Chapter IX: How Divine Providence Concurs with the Evil Actions of Human Beings
CHAPTER IX: HOW DIVINE PROVIDENCE CONCURS WITH THE EVIL ACTIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS
Divine providence concurs with evil actions, first, by foreknowing them; second, by sustaining nature.
§ 86. We say, then, that God concurs in evil actions, first, by foreknowing them—or, rather, by knowing and seeing them. Ecclus. 23:[19] and 39:[19]: “Nothing can be hid from His eyes, which are brighter than the sun.” Nevertheless this foreknowledge does not produce an absolute necessity for evil actions, as we have shown earlier [§§ 32–40].
§ 87. Second, the providence of God concurs in them by sustaining nature, for “in Him we move” (Acts 17:28). Indeed, marvelous is the forbearance of God, that even in the most offensive of deeds He sustains our members and preserves our powers and movements. This happens because of the intercession of the Son, and this “goodness of God invites us to repent” [Rom. 2:4; cf. 2 Pet. 3:9]. After all, if we were to perish as soon as we sin, we could not return to repentance (Rom. 2:4). Also, if man, according to his impenitent heart, receives the wrath of God, he is sustained so that God later may show the greatness of His wrath against sin in His punishments, to the glory of His divine justice (Exod. 9:16).
The doing itself is one thing; the fault of the act is another.
§ 88. A careful distinction must be made between the doing or action itself and the fault of the action. An action as action is not a sin; otherwise all actions would be sins. Rather, the fault and defect in the action is sin. Now, the fault and defect are not from a universal cause, but from a proximate cause,1 namely, from the will of man. Thomas ([ST,] 1.2., q. 79, art. 1): “The effect of a second cause2 proceeding from [the first cause] is traced back to the first cause insofar as it accords with the order of the first cause; however, a deficiency in a second cause cannot be traced back to the first cause insofar as it goes outside the order of the first cause.” Augustine (De perfectione justitiae) explains this with the example of limping, which does not stem from one’s strength to move but from the dislocation of the leg. Biel (Sent. 1, dist. 47, q. 1) makes a subtle distinction between the expressions malum facere [“evildoing”] and facere malum [“to do evil”], but we are unwilling to follow him.
§ 89. Sin is “not so much a work as it is a departure from the work of God to one’s own works” (Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. 14, ch. 11). “Hence we must not so much look for its efficient but for its deficient cause” (De civ. Dei, bk. 12, ch. 7). Because God is the greatest and purest actuality, He cannot fail in any way. Consequently, to say that God is the cause of sin is to deny that He is the first and most perfect cause. For that which produces failure fails in causation. That which fails is not perfect nor of infinite power.
Third, by permitting.
§ 90. Third, therefore divine providence concurs in evil actions by permitting them. God does not will sin, yet He does not hinder it, and that is His permission. Although He may willingly and without objection permit [sin], nevertheless His permission and will are directed to different objects. Permission applies to sin itself; the will applies to a useful end which, because of His wisdom, He knows how to produce from it. In connection with this, Rupert of Deutz (De vol. Dei, ch. 3) argues that “it is one thing to will something to happen and another to be willing to permit something to happen”; and also Lombard (Sent. 1, distinctions 45–46) argues from Augustine: “Permission properly implies the negative act of not willing.”
§ 91. Here note carefully that Scripture itself sets forth this explanation to us. Rom. 1:24: “God gave up the Gentiles to impurity.” This is explained in Acts 14:16: “He allowed them to walk in their own ways.” Thus Deut. 28:28: “Jehovah will strike you with blindness and confusion of heart.” It is explained in Hosea 4:16–17: “Like a rebellious calf Israel has rebelled. Now Jehovah feeds them like a lamb in a broad pasture. Israel is a partaker of images; leave him alone.” So also what is said in 2 Thess. 2:11: “God will send them the working of error.” This is explained by Azariah, 2 Chron. 15:2: “The Lord is with you while you are with Him. If you seek Him, He will be found by you, but if you forsake Him, He will forsake you.” Thus Matt. 6:13: “Lead us not into temptation,” is explained in James 1:13–14: “Let no one say when he is tempted: ‘I am being tempted by God.’ But each one is tempted by his own desire.” So how does God concur? 1 Cor. 10:13: “God is faithful, and He will not let you be tempted beyond your strength.” Ps. 81:11–12: “My people did not obey My voice; Israel refused Me. So I gave them over to the strength of their heart.”
