CHAPTER I: Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature

CHAPTER I: Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature

Of Original Sin and Free Will by Peter Martyr Vermigli

Table of Contents CHAPTER I: Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature -- How by Sin all things are subject unto vanity.

CHAPTER II: Of Free Wil -- Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary -- Of that which is Voluntary -- Of Man's Election or Making of Choice

CHAPTER I:

Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature

First, we will see whether there is any original sin or not: for there are some who utterly deny the same to be. Then we will declare what it is; lastly, what properties it has, how it is conveyed to posterity, and by what means it is released. As touching the first, we must remember that both in the Holy Scriptures and among the Fathers, it has diverse names. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, it is called sin, the law of the members, and concupiscence.

Elsewhere, it is called the want of original righteousness, a corruption of nature, a lump of wickedness, a froth, a natural weakness, the law of the flesh, and other such names.

The Pelagians in old times denied this sin; today, the Anabaptists deny it. These are their arguments. First, they say that the fall of Adam was sufficiently punished in himself and that there is no cause why God would revenge it in his posterity; especially seeing it is written in the prophet Nahum, that God does not twice punish the same thing. It suffices Him that He had once punished. Moreover, it is also written, that the son shall not bear the father's iniquity, but the soul that sins shall die. Further, that the body, when it is formed in the womb, is the workmanship of God and has nothing that ought to be blamed; rather, it is worthy of great admiration. The soul is also either created or infused by God. The means of propagation cannot be accounted evil because marriage in the Holy Scriptures is commended, and from the beginning, God commanded man to beget children. Therefore, among so many defences of innocence, they demand by what entrances sin could insinuate itself.

They add also that Paul in his first epistle to the Corinthians, when he exhorts the believing wife to abide with her unbelieving husband if he will abide with her, among other things, says: Your children are holy. But they say that they cannot be holy if they are born in sin; and that therefore, those born of faithful parents cannot draw with

them original sin. They affirm that it is commonly said that sin is a thing spoken, done, or lusted against the law of God; and that it is not sin unless it is voluntary. And as John says in his first epistle, the fourth chapter: Sin is iniquity, contrary to which is equity or right.

This can be no other thing than what is contained in the law, and so that sin is a transgression of the law. All these things cannot fall into infants when they are born. They say further that it does not seem convenient to assert that this sin is by the flesh or body poured out from one to another; for that the flesh and the body are in their own nature senseless things, neither can they seem to be a meet subject for sin. To establish their devised argument, they add that those things spoken by Paul in the fifth chapter of Romans must be extended unto the sins which are called actual. They say it is said that sin entered by one man into the world because of the imitation and example which the posterity followed.

By these and similar arguments, they deny that there is any original sin. As for death and the afflictions of this life, which are commonly brought as tokens whereby original sin is confirmed, they say that those consist of natural causes, such as the temperature of the elements and of the humours. Therefore, they say, it is a vain fable to refer them to the fall of Adam. They think it absurd to affirm that to be sin which by no means can be avoided. Lastly, they say that if by that means we are said to sin in Adam because we were in his loins, as it is said of Levi in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that he paid tithes in the loins of Abraham: by the same reason, we may say that we were in the loins of other forefathers from whom we have descended by procreation. Therefore, there is no cause why the sin of Adam has been derived to us rather than the sin of our grandfather, greatgrandfather, his father, or any other progenitors. By this means, the state of those who shall be born in the latter days would seem most

unhappy, for they must bear the offences of all their forefathers.

These arguments they allege to prove that there is no original sin.

But we, on the contrary part, will prove by many testimonies of the Holy Scriptures that there is such a sin. Thus God says in the sixth chapter of Genesis: My spirit shall not always strive with man, because he is flesh. And again: All the imagination of their hearts is only evil every day. And in the eighth chapter: The imagination of their heart is evil, even from their very childhood. These things declare that there is some vice in our nature when we are born. Also,

David says: Behold, I was conceived in iniquity, and in sins my mother conceived me. Nothing can be plainer than this testimony.

Also, Jeremiah in the 17th chapter says that the heart of man is wicked, perverse, and stubborn. Jeremiah and Job also curse the day they were born into the world because they perceived that the very original and fountain of vices sprang up together with them. Job has a most manifest testimony of the uncleanness of our nativity, for thus he says: Who can make that clean, which is conceived of unclean seed? And our Saviour says: Except a man is born again of water, and of the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. Just as the potter does not make any vessel anew unless he perceives the same to be ill-fashioned before, so Christ would not have us be regenerated again unless He saw that we were first unhappily begotten. He also testifies in another place, saying: That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.

By these words, He would signify unto us that regeneration by the Spirit is necessary because we had before only a carnal generation.

Paul in the sixth chapter of Romans says that we must not abide in sin because we are dead unto it. He proves this by baptism, saying that all who have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death so that we should die unto sin and that our old man

should be crucified, and the body of sin abolished. As young children are baptized, this testifies that sin is in them: for otherwise, the nature of baptism, as described by Paul, would not be consistent. He follows the same reasoning in the Epistle to the Colossians, where he says that we are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, by putting off the sinful body of the flesh, being buried together with Christ in baptism. He compares baptism with circumcision, stating that those baptized have put off the body of sin.

It is certain that those baptized are baptized into the remission of sins. Assuredly, the circumcision given unto children in the old law corresponded to our baptism. Concerning circumcision, it is written:

The soul whose flesh of the foreskin shall not be circumcised the eighth day shall die the death. Therefore, seeing children have need of the sacrament of regeneration, it follows necessarily that they are born under the power of sin. Paul to the Ephesians in the second chapter says that we are by nature the children of wrath. But our nature could not be hateful to God unless it were defiled with sin. In the same place, Paul with weighty words describes the fierceness of this wrath; how we walk according to the prince of this world, which is of strength in our hearts, by reason of our disobedience, and therefore we do the will of the flesh and of our mind.

Augustine also cites a place from the first epistle to the Corinthians that Christ died for all men: wherefore it follows that all men were dead and needed His death. It is wicked to exclude children from the number of those for whom Christ died. If you demand what kind of persons they were for whom Christ suffered, this the apostle sufficiently declares in the Epistle to the Romans, saying that they were weak, God's enemies, ungodly, and sinners. Among them, we must reckon young children if we grant that Christ died for them.

Besides this, it seems that original sin is most manifestly taught out of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: for thus it is written: The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin. It is added: The good which I would do, that do I not; but the evil which I would not do, that do I: it is not I then that do it, but it is sin that dwells in me. He also mentions the law of the members, lamenting that he was thereby drawn captive against his will. In the eighth chapter, he says that the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God and that it is not subject to the law of God, nor yet can be. The death of young children bears sufficient record that sin sticks in them; unless we say that God punishes them undeservedly. Moreover, the place in the fifth chapter of Romans contains a most evident testimony of original sin: for thus it is written: By one man sin entered into the world, and all men without exception have sinned, and the sin of one man spread over all men, and for the disobedience of one man many are made sinners. Further, those who are grafted in Christ are towards the end of the same epistle called wild olive trees, signifying that man degenerated from the good institution of his own nature. If we have departed from our own nature, undoubtedly we have gotten original sin. Paul before so accused all mankind, saying:

There is none just, there is none that understands or seeks after God: all have declined, and are altogether become unprofitable, there is none that does good, no not one. All these things sufficiently declare the depravation of man's nature. By these testimonies of the Scriptures, it sufficiently appears (as I think) that there is original sin.

Next, I should confute the arguments of the adversaries, but first I thought it good to show the definition of original sin; for by diligently weighing and knowing the same, many things will in the meantime be known, which serve for the confutation of their reasons. First, we will recite the opinions of other men, then we will declare what we

think thereof. The Pelagians affirmed that the sin of Adam did not spread abroad into the posterity, but by imitation only. Against these, Augustine disputed vehemently, and by many arguments showed that original sin is not only by the imitation of Adam's sin.

For if Paul would have said that the first sin had been spread abroad in this manner, he would not have said that it came from Adam, but rather from the devil; for he was the first to give a form and example of sinning. Wherefore Christ in the Gospel of John said that the Jews, who boasted that they came from their father Abraham, were rather the sons of the devil, because they did his works. For the devil was a murderer from the beginning, and they sought to kill Him who had not deserved evil at their hands. Augustine cites that which is in the second chapter of the Book of Wisdom: "Through the envy of the devil, sin entered into the world, and they which are of his part do imitate him."

Nevertheless, I do not attribute much to this saying, partly because that book is not of the canonical scriptures, and partly because in the Greek text there is some ambiguity. For this verb 'do imitate' is not written there, but rather 'have experience of that death'. However, the reason is firm, that from the devil came the first example of sinning. Further, this opinion is hereby confuted, in that Paul makes an antithesis between Christ and Adam. But the righteousness of Christ is not only set forth for us to imitate; but also that those who believe in Him should be changed in mind, corrected in spirit, and amended in all their strength. Wherefore, on the other side, it is required by the nature of contraries that besides the ill example, which Adam gave unto his posterity, he has also infected their nature, and (as Augustine writes in his book De peccatorum meritis et remissione) has depraved it with a certain corruption.

Thirdly, this also makes against the Pelagians, that even infants die.

For as Paul says to the Romans, in the sixth chapter: "The reward of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." And in the 15th chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians: "The weapon (says he) of death is sin." Lastly, the baptism given to young children cannot blot out the sin of imitation.

Wherefore, we must of necessity affirm some other kind of sin to be in them unless we will say that they are baptized in vain.

Another opinion was that which the Master of the Sentences cites in the 2nd book, the 33rd distinction of those who thought that original sin is only a guilt, or trespass, or bond, whereunto we are tied by the sin of Adam. They acknowledge not that there is truly and in very deed any fault or sin in those who are born, but only a certain offence and obligation, which might cause them to die and be condemned for the sin of Adam. This opinion Pighius seems to have revived; for he denies that original sin is sin indeed, because it is neither a transgressing of the law nor yet voluntary. Therefore, he affirmed it to be nothing else but the sin of Adam, for which we, his posterity, are made subject unto damnation and death and become exiles from the kingdom of heaven. But as for death and afflictions of this life, and lusts of the flesh, and other such like affections, he says that they come from the wellsprings of nature. All these things, so far from calling sins, he pronounces to be the works of God; for he says that God is the author of nature, and that these things follow the humours and temperature of the body. What happens in brute beasts happens also in men, as touching the flesh and grosser powers of the mind.

They desire things preservative, pleasant, and profitable, whether they be agreeable to reason or against it, and avoid things contrary.

Therefore, he affirmed original sin to be the only transgression of Adam, in the danger of which one transgression, he would have us all

to be born: not for any sin, or fault, or corruption that we have in ourselves.

He says moreover that those who die only in the danger of that sin of Adam shall not be afflicted in another life with sensible pain. He imagines (although he dares not boldly affirm it) that they shall either in this world, or else in some other pleasant place, be happy with a certain natural blessedness, wherein they shall live, praising

God and giving thanks, although they be banished from the kingdom of heaven. Of this discommodity, nevertheless, they shall not complain or be sorrowful; for this were to strive against the will of God, which a man cannot do without sin. But as they had no naughty will while they lived here, it is not to be thought that they shall have it in another life. He claims that they shall not be pressed with sensible pain, which he thinks he very well proves by two reasons: first, because they committed no evil, nor yet contaminated themselves with any naughtiness; secondly, because in this life no repentance or contrition for original sin is required. For this feigned devise, he has this colour: that sin should not be understood but in its true proper manner, that is, a thing spoken, done, or lusted against the law of God, and that it is voluntary, because it is not forced upon anyone against their will, but may be avoided. But as these things take no place in young infants, therefore sin cannot be in them. However, he says that he does not deny original sin; for he says it is the sin of Adam, for which we are all condemned and die.

This man seeks pretenses, because I see in very deed that he was moved to speak these things for some other cause. For as he attributes so much to free will and has written so many things touching that matter against us, and seeing that it might not consist if he plainly grants original sin in such a way as taught by all the godly, he found out this new devised doctrine, which (as I said) is not

altogether so new, for it is both touched and rejected by the Master of the Sentences.

To give a more colourable show to this devise, he brings a similitude of a most liberal prince, who not only gives freedom to a servant of his, but also endows him with lordship and heaps of riches, which also should come to his posterity. He only charges him faithfully to observe certain commandments, which he, transgressing, knows that all those riches and preferments shall be taken from him, and he returns to his old bondage. This servant, as an indiscreet and ungrateful person, breaks the prince's commandment, whereby not only himself becomes a servant as before, but also his seed born unto him become bond-slaves. He says that those children have nothing wherefore they should complain of bondage to their prince, but rather give thanks that he had so liberally shown himself to their fathers. As concerning their father, they may grievously sorrow because he lost those benefits for himself and his posterity. What if this also be added: that the prince's liberality was so great, he invited the posterity of that ungrateful servant to the very same and much greater preferments, and so invited them, as frankly he sent his own son to provoke them? Even so (he says) stands our matter. Adam was so created by God, that he was capable of that supernatural felicity; who nevertheless, setting light by the commandments of God, was despoiled of all those supernatural gifts and left to the first state of his own nature. In the same state, we also are procreated, and so for his sin are we damned, die, and are banished from the kingdom of heaven, suffering many discommodities derived from the originals of our nature. Wherefore we may complain of our first parents, but not of God; for he was most liberal unto him, and especially, seeing he calls us again unto himself (which is the highest felicity) by his only son, and would have him suffer death for our salvation.

But that which I have now twice spoken of makes very much against this opinion: that infants die. For death has no right where there is no sin unless we say that God punishes the innocent. This reason is confirmed by Saint Paul's argument, whereby he proved sin to be before the law: "For death (he says) reigned from Adam even unto

Moses." But according to Pighius's opinion, this reason might seem very blunt. For some might say: Though they died, yet it does not follow that they had sin: for sin happened to them by reason of Adam, for whose sin they became mortal. Moreover, does not Paul grant corruption to be in nature when he declares that sin dwells in him and confesses that the law of his members draws him away captive? But let not Pighius object that these things come from the originals of nature; for these originals are not of nature that is perfect, but of nature corrupt and depraved. Neither should he bring a similitude of brute beasts in this matter; for man is created far more excellent than brute beasts, and to be the ruler over them.

Indeed, man had in himself originals whereby he might desire things pleasant and commodious, but not against reason and the word of God. To have such forcible and violent effects is not the property of men but of beasts. Seeing our soul was immortal and given from God, it requires a body meet for the same, namely, such as might be preserved forever, lest the soul should at any time be constrained to be without the same. So we must not fly to the first grounds of nature; for it was not so ordained at the first as we now have it.

If Pighius imagines that God created these wicked lusts and affections in us, he deals both blasphemously and reproachfully against Him, the faults of which he goes about to lay to our charge without cause. For seeing God is both the best, the wisest, and the most just, and created man unto the chiefest felicity, he would not have endowed him with those things that would draw him back from that felicity, which would induce him to that which is contrary to His

commandments: which things of themselves would be vile, and lead us captive under the law of sin and death. For if these affections should be mortified and crucified in us (as indeed they ought to be), we must confess that they are vices and are hateful unto God. It matters not that he says that those things properly are not sins unless, just as cold is called slow because it makes men slothful, these things, because they stir up men to sin, may be called sins. Or else in the same way as the scripture is named a hand because it is written with the hand, or that the speech is called a tongue because it is uttered by the ministry thereof, these may be called sins because they have proceeded from sin. These similitudes do nothing to further Pighius's cause; for although Augustine used now and then to speak in that manner, he meant to be understood concerning those defects and imperfections that remain in man after baptism.

