-- Of Man's Election or Making of Choice
the motions of the heart are not in our power. Actions proceeding from lust and wrath are human actions for which we shall give account.
Of Man's Election or Making of Choice 61 Aristotle says that making a choice is most proper to virtue. In the definition of virtue, he first placed the general kind, namely habit; then he added the difference, namely mediocrity. After that, he joined the two properties: that through virtue we do things of our own accord and that we do them by making a choice. However, of these two properties, making a choice is the more proper, not only when compared with acting of our own accord but also when compared with the other properties of virtue, which are many.
For this reason, actions proceeding from virtue are commended because they come from making a choice. Aristotle says, "Manners are more judged by making a choice than by actions." It is true that manners are known by actions, as a tree is known by its fruit, but that judgment can be deceiving. Hypocrites often make a counterfeit show, and at times actions are done with far different purposes than they appear. The Manichees abstained from wives and from eating flesh, not because of chastity or sobriety but because of their erroneous and blasphemous opinions. Tyrants sometimes treat their subjects courteously, but to deceive them. Wicked men sometimes abstain from wickedness out of fear of punishment, not out of love for justice. Thus, in judgments, when the fact is apparent, there is often an inquiry into the will, mind, and purpose of the doer. Making a choice is never subject to fortune as action is. Those found guilty of a crime often say they meant to have acted differently and did not intend for such things to happen.
Actions are more apparent since they are visible to everyone, but they do not make the judgment either surer or more certain. Men judge manners by what follows, namely by the work, but the judgment of choosing proceeds from the cause, from what went before. Sometimes a person does no action, so it cannot be judged by actions whether they are good or evil. However, once they show their choice, even without action, people judge them for their goodness or naughtiness.
But how can it be said that young children and brute beasts lack the making of choice when they choose one food over another, play over discipline, and avoid some things more than others? We must answer that making a choice is of two sorts. One is common, where one thing is preferred over another or more avoided than another.
Brute beasts and children do not lack this kind of choice. The other is the proper choice, which has counsel going before and is directed by the judgment of reason. This kind of making a choice is not possible for brute beasts or children, as they are led by sense, not by reason.
Also, things done in haste and upon the sudden are without making a choice, not because reason is absent but because there is no time to deliberate. The counsel, judgment, and deliberation of reason are hindered by the vehemency of perturbation.
Three things lack the making of choice. First, brute beasts, because they are not capable of reason. Second, young children, who, although endowed with reason, cannot use it due to their tender age.
Third, sudden and hasty motions of the mind, where despite having reason and years, there is no time for deliberation. Thus, those who act under the force of any affection often say they did not act purposely or advisedly.
Since making a choice belongs to the mind, it is either of the power of knowing or the power of appetite. All appetite is divided into three parts. It is either of the more noble part of the mind, joined with reason and called the will; or it is of the grosser part, divided into the desiring power and the angry power. Aristotle said that some thought choice to be the will, others thought it to be anger, and others thought it to be desire. If it belongs to knowledge, then those who affirm choice to be an opinion, possibly the Stoics, come into play.
First, Aristotle treats of desire and anger, reasoning that their opinion is foolish because then we should yield that brute beasts have choice, for they are moved by both desire and anger, which he rejects as absurd. Thus, it is clear that Aristotle removes desire from choice because we cannot say desire is choice. Willingness differs from choice but cannot be separated from it, as every choice is according to the will.
Aristotle's argument is this: If desire were choice, anything acting by desire would act by choice. But not everything acting by desire acts by choice. The incontinent person acts by desire but not by choice because they do not follow it. They determine to do well but do not stand by their determination, thus not acting according to the choice conceived in their mind. Choice is an appetite guided by counsel, but the incontinent person, carried away by desire, heeds no counsel.
Conversely, the continent person ignores desire and follows their right choice.
The same applies to anger. One acting by anger does not act by choice, as seen in angry people. It suffices to say that an incontinent person is not entirely without choice but does not follow their choice.
Finally, to prove that choice is not opinion
Finally, to prove that choice is not opinion, which was set down in the fourth place, the reason is drawn from the objects. Opinion is of all things; but choice is not of all things; therefore, choice is not opinion. The argument is in the second figure, taken from the nature of relatives: for the power is referred to its object.
Now let us see what opinion is. It is an assent of the mind, whereby we take upon ourselves to maintain one part of a thing that is gainsaid. Yet we do not assert it without all fear, but with some doubt, lest perhaps the other part of the contradiction should be found true. And herein opinion differs from knowledge: for knowledge is a most sure and immovable assent. Therefore, let no man go about to persuade one who has knowledge, or is a professor of the mathematical sciences, that a thing is otherwise than he knows it to be: for it is impossible to persuade him otherwise.
