6. The Second Dividing Principle: All Religions Are to Be Tolerated
Chapter Six The Second Dividing Principle: All Religions Are to Be Tolerated T his is indeed a divider. There is a great outcry about this, but what is its scope? It is to exasperate men's spirits against the toleration of anything. Some believe there must be a necessary connection between tolerating some perceived errors and tolerating all things; and if it were not for fear of one, there would not be such ado about the other. But I hope to clearly show there is no such dependence; just as this is a dividing principle
—that all things should be tolerated—so is the other as truly dividing and false: that nothing should be tolerated.
Nothing causes more stir among us today than this principle of absolute liberty in matters of religion. Conscience compels me to speak what I find to be God's mind on this matter: The wantonness of men's spirits and their extreme boldness about matters of God and Christ are such that they should cause our hearts to tremble. Such horrid blasphemous things are among us, owned and professed with so much impudence, and their practice strengthened by this principle: that there is to be absolute liberty in matters of religion. Our duty to God and our love for and care for the preservation
of religion call us to set ourselves against such a false, sinful, dangerous, disturbing principle as this.
This principle is strengthened by two positions; both are dividing as well as the principle itself.
First, that magistrates have nothing to do with men in matters of religion.
Second, that conscience is a tender thing and must have liberty; nothing must be done to men who plead their consciences for what they do.
First, we shall show the principle itself to be a dividing principle; then address the mistakes in those two assertions that uphold this principle: as they strengthen the principle, so they strengthen division.
The principle is dividing because:
First, it is abhorrent to nature. Is it not abhorrent to any man's heart in the world that men should allow God to be blasphemed, whom they honor?
And that nothing should be done to restrain anyone but to ask them why they do so and persuade them to do otherwise? There has always been as much contention among people about religion as about anything else. In Exodus 8:25-26, Pharaoh told Moses to sacrifice in the land. But Moses said it was not right to do so because they would sacrifice what was an abomination to the Egyptians. "Lo," he said, "shall we sacrifice what is an abomination to the Egyptians before their eyes? Will they not stone us?"
Even though they had leave from the king, the people would not endure it.
Second, it is against the light of Scripture. In Deuteronomy 13:6-9: "If your brother, the son of your mother, or your son or daughter or the wife you cherish or your friend who is as your own soul entices you secretly saying, 'Let us go and serve other gods,' which you have not known nor your fathers, you shall not consent to him or listen to him; nor shall your eye pity him nor shall you spare or conceal him. But you shall surely kill
him; your hand shall be first against him to put him to death and afterwards the hand of all the people."
Let no one dismiss this Scripture by saying it is in the Old Testament and we find no such thing in the Gospel; for we find almost the same words used in a prophecy of Gospel times in Zechariah 13:3. At the end of Chapter
12, it is prophesied that those who pierced Christ shall look upon Him and mourn, having a spirit of grace and supplication poured upon them. In Chapter 13:1-3: "There shall be opened a fountain for sin and uncleanness."
Verse 3 states: "It shall come to pass that if anyone still prophesies, then his father and mother who begot him will say to him, 'You shall not live because you have spoken lies in the name of the Lord.' And his father and mother who begot him shall thrust him through when he prophesies."
You must understand this by what is stated in Deuteronomy. The meaning is not that his father or mother should immediately run a knife into him but that although they begot him, they should be the means to bring him to just punishment—even taking away his life. Those who were instruments of his life should now be instruments of his death.
Thirdly, it is a dividing principle because it allows for unrestrained indulgence in all kinds of wantonness and a spirit of opposition in matters of religion. People are naturally more wanton in religious matters than in anything else, and corrupt spirits are inclined to and pleased with opposition in these matters above any other. Since religious matters are considered to have an inherent excellence and are beyond reason, they are susceptible to contradiction from people with corrupt minds. If there is nothing to restrain people from opposing one another in these matters, the wantonness and pride of people's hearts will lead to endless disputes, contentions, and divisions.
If it is said that Christ has left spiritual means to help with this, it is answered that Christ's spiritual means are intended to work in a spiritual way upon the heart to change it, and secondarily upon the outward person.
While Christ's means are working thus, external means may prevent evil from manifesting in the outward person. Christ has not left the outward person at absolute liberty to do whatever they will until spiritual means are made effective in the heart, especially considering that if you grant this liberty, people may choose whether any of those spiritual means of Christ should come to them at all.