But Augustine says that in any wise they are sin before baptism; yea, the Holy Ghost also by Paul calls them sins, and the nature of sin is agreeable unto them. For we have defined sin in such a way as it pertains to all things whatsoever that strive against the law of God.

For as John says: Sin is unrighteousness, and who perceives it not to be a thing unjust, that the flesh should make the spirit subject unto it, and that our soul will not repose itself in the word of God? Seeing therefore all these things do stir us up to transgress and rebel against the word of God, they are both unrighteous and must be called sins.

Besides this, the words of David are against Pighius: Behold, I am conceived in iniquity, and in sins my mother hath conceived me. If naughty desires and these vices were the works of nature, surely the man of God would not complain of them. And what did Paul the Apostle otherwise mean when he wrote these words unto the Ephesians: We are by nature the children of wrath, but that sin is in every one of us?

But Pighius goes about by a perverse interpretation to wrest this testimony from us, saying that to be the children of wrath by nature is no other thing than to be the children of wrath by a certain condition of our birth because we are so brought forth into the world.

And he alleges that some are called servants by nature, which is no other thing but that they are born unto such a state as they do serve.

But we neither can nor ought to rest upon this feigned device; for the wrath of God is not stirred up but upon just cause, for it is no such thing as can be kindled either rashly or by chance. So it behoves that in our nature there is something amiss, whereby God's wrath is provoked to revenge.

And that similitude of his serves not to his purpose; for those who are said to be born bondmen by nature have even by nature something in them apt for bondage. If we give credit to Aristotle in his Politics, they are bondmen by nature who exceed in strength of the body but are slow and dull in reason. And thereby it comes to pass that they are more meet to serve than to command others or to live at liberty.

Also, the Apostle does sufficiently declare why he calls us by nature the children of wrath: even because we by nature seem to be prone to stir up God's wrath, and do walk according to the prince of this world; and also for that the devil can do much in our hearts by reason of incredulity; and that we fulfill the will of our flesh and of our mind. These are the things which make us the children of wrath.

And how can it be denied that sin is in our nature, seeing Christ would have us to be regenerate? For unless we are framed amiss, what need is there for us to be fashioned anew?

Besides this, in the eighth chapter of the Book of Genesis, it is plainly spoken that the imagination of man's heart is evil, even from his

childhood. And how dare Pighius be so bold as to call that a good thing and the work of God, which the Holy Ghost in plain terms has called evil? But lest he should seem to say nothing, he imagines that the same was spoken by God of his mercy; as though he would so excuse men and testify that he would not destroy the world anymore by water, because men were made in that manner and that the cogitations of them did tend unto evil, even from their childhood.

But while he judges this to be an excuse, he is far deceived; for this is thought to be the better and more natural sense of this place: namely, that God would enter into a covenant with Noah, that he would never destroy the world again with water; though otherwise men were such as they deserved the same, and the imagination of their hearts was evil even from their childhood. These things do not clear man's nature from sin but rather signify the same to be more vicious and corrupt, which nevertheless God will spare for his mercy's sake.

Lastly, we read in Paul that by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners, which shows that there is sin in those who are born of Adam, for which they may be called sinners. But Pighius thinks himself able by shifts to avoid this because sinners are sometimes so called by reason of guilt or fault, although the act of sinning is past and shows itself no more. Notwithstanding this, he is never able to show out of the scriptures that any man is called a sinner but that either he has sin in him, or else has surely committed sin before, unless he will say that God makes men guilty without any sin committed by them.

Moreover, Pighius does not consider that by this his feigning is brought in a middle opinion, touching the state of those who die only in the guiltiness of Adam; whereas the scriptures do plainly teach us that in the last judgment there shall be no middle ground, but that

men shall either be committed to everlasting fire or else shall enjoy eternal felicity. It is rash to proceed further in such things than is revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, they deal with more moderation and greater wisdom who refer all this whole matter to God's divine providence.

But it is a goodly matter to see by what reasons our Pighius is moved.

"They shall not be grieved (says he) with any sensible pain because they did not contaminate themselves in this life with any lewd purpose." What matter makes this? It suffices that they had a naughty nature, for they were prone unto sin, although in respect of their age they could not sin. The wolf's whelp is slain, which nevertheless might excuse itself, saying it had not yet worried any sheep or done any damage to the flock; yet the reason why he is killed is good: because he has a wolf's nature and would do those things if he were suffered to live.

Hereunto Pighius adds another argument, namely, that sorrow and contrition are not required for original sin. But how is he able to prove this? For all godly men have grievously lamented for being oppressed with this vice. David, at the time he occupied himself in repentance, broke out into these words: Behold how I am conceived in iniquity. Paul does so bewail this offence as he cries out: O unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from this body subject unto death? And whereas Pighius says that these will be content with their state, he uses no other reason than because if they should strive against the will of God and should be sorrowful for the judgment done upon them, they should sin. This is not needed to surmise of them because they committed no sin in this life. But here Pighius must be demanded whether infants have had that right will in this life. He must of necessity deny it, seeing by reason of their age they could not have it. Which being so, how dare he assign the same to

them in another life? It is much more probable that they shall there have an evil will, whereof there was a beginning in them while they were here, than any good will, whereof they possessed no token in this life.

But that similitude, which he brought of a liberal prince who not only freed his servant but also advanced him to great honours, is none of his own proper invention, for it is borrowed from Aegidius Romanus, the School-divine, who nevertheless acknowledges with us the corruption of nature and naughtiness naturally engrafted in us from the beginning.

But yet this similitude must be examined, lest, as tapestry hangings cover the blemishes of bare walls, so the same, with the show and colour cast upon it, may cloak some error and dangerously deceive and abuse us. He sets forth unto us Adam as a bondman, who from the beginning was both set at liberty by God and endowed with excellent gifts, and so furnished that those things should also have been extended unto his posterity, so that he had obeyed the commandment and law of God. But if he neglected to do the same, then he with all his posterity should return to the former state of bondage. Herein lies the error of Pighius, for he feigns to himself a man who from the very beginning had a nature that was subject to corruption and bound fast unto the servitude of unreasonable affections. Which thing is not true; for he was made perfect by God, not that he should be like unto a brute beast. Indeed, he had desires unto things which were both pleasant and might preserve, but yet unto no such things as should stir him up against the word of God and right reason. And there was a body given unto him which might have endured forever. Therefore when he sinned, he fell not into his first state but procured for himself a new infelicity. These things shall suffice at present concerning that second opinion.

The third is, that lust or concupiscence dispersed in the flesh and members is original sin. Of this opinion was Augustine, as appears by his book De peccatorum meritis et remissione and by many other places. The Schoolmen interpret that he meant not only the concupiscence of the grosser parts of the mind but also the naughtiness of the will. But Pighius repugneth, saying that Augustine affirmed that only concupiscence of the flesh and members is original sin, as though Augustine meant not that by the wickedness of the affections, both the mind is blinded, and the will corrupted.

For seeing these vices are joined one with another, he would under one name comprehend them all, and he used the name of concupiscence because in it the force of this disease does more plainly and manifestly appear. Where Hugo De Sacramentis wrote, that original sin is that which we from our nativity draw into our mind through ignorance and into our flesh through concupiscence.

Lastly, whereas Christ said that none can be saved except he be regenerated, he meant not only as touching the flesh or lusting part of the mind: for it chiefly behoves that our reason and will be born anew; then follows the regeneration of the affections and of the body, whereby (as meet it is) all things are subdued to the spirit and word of God. Neither did Augustine by concupiscence understand the very act of lusting, but the ableness, proneness, and ready disposition unto ill-doing: which vices are not always known in children, but so far forth, as they disclose themselves by their age. For so in deep darkness, there is no difference between a blind man and him that sees; but as soon as light comes, or the day is present, the impediment of the blind man is easily perceived. Before the wolf passes the age of a whelp, he shows not his nature and ravening. The scorpion does not always prick, yet he always carries a sting. The serpent, while he is numb with cold in the winter, is safely handled,

not because he has no venom, but because he is not able to pour it out.

And he says that this concupiscence is brought unto us by generation because all we have sinned with Adam; for he judges that all mankind was in Adam, as in one lump: and that because nature was corrupted in him through sin, we cannot from thence draw other than a corrupt nature; for grapes are not gathered from thistles, nor figs from thorns. But he says that this concupiscence is specially derived unto the posterity through the heat of lust which happens in procreation. Yet some of the wiser sort of Schoolmen have judged that although there should happen no wantonness of lust in the conjunction of the parents, yet the child should not be without original sin; because the same was in the first man, as it were in seminali ratione (as they speak), that is, the nature of the seed. But if you demand of Augustine whether he thinks that this concupiscence, which he says is original sin, is voluntary, he will answer that it may be called voluntary because the sin committed by our first parents was voluntary: but in us, it cannot be said voluntary because we have not taken it upon us by our own choice, unless perhaps it may be so called because it is not by violence put into us.

Against this opinion, Pighius inveighs, for thus he says: If the sin of Adam corrupted man's nature, it behoved such a natural effect to be in sin; for there was nothing at all in that first transgression that had a property to corrupt nature more than other sins have. Therefore, it shall be necessary to confess that our nature is corrupted, not only by the fault of our first parents but also by the sins of all our progenitors. Which thing seems very absurd unto Pighius, that we should be so much more corrupt than others, as we are later born than they.

But this chief point, whether the sins of all parents are derived from one to another unto the posterity, I will for this time omit and will speak thereof toward the end, so much as shall be thought meet. In the meanwhile, I deny that which this man takes for a ground; namely, that corruption is the natural effect of sin. For the reason thereof proceeds rather from divine justice, by which the grace of the spirit, and heavenly gifts, wherewith man was endowed before his fall, was removed from him when he had sinned. And this withdrawing of grace proceeded from God's justice, although the blame must be ascribed to the transgression of the first man, lest you should straightaway say that God is the cause of sin. For when he had once withdrawn his gifts, wherewith he beautified man, forthwith ensued vices and corruptions of their own accord, which before were strange from the state and condition of man.

This man demands how sin can have the power to corrupt man's nature. Whether by means of privation? Or by reason of the matter or subject of privation? But by means of privation, he thinks it impossible to be; for that, being nothing, can work nothing: neither can it be by reason of that action, which is subject unto privation, as was the wicked choice through the will of the first man. For he says that Adam, when he did eat the forbidden fruit, desired not this; neither was it his will to corrupt his own nature and the nature of his posterity. This is a very weak argument; for oftentimes we see that many things follow men against their wills and unawares, which things, though they would not, yet are they joined together with their actions. They who load themselves immoderately with meat and drink do not do it upon any such cause as to procure unto themselves the gout; but the gout follows of its own accord. Even so, although

Adam would not have had these things happen, yet when he had sinned, they happened of themselves.

But he says that seeing this concupiscence happens of a certain necessity of birth, and not by choice or election, it cannot have the nature either of a fault or sin. But this comes to pass by reason that he makes a lesser and lighter matter of sin than he ought to do: for he would have sin to be voluntary, and a thing spoken, done, or lusted against the law of God. But if he takes the same to be iniquity, as John has described it, he shall perceive that the nature of sin is to be found in concupiscence. For it is an unjust thing that the body should not obey the mind in honest things, and that the lusts should be at variance with the mind and seek to have dominion over it, that reason should strive against God, and despise his commandments.

These things being unjust, whether they come willingly or necessarily, are doubtless sins.

But does not this Pighius, who objects to these things, perceive that it is necessary also for him to appoint that the posterity of Adam is guilty of his sin, whether they will or no; which thing is especially against the word of God? For it is written in the prophet Ezekiel; The son shall not bear the father's iniquity; And; The soul that sins, the same shall die. Which doubtless will be false if we believe Pighius, seeing children do die and are guilty of eternal damnation, although they have sinned nothing at all. Unto which absurdity we are not driven, for we put in every man that is born, the fault and the cause why he dies and is condemned.

Also unto Pighius, it seems a reproachful and blasphemous thing against God that he suffers sin to be sown in newborn babes, seeing they cannot do withal, but be born and affected in such sort as we see all other men to be born and affected. But let Paul make answer to this objection, which says in his epistle to the Romans; O man, who are you that make answer unto God? Has not the potter power of the clay to make of one lump one vessel to honour, and another to

dishonour? Let Isaiah also answer, which says; that it is not convenient for one potsherd to dispute with another touching the workmanship of their maker. God is not such a one as ought to be brought into order by our reason; which would come to pass, if we should measure his justice by the rule of our judgment. Seeing there is no day that passes over wherein there happens not something in the government of worldly things, that we blame, and that does not content and satisfy our own wisdom; when, I pray, shall we count

God to be just? For who is able to declare the cause why grace is not so much given unto him which perishes everlastingly, as to another which is saved?

I know that these men have been accustomed to say that God does nothing unjustly because he is not bound to any law, and that he distributes one and the same grace unto all men. But here certainly human wisdom will not stay itself, for it will complain and say that he ought to deal alike towards all, though not by the precept of man's law, yet by the law of his own goodness. Moreover, what human wisdom can see what the justice of God is, that some are taken away while they are yet infants or children, lest afterward their hearts should be perverted with lewdness, and by this means attain unto salvation: whereas others are preserved safe unto their ripe years, at which time they deserve their own destruction, where otherwise they might have been saved, if they had died in their infancy? Here ought we to have in honour and estimation the secrets of God's judgment, and not to be of the mind to correct and amend them, according to the prescript of our law.

Cato, a heathen man, taking part with Pompey, because he judged that part to be juster than Caesar's part; at last, when victory inclined to Caesar and that Pompey's side was discomfited and fled; he looked up to heaven, and cried out that there is great obscurity in divine

things: for he thought it unworthy of God's providence that Caesar should have the victory. And surely, when I think upon these things,

I am much delighted with the answer of Augustine, which he used against the Pelagians, when he treated of the very same matter that we have now in hand. For two arguments somewhat subtle and difficult were objected unto him by the Pelagians. One was: how it might be that God, who for his goodness's sake, forgives us our own sins, will impute other men's sins unto us? Another was: If Adam, by original sin, condemns those who sin unadvisedly and against their wills, why does not Christ also, (lest he should give place to Adam in anything) save the unbelievers?

To these, Augustine makes answer. What if I were somewhat dull and could not confute these reasons upon the sudden; should I therefore give less credit to the scriptures? Nay rather, it is much more meet that I should acknowledge my own simplicity than lay any falsehood unto the scripture. But afterward, he dissolves both the arguments: for unto the first he answers that God is exceedingly good and does not impute the sins of others unto us (as these affirm he does in original sin); but the iniquity of our own selves, which cleaves to our own nature, even from the first beginning of all. Unto the other he says that Christ saves even those that are unwilling, for he expects not them till they are willing; but of his own accord comes unto sinners when they are both unwilling and resisting, and also that he brings many infants unto felicity before they as yet believe, neither by reason of their age can have faith, whereby they should believe.

