Chapter XI: The Position of the Scholastics and Papists in this Article, § 190
CHAPTER XI: ON THE POSITION OF THE SCHOLASTICS AND PAPISTS IN THIS ARTICLE
§ 190. Up to this point we have been showing in detail and, I hope, clearly that one must not establish an absolute decree for either election or reprobation. When the followers of Calvin do both of these, they entangle themselves in many difficulties and other errors. It remains for us to examine the position of the Scholastics and the Papists on this subject. The Scholastics define predestination as “the foreordaining of a rational creature to grace in the present and glory in the future,” and reprobation as “the foreknowledge of fault and the preparation of punishment.”
The disputations of the Scholastics on predestination.
§ 191. However, if the question is about the cause for election and for reprobation, they offer diverse opinions. Some of the Scholastics believe almost the same as the Pelagians, but some of them are far from the Pelagians.
The Pelagians once taught that the foreknown merits of men were the cause for both election and reprobation, for they claimed that it was in the power of man to accept or to reject the grace by which he can believe and live aright. Therefore they taught that God predestined men to the increase of grace and finally to eternal glory, or reprobated them to the removal even of first grace and ultimately to eternal death, according as He foreknew that they would either use their free choice well or poorly either to accept or to reject grace. Augustine (De praedest. sanct., ch. 18): “A Pelagian says that God foreknew who would be pure and holy through the choice of free will, and therefore He elected them before the creation of the world in that very foreknowledge of His by which He foreknew how they would be. Therefore God elected them, a [Pelagian] says, before they existed, predestinating as His children those whom He foreknew would be pure and holy.” Augustine again (Letter 105 to Sixtus): “The Pelagians say that God considered works He had foreseen.”
Prosper (Letter to Augustine, in vol. 7 of the works of Augustine) describes the position of the Semi-Pelagians:
This definition and confession of theirs is that when Adam sinned, every man sinned, and that no one is saved by his own works, but by regeneration through the grace of God. Nevertheless the propitiation which is the sacrament of the blood of Christ has been offered to all people without exception, so that whoever wants to come to faith and to Baptism could be saved. But God foreknew before the creation of the world who would believe and who would persevere in that faith, which subsequently would be assisted by the grace of God, and He predestined into His kingdom those who He foresaw had been called freely and would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end.
In short, they claimed that the beginning of faith lies within ourselves but that its increase comes from God, and therefore election happened according to His foreknowledge of that good impulse by which we apply ourselves by our own resources to receive faith and the grace of God.
Some Scholastics follow Pelagius in this question.
§ 192. Occam and Biel do not go very far afield from the Pelagian position. Biel, who followed his Occam, writes (Sent. 1, dist. 41, q. 1, art. 1): “Cause sometimes denotes something whose essence is followed by something else as an effect. Other times it denotes a priority of one proposition to another according to logical consequence. There is no cause of predestination and reprobation in man under the first definition but only under the second.” Article 2: “The cause of reprobation is ultimate impenitence. Of any predestination there is some cause, because some people are predestined because God foresees in them the good use of free will and merits. However, there is no cause or total reason for any predestination, because some people are ordained to eternal life by specific grace, so that they are not abandoned to themselves but are prevented from being able to set up any hindrance and from being able to sin or to remain in their sins: the blessed Virgin and Paul, for instance. In such there is no good use of free will, because grace comes before the use of free will.” Article 3: “Properly, the effect of predestination is eternal life. Nevertheless if you extend this to the means, you should speak of what in the case of many precedes grace: the good use of free choice as congruent merit.” Article 4: “It is within a man’s power to use his own choice well or poorly, to set up a hindrance against grace and to remove that hindrance once he has set it up. Just as God foreknew the salvation of the elect, so also He foreknew all the meritorious acts by which he is saved as well as acts related to them.” Those are Biel’s words.
Against the foresight of works.
