-- Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary
whomsoever a thing contingent (as the School-divines speak) is due, they have the same: and to whomsoever necessity belongs, with necessity they be constrained. But indeed, grace, which finally seems to resist free will, does not take the same away, but rather helps and restores it. But now we will cease from these matters, lest we dispute more curiously of them than befits Christians. Let everyone follow their own vocation; and let us leave inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let us follow that doctrine of God, which is plainly laid out before us in the holy scriptures.
Look in another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this book. Now we think it convenient to join unto this disputation certain other discourses; namely, of Voluntary and Not Voluntary, and also of man's choice, and such like.
Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary 41. Aristotle, in his first book of Ethics, treats at length the concepts of what is voluntary and what is not voluntary. The reason is that praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercy are voluntary. The argument is taken from the consequences. Praises and dispraises serve moral knowledge; for as commendable manners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blameworthy are to be avoided.
However, such praises and dispraises cannot be judged unless we know whether they are done with a willing or unwilling mind.
Further, he added another cause: that this doctrine is a part of the civil faculty, whereto belongs the making of laws. And laws set forth rewards and punishments to the observers and transgressors of them. Therefore, it is necessary to know which things are voluntary and which are not voluntary. For men that are unwilling do not
obtain rewards, and they who sin by compulsion should not suffer punishments.
Some wrest this reason of lawmakers hereunto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things which of necessity must be done, nor those things which are impossible to be done, but only those which are in our own power: and that therefore it behooves them to know what is the nature of voluntary and not voluntary. I know indeed that this is the definition of law: that it is a reason commanding honest things and calling back from things that are dishonest. But what these men avouch, namely, that it commands things which are possible, I would only grant it as touching civil laws, but not divine laws: for those require things that are impossible, especially in respect of the state of nature, corrupt and defiled. However, Aristotle used not this reason; he only touched on these things which I have mentioned regarding punishments and rewards.
But why did he speak of the affections, since those are not voluntary but are naturally planted in our minds? The Greek scholia answer that although, in substance and root, they are of nature, yet they may be called voluntary in some sense, insomuch as by use and exercise they may be enlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer that Aristotle mentioned both affections and actions, but "voluntary" must only be referred to actions. By doing this, it will also pertain to the virtues, which are concerned with the affections: for those are also acquired by actions, which, when they are right and commendable, must be accounted as voluntary. Moreover, why does
Aristotle say that sometimes pardon and sometimes mercy must be shown? Because we do not always take mercy on those whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself may kill someone who
attacks him; he did not do it willingly, he is forgiven, but we do not take pity on him.
42. How the knowledge of what is voluntary and not voluntary may help to moderate the punishments which laws appoint can be shown in many ways. Those who have committed anything against their wills or under compulsion are not punished. And in the civil laws, there are many provisions that provide remedies in the case of ignorance or compulsion, just as they do concerning those things which are done out of fear, by crafty collusion, and concerning those who are under 25 years of age, etc. Also, someone who is taken with madness or frenzy is forgiven; even a madman, although he kills his father, shall not be punished. The laws of God acquit the hewer of wood who, by chance and not willingly, kills another, because perhaps the axe might fly out of the handle, and certain cities were appointed for refuge. Also, Plato in his ninth book of laws shows that many things are to be forgiven where the will did not consent.
Therefore, it greatly benefits lawmakers and judges, because of giving punishments and rewards, to know what is done voluntarily and what is not done voluntarily.
We will first speak of what is not voluntary, for in this matter, the privation seems to be better known than the thing itself. Light is better known by darkness, and the goodness of health by sickness.
This definition of "not voluntary" appears by the enumeration of its parts, so that it is rather a division than a definition, albeit that just and full divisions sometimes take the place of a definition. We then chiefly use them when that which is common to the parts cannot be expressed by any one certain point thereof. However, we must understand that it is called "not voluntary" of these two forms or kinds, which are of one signification: for even that which is done violently and unwittingly is not voluntary. And we prove that the
division of these two parts is rightly made: for "voluntary," which is contrary to "not voluntary," consists of two things: knowledge and desire. First, we must know that which we must desire; then are we stirred up thereto by a motion of desire. But either of these two may be hindered: ignorance takes away knowledge, and violence hinders desire. For good cause, therefore, are these two put contrary to that which is voluntary.
Violence is defined after this manner: It is a vehement enforcing, which either cannot be resisted at all or can be resisted only with great difficulty. But some may marvel how two things may be set against one: for against "voluntary" is set that which is done by violence, and also that which is done unwittingly. Hereunto we answer that there is but one set against one: constraint or "not voluntary" is set against willingness or "voluntary." But this unwillingness or "not voluntary" is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is done by violence and another that is done by ignorance.
