CHAPTER II: Of Free Wil

CHAPTER II: Of Free Wil

drowned in the flood, all things were burned in Sodom, and all creatures were destroyed in Egypt due to Pharaoh's obstinacy. In his book De reparandis lapsis to Theodorus, Chrysostom shows that after Judgment Day, all things shall be renewed, and the glory of the Lord revealed, filling all things.

Greek scholars acknowledge the figure Prosopopoeia and affirm that the creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption because it was made subject to corruption for our sakes. They explain that the adoption of the sons of God shall be revealed because the sons of God are now among the children of the devil and cannot easily be distinguished. Moreover, we are pressed with afflictions, surrounded by infirmities, and defiled with many falls. Although these do not frustrate the adoption we have by faith, they so obscure and dim it that without the inward testimony of the Spirit, it cannot be known. But our glory shall be revealed in due time, and it shall not only appear but also be given to us. We have it now, though not fully and perfectly; then it shall be perfected, obtaining all that is now wanting.

CHAP. II. - Of Free Will Now it shall be good to discuss somewhat the liberty of our will. At this present, we will inquire how much free will the natural corruption, which came by original sin, has left unto us, especially seeing whatsoever we do well, all that is said to be attributed to the grace of God. And although this word 'free will' is not read in the Holy Scriptures, yet the thing itself must not seem to be either

imagined or devised. The Greeks call it ἐξ αὐτοῦ, which is 'of his own power' or 'of his own right': the same thing the Latins signify when they call it 'libertatem arbitrii', that is, the liberty or the choice of will. For that is free, which follows not the will of another, but his own will. The choice seems herein to consist in that we follow, as we think good, those things which are decreed by reason. Then doubtless the will is free when it embraces those things which are allowed by the considering part of the mind. Wherefore, the nature of free choice, although it does most of all declare itself in the will, yet the root thereof consists in reason. But they who will use this power aright must have a special regard that there falls no error into reason.

This error commonly comes in two ways: either it is unknown to us what is just and what is unjust in the doings of things; or else, if we do know it, yet we fail in giving judgment of the reasons which are alleged on both sides. For often, our desire joins itself to the weaker argument. Wherefore, it often happens that the stronger and the better reason is neglected and forsaken.

This we see often happens in disputations: for those who take upon them to defend the weaker part are wont to dress up the same with all the ornaments and colors they can, so that the hearers, being allured with eloquence and counterfeit speech, may not thoroughly weigh wherein the strength and weight of the argument consists.

Moreover, it is to be understood that men do not commonly deliberate concerning all manner of things, but only those which are called πρακτικά by the Greeks, that is, which are to be done by us.

Indeed, all the things which we either pursue or avoid do not need deliberation: for there are some things so manifestly and undoubtedly good or evil that it suffices they be named; for they are immediately either chosen or refused: such are felicity, infelicity, life,

death, and whatever is of the like sort. But there are certain other more obscure or indifferent things upon which men are wont to deliberate.

That God is to be worshipped, all men confess without any doubting; but after what manner, and with what rites and ceremonies he must be worshipped, therein is great doubt. That it is profitable for men to be together in cities and to maintain fellowship, all men do know; but by what laws they must be ruled, or what kind of commonwealth ought to be used, there men many times do doubt very much. In these and such other like things, free will is occupied.

2. I define free will after this sort: Free will is a faculty or power whereby we either take or refuse, as we desire ourselves, those things which are judged by reason. But whether such a kind of power exists in men or not, or how it exists in them, cannot be defined with one answer. First, we must necessarily distinguish the state and condition of man. There are verily found in man four different states at the least: for the state of Adam, when he was created in the beginning, was far different from the state after his fall, such as is now also the state of all his posterity. Moreover, those who are regenerated in Christ are in a far better state than those who live without Christ, for we shall become most happy and most free when we have put off this mortal body. Wherefore, we will answer the proposed question according to these four states.

We must believe that Adam in his first creation had free will. Before I declare this, three kinds of works that are in us are to be noted. Of these, some pertain to nature: as to be sick, to be in health, to be nourished, to digest our food, and such other like: in these things, albeit the first man was a great deal happier than we are at present, yet he was subject to some necessity: for it behooved him both to eat,

to be nourished, and to take food. Nevertheless, he was free from all calamities which might bring death.

There are other works also, which after a civil or moral consideration, are either just or unjust. The third kind is of those works which are pleasing and acceptable to God. Concerning all these, man was free from the beginning, for he was created in the image of God, to whom nothing agrees better than true and perfect liberty. Of him it is thus written: God has crowned him with glory and honour; and again: When he was in honour, he knew it not. And what honour can there be where liberty is lacking? Lastly, God made all things which he had created subject to him: which without doubt he could not truly and according to right reason have governed if he himself had been created a slave to affections and lusts. But in what sort that state was, seeing there is a lack of scripture to show us, nothing can be defined for certainty.

Augustine, in his book De correptione et gratia, says that the help of the grace of God was bestowed upon Adam: and such a help it was, as both he might forsake it when he would, and in it might remain if he would; but not that it should be as he would. And as for this thing,

Augustine dares prefer the grace which we enjoy by Christ above that grace which Adam had in paradise: for now, by the grace of Christ, not only do we abide if we will, but also (as Paul says) we have both to will and to perform; for the heart of believers is changed, so as of not willing, they are made willing. And this same 'to will' was in the very choice of the first man, neither was it the grace of God that wrought this in him. But why God gave free will to Adam in his first creation, Augustine brings this reason in his second book De libero arbitrio: for that God had decreed to declare to him both his goodness and his justice. And he would have declared towards him his goodness if he had done well, which thing undoubtedly he could

not have done if he had not been free. But if he should behave himself dishonestly and naughtily, God was to use towards him the severity of his justice. But he, when he was free, fell miserably. And even as Christ describes the man coming down from Jerusalem to Jericho, to have fallen among thieves, to be ill-treated by them: so he

[to wit Adam], not only having his garment taken away, lost all his ornaments; but also having received many wounds, was left for half dead and destitute of hope.

3. Wherefore we say, concerning this second state of man, when we are strangers from Christ, there is but a little freedom remaining to us: for we are subject to the necessities of nature and are afflicted with diseases, whether we will or not; and last of all, we are struck with death. However, there is some freedom left concerning works that are civil and moral: for these things are both subject to our natural knowledge, and also they do not exceed the powers of our will. Yet in them also men experience great difficulty because licentious lusts resist moral honesty. Enticements and pleasures always hurt our senses, and these are set forward by wicked persuaders; Satan also continually urges us and drives us forward. For he, envying man's welfare and perceiving that civil discipline is still retained by such works, covets by all means to overthrow them. But that man's power may do much in these civil matters, at least in respect of judgment, many good laws set forth by Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, and various others sufficiently declare. And Paul to the Romans says: Do you think, O man, that you shall escape the judgment of God, when you do the same things that you judge?

Moreover, in these things there are two points which must not be passed over. The first is that God uses the will of man for the ends which he has appointed. The second is (which also depends on the first) that those events do not follow which they appoint who apply

themselves to civil works: for oftentimes things happen far otherwise than they ever imagined could be. Hence it comes to pass that pagan men are often troubled. Pompey, Cato, and Cicero thought to themselves that they had intended excellent counsel: but when the same came to nothing, there remained nothing but desperation for the authors; for being disappointed of their purposes, they attributed all to fortune and chance. But Jeremiah declares that the success and event of things are in the hands of God: The way of man (says he) is not in his own power, nor does it lie in man to direct his own steps.

The Hebrews expound this place of Nebuchadnezzar, who (they say) went forth from his house not against the Jews, but to make war upon the Ammonites, as we read in the 21st chapter of Ezekiel: but when he came to a way that had two turnings, he began to deliberate and to take counsel of the entrails of beasts, of idols, and of lots by the brightness of a sword: and having received guidance, he set upon Judah, and leaving the Ammonites, he besieged Jerusalem. These two things are not hidden from the godly; namely, that God is the author of counsel and gives such a success to things as he will.

Therefore, they determine nothing with themselves without adding this condition: If God wills it, which James warned us to do. Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, says that he desires to have a prosperous journey to them, but yet by the will of God. Wherefore, if things happen otherwise than they looked for, they are comforted in themselves because they know that God, their most loving father, better provides both for his own kingdom and their salvation than they could have provided for themselves. They always have in their mouth what David sang: Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labour in vain. Therefore, it is their care that they may frame and apply their counsels to the word of God, and the event they commit to God: and so they work surely on every part.

4. But in those works which are acceptable and grateful unto God, such men as are strangers from God have no freedom at all. From this came that saying of Augustine in his Enchiridion: "Man, abusing his free will, has lost both himself and also the liberty of his will; for when sin got the upper hand in battle, it brought man into bondage."

I know there are some who interpret this sentence of Augustine as saying that Adam lost free will concerning grace and glory, with which he was adorned, but not concerning nature. Truly, I will not labour much here to deny that the reason and will, which belong to nature, were left to man after his fall. However, that the same nature is imperfect and wounded, they themselves cannot deny. The Master of the Sentences also affirms this in his second book and 25th distinction: he says that a man now after his fall is in such a case as he may sin; and that it fares with him as he cannot but sin. Although

Augustine and others did not affirm it so, yet most sound reason might teach it to us.

For holy works depend upon two principles: knowledge and appetite.

Concerning knowledge, Paul says, "The natural man does not understand those things which are of the Spirit of God; indeed, he cannot, for they are foolishness to him." If we do not know what is to be done and what is pleasing to God, by what means may we show the same in our work?

Moreover, in what sort our appetite and thoughts are toward those holy works is shown by the sixth chapter of Genesis: "My spirit," says

God, "shall not strive in man forever, because he is flesh." And a little after: "God saw that the malice of man was great, and all the imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil every day." In the eighth chapter: "The imagination of man's heart is evil even from his infancy." These things God himself speaks; there is none to be

believed better than him who made us, when he gives testimony of his own work.

In the 18th chapter of Jeremiah, the people said, "We will follow our own imaginations." Jerome, expounding this passage, writes:

"Where is therefore the power of free will, and the judgment of man's own will, without the grace of God; seeing it is a great offence to God for a man to follow his own thoughts, and to do the will of his wicked heart?" That we are subject to servitude, Christ teaches us in John, saying, "He that does sin is the servant of sin." Wherefore, seeing we commit many things and have sins cleaving to us from our mother's womb, we must necessarily grant that we are servants. But we shall be free indeed if the Son sets us at liberty; otherwise, we serve in a most bitter bondage.

Paul said he was sold under sin, and so sold that in his flesh he confessed that no good thing dwelt; he did the things he would not and hated, and felt another law in his members, resisting the law of the mind and leading him captive to the law of sin. To the Galatians, he says, "The flesh strives against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do what we would."

If these things are true, touching so worthy an apostle and holy men regenerated by Christ, what shall be thought of the wicked, who do not belong to Christ? They cannot come to him unless they are drawn: for Christ says, "None can come to me unless my Father draws him." As Augustine says, one who would go before of his own accord is not drawn but led. If we must be drawn to Christ, in that we would not before, the same is a most grievous sin. Therefore, we will not, because "The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be." Those who are not set at liberty by Christ live under the law and, as Paul adds to the

Galatians, are under the curse. This would not be true if they could fulfil the law of God, for they incur the danger of the curse only if they transgress the law.

Paul expressly says, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy." Our salvation is his work, not the work of our strength. It is he who works in us, both to will and to perform.

Before he does that, whatsoever he does with us, either by the law or by the instruction of his word, he deals with stones; for our hearts are stony unless God changes them into fleshy hearts, which he promises in Ezekiel to do, and will bring to pass that we should walk in his ways.