§ 193. In many passages, and especially in his books De praedest. sanct. and De dono persev., Augustine vehemently opposes this Pelagian position on the foreseeing of merits according to which election is carried out. In these books he shows that: (1) The actual beginning of faith lies in the grace of God, perseverance is the gift of God, and, in fact, eternal life itself is a free gift. (2) He points out the example of infants who are reborn from grace through Baptism and are made partakers of salvation apart from merits. (3) He teaches that in Christ, the Head and Mediator of the elect, we are given a model of free election. (4) He urges many passages of Scripture against the Pelagian position: “1 Kings 19:18: ‘I left Myself seven thousand.’ He does not say, ‘They left them to Me’ but “I left.’ ” John 15:16: “You did not choose Me, but I chose you.” Rom. 9:11: “Though they” (Jacob and Esau) “were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad, in order that according to election God’s purpose might remain, not from works but from Him who calls, it was said, ‘The greater will serve the less.’ ” Eph. 1:4: “God chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless” (not because we were going to be holy). Prosper and Fulgentius follow Augustine.
Arguments from Ephesians 1.
One can add many arguments from Ephesians 1, which is the proper basis [sedes] of this article. (1) The very word “choose” indicates an unearned love, as we showed in § 26, section II. Eph. 2:3: “We were by nature the children of wrath.” (2) Eph. 1:4: “God chose us in Christ.” Therefore He found nothing in us ourselves because of which He should choose us. If we could have been chosen because of our own worthiness, what need would there have been for Christ? (3) An end is not involved in the doing of a thing. Good works are part of the end result of election. Eph. 1:4: “He chose us that we might be holy.” (4) [Eph. 1:4:] “God chose us before the foundation of the world.” Therefore our works did not move Him to predestine us. (5) Eph. 1:5: “God predestined us in Himself.” Therefore He found nothing in us ourselves that made Him predestine us. (6) Eph. 1:5: “He predestined us according to the purpose of His will.” Therefore His purpose is the cause of predestination and not the purpose of our will. (7) Eph. 1:6: “God chose us to the praise of His glorious grace.” Therefore this was not because of our works, for “if it is by grace, it is no longer of works” (Rom. 11:6). (8) The grace of God, “by which God considered us pleasing to Himself in His beloved Son” (Eph. 1:6), is the cause of our election. Yet that favor of God is completely free [gratuitus]. (9) God chose us from eternity, “just as” (καθώς) He blesses us in Christ in time (Eph. 1:[4]). Yet we are blessed in time out of the sheer, free grace of God. Justification does not depend on the merit of works; therefore neither does election. Neither works before justification nor works after justification can be the cause of election—not the former, because works do not please God before the person could please God; not the latter, because those works are gifts of grace and not the merits of grace.
An explanation of 2 Timothy 2[:20–21], which is cited to establish foreknowledge of works.
§ 194. They usually cite 2 Tim. 2:20–21: “In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver but also of wood and clay, some for honorable use and some for dishonorable. Therefore, if anyone cleanses himself from those, he will be a vessel for honorable use, sanctified and adapted for the Lord’s uses.” From this they try to prove that it is within man’s power to cleanse himself of sins, and that upon that cleansing depends our being vessels for honorable use, that is, our being elect.
We respond. (1) The apostle is not saying that such cleansing is within the power of someone not yet regenerate, nor is he ascribing the cause for our election to our works. Rather, he is discussing the effects and “signs” [τεκμήρια] of election—in other words, the signs by which it becomes evident who the vessels for honorable use are, who are in the number of the elect, that is, those who cleanse themselves from impurity of doctrine and life by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit.
(2) You see, just because we are bidden to cleanse ourselves does not yet prove that this is possible for us of ourselves. In fact, 2 Cor. 3:5: “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything good as coming from us.” Phil. 2:13: “It is God who works in us both to will and to do.” Rather, we are enabled by those new powers granted by God.
