-- Of that which is Voluntary
either removes the knowledge necessary for a voluntary action or the knowledge that would prevent the action altogether.
It is possible for someone acting unwittingly to be ignorant of their action's specifics but not unwilling in their desire, leading to no subsequent sorrow. Such ignorance does not excuse nor make the action against their will. For example, if someone kills their enemy, believing them to be a deer, and rejoices afterward, they acted through ignorance but not unwillingly.
Certain willful ignorances, such as avoiding knowledge to continue sinning, are highly blameworthy. Another type occurs when someone neglects to consider right action due to intense perturbation or bad habits, which also do not excuse the person since they fail to act as they should.
Ignorance arising from neglecting to learn or avoiding effort also does not excuse since everyone should know general laws. This form of ignorance prevents actions or the will's movement, making the action "not voluntary" rather than "against the will." The ignorance that excuses and obtains mercy is specific to unknown circumstances, combined with subsequent grief and sorrow.
Of that which is Voluntary 55 As for the voluntary, the definition consists of two parts. First, says Aristotle, the origin of the action must be internal. Secondly, the circumstances must be known. If voluntary is contrary to that which is against the will, and that which is against the will consists of two parts, then the opposites of these parts must be included in the definition of voluntary. Hence, we see the excellent method of Aristotle: for without previously explaining the nature of violence
and ignorance, he could not so easily have defined what voluntary was.
Moreover, Aristotle was further motivated to write on these matters because actions performed by angry men or those driven by desire fall under the definition of voluntary. Both the origin of the action is within the person who acts, and they understand and know the particulars well; for they deliberate and make sharp judgments, either to seek revenge or to achieve their desires. Such deliberation would not occur if they were ignorant of the circumstances. Thus, it is concluded that these actions are voluntary, and those who think otherwise are mistaken.
What led them to think such actions are against the will is clear. They observed that it is extremely difficult to resist anger and desire, which are more powerful than other emotions, and thus thought men are compelled by them. Heraclitus said, ὀργὴν χαλεπὸν μαχεῖσθαι (It is hard to fight against anger). Plato, in his second book of the "Republic," said, ὀργὴν οὐκ ἔστι μαχέσθαι οὐδὲ κρατεῖν (Anger is neither to be striven with nor subdued). If anger cannot be resisted or conquered, it seems to compel, making actions appear against the will. Plato, in his ninth book "De Legibus," stated, ὀργιζόμενος ἐοικὼς ἀκουσίῳ ὄντι (An angry man is like one acting against his will). He didn't say such actions were completely against the will but like it. Cato the Censor claimed that an angry person differs from a madman only in the duration of their condition. Others, such as Evenus, boldly stated that anger is much worse than madness. In his treatise "Cratylus," Plato compared desire to a very strong bond.
We also recognize that these two emotions are intense and powerful, but not so overpowering that they cannot be controlled by reason, as evidenced in temperate individuals and those endowed with
meekness and other virtues. However, I would not deny that actions done without such affects are more voluntary, but this does not exclude the others from being voluntary.
56 Aristotle states that none of the other living creatures do anything against their wills, not even children. This proposition is confirmed: those things done by enforcement or desire are voluntary. This was previously demonstrated by the definition. Now, additional reasons are provided. The first reason is if these actions were against the will, neither brute beasts nor children would act of their own accord. But they do many things willingly, so these actions cannot be against the will. The argument is a conditional of the consequent, taken to overthrow the antecedent.
Brute beasts and children, being without reason, act through these affects. However, it is absurd to think they do nothing willingly, as we see they do certain things against their will when confined but act willingly when freed. They choose food, enter chambers or dens at will, and defend their young. Alexanders' horse Bucephalus admitted no rider but Alexander, not by constraint. Elephants love their masters and obey them. Dogs in a house fawn on their masters and bark at strangers.
Many similar examples from birds, fish, and other animals show actions done willingly. Some have even attributed reason to them due to their industrious actions.
While we won't grant them reason, we affirm they act willingly. If they are called wild beasts because they are led violently, they still have an inward appetite driving them. Hence, their actions are of their own accord.
Aristotle groups children with brute beasts because both lack mature reason and are driven by affects like anger and desire. Yet, who would deny children act willingly? They play, run, and fawn on parents.
It would be unjust to punish children if they did not act willingly.
Teachers expect them to abstain from misbehaving, implying they can do so.
There are two types of appetite: one following sense and the other reason. Brute beasts and children are driven by sense-based appetite.
Brute beasts lack reason, so their desires never obey reason. Children have potential reason, which develops with age to guide their desires.
The Greek word ἑκούσιος is broader than "voluntary" and applies to brute beasts and children, who lack a proper will.
57 Moreover, some who opposed Aristotle affirm that actions driven by anger or lust are done against the will. If this were true, it would imply that either all such actions are against the will, or that good actions are voluntary and evil actions are involuntary. However, neither of these propositions can be accepted. Aristotle refutes this by stating: "Is it not ridiculous to assert that good actions are voluntary and evil actions are done by compulsion and against the will, considering that shameful acts performed through anger or lust originate from the same source as virtuous acts influenced by the same emotions?"