43. As touching violence, Aristotle says that the beginning of its motion must be outward, for those things which are moved by an inward beginning are moved naturally, not violently. However, some cut off the latter particle that Aristotle includes, asserting that what suffers or acts does not bring any help to that beginning. Those who say this are mistaken. Consider a shipwreck caused by a great tempest: the winds, waves, and storms are external beginnings. Yet the wreck would not occur unless the shipmen themselves chose to cast away certain items from the ship. Similarly, those forced by a tyrant to commit shameful acts have the commandment of the tyrant as an external beginning, but these acts would not be performed without the individuals' own compliance. Therefore, these actions
have their beginnings outwardly but still involve some internal cooperation.
Others argue that "doing" is added in vain, asserting that if the beginning is an outward motion, it should be enough to call it suffering, not doing. We counter that the same things moved violently may also act as instruments: for example, a staff moved by us moves a stone. In a dense crowd, a person might be crushed by others who, although not acting of their own will, are driven by the crowd's movement. Aristotle's examples include a living creature being carried away against its will by others and inanimate objects like a person carried by the wind while sailing. If asked whether
"voluntary" and "without constraint" are the same, we answer that "without constraint" extends further than "voluntary." "Without constraint" can apply to inanimate things, whereas "voluntary" does not.
Knowledge arises from an outward object, though the same motion brings the sense to pass by the object in another order. The beginning Aristotle mentioned is the cause, specifically the efficient cause, sufficient to move by itself.
44. A question arises about certain actions that seem intermediate, wondering whether they are voluntary or not. The question might be simple, asking whether actions taken out of fear of greater evils, rather than for obtaining good, are voluntary. This situation occurred with Socrates, who refused to obey the thirty tyrants who demanded he kill an Athenian citizen under threat to his family. The question can also be twofold: whether actions taken out of fear of greater evils or for obtaining something otherwise unattainable are voluntary. For instance, a lie told to save a life, although inherently wrong, raises the question of whether it is voluntary.
Adultery is another example. If someone commits adultery to gain the tyrant's wife's favour to kill the tyrant, is this act voluntary? We know the great pains merchants endure, and the ambitions and pleasures pursued for their ends, which they wouldn't face without a perceived benefit. Therefore, whether these actions are voluntary is questioned.
For instance, death, breach of chastity, bondage, ungodliness, and similar great evils drive people to commit shameful acts to avoid them. Notable examples include Cato, who chose death over subjugation, Regulus, who returned to Carthage to face death to keep his word, and Virginius, who killed his daughter to preserve her honour.
Scriptures provide examples too. Lot offered his daughters to protect his guests, while his daughters later committed incest to preserve humanity. Abraham endangered Sarah's chastity to avoid death, and Judith risked hers to save her people. We do not debate whether these actions were right but question whether they were voluntary.
There is a difference between wicked individuals who commit evil for personal gain and those who, driven by a sense of duty, commit acts under dire circumstances. Some claim they are compelled to act to achieve great good, while others attribute their actions to tyrannical oppression.
Today, many renounce Christian truth under persecution. An analogy is the casting forth of goods during a storm: done under compulsion, it serves to clarify our understanding of voluntary actions in the face of extreme necessity.
45. The actions we have discussed are mixed actions. Since they can be omitted and are not of such necessity that they must be done, they seem voluntary. However, because no one would choose them for their own sake, they seem not voluntary but rather close to the
nature of voluntary actions because they involve a comparison of evils. Two evils are proposed: poverty with the loss of goods or death while retaining those goods. The will chooses the lesser evil to avoid the greater. Therefore, when the will plays a part in these actions, they must be called voluntary.
Furthermore, Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, notes that the lesser evil has the consideration of the good and is greatly to be desired, since what is desired is good. There is no doubt that it is the will that chooses the end. The end of these actions is related to the present moment.
For instance, mariners cast goods into the sea to ensure their safety, which they cannot achieve otherwise. Therefore, the will chooses to cast the goods away.
Thus, we must judge these actions according to the present time while they are performed. No one would choose these actions before or regret them afterward, but at the moment, a choice is made. Since the original decision lies with the doer, who can choose to act or not, these actions are said to be voluntary. Although generally, these actions are not voluntary because no one desires them for themselves, they are desired in context, with knowledge and present will. Hence, they are voluntary actions.
