it said that Aristotle posited the world as eternal, and when I heard the reasons and arguments to this effect, my heart began to pound and I began to think: how can this be? But now this is all so public that no hesitation (in the matter) is permitted."7 The theological reaction to this version of Aristotle had now set in, a reaction that was to lead to the condemnations of 1270 and 1277. At least one of his historians, Jules D'Albi, believes that the Franciscan theologian was the initiator of an anti-Averroist, and to some extent anti-Thomist, movement.8 sequent references to works of St.
Bonaventure are to this edition.
3 See E. Gilson, History of Christum Philosophy in the West (New York:
Random House, 1955), p. 245.
6 St. Bonaventure, Collationes in Decern Praeceptis II, 25, vol. V, p.
514.
4 Ibid., p. 686, n. 18.
5 St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Opera omnia (Quarrachi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae
^ Ibid., II, 28, vol. V, p. 515.
8 D'Albi, op. cit., pp. 139 ff.
1882- ), vol. II, p. 21. All sub [101]
While the works of Bonaventure's later period often refer in an incidental way to the error of an eternal world, the Collationes in Hexaemeron contain the most detailed and strongest attack on that error. Consequently, in considering his views on the eternity of the world, it is necessary to look first at the discussion in the Commentary on the Sentences and then note the attitude adopted in the Collationes in Uexaetneron.
The position Bonaventure attacks in the Sentences is first stated in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine that everything that begins to be begins to be by motion or change. Since the absolutely perfect, and so circular, motion of the heavens could not have preceded itself or its primum mobile, it must be eternal. Moreover, if motion comes to be, it comes to be through motion. In order to avoid an infinite regress, a motion lacking a beginning, and so eternal, must be posited.
The next statement of the Aristotelian position is in terms of time.
In every time there is a before and after, and an instant or moment only through that before and after. Consequently, if time began, it began in time and there would follow the absurdity that there was time before time began. Turning now from the world to God, two more arguments for the eternity of the world are given. Given an adequate and actual cause, the effect is given. But God from eternity is the adequate and actual cause of this world. Consequently, the world must be from eternity. Further, if God were to begin to pro duce the world, He would pass from rest to act and thus be subject to mutability. But to say this is to deny His absolute perfection and simplicity.
Bonaventure will not, as St. Thomas does, concede that a begin ning in time is indemonstrable. Not only does he think that his refuta tions of the Aristotelian arguments are valid, he holds that it is con tradictory to admit that a created universe may have existed from all eternity. Thus, he argues that one cannot add to the infinite; but the new day, the new month, the solar and lunar revolutions would do just that if the world's duration were infinite. Moreover, there could be no order in that duration, one revolution before another, if there were not a first revolution. Besides this, the infinite cannot be tra versed; but the world, on Aristotle's supposition, would have traversed an infinite number of revolutions. Further, since the world would not be without there being men, either there would be in an infinite time an actually infinite number of rational souls (and there can be no actually infinite number), or there has been a transmigration of souls
(which Aristotle would not admit), or there is one soul for all men (an even more grievous error). Finally, Bonaventure gives the argu ment which he seems to regard as the fundamental one. The world,
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produced by God out of nothing as an origin, has being after nonbeing, and so cannot be eternal.
From this last argument it is evident that he believes that the type of production which is creation involves a temporal product. For him, the creating of things, which he calls a supra-natural motion, involves the concreating of both natural motion and time. Since Aristotle knew only of natural motion, he did not know this. Furthermore, creation is from the divine will through the divine wisdom, which knows that eternity does not befit the mutable nature of the creature. Thus,
Bonaventure believes that rationes necessariae, arguments necessitat ing assent, may be given for what the Christian already knows by faith and revelation: In the beginning God made all things.9
Several times during his conferences on the six days of creation, the Collationes in Hexacmeron, the Minister General of the Fran ciscans refers to the error of an eternal world. In the sixth conference,
Aristotle is represented to be the leader of a group (presumably the Latin Averroists) who are likened to the angels of darkness.10 The Franciscan theologian attempts to identify the first step these men have taken on the path to darkness. He finds it in Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic Ideas, the exemplars of things in their First Cause.
From this root error spring all the others: God knows only Himself, has no knowledge of the particular, moves only as desired and loved, has no foreknowledge or providence. This leads to a fatalism which would remove all reason for penalty or glory in an afterlife. Exemplarism, divine providence, and the disposition of earthly things according to penalty or glory having been hidden away in darkness, these men suffer from a concomitant triple blindness: about the eternity of the world, the unicity of the intellect, and future happiness or punishment.