(3) The phrase “he will be” [2 Tim. 2:21] denotes the same thing as “he will be declared, he will be known, he will be revealed.” Matt. 5:44–45: “Love your enemies that you may be the children of your heavenly Father.” John 8:31: “If you abide in My Word, you will truly be My disciples.” The rule is well-known: many things are said to happen at the time when they are revealed to have already happened.
(4) The whole context confirms this explanation. The apostle wanted to counteract the scandal which had risen from the apostasy of Hymenaeus and Philetus, learned men of great reputation. Therefore he says that no one should be offended because in the church there are not only the elect but also the reprobate, just as in a great house there are not only gold and silver vessels but also ones of wood and clay. God knew from beforehand and simply who His [elect] are, but we cannot know them except from the effects, namely, that those have been elected who through the grace of the Holy Spirit cleanse themselves from wicked doctrine and life.
Some Scholastics seem to depart from Pelagius.
§ 195. Thus far we have discussed the position of Occam and Biel, which comes very close to that of Pelagius. In our time this position has been followed by Albertus Pighius. The rest of the Scholastics can seem more moderate. Lombard (Sent. 1, dist. 41, sect. 1):
We find a merit of obduracy, but we do not find a merit of mercy because there is no merit of mercy, lest it be emptied of grace; for if it is not given freely, then it is remuneration for merits, etc. Since there are no merits of grace, which is applied to a person for justification, all the less can any merits preexist for predestination by which God chose from eternity those whom He willed. Neither can there preexist any merits of reprobation by which He knew from eternity that some would be wicked and would be condemned, just as He chose Jacob and reprobated Esau. This did not occur because of the merits they had at that time, because they had none, since they did not yet exist. Neither did He choose one and reprobate the other because of their future merits which He foresaw.
Thomas ([ST,] part 1, q. 23, art. 5):
Why God chooses some and not others has no reason except the will of God, nor is there any iniquity here, because predestination is a matter of grace. The reason for predestination and reprobation is taken from divine goodness itself, because it is necessary that the goodness of God, which in itself is one and simple, manifests itself as multiform in things, since created things cannot engage the divine simplicity. Therefore different degrees of things are required. God permits some bad things to happen so that the multiform quality of degree may be preserved, lest many good things be obstructed.
Thomas again:
If the human race be considered as a universality, God wanted to save some through His mercy and to reprobate others through His justice.
To the question Is the foreknowledge of merits the cause of reprobation? he responds (ibid.):
The effect of predestination can be considered, first, in particular. In this way any effect of predestination is the cause and reason for the other, a latter for the former, according to the definition of a meritorious cause. This is as if we should say that God foreordained that He would give someone glory because of his merits and that He foreordained that He would give him the grace to earn the glory. It can be considered, second, in common, and in this way it is impossible that the cause of the entire predestination can be given as an effect on our part, because whatever is included under the effect of predestination happens through divine aid, even the very preparation for grace. Lam. 5:21: “Restore us, O LORD, that we may be restored.” However, predestination taken in this way has the goodness of God as its reason.
Those are Thomas’s words.
Bonaventure (Sent., bk. 1, dist. 41, q. 1), to the question Does predestination or reprobation have a meritorious cause in us? responds thus:
Note that three things are understood in predestination: first is the eternal purpose; second is the making-acceptable [gratificatio] in time; but the third is eternal glorification. In like fashion three things are understood in reprobation, namely: eternal hatred, hardening in time, and eternal damnation. As far as the first and last are concerned, the judgment must be similar, for the last—namely, glory and punish-ment—fall simply under merit. On the other hand, the first—namely, the eternal purpose—by the very fact that it is eternal, cannot have merit. As far as the middle one is concerned, which is making-acceptable and hardening, the judgment must be different, because hardening falls simply under demerit or under bad merit. However, making-acceptable falls neither simply under merit nor simply outside of merit, for there is congruous merit, worthy merit, and deserved merit [meritum congrui digni et condigni]. Congruous merit is when a sinner does what is in himself and for himself. Worthy merit is when a righteous person works for someone else. Deserved merit is when a righteous person works on behalf of himself, because deserved grace is directed toward this. Grace to be earned for someone else is not completely deserved, because a sinner is unworthy of every good, nor is it only congruous because a righteous person is worthy of being heard. Therefore making-acceptable can fall under congruous merit as far as the person who is to be given grace is concerned, under worthy merit to the extent that it pertains to another holy man, and under deserved1 merit as it concerns neither. Properly speaking, this is merit.
