Glossary
GLOSSARY
accident. An incidental property of a thing. That which affects something and is outside its essence. For example, “whiteness” can be an accident of a wall but is not of its substance. See substance.
actuality, primary (actus primus). This term can be taken in two ways. Sometimes it means “potentiality,” which is contrasted with “actuality.” For example: “The boy is a grammarian in primary actuality,” because as time passes he can become a grammarian, though he is not actually one now. But sometimes it means an inherent quality or habitus that one possesses but that does not exert itself. “Primary actuality” in this sense is contrasted with “secondary actuality” or “operation.” For example: “Priscian, even in his sleep, is a grammarian in primary actuality, though he is not exerting this grammatical knowledge in secondary actuality.” In both cases, primary actuality refers to a power or potential that is not currently actualized.
actuality, pure. Something that does not depend on anything else for existence and “actuality” and has no “passive potential.” It is is actual, absolute, and infinitely perfect, such that there is no room for improvement.
actuality, secondary (actus secundus). The actual operation of a thing. For example: “Priscian, when exercising his grammatical knowledge, is a grammarian in secondary actuality.”
argument from nondistributed to distributed. A fallacious argument that moves from what is unspecified to what is specified. It starts from a premise of something that holds true for part of a set, and then concludes that this same thing holds true for the entire set.
argument from particular to particular. A fallacious argument that moves from what is unspecified to something else that is unspecified. It starts from a premise of something that holds true for part of a set, and then concludes that this same thing holds true for a different part of the set.
cause, adequate. The total cause of something. It perfectly constitutes the essence of an effect. An effect proceeds from the whole adequate cause and from it alone.
cause, efficient. Something by means of which something else happens, and on which the effect of that happening depends; that which brings about an effect.
cause, final. The same as an “end,” that is, an aim, purpose, or goal. An end is the cause for which a doer acts, or that for whose sake something happens.
cause, impulsive (internal). Something that impels a principal efficient cause to act. This impulsion comes either from inside or outside of the principal cause.
cause, instrumental. Also called a “secondary cause” or “organic cause.” In producing an effect, the instrumental cause makes a specific contribution, but it operates only in virtue of the motion or power given it from the principal cause. See cause, principal.
cause, material. The same as the “material” or “matter” of something. Matter is the potential and determinable part of a composite, i.e., that from which something arises or of which it consists. When form and matter are combined, they produce actually existing beings. A material cause concurs toward an effect by receiving and sustaining a form.
cause, principal. Also called a “primary cause.” In producing an effect, the principal cause is not an instrument of some cause that is higher or more primary in its class or genus. See cause, instrumental.
cause, proximate. The nearest and immediate cause of something; it moves the effect primarily and is linked with it most closely. It attains an effect through itself and immediately. For example, fire is the proximate cause of heat.
connotative. A word that, by being known, makes known another word.
desire, rational (rationali appetitui). “Rational” or “intellective desire” is the desire by which one either wishes for something good or avoids something bad. It is always joined with freedom.
end. See cause, final.
evil of fault (malum culpae). An evil that is constituted by deliberate fault or guilt.
evil of punishment (malum poenae). The punishment that God renders for sin according to His justice. This is not “evil” in the English sense of the word, but rather “bad” to the one who experiences it.
fallacy of speech (fallacia phraseos). A fallacy in how the words of an argument are used, of which there are various kinds.
form. That which completes another thing, or determines it, or through which it operates. “Form” is that which gives the being of a thing, or what makes it what it is.
moisture, root (humidum radicale). In medieval and early modern physiology, “root moisture” was the human body’s basic fluids begotten together with the body’s natural heat. This was considered as distinct from the “inflowing moisture” [humidum influens] which the body receives through eating and drinking. Medieval scholars explained that mortality results when the body’s natural heat dries up its root moisture, which cannot be replaced simply by nourishment; as the natural heat does this, it in turn is diminished.
motion, first (motus primus). The daily movement of the heavenly bodies around the earth, movement by which time is constituted and measured.
motion, second (motus secundus). The movement of the planets around the earth in their own specific periods.
necessity of the consequence. A necessity that is based on contingent circumstances. It is a necessity by which something is not necessary by its own nature but only on the supposition of something antecedent. For example, supposing that all the boys in Illinois own a ball, it is necessary that John, a boy who lives in Chicago, owns a ball. Yet there is no intrinsic relationship of living in Chicago and owning a ball.
necessity of the consequent. A necessity that stems from an intrinsic connection of cause with effect. It is an absolute necessity, something that cannot be other than it is.
potential, passive. The capability of being acted upon as a passive object.
principle. A source or origin from which something proceeds or emanates.
production from the potentiality of matter (eductio de potentia materiae). When something that was previously only potential is brought into actuality.
(“to one”). This term was used by Aristotle when speaking about an “imperfect genus,” a category of things in which a quality could not be predicated equally about all members of the category; the quality would belong more to one species than to another.
related things. “Related things are together both in nature and in recognition, so that when one is posited, the other is posited, too, and when one is recognized, the other is recognized too” (Micraelius, Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “Relatio”). As an example of related things, Micraelius mentions “father” and “son.” Thus, upon learning that Isaac is a son, you know that there must be a father. The one implies the other.
representations (species). Conceptual images that represent real objects to one’s intellect. They are distinguished by Scholastics into “sensible representations” (species sensibiles), which are perceived by external senses, such as color; “phantastic representations” (species phantasticae), which refer the object to the internal senses while preserving its specificity; and “intelligible representations” (species intelligibiles), which represent the quiddity or essence of the object, stripped of all specification, to one’s intellect.
sense, composite. The meaning of a concept when considered together with other facts or concepts. For example, in the proposition “It is possible for one sitting to run,” if running is taken in the composite sense with sitting, the proposition is false because one cannot sit and run at the same time.
sense, divided. The meaning of a concept in itself, apart from its relation to other facts or concepts. For example, in the proposition “It is possible for one sitting to run,” if running is divided, or taken in the divided sense, from sitting, the proposition is true because he who is now sitting can run later.
subordinates. Noncontradictory things or propositions of which one is contained under the other. For example, Gerhard says that the Holy Spirit and the water of Baptism are related to each other as subordinates in the giving of salvation, not as opposites. The water of Baptism is a means by which the Holy Spirit gives salvation, and thus the one does not rule out the other in the giving of salvation (Commonplace XXIII, On Holy Baptism, § 104). See also Commonplace XXX, On the Resurrection of the Dead, § 101.
substance. A concrete reality, that which exists. See accident.
understanding, acting (intellectus agens). A mind as it abstracts forms or ideas from the individual things of the world. See understanding, possible.
understanding, possible (intellectus possibilis). A mind as it is receptive to any and all cognitive representations (such as ideas or sensory perception) from outside of itself.
will of good-pleasure (voluntas beneplaciti). What God is well-pleased to do, which is not always revealed to humanity.
will of the sign (voluntas signi). God’s will as it is revealed to humanity.