These things I thought good to bring in, to show that it is lawful for me, if I will, to use the answer which this father first used, and to say unto Pighius; Let us leave unto God the defence of his own cause, he has no need of us to defend him, that he should not be counted

unjust or cruel. Let us believe the scriptures, which cry out everywhere that we are born in sin and corruption. Which thing also both death, and an infinite heap of calamities do show; which in very deed should not be laid upon the children of Adam unless there were some sin in them to be punished. But they who descend not into themselves, nor look into their own nature, how prone it is unto all naughtiness, do not know what this concupiscence means. Yet no small number of the heathen philosophers perceived the same; for they marvel how in so excellent a nature, so great lewdness, and selflove, and desire of voluptuousness can be: and they so acknowledged these evils that they also adjudged it most needful for their children to have chastisement and discipline. And for the redressing of this engendered naughtiness, they counselled us to take in hand labours and exercises and other weighty and hard enterprises: but indeed they perceived not the cause and fountain of these evils; for that is only to be perceived by the word of God.

Furthermore, Pighius disputes that this lusting, which Augustine calls concupiscence, is the work of nature and of God, and therefore cannot seem to be sin. But it is answered before that it proceeds not from the originals of nature, as the same was instituted by God, but from it being corrupted. For when man was created, he was made just, and (as the scripture speaks) in the image of God. Therefore that same appetite in Adam, of things pleasant and preservative, when he was first created, was not raging and vehement, that he should do against right reason and the word of God; for that followed afterward. Wherefore the same must not (as Pighius says) be called the work of God, but the naughtiness of sin and the corrupting of affections. And therefore Augustine calls Julian the Pelagian a shameless praiser of concupiscence, for he commended it, even as Pighius does, to be a notable work of God.

Moreover, Pighius is against Augustine for the same very cause, that he says concupiscence is sin before baptism and denies it so to be after baptism; whereas (says he) concupiscence is all one, God all one, and his law all one: wherefore he concludes that either sin must be in both, or else in neither of them. But here Pighius greatly errs in two respects: first, because he thinks that in regeneration, there is no change, especially seeing he cannot deny that Christ's remedy is added, his righteousness applied, and our guiltiness taken away; for God does not impute that concupiscence which remains after regeneration.

Moreover, the spirit is given, wherewith the strength of concupiscence may be broken; that although it does stick within us, yet that it shall not reign over us; for to this end Paul exhorts us, when he says: Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies. Again, on the other part, he is deceived in thinking Augustine judges that the concupiscence which remains after baptism is no sin at all; but most especially, if the sin is considered alone, as it is by itself. For in most plain words he declares it in its own nature to be sin because it is disobedience, against which we must continually wrestle. And where he denies the same to be sin, it must be understood as concerning guiltiness; for that, out of all doubt, is taken away in regeneration.

For by that means it comes to pass, that although it be very sin indeed, yet God does not impute it for sin. Moreover, Augustine compares concupiscence with those sins which are called actual; by the comparison whereof, it may be said to be no sin: for it is far from the grievousness of them.

But I marvel how Pighius dares say that Augustine determines without testimony of the scriptures, that concupiscence is original sin, seeing he, in his disputations against the Pelagians, defends his opinion chiefly out of the holy scriptures. And the cause why he calls

original sin concupiscence is that original corruption chiefly declares itself through the impure desires of the mind and of the flesh.

Now it is expedient to see what others have said concerning this matter: for, besides this, there is also another opinion of those who say that original sin is a lack of original righteousness. This was affirmed by Anselm in his book De partu virginis, and he drew many other scholastic authors into his opinion. These men mean no other thing by original justice or righteousness but the right institution of man, when the body obeys the mind, and the inferior parts of the mind are subject to the superior, and the mind is subject unto God and to his law. In this righteousness was Adam created, and if he had so continued, all we should have lived in it: but seeing he fell, all we were deprived thereof. And they would have the lack of this righteousness to be original sin.

But to show their opinion the better, they say that every defect is not evil; for although a stone does lack righteousness, yet it shall not be said that a stone is unrighteous or evil; but when a thing shall be fit and meet to possess that whereof it is destitute, then such a defect is said to be evil: as it happens in the eye, when it is bereft of the ability to see well; we do not say therefore that there is a fault or blame in the eye. For sin comes when by reason of such a lack, there follows a contending and wrestling against the law of God. And this opinion is also condemned by Pighius; for he says that it is no sin if one keeps not the gift which he has received. For it may be that one who is born in perfect health and in a good state of the body may fall into a disease, or be maimed in some member, or else become lame; yet there is none that will call those defects offenses or sins.

But this similitude is not agreeable to the purpose; for a disease or maim of the body does not pertain either to the performing or

violating of God's law: but that which they call a want of original righteousness does of necessity bring with it the breach of God's law.

Moreover, he labours to prove that the loss of original righteousness in young children is not sin because the same was not foregone by their fault: but this again is to call God to account. But God is not registered among the decrees of men; he is not to be brought into the order of man's laws.

Let Pighius confer that opinion with this, which he reasons against.

This affirms he, that God condemns the faultiness and uncleanness, which he appointed and showed to be in newborn babes: Pighius makes guilty and condemns children of that vice and sin which is not in them; but only is that which Adam the first parent of all committed in himself: for otherwise, he takes those children to be most innocent. But whether of these is the further from reason, and dissents from the laws of men? To punish an innocent for the sin of another? Or else, to condemn him who has cause in himself why he should be condemned? Undoubtedly, to those who shall diligently consider the thing itself, the saying of Anselm is better in many respects than this opinion of Pighius. We know it to be true, which Ecclesiastes says, that God made man upright: but when he had once sinned, he fell immediately into wickedness. He does not now behold

God and heavenly things anymore, but he bends himself continually down to earthly and carnal things and is subject to the necessity of concupiscence: and this is to lack original righteousness.

For actions are not plucked away from man, but the power of wellusing them is taken away: as we see happen by experience in those taken with the palsy; verily they move their hand, but because the power is hurt whereby they might rule that motion, they move the same faintly and deformedly. This also happens in us; for seeing divine righteousness is wanting, the ground is corrupted, whereby

our works should be rightly ordered and performed. But (says Pighius) it cannot be sin in young children to be destitute of this gift; for they are not bound by any duty or obligation to have it. But if (says he) our adversaries shall say otherwise, let them show a law, whereby we that are born be bound; which (says he) because they cannot do, let them cease to say that this want of original righteousness is sin.

But we not only will show one but three laws. The first is the institution of man; God made man according to his own image and likeness, wherefore such it behoves us to be: for God does justly require that which he made in our nature. And the image of God does herein chiefly consist, that we be adorned with divine properties; namely, justice, wisdom, goodness, and patience. But contrariwise,

Pighius cries out that this is not the nature of the image of God; for that (he says) consists in understanding, memory, and will: as Augustine in his books De Trinitate and in many other places has taught. These things indeed are said of the Schoolmen. But we will prove the matter to be far otherwise, both by the scriptures and sayings of the fathers.

First, it is thus written in the Epistle to the Ephesians: "Put off the old man, according to the conversation in times past, which is corrupt, according to the deceitful lusts: and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which according to God is created in righteousness and true holiness." And in the third chapter to the Colossians: "You have put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge and image of him that created him." And a little after he shows the properties of this image: "Put on the bowels of mercies, goodness, modesty, meekness, gentleness, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another." And in the eighth chapter to the Romans: "Whom he before knew, he also predestinated, to be made

like unto the image of his son." All these things do sufficiently declare what manner of image of God the holy scriptures set forth unto us in the creation and restoration of man. Neither did the fathers dislike this opinion.

Irenaeus, in his fifth book, says that by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, man is made spiritual, even in such a manner as he was created by God. And Tertullian, against Marcion, says that the image of God is that which has the same motions and senses as God: and the reason which persuades us hereunto is that man was therefore made at the beginning like unto the image of God because he should be the governor of all things created, as if he had been a certain deputy of God. And no man can doubt that God will have his creatures to be well governed; for he continually bids us that we should not abuse them. And we are bound by a law to ascribe unto

God all those things whereby we are helped, as from whom all things do flow. But a good use and right administration of things cannot appear unless we be furnished with those conditions which (we have said) belong to the image of God. And whereas Augustine assigned the image of God to be in the understanding, memory, and will; we say he did it to set forth unto us some form or example of the divine persons, how one of them respects another. But he must not be so understood as though he would make these faculties of the mind to be the image of God, they being naked and despoiled of those virtues which we have declared.

Wherefore we have a law given unto us, either by the institution or by the restitution of man, which Paul commands: and by this bond we are bound to have the original righteousness which we have lost.

We have also the law of nature, and to live agreeable unto it (as Cicero says in his third book De Finibus) is the principal and last end of man's estate: and this law depends on that other which we before

spoke of. For it is from no other source that we, in cogitations, have our minds, which accuse and defend one another; but that they are taken from the worthiness of nature, as it was first instituted by God.

For whatsoever either the philosophers or law-givers have commanded, as touching the duties of man's life, the same does wholly depend on the fountains of our creation. For those precepts cannot come out of a corrupt nature, out of self-love, and out of malice; whereof it comes that we are prone unto evils: but they come from that kind of most upright nature, which they feign to be done by the worthiness of man, and which we know out of the holy scriptures to be instituted by God and commanded to be renewed by us. And hereunto (as some will have it) does appertain that law of the mind, which the law of the members does resist. There is also a third law, which God would have to be put in writing, namely; Thou shalt not lust: which commandment, although our adversaries do wrest unto actual sins, yet we have shown that the same belongs also unto original sin: and that God, by his commandment, would have all kinds of naughty concupiscence to be utterly cut off from men.

Now therefore we have laws, which, so long as they exist, shall perpetually bind us and make us debtors to perform that righteousness which they require. True indeed it is that infants do not feel those laws; and therefore sin lies asleep in them; as Augustine says in his second book De peccatorum meritis et remissione, following that which Paul says; "I sometimes lived without a law": not that there was at any time no law prescribed unto

Paul, but because in his childhood he felt not the same, by reason of young age. Wherefore Paul says; that "sin was dead", which Augustine interprets as being asleep: but when the commandment was come, that is, when the law began to be known to me, sin revived. No doubt, but it was in him before sin; but when he felt it not, it seemed dead. Now it appears how those things which we have

spoken agree with the holy scriptures. But Pighius urges yet further that these do pertain nothing unto infants, for that a law ought not to be made as touching those things which cannot be avoided. But when he speaks thus, he does not follow the sense of the holy scriptures; for they sufficiently teach that those things which are commanded in the law cannot be perfectly fulfilled, even though they be strictly commanded.

Paul says in the Epistle to the Romans that "what was impossible to the law, forasmuch as it was made weak by the flesh, God sending his only son, etc." By these words, it appears most plainly that the law, as it is commanded, cannot be performed; for if it could, we should be justified by works. Neither had it been needful that Christ should suffer death for us. There are also other offices of the law for which it is written. For assuredly, the same is profitable to direct the actions of godly men, but most profitable of all to discover sin: for "by the law" (says Paul) "comes the knowledge of sin." Again; "I had not known lust unless the law had said unto me, Thou shalt not lust."

Besides, by the law, sin is also increased, and does burden us the more, and does the more grievously press us; for "the law entered in, that sin might abound." And to the Corinthians; "The power of sin is the law."

All these things tend to this end, that man, as by a schoolmaster, should be brought unto Christ, and should crave his help, and pray that strength may be given unto him: that at the leastwise in part, and with an obedience begun, he may execute those things which are commanded; and that such things as he fails in may not be imputed unto him but may be supplied by the righteousness of Christ.

Augustine, in his first book against Julian, reprehends the Pelagians because they thought that they knew some great matter when they vaunted that God commands not those things which are impossible:

and he shows that these, which we have now declared, are the ends of the law. Yea, and the same Augustine, in his book of Confessions, makes mention also of those sins which young children, while they are yet sucking, do commit: yet none will say that they could resist them. But they should be no sins, unless they might be referred to some law violated by them. Neither does it anything help Pighius, or yet take away their sins, because they are not felt by them: for a thing that is dishonest, although it seem not so to us, yet in its own nature it is dishonest. That (says he) which is dishonest, is dishonest, whether it seems so or no.

This opinion of Anselm, as touching the lack and want of original righteousness, differs in very deed nothing from the saying of Augustine, wherein he calls original sin concupiscence; but that it is there spoken somewhat more expressly, which in the word concupiscence is wrapped up more obscurely. But because this want of original righteousness might so be taken, although we understand only the privation of the gifts of God, without any fault of nature; therefore it shall be very well to set down a more full definition.

Original sin, therefore, is a corruption of the whole nature of man, derived by generation from the fall of our first parent into his posterity; which, were it not for the benefit of Christ, would adjudge all that are born therein to infinite miseries and eternal damnation.

In this definition, all the kinds of causes are contained. For the matter or subject, we have all the parts and powers of man; the form is the corruption of them all; the efficient cause is the sinful will of Adam; the instrument is the spreading of derivation, which is done through the flesh; the end and effect are eternal damnation, together with all the discommodities belonging to this life.

And from this have arisen diverse names for this sin; sometimes it is called a defect, sometimes perverseness, sometimes vice, sometimes a disease, sometimes a contagion; and by Augustine, an affected quality and a rude lump. That the whole man is corrupted is evident because he was created to cleave unto God, as unto the chief good.

But now he understands not divine things, he patiently waits for the promises of the scripture, he hears with grief the commandments of God, and he contemns punishments and rewards. His seditious affections impudently deride right reason and the word of God; the body refuses to obey the mind.

Although all these things are experiments of natural corruption, they are also confirmed by testimonies of the scriptures. As touching the impediments of the understanding, Paul says: "The carnal man perceiveth not those things which be of the Spirit of God: no verily, nor cannot, because they be foolishness unto him." In these words, we note, by the way, against Pighius, that the law was made concerning that which could not be done: for first of all the law wills us to know divine things, which nevertheless Paul affirms plainly that a carnal man cannot perceive. And as touching our purpose, we see that Paul affirms that this blindness or ignorance is engrafted in men, and that by nature: for it cannot be imagined that the same has come unto us by reason either of time or age. For the older that every man waxes, the more and more he is instructed as concerning God: wherefore in that he is a carnal man and unapt to perceive heavenly things, that has he gotten by nature corrupted.

This corruption is of such great importance, (as Augustine says in the third book against Julianus, the twelfth chapter;) that by the same, the image of God has become a stranger unto the life of man, through the blindness of the heart; which blindness (says he) is sin, and does not sufficiently agree with man's nature. The same father, in his first

book De peccatorum meritis et remissione, the 36th chapter, where he alleges that those words of David; "Remember not the sins and ignorances of my youth," makes mention of the most thick darkness of ignorance that is in the minds of young children while they are yet in their mothers' wombs: who know not wherefore, from whence, or when they were there enclosed. For there lies the poor infant unlearned, unapt to be taught, unable to conceive what a commandment is, being ignorant where he is, what he is, of whom he was created, and of whom he was begotten: all of which things did not agree with the nature of man as it was first created, but are rather corruptions of nature. For Adam was not so created, but he was able both to understand the commandment of God and to give names to his wife and to all living creatures: but in infants, a long time must be expected, whereby they may by little and little pass over this kind of dizziness.