Bonaventure (ibid., q. 2) asks Does predestination and reprobation have a motivating reason in God? to which he responds:
When one asks if the eternal purpose of God—either election or reprobation—has a motivating reason in God, this is not understood in reference to the divine will or to His acting, which is God, but rather in reference to the ordering of what is willed according to His will. Now if the question is about a causal or meritorious reason, the answer is that there can be none. However, if the question is about a reason of congruity and fittingness [ratio congruitatis et decentiae], some respond that the very will of God is its own reason. There is no other reason He chose this person, except that it pleased Him, etc. However, one must be careful,
(says Bonaventure)
lest, while we seek to magnify the will of God, we diminish it instead, etc. With regard to this, it must be said that His eternal purpose and will are the most reasonable and have reason. Just as it has existed from eternity, so also it has had reason from eternity, and not another reason in regard to essence but in regard to connotation. Now, what it is in the election or reprobation of men is neither completely known nor completely unknown to us. With regard to this, it should be noted that there are some works which proceed from the divine will with another order of necessity ordained for this, whether we take “necessity” in causing, or in meriting or disposing. With respect to such things, the will of God has reason in general and specifically. However, if one should ask why God wants to save Peter rather than Judas, the answer is that the former had good merits and the latter, bad. Now, there are some works which come from the will of God with another order of congruity ordained for this, such as our making-acceptable or justification, which is done by the divine will along with the operation and preparation of free choice. However, at times God justifies without preparation and cooperation, as is clear from those who have been sanctified in the womb. With respect to such works, His will has reason in general and specifically, but a certain reason in general and a hidden one specifically. After all, if someone asks why God wants to justify, the answer is to show His mercy. If someone asks why He does not deign to justify all people with the will of His good-pleasure, it must be said that this is to show His justice. If one should ask specifically why He wants to justify one rather than another, when considering two similar people: since there can be many kinds of congruence, therefore there is no certainty on the part of the thing, and therefore since our knowledge depends on the certainty of the thing, no one can find a certain reason, unless he has it through revelation.
These are the words of the Scholastics. They turn hither and yon and are forced on the basis of their hypotheses to claim that election took place on the basis of the foreknowledge of merits, because they claim that people merit justification congruously and glorification deservedly.
Bellarmine’s position on predestination.
§ 196. So what do the Jesuits claim about predestination? After Bellarmine had shaped several propositions about the help of the grace of God, he finally adds (De grat. et lib. arbit., bk. 2, ch. 9, col. 603): “Although sufficient grace [gratia sufficiens] is given to all, nevertheless we can assign no reason for divine predestination on our part.” With the word “reason,” he says that he is excluding not only merits in the proper sense but also the good use of free choice or of grace or of both together (which use God foresaw), even though it is not called a “merit” but only the “condition without which one is not predestined” [conditio, sine qua non praedestinaretur]. He also adds: “Although no reason can be assigned on our part, yet a cause in general can be assigned on God’s part, namely, to show His mercy and justice. Also, in particular, one cannot doubt that God has His own reason, albeit hidden from us, as to why He wanted to predestine one man rather than another to life.”