Surely, if we might live well and rightly without grace, we might also be justified by our own works, which doctrine is utterly condemned by Paul and all the holy scripture. Jeremiah says, "Convert me, O

Lord, and I shall be converted." David says, "A pure heart create in me, O God." That this does not come to pass in all men, we perceive from the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, where it is written, "The Lord has not given you eyes to see, nor ears to hear, nor a heart to understand." In the 30th chapter, God promises that he will circumcise their hearts and the hearts of their seed, that they should walk in his commandments. For he both begins and finishes our salvation: Paul says to the Philippians, "I hope that he who has begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Christ."

Understanding this, holy men pray with David, "Incline my heart to your testimonies," and with Solomon, "The Lord shall incline our hearts that we may walk in his ways," and with Paul to the Thessalonians, "The Lord direct your hearts in patience and in the expectation of Christ." Solomon in his proverbs says, "The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclines it to whatever end he

wills." These testimonies sufficiently declare that it is God's work, not ours, to be converted to him and to do uprightly.

5. Here some object to us the commandments which are set forth in the Holy Scriptures, for they seem to signify that it lies in ourselves to observe those things we are commanded. Isaiah says, "If you will and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land."

And the Lord often commands us that we should convert ourselves to him: "Be converted," he says, "to me; I do not desire the death of a sinner, but rather that he be converted and live." When he had published the law, he said that he had set before them life and death, blessing and cursing. An infinite number of other such testimonies might be brought.

But here it must be considered that these things are indeed commanded to men, but we are nowhere taught that a man is able to perform them by his own strength. Neither is it appropriate to measure the greatness of our own strength by the precepts of God's law, as though we could accomplish as much on our own as God's law commands. Rather, our infirmity is to be measured by this: that when we see the excellency and worthiness of God's commandments exceed our strength by innumerable degrees, we may remember that the law has a certain other end than to be performed by us.

Paul shows that end to be manifold: "By the law," he says, "comes the knowledge of sin," which he says was made so that the number of transgressions might be increased. By this means, "The law has become a schoolmaster to lead men to Christ," so that when they see themselves overburdened with the heavy weight of the commandments and the greatness of their sins, they may perceive their salvation to consist only in the mercy of God and the redemption of Christ. Considering our weakness and unworthiness,

we immediately begin to pray to God that he will, for Christ's sake, pardon our sins and give us the sufficiency of his Spirit so that we may endeavour to follow his will. "Give what you command," says

Augustine, "and command what you will."

Furthermore, another use of the law is that we should see to what we must apply ourselves. Also, it may be that through the grace of God, if there is an increase of obedience begun, men may apply themselves to the law. Lastly, though in this life it is not given to us that we can in every condition satisfy the law, we shall fully obtain the same in another life when we shall cast away all this corruption. Yet God ought not to be accused of injustice for this, for he is not at fault that men are not able to keep his commandments. Neither can any of us be excused because we willingly and greedily break the law that is appointed to us. The same was given in such a manner as it might best agree with our nature when it was first instituted, for the image of God could not by any other means be more plainly and effectually expressed. And if, because of sin, we are not able to accomplish the law, yet at least we see what manner of persons we ought to be.

6. But that sentence, which is commonly objected: "Nothing is to be counted sin which does not depend on election," must be understood

(as Augustine interprets it) of that kind of sin which is not the punishment of sin, for otherwise, original sin is neither voluntary nor received by election. But you will say, "Seeing the matter stands thus, we shall seem of necessity to stick fast in sin," which indeed I do not deny; although such is this necessity, as it has no compulsion joined with it. God is of necessity good and cannot sin by any means, and yet he is not driven by force to be good. Augustine, in his 22nd book

De Civitate Dei and 30th chapter, declares this very well: "Because God himself," he says, "cannot sin, shall we therefore deny that he has free will?" Ambrose, in his second book and third chapter De

Fide to Emperor Gratian, testifies that God is free when he says:

"One and the same Spirit works all things, dividing to all as it pleases him according to the choice of his free will, and not to obey necessity."

In these sentences of the fathers, free will is taken as contrary to violence and compulsion, not as equally bent to either part. Jerome, in his homily of the prodigal son, which he wrote to Damasus, because he took free will in another sense, wrote otherwise: "It is only God," he says, "on whom sin does not fall nor can fall; but others, since they have free will, may be bent every way." It is also agreeable to blessed spirits and angels that they cannot sin, seeing their felicity is already confirmed.

Wherefore Augustine, in his 22nd book De Civitate Dei and 30th chapter, says: "Even as the first immortality, which Adam through sin lost, was that it was possible he should not die; even so the first free will was that it was possible he should not sin; but the last free will shall be that he shall not possibly sin." Yet nevertheless, there is granted a certain kind of liberty to them, not whereby they can be bent to either part, but such that, although what they do is of necessity, they are not compelled or violently driven. Just as there are certain true things so manifest that the mind cannot but consent to them, so the presence of God, now revealed and made manifest, is so good a thing that the saints cannot fail or forsake it. Likewise, although we of necessity sin before we are regenerated in Christ, the powers of the will are not violated, for whatsoever we do, we do it willingly, and we are led to do it upon some hope.

We must not therefore be accounted to differ nothing from brute beasts, for they, although they are moved with a certain kind of judgment, it is not by a free judgment. But in men, although they are

not yet renewed, there is (as we have said) much liberty remaining concerning civil and moral works. Further, among the very sins in which they are necessarily involved, they have a choice to choose one and refuse another, though they cannot attain those things which please God. These things do not accord with brute beasts, for they are rather driven by the force of nature than that they can do anything by any liberty or free choice. Men may be said to be free, either in respect of compulsion, sin, or misery. The first liberty from compulsion is given to all men; however, unto sin and misery all men who have not attained to Christ are altogether subject.

After what sort men who are regenerate are subject either to sin or misery while they live here, I will declare afterward. In the meantime, we ought to be sure that the will is not constrained to sin through this necessity we speak of.

7. But that we may with more clarity and plainness declare this whole matter, it must first be determined what the words Free,

Violent, and Willing signify. We call that Free which, having two or more things set before it, can choose, as it desires, what it will.

Therefore, we deny that the will of unregenerate men is universally free, for it cannot choose those things which pertain to salvation.

Violent is that which is so moved by an outward cause that it of itself contributes nothing to that motion but rather resists it, as when a stone is cast on high. That is said to work of its own accord, or willingly, which has an inward cause inclining to that motion whereby it is driven. By these definitions, it is clear that to act of one's own accord and to act of necessity are not contrary to one another, for they may be joined together. This is evident in our will, which of necessity embraces felicity; yet it does so not against its will or by compulsion, but of its own accord and gladly. Neither is it possible that the will should be compelled to will what it does not

will. Augustine even thinks it so absurd that a man should will what he does not will, as if one should say that something can be hot without heat.

Yet the necessity by which the wicked are said to sin is not absolute and perfect, so that it cannot be otherwise. For as soon as the grace and Spirit of Christ come, that necessity is immediately loosed.

Augustine therefore says that it is natural to be able to have faith, hope, and charity; but to have them indeed is entirely the gift of grace, for that power or ability does not break forth into action unless grace is given from God. In this, Augustine agreed with the Pelagians: that to be able is natural. But Augustine added what

Pelagius did not allow: that to will well and to live uprightly is to be attributed to grace only. However, I think that regarding this power of nature, a distinction must be made: if they mean that our nature is so made by God that neither faith, hope, nor charity strive against it if given by God, but rather accomplish, perfect, and adorn it, I confess what they say is true. But if they mean that the power of nature signifies some strength by which it can claim these things for itself, I do not yield to them in any way, for it is a wicked and damnable opinion.

We say, therefore, that the will of man has respect to both good and evil, but in different ways. It may embrace evil of its own accord, but it cannot embrace good unless it is restored by the grace of God. We need divine inspiration to perform those things which are good, a point even the pagan writers, forced by the truth, sometimes declared. Aristotle, in his first book of Ethics, says, "If there be any gift of God, we must verily think it is felicity." And he defines felicity as nothing else but a most excellent action proceeding from the chief power of the mind by a most notable virtue. Plato confesses in a certain place that virtues are engendered in men by divine

inspiration. The Schoolmen also, if any were somewhat sounder than the rest, confessed that the grace of God is necessary to assist man's strength in every good work. However, afterward, forgetting themselves, they decreed that a man, not being renewed, may do some good deeds which may please God and merit the grace of Christ by congruity (as they term it).

8. They call congruity what we may call meet and good, which is when the rigour and sharpness of the law are remitted. But condignity they call that which is of right due. But those who first invented these terms did not consider that those goodly civil works, though in show they seem good to men, are sin before God, as Augustine by most certain reasons proves. Before we are converted to God, we are the children of wrath. John says, "He that believes not in the Son of God has not everlasting life, but the wrath of God abides upon him." What can be offered to God by his enemies and those who hate him that may be acceptable to him? Paul to the Ephesians says that before we came to Christ, we were dead in our offences and sins. Just as the dead feel nothing, they can bring nothing to pass whereby they should be called back to life. Paul to the Philippians counted all things he did before he was converted to Christ as loss and dung; so far was he from placing any merit in them.

God in the first chapter of Isaiah testifies that he abhorred, detested, and counted abominable those oblations which the Jews offered without faith and godliness. The same prophet compares all our righteousness to most vile and filthy rags. And our Saviour Christ says, "I am the vine, and you are the branches." Just as the branch cannot bear fruit unless it abides in the vine, so you can bring forth no fruit unless you abide in me. He adds, "Without me, you can do nothing." In another place, he says that an evil tree cannot bear good

fruit, for the root must first be good before any good fruit can be hoped to come from it. But good trees we cannot be before we are grafted in Christ. This grafting in the Holy Scriptures is called regeneration. Just as no man helps anything to the generation of himself, no man can help anything to the regeneration of himself.

Paul also says, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." Seeing therefore the wicked are without faith, whatsoever they do is to be reckoned as sin. If your eye is single, your whole body shall be single; but if your light is darkness, how great shall that darkness be? Unless faith is present, we live in darkness and necessarily cleave to sin.

Moreover, if we follow the opinion of these men, we utterly overthrow the nature of grace: for grace, if it should be of works (as Paul says), now ceases to be grace. Paul also adds that the Israelites, pursuing the law of righteousness, did not attain righteousness because they sought it by works and not by faith. Also to the Colossians, he teaches plainly what we are before we are justified:

"We are alienated," he says, "from God, enemies in mind, and engaged in evil works." In the epistle to the Romans, he calls men not yet grafted in Christ wild olive trees, and we know that wild olive trees are barren and cannot bear any fruit. Furthermore, works cannot be good unless they either satisfy the law or, if they stray from the law, it is not imputed to them because of Christ. But unrenewed men cannot satisfy the law, for even the regenerate cannot do it. Not being joined to Christ by faith, they cannot attain the benefit of Christ, whereby these imperfections are made whole and sound.

He who teaches that a man is able without the grace of God to do works acceptable to God must also of necessity teach that Christ is not the redeemer of the whole man. For he who teaches that we, without the grace of Christ, work well and live uprightly, ascribes to our nature no small part of salvation without Christ. Paul also in the

epistle to the Romans says, "When we were servants of sin, we were free from righteousness," which is nothing else but that we had no trade or acquaintance with righteousness. Furthermore, he exhorts us that just as we have served sin, so we will now be servants of righteousness. He also teaches that we should now altogether serve righteousness without any sin, as we served sin before altogether without righteousness. Lastly, he has left no mean at all between the servitude of sin and righteousness.

But these men, on the contrary, imagine some sort of persons who, although they are not yet justified, yet do good and just works which may be acceptable to God. All these things sufficiently teach how absurd and foolish these men's opinions are.