The next reference to this triple blindness of Aristotle and his followers is within a context presenting the doctrine of a divine illumination of the intellect.11 This time Bonaventure finds an excuse for Aristotle, if not for the Parisian Averroists: "On the eternity of the world, he could be excused because he understood this as a philosopher, speaking as a naturalist (physicus), saying that it could not begin to be through nature."12 The Franciscan would agree that as a naturalist this is just what Aristotle would have to say. But it is precisely this limitation in Aristotle's thought that leads him and his followers into all the errors consequent upon the denial of the Ideas.
This "excuse" is relevant to Bonaventure's conception of the re lation of Christian wisdom to Aristotle's thought. One immediately
9 St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol. 10 St. Bonaventure, C ollationes in Hex1, 46, 2c: "rationes non necessariae, aemeron VI, 2.
. . . which give rise to ridicule 11 Ibid., VII, 1-2. among unbelievers etc." 12 Loc. cit.
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thinks of that famous passage wherein the Franciscan teacher says that Aristotle knew how to speak the language of science, but Plato spoke the language of wisdom in affirming the existence of the eternal reasons or Ideas, "while both languages, namely of wisdom and science, have been given through the Holy Spirit to Augustine."13
His Franciscan spirituality coinciding with his intellectual formation in Augustinian wisdom gave to St. Bonaventure's whole thought a Christocentric bearing.14 Even as St. Augustine could, in his City of God, express his regret that the Platonists, who were so wise, could fall into so many errors because they knew nothing of the wisdom of Christ, so also St. Bonaventure finds Aristotle in error on the origin of creatures and the destiny of man for this same reason. But he seems to regard the case of Aristotle as far more desperate than that of Plato, for Aristotle philosophizes as a "naturalist," a physicus, who knows nothing of the transcendent eternal reasons, the Divine Ideas, on which all wisdom must be grounded. Little wonder, then, that the Averroists in the Faculty of Arts who were willing to forget they were
Christians while they were philosophizing according to Aristotle were being led into a darkness of errors, and among them, that the world is eternal.
The Translation The translations that follow: In II Sent, d.l, p.l, a.l, q.2, as well as passages from the Breviloquium and the Collationes in Hexaemeron, are based on the text edited by the Franciscan Fathers of Quarrachi.
The appropriate passages in the edition by Fr. Delorme15 of the other redaction of the Collationes in Hexaemeron have been compared with the text of the Opera omnia edition. It seemed, with regard to the eternity of the world, no useful purpose would be served by includ ing them, since they would be, for the most part, repetitious.
13 Sermo TV de Rebus Theologicis 1819, vol. V, p. 572. stitute, 1954), pp. 21-22.
13 S. Bonaventurae Collationes in Hex aemeron, ed. Ferdinandus Delorme, 14 Geo. Tavard, A.A., Transiency and Permanence, the Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure (St.
Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan In O.F.M. (Quarrachi: Collegi S. Bona venturae 1934).
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St. Bona venture In II Sent, d.l, p.l, a.l, q.2:
The question is: lias the world been produced in time or from eternity. That it has not been produced in time is shown:
1. By two arguments based on motion,1 the first of which is dem onstrative in the following way: Before every motion and change, there is the motion of the first moveable thing (primm mobile); but everything which begins to be begins by way of motion or change; therefore that motion (viz., of the first moveable thing) is before all that which begins to be. But that motion could not have preceded itself or its movable thing (mobile); therefore it could not possibly have a beginning. The first proposition is a basic one and its proof is as follows: It is a basic principle in philosophy2 that "in every kind the complete is prior to the incomplete of that kind"; but movement toward place is the more perfect among all the kinds of motion in asmuch as it is the motion of a complete being, and circular motion is both the swifter and the more perfect among all the kinds of local motion; but the motion of the heaven is of this kind, therefore most perfect, therefore the first. Therefore it is evident that, etc.
2. This is likewise shown by an absurdity consequent upon the alternative. Everything which comes to be comes to be through motion or change; consequently, if motion comes to be it comes to be through motion or change, and with regard to this latter motion the question is similarly raised. Therefore, either there is to be an infinite regress or a positing of some motion lacking a beginning; if the motion, then also the movable thing and, consequently, also the world.