Moreover, that this kind of ignorance is to be accounted sin, Reticius, the most ancient bishop of Autun, bears record, as Augustine testifies in his first book against Julianus. For when he speaks of baptism, thus he writes: "It is a principal indulgence in the church, wherein we cast away all the burden of the old crime, and do blot out the old wicked acts of our ignorance, and do put off the old man with his natural ungraciousness." By these words, we understand that wickedness is natural unto us and that the sins of ignorance are taken away in baptism. Wherefore, seeing infants are baptized, they by the authority of this father are proved to have sins, and that their old ignorance is abolished in baptism.

Now as concerning the will, let us see whether that also be corrupted or no. Thereof the apostle gave an excellent testimony, to wit, that "the sense and wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God": and under this sentence, he comprehends all the affections of men not yet

regenerate. But I marvel at the impudence of Pighius, who to wind himself out by some means or other, says that this place must be understood as touching the sense of the letter, which he affirms to be against God, and cannot be subdued unto him. For, as well that which goes before as that which follows, does manifestly reprove him; for Paul forthwith adds the difference between men that be in the flesh and those which be in the spirit. Wherefore it appears sufficiently that he treats not of the diversity of the sense of the scripture but of the diversity of men themselves. And the next words before that sentence are: "That which was impossible to the law, inasmuch as it was weak, because of the flesh, God sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, by sin condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us." These words also do testify that Paul spoke of us; not of the spirit, or the letter of the scriptures. For in us is the infirmity, whereby the law is weakened, that it could not bring us to salvation; and by Christ, the righteousness of the law begins to be fulfilled in us.

Neither must we hearken unto them, which both in this place and in many others, will that by flesh should be understood the grosser parts of the mind. For when Paul to the Galatians reckons up the works of the flesh, he puts in that number not only adulteries, fornications, and wantonness but also idolatry: which no man can deny but that it does pertain to the mind, not unto the flesh. And Christ, when he says: "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the spirit, is spirit," exhorts to regeneration: which in very deed pertains not only to the substance of the body or grosser parts of the mind but especially also unto the will and mind.

And when he said unto Peter: "Blessed art thou Simon, the son of Jonah, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee": he meant that he had not learned those things by natural knowledge, but by the spirit of God. For under the name of flesh, he comprehends those

things which pertain to the mind and reason. But yet we say not (as Pighius fondly cavils) that in the nobler part of the mind there is nothing but flesh: for we know, although Pighius had not told us, that the soul is a spirit, which nevertheless in the scriptures is called flesh, before it be regenerated; because whereas it ought to make the flesh, that is to say, the grosser part of itself spiritual, and ought to reduce the same to the obedience of a mind instructed by the word of God, it will rather bend unto the pleasures thereof, and so is made carnal.

But they object against us, that saying unto the Galatians: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh": as though this may not be, if in the minds of men, we leave nothing that is sound. But we will easily answer to this objection; for first, those words are pronounced by Paul, as touching believers, which be already regenerated: which thing those words that follow do sufficiently declare: "That ye do not those things which ye would." By which words he declares that they obtained a right will by the spirit of Christ, which nevertheless they could not accomplish, by reason of the continual conflicts of the mind and their great infirmities. And therefore the apostle meant no other thing in that place than that whatsoever is in us not perfectly regenerated, all that does strive against the spirit of God. Nor do we deny, but that some such conflict is otherwhile in men, which be not yet regenerated: not that their mind is not carnal, and prone unto naughtiness, but because the laws of nature are as yet engraved therein, and that also there is some illumination of God's spirit in the same, although it be not such as either can justify or bring in any change to salvation.

Moreover, that reason is corrupted in us, Paul's words sufficiently declare, wherein he exhorts us to "put on the new man," which must be continually renewed in us. Seeing he wills that man be so wholly

changed, and that man consists not only of the body and affections of the flesh, but also, and much more, of the mind, will, and reason, it is necessarily gathered that these things were also corrupted in him.

For otherwise, what need have they to be renewed? And it matters not greatly if you say that these things must be understood of such as have come to ripe years, who of their own choice and voluntary sins have corrupted these things in themselves. For I will ask, wherefore all in general, who are not regenerated, did so contaminate themselves, as there was not one innocent to be found among them all? Truly, there can be nothing else answered to this question, but that the very fountains were corrupted and defiled in them, even from the beginning.

Augustine teaches also that we are only regenerated in so much as we become like unto Christ; for in that we are unlike unto him, therein we are not born anew, but retain still the old man in us. Wherefore, let us see whether from the beginning we have a mind, will, and reason like unto Christ; for if they be found unlike, we must conclude that they are corrupt and do pertain unto the old man. As for the corruption of the baser parts of the mind, daily experience sufficiently teaches us.

Again, this property belongs unto the baser parts of the mind, that they are sprinkled abroad in the members and do spread themselves over all the parts of the flesh; which cannot be agreeable unto the mind and reasonable part, being things spiritual and invisible. That the body also and its parts have fallen from their duty, to become rebellious and repugnant to the mind, Paul teaches, when he cries out: "O unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" And again, when he says: "I feel another law in my members." Finally, that the whole man, how much soever he be, is corrupted, the commandment of Christ sufficiently proves, wherein

he bids us to deny ourselves. But if our nature were innocent and perfect, there would be no need for us to renounce the same; for things that are good should be retained and not abandoned. With this definition of original sin, which we have made, agrees the want of original justice: so likewise agrees Augustine's definition, wherein he says that the same is concupiscence of the flesh; so that both the one and the other be rightly understood.

Those who were chief among the Schoolmen acknowledged this doctrine, such as Thomas, Scotus, and especially Bonaventure. These affirm the material part in this sin to be the corruption of nature or concupiscence; the formal part to be the want of righteousness; and so of those two opinions, which I now spoke of, they make one. But there are some of our men who would have the formal part to be guiltiness, or the imputation of God; but seeing that this is an outward thing from sin, I would rather incline to that sentence which makes those formal parts to be the fight and wrestling against the law of God, for that is the principal reason why the corruptions of nature must be called sins.

And there must be no credit given unto them who cry out that our nature is good. Indeed, I would grant it to be true, as concerning our first creation of nature, but not as it has fallen; for it is good indeed, but yet so good, as it has some corruption joined therewith. But whereas these men say that lusting is good, they must give me leave if I give more credit unto Paul than unto them. For he says: "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwells no good thing": and a little after; "I find by the law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me." In this place, he says that concupiscence is evil. To the Galatians also, he sufficiently proves it to be evil, when he wills the same to be crucified. It is also false what they say, that it always desires things which are profitable and tend to preservation; for we

find by experience that it is continually prone to offenses and to those things which are enemies unto life.

Moreover, if nature were as innocent and good as they imagine it to be, wherefore should it be so grievously punished by God? Among all the kinds of living creatures, we see in a manner none more miserable than man. If we respect either his birth, infancy, childhood, education, and discipline; all things are replenished with tears, with sorrow, with lamentation, with infirmity, and with pains taking. The body must labor to get its living; the mind is continually disquieted with troublesome affections, the heart is stirred up with perturbations, the whole body is tormented with diseases: all which things, some considering with themselves, have said that nature is not a mother, but a step-mother.

I pass over that the bodies and souls also of children and infants are sometimes delivered unto the devil to be vexed; as we read in the Gospel that a young man was in such a manner tormented by the devil that he cast himself sometimes into the fire and sometimes into the water. So the severity of God does so account for the innocence of man's nature, as he grievously punishes the same. And it should appear that the very heathen men perceived more concerning this thing than these divines; for Plato in his second book De Republica says that men by nature are evil, as those who cannot be led by their own accord to embrace righteousness, but only to be discontent with injury. And Socrates shows that unless men be inspired, as it is said the poets were, with some divine power, virtues cannot be had. And Cicero in his third book De Republica (as Augustine alleges in his fourth book against Julian) says that "Man is brought into light by nature his stepmother, with a naked, frail, and weak body; having a mind vexed with grief, subject to fears, feeble unto labours, prone unto lusts, in whom is hidden the fervent love of God, and also his

mind and his wit." Also, the ecclesiastical writers have condescended to this opinion, many of whose consents Augustine has gathered together in his book against Julian.

Touching Irenaeus and Tertullian, I have already spoken. Cyprian also says that Christ healed the wounds which Adam made and the venom with which the devil infected our nature. Cyprian acknowledges infirmity to be derived from the sin of our first parent, wherewith we are so provoked unto sin that no man can flatter himself in his own innocence: for who can boast that he has a clean heart? For as John says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us." Again, Cyprian in his epistle unto Fidus teaches that children must be baptized, lest they perish everlastingly.

Augustine cites Reticius, the bishop, whose words we recited before; he also cites Olympius, a bishop of Spain, who says that "the sin of Adam, the first framed man, was so sprinkled among the young plants that sin is born together with man." He also cites Hilary, who thus wrote concerning the flesh of Christ: "Therefore, he being sent in the similitude of sinful flesh; even so he had sin. But because all flesh is of sin, namely of the sin derived from Adam the first parent, he was sent in the similitude of sinful flesh; so that there was no sin in him, but the similitude of sinful flesh." The same father in another place, expounding the 18th Psalm, urges this sentence of David:

"Behold how I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin my mother has conceived me." The same father in a homily upon the book of Job says that "the body is a matter of naughtiness," which could not so be said to be at the first creation.

And Ambrose upon Luke says that "the body is a foul puddle, and a harbour of sins; but by the benefit of Christ it is changed into the

temple of God, and a holy place of virtues." The same father, writing against the Novatians, says that "our beginning was in sin"; again, in his apology: "David says that before we are born, we are spotted with contagion; and before we have the use of light, we receive original unrighteousness and are conceived in iniquity." And he says of Christ, "It was not requisite for him, in whose body no sin should be, to feel any natural contagiousness of generation. Justly therefore did

David bewail in himself the foul filthiness of his nature, and that infections began to be in a manner before he had life." The same

Ambrose, in his book De arca Noe, writes: "Whom then has he now called just, but him that is free from these bonds, whom the common bonds of nature cannot hold?" Also upon the gospel of Luke:

"Through the washing of the healthful ministry, those infants who have been baptized are now cleansed from wickedness."

Jerome upon the prophet Jonah says that young children are subject to the sin of Adam. And lest you should think he only spoke of the guiltiness of Adam's fault, upon the 18th and 41st chapters of Ezekiel, he says: "Not so much as the child of a day old is without sin," urging also that sentence: "Who can make that clean, which was conceived of an unclean seed?" Gregory Nazianzen says, "The image of God shall cleanse the blemishes of bodily inundation." And afterward:

"Reverence the birth by which you are delivered from the chains of earthly nativity." And entreating of baptism he says: "By this man the spots of our nativity are taken away, by which we were conceived in iniquity, and in sins our parents begat us."

Basilius Magnus is defended by Augustine: for the Pelagians would have had him seem to be of their part. He writes against the Manichees that evil is not a substance; but a conversation, which comes only of the will. He meant this of those who procured the infection of conversation by their own proper will; which

conversation (he says) may easily be severed from the will of them that be diseased: for if it could not be severed from the same, evil should be a substantial part thereof. All these things Augustine affirms to be rightly spoken; for the Manichees decreed that evil is a certain substance, and that the same is the beginning of worldly affairs. But contrariwise Basil says that evil is in a good thing and that it happened through the will of the man and of the woman that sinned. And whereas he says that it may easily be severed from the will, he ascribes not that unto our strength, but unto the mercy of God. And in that he says, there shall be no token thereof left, we also do hope the same; though not in this life, yet in the life to come. But that he acknowledged original sin, his own sermon of fasting does sufficiently bear witness: for thus he says: "If Eve had abstained from the tree, we should not have had any need of this fasting: for sound men have no need of the physician, but sick men. We became sick through that sin, let us be healed by repentance: but repentance without fasting is vain." By these words, Basil determined that we by reason of the sin of Adam are not sound.

Moreover, he cites the twelve bishops of the East who condemned Pelagius. To whom we should add Origen, who interpreting that sentence of Paul, which we have spoken of: "Death came upon all men"; said that Abel, Enoch, Methuselah, and Noah sinned: other fathers he says he will not recite, because they sinned all, every one, and that none is clean from corruption, though he has lived but one day. But upon the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, he speaks more plainly, when he says that baptism was appointed by tradition from the apostles, to be given unto infants; because the apostles knew that the natural corruption of sin is in all men, which ought to be washed away by water and the Spirit. And Chrysostom upon Genesis, entreating of the question: Wherefore are men nowadays afraid of beasts, and hurt by them, seeing they were

created lords over them? He says that this happens by reason of sin, and because we depart from our confidence and honour. And thereby

Augustine proves that the natural gift of young children is fallen away, in that the beasts do not spare them. The same Chrysostom, expounding that place of the sixth chapter of Romans, says how that sin, which remains through the disobedience of Adam, has polluted all things. He has also many other places to the same effect.

Yet the Pelagians, and especially Julianus, were not ashamed to cite this father as a witness, as though he had made a case for them; because in his sermon De baptisatis, he reciting many gifts of baptism, says that those who are baptized not only receive forgiveness of their sins but also are made the children and heirs of God, the brethren of Christ, and joint-heirs with him, the members and temple of God, and instruments of the Holy Ghost. He adds at the end: "Do you see what a variety of liberality there is in baptism?

And some do think that heavenly grace consists in the remission of sins; and for that cause, we baptize young children, when nevertheless they are not polluted with sin, that unto them should be given or added righteousness, holiness, adoption, inheritance, brotherhood of Christ, that they may be his members."

By these words, Julian thought that Chrysostom does not consent that there is original sin. But Augustine says that his words must be understood concerning sin committed by their own advisement, from which sin assuredly they are exempt; and by this reason they may be called innocent. According to this meaning, Paul writes of those two brethren: "Before they had done either good or evil."

Nevertheless, there is none altogether exempt from what the apostle said: "By the sin of one, condemnation came upon all men." And: "By one man's disobedience, many are made sinners." Hereof it appears how warily we must read the fathers; for sometimes we read in them

that young children have no sin proper to their own actions, while they especially acknowledge the corruption of nature, that is, original sin, to be in them.

To have sins proper may be understood in two ways: either concerning things they have done of their own will and free election, and in this respect, Chrysostom's statement concerning infants is allowed; or else sins are called proper corruptions of nature, whereby we are both defiled and condemned, which cannot be removed from young children, seeing they are born with them, as David plainly proves. Augustine noted in Chrysostom's words, which are extant in Greek, that "there are set down sins" in the plural number, and not "sin" in the singular, as Julian had cited them. For thus it is read in the Greek, "τα αμαρτήματα." The word "αμαρτήματα," in the plural number (as Augustine thinks), is most properly applied unto sins, which they name actual. He adds that the more ancient fathers did not so copiously dispute original sin because the Pelagians had not yet arisen to impugn it.