9. Yet in the meantime, they cry out that we are blasphemous for claiming the whole nature of man to be evil. But as Augustine prudently writes, "Under the praises of nature, lie hidden the enemies of grace." It is fitting that they should consider to what ground we refer that evil of which we complain, for we ascribe it neither to nature as it was created nor to God, but to sin, which entered through the first man. By all means, we disagree with the Manichees, for they believed that our nature is evil and that it was created evil by God. We confess and acknowledge that man was created free, and in that he has now lost his freedom, we do not ascribe this to God, but to man's own fault. Those who deny free will have been called heretics by the Church. This must be understood concerning the first creation of our nature; otherwise, there is not one of the fathers who, if the truth is well weighed, does not bewail the calamity of man into which he fell through sin.

Our adversaries come closer to the Manichees, who affirm that our corrupt affections, as they are now, were created by God. Thus, they

claim that He created them evil. But as we perceive that these troublesome affections are not void of sin, we deny that they were so created by God; instead, through our own fault, they have become unbridled and are repugnant to the word of God. It is certain that man, at the beginning, was made in the image of God, and there is nothing more fitting for this image than liberty. But seeing that this image was almost blotted out in us, necessitating restoration by Christ, it is no marvel if our liberty is also for the most part taken away. When they argue that man is free, they do so as if saying that a man is a two-footed creature and therefore able to walk upright. If they were to conclude thus of a lame man, it would easily appear how much they are deceived, for the properties of man, which would be agreeable to his nature when perfect, do not agree when applied to that nature being corrupt.

Neither do our adversaries' opinions differ much from the Pelagians, who taught that nature, being helped by the grace of creation and the doctrine of the law, may live uprightly. These men say that nature, being helped by grace preventing and knocking, is able to do good works that may please God. The Catholic Church resisted the Pelagians, contending not about the grace of creation or of the law, nor about the grace preventing, but taught that without the grace of Christ, whereby we are justified, none is able to work aright. By the judgment of Augustine, who vehemently contended against these men, there is no difference between doing rightly without grace and doing rightly without the faith of Christ. He, upon the 31st Psalm, to show that there is no good work without faith, writes thus: "A good intent makes the work good, but faith guides that intent: wherefore consider not what a man does, but what he has respect to while he is doing."

10. And whereas in all the Holy Scriptures, there is not one sentence repugnant to our doctrine, yet they continually object to us the example of Cornelius, who, being not yet (as they think) regenerate, nor believing in Christ, yet did such works as were acceptable to God.

Indeed, we grant that both the alms and prayers of Cornelius were pleasing to God, for the angel affirmed the same. But these men add their own belief that Cornelius, when he did these things, was not yet justified nor believed in Christ. They do not note that the scripture in that place called him religious and one that feared God; therefore,

Cornelius believed, and in the Messiah he believed, being instructed in the Jews' learning. However, whether Jesus of Nazareth was that Messiah, he did not know for certain, and thus Peter was sent to instruct him more fully.

To deceive us, they say that Paul, in the 17th chapter of Acts, attributes some godliness to the people of Athens, even though they were idolaters. He says, "Ye men of Athens, I show unto you, that God, whom you ignorantly worship." Just as a man who can draw one letter well is not therefore a good writer, nor is someone who can sing one or two verses well considered a singer, for these names require consideration and art, and it may happen by chance that a man may draw or sing well once or twice. Similarly, none is to be counted truly good who performs one or two good works with some show of godliness. But Paul did not call the Athenians godly without adding terms that diminish their godliness: "Whom you ignorantly worship." What piety can that be which is joined with ignorance of the true God? Moreover, he had called them "very superstitious," diminishing their piety.

But Luke absolutely calls Cornelius religious and adds that he "feared God," which addition is so significant that in the book of Job, a man fearing God is translated by the Seventy interpreters as "a true and

religious man." David says, "Blessed is the man that fears the Lord."

If blessed is the man who fears God, how is not the same man also justified? Besides these things, which in a way declare the justification of Cornelius, we have another testimony of the effects: he gave alms, which were acceptable to God. We have already proven by many reasons that none can do works acceptable to God but he who is justified and regenerate.

Further, he distributed these alms to the Jews, from whom he had been instructed in the skill of godliness, and would impart to them some of his temporal goods. "It is meet," as Paul says to the Galatians, "that he who is instructed should communicate to him who instructs him in all good things." Moreover, the soldier sent to Peter declares that Cornelius had a good testimony from all the Jews.

All these things show sufficiently that although we do not read that he was circumcised, he came so close to the doctrine of the people of God that all men commended his piety. It is also written that he prayed continually. If we diligently weigh the whole history, we shall find that he observed the same hour which the Jews had appointed for common prayer, for it says, "At the ninth hour he saw an angel standing by him, which gave him to understand that his prayer was heard." From the first chapter of Isaiah, the 15th of Proverbs, and many other places, we are taught that the ungodly and sinful are not heard by God. This must be understood as long as they would remain sinners and retain a will to sin.

11. Neither is what Augustine writes against the Donatists repugnant to this doctrine; namely, that the prayers of wicked priests are heard by God. He adds that this comes to pass by reason of the people's devotion. But Cornelius, when he prayed, was helped by his own faith, not through the faith of others who stood by. Augustine, in his epistle to Sixtus, says that God, in justifying a man, is wont to give

his Spirit, whereby he may pray for those things which are profitable for salvation. Seeing that Cornelius prayed for such things, there can be no doubt that he was justified.

Additionally, no man can rightly pray to God unless he has faith. We are justified by faith, as has been sufficiently testified and declared already. Peter also, before he began to preach to him, said that he perceived in very truth that God is no respecter of persons, but that he is accepted by him from any nation who works righteousness.

These words teach us plainly enough that Cornelius was already accepted by God before Peter came to him. I marvel that anyone dares affirm that Cornelius did not have faith in Christ, when Christ himself, in the eighth chapter of John, says that he who does not believe in the Son of God does not know God. In the 14th chapter, he admonishes his disciples, "If you believe in God, believe also in me," and "If you believed Moses, you would also believe in me."

These things assure us that Cornelius truly believed in God, and therefore also believed in the Messiah who was to come, as he had been instructed by the Jews, although he did not know that the Messiah had already come and that Jesus of Nazareth, whom the Jews had crucified, was the same Messiah. He had the same faith with which the fathers believed that Christ would come. Seeing that they were justified by the same faith, how dare we deny the same to Cornelius? Nathaniel, who believed that the Messiah would come and thought he was not yet come, is pronounced by Christ to be a true Israelite, in whom there was no guile. These two things cannot concur in a man who is not yet justified. Peter was sent to Cornelius so that he might more plainly and expressly know that which he had already intricately believed about Christ.

Gregory, in his 19th homily upon Ezekiel, says that faith is the entry whereby we come to good works, not the other way around. By good works, we cannot come to faith. Gregory concludes that Cornelius first believed before he could bring forth any laudable works. He cites Hebrews: "It is impossible to please God without faith." This sentence cannot be otherwise understood than of justifying faith.

Bede, expounding the third chapter of Acts, shares the same view and cites Gregory's words. The Master of the Sentences, in his second book and 25th distinction, holds a similar judgment.

Our adversaries object to us Augustine's words in his 7th chapter De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, where he argues against those who taught that faith is of ourselves, while they confessed that the works which follow are of God but obtained by faith. Augustine confesses that the works which follow faith are of God but denies that faith is of ourselves. He says that Paul writes to the Ephesians: "By grace you are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God." However, Augustine's hard saying is that the prayers and alms of Cornelius were accepted by God before he believed in Christ.

We must weigh the following: Augustine adds that Cornelius did not pray or give alms without some faith, for "how did he call upon Him in whom he did not believe?" These words plainly declare that Augustine did not take away all manner of faith in Christ from Cornelius but only an unfolded and distinct faith. This is shown by the epistle to the Romans: "How shall they call upon Him in whom they have not believed?" These words are written about the faith and invocation of regenerate men, as the next sentence plainly declares:

"Everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved," for we cannot attribute salvation to anyone except those who are justified. Peter was sent to Cornelius to build upon, not lay the foundation, for the foundations of faith were already laid in him.

12. But what Augustine adds seems to bring greater difficulty: "If Cornelius could, without the faith of Christ, be saved, that singular workman the Apostle should not have been sent to edify him." Yet, seeing that Augustine already attributed faith and invocation to Cornelius, after which salvation necessarily follows, as the Apostle speaks in Romans, how can he take salvation from him? Unless we understand that faith and salvation in justified men are not perfect while they live here. Our salvation does not in this life reach the degree or quantity Christ requires in his elect. No one may doubt that we will not attain perfect salvation until the resurrection and eternal salvation, although we have begun to enjoy it already. Paul to the Ephesians affirms that we are now saved by faith. Yet to the Philippians, he exhorts us to work out our salvation with fear and trembling. These places cannot be reconciled unless we say that the salvation begun in us through justification is daily made perfect in us. We are always being renewed, and our faith becomes more full, more expressed, and more effective.

These words of Augustine, unless interpreted in this way, either must be none of his, or he is repugnant to himself. That the book is

Augustine's, we cannot deny; that he is repugnant to himself, is not likely.

If you say that these things may agree well enough if we grant that Cornelius was not yet justified, yet did works well-pleasing and acceptable to God, I answer that this can by no means agree with Augustine's meaning. In his 801st treatise upon John, in his fourth book and third chapter against Julian, and upon the 31st Psalm,

Augustine proves by sure reasons that all works done before we are justified are sin. But that faith is more expressly set forth and made perfect in those justified, we can easily perceive by what Christ said to his apostles: "Many kings and prophets desired to see the things

which you see and did not see them." These kings and prophets were godly and justified, although they did not know as expressly all the mysteries of Christ as the apostles did. Christ, when he prayed, said concerning the apostles, "The words which you gave me, I have given to them; they have received them and have known that I came from you and that you sent me." These things show that the apostles believed in Christ and therefore were justified. Yet the very history of the Gospel shows that they were ignorant of many things, for it is often shown that their eyes were closed, or they did not understand what was spoken.

Therefore, Augustine denies that Cornelius had perfect and absolute salvation before Peter was sent to him.

13. But they further object to the same Augustine in his Questions unto Simplicianus, in the second book and second question, where he plainly teaches that faith goes before works. After that, he places a certain mean between grace and the celebration of the sacraments: for he says that it may be that a Catechumen (one newly converted to the Christian religion), and he who is conversant among the Catechumens, may believe and have grace, and yet the same man is not yet washed by baptism. Moreover, he says that grace is more plentifully poured in after the sacraments. By these words, he signifies that it is one and the same grace, but is afterward made more abundant. And to show that he is speaking of justifying faith, he cites a passage from the epistle to the Ephesians: "By grace you are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God."

But our adversaries will say that they also teach that grace goes before good works, and that by this grace, some faith is bestowed upon men. But this faith at the beginning is so weak that it cannot

have the power to justify; however, some works may be done which are acceptable to God.

We will recall what Augustine writes of Pelagius in his hundred and fifth epistle to Innocentius, Bishop of Rome. He says that Pelagius, in the council of Palestine, to avoid being accursed himself, did curse all those who should say that they could live uprightly without grace.

But by grace, Pelagius meant no other thing than the gift bestowed upon us in our creation: free choice, reason, will, and the doctrine of the law. The Palestine bishops, being beguiled by this crafty deception, absolved him. Augustine excuses them because they dealt plainly and simply. When they heard that Pelagius confessed the grace of God, they could not understand it to be other than that grace which the Holy Scriptures set forth; namely, the same whereby we are regenerate and grafted in Christ. Wherefore it appears that those who feign another grace than that by which we are justified and grafted in Christ thrust upon us a thing imagined by man, or rather a Pelagian refuge, which the Holy Scriptures do not acknowledge.

Moreover, Augustine in the same place affirms that the Catechumen and such as believe, though they are not baptized, are nevertheless conceived; but those who are now conceived as the sons of God cannot be strangers from him or enemies to him. Therefore, it follows that they are already justified, though not in such perfect sort. This is also evident in that Augustine calls the grace following a more full grace, as that which differs not from the first in kind and nature, but only in degree and quantity. And seeing it is of the same kind as the other, it shall also justify.