3. Similarly, a demonstrative argument based on time is as fol lows:3 Everything which begins to be either begins to be in an instant or in time. If, therefore, the world begins to be, it does so either in an instant or in time. But before every time there is time, and time is before every instant. Consequently there is time before all those things which have begun to be. But it could not have been before the world and motion; therefore the world has not had a beginning. The first proposition is per se known. The second, namely that before every time there is time, is evident from the fact that if it is flowing, it was of necessity flowing beforehand.4 Similarly, it is evident that there
1 Aristotle, rhijs. VIII, 1, 250bll252b7; V, 1, 224a20-225bl0. De Gener. et Corrup. I, 3, 317a32319b5.
287b22.
3 Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 1, 251bl927.
^ Aristotle, Phys. IV, 11, 220a25; IV, 2 Aristotle, Pliys. VIII, 9, 265al2266al0. De Caelo II, 4, 286bl012, 221al; IV, 14, 223bl2-29; IV, 13, 222a10-12.
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is time before every instant since time is a circular measure suited to the motion and the movable thing; but every point in a circle is a beginning even as it is an end; therefore every instant of time is a beginning of the future even as it is a terminus of the past. Accord ingly, before every "now" there has been a past. It is evident, there fore, etc.
4. Again, this is shown by the absurdity consequent upon the alternative. If time is produced, it is produced either in time or in an instant; therefore in time. But in every time there is a prior and a posterior, both a past and a future. Consequently, if time has been produced in time, there has been time before every time, and this is impossible. Therefore, etc.
These are Aristotle's arguments based on the character of the world itself.
5. Besides these, there are other arguments based on the character of the producing cause. In general, these can be reduced to two, the first of which is demonstrative and the second based on the absurdity consequent upon the alternative. The first is as follows: Given an adequate and actual cause, the effect is given;5 6 7 but God from eternity has been the adequate and actual cause of this world; therefore, etc.
The major premise is per se known. The minor, namely that God is the adequate cause, is evident. Since lie needs nothing extrinsic for the creating of the world, but only the power, wisdom and goodness which have been most perfect in God from eternity, evidently He has, from eternity, been the adequate cause. That He has also been the actual cause is evident as follows: God is pure act and is Ilis own act of willing, as Aristotle says;0 and our philosophers (Sancti) say that He is His own acting. It follows, therefore, etc.
6. Also, by the absurdity of the alternative. Everything which begins to act or produce, when it was not producing beforehand, passes from rest into actJ If, therefore, God begins to produce the world, He passes from rest into act; but all such things are subject to rest and change or mutability. Therefore God is subject to rest and mutability. This, however, contradicts His absolute goodness and absolute simplicity, and, consequently, is impossible. It is to blas pheme God; and to say that the world has had a beginning amounts to the same thing.
These are arguments which the commentators and more recent men (moderniores) have added over and beyond the arguments of Aristotle; or, at least, they are reducible to these.
Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b7-22. St. Aug ustine, Confess. XI, 10, 12, PL 32, 814; De Civ. Dei XII, 17, 1, PL 41, 366.
5 Aristotle, Pliys. II, 3, 195M7-18.
6 Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 6, 1071bl819; XII, 7, 1072a21-26.
7 Aristotle, Phtjs. VIII, 1, 251al7-27; [106]
But there are arguments to the contrary, based on per sc known propositions of reason and philosophy.
!• The first of these is: It is impossible to add to the infinite.8 This is per sc evident because everything which receives an addition be comes more; "but nothing is more than infinite." If the world lacks a beginning, however, it has had an infinite duration, and conse quently there can be no addition to its duration. But this is certainly false because every day a revolution is added to a revolution; there fore, etc. If you were to say that it is infinite in past time and yet is actually finite with respect to the present, which now is, and, accord ingly, that it is in this respect, in which it is finite, that the "more" is to be found, it is pointed out to you that, to the contrary, it is in the past that the "more is to be found.9 This is an infallible truth: If the world is eternal, then the revolutions of the sun in its orbit are infinite in number. Again, there have necessarily been twelve revolutions of the moon for every one of the sun. Therefore the moon has revolved more times than the sun, and the sun an infinite number of times.
Accordingly, that which exceeds the infinite as infinite is discovered.
But this is impossible; therefore, etc.