Clearly, actions sharing the same origin must be classified similarly.
Further, Aristotle argues that it is just and appropriate to be angry in certain situations, particularly against vices and wicked individuals.
If private citizens did not rebuke, and magistrates did not punish such individuals, they would be culpable. Additionally, there are
many things, such as health and knowledge, which it would be negligent not to desire and strive for earnestly.
Should we then claim that the laws of honesty and justice demand actions that are against our will and done under compulsion, or actions from which we cannot abstain? This notion would be absurd in the context of civil laws. Moreover, actions done against the will bring grief and sorrow, but actions driven by anger and lust are often pleasurable rather than distressing. Regarding lust, this is evident.
For anger, Aristotle references Homer in his "Rhetoric," describing anger as sweet to Achilles like honey melting under his tongue.
Anger, essentially, is a desire for revenge.
Furthermore, Aristotle asks, "What difference is there between actions done against the will that align with reason and those wickedly executed out of anger, given that both can be avoided?"
This question hinges on the nature of sin: since sin involves actions that should or can be avoided, and this applies equally to rational errors and those driven by anger or desire, both should be considered voluntary. Why, then, do adversaries deem the latter involuntary?
58 Aristotle continues, reasoning about human emotions: "Because unreasonable emotions are human and arise from anger or desire, they too are voluntary and done without compulsion." Human emotions, like reason, are part of the human experience. Therefore, if actions stemming from reason are human because reason is part of our mind, so too are actions from anger or desire, for these emotions exist in the human mind.
An objection might be that actions driven by anger or desire come from the irrational part of the mind. True, says Aristotle, but these are still powers of the human mind, making the resulting actions
human. Although these powers are irrational by nature, they can be influenced and governed by reason, unlike in brute beasts.
Additionally, these emotions and actions originate from the will, meaning they can be restrained by it. This is unlike the involuntary processes of nourishment and growth, which occur regardless of will.
Therefore, it is absurd to claim that actions driven by anger or desire are against the will or done under compulsion.
59 Now let us see how these things, which we have here treated of, agree with the Holy Scriptures. Aristotle said that he would treat of voluntary and not voluntary actions because praises and dispraises, rewards, punishments, and mercy, accompany those things which are voluntary. Similarly, in Psalm 111, the faithful are praised because they are a willing people. Eunuchs are commended, not those who became eunuchs through violence or were born so, but those who willingly chastened themselves for the kingdom of heaven's sake.
A woodcutter who accidentally kills his fellow is forgiven because that action was not voluntary. The devil, constrained to speak the truth and compelled to depart from those possessed, does not deserve praise or rewards. Balaam is compelled by the angel with a sword not to curse the people of God; he receives no praise because he did it unwillingly. The definition of violence, as having an outward beginning and not giving any help, indicates that original sin is not a violent thing because it is an inward corruption in us, which we further by the naughtiness we daily add to it.
If anyone argues that we are without knowledge and understanding when such are acquired, and that it comes from the initial naughty motions of our mind, where there is no choice or deliberation, we answer that Aristotle's points must be understood concerning moral
and actual deeds: for these sins did not he know. However, it suffices us that such things cannot be called violent, seeing they have their beginning from within.
We also grant that there are mixed actions, and we affirm that they ought to be reckoned among those which are voluntary. Therefore, the Holy Scriptures exhort us to them, persuading us that we must endure anything rather than run into sin. Paul says, "We must never do evil, that good may come of it." We must rather obey God than men. We are called to take up our cross and follow the Lord. He is said to have found his soul who has lost it. The denial of oneself has no other respect. These actions are of the mixed sort because no one would choose these things, except by chance: but we will and do these things partly to avoid sins and partly to be joined to the Lord.
However, you might say that these things have an outward beginning, and therefore they are rather violent. For unless the Lord did these things in us, none of us would do them. We grant that the beginning, whereby our wills are changed, is from without: but our wills being changed by the Spirit of God, are inward to us, and at their command, we are moved to these actions. Therefore, they ought to be called voluntary, for they are not done by God without us.
Indeed, we are praised and dispraised for these mixed actions. Christ says that He will deny before His Father those who deny Him before men. He will not be ashamed of those who are not ashamed of Him before men. They are commended who, for Christ's sake, suffer grievous vexations: "Blessed are they who suffer persecution, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." In such things as these, Aristotle says pardon is given, as when David feigned madness before King
Achish to avoid being slain.
However, there are certain things we should never be led to commit, and these are sins. There is an old saying, "Usque ad aras," meaning
"saving a man's conscience and religion." Job is an example to us, who in adversities could never be driven, either by the reproachful speaking or bragging of his wife, to blaspheme God. Those driven to these things find no mercy, as they fall from the hope thereof, as stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews about those who departed from the known truth. This happened to Spiera the Italian and those who killed themselves after abjuring the Gospel.
Aristotle propounds two difficult questions. The first is what a man should suffer for anything. The answer is easy: we must suffer anything rather than depart from Christ and His holy commandments. "What does it profit a man if he gains the whole world and loses his own soul?" "Do not fear those who kill the body but are not able to kill the soul," says the Lord. The second difficulty we experience in ourselves: we often see followers who only believe for a time. "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." However, we comfort ourselves with the thought that "all things are possible to him who believes," and Paul said that he was able to do all things through Christ who strengthened him.