§ 92. In connection with this, Hugh of St. Victor (De sacram., part 2, ch. 19) says: “His providence works in itself and in another—in itself, by what it has done, and in another, by what it has permitted.3” Augustine (Enchir., ch. 94): “Nothing happens unless the Almighty wants it to happen either by allowing it to happen or by doing it Himself. We must not doubt that God does well even in allowing something bad to happen.”
The causes and ways of God’s permission.
Here we should also cite the seven ways—or, rather, final causes4—of God’s permission, which Damascenus (Orth. fid., bk. 2, ch. 31) lists from Nemesius: (1) When God sometimes allows a just person to be beset with calamities to make the virtue latent in him obvious to others (e.g., Job). (2) When God accomplishes something salutary through an absurd and disgraceful act, as when He works out the salvation of man through the most shameful death of His Son. (3) When He subjects someone to adversities, lest he become puffed up. We have an example of this in the case of the apostle (2 Cor. 12:7). (4) When He allows some people to fall into dire straits in body or mind, that their destruction may serve as a warning to those who follow. (5) When He permits someone to be afflicted with the plague or other calamity for the glory of His name, as, for example, in the case of the blind man (John 9:3). (6) When God allows some people to suffer the worst so others may imitate, so that a similar constancy and patience may be kindled in them, as, for example, the case of the martyrs. (7) When God permits peoplev to slide into sins and senseless deeds so that other affections of theirs may be corrected. So much for Damascenus, according to the interpretation of Pelargus (Comment.), a man most learned in the fathers.
Fourth, by abandoning.
§ 93. Fourth, divine providence concurs in wicked actions by abandoning. Yet here we point out that this was not the case in the first sin of Adam because, as Augustine teaches correctly: “Abandoning was not the cause of Adam’s fall. Rather, the fall was the cause of the abandoning.” However, this is the case in all other sins of men, for when man resists the Holy Spirit and rushes into wickedness, God severs him from His grace or even takes away the grace once given. Thus, after Saul had rejected the word of the Lord (1 Sam. 15:26), “the Spirit of the Lord departed from Saul” (1 Sam. 16:14). In this way Isaiah 5 lists the various benefits that God has given to His vineyard, that is, to the church: “What was there to do for My vineyard that I have not done in it?” (Isa. 5:4). But when it bore wild grapes instead of grapes, God said: “I will remove its hedge. I will make it a waste, and I will also command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it” (Isa. 5:5–6).
§ 94. This is why Suidas, Phavorinus, and Damascenus (Orth. fid., bk. 2, ch. 31) say: “His providence exists in the good according to His good-pleasure, but according to His permission in the evil.” Theophylact (on Romans) clarifies this divine forsaking with the example of a physician who, because of the incorrigible intemperance of a sick man, ceases his treatment but still is not himself the cause of the patient’s death. Chrysostom (Homily de Adamo et Eva) uses the example of a general who, upon seeing his soldiers hurl themselves upon the enemy with reckless abandon, departs and, so to speak, removes himself. Theodoret (on Romans 1) uses the example of a captain of a ship who permits his ship to sail without a pilot. Augustine (De nat. et grat., ch. 23): “God drives no one to those things but merely forsakes those who deserve to be forsaken.” Augustine again (Sermon 88 de tempor.): “God never forsakes a person unless that person first forsakes Him by committing serious sins once, twice, and three times; and nevertheless the Lord continues to wait for him.” Fulgentius (Ad Monim., bk. 1, ch. 13): “He who forsakes God is deservedly forsaken by God. Because man sins when he forsakes God, God preserves His righteousness when He deserts the sinner.” Prosper (Respons.): “The grace of God has not abandoned them before they abandoned it.” Macarius (Homily 4): “Those who fall away from God are forsaken by Him.”