These many sayings of the fathers, Pighius should have weighed; especially seeing he accounts them for eagles, which see most sharply and always fly unto the carcass. But it seems to me that he esteems them as counters to reckon with, which, being set in sundry places, may sometimes signify a talent and at another time but a dandiprat, as it pleases him that casts the account. So Pighius will sometimes have the father's authority to be exceedingly large, and sometimes (if they do not content him sufficiently) to be none at all; thus at one time he extols them as eagles and another time despises them as jays.

In this, he seems not to regard the judgment of his Roman church, which otherwise he equates with God himself; for that church so acknowledges original sin that it does not vouchsafe even the

churchyard for burying those infants who die without baptism and requires that the devil be expelled from young infants by exorcisms when they are brought to baptism because it says they are bondslaves of the devil. I do not speak of this because I would either allow those exorcisms or wish for them to be retained still: for this must be obtained of God by prayers, and we must not deal as if we would seem by miracles to heal a man possessed by the devil. Seeing at this day there is no such gift extant in the church, there is no cause why we should imitate the same. Neither do we grant that infants not yet baptized are assaulted by the devil. Also, Innocentius, the bishop of Rome, who lived in the time of Augustine, condemning Pelagius, was of the very same mind that we are of concerning original sin. We ought not to extenuate this evil; otherwise, we shall extenuate the benefit of Christ. Those who will not acknowledge this sin are neither sorrowful for it nor seek the remedy of Christ. Truly Pighius herein went further than the Pelagians; for they only denied the propagation of sin by Adam. But Pighius cries out that this opinion is wicked and blasphemous and reproachful against God. Again, they thought this enough, to say that infants, dying without baptism, shall both be excluded from the kingdom of heaven and also be placed in the pains of hell. But this man dreams that they shall be happy through a certain natural blessedness, and so happy, as they shall bless, praise, and love the Lord with all their mind, with all their heart, and with all their strength.

Chapter XXIV:

Now let us see how obscure he endeavours to make the definition alleged. First, he says by these darknesses and corruptions of nature, you understand either mere privations of God's gifts or certain positive things. If you appoint them to be privations, I understand what you say. But your cavillations are nothing else but tragic names

and vain terms. But if you will have these things to be positive: seeing in the infant newborn, there is nothing but the soul and the body, which are clean and have God and nature to be their author, from whence or by what means did these mischiefs break in, which you do make mention of?

First, we answer that the privations here set down are not as though they were mere negatives, which take away the whole: as when we say there is no Centaure nor Scylla; but we say they are such names of things as leave their subject maimed, unprofitable, and deformed, as appears in the eye destitute of sight, and in the trembling hand of one that is taken with the palsy. Even so fares original sin with us.

Indeed, the powers of the mind and actions do remain, but yet destitute of their right government, and therefore evil and corrupted.

But Pighius errs still because he feigns the nature of man to have a certain natural integrity of itself, to which have come these supernatural gifts, which were planted in the first parent. But that after sin was committed, those gifts being taken away, man fell into his old state. But this is a mere dream, for such a nature of man was instituted by God as was convenient for him. Therefore, his gifts being taken away, it is corrupted and very much marred. Seeing he swerved from his creation, he is in sin. Moreover, we do not only say that original sin is this privation, but also that it does comprehend things positive, such as proneness unto evil, a violence of nature against the word of God, and such other like things. Therefore,

Bernard says that "in the conjunction of the soul with the body, it is even as if it should fall upon a heap of most hard potsherds and hurting stones." Among the Schoolmen, Gulielmus Parisiensis, in his book called Summa de vitiis et virtutibus, brings this similitude: that a soul is so let down into the body, as if a man should fall into a miry, deep, and stony place; and so should both sink in, be defiled, and

hurt. In like manner (he says), we through original sin are plunged in the darkness of ignorance, we are defiled with lusts, and as touching the powers and faculties of the mind, we are wounded.

And whereas Pighius says that both the body and the soul are good things and have God for their author, I grant it. When he afterward demands how they are then corrupted, I answer with Paul: by one man, who fell; and that by procreation, as will be shown a little later.

But in that he says they can by no means be corrupted because God is the author of them, it is no firm reason. For even those who are of ripe years have both a body and a soul, which are the works of God and are continually preserved by His power, and yet they may be defiled and corrupted. If he shall say that this comes of man's will and free choice, so will we answer that the same may come of other causes, namely through propagation and seed. Pighius reasons from what is not the cause, as though it were the cause. His meaning is that if men are corrupted, it cannot be otherwise than by the will and free choice, which is not true. All the arguments he objects against us arise from this: that he says he does not understand how this corruption can be derived to the posterity, how it is possible that infants should be bound by any law, and how a law can be made of that which we are not able to avoid.

But seeing the holy scriptures declare, teach, and testify these things, it matters not how much Pighius either understands or does not understand: for we believe many things which we neither perceive nor know by any certain reason. Nevertheless, this ought not to be of such force that every man should insist we believe whatever they think good, under the pretense that although they cannot be perceived by reason, yet they ought to be comprehended by faith, since God is also able to make things which are far greater. First, what we would have believed ought to be shown out of the holy

scriptures: then afterward, if we cannot attain unto it, let us cling to faith and set reason aside.

It does not follow from our definition that there is no good thing left either in nature or in non-Christians. Only this we affirm: that this sin would destroy all if God (through Christ) did not bring a remedy unto the regenerate. Also, God is sometimes present in those who are not regenerate and adorns them with excellent and noble virtues, whereby original sin is restrained and commonwealths and empires are kept at least in some civil order. Socrates would not leave prison when he might. Aristides, being driven into banishment, wished unto his citizens that they might never be in such ill case as to remember him. Phocion, being asked a little before his death whether he would have any message sent to his son, said, "Let him never remember the injury done unto me." The Commonwealth of Rome had its Curtius,

Scipios, and Catos, men of civil honesty and very great lovers of upright dealing. These duties, although sins in those who knew not God, were yet bridles of original sin and of nature corrupted, lest all things should be confounded, good laws fall to ruin, and the light of nature be extinguished.

Now, seeing we have confirmed original sin by the testimony of the scriptures, confuted the opinion of Pighius, rejected the opinion of those who think original sin to be a guilt and bond procured through the sin of Adam, and presented the definition of Augustine—that original sin is concupiscence of the flesh—and of Anselm—that it is a want of original righteousness—and last of all, seeing we have extensively and by many testimonies proved our own definition, it remains that we proceed to the third topic: namely, the conditions and properties of original sin, how it is spread, how it is abolished, how the remnants of it persist in the renewed, and what punishment is due to it.

As for the manner of how it is transmitted to posterity, many opinions are cited. The first is of the propagation of souls, which we will show, by the judgment of Augustine, to be a more ready way than the rest, although it is not received by all men. Another opinion, which Augustine follows, is that original sin is conveyed from one to another by the lust and inordinate delight of the parents. This reason has two errors: first, because it says that this evil is in procreation as a matter of necessity, which nevertheless may be separated from the same. The Schoolmen themselves confess that one begotten without a vicious desire of the parents would still draw original sin, as they say it is sufficient that it was in Adam, as in the first principal seed.

Another absurdity is that original sin would only consist in the foul affection of lust, whereas it truly comprehends the entire corruption of nature.

Others have thought that the soul was created evil by God, because it should be a part of man, execrated and put under the curse. But because this seems to be against the nature of creation, that it should be called a depravation, that opinion is also rejected. The last opinion, commonly received, is that the soul gathers original sin through conjunction with the body, which is already infected and corrupted by the parents. If it is asked, what is the seat thereof, or, as they commonly speak, what is the subject? We answer that it has place in the flesh, as in the root and beginning: then out of that fountain, it also possesses the soul and so is extended throughout the whole man, so that the seed is the instrument by which this sin is conveyed from the parents to their children.

Pighius objects that vices cannot be derived by seed to the posterity, unless perhaps those vices which cling and stick in the body of the parents, as we see in the case of leprosy, epilepsy, and other diseases of the body. He argues that nature does not permit sin to take place

in the very substance of the seed so as it can be conveyed by it to the children. Here we answer first that it is not true that only the diseases of the body of the parents are derived to the children. We also see that many conditions of the mind are derived from the parents to their children, such as wit, fury, ambition, gentleness, pride, and the like. As to the other, we grant indeed that the ill quality or corruption, which is brought by the seed, as it is in the seed, is not sin. But this does not prevent the corruption brought into the children by seed, as by an instrument, from having in it the nature of sin, just as the qualities I have now recited do not make the seed to be witty, docile, or covetous, but those qualities derived to the child do make him such a one.

Howbeit, whether it may be affirmed that God is the author thereof; they commonly say that the deformity and unrighteousness that is in this sin is drawn out of nature already corrupted, which, as it was created by God, was not so depraved. And so they affirm that whatsoever is in the nature of goodness, the same is of God; but whatsoever is evil therein, forasmuch as it is nothing else but a defect or want, there needs to be no efficient cause for it. For that which is but a want is not of necessity that it should be made; for if it should be made, it should be also in it. Howbeit, this is not enough; indeed we agree with them that God is the author of the subject, or of the substance, wherein the defect is. But in that they say that the defect itself has no efficient cause, therein we do not agree with them. For something must remove or prohibit that perfection which is requisite, and withdraw the grace and gifts wherewith our nature was endowed at the beginning. Thus we must of necessity refer this privation or defect unto God, who does not give perfection utterly without a defect: which is always done by His just judgment, although it is not always manifest unto us. And by the scriptures, it is most certain and cannot be denied, that God punishes sins by sins;

but yet they are not so laid upon us by God, as they should be sins, in respect that they depend upon Him: for whatsoever God does, is without all controversy both right and just.

And punishments themselves, so far as they are punishments, do pertain to the nature of goodness. However, as they proceed from us, they are sins. For we affirm not that God himself pollutes the soul when He creates it; for it draws the filthiness of sin from the corrupted body, to which it is adjoined. But man's wisdom in this thing is very much offended; for it thinks that in no wise there ought to be made such a conjunction: for it seems to be as if a man should cast a precious thing into an unclean vessel. Also, it appears an unjust thing that the soul, which has done neither good nor ill, should be joined with a body and draw from it original sin: rather, that if it be so, men should abstain from procreation. As those also who have leprosy are persuaded to refrain (if it be possible) from procreation, lest they might thereby proceed to infect mankind. And because the end for which man is instituted is eternal felicity, it seems not convenient that the soul should be placed in that body, whereby it should be called back from the end prescribed. And as it is unjust that the soul, which has not sinned, should be punished in hellfire, even so it seems unjust that the same should be cast into that body, wherein it incurs not pain as in hell, but sin and the hatred of God, which are more grievous; and does so incur, as it can by no means avoid it.

These things are so difficult and obscure that they cannot fully be satisfied by man's judgment. Indeed, there are certain consolations gathered out of the ecclesiastical writers, which do so mitigate and qualify these objections as may suffice godly minds, but not so much as man's reason would require. For the soul is joined with an infected and unclean body, that consideration may be had of the whole world,

lest mankind, which is the principal, should be wanting therein. God fails not in His office, He hinders not the course of nature; but the body being made, He creates the soul according to His order prefixed and would rather that a man should be, although he be not born without sin, than that he should not be at all. And although He does not bountifully give all things which He gave at the beginning, yet of His mercy He gives many things. Further, He has set forth the remedy, which is Christ our mediator, by whom the sin which we have drawn shall be cleansed. This sin, before conversion, drives the elect unto Christ, that they, feeling the force of their disease, may receive the medicine of Him: and then, after they are once grafted into Christ, they have this sin remaining still, that they, having battle and wrestling, may at last bear away victories and triumphs.

But you will say; God might by some other kind of means have saved mankind from destruction; namely, if He had created another man pure and perfect, so that Adam, dying without kindred, all the posterity might have been procreated of that other man uncorrupted.

There is no doubt, but God could so have done if He would: but this had not been to raise up him that was fallen, to save him that was lost, and to redeem him that was utterly perished. This form of goodness God would show, that (notwithstanding the corruption of nature) He might preserve from destruction as many as He had chosen. A shaken reed He would not bruise, and smoking flax He would not quench. For He would bring forth Christ, as another

Adam, who should so preserve His, as the other had destroyed them.

These and such other things persuaded Gregory to cry out; "O happy offense, that deserved to have such a redeemer!" Which words I would not be hasty to speak, forasmuch as I see nothing in that cause which is not miserable and meet for great lamentation. For, in that there followed so great a salvation, that must be wholly imputed to

the goodness of God, and not to the offense committed by Adam: for so great a good thing has not proceeded otherwise than by accident.

These things, although they cannot fully answer those objections which we have put forth as human reason would require, yet by them we have something we may answer. The conjunction of the soul with the corrupt body makes nothing to the destruction of the chosen, for in Christ, as well the body as the soul is renewed. And as the soul is infected by the body, so by the faith of Christ, which is in the soul, the same, together with the body, is repaired. And whereas the innocent soul, which has done nothing, either good or evil, is joined with a corrupted body; this the order of nature does require, unless the body should be left without life and be forsaken, as destitute of all mankind. But if we shall stand in disputation with God, there will be no measure nor end. Innumerable souls would complain because they were created, not predestinated [to salvation;] who nevertheless deserved not the same. Many would complain that they have been born of wicked infidels and barbarous parents, and that they died in their tender age, by means whereof they could not come by the knowledge: and a thousand more complaints they might imagine.

As concerning procreation, we say that it is commendable when it consists of lawful matrimony: therein must be considered man that is begotten, that is, (as the Schoolmen term it) the effect proper and of itself. But man is the good creature of God, vice and corruption is added by accidental means. And this evil has a remedy; which thing happens not in leprosy and other incurable diseases. Also we do grant that man is made to attain eternal felicity. And whereas it is objected that he is revoked from this end through the corruption of the body, we contrariwise do say that by the very same means he is invited unto Christ. Lastly, we grant that it may seem to be an unworthy thing that the innocent soul should be placed in hell;

seeing no hope of redemption is there to be looked for: but being set in a body, although it be a corrupt body, yet it may obtain salvation and redemption.

Now must the reasons be brought forth, which firmly and soundly prove that original corruption is spread in men by seed and generation. This we will show by the holy scriptures because many openly repudiate it and think that all the matter is feigned.

First, Paul says that sin by one man came into the world. Therefore, we must see how men depend on Adam, in such a way that they can be partakers of his sin. There can be no other means found than by seed and generation. Moreover, when the apostle says unto the Ephesians that we by nature are the children of wrath; and nature, as the natural philosophers affirm, is the origin of motion, we must have recourse to seed and generation, for they are the foundation of our motion and beginning.

David more evidently shows this when he says, "Behold how I am conceived in wickedness, and in sin my mother hath conceived me."

In these words, he plainly teaches that this sin is derived by generation. Most manifest of all is that saying of Job, "Who can make that clean which is born of unclean seed?" By this passage, the infected seed of our forefathers is proved to be unclean, though

Pighius denies it ever so much.

