The Christian Perspective on the Will
Turning to Christian church scholars, while acknowledging that sin weakens reason and the will is beset by diverse concupiscences, many have aligned themselves more closely with philosophers than perhaps necessary. Two reasons seem to influence early church fathers in this regard. Firstly, fearing ridicule from philosophers and the risk of undermining their teachings, they sought to retain a semblance of compatibility. Secondly, the flesh's inclination towards complacency might have led to disregard for good works. Thus, they endeavored to bridge the gap between scripture and philosophical thought to avoid causing offense.
However, their emphasis appears to be on the latter reason. St. Chrysostom, for instance, asserts, "God has given us free choice to decide between good and evil, without imposing constraint. He awaits our willing approach, rather than coercing us." He reiterates, "The wicked can become virtuous if they choose, and the virtuous can decline into wickedness. God grants us free choice in our nature, refraining from imposition while providing remedies that we can utilize." Likewise, he upholds that just as we require God's grace for any good deed, we must also contribute from our side. St. Jerome's perspective aligns with Chrysostom's, asserting, "We must initiate, and God shall complete; we offer our efforts, and God supplements our deficiencies." While these statements appear to endow humans with greater power than warranted, this approach seems intended to awaken human diligence. Whether they were justified in this stance will soon become clear. Notably, Greek fathers, especially St. Chrysostom, might have exceeded the proper bounds in exalting human capability. Nonetheless, nearly all early church fathers, except St. Augustine, exhibit inconsistency or express hesitation and obscurity on this matter. Their writings lack a definitive consensus, and thus, we will avoid considering each individual's viewpoint. Instead, we shall touch upon these perspectives sporadically, in accordance with our discussion's progression.
Subsequent authors, emerging after the church fathers, endeavored to establish intricate defenses for human capabilities. Unfortunately, their progression led to a gradual deterioration, culminating in the widespread belief that only sensuality was marred in people, while reason remained largely unscathed and freely wielded its intentions. The term "free will" perpetually echoed among the Latins, and the Greeks employed an even more audacious expression signifying personal power.
Given that the notion of "free will" has profoundly permeated the populace, even reaching the uninformed masses, the majority of those who sought intellectual prestige acknowledge a certain ignorance regarding the extent of this freedom. Let us, therefore, begin by comprehending the essence of the term, and subsequently draw from the unadulterated teachings of scripture to discern humanity's potential to commit good or evil.
Despite the widespread use of the term "free will" across the world, few have taken the time to elucidate its meaning. It appears that in his time, Origen provided a definition that garnered widespread acceptance: "the faculty of reason to distinguish between good and evil, coupled with the will's ability to choose either." St. Augustine concurs with this definition, describing it as "the ability of reason and will to choose good in the presence of God's grace, and evil in its absence." St. Bernard, in his quest for precision, resorts to a more obscure description, naming it "consent" due to the freedom of will and the discernment of reason, qualities both immutable. Anselm's definition offers little clarity, defining it as the "power to uphold righteousness for its own sake." The "Sentences" master and scholastic theologians gravitate towards Augustine's definition, finding it more accessible and inclusive of the essential role played by God's grace. However, they add nuances in the hope of improving or at least elucidating existing definitions. Initially, they ascribe the term "will" to reason, which distinguishes between good and evil. Adding the descriptor "free" to "will," they emphasize its aptitude to incline towards either. Given that freedom naturally accompanies the will, St. Thomas Aquinas suggests a suitable definition: "free will is the power to choose, residing between understanding and will, yet leaning more towards the latter."