The two kinds of abandonment on the basis of Damascenus.
§ 95. Damascenus (in Orth. fid., bk. 2, ch. 31, on the basis of Nemesius, De nat. hom., final chapter) establishes two types of abandonment. The one he calls οἰκονομικὴν καὶ παιδευτικήν (“pertaining to dispensation and correction”), when, for the sake of saving and correcting and to the praise of His own name, He sometimes abandons the faithful even as Christ complains that He was abandoned (Ps. 22:1). The other he calls τελείαν καὶ ἀπογνωστικήν [“final and condemnatory”], as when God does all things related to salvation and the person remains incorrigible and incurable and is abandoned by eternal grace in the just judgment of God, just as the Spirit of God departed from Saul (1 Sam. 16:14; 28:15).
Kinds of abandonment on the basis of Elijah of Crete and Hugh.
Elijah of Crete (commentary on Nazianzen, Orat. secund. de Filio) posits four kinds of forsaking (among which the first two kinds seem to refer rather to final causes). The first is for the sake of examination, as in the cases of Job and Joseph [cf. Gen. 39:1–23], by which the former became a pillar of fortitude; the latter, of morality. The second is for paternal chastisement, as in the case of the apostle [cf. 2 Cor. 12:7], that he might keep that very great grace by abasing and humbling himself. The third is by turning away, as in the case of the Jews, that, pricked in conscience, they might be turned to patience. In addition to all these there remains the manner of the abandonment in the Lord’s dealings on behalf of the human race, that through what appeared to be abandonment we who were once abandoned would be accepted again through the incarnation of Christ and be saved by His suffering. Hugh, on Psalm 21: “The Lord is said or not said to abandon: (1) By the exposing of blame, as Ps. 37:28: ‘He will not forsake His saints.’ (2) By exposing the punishment, as Isa. 54:7: ‘For a brief moment I forsook you.’ (3) By not giving grace or by taking it away, as Isa. 50:1: ‘Which one is your mother’s certificate of divorce, with which I sent her away?’ (4) By suspending punishment, as Ezek. 16:42: ‘I will cause My wrath toward you to rest, and My jealousy shall depart from you.’ (5) By giving one over to eternal punishment, as 1 Chron. 28:9: ‘If you forsake Him, He will cast you off forever.’”
By handing one over to Satan.
§ 96. Fifth, God concurs with evil acts by handing one over to Satan, for people who have turned away from God are surrendered by Him, as by a just judge, to the devil as the executor of divine justice, and by him they are driven to different sins. What the Lord says in Ezek. 14:9: “If the prophet is deceived and speaks a word, I have deceived him,” is thus explained in Jer. 14:14: “They are prophesying falsely in My name. I did not send them, nor did I command them or speak to them. They are prophesying the seduction of their own heart.” The way our just God permits deception is explained in 1 Kings 22:20–23: “The Lord said, ‘Who will entice Ahab?’ Then a spirit came forward and stood before the Lord, saying: ‘I will entice him. I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ Therefore the Lord said: ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so.’ Now therefore behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these, your prophets.” What is said in 2 Sam. 24:1: “The anger of the Lord stirred David to count the people,” is explained in this way in 1 Chron. 21:1: “Satan stood up against Israel and stirred David.”
By setting the limits beforehand.
