Philosophical Theories of the Will

To explore human faculties, we shall begin by discerning them in the simplest manner, without exploring the intricacies of philosophical debates. Although Plato's assertion of five senses functioning as instruments for the common sense appears reasonable, we do not need to be encumbered by these intricate details. It is sufficient to comprehend that within the soul, three cognitive powers exist: reason, understanding, and imagination. Corresponding to these are three desires: will, anger, and concupiscence. However, we shall refrain from looking deeper into these matters due to the potential for confusion and limited practical applicability.

We may explore further distinctions, such as those proposed by Aristotle, who delineates parts of the soul guided by reason and even those that partake in reason. He also identifies three fundamental sources from which all human actions stem: senses, understanding, and desire. Yet, for the sake of comprehension accessible to all, let us employ a simpler language, devoid of philosophical complexity. Philosophers, when seeking simplicity, divide the soul into two facets: understanding and desire. They further bifurcate both categories, positing a contemplative understanding that remains detached from action and solely embraces contemplation. This they term "intelligence," as Cicero states. Practical understanding, in contrast, comprehends good and evil, guiding the will to embrace or shun these concepts, encompassing knowledge of righteous living. Their division of desire entails "concupiscence" and "will," using the term "will" to denote submission to reason and "concupiscence" to represent unrestrained flight from moderation. However, given our assertion that human reason is deficient, we diverge significantly from their standpoint.

Hence, we shall introduce a distinct perspective, emphasizing two segments within our soul: understanding and will. Understanding deliberates among proposed options, judging what is virtuous and condemnable. Will, in contrast, elects and follows the judgments of the understanding, either pursuing the good or rejecting and shunning the condemned. Though we shall not dwell on Aristotle's nuanced argument regarding understanding's lack of inherent impetus, we can agree that understanding serves as a governor and captain of the soul. Will, in turn, aligns itself with understanding's preferences and desires nothing until understanding passes judgment. This alignment underscores Aristotle's assertion that "fleeing or desiring is the equivalent for the desire, as denying or approving is for the understanding." The guidance of understanding in directing the will correctly will be further explored. Our present aim is to demonstrate that the entire spectrum of human soul faculties can be distilled into these two components. Consequently, the senses also fall under the jurisdiction of understanding. Philosophers segregate senses into two factions: those inclined towards sensuality and others towards virtue and honor. Furthermore, we shall employ the more widely used term "will" in place of "desire."

Now let us contemplate the faculties within each facet. Philosophers unanimously posit that reason dwells within the soul, serving as a guiding light for understanding and a governing force for the will. They envision reason as a divine light that discerns between good and evil, equipped with the capacity to govern admirably. In contrast, the senses are enveloped in ignorance, incapable of contemplating profound matters, invariably bound to earthly concerns. As for desire, they believe that if it submits to reason instead of yielding to the senses, it is impelled towards the pursuit of the good and the honorable. By adhering to reason, desire can tread the righteous path. Conversely, if it succumbs to the senses, it becomes debased and corrupted, indulging in shameless conduct without restraint. Philosophers maintain that human understanding harbors an intrinsic reason to guide virtuous living, contingent upon its preservation and the nurturing of innate virtue. They posit an inferior impetus—labeled as the senses—which, if not reined in, leads reason astray. They assert that reason has the power to gradually tame the senses until they diminish into insignificance. As for the will, philosophers place it as a mediator between reason and the senses—free to align with reason or surrender to the senses.

Experience compels them to admit that establishing reason's dominion within oneself is a formidable challenge. The initial impetus often emerges from sensuality, followed by deception through superficial notions of good. Uncontrolled desires then destabilize individuals, akin to Plato's depiction of "cords" pulling them in various directions. Cicero aptly remarks that nature ignites faint sparks of goodness in our spirits, easily tarnished by false beliefs and immoral behavior. Moreover, philosophers concede that once such ailments grip the soul, they wield immense power, difficult to restrain. They liken these conditions to runaway horses. "As a runaway horse," they describe, "kicks without restraint after escaping its master, so does the soul, casting off reason and surrendering to concupiscence, spiral into chaos." Philosophers maintain that virtues and vices alike are within our control. If the ability to do good or evil were not in our hands, refraining from such actions would also be beyond our power. Thus, if we possess the freedom to refrain, we also possess the freedom to act. Consequently, we exercise choice in all our deeds, both positive and negative. Some philosophers have even gone to the extreme of asserting that life itself originates from God, while the capacity to live virtuously stems from our own selves. In sum, philosophers assert that the reason within human understanding is sufficient to guide us and illuminate virtuous courses of action. The will, under reason's influence, faces temptation from the senses to transgress, yet its freedom prevents it from yielding entirely to reason.