Chapter 38
are not simultaneous, since their production involves succession. But in things that are not made by way of motion, their making does not precede their existence.
Therefore it is quite evident that nothing prevents us from main taining that the world has not always existed. And this is what the Catholic faith teaches: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth" (Genesis 1:1); and in Proverbs 8:22 it is said of God: "Before He made anything from the beginning," etc.
Chapter 38 Arguments by Which Some Endeavor to Prove that the World is not Eternal We come now to a group of arguments brought forward by certain thinkers to prove that the world has not always existed; they are drawn from the following considerations.
1. That God is the cause of all things, has been demonstrated. But a cause must precede in duration the things that are produced by its action.
2. Again, since all being has been created by God, it cannot be said to have been made from some being, and so we conclude that it was made from nothing. Consequently its existence must be subse quent to non-existence.
3. Another reason is that an infinite series cannot be crossed. But if the world has existed forever, an infinite series would by now have been crossed. For the past has been traversed, and if the world has always existed, an infinite number of days or of solar revolutions have gone by.
4. A further consequence is that an addition is made to the infinite, for new additions are daily being made to the days or solar revolu tions which have passed.
5. Still another consequence is that we are proceeding to infinity in efficient causes, in the hypothesis that generation has always taken place. This has to be admitted if the world has existed forever, for the father is the cause to his son, and another man is the cause of the father, and so on, back into the endless past.
6. Furthermore, it will follow that an infinite multitude exists, namely, the immortal souls of an infinite number of men dead and gone.
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Since these arguments do not conclude with strict necessity, al though they are not entirely devoid of probability, it is enough to touch on them briefly, so that the Catholic faith may not seem to rest on inept reasonings rather than on the unshakable basis of God's teaching. And so we deem it suitable to show how such arguments are met by those who have maintained the eternity of the world.
The first contention, that an agent necessarily precedes the effect wrought by its action, is true of causes which produce something by way of motion, because the effect is not achieved until the motion has come to a stop, whereas the agent must exist even when the mo tion begins. But in causes that act instantaneously the same conclusion need not follow. Thus, as soon as the sun reaches the point of the east, it at once lights up our hemisphere.
Also the second argument is invalid. For if the proposition, "Some thing is made from something," is not granted, the contradictory to be asserted is, "Something is not made from something," and not,
"Something is made from nothing," except in the latter sense. We cannot conclude from this that a thing comes into existence subse quent to non-existence.
Again, the third, argument lacks cogency. For, even though the infinite does not exist all at once if it is actual, it can exist succes sively; understood in this sense, any infinite is finite. Therefore, since each of the preceding revolutions was finite, it could make a full turn. But if they are all viewed as existing simultaneously, on the supposition that the world had always existed, a first revolution cannot be assigned. And so there could be no transition to the present, for transition always requires two extremes.
The fourth argument, too, is weak. There is nothing to prevent an addition to the infinite on the side on which it is finite. On the sup position that time is eternal, it must be infinite on the part of what went before, but finite on the part of what came after, for the present marks the end of the past.
The fifth objection is likewise devoid of cogency. According to philosophers, infinite procession is impossible when there is question of efficient causes that act together at the same time, because the effect would have to depend on an infinite number of co-existing actions. But, according to those who propose the theory of an end less series of generations, infinite procession is not impossible in the case of causes that do not act simultaneously. Here the infinity is accidental to the causes; whether the father of Socrates is another man's son or not, affects him only accidentally. But when a stick moves a stone, its movement by the hand that holds it is not accidental; the stick moves only to the extent that it is moved.
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The sixth objection, about souls, is more difficult. Yet the argu ment is not of much utility, as it supposes many things.47 Some advo cates of the eternity of the world have contended that human souls do not survive the body. Some have maintained that nothing remains of all the souls except a separate intellect: the agent intellect, in the opinion of some, or also the possible intellect, in the view of others.
Some have imagined a rotation in souls, saying that the same souls return to bodies after several centuries. And some hold that it is not impossible for certain things to be actually infinite in number, if there is no order among them.
A more effective procedure can be adopted in this matter if we start with the purpose of the divine will, as was suggested above.48
The end of the divine will in the production of things is the goodness of God as manifested by His effects. But the divine power and good ness are best made known by the fact that things other than God
Himself have not existed forever. The very fact that such things have not always existed shows clearly that they have their existence from Him. It also shows that God does not act by necessity of His nature, and that His power of acting is infinite. To manifest the divine good ness, therefore, it was supremely fitting that God should assign to created things a beginning of their duration.
Reflections such as these enable us to avoid various errors into which pagan philosophers fell. Some of them asserted the eternity of the world. Others held that the matter of the world is eternal, and that the world began to be fashioned from it at a certain moment, either by chance, or at the direction of some intellect, or else by attraction and repulsion. But all of them take it for granted that some thing besides God is eternal; and this is incompatible with the Catho lic faith.
47 Cf. Book II, chap. 81, in the re sponse to the third argument. The objection takes for granted that man has always inhabited the earth and that an infinite multitude of spiritual substances is impossible. St. Thomas points out that the arguments used by Aristotle to prove the impossibility of an actual infinity of material bodies do not touch the question of an infinite multitude of imma terial beings. He adds that this diffi culty cannot disturb those who pro fess the Catholic faith, since Catho lics do not admit the eternity of the world.
48 Chap. 35.
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St. Thomas Aquinas On the Power of God (De Potentia Dei) Question 3, Article 17 Whether the World Has Existed Forever The seventeenth inquiry is whether the world has existed forever.
The answer would seemingly be affirmative, for the following reasons.
1. A thing always achieves what is proper to it. But, as Dionysius points out, it is proper to God to summon beings which exist to a share in the divine goodness;1 and this is accomplished by producing creatures. Since, therefore, the divine goodness has always existed, God has apparently always brought creatures into being; and so we may conclude that the world has existed forever.
2. God does not withhold from any creature what is within its capacity in accordance with its nature. But there are some creatures with a nature capable of having always existed, as, for example, heaven. Therefore heaven seems to have received the gift of eternal existence. And if we grant that heaven existed, we ought also to grant that other creatures existed, as the Philosopher shows in Book II of De caelo et mundo.2 Therefore it seems that the world has always existed. Proof of the minor: Whatever is incorruptible has the power of existing forever; for if it had the power of existing for a limited time only, it could not exist forever, and hence it would not be in corruptible. However, heaven is incorruptible. Therefore it is capable by nature of existing always.
