Chapter 35
regression along this line is impossible, we must come to some first subject that never began but always existed.
3. Besides, everything that begins to exist anew, had a possible existence before it actually existed; otherwise it was impossible for it to exist and necessary for it not to exist. Thus it would forever have been a non-being and would never have begun to be. But that which has the possibility of existing is a subject that is potentially a being.
Therefore, before anything begins to exist anew, a subject that is potentially a being must pre-exist. And since we cannot go back in this way indefinitely, we must suppose some primary subject that did not begin to exist anew.
4. Again, no permanent substance exists while it is being made.
For it is made that it may exist; hence if it were already existing, it would not still have to be made. But while it is being made, there must be some subject that is worked upon; for, since the process of making is an accident, it requires a subject. Accordingly everything that is made has some pre-existing subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, the conclusion follows that the first subject was not made, but is eternal. From this the further conclusion follows that something besides God is eternal, for lie Himself cannot be the sub ject of making or of movement.
These, then, are the arguments to which some thinkers give their adherence, as though they were demonstrations vindicating their con tention that created things must have existed forever. In this they contradict the Catholic faith, which insists that nothing outside God has existed forever, and that all things, except the one eternal God, have had a beginning of their existence.
Chapter 35 Solution of the Arguments Alleged Above, and First of Those Derived from the Standpoint of God
We have now to show that the foregoing arguments do not neces sarily conclude. We shall consider, first, those that are alleged on the part of the agent.30
Even if the effects produced by God begin to exist anew, lie Himself need not be moved either directly or indirectly, as the first objection argued. Newness of effect can, indeed, indicate a change in the agent to the extent that it demonstrates newness of action; a new action cannot be performed by an agent unless the latter is
30 Cf. chap. 32.
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moved in some way, at least from inactivity to action. Yet newness of a divine effect does not demonstrate newness of action in God, since
His action is His essence, as was brought out above.31 And therefore newness of effect cannot demonstrate such change when God is the agent.
Nevertheless it does not follow that, if the action of the First Agent is eternal, His effect must be eternal, as the second argument inferred.
We showed above that God acts voluntarily in producing things.32
However, He does not act in such a manner that some other, inter mediate action is elicited by Him, in the way that in us the action of our motive power intervenes between the act of the will and the effect, as we have shown previously;33 God's act of understanding and willing is necessarily identical with His act of making. An effect issues from the intellect and will according to the direction of the intellect and the command of the will, just as any other condition of the thing made is determined by the intellect, so a time is set for it; art not only determines that a thing should be of a definite quality, but assigns a time for it. For example, a physician prescribes that a medicine should be given at this or that time; if his act of will were in itself powerful enough to produce the effect, the effect would follow in due time from the previous decision, without any new action on his part. Hence there is nothing to prevent us from saying that God's action existed from eternity, although its effect was not produced from eternity but occurred at the time eternally appointed for it.
This consideration also makes it clear that, even though God is the sufficient cause producing the existence of things, we do not have to conclude that His effect is eternal just because He Himself exists eternally, as the third argument contended. Given a sufficient cause, its effect does, indeed, follow. This is not true, however, of an effect that is foreign to the cause, such as would result from an insufficiency in the cause, as if, for example, a hot body failed to emit heat. The proper effect of the will is the production of that which the will de cides; if something else than what the will decrees were to result, the effect would not be proper to the cause but would be alien to it. But, to repeat what we have said, just as the will determines that a thing should be of a definite nature, so it wills that the thing should exist at a particular time. In order that the will may be a sufficient cause, therefore, the effect need not exist when the will itself exists, but only at the time which the will appoints for it. The case is different with things proceeding from a cause that acts naturally, because the action of nature is determined by the nature itself; given the existence of the 31 Chap. 9. 33 Chap. 9.
32 Chap. 23.
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cause, the effect must follow. The will, however, acts in a way that is governed, not by its existence, but by its intention. And therefore, just as the effect of a natural agent is determined by the agent s ex istence, if the latter is a sufficient cause, so the effect of a voluntary agent is produced in accord with the agent's purpose.