2. The second proposition is: It is impossible for the infinite in number to be ordered. For every order flows from a principle toward a mean. Therefore, if there is no first, there is no order; but if the duration of the world or the revolutions of the heaven are infinite, they do not have a first;10 therefore they do not have an order, and one is not before another. But since this is false, it follows that they have a first. If you say that it is necessary to posit a limit (statum) to an ordered series only in the case of things ordered in a causal re lation, because among causes there is necessarily a limit,11 I ask why not in other cases. Moreover, you do not escape in this way. For there has never been a revolution of the heaven without there being a generation of animal from animal. But an animal is certainly related causally to the animal from which it is generated. If, therefore, ac cording to Aristotle and reason it is necessary to posit a limit among those things ordered in a causal relation, then in the generation of ani mals it is necessary to posit a first animal. And the world has not existed without animals; therefore, etc.
3. The third proposition is: It is impossible to traverse what is infinite.12 But if the world had no beginning, there has been an in finite number of revolutions; therefore it was impossible for it to have traversed them; therefore impossible for it to have come down to the 8 Aristotle, De Caelo I, 12, 283a9-10. 11 Aristotle, ibid.; Metaph. II, 2, 994al9 St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent. d. 1, 19. q. 1, a. 5, ad 3m and ad 4m. 12 Aristotle, Metaph. XI, 10, 1066a35.
10 Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 5, 256al7-19.
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present. If you say that they (i.e., numerically infinite revolutions) have not been traversed because there has been no first one,13 or that they well could be traversed in an infinite time, you do not escape in this way. For I shall ask you if any revolution has infinitely preceded today's revolution or none. If none, then all are finitely distant from this present one. Consequently, they are all together finite in number and so have a beginning. If some one is infinitely distant, then I ask whether the revolution immediately following it is infinitely distant.
If not, then neither is the former (infinitely) distant since there is a finite distance between the two of them. But if it (i.e., the one im mediately following) is infinitely distant, then I ask in a similar way about the third, the fourth, and so on to infinity. Therefore, one is no more distant than another from this present one, one is not before another, and so they are all simultaneous.
4. The fourth proposition is: It is impossible for the infinite to be grasped by a finite power. But if the world had no beginning, then the infinite is grasped by a finite power; therefore, etc. The proof of the major is per se evident. The minor is shown as follows. I suppose that God alone is with a power actually infinite and that all other things have limitation. Also I suppose that there has never been a motion of the heaven without there being a created spiritual sub stance who would either cause or, at least, know it. Further, I also suppose that a spiritual substance forgets nothing. If, therefore, there has been, at the same time as the heaven, any spiritual substance with finite power, there has been no revolution of the heaven which he would not know and which would have been forgotten. There fore, he is actually knowing all of them and they have been infinite in number. Accordingly, a spiritual substance with finite power is grasping simultaneously an infinite number of things. If you assert that this is not unsuitable because all the revolutions, being of the same species and in every way alike, are known by a single likeness, there is the objection that not only would he have known the rota tions, but also their effects as well, and these various and diverse effects are infinite in number. It is clear, therefore, etc.
5. The fifth proposition is: It is impossible that there be simul taneously an infinite number of things.14 But if the world is eternal and without a beginning, then there has been an infinite number of men, since it would not be without there being men—for all things are in a certain way for the sake of man15 and a man lasts only for a limited length of time. But there have been as many rational souls as 13 St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol. I, 14 Aristotle, Phys. Ill, 5, 204a20-25. q. 46, a. 2, ad 6m; In II Sent. d. 1, Metaph. XI, 10, 1066bll. q. 1, a. 5, ad 3m and ad 4m. 15 Aristotle, Phys. II, 2, 194a34-35.
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there have been men, and so an infinite number of souls. But, since they are incorruptible forms, there are as many souls as there have been; therefore an infinite number of souls exist. If this leads you to say that there has been a transmigration of souls or that there is but the one soul lor all men, the first is an error in philosophy, be cause, as Aristotle holds, "appropriate act is in its own matter." There fore, the soul, having been the perfection of one, cannot be the per fection of another, even according to Aristotle. The second position is even more erroneous, since much less is it true that there is but the one soul for all.
6. The last argument to this effect is: li is impossible for that which has being after non-being to have eternal being, because this implies a contradiction. But the world has being after non-being. Therefore it is impossible that it be eternal. That it has being after non-being is proven as follows: everything whose having of being is totally from another is produced by the latter out of nothing; but the world has its being totally from God; therefore the world is out of nothing. But not out of nothing as a matter (materialiter); therefore out of nothing as an origin (originaliter). It is evident that everything which is totally produced by something differing in essence has being out of nothing.