3. But someone may object that heaven is not absolutely incor ruptible, for it would drop back into nothingness if it were not sus tained in being by God's power. To this objection the reply may be made that a thing is not to be judged possible or contingent on the ground that its destruction results from the removal of some conse quent fact; thus, although man is necessarily an animal, his destruc tion ensues upon the removal of the consequent fact that man is a substance. Therefore we ought not to conclude that heaven is cor ruptible merely because it would cease to exist on the supposition that God were to withdraw His sustaining influence from creatures.
4. As Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics, every effect is necessary in relationship to its cause.3 For if, given the cause, the effect does not 1 De caelesti hierarchia, cap. 4 (PG 2 Aristotle, De caelo, II, 3 (286a 10-b
3, 177). 9). s Metaph., I, 7 (73 ra).
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necessarily follow, it will be possible for the effect to follow or not to follow even when the cause is present. But what is in potentiality is not reduced to act except by something actual; hence, in addition to the aforesaid cause, some other cause will be needed to render the effect actual from the state of potentiality in which, even in the pres ence of the cause, it had the possibility of existing or of not existing.
From this we can gather that when there is a sufficient cause, the effect must necessarily follow. But God is a sufficient cause of the world. Therefore, since God has always existed, the world, too, has always existed.
5. Whatever precedes time is eternal; aeviternity, however, does not precede time, but began along with time. But the world did pre cede time, since it was created in the first instant of time, and that first instant certainly preceded time; for we are told in Genesis 1:1:
"In the beginning God created heaven and earth," that is, in the be ginning of time. Therefore the world existed from eternity.
6. As long as anything remains one and the same, it always pro duces the same effect, unless it is hindered. But God always remains one and the same, as we read in Psalm 101:28: "Thou art always the selfsame." Accordingly, since He cannot be hindered in His action, because His power is infinite, we should conclude that He always produces the same effect. And therefore, since He produced the world at some time, He apparently has always produced it, from eternity.
7. just as man necessarily desires his own beatitude, so God neces sarily wills His own goodness and all that pertains to it. But the production of creatures pertains to the divine goodness. Therefore this is something which God necessarily wills; and so, as He has willed
Plis own goodness from eternity, it seems that He has also willed to produce creatures from eternity.
8. The objection may be raised that it does, indeed, pertain to God's goodness to bring creatures into existence, but not to do so from eternity. The answer to this is that the bestowal of a gift early rather than later on, evinces greater generosity, and the generosity of the divine goodness is infinite. Therefore God has seemingly en dowed creatures with existence from eternity.
9. Augustine says that a person wills what he does, if he is able to.4 But from eternity God willed to produce the world; otherwise He would have undergone some change, if a new act of willing to create the world had occurred in Him. Therefore, since no powerlessness can be attributed to Him, He apparently produced the world from eternity.
>Cf. Confessions, VIII, 9 (PL 32, 759).
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10. If the world has not always existed, then, before it existed, its existence was either possible or not. If its existence was not possible, then it was impossible, and so its non-existence was necessary; hence it would never have been brought into existence. And if its existence was possible, then there was some potentiality with regard to it, and so there was some substratum or matter, since potentiality requires a subject. But if there was matter, there was also form, since matter cannot be completely devoid of form. Therefore some body composed of matter and form, and consequently the entire universe, was in existence.
11. Whatever becomes actual after it has been possible, is educed from potentiality to actuality. If, therefore, the world was possible before it was brought into existence, we must say that it was educed from potentiality to actuality, and hence that matter preceded it and was eternal; thus we come to the same conclusion as before.
12. Every agent that begins to act anew, passes from potentiality to actuality. But such a process cannot be attributed to God, since
He is absolutely changeless. Therefore it seems that He did not begin to act anew, but produced the world from eternity.
13. If a voluntary agent begins to do what he previously willed but did not carry out before, we must suppose that some incentive now induces him to act though it did not induce him previously; such an incentive somehow arouses him to action. But we cannot say that prior to the world there was something beside God which presented
Him with a fresh inducement to activity. Since, therefore, He willed to make the world from eternity (otherwise His will would have been subject to some new influence), He apparently did make it from eternity.
14. Nothing moves God's will to act except the divine goodness.
But the divine goodness is ever in the same disposition. Therefore God's will also is ever disposed to produce creatures; and so He pro duced them from eternity.
15. That which is always in its beginning and its end, never begins and never ceases, because a thing exists after it has begun and before it has ceased. But time is always in its beginning and its end, since time is nothing but an instant, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time never begins and never ends, but exists forever. Gonsequently, movement and whatever is subject to movement and so also the entire world exist forever; for there is no time apart from movement, or movement apart from things subject to movement, or things subject to movement apart from the world.
16. Here an objector may say that the first instant of time is not the end of the past, and that the last instant is not the beginning of [47]
the future. Opposed to this, however, is the fact that the now of time is always regarded as flowing, and that in this respect it differs from the now of eternity. But whatever flows, proceeds from one point to another. Therefore every now must flow from a previous note to a later one. Consequently any first or last now is impossible.
17. Motion follows that which is movable, and time follows motion.
But since the first movable body is circular, it has neither beginning nor end, because neither an actual beginning nor an actual end can be designated in a circle. Therefore neither motion nor time has a beginning; and so we have the same conclusion as above.
18. Someone may argue that, although a circular body has no be ginning of its magnitude, it has a beginning of its duration. On the contrary, however, the duration of motion follows the measure of magnitude, because, according to the Philosopher, motion and time are in proportion to size.5 Therefore, if there is no beginning of a circular body's magnitude, there will be no beginning in the magni tude of its motion and time, and consequently there will be no begin ning of their duration, since their duration, and especially that of time, is their magnitude.
19. God is the cause of things by His knowledge. But knowledge is predicated in relation to what is knowable. Accordingly, since rela tives are by nature simultaneous, and God's knowledge is eternal, it seems that things have been produced by Him from eternity.
20. God precedes the world only in the order of nature, or also in the order of duration. If only in the order of nature, in the way a cause precedes its simultaneous effect, it seems that, since God has existed from eternity, creatures, too, have existed from eternity. And if God precedes the world in duration, we must admit, prior to the duration of the world, some duration which is related to that of the world as before and after. But duration in which before and after are discerned, is what we mean by time. Therefore the world was pre ceded by time, and consequently by motion and movable bodies; and thus we are brought to the same conclusion as before.
21. Augustine states: "I refuse to admit that God was not Lord from eternity."6 But as long as He was Lord, He had some creature for His subject. Therefore we should not assert that no creature existed from eternity.