14. The nature of faith is evident; justifying faith cannot be understood without faith. Bede, in his commentary on the tenth chapter of Acts, holds the same opinion and cites the words of

Gregory. Neither does the Master of the Sentences in Book 2, Distinction 25, feel otherwise.

However, our adversaries object, citing Augustine in "On the Predestination of the Saints," Chapter 7, where he argues against those who taught that faith is from ourselves, while conceding that subsequent works are from God, yet still obtained through faith.

Augustine indeed acknowledges that the works which follow faith are from God; however, he denies that faith itself is from us. For he states that Paul writes to the Ephesians, "Faith is not from you: By grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not from you: it is the gift of God."

This passage is difficult for those who assert it is from us. Moreover, they add that the prayers and alms of Cornelius were acceptable to God before he believed in Christ. Yet, one must consider what follows: Augustine adds that Cornelius prayed and gave alms not without some faith. For how could he call upon one in whom he did not believe? These words sufficiently show that Augustine did not deny Cornelius all faith in Christ but only a fully developed and distinct faith.

This is further evidenced by the cited passage from Romans, "How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed?" For these words are written about the faith and invocation of regenerate men in Christ, as the subsequent sentence clearly indicates: "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved." We cannot grant salvation except to the justified. Peter, therefore, was sent to Cornelius to build up, not to lay a foundation. The foundations of faith had already been laid in him. Peter came to build on what was already there.

15. Yet what Augustine subsequently wrote seems to present a greater difficulty. He states that if one could be saved without faith, namely in Christ, the architect would not be sent to build up, nor the Apostle to lay the foundation. But since faith and invocation, which necessarily lead to salvation, had already been granted, as the Apostle writes in this Epistle, how can salvation be taken from him?

Unless we understand that faith and salvation in justified men are not perfected while we live here. The salvation we have in this life has not yet reached the degree nor the magnitude that Christ requires in His elect. For no one can doubt that absolute salvation in this life does not exist until resurrection and eternal salvation are attained, even though we now enjoy it in its beginnings.

Paul affirms to the Ephesians that we are already saved by faith. Yet he exhorts the Philippians to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. These passages cannot be reconciled unless we say that salvation, initiated in us through justification, is daily perfected. For we are always renewed more and more, and faith becomes fuller, more explicit, and more effective. This daily perfection occurs through justification.

We cannot deny that this book is Augustine's, nor is it likely that he contradicts himself. But if you say these things can rightly agree, we trust that Cornelius was not yet justified, even though he performed some works that were pleasing and acceptable to God. I respond that this cannot in any way agree with Augustine's opinion. For he proves with very strong reasons in his Treatise on John 801, and against Julian in Book 4, Chapter 3, and in Psalm 31, that all works done before justification are sins. We can easily understand that faith in the unjustified can be explained and perfected from what Christ said to the Apostles: "Many kings and prophets desired to see what you see, and did not see it." Yet those kings and prophets were no less

pious and justified, even though they did not know all the mysteries of Christ as explicitly as the Apostles.

When Christ prayed, He declared concerning the Apostles: "The words you gave me, I have given them; they received them and knew with certainty that I came from you, and they believed that you sent me." These words indicate that the Apostles believed in Christ and were therefore justified. Yet the Gospel history itself teaches us that they were ignorant of many things. Often it is narrated that they either had their eyes closed so they could not see or did not understand what was said.

Therefore, Augustine denies Cornelius salvation before Peter was sent to him, not universally, but in its absolute and perfect form.

16. But many suspect that this doctrine opens a window to many vices: for if all the actions of civil men, even when they seem to pursue virtue, are sins, they may easily be deterred from those good works. I answer that we do not teach that civil discipline should be neglected; for it is, by God's providence, like a bond that preserves civil society. God can tolerate cities and commonwealths as long as integrity of manners and honesty flourish in them; but when these things become wholly vitiated and corrupt, then God is so provoked to wrath that he will punish those things he had long overlooked. So long as men are without Christ, they sin, even when they show forth notable works. Yet they sin far less than if, setting aside all civil duties, they utterly abandoned themselves to all manner of sins. For we are not Stoics, who think that all sins are alike.

Further, if these men omit doing those things which by the very light of reason they acknowledge to be honest, they wrestle against their own conscience. And if we want to see more clearly whether our doctrine or our adversaries' doctrine opens a greater window to

vices, let us compare them. They, when they teach that the wicked can do good works that may please God and can, through them, deserve grace (as they speak) of congruity, what do they do but foster and nourish miserable souls in their damnable state? For they cause them to approve of themselves for their works, hoping that, at least in the end of their life, they shall obtain of God, for those works' sake, to be truly and earnestly converted. Meanwhile, they live securely, neither turning away from their wicked deeds with just and true repentance. But we, on the contrary, admonish them daily to come to Christ and be reconciled by true repentance, for otherwise, good works shall profit them nothing at all. Though they may be goodly in appearance, they are sins before God. Do we not earnestly urge them to leave impiety and a corrupt life and convert themselves to the righteousness of God?

If you prudently consider these things, you shall easily perceive which of us makes the way more open to lusts. Doubtless, all who are touched with the desire for truth and godliness may judge this.

Besides what I have said, they shall easily perceive that all the good works attributed to unregenerate men derogate from and rob the grace of God. For if we can do many things without the grace of God that may be grateful and acceptable to him, then we are not wholly redeemed and restored by him, which is a thing so impious and strange from the catholic truth as nothing can be imagined more impudent and wicked. For what godliness remains when Christ is deprived of his own honour? Or what honour is left to Christ if we teach that he has not brought to us all the power we have to live uprightly?

Some boast that, occasionally, many things happen to be done before regeneration which are as certain means to obtain it. And seeing it often comes to pass that by them we are justified, they cannot seem

to be sins. Indeed, we grant that these are sometimes certain means whereby God leads us to justification. However, it is not proven thereby that these are not sins to those by whom they are done.

Doubtless, concerning the nature of their works, to some they are occasions of greater destruction. For many, by reason of such works, become wonderfully puffed up and pleased with their own fancy, preferring themselves over others. When they are full and content with their own opinion, they refuse to proceed any further. In such men, works are preparations for everlasting death. But as for the elect, God governs and moderates their works, finding means that they work together for salvation. Although they are sins in their own nature and must be esteemed as corrupt things, they are made whole as the light of justification shines upon them. Wherefore we confess that works are certain preparatives for healthful conversion, but only for the predestinate and elect, whom God sometimes leads to justification. Not that they have this strength of their own nature to prepare for justification; for to the reprobate and castaways, they serve unto condemnation.

17. But let us see what works our adversaries so highly praise in unregenerate men. They say there is a certain acknowledgment of sins, from which springs a terror that pierces them deeply.

Afterward, a sorrow is stirred up for the loss of the kingdom of heaven, and then they are moved with a lesser desire for wicked acts.

They take less pleasure in sins and the allurements of this world and seem to endeavour to hear the word of God. And how, they ask, can these things seem to be sins? Yet they say these are not effective enough for a man to be converted and leave his old, sinful life.

Here I would ask these men, what manner of knowledge of sin is that which, while acknowledging it, prefers it over the righteousness of God? Surely, as it lacks the proper end, which is to forsake sin and

embrace God's justice, it cannot be anything but sin. For to this end is knowledge given to us: that knowing sin, we should forsake it and embrace God's justice. Without this end, the work is corrupted and is made sin. All the Ethnic writers confess that an action deprived of its due end is sin.

Moreover, what manner of fear of hell-fire is that, when they proceed daily in casting themselves headlong into it? Or what sorrow is there for the loss of the celestial kingdom, when they continually refuse it, though it is offered to them by the Holy Scriptures and the preachers? If they are moved with less desire to sin and take less pleasure in their sins, yet they take so much delight in them that they cannot be pulled away from them. If they hear the word of God with any diligence, yet having heard it, they deride it, hoping that the promises will happen to them, although they live as they do.

Wherefore we see that all these things wander from the mark and end appointed. Seeing that all these motions are of little efficacy and leave men under the wrath of God, nothing sound can be hoped for from them.

Let us hear what Isaiah pronounces concerning this kind of work in the 58th chapter: "Every day they seek me and want to know my ways, as if they were a nation that worked righteousness and had not forsaken the statutes of their God. They ask of me the ordinances of justice and want to draw near to God. 'Why do we fast,' they say, 'and you do not see it? We have afflicted our souls, and you do not regard it.' Behold, in the day you fast, you find what you desire, and you all seek and require your debts. Behold, you fast to strife and debate and to strike with the fist. Is this the fast I have chosen?" These words of the prophet plainly teach that it is sin before God to seek after his ways, to fast, and to afflict oneself if such works are done without

true worship and piety. It cannot be denied that these are goodly and plausible works, yet God, the just judge, rejects them.

Augustine, in his Confessions, provides a plain example of this matter concerning himself. He shows the motions he suffered in his mind before he was converted to Christ. He writes in the eighth book, eleventh chapter: "I lived in my bondage until the whole was broken asunder, holding me now little, but still holding me. You, O

Lord, by your severe mercy, doubled the scourges of fear and shame in my eyes. I said inwardly to myself, 'Behold now, let it be done.

Now, in a manner, I know it, and did it not. It wanted very little, but I even now touched it and held it, and yet touched it not, nor held it not. And the worst that was grown in use, prevailed with me more than the better out of use. And the nearer it approached to me, the greater horror it drove into me. I was held back by trifles of trifles and the vanities of vanities, and my old wanton lovers whispered, 'Do you now forsake us? And shall we never be with you anymore after this time? Do you? And from this time forward, will you never use this or that?' I now began to hearken to them a great deal less than half."

He declares and accuses these thoughts before God as sins, which are so greatly commended by these men. These were indeed means by which God brought Augustine to salvation; yet in the meantime, they were sins in him, for he obeyed them not but corrupted them with many abuses so that he could not be efficaciously changed thereby.

But whatsoever lacks due perfection is sin.

18. But these sophisters are like a kind of serpent called Hydra: for when one argument is cut off, as it were a head, another arises. They object to us the Publican, who prayed in the temple, saying, "God be merciful to me a sinner." It is said that he went home justified:

wherefore (they say) he was a sinner when he prayed, for we read that he was afterward justified. But his prayer pleased God; therefore

(they say) we may do works acceptable to God before we are renewed. But these men should remember that this man prayed, which could not be done without faith, as we declared concerning

Cornelius. "For how shall they call upon Him in whom they have not believed?" Therefore, he was justified even at the same time that he prayed.

You must not understand those words as though he was first justified when he finished his prayer. Although it is said to be done afterward, it does not follow that it was not done in any sense before. He obtained a more perfect justification, a more ample spirit, and a nearer feeling of God's mercy. He called himself a sinner justly, partly because he still felt within himself that which he disliked (for we are always commanded to pray, "Forgive us our trespasses"), and partly because he pondered in his mind the grievous sins he had committed before he was justified.

Godly men ought chiefly to consider, while they are praying, how great the burden of their sins is. When they come to God with their prayers, they are moved with true repentance to say with David: "My bones are consumed in my crying out; continually day and night thy hand is heavy upon me; my moisture is dried up as in the summer heat."

"Innumerable evils have compassed me about; my iniquities have closed me in on every side, so that I cannot see; they are more numerous than the hairs of my head; my heart has failed within me. I acknowledge my wickedness, and my sin is always before me; against thee, against thee have I sinned, and done evil in thy sight." To ensure godly men beware of sins afterward, God stirs up in them the

sharp feeling of his wrath, that they may know what they have deserved unless God had helped them by his Son. He opens their eyes so they may perceive his fatherly chastisement towards them, and to better feel this, he oftentimes withholds from them the taste and feel of his mercy. Therefore, they cry, "Make me to hear joy and gladness, that my bruised bones may rejoice; hide thy face from my sins, and blot out all my wickedness; create in me a clean heart, O

God, and renew a right spirit within me; cast me not away from thy presence; take not thy Holy Spirit from me."