46. These mixed actions are proved to be voluntary for two reasons: they must be judged according to the present time, and they are within the power of the doer. Without the will moving the instrumental parts, these actions would not occur. A third reason is taken from praise and dispraise: since people are sometimes praised or dispraised for suffering vile and shameful things, these actions must be voluntary. Praise and dispraise apply only to voluntary actions.
Aristotle notes that praise or dispraise is given depending on the context: either for not enduring shameful things for great and excellent causes or for enduring them for light and unworthy causes.
Aristotle mentioned the former but not the latter. Great and honorable causes include one's country, parents, children, wife, justice, and similar values.
For instance, Zopyrus the Persian mutilated himself to betray Babylon to King Darius, and Ulysses disguised himself to spy on the Trojans. Conversely, Dolo was dispraised for revealing his country's secrets to avoid torment. It is essential to clarify that when shameful things are to be endured, it does not mean committing wickedness or crimes, which must never be done for any utility or honor. It means enduring actions that bring some grief and reproach.
For example, if a magistrate is asked to run like a servant through the streets or wear a woman's garment for great preferment or lawful gain, he might do so. These must be significant matters for which one endures such things to be praised. The examples from the Scholies suggesting lying or committing adultery to kill a tyrant are not valid, as Aristotle did not mean sinful actions. Praise corresponds to virtues, and dispraise to vices.
Some people, due to their abject and vile minds, are rightfully dispraised for not enduring anything for a just and honest matter.
Soldiers who abandon their posts or surrender strongholds without constraint are dispraised. Similarly, those ready to do anything to avoid paying money are dispraised.
47. It is evident why Aristotle said that sometimes praise follows the suffering of grievous things, because this does not happen continually. For sometimes, neither praise nor dispraise occur in such cases, but pardon is given. This happens when a person, under
extreme duress, acts in a way that is beyond the power of human nature to withstand. Aristotle states that we pardon someone in such circumstances. If a person is threatened with being burned or cut asunder, and they yield by disclosing secrets or suffering any vile thing, they are pardoned. Some even believe that in such cases, it is lawful to lie.
Aristotle adds that there are certain things which no one ought to endure, and they should rather face anything than submit. Therefore, our martyrs hold the right opinion, choosing to endure anything rather than abandon godliness. Aristotle gives an example from Euripides' tragedy, where Alcmaeon is not pardoned for killing his mother because the cause was trivial or ridiculous.
Since the actions we discuss are mixed—both voluntary and not voluntary—when the voluntary aspect prevails, praise or dispraise follows. However, if the involuntary aspect predominates and it seems the person acted against their will, they are forgiven. Mixed actions consist of two elements: one can dominate over the other.
Aristotle rightly makes exceptions for grievous crimes that cannot be pardoned. For instance, who will forgive someone who condemns an innocent person, commits adultery, betrays their country, or denies godliness under torture?
Anaxarchus, to avoid pleasing the tyrant, was beaten in a mortar with iron pestles, saying, "Beat on, Anaxarchus's bag." He refused to change his will or yield to torment. Zeno bit off his own tongue during torture to avoid betraying his fellow conspirators. Aristotle thus categorizes four kinds of people: those praised for enduring grievous things, those dispraised, those pardoned, and those who receive no pardon.
48. Aristotle discusses two difficult issues regarding suffering or not suffering grievous things for an honest cause. The first pertains to judgment, as it is often unclear what should be suffered for a cause.
Should one suffer in matters of the mind, body, or fortune? What kind of things should or should not be suffered? Aristotle rightly says this can be hard to judge, though it is sometimes clear that wickedness should never be suffered.
For instance, Achilles doubted whether to seek a long, obscure life at home or a short, glorious life at Troy. A son might wonder whether to stay silent or betray a father who robs his country. David might question whether to feign madness or be slain by a barbarous king.
Comparing sorrowful and dishonest things is challenging, and virtue lies in difficult matters, bringing either praise or dispraise. The variety of circumstances increases the difficulty, preventing clear rules.
The second difficulty arises from a lack of strength, not judgment.
When safe and free from sorrow, we see clearly what to choose and often discern rightly. However, experiencing grief, pain, and torment changes our perspective. Thus, we may advise the sick well when healthy, but not ourselves when ill. Those who maintain their good intentions despite adversity are commendable, while those who falter are to be dispraised.
Themistocles is greatly praised for preferring death over bearing arms against his country. Conversely, those who deny godliness to avoid torment or death are most worthy of dispraise.
49. When Aristotle had set down two kinds of actions that are Not Voluntary, he then refuted the opinion of those who proposed a third kind. These individuals claimed that wicked actions committed for the sake of pleasure and profit are violent, and that only actions
rightly consenting to reason are truly voluntary. Aristotle refuted this view with several reasons:
1. First Reason: If this were true, all our actions would be violent, as we often act for pleasure and profit.
2. Second Reason: Violence is accompanied by sadness, but those pursuing pleasure are glad, not sad; thus, these actions are not violent.