But now, on the contrary part, let us examine by what means this sin is taken away. Just as by one man it was brought in, so by one man it is removed away. And just as sin is from Adam spread over all through seed and generation, so on the other side, in that multitude which pertains to Christ, there are some things which may have the respect of seed: such as election, predestination, grace, the Spirit, the word of God, and baptism. These two latter instruments God uses to

regenerate those who are His. But if anyone demands whether the outward word or visible sign of baptism is altogether necessary, we answer that indeed the inward word, whereby men are moved unto

Christ and reformed, is wholly required if we speak of such as are of perfect age. But in young infants, neither the inward word nor the outward word has any place.

Undoubtedly, the outward word is the ordinary instrument whereby God calls those of ripe years to salvation, although in some He uses only the inward word, after an extraordinary manner. For so He called Abraham out of his own native country and instructed Adam immediately (as the School-divines term it) without any outward ministry. The sacrament of baptism also must not for any cause be contemned, for those who despise it when they may attain unto it shall not obtain regeneration. But if there be no opportunity to come unto it, it shall be no danger unto the godly man who is converted unto Christ, although he be not baptized. Upon this occasion, among the fathers, there was mention made of the baptism of blood and of the Spirit. Ambrose, writing of the death of Valentinian the Emperor, says that he was not without the grace of baptism (seeing he burned with the desire thereof) although he were not baptized.

Howbeit, if I should be asked concerning the infants of Christians who depart without this sacrament, my answer would be that we must have a good hope for them and hold fast to the word of God; namely, to the covenant made with Abraham, wherein God promises

Himself, not only to him but also to his seed. This promise, seeing it is not so general as to comprehend all, I dare not promise certain salvation particularly to any that departs hence. For there are some children of the saints who do not belong to predestination; such as we read of in Esau, Ishmael, and others, whose salvation is not hindered because they were not baptized.

Yet, while we live here, the remnants of this sin remain even in those who are regenerate. For original sin is not utterly eradicated, even by regeneration; indeed, the guiltiness is taken away, and those things which remain are not imputed unto us for our eternal destruction.

But everything ought to be considered for what it is in itself.

Therefore, if it is demanded of us whether it is sin that remains in the persons regenerate, we will answer that it is sin. But if you read that it is not sin, understand that to be spoken of the guiltiness of sin. Of this matter, we will speak more at large in another place. At the time of death, this kind of sin shall be completely abolished, for in the blessed resurrection we shall have a new body, a body made fit for eternal felicity. Meanwhile, while we live here, our old man and natural corruption continually pine away, so that finally, at the time of death, it ceases to be at all. Now we have seen these three things: how original sin is derived, how it is taken away, and what we are to determine concerning the remnant of the same.

Now let us speak of the punishment. Some of the School-divines think the same shall be without feeling. The Pelagians judged that such should only be banished from the kingdom of heaven and appointed nothing else. But Pighius adds this also, that those who die having but this sin only should be blessed with a certain natural happiness and that they shall love the Lord with all their heart, with all their mind, and with all their strength and shall set forth His name and praise. Although he dare not teach these things for any certainty, yet he allows them as very likely.

But Augustine, in De Fide ad Petrum and elsewhere, adjudges young infants to hell-fire if they die not regenerated. The holy scriptures seem to favor his part, for in the last judgment, there shall be only a double sentence pronounced. There is no third place appointed between the saved and the condemned. The Papists, although they

think there shall be a purgatory until the day of judgment, do not appoint any mean place between both after that day. It is written evidently that those who believe not in Christ not only shall not have eternal life but also that the wrath of God rests upon them. While we are enemies of Christ, we are called the children of wrath. There is no doubt that God punishes those with whom He is angry. Therefore, we will say with Augustine and with the holy scriptures that they must be punished. But of the kind and manner of punishment, we are able to define nothing. However, whereas there are diverse sorts of punishments in hell (for the scriptures affirm that it shall be easier for some than for others), it is credible concerning these that, since they did not join actual sin to original corruption, they shall be punished more lightly.

I always except the children of the elect, for we doubt not to number them among the company of believers, although they as yet believe not by reason of their age, just as those born of infidels are reckoned among the unbelievers, although they do not yet resist the faith. So the children of the godly, departing without baptism, by reason of the covenant that God has made with their parents, may be saved if they belong to the number of the predestinate. I also except all others, if any there be, who by the secret counsel of God belong to predestination.

Now, with these matters thus ordered, we will address the arguments of the Pelagians, who believed they could prove that there is no original sin. The first of their arguments is that it is unlikely that God would continue to persecute Adam's sin, having already punished it sufficiently long ago, especially since the prophet Nahum says that God will not judge twice for the same offense.

I know some answer that God did not judge twice upon that sin but only once, including Adam and all his posterity under one judgment.

However, to clarify the matter, I say that in each of us, whenever we are punished, there is a cause why we ought to be punished, and therefore, in every person, it is not the fault of another that is condemned, but his own. If we read that God avenges Adam's fault in us, it must be understood because our corruption originated from him. This is similar to one being sick with the plague, infecting others, and causing their deaths. If a man says they perished through the contagion of the one who first brought the plague, it must be understood because he was the first to spread the infection.

However, that sentence of the prophet Nahum is not relevant here.

Indeed, Jerome, when interpreting that place, said that by those words, Martion the heretic was confuted, for he falsely accused God of being cruel and vengeful in the Old Testament because of the severe punishments He inflicted upon men. Jerome argued that this severity was due to God's benignity, aiming to prevent eternal perishing by delivering once and for all severe judgment to avoid future punishment.

Jerome, seeing that his explanation might not be firm enough, addressed an objection that it may seem advantageous for adulterers to be caught late since they could escape everlasting hell by receiving only temporal punishment. He replied that the judgment of this world cannot prevent God's ultimate judgment and that easy punishment cannot erase sins deserving severe and prolonged pain.

In Jerome's words, two points are notable: one, that adultery was punished with death in those days, and two, that his first interpretation seemed unsatisfactory. He thus provided another

Jewish exposition, suggesting that God meant the Assyrians would

not succeed in also taking the kingdom of Judah after leading away the ten tribes. God would not allow a double trouble; He was content with the destruction of the ten tribes and would save Judah.

Although this explanation is pious, it does not seem to align with the prophet's intent, who prophesied against Nineveh, foretelling the severity of punishment by the Chaldeans, implying no further need for vengeance. This is similar to saying a man struck dead with one blow does not need a second. This is the scope and sense of the prophet's message.

Regarding the matter, we do not deny that afflictions in the godly aim to prevent them from being condemned with the world, as Paul says. These are fatherly corrections leading to repentance. However, a general rule cannot be drawn from this to limit God's judgment, assuming that earthly punishment precludes further punishment if faith and repentance are absent. If they return to God, they will suffer nothing in another life, not because they have satisfied God with their earthly punishments but because Christ paid the price for their redemption. Just as godly men receive pledges of another life, the wicked begin their everlasting punishment with earthly afflictions. Christ also grants this when He says to fear the one who can destroy both body and soul in hell. Thus, the prophet's oracle, as plainly expounded, does not pertain to the matter at hand.

Another argument from the Pelagians is taken from the prophet Ezekiel: "The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father." To this, we might answer that children do not bear their parents' iniquity but their own, which cleaves to each from birth. However, as this passage is interpreted differently, we will briefly state our view.

A common proverb among the Jews was: "The fathers ate sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," meaning that the

children suffered for their fathers' sins. The Rabbins said the ten tribes attributed this to Jeroboam, who made the golden calves, while the kingdom of Judah referred it to Manasseh, whose ungodliness they believed brought captivity upon them. God reproved this proverb, stating that each soul belongs to Him and the son shall not bear the father's iniquity but will die for his own sin.

Some interpret this as referring to temporal punishment, citing Deuteronomy 24, which commanded that parents not be killed for their children's offenses nor children for their parents. Amaziah, king of Judah, observed this law as recorded in 2 Kings 14. However, the Israelites did not always follow this, as seen in Joshua 7, where

Achan's entire family and possessions were destroyed for his sin, by God's special command, which does not contradict the general law.

Nevertheless, this exposition concerning the civil law does not align with the prophet's words. The Jews did not complain of judicial punishment or that imposed by the prince; they lamented the calamities God Himself brought upon them, such as the spoil of their goods, the destruction of the Jewish kingdom, and the Babylonian captivity. They accused the judgments of the Lord, murmuring that His ways were not right. Some interpret the passage as referring to eternal punishments, the loss of grace, and the spirit, which occur to everyone for his own sins, not for the sins of others. Meanwhile, they affirm that both children, for their parents, and people, for their princes, suffer temporal punishments. God punishes fathers in their children, considering children a part of their parents. They argue it is not absurd if children, through their afflictions, benefit their parents by calling them to repentance. No injustice is done to the children if they die, as they are mortal, and God wisely determines the times of living or dying. He may take children from life to prevent their corruption by naughtiness or to halt their sins, thus sparing them further burden and allowing them to end their sinful living.

Augustine leans towards this opinion in his questions on the book of Joshua, questions eight and nine. Those who deny the remnants of original sin after regeneration are compelled to say this, as they cannot show that infants are punished for their own sins, which they claim infants do not possess. We, who assert that these are sins, teach that they are not imputed to eternal death but sometimes warrant certain punishments to show they displease God.

Augustine's exposition does not fully align with Ezekiel's meaning.

The prophet says it shall no longer be that children suffer temporal punishments (like exile and captivity) for their parents' sins. The Lord declares, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father." This contradicts the idea that this applies only to spiritual punishments and eternal damnation, as the prophet speaks plainly of bodily punishments in this life.

Another of Augustine's interpretations, found in "Enchiridion ad Laurentium" chapter 46, suggests this sentence prophesied Christ's benefit to us. Since Christ's death made satisfaction for original sin, the prophet says, "Hereafter the son shall not bear the sin of his father, but his own." Augustine may have been led to this opinion because, in Jeremiah 31, a similar promise of the New Testament follows a similar statement. "Behold," says the Lord, "the days shall come when I will make a new covenant with the house of Judah."

However, this interpretation does not seem to fit the prophet's original intent. Furthermore, although Christ suffered at a specific time, the grace of His death saved children in the Old Testament as well. Therefore, it was unnecessary to say it would no longer be so, as it was not so before.

Moreover, those strangers to Christ bear their iniquity and suffer punishment for their offenses, not others'. Thus, we say the prophet's sentence is generally true, applying to all, whether children or adults,

of both the Old and New Testaments. Each bears his own iniquity, for all are born with sin and corruption deserving punishment. This sentence supports our view and contradicts Pighius, who claimed children bear their parents' sins while otherwise being sinless. The Jews claimed they were innocent and suffering for their parents' sins.

God declared that this proverb would no longer be relevant, as His judgments do not punish any innocent person for another's sin. The prophet foretold a time of enlightenment through the Holy Spirit in the New Testament, clarifying that each would bear his own sin.

The law seems to contradict this exposition. God says He will visit the fathers' iniquity upon the children to the third and fourth generations. These statements appear contradictory, as God both punishes the fathers' iniquity on the children and also declares the children will not bear their parents' sins. To reconcile this, we must first understand the law's words.

Some interpret this law as reflecting God's mercy, others His severity and justice. Those who see it as mercy argue that God is so gracious that He does not immediately destroy a sinner but waits for repentance. Sometimes, He spares the father but punishes the son; sometimes, He defers punishment to the third or fourth generation, as seen with Jehu, king of Samaria. God did not remove Jehu's posterity from the kingdom until the fourth generation, showing His patience. Others see it as demonstrating God's severity and justice.

His goodness is shown by blessing those who love Him for a thousand generations, but His justice is seen in punishing iniquity not just upon the sinners but also their descendants to the third and fourth generations.

Examples support both views. The Amalekites, who harassed Israel in the wilderness, were eventually destroyed by Saul, as commanded

by God. Gehazi, Elisha's servant, was struck with leprosy for his greed, and the curse extended to his descendants. Both interpretations are godly, but the latter better aligns with the text.

The law clarifies that God punishes the iniquity of fathers upon children to the third and fourth generations of those who hate Him.

Only children who share their parents' sins bear their punishment.

Hatred of God can be understood as both a conscious act by those of mature age and an inclination and corruption inherent in infants.

But someone may object: If we understand that God punishes only those who imitate the vices of their forefathers, what need was there to add "unto the third and fourth generation," seeing punishment is always to be administered against all sinners, whatever their generation? Augustine was so troubled by this objection that he suggested that by this form of speaking, "unto the third and fourth generation," must be understood to mean all posterity in general, with a definite number used for an infinite one. For if you join four to three, it makes the number seven, which is often used to represent any other number.

Similarly, he says it is written in the prophet Amos: "For three wickednesses and for four, I will not spare him," which he interprets to mean that if one offends once or twice, God may forgive him. But if he heaps sin upon sin and continues to do so immeasurably, God cannot forgive him. In this place, "three or four wickednesses" denote the continuation of sins. Thus, God may be said to punish to the third and fourth generation of those who hate Him when He punishes all such people, regardless of their generation.

But another answer might be that God prescribed the third and fourth generation to show that His wrath is tempered with kindness, indicating that He may eventually cease His torments and go no

further in punishing. Others think the third and fourth generations are specifically mentioned because the posterity up to that point is often led into sin by the bad example of their progenitors. Most ancestors do not live past the fourth generation; they usually die having seen their great-grandchildren. Therefore, the words of the prophet are not contrary to the law but rather interpret it. The prophet says the son shall not bear the father's iniquity because the law states that God punishes the sins of the fathers on the children if they follow their parents' sins. When punished, they understand they suffer for their own sins, not for their parents'.

It is said that God punishes the sins of the fathers upon the children because those sins originated with them and continued through the children. If the children had not had such sinful ancestors, God might have forborne His wrath, as He did with their progenitors. But since both progenitors and descendants sin, God no longer defers punishment, lest He appear to neglect human affairs and encourage others to sin more securely. Nevertheless, those punished cannot be called innocent since they also hate God.

This does not contradict what Christ says in John concerning the man born blind: "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents." The meaning is not that the blind man was punished without cause, but that God's providence directed the fault of his eyes for a different purpose—to celebrate Christ's divinity.

God arranges His punishments to serve not only as penalties but also to achieve other ends He has appointed. Therefore, the prophet's words do not contradict the definition of original sin we have provided but rather support it, contrary to our adversaries who claim that children are guilty of others' faults.

The next argument is that since both the soul and body are God's works, and since progenitors can be pure and godly, commended in the scriptures, and marriage and procreation are praised, how has sin crept in among such fortresses of innocence? We first answer with Paul: By one man. They falsely claim the ancestors were clean and holy. Though they were godly and original sin is forgiven regarding guilt, a corrupt nature and impure state remain. They pass on their nature to their descendants through seed and generation.

Some argue that the body cannot corrupt the spirit, but we do not claim the soul is corrupted by the body through a natural action.

Rather, since the body is corrupted, it resists the soul. Without its original endowments, the soul is subject to the body's inclinations and does not rule as it should but is ruled by it. Natural reasons teach that there is a natural agreement between the body and the soul, with the soul affected by the body's condition. Those with abundant choler or melancholy are often angry or sad. Thus, the argument based on false principles concludes nothing.