For what is totally produced is produced in its matter and form. But matter does not have that out of which it would be produced because it is not out of God (ex Deo). Glearly, then, it is out of nothing. The minor, viz., that the world is totally produced by God, is evident from the discussion of another question.10
Conclusion Whether positing that all things have been produced out of nothing ivould imply saying that the world is eternal or has been produced eternally.
I answer: It has to be said that to maintain that the world is eternal or eternally produced by claiming that all things have been produced out of nothing is entirely against truth and reason, as the last of the above arguments proves; and it is so against reason that I do not believe that any philosopher, however slight his understand ing, has maintained this. For such a position involves an evident con tradiction. But, with the eternity of matter presupposed, to maintain an eternal world seems reasonable and understandable, and this by way of two analogies which can be drawn. For the procession of earthly things from God is after the fashion of an imprint (vestigium).
Accordingly, if a foot and the dust in which its print were formed 10 St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
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were eternal, nothing would prevent our understanding that the foot print is co-eternal with the foot and, nevertheless, it still would be an imprint from the foot.17 If matter, or the potential principle, were in this fashion coeternal with the maker, what would keep that im print from being eternal? Rather, on the contrary, it would seem quite fitting that it should be.
Again, another reasonable analogy offers itself. For, from God the creature proceeds as a shadow, the Son as brightness. But as soon as there is light, there is immediately brightness, and immediately shadow if there should be an opaque object in its way. If, therefore, matter, as opaque, is coeternal with the maker, just as it is reasonable to posit the Son, the brightness of the Father, to be coeternal, so it seems reasonable that creatures or the world, shadow in relation to the Highest Light, is eternal. Moreover, this view is more reasonable than its contrary, viz., that matter has been eternally incomplete, without form or the divine influence, as certain philosophers have maintained. In fact, it is more reasonable to such an extent that even that outstanding philosopher, Aristotle, has fallen into this error, ac cording to the charges of our philosophers (Sancti), the exposition of the commentators, and the apparent meaning of his text.
On the other hand, modern scholars say that the Philosopher has never thought this nor did he intend to prove that the world had no beginning in any way at all, but rather that it did not begin by way of a natural motion.
Which of these interpretations is the truer one I do not know. This one thing 1 do know, that if he held that the world has not begun according to nature, he maintained what is true, and his arguments based on motion and time are conclusive. But if he thought that it has in no way begun, he has clearly erred, as has been shown above by many arguments. Moreover, in order to avoid self-contradiction, he had to maintain either that the world has not been made, or that it has not been made out of nothing. In order to avoid an actual in finity, however, he had to hold for either the corruption of the rational soul, or its unicity, or its transmigration; thus, in any case, he had to destroy its beatitude. So it is that this error has both a bad beginning and (he worst of endings.
1. To the first objection, regarding motion, viz., that there is a first among all motions and changes because there is a most perfect one, it must be granted as true with respect to natural motions and changes and there is nothing against it. But with respect to the supernatural change, through which that mobile (i.e., the heaven) has proceeded
17 St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei X, 31,
PL 41, 311-12.
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into being, it is not true. For this latter change precedes every created thing, and so precedes the primum mobile and, of course, its motion.
2. To the objection, eveiy motion passes into being through mo tion, it must be answered that motion does not pass into being through itself nor in itself, but with another and in another. And since God has, in the same instant, made the mobile and, as mover, acted upon the mobile, then He has cocreated the motion with the mobile. If, however, you were to seek further with regard to that creating, it must be said that there a limit is reached as in the very first of things. Further on, this will be made better known.18
3. To the third objection, regarding the "now" of time, it must be said that just as there is a two-fold indicating of a point in a circle, either when the circle is being made or after it has been made, and just as when it is being made there is a placing and indicating of a first point but when it already is there is no locating of a first, so also with regard to time there is a twofold acceptance of the "now." In the very production of time, there has been a first "now" before which there has been no other and which was the beginning of time in which all things are said to have been produced. But with respect to time after it has been made, it is true that it is the terminus of the past and it is in the fashion of a circle. But things have not been produced in this way in a time already complete. Thus it is clear that the Phil osopher's arguments do not at all establish this conclusion. With re gard to the statement that before every time is time, this is true in terms of dividing time from within, but not in the sense of preceding as outside time.