22. God could have produced the world before He did produce it, as otherwise He would have been deficient in power. He also knew how to produce it earlier, as otherwise He would have been wanting in knowledge. Seemingly He also willed to create it, as otherwise
5 Aristotle, Physics, TV, 11 (219a 126 De Trinitate, V, 16 (PL 42, 922).
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He would have been subject to envy. Therefore He could hardly have delayed before undertaking to produce creatures.
23. Any finite perfection can be communicated to a creature. But eternity is something finite; otherwise nothing could extend beyond eternity. Yet Exodus 15:18 has this statement: "The Lord shall reign unto eternity and beyond"7 Hence we may infer that a creature is capable of eternal existence; and thus it was fitting that the divine goodness should have produced creatures from eternity.
24. Everything that begins to exist, has a measure of its duration.
But time cannot have any measure of its duration; it is not measured by eternity, since in that case it would always have existed; nor by aeviternity, as then it would endure forever; nor by time, because nothing is its own measure. Therefore time has no beginning, and the same is true of movable things and of the world.
25. If time had a beginning, it began either in time or in an instant. It did not begin in an instant, because in an instant there is as yet no time. And it did not begin in time, because in that sup position no time would exist before a definite point in time, since before a thing begins to exist it is nothing. Therefore time had no beginning; and again we come to the same conclusion as before.
26. God was the cause of things from eternity; otherwise we should have to say that He was a potential cause before being an actual cause, and so something already in existence would arouse
Him from potentiality to act; which is impossible. But there is no cause without an effect. Therefore the world was created by God from eternity.
27. Truth and being are convertible. But many truths are eternal, as, for example, that man is not an ass, that the world was to be, and a host of similar truths. It seems, therefore, that not God alone, but many beings exist from eternity.
28. Against this, someone may argue that all such things are true by reason of the first truth, which is God. On the contrary, however, the truth of this proposition: "The world is to be," differs from the truth of this one: "Man is not an ass," because even though we make the impossible supposition that one of them is false, the other will still be true. But the first truth does not tolerate alteration. There fore the propositions in question are not true by reason of the first truth.
29. According to the Philosopher, a statement is true or false from the fact that the thing referred to is as it is asserted to be or not.8
7 Thus the Vulgate: "Dominus regnabit for ever and ever." in aeternum et ultra." The Douay 8 Aristotle, Categories, 5 (4b 8). version has: "The Lord shall reign [49]
Therefore, if many propositions are true from eternity, the things sig nified by them have apparently existed from eternity.
30. With God, to speak is the same as to accomplish, as is brought out by Psalm 148:5: "He spoke, and they were made." But God's ut terance is eternal; otherwise the Son, who is the Fathers Word, would not be co-eternal with the Father. Therefore, also, Gods act of making is eternal, and so the world was made from eternity.
But on the contrary: 1. In Proverbs 8:24 ff., divine Wisdom is thus represented as speaking: "The depths were not as yet, and I was al ready conceived; neither had the fountains of waters as yet sprung out; the mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been estab lished; before the hills I was brought forth. He had not yet made the earth nor the rivers nor the poles of the world." Therefore the poles of the world and the rivers and the earth did not always exist.
2. According to Priscian,9 the younger in age people are, the keener is their intellectual perception. But such intellectual keenness is not infinite. Therefore the time during which it increased was not infinite, and consequently neither is the world.
3. In Job 14:19 we are told: "With inundation the ground by little and little is washed away." But the earth is not infinite. If, therefore, time had been infinite, the earth would by now have been entirely washed away; and this is evidently false.
4. As is clear, God is prior to the world by nature, in the way that a cause is prior to its effect. But duration and nature are identical in God. Therefore God is prior to the world in duration, and so the world has not existed forever.
I ANSWER THAT we must hold firmly that the world has not always existed, as the Catholic faith teaches. And this truth cannot be effectively attacked by any demonstration based on physics. To make this clear, we must understand, as was brought out in a previous question,10 that in God's activity we cannot assign any necessity on the part of the material cause, or on the part of the active power of the agent, or on the part of the last end, but only on the part of the form which is the end of the operation; for if a form is presupposed, things must necessarily exist in such a way as to be fit for that form.
And therefore we must speak of the production of one particular creature otherwise than of the creation of the whole universe by God.
For, when we speak of the production of some particular creature, we can assign the reason why it is such as it is from a consideration of some other creature, or at least from the order of the universe, to Priscian was a Neoplatonic philoso pher who flourished toward the end of the sixth century A.D. Among the few of his works that have come down to us is the Commentarium in Tractatum theophrasticum de sensatione.
10 Art. 16.
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which every creature is subordinated as a part to the form of the whole. Rut when we speak of the entire universe that is brought into being, we cannot discover any other creature from which we may gather the reason why it is such or such. Accordingly, since a reason for the definite disposition of the universe cannot be discerned either on the part of the divine power, which is infinite, or on the part of the divine goodness, which has no need of created things, the reason for it must be found in the sheer will of the Creator. Hence, if the question should be asked, why the heaven is of such and such a size and not greater, no other reason can be given than that the Creator so willed it.
And because of this consideration, too, as Rabbi Moses says, Sacred Scripture induces men to contemplate the heavenly bodies;11 their arrangement most clearly shows that all things are subject to the Creator's will and providence. For no reason can be assigned to ac count for the great distance of this star from that one, or for any other phenomena that may be observed in the disposition of the heavens, except the design of God's wisdom. Thus we are exhorted in Isaiah 40:26: "Lift up your eyes on high and see who hath created these things."
This position is not overturned by the contention that a particular quantity is governed by the nature of heaven or of heavenly bodies, on the ground that all existing things have a definite quantity by nature. For, just as the divine power is not restiicted to one quantity rather than to another, so it is not restricted to a nature requiring a particular quantity rather than to a nature requiring a different quan tity. And so the same question recurs with respect to nature as to quantity, even though we should grant that the nature of heaven is not wholly indifferent to quantity, or that it has no capacity for any other than its present quantity.
Rut the same cannot be said of time or of the duration of time.
For time, like place, is extraneous to a thing. Consequently even heaven, which has no capacity for a different quantity or a different accident intrinsically inhering, has such capacity with regard to place and position, since it has local motion; and also with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, just as there is succession in movement and locality [ubi]. Hence neither time nor locality can be said to result from the nature of heaven, as was stipulated in the case of quantity.
Thus it is clear that the prefixing of a definite quantity of duration for the universe, as also of a definite quantity of dimension, depends on the mere will of God. Accordingly we cannot arrive at any nec11 Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, II, 19 (p. 187 f.).
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essary conclusion about the duration of the universe, so as to be able to prove demonstratively that the world has existed forever.