Furthermore, they cite 1 Corinthians: "Your children are holy." They argue this means children do not have original sin, as holiness cannot coexist with sin. Some interpret this as civil holiness, meaning children of Christians are legitimate, not bastards. This does not hold, as even children of infidels in lawful matrimony are legitimate heirs. Others interpret holiness as godly education. If a godly spouse leaves an ungodly one, the children may remain with the ungodly and be led astray. If both parents live together, the godly one will impart some godliness to the children. This interpretation also falls short since godly education can occur even for children born of adultery and fornication, as seen with Adeodatus,

Augustine's son.

The apostle likely means that some holiness is imparted to the children from their parents, not through flesh but through the covenant's promise. God promised Abraham to be God not only to him but also to his seed. In the prophets, God calls the children of His people His own and laments their sacrifices to Moloch. Relying on this promise, we baptize infants in the church, believing they belong to God and Christ, confirmed with an outward seal of the promise.

But you might say, you could be deceived because perhaps your child does not belong to the number of the elect. I answer that the same difficulty can happen even with those of mature years. Someone may profess faith with a feigned heart, be led only by the persuasion of man, or have faith only for a time, and thus not truly belong to the elect. But the minister does not concern himself with these matters; he only regards the confession that the person to be baptised professes. He will say that God's election is hidden from him and does not trouble himself about it. Concerning particular matters, he can determine nothing but relies on the general promise, from which, although many are excluded, it is not his part to define who they are.

Paul speaks of the Jews: "If the root is holy, the branches also shall be holy; if the first fruits are holy, so is the whole batch or lump." By these words, he shows that God's favour was inclined towards the Jews because of the promise made to their fathers and that salvation was due to them for the same reason. Although this promise is indefinite and many are excluded from it, it remains stable because some are always converted to Christ and will be until the end. This is evident in Isaac, to whose seed God promised to be gracious.

Although the promise applied only to Jacob, not to Esau, this did not prevent Esau from being circumcised.

Similarly, we confess that the children of Christians who belong to God's election are holy, but they are still infected with original sin because they are, by nature, children of wrath, just as others are. If God does not impute guilt to them against their salvation, it is by His grace and mercy, not by the purity of their nature. Therefore, we affirm that they are both holy and, by nature, children of wrath.

Thus, it is clear how this argument should be discussed.

They also add that infants neither speak, do, nor think anything against the law of God, and therefore have no sin. How shamefully they err is evident from what we have already said. This argument is as if they were saying: They have no actual sin, therefore they have no sin at all. To argue from the particular to the general by a negative is the worst kind of reasoning. They are deceived because they do not follow the general nature of sin, which comprehends all things repugnant to the law of God.

Chapter 41 They also object that it is not right to say that original sin is spread through seed and flesh because these things have a senseless and dull nature and are therefore not capable of sin. But I have already said that sin is not in them except as the root; the nature of sin is perfected when the soul is joined to them. We have also explained how to answer the Pelagians, who affirm that Paul's words to the Romans should be understood as referring to imitation. That cannot agree with all the apostle's sayings, for he states that all have sinned and that by the disobedience of one, many became sinners. More firmly, he proves that sin was in the world before the law because death reigned from Adam to Moses.

There are reasons Augustine used against the Pelagians that we need not repeat. They add that human afflictions and death itself are natural because we have natural sources from which they flow. But we answer that these sources were not ordained in man's nature at creation but were later defiled and corrupted. Philosophers attribute effects to present principles, but Christians refer them to the word of God.

Since scripture teaches that death came by sin and that man, as created, could have always lived, let Pighius and his followers see how truly and godly they affirm that death comes to man by nature.

They also argue that what cannot be avoided should not be considered sin. This is false because the law is given to us, which no one can perfectly perform or avoid all offenses against it. In considering sins, we must not inquire whether something happens by chance or necessity, but whether it is repugnant or agreeable to the law of God. This is the measure by which sin must be weighed.

Thus, their arguments about necessity are vain and trivial.

Finally, they argue that if the sin of our first parents is derived to their descendants, there is no reason why the sins of the immediate parents should not also be conveyed to their offspring. If we grant this, they think the most absurd consequence would follow: that we born in this latter time would be most miserable because we would bear the sins of not only our first parents but also all our progenitors.

The Schoolmen have thought that it is not possible for the sins of immediate parents to pass into their children, and they seem to be led to this conclusion for two main reasons. The first reason is that immediate parents only communicate nature to their children and such other things as naturally accompany it, but they do not transmit special properties and accidental qualities unless they pertain to the

body. For instance, hereditary diseases like leprosy or gout may pass to the children, but mental qualities are not inherited; a grammarian does not beget a grammarian, nor does a musician beget another musician. Therefore, they argue that since sins pertain to the mind, they cannot be inherited from the parents.

The second reason is that the first parents had original righteousness, which was not only implanted in the mind but also in the body and members. Consequently, in procreation, they might transmit the lack of this righteousness, as it was inherent in the body and flesh. However, actual sins, which occurred later and pertain to the mind, cannot be inherited by children. Yet, Augustine in his

Enchiridion ad Laurentium, chapter 46, argues that it is probable that even the sins of immediate parents are communicated to their children. He supports this by comparing two scriptural passages previously discussed.

Since God says He will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, and elsewhere says the son shall not bear the father's offense, Augustine reasons that if the child does not bear the father's iniquity (but his own), yet God visits the sin of the father in him, it must be that the son has that sin within himself.

Otherwise, these passages would be contradictory. Therefore, sin so permeates human nature that it not only corrupts the mind but also taints the body, flesh, and members. Paul tells the Corinthians that our bodies are temples of the Holy Ghost and severely threatens anyone who destroys God's temple. Thus, if God punishes the sins of parents upon their children, and the child bears only his own iniquity, it follows that the children of wicked men, when afflicted, must have some of their father's wickedness within them, serving as a punishment to the fathers.

No one should complain about God's justice in this matter. If God, by His most sincere justice, can deliver sinners into a reprobate sense and punish sins with sins, there is no reason why He cannot justly allow the corruption of sin to affect both soul and body, so that those born of sinners inherit a similar nature. This doctrine serves as a warning to live purely, lest one pollutes both mind and body and, by the same means, infects one's children.

Having established these points, some may ask what the difference is between original sin and the sin inherited from immediate parents.

We answer that original sin's propagation is continuous, as the holy scriptures teach, whereas the continuation of other sins is not necessary. Sometimes, no sin apart from original sin is transmitted from immediate parents to their children. It appears that God has set a limit to prevent evil from abounding excessively and moderates this propagation of evil. Experience shows this; for example,

Hezekiah, a most godly prince, had King Ahaz, a most wicked man, for his father. Similarly, Hezekiah begat Amon, a most wicked child, who begat Manasseh, even worse than himself.

Although the beginnings of sin might be transmitted from parents to children, God sometimes grants such grace and strength to children that they can overcome these inclinations. However, this does not differ from original sin in that grace is granted to the godly to achieve victory over it. Moreover, when God gives good children to bad parents, He shows the power of His goodness, repressing the corruption of the parents so it does not pass to the children.

Conversely, when He allows evil children to come from good parents, He prevents the assumption that the children's godliness comes from the parents' merits, as grace is entirely spiritual and not naturally transmitted through procreation.

Therefore, while honesty and godliness are pure gifts from God, He promises to bless the posterity of godly men for up to a thousand generations, not due to the ancestors' merits but because of His mercy. To illustrate His freedom, God sometimes allows things to happen differently, showing that even holy parents still possess much corruption, which may manifest in their children. This serves to remind us of our inherent corruption, even among the godly. To support this opinion further, some cite the Psalmist's prayer against the children of the wicked: "Let them be fatherless; let none have compassion on them; let them beg for their bread." If the children of the wicked were innocent, this prayer would be unjust, suggesting that they partake in their parents' wickedness. Given their infancy, this must occur through propagation.

Some argue these words of David are prophecies of future events revealed by the Holy Ghost. Even if they are prophecies, they retain the form and inclination of a prayer, which must be just to be valid.

But whereas they say that it is most absurd, which may arise from this doctrine, namely, that the last men should also be more miserable than all others, inasmuch as they should bear the sins of Adam as well as all their forefathers, this must be answered in two ways. First, not all things which seem absurd to us are absurd to God. For let us consider this very matter: Christ threatens the Jews that all the blood of the godly, even from Abel to Zechariah, the son of Berechiah, should be laid to their charge. Who does not see that the state of those children of Israel, who were led into captivity, was more miserable than many generations of their forefathers who had defiled themselves with the same sins?

Secondly, we answer that indeed it would be absurd if the forefathers' sins continually passed from them to their children. But

since we have declared that this does not always happen, and that God's providence has limited and measured this evil, and that He has expressly pronounced this only concerning the third and fourth generations, there is nothing absurd in it. The reasons of the Schoolmen, wherewith they wrestle against this propagation, are very feeble. First, they presume that the properties of the mind are not communicated by the parents to their children, which experience teaches to be false. For we often see that angry persons beget angry children, and melancholic parents beget melancholic children.

Neither does this comparison serve them, saying that one grammarian does not beget another grammarian, nor one musician begets another; for these are arts attained by precepts and exercise, not affections bred in men. Yet we sometimes see by experience that in what art the father chiefly excels, he has children inclined to the same, be it husbandry, warfare, or liberal science. Moreover, we are chiefly concerned with those affections which are the springs and beginnings of actions.

In another argument, they say that sin in parents only corrupts the mind, which is not true. As we have taught before, their body is also polluted, so it is no marvel if fathers communicate such bodies to their children. On this matter, I willingly agree with Augustine that it is a probable thing and agreeable to the scriptures. This doctrine is also supported by Martin Bucer, a very godly and learned man, who holds that private sins are derived from parents to children.

However, it must be considered that this is contingent and not of necessity. God sometimes suspends the sin of the parents and, for His goodness, does not allow human nature to be utterly destroyed.

When He either represses this derivation of sin or allows it to take place, He alone knows. But it is enough for us to consider these two things: first, that sin is poured out from the fathers into the children; secondly, that the same is sometimes prohibited by God's benefit,

which cannot be said of original sin, for we are all born infected with it. Thus far, from the Epistle to the Romans, the fifth chapter, upon these words: "Even as by the disobedience of one," etc.

Look to a similar place in Genesis 8:21. These things I thought good to add out of the fifth chapter of Romans upon these words: "Even as by one man," etc.

To understand these words of the apostle clearly, let us examine three things set forth by him: first, what the apostle means by sin; secondly, who that one man is by whom sin entered into the world; thirdly, by what means sin is spread abroad. Concerning the first, the apostle uses the word sin generally and broadly to signify all that is against the law of God and His will. By this sin, man departs from the creation of nature and the image wherein he was created. For God made man in the beginning so that His image would shine forth in him. This does not happen when we contend against God's law. This is the only and true reason why man is not permitted to delight himself with every kind of pleasure; for if he did so, he would draw near to the nature of brute beasts and not to the similitude of God, his Creator. God would have him be His deputy in this world and therefore be most like Him.

Surely, if sin is understood thus broadly, it does not only comprehend original sin, which is our depraved nature and the corrupt powers of our body and soul, but also all the evils that ensue from it, such as the first motions of the mind to forbidden things, wicked deliberations, naughty endeavors, and corrupt customs.

Therefore, the apostle, under the name of sin, includes both the root itself and all the fruits of the same. Neither should we listen to those who claim that these things are not sins, for since the Holy Ghost calls them by this name, I see no reason why we should not also

speak so and adhere to His doctrine. Moreover, the very etymology of the word itself shows that the first motions of the mind and corruption of nature are sins. For this word "sin" comes from the verb meaning "to err from the right scope appointed," by whatever means this happens. Since it is the rule of our nature and all our actions that we should be very conformable to God in all things, when we are prone to those things forbidden by God's law and are carried headlong into them at the first impulse, without controversy, we must be said to sin, that is, to err from the scope and end appointed to us.

The Hebrew word for sin has a similar signification. The word "Chataa" is derived from "Chata," used in the same sense in Judges

20:16, meaning "to miss the mark." It is written of the seven hundred children of Benjamin that they could sling stones at a hair and not miss. Besides this, experience teaches how grievous these evils are, even in us who are regenerate, for we are so hindered by them that we cannot fulfill the law, which we are nevertheless bound to observe in every point. We are also commanded not to lust, to which precept everyone gives his secret consent, witnessing to himself how much he resists because of our proneness to sins and first motions to vices.

But if the Fathers seem to write that the law may be fulfilled by men regenerated in Christ, they speak of an obedience begun and of such a kind of fulfilling that has much imperfection joined with it. They pronounce those to be perfect and to perform God's law who can perceive their own imperfection, so they may daily say with others,

"Lord forgive us our trespasses," and acknowledge with Paul that they have a great way to go. The same Fathers confess that no one, not even the holiest, has perfectly loved all virtues. Jerome says, "He that excels others in one virtue, often fails in another." He cites

Cicero, who said that it is rare to find someone most excellent in

either the knowledge of the law or the art of rhetoric, but to find one excelling in both was unheard of. Therefore, the apostle may magnify and make famous the entire benefit of God through Christ bestowed upon us. He not only touches on original sin but also includes under the name of sin all kinds of vices that flow from it.

Now we must see by which one man it is that Paul says sin had such an entrance into the world. The same undoubtedly was the first

Adam, who was as a common lump or mass in which all mankind was contained. This lump being corrupted, we cannot be brought forth into the world but corrupted and defiled. Although Eve transgressed before the man, the original sinning is ascribed to Adam because succession is accounted in men, not in women.

However, Ambrose understood "one man" to be Eve. But since the word "one" in that place is in the masculine gender, it can hardly be applied to the woman without much wrestling. Others think that under the common name of "man," both Adam and Eve are understood, so this speech may not differ much from that in the first chapter of Genesis: "Male and female created He them." They do not much regard the adjective "one," because the scriptures testify that Adam and Eve were one flesh. The first interpretation is the more sincere and easy; therefore, I willingly follow it.

But we must remember what Paul writes to Timothy, that although both of the first parents sinned, their transgressions were not the same. He says that Adam was not deceived, which is gathered by their answers to God when He reproved them. The woman, being asked why she did it, accused the serpent: "The serpent," she said,

"deceived me." But Adam, when asked the same question, did not say he was deceived but said, "The woman whom Thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." These things must not be understood as though we affirm that no error happened to the man

when he transgressed. For, as it is plainly taught in the Ethics, in every kind of sin there always happens some error. This only we are taught: that man was not seduced by so gross a guile as the woman was.

This very much furthers Paul's reason, for in the same place, he willed the woman to keep silence in the church because she was an instrument fit to deceive. He confirmed this by the example of the first parents, for she who persuaded man to sin is not likely to rightly instruct him. She who could be seduced by the devil and deceived by the serpent is not meet to bear office in the church. Yet the book of Ecclesiasticus says that sin had its first beginning from the woman, which is not to be denied if we consider the history in Genesis. But Paul, as we have already said, follows the usual manner of the scriptures, which ascribe succession and procreation to men, not women. His purpose was not to teach at that time whether Adam or Eve sinned first but to show the root from which sin spread in the world. This also answers the objection from the book of Wisdom that "through the envy of the devil, sin came into the world." John also writes that "the devil sinned from the beginning." Here it is not treated as the imitation of the sin of another or the persuasion to sinning. Otherwise, it is true that the first example of sin came from the devil, who was the very persuader and author of transgression.