4. To the objection concerning time, as to when has it begun, it must be said that it began in its own beginning (principium). But the source (principium) of time is the instant or "now"; and so it began in an instant. Also, the argument: Time has not been in an instant and so has not begun in an instant does not stand because things which are successive are not in their own beginning. This same thing can be said in another way since there are two ways of speaking about time, either according to its essence or according to its being (esse). If one speaks of it according to its essence, then the "now" is the whole essence of time, and that has begun to be with the mobile thing, not in another "now" but in its own self since it has been established in the very beginning and thus it has not had another measure. If one speaks of it according to its being, then it has begun with the motion
18 St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 1, ask whether there is a creating of p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 5m. St. Bonacreating is to ask a meaningless venture's point seems to be that to question.
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of change, viz., it has not begun by way of creation, but rather through the change of the changeable, and especially of the primum mobile.
5. To the objection based on the adequacy and actuality of the cause, it must be said that the adequate cause of any effect is of two kinds, either as operative through its nature or as operative through will and reason. If operative through nature, then, as soon as it is, it produces its effect. On the other hand, if operative through ivill, even though it be adequate, it is not necessarily operative as soon as it is, since a cause of this sort is operative by way of wisdom and discernment and so takes suitability into account. Therefore, inasmuch as eternity did not befit the nature of the creature itself, it was not fitting that God should grant this most excellent of states to any thing.
Accordingly, the divine will, which operates by way of wisdom, has produced the world not from eternity but in time, since, as He has produced, so has He disposed and so has He willed. For He has willed from eternity to produce then when He has produced, just as I will now to hear Mass tomorrow. It is thus evident that the adequacy of the cause is not pertinent to this question.
Similarly with regard to actuality, it must be said that a cause can be in act in two ways, either in itself, as if I were to say: The sun shines, or in its effect (in effectu), as if I were to say: The sun illumines.
In the first way God has always been in act, since He is pure act un adulterated by the merely possible. In the other way He is not always in act, for He has not always been producing.
6. To the sixth objection: If from being non-producing He has become producing, He has changed from rest to act, it must be said that there is a type of agent in which action and production add something over and beyond the agent and producer. Such an agent is changed in some way when from non-acting it becomes acting, and in this case rest precedes operation and by operation completion is achieved. But there is another agent which is its own action, and nothing at all is added to such an agent when it produces nor does anything come to be in it which it was not beforehand. An agent of this sort neither receives completion in operating nor is it idle in non operating, nor, when from non-producing it comes to be producing, is it changed from rest to act. But such is God, even according to the philosophers, who have asserted God to be the most simple of beings.
It is evident, therefore, that their argument is a foolish one. For if He had produced things from eternity in order to avoid idleness, then He would not be, without things, the perfect good, nor consequently would He with things, since that which is most perfect is perfect by its own self. Moreover, if because of His immutability it were neces sary that things be from eternity, then lie could produce nothing new
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now. And what kind of God would He be who is now essentially in capable of anything? All these consequences imply nonsense rather than philosophy or an argumentation.
If you were to ask how this is to be understood, viz., that God acts by His own self and yet does not begin to act, the answer would have to be that, even though this cannot be fully understood because of the conjoined imagination, nevertheless it can be established by argu mentation necessitating assent; and anyone who withdraws from sense experience in order to consider the intelligibles will, to some extent perceive it. For if anyone were to ask whether an angel could make a pottery cup or throw a stone in spite of no hands, the answer would be that he could because he is capable, by his own power alone and without an organ, of what the soul is capable of with the body and its members. If, therefore, an angel, because of its simplicity and perfection, exceeds man to such an extent that he can do, without an organ as a means, that for which man necessarily requires an organ, can even do through one [power] what man is capable of only through many, how much more can God, Who is at the very limit of the whole of simplicity and perfection,19 produce all things without any means by the command of His own will which is nothing other than Himself, and thereby remain immutable in producing! In this way a man can be led to an understanding of this truth. But that man will grasp it more perfectly who can consider these two aspects of his Maker, namely that He is most perfect and most simple. Because He is most perfect, all the perfections there are are to be attributed to Him; be cause most simple, these introduce no diversity into Him, and accord ingly no change or mutability. So it is, "remaining at rest He causes all things to be moved."20
Collattones in Hexaemeron IV, 13 The sixth division is into cause and caused; and here there are many errors. For some say that the world has been from eternity. Wise men agree that something could not come to be from nothing21 and in this way be from eternity, since it is necessarily the case that, just as when a thing passes into nothing it ceases to be, so also when it comes to be from nothing it begins to be. But some seem to have posited an unoriginated matter; from this it follows that God does not make anything. For He does not make matter, since it is unoriginated.