Thus, those who are justified pray that any remaining infirmity may not be imputed to them. They call to mind their grievous sins and crave with tears some taste of God's mercy and the righteousness bestowed upon them. This is the natural meaning of such godly prayers. We must not think that the Publican prayed otherwise; he did not intend to retain his old purpose to sin but truly converted to God from his heart. Our adversaries imagine that those who persist in their sins, without intending to change their lives, yet do some good that pleases God. But we are taught from the Holy Scriptures that "He who believes in God has eternal life and is therefore justified," but other deeds are neither good nor pleasing to God.

Therefore, seeing that the Publican prayed faithfully, it is certain that he had eternal life and was not destitute of justification.

19. To better understand all these things, it is important to know what is required for a good work to be acceptable to God. First of all, whoever does any good thing must be moved by the Spirit of God; otherwise, in us—that is, in our flesh—dwells nothing good, and those who are led by the Spirit of God are the children of God.

Secondly, faith must be present, by which it is understood for certain that the work we undertake is of the kind of things that God wills and

has commanded in his law. For "whatsoever is not of faith is sin." We ought not to act so that our own heart accuses us in what we do.

Thirdly, whatsoever we do must be wholly directed to the glory of God, with the chief aim being that the praise and glory of God may be set forth by our works. "Whether you eat or drink or whatever you do, do it all to the glory of God," says Paul. Fourthly, because of the infirmity that is grafted in us, there is always some deficiency in our works, even in those that seem well done. It is necessary that the grace and mercy of God, through Christ, be present with us to supply that defect or want.

For this cause, David says, "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven; blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not impute sin."

Paul says, "There is now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus." Again, "What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God did by sending his own Son." These testimonies declare that our works fail in their perfection and just end and that it is through Christ and the mercy of God that the blame mingled with our works is not imputed to us. Lastly, it is required that no one glory in what he does uprightly but that he glories in God only and acknowledges that what he does, he does by God's goodness and not of his own strength. "Who has separated you?" asks Paul to the Corinthians. "What do you have that you did not receive? If you did receive it, why do you boast as though you did not?" When all these conditions are met, the work, without controversy, will be good and acceptable to God.

From these conditions of a good work, the diligent reader may gather the definition thereof. On the contrary, if we consider the nature of man not regenerate, we shall easily perceive that these conditions necessary for a good work cannot be found in him. He is altogether

void of the Spirit of God and of faith and is so infected with the love of himself that whatever he does, he refers not to God but to his own profit. Moreover, being a stranger to Christ, he is necessarily left under the law, so that whatever defect or fault there is in his works

(and there must be many), the same cannot be recompensed by any other means. To conclude, if he perhaps does any notable and goodly work, he does not glory in God but in himself, for he is ignorant of Christ and of grace. By these descriptions of a work good and acceptable to God and of a man who lives without Christ, I think it is now manifest that the works of a man out of faith cannot be good and acceptable to God.

20. But our adversaries endeavour to wrest from us two very strong points that we use to confirm this matter. The first is that we say, "An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit"; the second is, "Everything that is not of faith is sin." Something must be said about these points here. Christ used the metaphor of an evil tree that cannot bring forth good fruit not only in the seventh chapter of Matthew but also in the twelfth chapter of the same Gospel. From this, he inferred, "You generation of vipers, how can you speak good things when you yourselves are evil?"

Before I address this argument, I think it is good to declare how Augustine, in the fourth book and third chapter against Julian the Pelagian, contended for this very same point. He sets forth a good work of an infidel, namely, clothing a naked man, and he asks whether this work may be called a sin. Surely, unless this work is of the kind that pleases God, I do not perceive that any other work of an infidel can be acceptable to Him. Augustine affirms and proves that the same is sin, and lest he seem to speak this without reason, he says, "It is therefore sin because the one who did that good work glories in his work; for he does not by faith acknowledge either God

or Christ, to whom he should ascribe the doing thereof." Moreover, he says that to avoid the nature of sin, it is not enough that a good thing be done, but it must also be done well and uprightly.

Shall we then say that an infidel has done a good work and worked uprightly? If we do not grant this, then we confess that he sinned.

But if we do grant it, then we confess the fruit to be good, whereas the infidel without Christ is an evil tree. By this means, we shall grant that an evil tree brings forth good fruit, which Christ expressly denies. Our adversaries, therefore, are driven to such a pass that now they fight not only against us but even against Christ Himself.

Unless, perhaps, they will say that a man being faithless, an infidel, and a stranger to God, is a good tree. But if they affirm this, how do they deny that he pleases God, seeing that which is good cannot be but acceptable to our good God? But he who pleases God must undoubtedly have faith, for it is written to the Hebrews, "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." But these men, by their heresy, will impose upon us that which the same epistle denies can be done.

But a man (they say) in that he is a man, is no evil tree. Augustine says, "If we consider the natures only, then shall there be nowhere any evil tree; for both angel and man were created by God and received good natures." But these natures must not be measured by us according to what they were made by God, but according to the state which came upon them afterward. A man endowed with a good will shall be called a good tree; but an evil tree is a man endowed with an evil will. We say that after the fall of Adam and the first ruin of our kind, men are such that they are not moved with a good will but with an evil.

But to return to the alms of an infidel, where we began, we may ask whether this mercy, which is shown, is of faith or faithless. As it is

done without faith, it must be faithless; therefore, it cannot be without vice and sin. It is not sufficient to have mercy on our neighbour unless it is also done faithfully and rightly. Mercy is not of itself alone good. God has disallowed many benefits bestowed upon our neighbours, as when the king of Israel spared the king of Syria, and Saul spared Agag, the king of Amalek. But faith, which works by love, is always good and can never be evil. As mercy is not of that kind, it is necessary that uprightness be used so that it may be done faithfully to receive commendation.

They cry out that this natural affection of showing mercy is good, which perhaps we will not deny. But they should consider that unregenerate men abuse the good thing when they do not direct it to God, who is the only end of all our actions. Surely, he commits no slight sin who perversely abuses so great a gift of God.

21. Furthermore, Augustine affirms that whatever good can be perceived in the work of an infidel is wholly of God. Therefore, in that our neighbour is helped, and some ordinance of reason observed, and some civil honesty retained, this comes not from any other source than God. But as far as it proceeds from an infidel and a corrupt man, it is sin and displeases God. By these and other reasons, Pelagius was led to confess that these men, who by nature behave themselves rightly, are good indeed but yet without fruit.

Augustine replies against them, saying that such is the nature of barren trees that either they bring forth no fruit at all or else evil fruit. Pelagius endeavours to clear himself, saying that these men are to be called barren, for although the things they do are good, yet they help nothing to the attainment of the kingdom of heaven. But in saying this, he says nothing; rather, he hinders himself. Truly, the Schoolmen of our time have the very same opinion, which Augustine withstands by all his might. He says, "By this means the Lord, who is

good, shall cut down and cast into the fire a good tree bringing forth (as you say) good fruit." What manner of justice is this, which you so severely defend everywhere? Upon this opinion of yours follow many vain and absurd things. Thus far out of Augustine.

But our men boast that they differ much from Pelagius. "We put," they say, "a certain grace preventing and knocking, whereby in the hearts of men may be enclosed some good treasure, by which they may work some good thing. Therefore, they are not utterly dead plants; for in a way, they bring forth fruit. And although what they bring forth cannot bud forth into flowers and into tried fruit, yet there are boughs that may and do come forth from some sap of the grace of God, of which even those who are strangers to the grace of God are altogether destitute."

Pelagius confessed the same things, for he did not dislike the name of grace. Yet, by that name (as Augustine prudently discovered), he understood what he wished rather than what he ought, a far different matter than what that word signifies among the catholic writers or in the church of Christ or in the Holy Scriptures. But these men, in their similitude, have small consideration, for they do not remember that the Lord in the Gospel cursed the tree that bore only leaves without fruit and commanded that it be cut off and cast into the fire.

There is nothing in the danger of God's curse and hellfire but sin.

They have yet another argument to avoid this point: they say that these trees are indeed evil, but not utterly dead, for in them is found some sap of grace. They affirm that there is in man a certain grace, which knocks and prevents, whereby in the hearts of unregenerate men some good treasure may be enclosed, out of which may spring some blossoms from a man not penitent. Although they are not able to make what they bring forth prosper into perfect and ripe fruit or

bear flowers, they at least bring forth boughs and leaves, which are a token of secret grace and life.

It is a wonder to see how these men stand in their own conceit concerning this knocking and preventing grace, of which we have declared before what is to be thought. But they who speak and judge this way are too inconsiderate, for they do not understand that this grace of theirs is no more than a certain invitation to Christ, but not efficacious, for men are left under the wrath of God, and their hearts are not changed. What good treasure then can be in them from which works acceptable to God may spring forth?

But to address their similitude: Whereas they say that there are plants that bring forth boughs and leaves, although they have no fruit, they should remember that Christ cursed such trees. When he sought fruit upon the fig tree and found nothing but leaves, he smote it with such an effectual curse that it dried up. We do not deny that men may do some civil and moral good thing, which proceeds through that power of God whereby all things are preserved. For as the pagans also confessed, "In Him we live, we move, and have our being." But that power, whereby God governs and moves all things, does nothing at all to further men to eternal life who are not regenerate.

The state of our cause is whether those who are as yet aliens from Christ can do anything that may be allowed and acceptable to God.

That is what we deny, and they affirm. There has been sufficient discussion to show how much the place concerning the evil tree, which cannot make good fruit, supports our position.

22. Now let us examine the other passage that our adversaries attempt to wrest from us: "Whatever is not of faith is sin." Augustine frequently used this against Pelagius. Pelagius responded that this is

merely a particular reasoning spoken only about meats and therefore should not be extended to other works, especially those of infidels.

Indeed, we confess that the question first arose concerning meats.

But let us consider how the reasoning is used in Paul's words: "He who doubts is condemned if he eats, because his eating is not from faith; and everything that does not come from faith is sin."

Paul's meaning is that whenever we undertake anything, we should be thoroughly assured that it will be acceptable to God and is required by Him through some commandment of the law. Without this certainty, whatever we do is sin.

Paul's firm argument can be constructed as follows:

1. Whatever is not of faith is sin.

2. To eat meats prohibited by the law while doubting their lawfulness is not of faith.

3. Therefore, it is sin.

Although the apostle proves a particular proposition, he uses a universal reason, which can be applied to all other actions. Thus, everything that lacks this faith is sin. Therefore, neither we nor Augustine abuse this passage when we apply it to the works of unbelievers. But many today argue that "faith" in this passage signifies the persuasion of the conscience and that Paul did not mean the faith that we say justifies.

These men assume too much by introducing a new meaning of faith without any scriptural testimony; thus, we might well deny this to them. However, even if we grant them their point, they are still compelled to return to our opinion, so we will not contend much with them about it.

Assume, as they wish, that "faith" means "conscience." But what persuasion should the conscience have concerning works to understand which are good and which are evil? Doubtless, if we are godly, we can have no other rule than the law of God, which judges good and evil. From there, the persuasion of our conscience must arise, so by faith it may understand a work to be good if it aligns with God's law and evil if it opposes it. This is precisely what we previously discussed regarding faith.

Therefore, let us leave these men who, when they try to speak differently from us, inadvertently fall into the same opinion. We are taught here that in whatever we undertake, we must be assured of God's will. Paul taught the same when he said, "Let us try what is the good will of God," and in writing to the Ephesians, "Let us not walk as unskilled, who do not understand what the will of God is."