Some thinkers, however, inevitably fell into error concerning the beginning of the world, because they failed to consider the creation of the universe by God. Thus the earliest naturalists, oblivious of ef ficient causality, admitted nothing but uncreated matter as the cause of all things; in consequence they had to maintain that matter has always existed. For, since nothing raises itself from non-existence to existence, anything that begins to exist must be caused by something else. And these philosophers asserted that the world has always ex isted continually, because they recognized only natural agents which were confined to one mode of action, so that the same effect had to follow invariably. Or else they held that the world had an interrupted existence; thus Democritus taught that the world, or rather worlds, had been formed and destroyed over and over again by chance, as a result of the haphazard movements of atoms.
However, it was judged impossible that all the conveniences and utilities existing in nature should be the product of chance, since they are found in all or at least in the majority of cases; still, such a con clusion would necessarily follow if nothing but matter were ac knowledged, especially since some effects are observed which are not sufficiently explained by appealing to the causality of matter. There fore other philosophers postulated an efficient cause, which, according to Anaxagoras, was intelligence,12 or, according to Empedocles, was love and strife.13 Nevertheless they did not regard such agents as ef ficient causes of the universe, but rather likened them to other par ticular agents that act on matter by transforming it from one thing into another. Hence they were forced to hold that matter is eternal, as lacking a cause of its existence. Yet they taught that the world had a beginning, on the score that every effect of a cause which acts by motion follows its cause in duration, since such an effect does not exist until the motion has come to an end; and this end is preceded by the beginning of the movement, with which the agent initiating the move ment has to be simultaneous.
On the other hand, Aristotle taught that the world has always existed; for he reflected that, if the efficient cause of the world were held to act by motion, an indefinite recession would ensue, since every movement must be preceded by another movement.14 His argument did not proceed from the consideration which regards the universe as taking its origin from God, but from the consideration that an 12 Cf. Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 1 (250b 14 This is an Aristotelian argument, as 24). reported by Maimonides, Guide for 13 Cf. Aristotle, Phy., VIII, 1 (250b the Perplexed, II, 14 (p. 174)
26).
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agent which begins to act must itself be moved; in other words, he was thinking of a particular cause, not the universal cause. And that is why he derives his arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the motion and immobility of the prime mover. If we look closely into the reasons he alleges, they give the impression of being argu ments of one who is contending against a definite position. Thus in the beginning of Book VIII of the Physics, after introducing the ques tion of the eternity of motion, he starts by reporting the views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles,15 against which he intends to direct his discussion.
But those who came after Aristotle, judging that the entire uni verse was produced by God through an act of His will and not by way of motion, endeavored to prove the eternity of the world by arguing that the will does not put off doing what it intends to do unless some innovation or change has intervened. Such an event, at least so we have to imagine, occurs within the flow of time in the one who wills to do something at a definite movement and not earlier.
Nevertheless these men, too, fell into an error similar to that of those who were mentioned above. They thought that the first agent was like any other agent who exercises his activity in time, yet acts through his will. Such an agent is not the cause of time, but pre supposes time. God, however, is the cause even of time itself. For time itself is included within the universality of things that have been made by God; therefore, when we speak of the production of all being by God, we ought not to consider the question why He made it at a particular moment rather than sooner. Such a consideration supposes that time preceded the making, instead of being conditional on the making.
But if we consider the production of all creatures in their uni versality, among which time itself is included, we ought to inquire why God pre-appointed such and such a measure to time, not why
He made the world at such and such a time. The appointing of a measure to time depends on the mere will of God, who decreed that the world should not exist forever but should have a temporal begin ning, just as He willed that heaven should not be greater or smaller than it is.
Reply to Objection I. It is proper to goodness to bring things into existence through an act of the will, whose object is the good. There fore things did not have to be brought into being in such a way as to be co-eternal with the divine goodness; rather they were produced in the way that the divine will disposed for them. is phijs., VIII, 1 (250b 24-29).
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Reply to Obj. 2. Since a heavenly body is incorruptible, it is capable of existing forever. But no power either of existing or of acting regards the past, but only the present or the future; for no one has power over what he has done in the past, since he cannot now cause to have been done what was then left undone. Yet a person has the power to do such a thing now or in the future. Hence the power of existing forever that is possessed by heaven does not regard the past, but the future.
Reply to Obj. 3. We cannot say simply that heaven is corruptible because of the fact that it would lapse into non-existence if it were not sustained by God. However, we may grant that it is corruptible in a certain sense, that is, in the supposition that God would not sus tain it. The reason for this is that preservation of a creature by God depends on the divine immutability, not on natural necessity. Conse quently no creature can be said to be absolutely necessary, for it is necessary only on the supposition that the divine will has unchange ably decreed its preservation.
Reply to Obj. 4. Every effect has a necessary relationship to its efficient cause, whether that cause is natural or voluntary. But our position is that God is the cause of the world, not by any necessity of His nature, but by His will, as was explained above.16 Hence the effect caused by God must necessarily follow, not so as to be co-extensive in duration with the divine nature, but at the time disposed for its existence by the divine will, and precisely such as God willed it to be.
Reply to Obj. 5. The existence of a thing prior to time may be understood in two ways; first, prior to the whole of time and to every thing that pertains to time. In this sense the world did not exist before time, because the instant at which the world began, though it is not time, is nevertheless something pertaining to time, not indeed as a part, but as the starting-point of time. In a second sense a thing is regarded as preceding time because it precedes complete time; and time is not complete until the instant which is preceded by another instant. In this sense the world is prior to time. But that does not necessarily mean that the world is eternal, because even the instant of time which thus precedes time is not eternal.
Reply to Obj. 6. Since every agent produces its like, an effect must issue from an effectively operating cause in such a way as to retain a likeness to its cause. But just as an effect produced by a cause that acts by its nature bears a likeness to the cause, in the sense that it has a form similar to the form of the agent, so an effect proceeding from a voluntary agent bears a likeness to the latter, in the sense that it has a form similar to that of its cause, inasmuch as something is
16 Cf. art. 15.
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produced in the effect that is in accordance with the decision of the agents will. An example of this is the work produced by a craftsman.
Now the will determines not only the form of the effect, but also its place, duration, and all its conditions. Therefore the effect produced by the will must come into existence when the will so determines, not whenever the will itself exists. For the effect is assimilated to the will, not in being, but in the way the will disposes. Consequently, even though the will should remain the same forever, the effect need not issue from it forever.
Reply to Obj. 7. God necessarily wills His own goodness and everything that is necessarily connected with it. But the production of creatures is not such a thing. Hence the argument is not conclusive.