But the apostle's scope is to teach from what beginning sin was conveyed by propagation to mankind.

That this is the apostle's meaning may be proved by the antithesis, or contrary comparison, which he makes between Christ and the first

Adam. The Lord did not restore us or make us just only by laying an example before us of following Him or by showing Himself as a most faithful admonisher but by altogether changing us and making us new by the Spirit and grace. Augustine seems to have rightly

expressed the harm brought by Adam when he said that Adam "brought mankind into a consumption," signifying that by a certain contagion, he infected us all.

Against this doctrine, the Pelagians use this argument: "That which has no being cannot hurt; but original sin (if any) is already wiped away by faith in Christ and by baptism, and does not remain; therefore, it cannot hurt the children who are baptized." But what these men take as granted, namely that original sin is abolished in believers and in those who are baptized, is not perfectly true. In every sin, two things must be weighed: the action or lewd affection, which is as it were the matter, and the offense or bond unto punishment, which they call guiltiness.

Original sin differs from actual sins because in actual sins, the matter does not continue. As soon as one commits adultery or speaks blasphemy, those actions cease and are no more extant; only the offense against God and the guiltiness remain. Therefore, seeing by faith and repentance the bond unto punishment or the offense against God is remitted, we may easily grant that the whole sin is abolished. But in original sin, the consideration is otherwise because its matter does not pass away. Everyone has experience that the corruption of nature remains, seeing that we continually run headlong into sin and are unapt to divine things both in body and mind. These sins are not imputed to the faithful, for the guiltiness and offense against God are forgiven in baptism through faith in Christ, although the matter of sin remains. This matter, though broken and of slender force in the godly, will not be perfectly abolished until we die.

Since regenerate men procreate children not as regenerate but by nature and flesh, it follows that the children of believers are born

subject to original sin. Into them is poured the same defiled and corrupt nature that is in the parents, while forgiveness or imputation, apprehended by faith, cannot be poured into them. For explaining this matter, Augustine uses two analogies. One is of grains of corn, which, although they are sown into the ground, being purged of their small leaves, chaff, straw, and ears, yet they grow up again with all those things. This happens because cleansing comes to those grains not by nature but by the art and industry of men. Since the corn springs not from principles of art and industry but from nature, it follows the order of its own nature, not of human industry.

The other analogy is of a man circumcised, who nevertheless begets a child with his foreskin. This happens because circumcision was not in the father by nature but by an outward act. Since children are not begotten by that outward power but by the inward strength of nature, it is necessary that when they are begotten, they follow the order of nature. Therefore, we bring forth children just like ourselves. Since we have the infection of original sin, they cannot be without it. But we cannot impart to our children the remission and forgiveness of that sin; that must be hoped for from God alone.

The same thing happens in sciences and virtues, which, although they are in the parents, are not derived to their offspring. This sufficiently shows wherein the Pelagians were deceived. Neither can any man justly accuse us of taking anything away from faith or baptism. We grant plentifully to baptism that it seals to us the remission of guiltiness and offense, grace and the Holy Ghost, and engrafting into Christ, and that it seals to us the right to eternal life.

Yet it does not follow that baptism abolishes the corruption of nature or the continual nourishment of sin. Paul rightly says that "by hope we are saved."

It is a great marvel how the Pelagians can deny original sin in infants, seeing they perceive them dying every day. The scripture manifestly teaches that "the wages of sin is death, and the sting of death is sin." Therefore, whoever you exclude from sin, you must also exclude from death. By the testimony of the scripture, these are compared together as cause and effect. Here we must except Christ only, who, though He knew no sin, yet for our sakes died; but death had no dominion over Him, for He voluntarily suffered it for our salvation. To affirm that there are some without sin, although all men die, is to join together things repugnant and contrary to each other.

Besides this place, there are many others that prove infants are not without sin. David says, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Paul to the Ephesians calls us "children of wrath by nature." In Genesis, it is written, "The heart of man is prone to evil even from his infancy." Many other places serve this purpose besides those we have brought forth.

Now, seeing it has been declared by me what the apostle means by sin and by what one man the same entered into the world, it remains to consider by what means the same has been spread abroad. The matter is indeed obscure and very hard, and therefore I purpose to stand on it less. For seeing the word of God plainly teaches us that there is original sin, and that it is conveyed unto posterity, although we understand not the manner and way how it is imparted, yet we must yield unto truth and not trouble ourselves by reasoning more than necessary regarding the way and manner, which is hard to be known and may without damage be left unknown.

However, I will not hesitate to rehearse those means I have observed among the ecclesiastical writers, whose opinions regarding this

matter are four in number. The first is of those who suppose that we receive from our parents the soul together with the body; that just as God, by human seed, frames the body, so from the same, He creates the soul. This opinion Augustine mentions in his tenth book upon Genesis ad literam, and in many other places; he did never (as far as I can remember) disallow the same. Rather, he says that by this doctrine may be resolved the knot of original sin. Tertullian and many ancient writers favoured this opinion. When I examine their arguments diligently, I judge them probable but not necessary. For that which they allege out of the 46th chapter of Genesis, touching the 66 souls that came forth from Jacob's thigh, it may be expounded not unfitly by the figure Synecdoche, so that by the soul, which is the chief part of man, is understood the body, which without controversy is begotten of the seed of parents. Also, by the soul, we may understand the grosser parts of the soul, such as the vegetative part and the sensitive part, which doubtless are procreated from the seed.

The holy scriptures sometimes use the word soul in this sense, as Christ testifies in the Gospel where He says, "He that loseth his soul for my sake shall find it."

Another of their reasons (as Augustine writes in his tenth book upon Genesis) is this: In the creation of the woman, it is not written that God breathed into her a living soul. Whereupon they gather that she had not only her body from Adam, but her soul also. But Augustine judges this reason weak, for it might be replied that it had already been said that God breathed a soul into Adam, and therefore there was no need to repeat it. If there had been a new manner of procreation of souls, the scripture would not have passed it over with silence. Seeing the scripture makes no mention of a new manner, we ought to use that which it had before expressed. Especially, seeing

Adam said of his wife, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," but did not add, "and soul of my soul," which would have

served better to express the knitting of matrimony. However, Augustine confesses that the doubt is not thereby dissolved. If we affirm that souls are created every day and so created in bodies with no preceding means of seed, which he calls [Ratio seminalis], then

God shall not seem to have perfectly ceased from all His works on the seventh day, seeing He still creates souls out of nothing every day.

But it may be answered that in the body derived from parents, it is sufficient if there are qualities and conditions whereby it can receive a reasonable soul, and this is the Seminalis ratio here spoken of.

But whatever may be said about these arguments and answers, Augustine inclines this way. He thinks at least that the soul of Christ proceeded not from the Blessed Virgin by propagation. He says that others besides himself judged this and that they affirmed it could be proved by the epistle to the Hebrews. There it is said that the priesthood of Christ excelled the priesthood of Aaron because Christ is a priest according to the order of Melchizedek. The priesthood of Melchizedek was more excellent than the priesthood of Aaron because Levi gave tithes to Melchizedek; for he was in the loins of Abraham, who paid tithes to Melchizedek. But Christ should also have been no less in the loins of Abraham than Levi if He had received both His soul and His body from him. Therefore, in this respect, the dignity of each priesthood would have been alike, seeing either of them in Abraham paid tithes to Melchizedek.

But here they who favour that opinion might answer that there was another manner of difference between Christ and Levi. Although both of them were in the loins of Abraham concerning both the body and the soul, yet they did not derive their nature from him in the same manner. Christ was born of the Virgin by the means of the Holy

Ghost, but Levi was begotten and born in the ordinary manner that other men are procreated. Therefore, Augustine passes over this

reason and brings another out of the book of Wisdom, wherein it is written, as he thinks, under the person of Christ: "I have by lot obtained a good soul." He thinks that this phrase can have no place if the soul of Christ had been derived by propagation through the law of nature from His forefathers, unless we shall affirm that nature works by chance. He thinks that this word "lot" took place in the soul of Christ so we would understand that those ornaments, which were most abundant and plentiful in it, were not bestowed thereupon for any preceding merits but through the mere mercy of God. He thinks this was a very great ornament of the soul of Christ, to be joined to the same substance and person with the word of God. But this testimony, not being from the holy scriptures reckoned canonical, has no great force.

Lastly, he leaves indifferent the question of the derivation of souls [from parents] as a thing each way probable. Because those against it cite this place from the 33rd Psalm: "He fashioned the hearts of them severally," Augustine says this is weak because even those who defend the derivation of the soul [from parents] do not deny that souls are created by God, although they affirm the same is done by a means. For so we read in Genesis that the birds were not created from nothing but at God's command issued forth from the waters.

Every one of us is said to be dissolved into the earth from which we were taken, although we have not bodies immediately from the earth but from our parents' bodies. Thus, this opinion cannot be confuted and overthrown by the scriptures. Although I know the opinion received in the church is that souls are created in creating and infused in infusing, I have recited these things not to cause any alteration concerning this doctrine but so it may be understood what manner of propagation of original sin seemed most reasonable to some ecclesiastical writers. The School-men, when they refuse this doctrine, only use natural reasons, that the reasonable soul in nature

is spiritual and indivisible, and cannot be sundered. They hold it to be the understanding part, more worthy than that it can be drawn out of the matter or substance itself, and earnestly affirm it must not have its being by generation but by creation.

Augustine assigns another way in his book De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia and in many other places where he disputes against the Pelagians regarding this kind of sin. He says that this vice is supposed to pass into the children through the pleasure which the parents take in the fellowship of nature. But this reason for propagation leans on a suspected and, in my judgment, untrue ground. The pleasure taken from procreation is not evil in its own nature unless a naughty desire accompanies it. For if that action should necessarily have sin joined with it, the Holy Ghost would not exhort any man to it, which He does when He persuades us to matrimony and when, through Paul, He admonishes those who are wed to yield mutual benevolence to one another. However, even if it were so, it would follow that only this kind of lust is derived to the children. But the infection of original sin consists not only in carnal desires but also in other lusts after riches, honours, revenge, and finally in the whole corruption of our nature.

The third way is that God creates the soul with such an imperfection or defect because it must become the soul of a man now damned and appointed to be under the curse. They say God creates such a soul as is required for such a man, just as we see a dog's body given a life suitable for a dog and an ass's body given a life suitable for an ass.

But this seems a very hard opinion, namely, that God should contaminate with sin a soul that does not yet belong to Adam, especially since they cannot say that this kind of sin is the punishment of a preceding sin. Therefore, this idea is rejected by all men, lest we make God the absolute author of sin. The fourth

manner, embraced by many and seemingly true, is that the soul is not created sinful but immediately draws sin unto itself as soon as it is joined to the body derived from Adam. Lacking the graces and virtues with which the first man's soul was endowed, and obtaining a body subject to the curse, with instruments unfit for spiritual works, the soul is oppressed by the body and drawn into its lusts. Thus weakened on both sides—by the body's impurity and its own weakness due to a lack of power to overcome nature—corruption and the naughtiness of the whole nature depend on these two points. I have now discussed sufficiently what the apostle means by the word

Sin, by whom it is spread abroad over mankind, and what the ecclesiastical writers have taught about how it is conveyed from one to another.

Against the Pelagian errors, Augustine disputes earnestly in his book De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, where he declares that the body of the first man was not necessarily subject to death. Yet he was mortal because, if he sinned, he was to die. But Augustine would not have it said, "This is mortal; therefore, it shall utterly die." Even as we grant that our flesh may be wounded, yet it may come to pass that we shall not be wounded. The body of man, as I may say, is in a state to be sick, though it often happens that some die before they become sick. Therefore, he says that the state of Adam's body was such that although he might die, unless sin did happen, he would be preserved from death by God, just as the garments and shoes of the Hebrews were not consumed or worn over forty years in the wilderness by God's power, as we read in the 19th chapter of Deuteronomy. He thinks that Enoch and Elijah now have the state of Adam's body because they are preserved from death, whether they are sustained without meat or use sustenance prepared by God. The first man had meats to nourish him and ate other fruits to withstand nature's defects. But the tree of life was against old age, making decayed

matter as good as the lost matter. But since this does not happen to us, we both suffer old age and, at last, death.

In Adam, therefore, there was a state of mortality, but such as was to be swallowed up by God's benefit when he would be translated to ultimate felicity. Augustine judged that we might perceive the greatness of Christ's benefit, seeing He has restored us to more than

Adam took from us. Through Christ, not only is life restored, and death chased away, but mortality is also removed at the resurrection.

We shall not be able to die, which Paul teaches when he writes, "This mortal shall put on immortality." Romans 8:10 seems to support this doctrine: "But if Christ dwells in us, the body is dead because of sin," where he does not say our body is mortal through sin but is dead, that is, subject to death. He adds, "His Spirit, which raised Christ from the dead, shall quicken your mortal bodies," speaking of the resurrection, wherein our bodies must be quickened, which he called mortal but not dead, to understand that not only death shall be taken from them, but they shall be mortal no more.

The Pelagians think death is allegorically taken for the fall of souls, which cannot be allowed, as it is written in Romans 5:12: "By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death." If only the death of souls is brought by Adam, why did Paul express both, saying not only "sin" but also "death"? Moreover, Genesis clearly convicts them, where man's punishment is recited: "Earth thou art, and into earth thou shalt return," which these men must ascribe to the death of the body unless they dare affirm that our souls are fashioned of earth and will return to earth. They object that we have a body naturally composed of contraries, but it matters not because preservation depends on God, not nature, as the scriptures declare regarding the Hebrews' garments and shoes.

To understand what he means by death, we must compare it with life. Life is twofold: one that moves us to spiritual, divine, and heavenly good things, which comes to pass as long as we are joined with God; for unless moved by the Spirit of God, we cannot aspire to things beyond our nature. The other life moves us to pursue good things that preserve our nature and maintain our bodily state. Both these lives were taken away by the death brought by sin. Death is the deprivation of life: as soon as man sinned, he was turned away from God, forsaken by His grace, and unable to aspire again to eternal felicity. This bodily life was also taken away through sin, as hunger, thirst, sickness, consumption of moisture and heat, and the daily quenching of life invaded man, leading him to death.

Chrysostom on Genesis says the first parents were dead forthwith after sinning, as God pronounced the sentence of death against them immediately. Though they lived longer through God's benignity, they were dead in truth after God's sentence. Ambrose says they were suddenly oppressed with death, having no moment without being subject to death, showing that both sorts of death were brought by sin.

We must not consent to those who say death is natural to man and a rest interrupting life's motion. These opinions belong to the pagans, for the godly affirm that death feels God's wrath, bringing grief and fear, as Christ in Gethsemane and other holy men showed. If anyone finds death pleasant, it is not through the nature of death. Paul says death is the sting of sin, as it consumes us by sin. Those who claim original sin is merely a certain feebleness that cannot condemn do not understand sin's nature nor Paul's sentence. If death flows from sin, all sins must be called mortal. God imputes not some sins to us, not due to their lightness but through His mercy. No sin, however light, does not bring destruction unless God's mercy intervenes. We

do not say with the Stoics that all sins are alike, as Paul describes grievous sins excluding men from heaven.

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