Chapter 31
St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles
BOOK II, CHAPTERS 31-38
Chapter 31 That Creatures Need Not Have Existed Always We have still to show that created things need not have existed from eternity.
If the entire created universe or any single creature necessarily exists, this necessity must arise either from the creature itself or from some other being. The necessity cannot be derived from the creature itself. For we showed above that every being must proceed from the first Being.1 But anything that does not enjoy self-existence cannot possibly derive necessary existence from itself, because what exists necessarily cannot lack existence; and thus that which of itself has necessary existence, also has of itself the impossibility of not being.
Consequently it cannot be a non-being; lienee it is a being.
If, however, the necessity in question is derived from some other being, it must come from some cause that is extrinsic, because every thing that is received within a creature owes its existence to another.
Now an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. The effect of an efficient cause exists necessarily when the agent acts necessarily, for the effect depends on the efficient cause in consequence of the agent s action. Hence, if the agent is not constrained by any necessity to the action of producing the effect, the effect does not have to follow with absolute necessity. But God is not compelled by any necessity to the action of producing creatures, as was shown above.2 Therefore, as far as the necessity that depends on an efficient cause is concerned, no creature has to exist with absolute necessity.
The same is true of the necessity that depends on a final cause.
For things that are means to an end do not acquire necessity from the end unless the end cannot be attained without them, as life can not be preserved without food, or cannot be so well attained, as in the case of a journey without a horse. But the end of the divine will, by which things were brought into existence, cannot be anything else than God's goodness, as was shown in Book I,3 and the divine good ness does not depend on creatures either for its existence, since it necessarily exists of itself, or for its well-being, since it is absolutely perfect in itself. All this has been proved above.4 Therefore no crea1 Chap. 15.
3 Chaps. 75-81.
4 Book I, chaps. 13, 28.
2 Chap. 23.
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ture's existence is absolutely necessary; consequently vve do not have to hold that some creature has always existed.
Again, nothing that proceeds from the will is absolutely necessary, unless the will happens to be impelled by necessity to will something.
But God brings creatures into existence, not by any necessity of His nature, but by His will, as we have proved;6 nor does He necessarily will creatures to be, as was shown in Book I.6 Hence it is not abso lutely necessary for any creature to be, and therefore it is not necessary that creatures should always have existed.
Furthermore, we showed above that God does not act with an action that is outside Himself;7 that is, no action of His issues forth from Him to terminate in a creature, in the way that heat issues from fire and terminates in wood. God's willing is His acting, and things are as God wishes them to be. But God is under no necessity to will that a creature should have existed always, since He does not have to will that a creature should exist at all, as was shown in Book I.8
Therefore it is not necessary for any creature to have existed always.
Besides, a thing does not proceed necessarily from a voluntary agent except by reason of some obligation. But, as was shown above,9
God is under no obligation to produce creatures, if the universal pro duction of creatures is considered absolutely. Therefore God does not produce a creature out of necessity. Consequently, although God is eternal, it is not necessary for Him to have produced any creature from eternity.
Moreover, we proved above10 that absolute necessity in created things results, not from a relationship to the first principle that is necessarily self-existent, but from a relationship to other causes that are not necessarily self-existent. But the necessity that stems from a relationship to something that is not necessarily self-existent, does not require a thing to have existed always. Thus, if something runs, it must be in motion; but it need not have been always in motion, be cause the act of running itself is not absolutely necessary. Conse quently, there is no cogent reason why creatures should have existed always.
8 Chap. 81. s Chap. 28.
'"Chap. 30.
5 Chap. 23. e Chap. 81. i Chaps. 9, 23.
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