Nor does He make form since either it comes to be from something or from nothing; not from matter since the being (essentia) of form
19 Liber cle Causis props. 20 and 21, phiae III, metr. 9, ed. A. Forti ed. O. Bardenhewer, (Freiburg ini Scuto, (London: Burns, Oates and Breisgau: Herder, 1882), pp. 182-83. Washbourne, Ltd., 1925), p. 81.
2(1 Boethius, De Consolatione Philoso21 Aristotle, Phys. I, 4, 187a29.
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cannot come from the being (essentia) of matter; and not from nothing since, as they suppose, God can make nothing from nothing. But let perish the notion that the power of God has matter as its supporting foundation.
Collationes in Ilexaemeron V, 29 And it is in this way that the Philosopher proceeds to prove the world eternal on the basis that circular local motion, because it is perfect, precedes every motion and change. But I answer: It must be said that the perfect is before the diminished when speaking of the simply perfect, but not when speaking of the perfect in a genus, as is the case with local motion.
Collationes in Ilexaemeron VI, 2-5 2. Just as it has been said of the angels, God separated the light from the darkness,22 so also it may be said of the philosophers. But what was the first step that some have taken toward darkness? It was this: although all of them have seen that the first cause is the begin ning of all things as well as their end, still they have differed from one another about an intermediary. For some have denied that the ex emplars of things are in that first cause. The leader of this group seems to have been Aristotle who at the beginning and at the end of his
Metaphysics 23 and in many other places, condemns Plato's Ideas. Ac cordingly, he says that God knows only Himself,24 does not need knowledge of any other thing, and moves as desired and loved.25
On this ground these men assert that He has no knowledge of the particular. As a consequence, Aristotle especially attacks the Ideas in his Ethics where he says that the highest good cannot be an Idea.20
His arguments do not hold, and the commentator [on the Ethics, Eustratius] has destroyed them.
3. From this error follows a further error, namely, that God does not have foreknowledge or providence since He does not have within Himself the intelligibilities (rationes) of things through which He might know them. Also they say that the only truth about the future is truth about the necessary, that truth about the contingent is not truth.27 And from this it follows that all things come to be either by chance or by the necessity of fate. Because it is impossible to come to be by chance, the Arabs introduce the necessity of fate, namely, that the sphere-moving substances are the necessary causes of all
22 St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei XI, 19,
PL 41, 332-33; XI, 33, PL 41, 346-
47.
23 Aristotle, Metaph. I, 9, 990bl0 ff.; XIII, 4, 1079a4 ff.
1075a11.
2r> Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 7, 1072a2426.
26 Aristotle, Nic. Etli. I, 6, 1096all1096b5.
24 Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 9, 1074b3327 Aristotle, De Interp. I, 9, 18bl-19b4.
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things.28 From this it follows that the truth that there is a disposition of earthly things according to penalties and glory is obscured. For if those substances unerringly move, nothing is affirmed regarding hell, nor that there is a devil. Nor, as it seems, has Aristotle ever asserted that there is a devil, and that there is a beatitude after this life. This threefold error, then, consists in hiding away within dark ness, exemplareity, divine providence and the disposition of earthly things.
4. There follows upon these a threefold blindness or mental dull ness. First, about the eternity of the world, as Aristotle seems to hold according to all the Greek doctors, such as Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory
Nazianzenus, Damascene, Basil, as well as according to all the Arabic commentators, who say that Aristotle taught this and they seem to speak his words. You will never find him saying that the world had a source or a beginning; rather he argued against Plato who alone seems to have held that time had a beginning.29 And this is in direct conflict with the light of truth.
From this follows another blindness, about the unicity of the in tellect. For if an eternal world is posited, some one of these conse quences follows necessarily: either there is an infinite number of souls since men would have been infinite in number, or the soul is perish able, or there is a transition from body to body, or the intellect is one in all men, the error attributed to Aristotle by the Commentator.30
From these two it follows that after this life there is neither hap piness nor punishment.
5. These men, therefore, have fallen into errors, nor have they been "separated from the darkness"; and such errors as these are the very worst. Nor has the abysmal pit been as yet locked up.31 This is the darkness of Egypt; for although great light might be discerned in them in knowledges prior to this, still it is entirely extinguished through the aforementioned errors. And some men, seeing that Aris totle was so outstanding in other matters and in them spoke the truth, cannot believe that he has not said what is true in these matters.