Reply to Obj. 8. Since God made creatures in order to manifest Himself, it was better and more fitting that they should be produced in such a way as to manifest Him in a more becoming and impressive manner. But God is more impressively manifested by creatures if they have not existed forever; this fact shows clearly that they were brought into existence by another, that God has no need of creatures, and that creatures are completely subject to the divine will.
Reply to Obj. 9. God's will to create the world was, indeed, eternal.
He willed, however, that the world should be brought into being, not from eternity, but at the time when He made it.
Reply to Obj. 10. Before the world existed, it was possible for the world to be made, not indeed by reason of any passive potentiality, but solely by the active power of the agent. Or we may say that it was possible, not because of any potentiality, but because the terms of a proposition such as this: "The world exists," are not mutually con tradictory. In this sense a thing is said to be possible without reference to any potentiality, as the Philosopher shows in Book V of his Meta physicsr.17
This reply also furnishes the solution to Objection 11.
Reply to Obj. 12. The argument proposed envisions an agent that begins to act with a new action; but God's action is eternal, since it is His substance. He is said to begin to act, however, by reason of a new effect which results from His eternal action according to the dis position of His will, which is regarded as the principle of His action with reference to the effect. For an effect results from an action in accord with the condition of the form that is the principle of the action; thus a thing is heated by the heating action of fire in accord with the degree of heat in the fire.
17 Aristotle, Metaph., V, 12 (1019b 34).
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Reply to Obj. 13. The argument is concerned with an agent that produces an effect in time, yet is not the cause of time. But it does not apply to God, as is clear from what was stated above.18
Reply to Obj. 14. If movement is taken literally, the divine will is not moved. Metaphorically, however, it is said to be moved by its object; in this sense, God's goodness alone moves His will, as Augustine points out when lie says that God moves Himself independently of place and time.19 Yet it does not follow that the production of crea tures is co-eternal with His goodness, because creatures proceed from God, not as though they were due or necessary to His goodness, since the divine goodness has no need of creatures and does not stand to gain anything from them, but by His mere will.
Reply io Obj. 15. Since the first succession of time is caused by the succession of movement, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics,2U it is true that every instant is both a beginning and an end of time, as it is also true that every moment is a beginning and an end of motion. Accordingly, if we suppose that movement has not always ex isted or that it will not always exist, we shall not have to grant that every instant is a beginning and an end of time; for some instant will be only the beginning and some will be only the end. Clearly, therefore, this argument goes around in a circle, and consequently it is not a demonstration; yet it is effective for the purpose intended by Aristotle, who advances it against a definite position, as was mentioned in the body of this article. Many arguments are thus effective for attacking a position because of statements made by adversaries, and yet they are not absolutely sound.
Reply to Obj. 16. An instant is, indeed, always regarded as flowing; not, however, as always flowing from one point to another, but some times as flowing only from a point, such as the last instant of time, and sometimes as flowing only toivard a point, as the first instant.
Reply to Obj. 17. The argument in question does not prove that motion has endured forever, but that circular motion can endure for ever, because no certain conclusion about motion can be derived from mathematics. Hence Aristotle does not prove the eternity of motion by arguing that it is circular; but, on the supposition that motion is eternal, he shows that it is circular, because no other motion can be eternal.21
This also provides an answer to Objection 18.
Reply to Obj. 19. The knowable is related to our knowledge as God's knowledge is related to creatures. For God's knowledge is the 18 Art. 15. 20 Aristotle, Phys., IV, 11, (219a 1919 De Genesi ad litteram, VIII, 22 (PL 25).
34, 389). 2i Phys., VIII, 9 (265a 25).
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cause of creatures, as the knowable is the cause of our knowledge.
Consequently, just as the object of knowledge can exist even if we have no knowledge of it, as is stated in the Categories,22 so God can have knowledge even if the knowable thing does not exist.
Reply to Obj. 20. God precedes the world in duration, not indeed of time, but of eternity, because God's existence is not measured by time. Yet, prior to the world there was no real time, but only imaginary time; that is, we are able at the present moment to imagine that in finite eons of time, co-existent with eternity, could have been coursing along before the beginning of time.
Reply to Obj. 21. If the relation of lordship is regarded as conse quent on the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then
God was not Lord from eternity. But if it is regarded as consequent on His power of governing, it belongs to Him from eternity. So we do not have to conclude that creatures existed from eternity, except potentially.
Reply to Obj. 22. Augustine employs this argument to prove the Son's co-eternity and co-equality with the Father.23 But the argument is not applicable to the world, because the Son's nature is identical with the Father's, and therefore has to be co-eternal and co-equal with that of the Father; withholding of such perfections would savor of envy. A creature's nature, however, does not require these per fections; hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Obj. 23. According to the Greek version, the text reads:
"The Lord shall reign for age upon age, and beyond." In a commentary on this passage, Origen explains that "age" means a period of one generation whose end is known to us, while "age upon age" refers to an immense span of time which has, indeed, an end, though it is un known to us; and God's reign will extend even "beyond" that.24 Ac cordingly, "eternity" here signifies a long time. Anselm, however, in his
Proslogium,25 takes eternity to mean aeviternity, which never comes to an end; and yet God is said to reign beyond it, for three reasons: first, because aeviternal beings can be thought of as not existing; sec ondly, because they would not exist if God did not sustain them in being, so that of themselves they have no existence; thirdly, because they do not have their whole existence at once, but are subject to some successive change.
Reply to Obj. 24. A thing which begins to exist must have a measure of its duration to the extent that it begins through motion.
But time does not begin in this way by creation, and so the argu22 Aristotle, Cat., 7 (7b 30). 24 Origen, In Exodum, horn. VI, 13
23 Contra Maximinum, II, cc. 7; 23 (PG 12, 340).
(PL 42, 761 {.; 796-801). 25 Cap. 20 (PL 158, 237; ed. Schmitt, I, 115).
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ment proves nothing. Besides, every measure may be said to be meas ured by itself within its own genus, as a line is measured by a line, and likewise time is measured by time.
Reply to Obj. 25. Time is not like permanent things which possess their substance all at once; hence the whole of time does not have to exist as soon as it begins. Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that time begins in an instant.
Reply to Obj. 26. God's action is eternal, but the effect caused by it is not eternal, as was shown above. Therefore, even though God had not always been a cause, inasmuch as there was not always an effect, it does not follow that He was not a cause potentially, since
His action has always existed; however, the conclusion follows if the potentiality in question refers to the effect.