Justly did Aristotle reprove those who thought that honest and just things are voluntary but dishonest things are not voluntary: we must not think so in any wise. Paul said, "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good thing." If we have anything good, it must be altogether attributed to God. For to the Philippians, we read, "It is
God who works in us both to will and to perform."
60 Now let us see what is to be said regarding ignorance. There is a certain ignorance, after which repentance follows immediately upon perceiving the error; and sometimes no repentance follows at all.
Regarding the latter, the Lord says, "Forgive them, for they know not what they do." Stephen prayed the same. Among those for whom prayer was made, some repented afterward, and some never did.
Jonathan tasted honey, being ignorant of what his father had decreed; and upon knowing his father's decree, he did not sorrow but was rather angry with him. But Paul, when he perceived his error, was sorrowful. Likewise, those of whom Peter spoke in the Acts, "I know that they did it in ignorance," also sorrowed. Their words,
"Men and brethren, what shall we do?" show their repentance.
The sorrow that follows does not always indicate that there was no sin, for both those who crucified the Lord and Paul sinned because they were ignorant of what they ought to have known. If, however, there had been a certain ignorance of the circumstance, which could not have been known, as in Noah when he was drunk, not having seen the wine before nor knowing its strength and property; or as it happened to Jacob, who lay with Leah instead of Rachel, both of them were excused due to their ignorance. But he who does not know the general and principal points of the laws is not excused. Thus it is said of Paul in the first epistle to the Corinthians, "He that is ignorant, let him be ignorant." This ignorance, which does not excuse, is sometimes laid upon men by God as a punishment, while
He punishes sins with sins. As written to the Thessalonians in the second epistle, "Because they have not received the love of the truth, that they might be saved, therefore God will send upon them strong delusion, that they should believe lies." And in Ezekiel, "If the prophet be deceived, I the Lord have deceived that prophet." Also,
Ahab was seduced by the evil spirit, with God permitting it. Thus, we see what ignorance excuses and what does not.
Aristotle adds that those things done by drunkenness and anger are voluntary, which we also affirm. Concerning these, we have received
a law: "Be angry, but sin not. Let not the sun go down upon your wrath." And we are forbidden to say to any man, "Thou fool."
Concerning drunkenness, the Lord says, "Beware that your hearts be not overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness." Paul also says,
"Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess." Therefore, things done through anger and drunkenness do not excuse, as these could either be avoided or controlled.
But all the wicked and ungodly are ignorant, though they are not excused. The Scriptures declare everywhere, "The fool has said in his heart, 'There is no God.'" In Proverbs 7, regarding those led by lust and pleasures, "He is led as an ox to the slaughter, and like a fool to the correction of the stocks." In Romans, "They professed themselves to be wise, but became fools, and their foolish hearts were darkened."
To the Ephesians, "You shall not walk as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their minds, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart." And Isaiah, as all the Evangelists testify, says, "Seeing they shall see and not perceive; hearing they shall hear and not understand," because being in darkness, they know not whither they go.
Among the circumstances, which when unknown excuse, Aristotle specifically mentions the end and the purpose. David sent Absalom to Hebron but could not know his intent or purpose and is thus excused. Similarly, Abimelech took another man's wife but did not know she was married and thus could say to God, "I did it in the integrity of my heart, for I did not know." The church is excused for baptizing Simon Magus because it was unaware of his ill and fraudulent intentions. However, in cases of ignorance that excuse us, if no sorrow follows, we are guilty because we do not condone what was done.
The man who shot an arrow and by chance killed King Ahab would not have sorrowed had he been aware of the deed; thus, it would not have been evident that the act was against his will. David sorrowed for the deaths of Absalom, Abner, and Amasa, showing these events happened against his will. Voluntariness encompasses two things: the beginning must be from within, and there must be no ignorance of what is done. Original sin begins from within, and we know such corruption is against God and righteousness, although we do not choose it, making it voluntary. This applies even to young children lacking knowledge, but our concern here is actual sins, not original sin.
That sins done through lust and wrath are voluntary has been shown by various reasons, which we admit. We have received laws concerning both vices: "Thou shalt not lust." We are commanded not to be angry with our brother without cause. Aristotle argued that brute beasts act voluntarily; Isaiah similarly said, "The ox knows his owner, and the ass his master's crib." Jeremiah said, "The stork in the heaven knows her appointed times." We also believe this of children; in the time of Elisha, they were punished by bears. Isaac, oppressed by Ishmael, was commanded by Sarah to be cast forth.
Aristotle affirms that we are sometimes required to be angry. "The zeal of Your house has eaten me up," and Phinehas is commended by God for avenging the impure fornicators.
Where it is said that actions done against the will bring sorrow, Paul testifies, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Aristotle states that actions committed through wrath and lust, as well as those done by reason and will, are to be avoided. We correct this by stating that they may be avoided if God's grace is applied; without it, who can guard against the motions of anger and lust? We can temper ourselves from outward actions, but