Collationes in Hexaemeron VII, 1-2 1. God saw the light, that it was good, and lie divided the light from darkness,32 etc. This text has been discussed in order to explain vision by the understanding naturally bestowed upon us. He causes
28 St. Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gent.
Ill, 87.
F. S. Crawford, (Cambridge, Mass.:
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), pp. 387-413; III, 17, pp. 43637; III, 36, pp. 495-502.
29 Aristotle, Phijs. VIII, 251bl6-28. De Caelo I, 10, 279b32-280al2.
30 Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima III, 5, ed.
31 Apoc. 11: 1 ff.
32 Gen. 1: 4.
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us to see this, that it was good, both in the order of scientific con sideration and also in that of sapiential contemplation. In the or der of scientific consideration, inasmuch as He illumines as light, namely, as the truth of things, as the truth of speech, and as the truth of conduct. In the order of sapiential contemplation, inasmuch as He illumines through the influx into the soul of a ray from the eternal light, in order that the soul may see that light in its own self as in a mirror, in the separate Intelligence as in a transmitting medium as it were (medio quodam delativo), in the eternal light as in a subject-source (in suhjecto fOntario). Also it has been said that He divided the light from darkness, because certain ones have attacked the Ideas, and as a result a threefold understanding of truth has been hidden in darkness, namely, the truth about the eternal art, the truth about divine providence, and the truth about the angelic fall, which follows if the angel would not have his perfection except through motion. From this there follows a threefold blindness, namely, about the eternity of the world, about the unicity of the intellect, and about punishment and glory.
2. The first one Aristotle seems to posit, as well as the last one since he does not place happiness in an afterlife; with regard to the middle one, the Commentator says he thought this. On the eternity of the world, he could be excused because he understood this as a philosopher, speaking as a naturalist, saying that it could not begin to be through nature. That Intelligences would have their perfection through motion, this he could have said inasmuch as they are not useless, because there is nothing useless in the very ground work of nature.33 Likewise that he placed happiness in this life may be be cause, although he thought it eternal, about that he did not interject his own view (se), perhaps because it was not a part of his treatment of the question. About the unicity of the intellect it could be said that he understood the intellect to be one by reason of the inflowing light, not by reason of itself, since it is many according to subject.
Breviloquium II, 1,1-3 1. These matters regarding the Trinity having been, in a summary fashion, grasped, some remarks now have to be made about that crea ture that is the world. What must be held in this matter is, briefly, as follows: The whole of the earthly contrivance has been produced in being in time (ex tempore) and from nothing (de nihilo) by one, sole, and highest first Principle whose power, though itself immeasur able, has disposed all things in a certain weight, number, and meas ure.34
33 Aristotle, De Caelo I, 4, 271a32-34. 34 Wis. 11: 21.
De Anim. Ill, 9, 432b21.
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2. From these points, understood in a general way, about the pro duction of things, truth is gained and error rejected. By "in time" is excluded the error of those positing an eternal world. By "from noth ing is excluded the error of those positing an eternal material prin ciple. By "by one Principle" is excluded the error of the Manichees positing a plurality of principles. By "sole and highest" is excluded the error of those positing that God has produced lower creatures through the ministry of the Intelligences. By adding "in a certain weight, number, and measure" it is pointed out that the creature is an effect of the creating Trinity under a threefold causality: efficient, by which in the creature is unity, mode, and measure; exemplar, by which there is in creature truth, species, and number; final, by which there is in the creature goodness, order, and weight. And, in deed, these are found in every creature, as a vestige of the Creator, whether they are corporeal or spiritual or composed of both.
3. The basis for understanding the aforesaid is as follows: For there to be perfect order and repose among things, all things must be reduced to one principle which indeed is first35 so that it may give repose to others and most perfect so that it may give completion to all others. The first principle through which there is repose can be one and only one. This first principle, if it produces the world, since it could not produce it out of its own self, must produce it out of nothing. And because production out of nothing posits being (esse) after non-being (non-esse) on the part of the produced and immeasur ability in producing power on the part of the producing principle, and since this belongs to God alone, it is necessary that the world as a creature be produced in time by that immeasurable power acting per se and immediately.
35 Aristotle, Metapli. II, 1 994al-19.
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