But chiefly do orators endeavour to root opinions out of the minds of men when they see that judges or hearers do otherwise judge than they themselves would have them. Aristotle proves that opinion is of all manner of things because men hold opinions even of things eternal. Men have opinions of many things concerning God, concerning angels, concerning heaven, and such like things, which philosophers consider eternal. Also, men have an opinion of things which cannot be, such as Chimeras, Centaurs, and such like monsters, and that the diameter is equal to the side lines of the quadrangle, which cannot possibly be.
Also, things necessary are otherwhile subject to opinion: for it may be that what one has perceived by knowledge, another believes by opinion. But when it is said that opinion is about all things, this must not be understood as concerning simple motions or single words but as touching propositions, which consist of many motions or words
and show that either a thing is or is not. Neither is there an opinion about all these things: for there are certain things, which of themselves are known either to the senses or to the mind.
For example, that fire is hot, we know certainly by the experiment of the senses, we do not have an opinion thereof; and that the whole is greater than its part, or that we pronounce of everything either that it is or is not (which things are called principles), we are not led by opinion, since they are known to our understanding. Opinion, therefore, is of all things; that is to say, of all propositions, which of themselves are not known to us.
Also, opinion is distinguished from divine faith: for faith signifies a firm assent given to the word of God, by the persuasion of the Holy
Ghost, so that it neither staggers nor wavers as opinion does.
The minor proposition of the argument aforesaid is thus proved: because choice is only of those things which may be done by us, wherefore it is not of all things, as opinion is.
Aristotle has another argument drawn from the parts. These two whole things, choice and opinion, do not have the same parts into which they might be divided; therefore, they are not the same. For the parts of choice are evil and good; but the parts of opinion are false and true opinion. Yet this argument may seem weak; for we commonly say there are many evil opinions; as if a man thinks that our souls are mortal, or that God does not by His providence care for men's actions. Whoever thinks these things is said to have ill opinions.
First, we answer that "ill" is understood here as it pertains to manners: and therefore Aristotle says that opinion is neither evil nor good because it is not reckoned among manners. But the common
sort calls opinions evil because what is false is evil, just as what is true is good. For those things commonly called transcendent are so joined together that true is good, and false is evil.
Also, these opinions may sometimes be called good or evil in a moral sense; because through those false or true opinions, men are stirred up either to good or to evil manners.
The next argument is taken from the effects, to prove that it cannot be particularly said that any kind of opinion is the same as choice.
Here we have to deal with the particular part because it has already been declared in general that opinion and choice differ.
Wherefore, lest anyone might say; they differ generally, and yet it may be that some opinion is a particular choice; Aristotle proves that this cannot be: because, he says, this is the effect of choice, that through a just cause we shall become men denominated of that quality; to wit, just men. But this does not happen in opinion; and therefore they are by no means the same.
What is said here is most evident in an incontinent man: for he, because he makes an ill choice, is said to be an evil man, whereas in other matters he may hold an opinion correctly. For concerning virtues, he judges rightly and thinks it is good to temper himself from unchastity and drunkenness, yet does not choose this: he is not called a good man.
But none can deny that even by conceiving an opinion, we become endowed with some certain kind of quality, since opinion itself is a quality, and even opinions give rise to some affects of the mind. But Aristotle is to be understood as touching that quality, whereby we conceive an opinion and make our choice: for in choosing chaste
things, we become chaste; by choosing strong things, we become strong; by choosing just things, we become just.
But it is not likewise true in general as touching opinion: for in conceiving an opinion of eternal things, we are not made eternal; nor yet in conceiving an opinion of anything touching justice, are we made just. However, this is true, that by true opinions we become more apt for virtues, and through false opinions, more prone to vices. But opinion itself does not immediately of itself communicate to us such forms or denominations; but yet it behoves that there be a choice had therein.
Moreover, choice is occupied in pursuing or avoiding, but so is not opinion: for when anything is offered to us, we begin to conceive an opinion of what it is, what commodity may be gained thereby, and how it must be used. But we do not so much conceive in our opinion whether the thing should be shunned or followed: for that rather pertains to choice. Indeed, between these things, there seems to be a certain order: for first, as I said, we conceive in opinion what it is, what profit it brings, and how it will serve our turn. These things being conceived in opinion, we then proceed either to pursue or to eschew the matter.
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