Chapter III: The Image of God was not the Very Substance of Man
CHAPTER III: THE IMAGE OF GOD WAS NOT THE VERY SUBSTANCE OF MAN
§ 94. So far we have shown that the image of God in the first man was not an external and supernatural gift of God or merely a gift of external embellishment which could have been and was removed without corrupting his nature. Rather, it was the uprightness, integrity, and perfection “connected with the nature” [τῇ ϕύσει ἑπομένην] and intrinsic to the entire human nature and all the powers of the soul; it was not something substantial in man nor the substance of man itself, as we shall show briefly. If the image of God was man’s substance, it would follow that either (1) it was the whole man himself or (2) the soul of man or (3) his body or (4) some essential part of his soul or (5) a substance different from the very substance of man. However, none of these can be said in regard to the image of God in man, nor can a sixth possibility be provided. Therefore what remains is that it cannot be placed into the class of substances. Now each part of the minor premise must be proved.
The image of God was not the whole man himself.
§ 95. The image of God was not the whole man himself, as is clear from these foundations: (1) Only the Son of God deserves this praise, that “He is the express and substantial image of the Father” (Heb. 1:3). (2) If the image of God had been the whole man, it would follow that original sin, which took the place of the lost image of God, is man himself, and thus there would be no difference between man and original sin. This conclusion is in opposition to the clear statements of Scripture and to the articles of creation, the incarnation, redemption, sanctification, and the resurrection, as we shall teach in its own place [On Original Sin(Commonplace XII), §§ 90–94]. (3) It is written that man was created after the image of God. This wording establishes an obvious distinction between the fact that he is created after the image of God and the image itself after which man, it says, was created. (4) The apostle defines the image of God as “true holiness and righteousness” [Eph. 4:24]. But now, holiness and righteousness do not belong to man essentially, but by inherence. Only God is righteous and holy in such a way as to be righteousness and holiness itself. (5) If the image of God had been the whole man himself, it would follow that after the fall Adam was a different man with regard to substance, and in essence fully other than the one who had been created initially. Also, in this way concreated blessedness would not have belonged to the Adam who fell, nor would that wretchedness which followed the fall have affected the Adam who was created initially.
The image of God was not the soul of man nor his body.
§ 96. The image of God was not the soul of man, as is proved thus: When that image was lost, either the soul of man would have perished or another soul would have been introduced in place of the lost one, both of which are absurd. Much less was the body of Adam [the image of God], especially since it was more base than his soul, and yet it survived even though the image had been lost. Why? Because the image of God is to be located in the body of man only secondarily and attendantly. However, it was not a part of his soul: (1) Because when the image of God had been lost, some part of his soul would have been lost. This clearly conflicts with the nature of things that are entirely whole and which have no part outside of the part.1 (2) If the image of God had been a part of the soul, then original sin would also have been a part of the soul, and thus that corruption would have pervaded not only the nature of man but also would have to be placed in only one part of the soul, while all the rest of its parts would remain sound and uncontaminated.
The image of God was not a substance different from the substance of man.
§ 97. The image of God was not a substance different from the substance of man, as is clear from these foundations: (1) Because in this way original sin would also be a substance different from the substance of man. But who is the author of original sin? God? But He cannot be the author of sin. The devil? But he cannot be the creator of substances.
(2) It would also follow that man himself was not corrupted through sin, but rather something in man was corrupted, namely, the substance truly distinct and different from man; and thus original sin would be diminished as much as possible by those who keep saying that they are fighting for this position in order to amplify that evil.
The error of Flacius.
§ 98. Therefore with all our heart we disapprove of what Flacius, an otherwise very learned man, writes (Clavis Script., part 2, treatise 6, p. 480): “Once upon a time, in the first creation, we were something very good both in accidents and in substance, but later we were changed essentially into a thing very evil in its substance, as if very fine wine had been turned into extremely bitter vinegar.” Also, p. 481: “Scripture makes quite clear that the image of God is especially the essential form in the highest and most noble parts of man, and thus in his highest office, namely, according as he is connected to God and has been directed in essence toward his Creator.” Page 483: “All Scripture uses words denoting substance in its description of the image of God and original righteousness,” etc. “God created man very good not only in his accidents but also in his very substance, so that he was substantially good; goodness did not merely adhere to him as an accident or embellishment,” etc. “We trust the Scripture that the image of God is the very substance of man along with his accidents.” From part 1 of the Clavis, on the word “image,” p. 542: “The apostle demonstrates that in the beginning the very spirit of our mind—just, holy, and truthful—was the image of God,” etc. In the proofs which Flacius produces in favor of his position, he has constant recourse to this mistake wherein he has two immediately opposing ideas: “Either the image of God was an extrinsic, supernatural accident or it was the very substance of man.” However, there is a third possibility: that [the image of God] was the concreated integrity, perfection, and uprightness of the human substance, and thus is to be categorized as a quality.
1 Things with “magnitude,” “extension,” or “dimension” are said to have a “part outside the part.” For example, if one considers a part of an automobile, such as the engine, there is yet another part (or parts) of the automobile apart from the engine. However, the soul cannot be divided into parts; wherever it is, it is whole and indivisible. (See Micraelius, Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “dimensio,” “extensio,” and “magnitudo.”)