§ 97. Sixth, the providence of God concurs with evil acts by predetermining their limits, for often in the course of impiety and wicked deeds it sets limits on the wicked. Isa. 8:10: “Take counsel together, and it will come to nothing. Speak a word, and it will not stand, for Immanuel is here.” We have a very nice example of this point in the account of Job. Neither Satan nor his minions can inflict any loss on us without God’s permission. Augustine (De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 27): “The devil’s will is to tempt (just as the wicked have the will to harm), but in his power there is neither the power to do it nor the means to do it.” Gerson (De consol. theol., bk. 3, pros. 4): “God keeps the lion of hell tied up, lest he rage” (pour out his rage upon us) “as he will.” The author of the Continuitas discursus Gallici states it very beautifully (p. 7): “By playing with the plans of men to such a great extent, God usually turns them to an opposite end, contrary to all expectation. The sundial hurries along the little lines of its course to its hours and moments; but if it seemed better to the Master of time to move it with His finger, it would be bent over to the other side of the circle.”
By eliciting good from them.
§ 98. Seventh, God concurs with evil actions by eliciting good from them. We have a very beautiful example of this in Isa. 10:5: “ ‘Assyria is the rod of My anger,’ says the Lord”; but in v. 7: “He himself will not so think, but” (he will think that he is sent) “to destroy.” But soon we have in v. 12: “When the Lord has finished all His work on Mount Zion, He will punish Assyria,” etc. Augustine (Enchir., ch. 11): “Because He is supremely good, God Almighty, who has supreme power, would by no means permit any evil among His works, if He were not so almighty and good as to bring good even out of evil.” Augustine again (Letter 59 ad Paulin., f. 301): “The counsel of God is very well hidden, and by it He employs evil things to the increase of good. In this He also exalts the omnipotence of His goodness because, just as it is part of their wickedness to misuse His good works, so it is characteristic of His wisdom to use their wicked works for good.” (He repeats the same thing in Letter 141 ad Maxim.; Contra Faust., bk. 4, ch. 21; on John, tractate 27; Enchir., chs. 96, 100, 101; etc.) Clement of Alexandria (Strom., bk. 11) writes: “The greatest proof of the providence of God is that He does not permit a crime [vitium] which has developed from a voluntary rebellion to remain unprofitable and useless or altogether harmful. For it is the function of divine wisdom and might and power not only to do good things but also to cause especially this: to bring to some good and useful end what evil people have thought up and to use with advantage those things which seem bad.”
§ 99. In this way God turned the selling of Joseph into good (Gen. 50:20). Thus did He use the crucifixion of Christ for the salvation of the human race. Leo (Sermon 16 de passione Domini) speaks about this beautifully: “There is great distinction and contrast in that at the same time the Jews’ malice was foreknown and yet Christ’s Passion was arranged;5 for their will to kill did not come from the same source as His will to die, nor did the savageness of their crime and the long-suffering of the Redeemer come from one and the same spirit. You see, the Lord did not send the impious hands of raging people upon Himself, but He allowed them. He did not compel them to it by foreknowing that it would happen, though He had taken up flesh for this very purpose.”
Why God permits people to sin.
§ 100. Damascenus (Orth. fid., bk. 2, ch. 31) has gathered eight reasons which are pertinent here as to why God permits people to sin: (1) So that the perfection and excellence of God may be shown, because God alone is unchangeable. (2) So that we may see the wisdom and power of God, which know how and are able to elicit good from evil.(3) So that we may see the merciful kindness of God, by which He comes to save sinners. “Remove the diseases, take away the wounds, and there will be no reason for medicine.” (4) So that we may see the justice of God, which not only renders rewards for good but also punishment for evil. (5) Lest man appear to be in a worse condition than the other creatures, which He manages in such a way that He permits them to act according to their own impulses. (6) So that some may receive praise. Ecclus. 31:10: “Praise belongs to a just man, because he had the power to transgress but did not transgress.” (7) So that people may be awakened and cleansed through evil people (Wisdom 3:6). And (8) so that we may see the beauty of the universe from opposites placed next to each other. These are the reasons of Damascenus, who is correct in adding in the same place that these must be understood as referring to the consequent (ἑπομένῃ) will of God: God saw that man wanted to sin; therefore He allowed him to sin. He permitted it in this way, because He knew how to elicit these goods from the sin of man.