This interpretation is not of our own devising; I urge the reader to consult Origen, Primasius (a disciple of Augustine), and the commentaries attributed to Jerome. They acknowledge no other faith than the one universally recognized.

23. To address the principal point of this controversy, I think it has been abundantly confirmed by the Holy Scriptures that all the works of infidels are sins. This view is held not only by Augustine against Julian but also by Ambrose in his book De Vocatione Gentium, the third chapter. He says, "Without the true worship of God, those things which seem to be virtues are sins." Basil, in his second book

De Baptismo, seventh chapter, purposefully raises this question and supports our position. He cites scriptures such as Isaiah: "A sinner, when he sacrifices, is like one who offers a dog; and when he offers sweet cakes, it is like offering swine's flesh." He adds, "He who commits sin is the servant of sin and serves it only. No man can serve

two masters, God and mammon. What agreement is there between light and darkness, between God and Belial?" Finally, he cites the testimony, "An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit." From these testimonies, he concludes the very same thing we teach.

From these points, it is now plain what we are to judge of the state of men not yet regenerate. First, they are free from the servitude of compulsion. Secondly, in moral and civil works, they can do many things by their free will. Lastly, among sins, they have some choice and sometimes embrace one sin over another as their will dictates.

However, they are not free to do things that may please God and are bound to the miseries and calamities of this life, whether they will or not.

Now we must speak of the liberty of men regenerate, which, besides being no less than that of the wicked, surpasses it in that it can attain to good works acceptable to God. Who is ignorant that Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son was most acceptable to God? For he was highly commended by God Himself. Paul, writing to the Philippians, calls their alms "sacrifices of a sweet aroma." To the Hebrews, we are taught that God is marvellously delighted with such sacrifices. Paul warns the Philippians to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling.

What need is there for other testimonies when the Judge Himself, on the last day, will recount the good works bestowed upon the members of Christ? Seeing, therefore, that men regenerate are good trees, it is agreeable that they both can and do bring forth good fruits. However, those who are regenerate must never forget that they obtained this freedom not by their own merits but by the benefit of God. For He fashioned them anew and, instead of stony hearts, gave them hearts of flesh. It was not of themselves but of the

heavenly Father that they were drawn to Christ. Unless they had been inwardly persuaded with great efficacy by God the Father, they would have fled from Christ like other men.

Wherefore, in that first change or impression of the Holy Ghost, our mind is passive, as they say. But after we are once persuaded and changed, we are so restored that we can work together with the Holy

Ghost and with grace.

24. The restoration of free will must be considered by two principal points, from which we declared at the beginning (when we described the nature of will) that every sin and every error in election or choice arises. When we deliberate on any matter, either we are utterly ignorant of what is just or unjust, or, though we see what is just and unjust, lust and perturbation intermingle, causing us to prefer weaker reasons over strong and sure ones. Thus, the knowledge of what is right cannot prevail. The violence of affections and the mind's entire attention are fixed on reasons that serve pleasure and lust, while the more honest arguments are not considered and therefore do not come into effect.

By the benefit of regeneration, both these issues are remedied.

Concerning the first, the light of faith is present, which, by adding the rule of God's law, clearly understands in practice what is just and unjust. Furthermore, by the power of the Holy Ghost, although all corruption of affections is not removed, it is so broken and weakened that it cannot hinder the making of a right choice as before.

However, since this lust cannot be completely eradicated while we live here, the liberty given to the godly to do things that please God is not perfect and absolute but weak and maimed. This is how it is set forth in the Holy Scriptures.

Regarding works acceptable to God, many people are greatly hindered in many ways, preventing them from doing them as they would and as the law requires. They always feel a law in their members fighting against the law of the mind, leading them captive to the law of sin whether they will or no. As we read in Galatians,

"The flesh lusts against the spirit, so that you do not do the things you wish." Paul laments that he did not do the good he earnestly desired but rather the evil he hated. Godly men, no doubt, serve the law of God in their minds but the law of sin in their flesh. This is a notable gift of God that they exceedingly bewail and lament these impediments. Although they doubt not that they have the first fruits of the Spirit, they groan and fervently wish for perfect restitution.

Moreover, daily fallings remind us of how weak our liberty is. For this reason, John says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." James says, "We all offend in many things." The Lord has taught us in our daily prayer to cry unto the Father, "Forgive us our trespasses." Nevertheless, we are not hindered by this imperfection of liberty from working together with God and framing ourselves as apt instruments for the Holy Ghost.

Paul warned Timothy to stir up the grace that was in him. In his first epistle to the Corinthians, he admonished them to apply themselves to the free gifts of God and to gifts more excellent, as though their diligence were required to be able to use rather this gift of the Spirit than that.

Those said to have these things are not simple and bare men, but when they are endowed with the grace and the Spirit of God, they are called the men of God. Because they are men of God, they are also called perfect and instructed in every good work. Therefore, we grant that men born anew in Christ have all the freedom granted to the ungodly. Moreover, they are also able to do works acceptable to God,

although they are not free from sin nor from the calamities and miseries of this life. Now we should also speak of the fourth state of man, but we may answer in one word: In our heavenly habitation, we shall enjoy the chief felicity, and no kind of liberty will be lacking.

Unless one calls the ability to sin and fall away from God a liberty, which it cannot be. Because that is a chief liberty, we hope that in that country we shall be most free.

25. Another question must now be addressed: whether the concupiscence and corrupt motions that remain in the regenerate are sins and ought to be called such. Paul calls these "the law of sin" and "the law of the members." By his own example, he taught that they remain in godly men after regeneration. Whether these are sins cannot be rightly defined unless we first understand what sin is.

Augustine says that sin is "whatsoever is spoken, done, or coveted against the law of God." But whether this definition applies to all sins or only those commonly called actual sins is uncertain due to the ambiguity of the word "coveted."

If "coveted" refers to the full assent of the will to corrupt desires, then the definition applies to actual sins. But if "coveted" is taken as broadly as in the last precept, "Thou shalt not covet," the definition may be universal and comprehend all sins. The Master of the Sentences, in his second book, 35th distinction, cited this definition after discussing original sin and moving to other natural sins, suggesting that he thought the definition pertained only to actual sins. However, I will not contend much about this. Ambrose, in his book De Paradiso, chapter eight, sets forth a broad definition of sin:

"Sin is nothing else than a transgression of the law of God and disobedience to the heavenly commandments."

But to pass over the sentences of the Fathers, the matter must be brought to the trial of the Scriptures, so we may certainly know and understand what sin is. John, in his first epistle, chapter three, says,

"Sin is ἀνομία," which is translated as "lawlessness." The Greek word is compounded of the privative particle ἀand the word νόμος, meaning "law." Here the nature of sin is very well declared; it is a privation or lack, whereby the good that ought to be present is taken away. If you inquire what that good thing is, the Greek word νόμος expresses it: it is the law of God. Therefore, we may say that sin is whatever withstands the law of God.

Now we are to see whether this definition, taken from the Holy Scriptures, corresponds to the corruption that remains in the godly after regeneration. We affirm this, but our adversaries deny it.

However, the Scripture is clearly on our side. Paul expressly says that "the law of the members wars against the law of God and of the mind" and that "the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, so it is neither subject to the law of God, nor can it be." It wholly strives against the first and greatest commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind, with all thy heart, and with all thy strength." If all our strength and ability yielded to God, this coveting would never reside in us. Furthermore, this very coveting or lusting also wrestles against the last precept: "Thou shalt not covet."

Augustine testifies that these two precepts cannot be fully observed and provides good reasons for why they are given, even though they cannot be kept, which shall not need to be recited here.

26. We have declared by the definition of sin that this coveting, of which we speak, is sin. Now let us consider other arguments. One is taken from the institution of man: "Man is made in the image and likeness of God" and "We are predestinated to be conformed to the image of the Son of God." We are commanded to "put on the new

man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him," and "which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness" (Ephesians 4:24, Colossians 3:10). The image of God, which we are commanded to put on, consists, as Tertullian says, in having the same motions as God. Paul, to the Philippians, exhorts us to be of one mind with Christ. But these motions and lusts most shamefully corrupt and blot the image of God in us.

Furthermore, that which we ought to crucify, mortify, and put off must be sin, for if they were good things, the Holy Ghost would have admonished us to nourish and maintain them. Paul says to the Colossians, "Mortify your members which are upon the earth"

(Colossians 3:5). To the Galatians, he says, "They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts" (Galatians

5:24). In another place, he says, "Put off the old man" (Ephesians 4:22). If these motions displease God, it is because they are sins, for God is so very good that nothing displeases Him unless it is sin.

Lastly, death is due as a reward for sin; where there is no sin, there can be no death. Only the Son of God died innocent, for He died for our sins. We die because we are not without sin. Let us see what our adversaries can allege as to why infants, who are born anew in Christ, die. They have no actual sins, and the guilt of original sin is taken away. Only lust and corruption of nature remain, not wholly amended. Augustine, in his eleventh book of Confessions, says corrupt motions are found in infants, and he both confesses and accuses them as sins. Seeing these are sins, they do not unjustly die for them.

Since it appears by substantial reasons that the corrupt lusts remaining in us after baptism are sins, it remains to see to what kind or part of sins they belong. Sin may seem to be divided thus: there is

one sin that may be forgiven and another that cannot. Transgression against the law of God, which is never forgiven, is sin against the Holy Ghost. If sin can be forgiven, it can be forgiven in two ways: it is forgiven in such a way that we must altogether depart from it, as with grievous sins that separate us from the kingdom of God and are commonly called mortal; or it is forgiven in such a way that we do not depart from it, partly through ignorance and partly by reason of infirmity. These are called small or venial sins, without which man's life cannot be led. Paul put a notable difference between these sins when he exhorted us not to let sin reign in us. Paul complained of this third kind of sin when he said, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Romans 7:24).

We mean these sins when we teach that the works of godly men are not without deadly sins, for nothing is done without this kind of defect. Such defects are deadly because they deserve death: "The wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23). Further, as long as we carry these blemishes of corruption, we cannot enjoy eternal life; we are excluded from it until death puts off all corruption. It is written,

"Cursed be everyone who does not continue in all things written in the book of the law, to do them" (Galatians 3:10). He who complains with Paul that he does not do the good he desires does not perform all the law requires and is not utterly without curse, though through God's mercy, it is not imputed unto eternal destruction.

27. The men of our part speak of the good works of godly persons not because we deny good works or think they are not pleasing to God, but to acknowledge our uncleanness and impurity, to which we are more than blind. Setting aside sin against the Holy Ghost, other sins are divided into three degrees. In the first is coveting or lust, which is engrafted in us; secondly, the first motions and impulses toward various sorts of wickedness continually spring from it;

thirdly, the consent of the will leads to actual sin. Paul assigned these three degrees when he said, "Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, that you should obey its lusts" (Romans 6:12). Sin, which ought not to reign in us, is the engrafted lust and corruption of nature. The first motions are the lusts of concupiscence, which we are admonished not to obey. Then comes obedience, which consummates and makes perfect the sin, commonly called actual sin.

There is no doubt that the corruption of nature pertains to original sin. Again, the sin to which the consent of the will is given is called actual sin. But there is doubt regarding those first motions. By Christ's benefit, we are not tied to a new blame and bond of God's judgment. Whether they are to be referred to original sin or actual sin is uncertain. They lie between both and take somewhat from each. As we work, covet, or desire anything through them, they have some consideration of actual sin. Paul uses the word πράττειν (to do), which undoubtedly signifies some action. But on the other hand, because we suffer this kind of motion against our wills, they communicate with original sin, for that sin is not taken by choice or of our own accord.