Our understanding of free choice's potency lies in reason and will. Yet, it remains imperative to ascertain the scope of its influence. Commonly, matters external to the kingdom of God are attributed to human discernment and choice, while true righteousness derives from divine grace and the transformation wrought by the Holy Spirit. This understanding finds resonance in the book "The Calling of the Gentiles," which posits three categories of willingness: sensory, animal, and spiritual. The first two are considered free, while the third is the result of the Holy Spirit's workings. The validity of this notion warrants closer examination, and for now, we shall focus on providing an overview of others' opinions. This perspective elucidates why discussions of free will often pivot towards spiritual obedience rather than dwelling on external physical actions. While the primary inquiry is centered on spiritual obedience, it is unwise to ignore the broader context. We shall undoubtedly establish the significance of this in due course.
Moreover, theologians have advanced a threefold division of freedom within theological schools. These categories entail freedom from necessity, freedom from sin, and freedom from suffering. According to this framework, the first form of freedom is so inherently ingrained in human nature that it cannot be relinquished. They concede that the latter two forms of freedom are forfeited through sin. This distinction is amenable, yet it must not be conflated with the confusion between "necessity" and "constraint," a topic that will be clarified at an appropriate juncture. The consensus supports the notion that human ability to perform good hinges on God's grace, particularly the special grace of regeneration bestowed exclusively upon the elect. However, it remains unclear whether human ability to perform good is utterly eradicated or whether a residue, feeble and minute, persists—incapable of any action without divine grace, yet functional in tandem with it. Attempting to resolve this ambiguity, the "Sentences" master proposes the need for a twofold grace to equip individuals for virtuous conduct. He labels one "working," fueling an effective desire for good; the other he terms "cooperating," supporting the will's virtuous inclination. However, I am wary of this division, as it implies that the grace of God instills an effective desire for the good. This suggests that, by one's inherent nature, a partial inclination towards the good exists, though non-efficacious. St. Bernard seems to align with this notion, asserting that "every good will is the work of God, yet a person, prompted by personal impetus, may still desire a good will." The "Sentences" master appears to misconstrue St. Augustine's stance while attempting to parallel his viewpoint.
Furthermore, a query concerning the second aspect troubles me due to the erroneous perceptions it has engendered. The scholastics contend that the reason for cooperating with God's grace is to either reject the initial grace offered—rendering it futile—or to confirm it through obedience. This viewpoint is echoed even by the author of "The Calling of the Gentiles," who maintains that those endowed with rational judgment can either distance themselves from grace or embrace it. Thus, it is deemed virtuous when they do not shun it, granting them merit for committing to an action that could have been avoided if they chose, although they could not have accomplished it without the cooperation of God's grace.
I have elucidated these points in passing to underscore my divergence from scholastic theologians. Their teachings possess more integrity than those of subsequent sophists, yet we still diverge on various matters, given their departure from their predecessors' purity. However, through this distinction, we can better understand their rationale for attributing free choice to humanity. Ultimately, the "Sentences" master underscores that "a person is deemed to possess free will not because they can perform good as readily as evil, but because they are unbound by constraint. This freedom remains unaltered even if we are wicked and ensnared by sin, only capable of choosing evil." We thus witness their admission that free will does not stem from an individual's equal capability to choose good and evil, but from the act of choosing driven by their will, devoid of compulsion. While this sentiment holds true, it is worth pondering the audacity of attaching such a lofty title to something of relatively modest stature.
Oh, the allure of such a freedom! To claim that a person is not coerced into servitude by sin, but rather, is bound voluntarily by sin's chains! Truly, I find these semantic debates that agitate the Church quite distasteful. Yet, it is my belief that we should steer clear of any language containing traces of absurdity, particularly if it carries the risk of misconceptions. When people are attributed with the label of "free will," how many fail to immediately assume that an individual commands both their judgment and will, capable of turning in either direction through sheer personal prowess? However, the potential danger could be averted if individuals are educated about the true meaning of "free will." Alas, I must express that given our proclivity to gravitate towards falsehood and deceit, we may seize upon a single word as an opportunity for sin rather than be enlightened by lengthy explanations. The peril entailed by this language is evident through our collective experience. After its introduction, the term was embraced in a manner that diverted attention from the early fathers' teachings, allowing people to embrace it as a source of pride.