How all things work together for good to the devout.
§ 101. Here we should quote the passage of Gerson (De consol. theol., bk. 1, prop. 4): “We must praise our very kind, almighty God, who not only is not overcome by our evil deeds but also works our good from them. For thus He is said to have confined all things under sin” (read, “permissively”) “in such a way that He has mercy on all people. Peter sinned [cf. Matt. 26:69–75] and became humbler, more careful, more merciful, not due to his act of evil but by the compassion of God. Mary Magdalene sinned and loved more afterward because she was forgiven much [Luke 7:44–47], and stands as an example of repentance for the rest. Paul was a blasphemer, and, humbled, he confessed that he was not worthy to be called an apostle and was chief of sinners [1 Cor. 15:9; 1 Tim. 1:15],” etc. On the basis of Gregory (Moral., bk. 26, ch. 13), Isidore says (Sent., bk. 2, ch. 39): “God often casts down the hidden pride of the mind through the manifest ruin of the flesh.”
§ 102. Anselm (De mensuratione crucis, letter B) writes in agreement: “Your goodness” (O God) “knows how to use our evils for good, as You also often make our failures produce an increase of humility, so that it is true that the just man falls and gets up again seven times a day [cf. Prov. 24:16].” Savonarola (on Psalm 31): “Does the apostle not write that for those who love [Him] all things work together for good [cf. Rom. 8:28]? Therefore all things do that, so that even sin itself works together for good for them. Does that mishap not work together for good to them, and from it they become more humble and more cautious?” Luther (on Genesis 20): “Not only the passive evils which are inflicted upon us but even the active ones which we ourselves commit turn out to our benefit.”6 However, here we must hold carefully that this happens not because of the nature of evils of themselves, but because of the power and goodness of God. Spinaeus (De providentia) makes this clear with this comparison: We see that fields are enriched and fertilized when sprinkled with manure, though it is filthy and reeking in itself; and that medicine and drugs made of various herbs and poisons are the best remedies against most ailments, though otherwise the herbs and poisons would be lethal of themselves. In the same way also, our God in His wisdom causes our sins, which by their own nature are lethal, to become salutary to those who learn to recognize their magnitude, to humble themselves under the mighty hand of God, and to be displeased over them before Him, acknowledging that they need His grace and mercy, by which their sins may be covered and hidden.” Thomas ([ST,] part 1, p. 19, art. 9): “Evil is not ordained for good of itself but according to accident, for it occurs outside the intent of the sinner.”
How God’s permission is to be understood.
§ 103. Up this point we have been explaining the seven ways in which the providence of God concurs in the evil acts of human beings. One can readily understand from these how we should respond to that verbal trickery, to which Beza (Resp. ad colloq., part 2, p. 183) attributes so much: “If God merely permits sins, a denial of the specific providence of God will follow, as if many things happened without God knowing or caring about them, or as if Satan were able to plot against the church, something he would like to do, though he cannot complete it.”
We respond. Divine permission certainly must not be understood in a way that would weaken the providence of God even in the slightest. In fact, this permission is not that of an ignorant God (because God knows people’s sins and does not hinder them, moved as He is by the wisest reasons, though He certainly could hinder them); nor is it simply that of an unwilling God, if you understand the word “unwilling” as meaning “forced” [τὸ βίαιον] (for as God forces no one to sin, so no one forces God with his sins; nevertheless God disapproves and detests sins, and thus it is said very correctly and believed very devoutly that He does not will them); nor is it that of an uncaring God (because God places limits on evil actions beforehand and elicits good from them); nor is it that of a God who opens the door to the plots of Satan (because Satan can plot or move not even the slightest action against the church without the prior permission of God). Thomas ([ST,] part 1, q. 14, art. 16): “Although God is not capable of doing evil things, nevertheless they are subject to His practical knowledge according as He permits or hinders or directs them.”