Reply to Obj. 27. According to the Philosopher, truth is in the mind, not in things,20 for truth is the conformity of the intellect to things. Hence all that has been true from eternity has been true by the truth present in the divine intellect, which is eternal.
Reply to Obj. 28. All things which are said to be true from eternity are true, not by different kinds of truth, but by one and the same truth existing in the divine intellect, with relationship, however, to various things as future in their own proper existence. And so some distinction in that truth can be assigned in accordance with the diversity of the relationship.
Reply to Obj. 29. The Philosopher's assertion refers to our mental or oral statements; for the truth found in our mind or in our utterance is caused by existing things. Conversely, however, truth in the divine intellect is the cause of things.
Reply to Obj. 30. On the part of God Himself, to make and to speak are not in any way different, for God's action is not an acci dent, but is His substance; nevertheless to make implies an effect actually existing in its own proper nature, whereas this is not implied by to speak.
The arguments proposed in favor of the contrary position do indeed conclude, though not with necessity, except the first, which is based on authority. The argument about intellectual keenness that in creases in the course of time does not prove that time had a begin ning. For study of the sciences could have been interrupted repeatedly, and later, after long intervals, have been taken up afresh, as the Philosopher also remarks.27 Furthermore, although the earth may be washed away by floods in one part, it is augmented in other parts by the mutual conversion of the elements. Finally, although God's dura20 Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 4 (1027b Aristotle, Metaph., XI, 12 (1068a
25). 31).
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tion is identical with his nature in reality, it differs from His nature logically. Therefore the fact that He is prior to the world by nature does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that He is prior to it in duration.
St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Part I, Question XLVI, Articles 1 and 2 Article 1 Whether the Created Universe Has Existed Forever
We proceed to the First Article as follows. It may seem that the created universe, which is now called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity.
1. For everything that begins to exist had the possibility of exist ing before it existed; otherwise it could not have come into existence.
If, therefore, the world began to exist, it had the possibility of existing before it began. But that which has the possibility of existing is mat ter; for matter is in potentiality to existence, which is brought about by a form, and to non-existence, which is the result of privation.
Therefore, if the world began to exist, matter must have existed be fore the world. But matter cannot exist without form; and the world's matter united to form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist; which is impossible.
2. Besides, nothing that has the power to exist forever, at some time exists and at some time does not exist, because a thing exists as long as its power to exist endures. But every incorruptible thing has the power to exist forever, for its power is not limited to any par ticular span of duration. Therefore no incorruptible thing at some time does not exist. But everything that begins to exist, at some time exists and at some time does not exist. Therefore no incorruptible tiling begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, such as the heavenly bodies and all intellectual substances.
Therefore the world did not begin to exist.
3. Moreover, what is ungenerated did not begin to exist. But the Philosopher says, in Physics I, that matter is ungenerated;1 and in De caelo I he asserts that heaven is ungenerated.2 Therefore the universe had no beginning.
4. Further, there is no body in a vacuum, although there could be.
But if the world had a beginning, there was formerly no body where 1 Aristotle, Phys., I, 9 (192a 28). 2 De caelo, I, 3 (270a 13).
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the body of the world is now; and yet a body could have been there, as otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore prior to the world there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
5. Besides, nothing begins to be moved anew, unless a mover or a movable thing is in a different condition now than it was before.
But what is in a different condition now than it was before, is moved.
Therefore, prior to all new motion, there was some previous motion.
Accordingly there was always some motion. And therefore there was always some movable thing, because motion is not found except in a movable thing.
6. Moreover, eveiy mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except in response to some pre-existing motion.
For nature always works in the same way; consequently, unless some change either in the nature of the mover or in the movable thing pre cedes, no motion that was not in operation before will be inaugurated by a natural mover. And as for the will, it may postpone doing what it proposes to do without undergoing any change; but even in this case, some sort of change is imagined, at least as regards the passage of time. Thus a person who wishes to build a house tomorrow and not today, waits for something to happen tomorrow that does not oc cur today; at the very least he awaits the passing of the present day and the coming of the morrow; and this involves change, because time is the measure of motion. Therefore, prior to all newly beginning mo tion, there was some other motion. And so we have the same con clusion as before.
7. Further, whatever is always in its beginning and always in its end, can neither cease nor begin; for what begins is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time is always in its be ginning and in its end, since no time exists except now, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time can neither begin nor end. Consequently motion, too, cannot begin or end, for time is its measure.
8. Besides, God is prior to the world either in the order of nature alone, or also in the order of duration. If in the order of nature alone, then, since God exists from eternity, the world also exists from eternity.
And if He is prior in duration, then, since before and after in dura tion constitute time, time existed before the world; and that is im possible.
9. Further, given a sufficient cause, its effect follows; for a cause that is not followed by an effect is an imperfect cause, needing some thing else to produce the effect. But God is the sufficient cause of the world. He is the final cause, by reason of His goodness; the exemplary cause, by reason of His wisdom; and the efficient cause, by reason of [60]
Ilis power, as is clear from the preceding exposition.3 Since, there fore, God is eternal, the world has also existed from eternity.
10. Moreover, if an action is eternal, its effect is likewise eternal.
But God s action is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world, too, is eternal.
ON THE CONTRARY, however, we read in John 17:5: "Glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was"; and in Proverbs 8:22: "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the be ginning."
I ANSWER that nothing has existed from eternity except God.
And this position is far from impossible. It was shown above that God s will is the cause of things.4 Therefore some things necessarily exist according as God necessarily wills them, as is stated in Meta physics V.5 * But it was shown above that, absolutely speaking, God is under no necessity to will anything except Himself.8 Therefore it is not necessary for God to will that the world should have existed for ever. All we can say is that the world is eternal if God wills it to be so, since the existence of the world depends on God's will as on its cause. Consequently it is not necessary for the world to exist always.
Hence no demonstrative proof is possible.
As for the arguments which Aristotle brings forward in support of this contention, they are not absolutely demonstrative, but only relatively so. That is, they serve to overthrow the arguments of ancient philosophers who held that the world began in certain ways that are in truth impossible. This appears from three considerations. First, be cause both in Physics VIII7 and in De caelo I8 he premises certain opinions, such as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, and proposes arguments to refute them. Secondly, whenever he treats of this matter, he reports the testimony of the ancients, which is not the procedure of one who undertakes a demonstration, but rather of one who uses probable arguments to persuade. Thirdly, he expressly says in Book I of the Topics that there are some dialectical problems which we have no means of solving; one of these is, whether the world is eternal.9
Reply to Objection 1. Before the world existed, it was possible for the world to exist, not indeed by reason of passive potentiality, which is matter, but by reason of the active power of God. And the world was possible also in the sense that a thing is said to be absolutely
7 Phtjs., VIII, 1 (250b 24; 251b 17).
3 Q. 44, aa. 1, 3, 4.
" Q. 19, a. 4.