3. Third Reason: If this were the case, every evil person could excuse their actions by blaming external factors like pleasure and profit, claiming they were forced by these things—an absurdity.
4. Fourth Reason: If their opinion were true, no sins or wicked acts could be held accountable, as they could always be excused as done against one's will or violently.
Aristotle argued that it is laughable to blame external factors rather than oneself for being swayed by pleasure and profit. One should resist these temptations and not be diverted from just actions. If people attribute honesty to themselves, they must also take responsibility for dishonest actions, as both types of actions originate from within us. Aristotle's view contrasts with Plato, who said good men are good by will and choice, while evil men are unwillingly evil.
Aristotle asserted that both good and evil actions are voluntary, driven by our own choices in response to external stimuli.
50. Having discussed Not Voluntary actions due to violence, let us now consider those arising from ignorance. Aristotle asserted that actions done out of ignorance cannot be called voluntary because voluntary actions require knowledge of what is done. He
distinguished between those who, upon realizing their ignorance, feel remorse and those who do not.
1. Remorseful Ignorance: Those who repent after realizing their mistake are termed as acting against their will.
2. Non-remorseful Ignorance: Those who do not regret their actions are described as having acted without willingness but not against their will.
In the initial division of actions, some were voluntary and some not voluntary. We began with Not Voluntary actions, further divided into those done by force (violence) and those done by ignorance. Violent actions are those whose origin is external and where the doer or sufferer does not contribute to the action. Actions done through ignorance can be with or without repentance. The former are simply against the will, while the latter, upon realization and lack of remorse, are closer to voluntary actions.
Examples:
Oedipus: According to the myth, Oedipus killed his father and married his mother unknowingly. Upon learning the truth, he was so remorseful that he blinded himself. Hence, his actions were against his will.
Tiberius: Tiberius tortured his host at Rhodes unknowingly, and upon realizing his identity, he executed him without remorse. Initially, his action was not willing, but as he did not regret it, it cannot be said to be against his will.
Another example is a person who kills a man, mistaking him for a wild beast, and feels sorry afterward—this is against his will.
Conversely, someone who receives gold instead of owed brass and rejoices in the error did it not willingly but also not against his will.
Thus, the principle can be summarized: Actions done violently or against the will involve sorrow or repentance, but not all actions done out of ignorance involve these emotions. Therefore, not all ignorant actions are violent or against the will.
51 There is also another distinction used. It is one thing to act through ignorance and another for the doer to be ignorant. Actions done through ignorance occur when ignorance is in some way the cause of the action. Conversely, many act while ignorant due to some severe perturbation, which they themselves have caused, thereby bringing error upon themselves. These situations differ as the general and the specific kind, as something spread out and something drawn together. Whoever acts through ignorance is indeed ignorant, but not everyone who is ignorant acts through ignorance.
Aristotle provides examples, starting with drunkenness. Many things are done by drunken individuals where they are unaware of their actions, yet they are not properly said to act unwittingly because they could have abstained from excessive wine. Those who drink more than necessary bring ignorance upon themselves. Thus, such a vice does not cause actions to be deemed against their will. Another example is anger: those greatly enraged often do not know what they are doing, but they do not act against their will. They should have tempered their anger and achieved the virtue to moderate such perturbation. Since they did not, they are not excused for their misdeeds done in anger. In short, ignorance of this kind does not constrain the will but indicates wickedness; otherwise, every wicked person would be excused. That evil people are ignorant is evident
because they do not know what to pursue or avoid. They are deceived by their own lusts, misunderstanding what is truly pleasant and profitable and what is truly grievous and damnable. Therefore, their judgment is corrupt, and they do not understand the nature of the end for which they act.
52 The reasoning can be framed thus: Not every evil person acts through ignorance, but every evil person acts while being ignorant.
Therefore, acting while ignorant and acting through ignorance are different things. The major proposition is clear; if evil people acted through ignorance, they could be excused. We have already explained that they are ignorant. General ignorance does not excuse because it pertains to the entire matter, not just the circumstances.
For example, if someone is ignorant that fornication or adultery are sins, they are not excused because they should have known this. In fact, they are more grievously accused for such ignorance. However, particular ignorance, related to circumstances, does excuse and deserves pardon because the circumstances could not be known.