§ 104. The most learned Chemnitz, a theologian without peer, explains this in the following words (Exam. conc. Trid., part 1, p. 209):
The permission of God must not be taken to mean the sort of permission of tyrants who apply their will to aid or approve sin; nor should it be understood in such a way as if God did not care at all when people commit sins. That permission is not so free and unhindered as not to be subject at all to the providence of God; for though He does not will nor assist nor cause sin, nevertheless He does determine the limits as to how far and how long He intends to permit it, when and where He intends to curb the ungodly. He hinders many thoughts and plans of the wicked, upsets and checks their efforts either for the sake of the church or so that they would bring destruction on themselves. Often God uses even the malice that springs from the evil will of men and is inflamed by the devil for calling down deserved punishments upon those whom He wishes to visit with His just judgment. For the sake of the church and the devout, God often turns into good even the most evil counsels and most destructive efforts of the wicked. Often sins are the punishments for sins, etc.
Accordingly, Augustine asserts in many places that sins are committed with God’s allowance and permission and forsaking, and then he adds (Contra Julian., bk. 5, ch. 3): “Whether this happens in some other explainable way or in an inexplicable way, God is just and good; that is, He is not a cause of sin.”
Whether God is the orderer of sins.
§ 105. Here we must explain the question: Should God be called the orderer of sins? Augustine treats this question in De ordine (bk. 1, ch. 7), where he introduces Trigetius, who argues thus: “If evils are included in the order, and if the order itself comes from God above and is loved by Him, it will follow that evils come from God and that He loves them.” To this Licentius replies:
God does not love evil if for no other reason than that it would be inordinate for Him to love evil. He loves His order so much because through it He does not love evil. On the contrary, God does not love those evils; they cannot be in His order, for this is the very order of evils: that God does not love them. Does the order of the universe—that God loves the good and does not love the evil—seem to be an insignificant point to you? In this way evils, which God does not love, are not outside His order, and yet He loves the order itself; indeed, He loves to love good and to not love evil, which is characteristic of His great order and of His divine disposition, etc.
De civ. Dei (bk. 11, ch. 18): “For God would never have created any—I do not say angel—but even man whose evil future He had foreknown, unless He had equally” (some texts, “earlier”) “known to what good uses He would apply them, and thus He would bedeck the order of the ages like a very beautiful song set off, so to speak, with antitheses.” De civ. Dei (bk. 14, ch. 26): “God Almighty, the supreme and supremely good Creator of all natures, the aider and rewarder of good wills, the deserter and condemner of evils, and the orderer of both, surely was not without counsel,” etc. He appears to say the opposite of this in Confess. (bk. 1, ch. 10): “Lord God, the Creator and orderer of all natural things but not the orderer of sins”; and in Ad art. sibi falso impos. (art. 10): “God punishes sin; He does not arrange it.” How should we explain this apparent contradiction in Augustine and thus the entire problem?
§ 106. Let us use this distinction. With regard to their objects, we must establish two orderings: we order either what we ourselves have done or what others have done. We have an example of the first ordering in generation and of the latter in logical analysis. God is not the orderer of evil wills, namely, in the first way, as if He authored them. Yet He brings back those inordinate, evil wills to the order of the universe and to a good end. Aeneas of Gaza puts it neatly: “A greedy person himself is certainly not functioning in the right order, but God brings back the wrongful order of greed to His own order and to life, and He does this as the finest craftsman. So impute injustice and sin to him who committed it, but for him who suffered the injustice it is salutary rather than harmful.”
1 Read a causa proxima with Cotta instead of ad causa proxima. On proximate cause, see above, p. 58 n. 5.
2 On first and second causes, see above, p. 58 n. 6.
3 Read permisit with Cotta instead of promisit.
4 See above, p. 42 n. 2.
5 Read dispositum with Cotta instead of dipositum.
6 Lectures on Genesis (1535–45/1544–54), AE 3:334 (WA 43:115).