Chapter 32
Chapter 32 Arguments of Those Who Seek to Prove the Eternity of the World from God's Standpoint However, since many have held that the world has existed always and of necessity, and have endeavored to demonstrate their position, we must present their arguments, with a view to showing that they do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the world is eternal.
We shall set forth, first, arguments derived from God's standpoint; secondly, those that are derived from the point of view of creatures;11 thirdly, those that are derived from the manner in which things were made, according to the contention that they began to exist anew.12
To prove the eternity of the world from God's standpoint, the following arguments are alleged.11
1. Every agent that is not always in action, is moved either di rectly or indirectly: directly, as when a fire, which was not always burning, begins to burn, either because it is freshly kindled or is just now carried over and placed next to some fuel; indirectly, in the way that an agent begins to move an animal by some new motion that affects it, either from within, as when an animal, awaking after the digestive process is finished, begins to roam around, or from without, as when some fresh incentives entice the animal to undertake some new action. But God is not moved either directly or indirectly, as was proved in Book I.14 Therefore God always acts in the same way, and it is by His action that created things are brought into being. Ac cordingly, creatures have always existed.
2. Again, an effect proceeds from its efficient cause by the action of that cause. But God's action is eternal; otherwise He would become an actual agent after being a potential agent, and He would have to be actualized by some prior agent; which is impossible. Therefore the things created by God have existed from eternity.
3. Furthermore, given a sufficient cause, its effect must neces sarily follow. For if, given the cause, the effect does not follow with necessity, it would be possible, given the cause, that the effect could exist and yet not exist; but what is possible needs something to reduce it to act. Hence some cause will have to be found to make the effect actual; and so the first cause was not sufficient. God, however, is the sufficient cause of the production of creatures; otherwise He would not be a cause in reality, but would rather be a cause in potentiality, since He would become a cause by the addition of something; and 11 Chap. 33. 13 These arguments are refuted in chap.
12 Chap. 34. 35.
14 Chap. 13.
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that is clearly impossible. Accordingly, since God has existed from eternity, it seems that the creature, too, must have existed from eternity.
4. Likewise, a voluntary agent does not delay in carrying out his purpose of making something unless he is awaiting some future event that has not yet taken place. And this sort of thing sometimes occurs within the agent himself, as when full power for acting or the re moval of some obstacle impeding such power is awaited. Sometimes, too, it is outside the agent, as when someone in whose presence the action is to be performed is expected, or at least when a suitable time that has not yet arrived is awaited. For if the will is fully equipped, its power is straightway carried into execution, unless it labors under some defect; thus the movement of a limb immediately follows the will s command, if no defect is found in the motive power that is to carry out the movement. Hence it is clear that, when one wishes to do something and it is not done at once, the failure must be ascribed either to a defect in power, the removal of which is looked for, or to the fact that the will is not fully equipped to perform the action. And 1 assert that the will is fully equipped when one wills absolutely to do something no matter what the circumstances may be; whereas the will is insufficiently equipped when a person wills to do something, not absolutely, but on some condition that is not yet verified, or unless a present obstacle is removed. Evidently, however, that which God now wills to exist. He has eternally willed to exist, for no new move ment of the will can occur in Him. Nor could any defect or impedi ment obstruct His power; and nothing else could be awaited as an incentive for the universal production of creatures, since apart from God nothing is uncreated, as was proved above.15 Therefore the con clusion that God has brought creatures into existence from eternity seems imperative.
5. Besides, an intellectual agent does not choose one thing in preference to another unless the one is more excellent than the other.
But where there is no difference, there cannot be any superiority in excellence. Hence, where no difference is discernible, no choice will be made of one thing rather than of another. This is the reason why no action will proceed from an agent equally indifferent to either of two alternatives, just as no action proceeds from matter; for potential ity of this sort is like the potentiality of matter. But there can be no difference between non-being and non-being. Hence one non-being is not preferable to another.
Now beyond the entire universe of creatures there is nothing except the eternity of God. But no difference in periods of time can
15 Chap. 15.
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be designated in nothingness; hence we cannot say that a thing ought to be made at one moment rather than at another. Likewise, such a difference in moments cannot be designated in eternity, the whole of which is uniform and simple, as was shown in Book I.18 The conse quence is, therefore, that God's will is equally disposed to the pro duction of creatures throughout all eternity. Accordingly, it is His will either that creatures should never be produced within His eternity, or that they should always have been produced. Obviously, however, it is not His will that creatures should never have been produced throughout His eternity, since creatures evidently came into being at the behest of His will. The conclusion, therefore, that the created world has always existed, is apparently necessary.
6. Again, things that are directed to an end derive their necessity from that end; this is especially true of things that are done voluntar ily. Hence, as long as the end remains the same, things directed to the end preserve the same dispositions or are produced in the same way, unless a new relation arises between them and the end. But the end of creatures issuing forth from the divine will is the divine good ness, which alone can be the end of the divine will. Since, therefore, the divine goodness remains the same throughout all eternity, both in itself and in reference to the divine will, creatures are apparently brought into being by the divine will in the same manner throughout all eternity. For if they are assumed to be quite without existence prior to some definite time at which they are supposed to have begun their existence, they cannot be said to have acquired any new relation to their end.
7. Moreover, since the divine goodness is supremely perfect, all things are said to have come forth from God by reason of His good ness, not in the sense that any advantage might accrue to Him from creatures, but in the sense that goodness has the tendency to com municate itself so far as possible; goodness is manifested by such self communication. Since all things share in the goodness of God so far as they have being, the more permanent they are, the more they share in God's goodness; that is why the perpetual existence of a species is said to be divine.17 But the divine goodness is infinite. Accordingly it has the tendency to communicate itself in an infinite way, and not merely at a particular time. Therefore the divine goodness seems to be a reason requiring the eternal existence of some creatures.
Such, then, are the arguments drawn from the side of God; they seemingly lead to the conclusion that creatures have existed forever.
16 Chap. 15.
17 Cf. Aristotle, De anima, II, 4 (415b 5).
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