Jerome, upon the seventh chapter of Matthew, makes a distinction between πρᾶξις (praxis) and πάθος (pathos). Πρᾶξις signifies the first motions after the consent of the will has come to them, and πάθος when they stir from the beginning. Although they have a fault in them, they are not held for great faults, but the passion is counted as sin. Jerome confesses that the first motions have the blame of sin, though they are not counted as crimes, and by Christ's benefit, they are not imputed unto death, or in man's judgment, they are not counted as crimes.

Sin is again divided into that which is only sin and that which is both sin and the punishment of sin. Augustine mentions this distinction upon the 57th Psalm: "The first falling away from God is sin only; but those sins that follow are both sins and the punishments of sins until men come unto hellfire." Whatever evils are committed between the first apostasy and hellfire are both sins and punishments for other sins. Paul declared this well to the Romans: first, he says the Gentiles knew God but did not glorify Him as God. For that cause, they were given up to wicked desires, filled with all corruption and covetousness. At last, he mentions the condemnation of hellfire, saying, "But you, according to your hardness and unrepentant heart, treasure up for yourself wrath in the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his deeds."

Many do not think these sins are the punishments of sin because men take pleasure in them. However, unless they were blind, they could easily understand from the apostle that they are punishments and such as are most grievous. He says their heart was blinded, they were made fools, though they boasted of wisdom, and they were given over to a reprobate sense to defile their bodies with shamefulness. What are these but most grievous punishments? If a thief's hands were cut off or his eyes plucked out, we would say he was grievously punished by God. Paul says these men were deprived of their minds, made foolish, and their bodies defiled. Are these not punishments?

How can we consider our mind to be safe, sound, and uncorrupt if sin reigns in it? Solomon says, "Can a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned? Can one go upon hot coals, and his feet not be burned?" (Proverbs 6:27-28). Therefore, sin is called a punishment because it hurts and corrupts nature. The unhappiness

of original sin has marred nature so much that it can scarcely seem half alive. The corrupt motions and violent rages that spring from that unhappiness must be kept in check and mortified, or they will become more raging. If you give consent to them, they grow stronger, and nature runs headlong to the worse.

28. All these considerations lead us to understand that the lust grafted in us and the corrupt motions that still remain in our minds belong to this kind of sins. Yet they are also punishments for another preceding sin, namely, original sin, if not for some other more grievous sin. Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that the first falling away is in itself a sin and a punishment. As we have said, there is no sin that does not grievously harm human nature, and so, at least, it has a punishment of itself joined with it. However, not every sin is the punishment of another preceding sin. But the sins we now discuss are indeed the punishments of preceding sins, and we firmly hold that they are sins. It seems a wonder to many that these can be sins since they are necessary.

Regarding this matter, let us consider what Augustine says in his third book De libero arbitrio, chapter 18: "Some things done of necessity are not to be allowed, as when a man would do well and cannot. Otherwise, why were these words spoken: 'The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. To will is ready with me, but to perform the good, I find no ability.' And this:

'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.' For these words are contrary to each other, that the things which you would not do, those you do. But all these things belong to men and proceed from that condemnation of death. For if they are not a punishment of man, but nature in man, then they are no sins. For if we do not depart from the state in which man was naturally made, so that he could not be better, then, when he does these things, he does

what he ought to do. But if a man were good, it should be otherwise.

But now, since it is thus, he is not good, nor is it in his power to be good, either because he does not see what manner of person he ought to be, or because, seeing it, he is not able to be such as he perceives he should be."

In these words, many things are worth noting. First, Augustine confesses that many things happening necessarily are to be disallowed. Secondly, he gives a reason why they are called sins: because we depart from the state in which we were naturally made.

Thirdly, he says that a man is not good, nor has he the power to be good. Fourthly, he gives two reasons why a man cannot be good: either because he does not see what is to be done, or because, seeing it, he cannot perform it due to infirmity. Lastly, it should be noted that Augustine speaks of regenerate men, for he cites Paul's words to the Galatians and those places we have now mentioned, which we have shown cannot be understood otherwise than of the regenerate.

But against Augustine's saying, there is Jerome's writing in his interpretation of faith: "We say that they err who say with Manichaeus that a man cannot eschew evil."

29. These things can be easily reconciled. Jerome speaks of nature as it was instituted by God, writing against the Manichees, who taught that we cannot resist sin because we were created evil by an evil god.

Yet none of us doubts that man, when created at the beginning, was most free. But Augustine speaks of nature after the fall, as is evident when he says, "All these things pertain to men and come from the condemnation of death." He confesses this is the punishment of fallen man. If these things refer to the regenerate, Jerome's saying pertains only to grosser kinds of sins that separate us from God's kingdom, from which we doubt not that men born anew in Christ

may abstain. Augustine speaks more broadly, understanding sins also as those we cannot avoid in this life. The Master of the Sentences cites this latter solution in his second book, distinction 36.

They may object that we injure baptism by saying sin is not taken away thereby. But we cannot be justly accused of this. We affirm that guilt or imputation of fault is taken away by regeneration. Although these vices remain, as both Scripture declares and experience teaches, their bond of punishment and guilt is discharged. Augustine frequently says that concupiscence remains, but the blame is taken away by Christ. He adds that sometimes the act and work of sin pass away, as in theft and adultery, but the guilt remains. Sometimes the blame is taken away, but the fault remains, as is clear regarding this lust. Though it remains, we cannot be accused of eternal destruction for it. If you ask why it is called sin when the blame is taken away, I answer that it is because it deserves death and damnation by its nature. This is changed by the mercy of God through Christ.

Everything should be judged as it is in itself and according to its nature. Sin's nature is to strive against the law of God, which occurs in lust and these first motions, so they are to be called sins. This does not lead us into the folly the Pelagians reproached Augustine and other Catholics with, as though they said that by regeneration, sin is not blotted out but only shaved. When hair is shaved, roots remain under the skin, allowing it to grow back. Although we affirm that lust and corrupt motions remain in regenerate men, we do not deny that God is perfectly reconciled to us. Although these, by their nature, are sins, the mercy of God wipes them out so they are not imputed to us at all. If we consider imputation, nothing of them remains.

30. Lastly, they object that we do Augustine an injustice by claiming he affirms these are sins when he himself interprets that they are

called sins improperly. For, as a script or writing is called a hand because it is done with the hand, so these things are called sins because they come from original sin. And as cold is called slothful because it makes us slothful, so these motions are called sins because they stir us up to sins. However, properly, they are not sins.

Augustine, they say, not only interprets himself as to why he calls these sins but also shows us how we ought to understand Paul when he calls them sins.

We answer that if Augustine or any other of the fathers denies that these are sins, it must be understood by way of comparison if they are conferred with actual sins, but not that the nature of sin can wholly be taken away from them. Augustine clearly declares this in another place. In his sixth book against Julianus, chapter eight, he writes: "For neither is it any equity when in one man either the superior parts are after a vile sort servants unto the inferior parts, or the inferior parts after a vile manner resist the superior parts, although they be not suffered to get the upper hand." Seeing he calls this sin iniquity, he plainly teaches that it agrees with the nature of sin, which we described before.

In his fifth book against the same Julianus, chapter three, he writes:

"The concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusts, is sin because it is a disobedience against the government of the mind, and it is a punishment of sin for it is rendered unto the merits of the disobedient person; and it is a cause of sin through the falling away of him that sins." Here we see that concupiscence or lust is by Augustine in three ways called sin. Neither can it be said that he writes these things of a man not regenerate, for he expressly says,

"against whom the good spirit lusts," for the Spirit of God is not in the wicked, with whom he might strive.

Thus, we have three places from Augustine—one from his fifth book De libero arbitrio, and two against Julianus—where he expressly confesses that concupiscence is sin, and he provides reasons for this belief. Our adversaries should not run to a figure to say that this is not properly to be called sin when interpreting Paul. For both from Paul and from other scriptures, good reasons are brought to show why concupiscence or lust is truly and properly called sin. It is astonishing that these men, who are so eager to use figures elsewhere, in this one proposition—"This is my body"—disdain all figures, where a figure is most appropriate for the sentence.

If you desire other testimonies from the fathers to prove that lust is sin, we have cited Jerome upon Matthew. In Augustine against Julianus, many other sentences of the ancient fathers are found, all of which support us. These things that follow are taken from a similar place at the end of the second chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians.

31. Now we must search out whether the liberty of the will is completely taken away by the things we have discussed. Paul's affirmation that "a natural man cannot know the things of God" seems to argue against free will. For if we cannot comprehend spiritual things through our natural power, how can we express them in our actions? Experience shows that doing is much more laborious than understanding. Moreover, predestination or foreknowledge seems to be a hindrance to free will. If God has known all things before they happen and cannot be deceived, it seems the liberty of our will is entirely gone, and all things happen out of necessity.

Additionally, the power of God, by which all things are wrought, complicates this matter. Paul says to the Romans, "Who can resist

His will?" Furthermore, the scriptures affirm sin's great force, which

corrupts and despoils almost everything in us. The strength left to the will is very feeble, not able to do as reason dictates. Moreover, divine oracles attribute so much to the grace of Christ that, without it, we can do nothing acceptable or pleasing to God. Since this grace is not equally given to all, it seems their liberty is destroyed, as they do not have this grace in their power.

Astrologers also extol the powers of the celestial bodies, almost persuading that things happen because of them, thus seeming to remove the perfect liberty of future events from us. Finally, some affirm that there are definite causes of things to be done, linked with such certainty that they create an inescapable necessity and destiny.

32. We need not dwell much on the argument from knowledge since it is clear from what we have discussed that this liberty is not judged to be in unregenerate men regarding works that are truly good and pleasing to God. Thus, that reasoning need not be weakened, as it confirms the apostle's doctrine. The next reason poses more difficulty: few can perceive how God's providence or foreknowledge can coexist with free choice in our will. The matter is so challenging that many old writers, when reasoning about it, concluded that all things done arise out of necessity and even believed God Himself is bound by this necessity. This led to the proverb that even God cannot withstand necessity, implying He dares not attempt anything against it.

Because of this liberty, poets have suggested that many things happen whether the gods will it or not. Homer portrays Jupiter sad and lamenting the necessity or destiny preventing him from saving his beloved son Sarpedon from death. He depicts Neptune grievously affected by his son Cyclops's fate, desiring to keep Ulysses from home but complaining that destiny prevents him. Virgil's Juno

similarly laments, unable to remove the Trojan fleet from Italy despite her efforts.

But we Christians do not speak of God in such a way. We learn from the holy scriptures that nothing is impossible for God, and Christ teaches us that all things are possible for God. Our faith, following

Abraham's example, clings to the belief that God can do whatever He promises. We must not think that Christ was condemned to death or forced to the cross against His will or His Father's will. God willed these things, not out of inevitable necessity but out of superabundant love for humanity. The scripture says, "God so loved the world that He gave His only Son," and "He who did not spare His own Son but gave Him up for us all." Christ, moved by the same love, died for us and taught us that "greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends." He showed even greater love by dying for His enemies. That He willingly accepted death is clear from His words at the last supper, "I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you."

33. By these passages, we perceive that the Lord's death was thoroughly foreknown and understood and did not in any way infringe on the liberty of either Christ or the Father. Therefore, it is greatly to be wondered at that Cicero, otherwise a very learned man, is earnestly disputed against by Augustine in his fifth book De

Civitate Dei, especially in chapters nine and ten, concerning this question. The controversy hinges on the fact that in the latter book

De Divinatione, Cicero refutes everything brought by Quintus, his brother, in the former book. Cicero endeavours by all means to overthrow all predictions of things to come and the prescience of God.

Therefore, Augustine affirms that the astrologers had reasons better to be borne with than Cicero's because, though they attribute too much to the stars, they do not deny all divination and prescience. As Augustine declares in his Confessions, a certain physician, a grave man who detested astrology, when asked how it came to pass that mathematicians prophesied so many truths, dared not (contrary to all histories and experience) deny every divination but answered that a certain destiny was spread over things and affirmed that it was not incredible that reasonable souls somehow felt it. Surely, there is nothing more contradictory than to affirm God's existence and yet deny His prescience of things to come. The prophet Isaiah would have these things so firmly knit together, saying, "Show us what things shall come to pass, and we will declare you to be gods."