All this makes it manifest that the effect of the divine will is not unduly retarded, as the fourth argument suggested, even though it did not always exist, notwithstanding the fact that it was willed. Not only the existence of the effect, but the time of its existence, is subject to the divine will. Therefore the thing willed, that is, the existence of a creature at a definite time, is not retarded, because the creature began to exist at the moment appointed by God from eternity.
We cannot admit any diversity of parts in some sort of duration prior to the beginning of all creation, as was supposed in the fifth argument. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration. And God's duration, which is eternity, has no parts, but is absolutely simple, without before and after, since God is immovable, as was explained in Book I.34 Hence there is no question of comparing the beginning of all creation with diverse parts designated in some pre existing measure, with which the beginning of creatures might be in agreement or disagreement, so that an agent would have to have a reason for bringing creatures into existence at this particular instant of that duration rather than at some preceding or subsequent instant.
Such a reason would indeed be required if some duration divisible into parts existed outside the universe of created beings, as is the case with particular agents that produce their effect in time, yet do not produce time itself. But God brought creatures and time into being together. Hence the question to consider is not, why He pro duced them now rather than earlier, but only why He did not endow them with eternal existence. Comparison with place will clarify this point. Particular bodies are produced in a definite place, as well as at a definite time. And because time and place, by which they are enveloped, are extrinsic to them, there must be a reason why they are produced in this place and at this time rather than another. But there is no reason for inquiring why the whole of heaven was located here and not there, for beyond it there is no place, and the entire place for all things was produced along with it. In their quest of such a reason, some fell into the error of attributing infinity to bodies. Simi larly, outside the totality of creation there is no time, since time was produced simultaneously with the universe; hence we need not go into the reason why it exists now and not earlier, and so we will not be led to concede the infinity of time. We have only to ask why it did
34 Chap. 15.
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not exist always, or why it came into being after non-being, or why it had a beginning at all.
Io pursue this inquiry the sixth argument was proposed; it is based on a consideration of the end, which alone can induce necessity in things that are done voluntarily. The end of the divine will cannot be anything else than God's goodness. However, God docs not act in order to bring this end into being, in the way that a craftsman acts
" ,n constructing his handiwork; for God's goodness is eternal and un changeable, so that nothing can be added to it. Nor can God be said to act for His own self-improvement. Again, He does not act to acquire this end for Himself, as a king engages in warfare to gain possession of a city, for God is His own goodness. It remains, consequently, that He acts for an end in the sense that He produces an effect which is to share in the end. In this production of things for the sake of an end, the uniform relation of end to agent is not to be regarded as an argument in favor of the eternity of His work; we should rather focus our attention on the relation of the end to the effect that is produced for the end. Thus we perceive that the effect is produced in such a way as to be more fittingly directed to the end. Hence the fact that the end is uniformly related to the agent does not justify us in con cluding that the effect is eternal.
Lastly, it is not necessary that the divine effect should have ex isted always, for the reason that it would thus be more suitably di rected to the end, as the seventh argument seemed to imply. Indeed, it is more suitably directed to the end for the very reason that it did not exist always. For every agent that produces an effect designed to participate in the agent's own form aims at reproducing its own likeness in the effect. Fittingly, therefore, God willed to produce creatures for participation in His goodness; by resembling the divine goodness they would represent it. Such a representation cannot reach the level of equality, in the way that a univocal effect represents its cause, so that effects produced by infinite goodness would have to be eternal; no, God is represented by creatures as the transcendent is represented by that which is surpassed. But the transcendence of the divine goodness over creation is best brought out by the fact that creatures have not always existed. This fact clearly shows that all things outside of God have Him as the author of their being, and that His power is under no necessity to produce such effects, as nature is with regard to natural effects; and consequently that He is a volun tary and intelligent agent. Some thinkers have entertained views op posed to these truths, because they assume the eternity of creatures.
Accordingly there is nothing on the part of the agent that compels us to hold the eternity of creation.
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