Those are the words of Bellarmine, whose chief error is that he takes predestination or election (for he admits that these are reciprocal terms) for the bare intent to give eternal life, as will become clear from what follows. However, Scripture distinguishes this purpose, this will, this good-pleasure from election when it says: “God predestined us according to the purpose of His will, according to His good-pleasure which He set forth in Himself. He predestined us according to the purpose of Him who accomplishes all things according to the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:5, 9, 11), and when it describes the elect as “those who are called according to His purpose” (Rom. 8:28). Therefore election is not that actual purpose of God but was done according to that purpose. We assert that it is sheer, absolute grace: that God decreed from eternity to save people, because even if He had saved none (that is, even if He had not created man for eternal life or had elected none of the fallen to life), He still would have continued to be perfect and blessed in Himself (to which all those things refer which Bellarmine brings up for appearance’s sake about merits and the good use of free choice or of grace being excluded from the act of predestination). However, nowhere does Scripture call this benevolent will of God, this sole purpose of God, “election” or “predestination.” Instead, it says that we have been chosen in Christ, that election took place according to foreknowledge, that the elect are those who would believe, etc. From these and similar statements it is clear that the arrangement of the means and foreknowledge of faith in Christ is included in the act of election. This I show more clearly thus: From eternity God wanted all people to be saved, because He still wants that in time (1 Tim. 2:4). (However, this will of God is not yet election itself.) Therefore He created all people in Adam for eternal life. But He foresaw that Adam along with all his descendants was going to fall and therefore determined as a remedy for the fall to send His Son to restore life again for all people. But because medicine accomplishes nothing without application, He also decided to offer the entire world the benefits of His Son through the Word and to kindle faith in the hearts of people by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, He foresaw that some would furiously reject the Word and the good things He offered, but that some, solely by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit through the Word, would persevere in their faith in Christ. Reprobation ultimately followed this foreknowledge, for He reprobated the former but elected the latter in Christ.
The order of divine decrees in predestination, according to Bellarmine.
§ 197. From this delineation of order in the divine decrees one can easily conclude what should be thought about the order of predestination in the mind of God. Bellarmine describes this for us (in this same ch. 9, col. 605), saying: “(1) God foresaw that if He created man, he would fall along with all his posterity. At the same time, He saw that He could in various ways free either all or some according to His own whim. (2) He wanted to create man, to allow him to fall, and mercifully to save some of the fallen while justly leaving others in the lump of perdition. (3) He developed remedies suitable for saving the elect, chief among them being the incarnation and suffering of the Savior. (4) He approved those remedies, and then chose Christ and us in Him before the foundation of the world. (5) He arranged, ordained, and commanded in what way” (perhaps it should read “in some way”) “for it to be so.” So much wrote Bellarmine, who strongly opposes himself and Scripture.
As for opposing himself, I will show it in this way: When he wishes to prove (in De grat. et lib. arbitr., bk. 2, ch. 5, col. 583) that aid sufficient for salvation is given to all with or without means in proportion to place and time, he cites 1 Tim. 2[:4]: “God wants all people to be saved.” Following Augustine, he explains it in this way: God wants all people to be saved because He gives to all the means whereby they can will to believe and to be saved. He also concedes that Christ paid the price of redemption for all people and, in fact, as a result of the plan of God. Now if the benevolent will of God about saving all people is universal and if the merit of Christ is universal, why does Bellarmine say here: “God wanted to free mercifully only some of the fallen, while justly leaving others in the lump of perdition.” Quite the contrary! God wanted to free and to save all, because He sent Christ as the Redeemer for all.
As for opposing Scripture, this can be understood readily from previous paragraphs, for Scripture describes a different order for us. The first and oldest decree of God about man is: “Let Us make man after Our image and likeness” [Gen. 1:26]. The second is: “You may eat of every tree except from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. On whatever day you eat of it, you will die” [Gen. 2:16–17]. Because he transgressed this command, man fell and became subject to eternal death along with all his descendants. Then, finally, follows the evangelical decree concerning the Seed of the woman who would crush the serpent’s head and whoever believes in Him will be saved [cf. Gen. 3:15]. From this we conclude the following order of predestination in the mind of God. (1) God decreed from eternity out of His pure goodness to create man after His own image and for eternal life.