That Cicero had little knowledge and no good judgment of God is evident from his book De Natura Deorum, wherein, disputing under the persona of Cotta, he strives utterly to deny the nature of God. It is indeed to be lamented that such a notable man is charged with what the Psalm of David ascribes to fools, as it is written: "The foolish man has said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 14:1).

Upon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialogue to Cotta, a bishop, is unclear unless perhaps he considered that none speak more freely and worse of God than those entrusted with ceremonies and holy things. Cicero, knowing it is odious to profess an opinion denying God, when he had disputed as much as he thought proper, showed his opinion at the end of his book, siding with Lucius Balbus and acknowledging that Cotta's opinion is to be allowed. Cicero, very studious of all kinds of learning and especially civil law, thought the state of man's actions would be overthrown if free will were denied. Not knowing how to reconcile this liberty with

the prescience of things to come, he preferred to strip God's wisdom than to deprive us of our will's freedom.

From this, we see the darkness and obscurity into which the sin of the first man has driven humanity. What madness is it to seek to dethrone God, the creator of all things, from the fortress of His wisdom to preserve man? This is the self-love condemned everywhere in the scriptures: we would rather everything perish than ourselves. This is not what godliness requires. Therefore, taught by the Spirit of God, we declare that both must be confessed: that God foreknows all things and that the freedom of our mind (as we have shown before) must be retained. The holy scriptures instruct us, wherein we read: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son" (Romans 8:29) and that "We were chosen by God before the foundation of the world" (Ephesians

1:4). In them, we learn that "The hairs of our head are all numbered"

(Luke 12:7) and that "Not even a sparrow falls to the ground apart from the will of our Father" (Matthew 10:29). Believing that God does all things rightly and justly, we cannot think He acts without reason and understanding.

34. Let us closely consider Cicero's reasoning. If, he argues, things to come are certainly foreknown, they must have a certain order, and since nothing happens without a cause, there must be an order and connection of causes. This will result in everything happening of necessity, thus overthrowing just and wholesome laws, eliminating admonitions and rebukes, and leaving no place for religion or prayers. Therefore, he argues, one must choose between divination and prescience of God or the free power of man's will. Both cannot coexist; they are mutually exclusive. Cicero finds it necessary to defend one and reject the other. Augustine astutely observes that

Cicero, while striving to maintain our freedom, makes us impious and wicked by robbing God of His foreknowledge.

It is important to note that Cicero's arguments also undermine the prophecies of our prophets, not just the divinations of the pagans. To address Cicero's reasoning, we concede that for God's prescience, there is a certain order of things and causes. However, we deny that this necessitates that all things happen inevitably. Despite an appointed order of causes, some causes may retain their liberty or contingency. Here, Cicero errs more than the Stoics: he would eliminate all order of causes and foreknowledge to preserve human liberty, stripping God of essential attributes. The Stoics, however, introduce destiny to preserve God's nature and our free will, removing it from the order of causes.

35. Let us join issue with him and steadfastly deny that the knowledge of God hinders our will, even though it comprehends things to come. The will of man will never bring anything to effect unless God has both foreknown it and willed it to be brought to effect. When He knows beforehand that tomorrow I will either run or read, indeed, I shall run and read, yet not driven thereto by any necessity but contingently; for, as far as it pertains to myself, I might do neither.

But if you urge further and say, "Nevertheless, you shall do it in such a way as God knew you would," I grant it. However, it does not follow that I could not do otherwise, because we do not always do what we can do. Many things might be done, which in no way are done. In that I shall read or run, it proceeds entirely from my own choice, for it is most within our power to will or not to will.

Therefore, when they say, "Because God knew beforehand that you would read or run, you must necessarily read," we must ask them

again whether under the name of necessity, they mean a compelled and repugnant will. If this is their meaning, we utterly deny it, for it is possible that God foreknew I would do something willingly and not with a constrained mind. But if by necessity, they mean that this must be done by me, we do not deny it, as the controversy is not about the thing done or not done but about the manner and form of doing.

Neither, as Cicero thought, are admonitions, laws, rebukes, or religious prayers rendered void. These things will be effective, even more frequently than he could persuade himself, because God not only has man's safety in His foreknowledge but also comprehends the ways and means by which He will help them. Therefore, if we perceive our brother to need the remedies we have mentioned, we must boldly use them, as they have appeared so far as God beforehand knew and willed them to be profitable.

We must not desist from our duty, even if all mortals affirm that we labour in vain. We must follow the law prescribed to us, not the secret prescience of God, of which we have no certainty about what

He has decreed for things to come. Since the prescience of God is not the nature or essence of our mind, we must judge the actions proceeding from it according to their nature and will, not by what is external to them. Therefore, since the nature of will is that it is moved neither unwillingly nor by constraint, it cannot be excluded by any outward means. It may be easier to abolish the will altogether than to remove its voluntary action, just as it may be easier to strip us of being human than to make us devoid of a reasonable soul while being human.

36. If you further ask whether it is necessary that I shall read tomorrow, seeing God has foreknown it, we answer that upon

condition or supposition, some necessity may be granted, but not perfect and absolute. With the necessity we grant, the choice of free will may very well agree. Aristotle, in his Ethics, disputes whether the casting forth done in the sea during a shipwreck is to be considered voluntary. Although he acknowledges a certain action mixed with willingness and unwillingness, he concludes that such actions belong to the voluntary sense, as the shipmen, in danger, will and choose them at that time.

If that notable philosopher did not hesitate to place willingness in such actions, where men are forced to choose something they would otherwise never have done, then how much more shall we attribute willingness to our usual actions when we perceive ourselves willingly doing what we think is good, despite knowing that God foreknew it?

Chrysostom plainly shows that the necessity we have taught by supposition does not overthrow the free power of our will. He writes on the first epistle to the Corinthians, interpreting these words: "It must needs be that heresies come, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you" (1 Corinthians 11:19). He says, "Christ used a similar form of speech when He said, 'It is necessary that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom they come.'" Also,

Christ said to His apostles, "It behooved Christ to suffer and enter into His glory" (Luke 24:26). All these things in holy matters are to be expounded as necessary without taking away from the nature of man's will. This is called among the Schoolmen, "A necessity not of the consequent, but of consequence."

37. Some commonly say that these distinctions help us nothing at all; if God has foreknown things, they must inevitably come to pass.

Yet, verily, they are profitable unto us, and that not meanly; for

thereby we understand that man's will is not compelled, but that willingly and without compulsion it desires whatsoever it will.

Otherwise, I will ask thee again, wouldst thou be saved against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldst be saved according to His will, He of necessity is not ignorant of thy salvation; for it is ordained that none wills that which he is ignorant of.

It happens to us very often that we together behold players; yet we do not say that the sight and knowledge which we have brings any necessity to them which play. And yet, while we see them in play, it is of necessity that they do play. Wherefore, as that necessity infringes not the nature of their will, even so the excellency of God compels not the will of man.

Some brawl at us, and say that this similitude is far from the question proposed; because none at any time do behold players which be not and play not indeed. Whereas it is ascribed to God that He has had knowledge beforehand of all our doings even from the beginning, when as yet neither we nor any of our actions appeared to be. To these men, I might answer that unto God all things are no otherwise present than they which do play are conversant in the sight of them which behold.

Let everyone, therefore, take heed to himself that he cast not the causes of his sins upon God; and when such a kind of cogitation enters into his mind, let him have respect unto lust, voluptuousness, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountains let him seek for the causes of his sins.

Neither must there be much credit given unto the Peripatetics in this matter, who deny that God has understanding of particular affairs,

lest they should seem to think that the mind of God is abject and vile if He should draw His knowledge from frail and transitory things.

This thing is not agreeable unto our doctrines; for we do believe that God of Himself has a perfect knowledge of all things, and that He has no need to challenge knowledge elsewhere to Himself.

38. As touching the third point, it was judged that the power of God is a hindrance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong.

For although God, by His infinite power with which He is endowed, does what His pleasure is, yet He suffers the state and nature of things to stand whole. Neither does He violate them or wrest them any other way than the condition of them does bear.

Wherefore, it is said in the Book of Wisdom, that God does mightily reach even from one end to another and does pleasantly dispose all things: or, as the Greek text says, εὐστάθιος (eustathios), that is, profitably. This might not be said if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The sum is that God here moderates His power in ruling the world so that He may fitly apply

His action unto all manner of things.

In the fourth place, sin seemed to be a hindrance to the liberty of the will, as if it so weakened the powers of man that after a sort they might be able to do nothing anymore. But there need not now be many words about this matter; because there has been plenty enough spoken in those things which we have declared, showing how much our liberty has been diminished by reason of sin, especially concerning very perfect and good actions which might be acceptable and well-pleasing unto God. Besides, it has been declared that our liberty is not by this means utterly taken away, but rather that there is as yet a great deal of it remaining.

39. Moreover, concerning the celestial powers, there shall be no great need to treat; seeing the Astronomers do glory in their own books, that "The wise shall bear rule among the stars." But if these things which they pronounce might not be escaped, all their gains would fall away: for no man would bestow cost upon the skill of those things which he thought he should neither be able to avoid nor change, either by endeavour or study. This would undoubtedly ensue if they ascribed a mere necessity to their foretellings. By this means, all prayers, piety, and worship of God would be taken away: for who would pray to God for obtaining anything if he were already persuaded that the same should not be granted unto him? Wherefore

Augustine said; "They which thus think do great wrong unto heaven: for they believe there is a court appointed wherein notable acts are decreed which cannot be avoided. If it were so on earth, it should needs be taken away. How much less must we think that the same is done by God in the celestial parts?" I beseech you, what judgment would be left if we did all things upon constraint?

This matter some excuse, saying that from heaven is only signified what shall come to pass, yet that we be not thereby driven by any necessity. And they bring forth a place out of the book of Genesis, wherein it seemeth to be spoken that the stars be put as signs. But that place is to be understood concerning seasons, winds, rains, tempests, and such like sorts. But how can they affirm that in heaven they see certain signs of things to come? They shall hardly prove it, especially touching man's affairs. For what answer can they make of twins, who being conceived at one time and have all one aspect of the heavens, yet (as experience teaches) have altogether differing fates and success?

Augustine, in his fifth book De Civitate Dei, and second chapter, is worth the reading; where he writes that sometimes there happened

two brothers to be so similarly affected that when one sickened, the other also was diseased; and when one recovered, the other was also eased. Concerning this, Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, answered that he thought them to be twins, and therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their bodies all of one nature. But Posidonius the Mathematician ascribed the whole cause to the stars because in their nativity they occupied all one aspect of the heavens.

But what (saith Augustine) will these men say of twins and innumerable living creatures which are born in hours and moments alike, and yet attain to such diversity of fortunes? Augustine witnesses that this example was taken out of Cicero, which nevertheless we read not in his extant books today, unless perhaps he found the same in his book De Fato, which remains amongst us all torn, mangled, and diminished.

40. Moreover, destiny, which the Stoics appoint to have mere necessity, hinders not our matter, for we admit not the same to be.

They severed it from the wills of men because they thought that all things would go to naught if, together with other causes, they comprehended will under destiny. However, it seemed not good to them to utterly sever man's will from destiny, except in respect of the first choice, which they would have to be wholly in our will. But while we shall choose any cause that might be under destiny, they would have it follow of necessity; that whatever things they were, they should be joined unto it. Even as Euripides said unto Laius, "It was free for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessity he should suffer even those things which Apollo prophesied to be contained under destiny."

But we, as we declared at the first, deny not that things are knit together, as God ordained and knew beforehand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remain whole and sound. For unto

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