Sometimes such cases arise where no one can know the circumstances for certain. But general ignorance, which could have been remedied, does not obtain mercy. If someone remains ignorant, it is their fault for not knowing, suggesting a desire to remain ignorant. If the excuse of universal ignorance were valid, no wicked person could be accused. The error arises because they seek only pleasure and profit, neglecting virtue and honesty.
Plato, in his dialogue Meno, explains this well. He assumes no one wishes to be miserable and unhappy. Given this, he concludes no one desires evil things, as being miserable and unhappy involves engaging with evil things and finding delight in them. Thus, evil
people unknowingly choose evil things. Cicero notes that this error is ingrained in us from our upbringing.
General ignorance does not cause one to act against their will because it does not hinder their choice. In fact, it is joined with it; evil people choose to steal rather than labor, to be idle rather than practice any art, and to indulge rather than abstain. Sometimes the entire matter may be generally unknown, other times it is generally known but specifically unknown. For instance, someone may know adultery is a sin but be ignorant that a specific act of adultery is forbidden. Neither form of ignorance is worthy of pardon.
However, if someone does not know the circumstances in general and believes that the end, place, time, or matter of their action does not need consideration, they are not worthy of mercy or pardon.
General perception belongs to universal knowledge, which is essential. But ignorance of specific circumstances can be excused since no one can perfectly know all such particulars. Thus, only ignorance of particular circumstances makes the action against the will.
53 Because such circumstances are of great importance (as they obtain pardon and mercy when unknown), Aristotle enumerates them so they can be thoroughly examined and understood. There are seven or eight of these circumstances, often remembered by a common verse in the schools:
Who, what, where, whereby: Wherefore, how, and when.
These are seven, but one is missing, namely, "Whereabout," which signifies the matter or subject of the action. Aristotle's "Wherein" signifies two things: place and time. Thus, if we want the complete number, there are eight circumstances. This can be explained as
follows: either we consider the causes of the action, or we consider the nature or substance of the action itself. If the cause is efficient, it is addressed by the circumstance "Who." If it is the end, it is considered under "Wherefore." If it concerns the matter, it falls under "Whereabout." If it involves instruments or means, it pertains to the efficient cause, "Who."
When we consider the action itself, its nature is expressed by the circumstance "Whereby." When considering its measure, we look at time and place, addressed by "When" and "Where." Lastly, we regard the manner, which pertains to quality and is the circumstance
"How."
Aristotle states that no one is ignorant of all these circumstances simultaneously. A person may be ignorant of one or another individually, but not of all collectively unless they are utterly foolish.
For instance, it is not generally true that someone could be ignorant of the efficient cause. If they themselves are the efficient cause, it is harder to be unaware of oneself. Yet, it can happen that someone might steer a ship without noticing, being preoccupied with another matter. This discussion is to be understood mostly as concerning moral actions.
The matter is clarified by examples. Did the circumstances excuse Aeschylus the tragic poet? He appeared to reveal sacred mysteries of Ceres in a tragedy, causing a great tumult in the theatre, nearly resulting in his death. He fled to the altar of Bacchus and was brought to judgment before the Areopagites. He pleaded that he did not know those things were mysteries and was acquitted because of his ignorance.
Another man built a war engine that cast stones. Demonstrating its effect, he accidentally killed someone. He excused himself, claiming
ignorance of what he did. The circumstance "Whereabout" (the matter or subject of action) is exemplified by Merope, who mistakenly killed her son, thinking he was her enemy. This error pertains to the circumstance "Whereabout," as seen in Euripides' tragedy "Cresphontes," which is no longer extant.
Sometimes we are ignorant of "Wherewith" (the means), such as thinking one is using a blunt spear when it is actually sharp, or throwing a stone instead of a pumice, resulting in harm. Ignorance of the end also excuses; for example, a man might administer medicine or perform surgery for health reasons, only to have an adverse effect, excused by ignorance of the outcome.
The manner of the action, if performed unwillingly, can also excuse.
For example, in a wrestling match, if one competitor unintentionally injures another while intending a light strike, he is excused.
Ignorance of principal circumstances such as "Wherefore,"
"Whereabout," or "Wherein" often excuses an action.
Aristotle's omission of place and time as circumstances needing examples is not surprising, as these might be considered self-evident.
Yet, it is possible for someone to be unaware that their actions occur in a sacred place or on a holy day.
54 If actions done against the will are attributed to ignorance of particular circumstances, additional criteria include the discovery of the error and resulting grief or repentance. Without such grief, the action may be termed "not voluntary" but not "against the will."
Understanding how ignorance can cause an action to be against the will is essential. Ignorance deprives one of knowledge, which would otherwise prevent the action or make it voluntary. Thus, ignorance