(2) He foresaw that man would fall and along with all his descendants would become guilty of eternal death. Therefore He again determined out of His pure goodness to bring aid to man and decreed to send His Son into the flesh, to offer people the benefits of His Son through the Word, and to work faith in their hearts through which they might become partakers of the benefits of the Son and of eternal salvation. (3) He also foresaw that some would believe by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit through that Word but that the rest by their own fault would continue in their impenitence and unbelief. The former He elected; the latter He reprobated. Therefore the decree of election comes after2 the decree of creation and the foreknowledge of the fall, the decree concerning the sending of His Son and the foreknowledge of faith.
Therefore Bellarmine errs in these main points: (a) He omits the first decree of God about creating all people in Adam for eternal life. (b) He claims that God could have freed all or some in various ways. On the other hand, we follow Scripture and say that no other remedy for fallen man could have been found than the incarnation and suffering of the very Son of God. (c) He claims that God first elected some absolutely and later thought out the remedies of salvation for them, despite the fact that Scripture says that we were chosen in Christ [Eph. 1:4]. (d) Among the remedies destined solely for the elect, he lists the incarnation and suffering of the Son of God, despite the fact that Christ was sent for the whole world and shed His blood for all. (e) He makes no mention of faith, despite the fact that we could not have been chosen in Christ without consideration of faith.
Whether Bellarmine excludes the foreknowledge of merits from the decree of election.
§ 198. Yet, indeed, lest Bellarmine appear to exclude the foreknowledge of merits from election completely, he provides a new distinction (De grat. et lib. arbitr., bk. 2, ch. 14, col. 627): “Eternal election can be considered in two ways: first, as the intention to give glory; second, as the arrangement of its execution and something like its execution in the mind of God. In the first way, election is purely free and requires no foresight of works. In the second way, it demands the foresight of merits, because God arranged to give eternal life as reward only to those who He foresaw would do good works.” He also adds (col. 628): “God wanted to give3 the elect glory before good works as far as His intent was concerned; but as far as His will of execution is concerned, which regards glory as the effect of good works, God wanted to give the elect good merits before the crown of glory. In this way, God elected to glory on the basis of His foresight of good merits.”
So much wrote Bellarmine, who (1) contradicts Scripture, which never and nowhere takes election as the bare intent to give glory.
(2) He clearly approves of the opinion of those who deduce the reason for election from a foreknowledge of merits and thus, with one stroke of his pen, removes whatever he had stated against them in detail up to this point. You see, they do not so insult the grace of God as to claim that God was moved by His foreknowledge of men’s merits to conceive His goodwill about the salvation of men, but they do look for the reason God elects some and not others in the foreknowledge of merits. Because Bellarmine clearly concedes this to them, why does he still attack them?
(3) Actually, Bellarmine cannot preserve his hypotheses and claim other than that election occurred on the basis of the foreknowledge of merits. God decided to save people from eternity in the same way in which He actually saves them in time. The immutability of the divine will and the following words of Scripture prove this rule: Rom. 8:[30]: “Whom He predestined, those He also called; whom He called, those He also justified; whom He justified, those He also glorified.” Eph. 1:3–4: “God blessed us in Christ just as (καθὼς) He chose us in Him.” 2 Tim. 1:9: “God freed us and called us with a holy calling according to His purpose and the grace which He gave us in Christ before the ages began.” And yet, according to Bellarmine’s position, God saved people in time because of their good merits. Therefore He decided to save them even from eternity because of their good merits; that is, He elected them to eternal life. Bellarmine is consequently chopping off his own legs when he argues in laborious detail that election did not take place without any foresight of works. After all, if election is free, surely our salvation is also free. What did not move God from eternity to elect us also did not move Him in time to save us. Whatever God did not regard from eternity as a reason to elect us, He also does not regard that in time as a reason to save us. It is nonsense to distinguish “between the decree and the execution of the decree,” as if the former were free but the latter were not; for the decree and its execution correspond most precisely to each other in all respects, as we have shown in greater detail in its own place [§§ 16, 151, 173 and 180].