5 Aristotle, Metaph., V, 5 (1015b 9).
8 De caelo, I, 10 (279b 4; 280a 30).
8 Top., I, 9 (104b 16).
« Q. 19, a. 3.
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possible, not by virtue of some potentiality, but from the sole relation of the terms which are not mutually incompatible. In this sense pos sible is opposed to impossible, as is stated by the Philosopher in Metaphysics V.10
Reply to Ohj. 2. That which has the power to exist always, does not indeed, once it has that power, sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. Plowever, before it had that power, it did not exist. Hence this argument, which is proposed by Aristotle in De caelo I,11 does not prove absolutely that incorruptible things never began to exist, but only that they did not begin to exist according to the natural process by which things subject to generation and corruption begin to exist.
Reply to Obj. 3. Aristotle proves in Physics I that matter is un generated from the fact that it has no subject from which to derive its existence.12 And in De caelo I he proves that that the heavens are ungenerated because they have no contrary from which to be gener ated.13 Clearly, then, no conclusion follows from either argument ex cept that matter and the heavens did not begin by way of generation, as some have asserted, especially with regard to the heavens.11 But our contention is that matter and the heavens were brought into being by creation, as was shown above.15
Reply to Obj. 4. The notion of a vacuum implies more than that in which nothing is present; it requires space which is capable of containing a body but does not contain one, as is clear from Aristotle in Physics IV.16 However, we hold that there was no place or space prior to the world.
Reply to Obj. 5. The first mover was always in the same state, but the first movable thing was not always in the same state, because it began to exist, whereas previously it had not existed. However, this was brought about, not by change, but by creation, which is not change, as was shown above.17 Hence it is evident that this argument, which Aristotle gives in Physics VIII,18 scores a point against those who acknowledged eternal movable things but not eternal motion, as maintained in the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles.19 Our position, however, is that there was always motion from the instant that movable things began to exist.
Reply to Obj. 6. The first agent is a voluntary agent. And, although He had an eternal will to produce some effect, He did not produce
10 Aristotle, Metaph., V, 12 (1019b is Q. 45, a. 2.
19).
16 Phys., IV, 1 (208b 26). u De caelo, I, 12 (281b 18) 17 Q. 45, a. 2, ad 2.
I2 Phys., I, 9 (192a 28).
18 Phys., VIII, 1 (251a 25) 13 De caelo, I, 3 (270a 13).
19 Cf. ibid. (250b 24). i4 Ibid., I, 10 (279b 13).
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an eternal effect. Nor does some change have to be presupposed, not even with regard to imaginary time. We must attend to the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes one thing and causes another, and the universal agent, that produces the whole effect. A particular agent produces a form, and presupposes matter; such an agent must introduce a form that is proportionate to suitable matter.
With good reason, therefore, we assert that a particular agent intro duces a form into some portion of matter and not into other matter, because matter differs from matter. But we are not reasonable if we assert the same of God, who produces form and matter together; rather, we are reasonable when we say that God produces matter suit able for the form and the end. Now a particular agent presupposes time no less than matter. Such an agent is reasonably described as acting in later time and not in earlier time, according as we imagine the passage of time succeeding time. But the univeral agent, who produces both the thing and time, is not to be regarded as acting now and not before, according to an imaginary passage of time succeeding time, as though time were presupposed to His action; the truth is, that He assigned to His effect as much time as He willed, as long a period as was suitable for showing forth His power. For if the world has not always existed, it leads us more clearly to a knowledge of the divine creative power than if it had always existed. The reason is, that everything that has not always existed evidently has a cause; but this is not so evident in the case of a thing that has existed forever.
Reply to Obj. 7. As is stated in Physics IV, "before" and "after" pertain to time, seeing that "before" and "after" are found in motion.
Hence beginning and end in time are to be understood in the same way as in motion.20 In the hypothesis of the eternity of motion, any given moment in motion must be a beginning and an end of motion; but this is not necessary if motion has a beginning. And the same is true of the now of time. And thus it is clear that the idea of the in stant now, viewed as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and motion. Hence Aristotle brings in this argument in Physics VIII against those who affirmed the eter nity of time, but denied the eternity of motion.21
Reply to Obj. 8. God is prior to the world in duration. Here, how ever, the word "prior" signifies priority, not of time, but of eternity.
Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, not of real time. In the same way, when we say that there is nothing above the heavens, the word "above" designates only an imaginary place, according as we are able to imagine other dimensions over and above the dimensions of the heavenly body.
21 Ibid., VIII, 1 (251b 29.) 20 Ibid., IV, 11 (219a 17).
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Reply to Obj. 9. As an effect follows from a cause that acts by nature in accordance with the kind of form it has, so likewise an effect follows from a voluntary agent in accordance with the form precon ceived and determined by him, as is clear from what we said above.
Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we do not have to hold that the world was produced by Him otherwise than as preordained by His will, that is, that it should have existence after non-existence, so as more clearly to manifest its Author.
Reply to Obj. 10. Once an action is performed, its effect follows as required by the form which is the principle of the action. In the case of voluntary agents, that which is conceived and preordained is re garded as the principle of the action. From God s eternal action, consequently, there follows, not an eternal effect, but an effect such as God willed it to be, that is, one which has existence subsequent to non-existence.
Article 2 Whether it is an Article of Faith that the World Had a Beginning We proceed to the Second article as follows. It may seem that it is not an article of faith but rather a demonstrable conclusion that the world began.
1. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration.
But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the efficient cause of the world; and this was also the conviction of some of the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be proved demonstratively that the world had a beginning.
2. Besides, if we have to say that the world was made by God, then it must have been made either from nothing or from something.
But it was not made from something, because in that case the matter of the world would have preceded the world itself; opposed to this position are the arguments advanced by Aristotle, who held that the heavens are ungenerated. Therefore we must conclude that the world was made from nothing. And thus it has existence coming after non existence. Therefore it must have had a beginning.
3. Further, everything that acts intellectually, begins its action from some starting point,23 as we observe in all works of art. But God acts by His intellect. Therefore He begins His action from some start ing point. Consequently the world, which is His effect, did not always exist.
22 Q. 19, a. 4; q. 41, a. 2. 23 Cf. Aristotle, Phys., Ill, 4 (203a 31).
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4. Moreover, we perceive clearly that certain arts and the inhabit ing of certain regions of the earth began at definite times. But this would not be true if the world has existed forever. Evidently, there fore, the world has not existed forever.
5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always existed, it would be equal to God in duration.
Therefore it is certain that the world has not always existed.
6. Besides, if the world has always existed, an infinite number of days has preceded the present day. But infinity cannot be traversed.
Therefore we should never have arrived at the present day—which is obviously false.
7. Further, if the world has existed eternally, generation has also taken place eternally. Therefore one man has been begotten by an other man in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of his son, as is stated in Physics IF24 Therefore efficient causes are linked in an infinite series—which is rejected in Metaphysics II.25
8. Moreover, if the world has always existed and generation has always taken place, an infinite multitude of men would have pre ceded us. But man's soul is immortal. Therefore an infinite multitude of human souls would now be actually existing—which is impossible.
Therefore we can know with strict certainty that the world had a be ginning; and so this truth is not held by faith alone.
ON THE CONTRARY, however, articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is concerned with "things that appear not," according to Hebrews 11:1. But that God is the Creator of the world in such a way that the world began to exist, is an article of faith; for we say: "I believe in one God," etc.28 And likewise Gregory points out that Moses prophesied about the past when he said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."27 In these words the inception of the world is conveyed. Therefore the inception of the world is known exclusively by revelation. Accordingly it cannot be proved demonstratively.
I ANSWER that we hold by faith alone that the world has not existed forever; this truth cannot be proved demonstratively. We spoke in the same way above, in connection with the mystery of the Trinity.28 The reason is that the inception of the world cannot be demonstrated by arguing from the standpoint of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. But every thing, viewed in its species, abstracts from here and now; this is why universals are said to be everywhere and always.29 Hence it cannot
2* Ibid., II, 3 (194b 30). I, 1 (PL, 76, 786).
25 Aristotle, Metaph., II, 2 (994a 5). 28 Q. 32, a. 1.
26 Nicene Creed (Denz., 54). 29 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 31 27 Gregory the Great, In Ezechielem, (87b 33).
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be demonstrated that man or the heavens or a stone did not always exist.
Likewise, this truth cannot he demonstrated by arguing from the standpoint of the efficient cause, which acts voluntarily. For God s will cannot he investigated by reason, except as regards those matters which God must will with absolute necessity; such however, are not those things which He wills with reference to creatures, as we said above.30 But the divine will can be made known to man by revelation, on which faith is based. That the world had a beginning, therefore, is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And we do well to keep this in mind; otherwise, if we presumptuously undertake to demonstrate what is of faith, we may introduce arguments that are not strictly conclusive; and this would furnish infidels with an occasion for scoffing, as they would think that we assent to truths of faith on such grounds.
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says, philosophers who affirmed the eternity of the world were divided between two opinions.31 Some asserted that the substance of the world does not come from God. And this is an intolerable error, which is refuted by cogent proofs. Others, however, who advocated the eternity of the world, nevertheless granted that it was made by God. "For they contend that the world had a beginning, not of time, but of its creation, so that, in some scarcely intelligible sense, it was made, yet from eternity." And St. Augustine continues: "They found a way of explaining their view. If, they say, a foot had always, from eternity, been planted in the dust, there would always be a footprint underneath, and no one would doubt that it had been made by someone stepping there. In the same way the world has always existed, since He who made it has always ex isted."32 To understand this, we must reflect that an efficient cause which acts by motion necessarily precedes its effect in the order of time, because the effect does not exist until the end of the action, and every such agent must be an initiator of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, the cause does not have to precede the effect in duration, as is exemplified in the case of illumination.
Hence they insist that, even though God is the active cause of the world, it does not necessarily follow that He precedes the world in duration,33 because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above.34
30 Q. 19, a. 3. 65 (The Incoherence of the Inco31 Be civitate Dei, XI, 4 (PL, 41, 319). herence, trans. by S. Van den Bergh,
32 Ibid., X, 31 (PL, 41, 311). [London: Luzac, 1954], I, p. 37).
33 Cf. Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut, I, 34 Q. 45, a. 2, ad 3.
Reply to Obj. 2. Advocates of the theory that the world is eternal would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not in the [66]
sense that it was made after nothing, according to what we under stand by the word, creation, but because it was not made from any thing. And so some of them do not repudiate the term, creation, as we learn from Avicenna in his Metaphysics,35
Reply to Obj. 3. This is the argument of Anaxagoras, as given in Physics III.36 But it does not conclude with necessity, except in the case of an intellect that deliberates in order to find out what ought to be done; and this procedure is similar to motion. Such is the hu man intellect, but not the divine intellect, as was shown above.37
Reply to Obj. 4. Those who hold the eternity of the world suppose that some region was uninhabitable, then inhabitable, and so on, back and forth, in an infinite succession of changes.38 They likewise postu late that the arts, because of various catastrophies and accidents, were discovered and later on decayed again in infinite succession.39 Aris totle observes, in his Meteorology, that it is ridiculous to admit the theory about the inception of the entire world on the basis of par ticular changes such as these.40
Reply to Obj. 5. Even if the world had always existed, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says at the end of his
Consolation.41 For the divine existence is existence that is simultane ously whole, without succession; but such is not the case with the world.
Reply to Obj. 6. Passage is always understood as proceeding from one term to another. No matter what past day may be designated, a finite number of days has elapsed between it and the present day, and these days can be traversed. The objection is based on the sup position that infinite intervals lie between given extremes.42
Reply to Obj. 7. In efficient causes, a series that is per sc infinite is impossible, that is, if the causes that are per se required for a cer tain effect should be infinite in number; for example, if a stone is moved by a stick, the stick by a hand, and so on endlessly. But a series of efficient causes that is per accidens infinite is not considered impossible, that is, if all the causes that are infinitely multiplied are in the order of a single cause, while their multiplication is accidental, as when a craftsman works with many hammers per accidens, because
35 Metaph., IX, 4 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, 104 va).
36 Aristotle, Phys., Ill, 4 (203a 31).
Q. 14, a. 7.
38 Cf. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei,
XII, 10 (PL, 41, 358).
39 Ibid.
« Meteor., I, 14 (352a 26; 351b 8).
41 De consolatione philosophiae, V, pros. 6 (PL, 63, 859).
42 Not all are satisfied with this reply.
L. Roy, "Note philosophique sur l'idee de commencement dans la creation," Sciences Ecclesiastiques, II (1949), 224, complains that St.
Thomas fixes a point of departure, and precisely this is in question; to solve the problem, one must not fix an initial day.
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