Bellarmine’s position on reprobation.
§ 199. Bellarmine writes about reprobation in this way (De grat. et lib. arbitr., bk. 2, ch. 16, col. 635): “Reprobation includes two acts: the one negative, for which there is no cause on man’s part; the other positive, the cause of which is the foresight of original and actual sin.” Column 636: “The reprobate are the opposite of the elect contradictorily and contrarily, for first God does not have a will to save them, and then He has a will to condemn them. As far as the first act is concerned, there is no cause for it on the part of man, as is true also for predestination. The reason for the latter is given as the foresight of sin.” Those are Bellarmine’s words.
We respond. (1) Some of Calvin’s disciples are not unwilling to concede this to Bellarmine, for Perkins writes (De praedest., p. 25): “The act of reprobation is dual. First is the intent to abandon some people and to declare justice against them. This stems purely from the good-pleasure of God without any respect given for either the good or the evil in the creature. For the will of God is the cause of causes, and accordingly God, on the basis of His supreme justice, creates vessels for His wrath; He does not find them. The second act is ordering to punishment or to a just destruction. This ordering that He makes is in one way simple, in another way comparative.”4 So also Keckermann (System. theol., p. 208) writes: “The first act of reprobation is the purpose of God to abandon some people and to leave them to themselves. This act is absolute and depends solely on the absolute decision of God. The other act is the decree to condemn because of sins. This act is not absolute but contains a consideration for the condition of sin.” Trelcatius (Loci, p. 29) calls the first act “an act of omission, which the Scholastics call passive and negative reprobation. The second act is one of preparation of punishment or pre-damnation from eternity, which the Scholastics call affirmative and active reprobation.” He says that the first is absolute but not the second. These certainly readily agree with Bellarmine.
(2) This distinction is devised outside of Scripture and, in fact, is contrary to it, because that “omission,” that “nonelection,” that “intent to abandon,” is nothing other than the actual decree of condemnation, for God omits no one in His election to eternal life who has not been judged worthy of condemnation because of his impenitence and unbelief. Compare the descriptions of the reprobate as set forth in the Scriptures in § 44. (3) This distinction does not satisfy the statements of Scripture, which show that the cause of destruction is to be sought only in man himself; for if you ask why God did not elect some, one can respond only that He determined to condemn them, for God does all things with a certain purpose. Accordingly, one cannot say that He passed over or did not elect some out of absolute hatred. Rather, just as He condemns in time because of ultimate impenitence and unbelief, so also He determined from eternity to condemn—that is, He reprobated—some for the same reasons, whether you take the word “reprobation” to mean the negative act of not electing or the positive act of passing judgment with punishments.
(4) This distinction contradicts Bellarmine himself because, if he claims from his heart that God gives all people sufficient help for salvation, if he wholeheartedly believes that Christ paid the ransom price for all people, how can he say that God passes over some out of absolute hatred so that no reason on the part of man can be given for that negative reprobation? As concerns the passage Rom. 9:11: “Before they had done anything either good or evil,” which Bellarmine pushes very hard, we explained it in very great detail in its own place [§§ 81–86].
1 Read condigni instead of congrui.
2 See p. 145 n. 3.
3 Read electis gloriam dare quam with Cotta instead of electis gloriam quam.
4 aliam simplicem, aliam comparatam. That is, Perkins considers God’s ordering as “simple” (not taking into consideration anything else but His good-pleasure) in one way and as “comparative” (taking other factors into consideration) in another way.