The first position that upholds this dividing principle is: Magistrates have nothing to do with matters of religion. It must be granted that a magistrate is not an officer of Jesus Christ the Mediator in his mediatory kingdom.
There is a two-fold government that Christ has:1. One as he is God equal with the Father, together with the Father ruling heaven and earth.2. Another as he is God and man, Mediator, in a peculiar kingdom of his that he has by way of dispensation from the Father.
Now, the magistrate is an officer of God, both the Father and the Son, in the general government of the world. But he is not an officer of Christ in that kingdom of his that he has by way of dispensation from the Father, that Regnum Mediatorium, as divines call it. No, even if he is a Christian magistrate, there are no officers of that kingdom but those who are by divine institution set down in the Word. His Christianity only adds further ability to execute the work of his office in a better manner; it adds no new authority to him. An infidel magistrate converted to Christian religion is thereby better enabled to perform the duty of his place than before, but he had the same authority before; it was his sin that he did not use his authority as he now can. Though he be a Christian who is a magistrate, yet the power
of his magistracy belongs to another kingdom, different from that which the second person has as he is Christ the Mediator.
Objection 2: But does not this then exclude him from exercising any power in matters of Christian religion?
Answer: No, for God, in exercising his power governing the world, has a special aim at promoting the kingdom of his Son Christ the Mediator.
Therefore, magistrates exercising this power of God ought to aim at these ends that God himself aims at in exercising his own power—that is, to be useful to Christ's government in his Church and for the good of his Church.
God, in all his ways from the beginning of the world, has aimed at setting up his Son to be King upon his holy hill and at promoting the glory of him who is God-man. If his ministers do not make use of their power to this end when this kingdom of his Son comes to be revealed to them, he will require it at their hands.
The power that God invested magistrates with in matters of religion in the Old Testament is so full and clear in what God gave to the kings of Judah and Israel that naming particulars would almost make a volume. I find many who write about this subject spend most of their strength here, but I wholly forbear mentioning instances because it is granted by all that they had power. However, the argument from there to the power of magistrates in the times of the Gospel prevails little with those who hold this dividing principle we are now speaking of. For they tell us that their power was typical; they were types of the kingly power of Christ because we find glorious promises of dominion and stability made to Christ in the persons of many of those kings.
2. They tell us that just as it is no argument because priests and Levites had power in temporal things during the time of the Law—ordering affairs
of the state—therefore ministers should have civil authority now; so neither is it an argument because magistrates had power then in spiritual things; therefore our magistrates should have similar power now.
3. They tell us that the Church and Commonwealth of the Jews were mixed into one; hence being a stranger from the Church is expressed by being a stranger from the Commonwealth of Israel (Ephesians 2:12), and therefore their magistrates were church officers as well as civil.
4. That the people of the Jews were brought up in a more servile way than Christ would have his Church brought up in during Gospel times; compulsion in matters of religion was more suitable to their condition than it is to our Jerusalem which is free.
5. The whole Church then was bound under the same state government; their state laws were by divine appointment; their kings were chosen by God. But now Christ chooses his Church out of all nations on earth and leaves them to various governments, laws, and officers of different nations for their civil state.
1. I confess if there were nothing but merely examples or laws from the Old Testament to confute this dividing position, to an examining eye, the argument would hardly be cogent or satisfactory—only insofar as there is common reason and equity in them—and so all judicial laws bind now as well as they did then.
2. Insofar as the New Testament approves for its times what was formerly done in the Old.
The strength of the argument from magistrates' power in the Old Testament lies in these two points:
First, there is common reason and equity. Whatever strength such kind of arguing has from one spiritual ordinance to prove another, without question
it is strong enough from one civil ordinance to prove another, even if it concerns spiritual things.
It is nature's dictate that magistrates should have some power in matters of religion. The generality of all people have ever thought it equitable. It has been ever challenged in all nations and commonwealths. The heathens would never allow their gods to be blasphemed but punished those guilty thereof by magistrate power. Socrates was put to death for blaspheming their multiplicity of gods.
Secondly, there is surely a common equity, for there is a necessity of it now as truly as there was then. I cannot argue the existence of spiritual ordinances from our need of them by saying, "There is such an institution because the Church needs it." Rather, I find it in the Word to be an institution, and therefore the Church needs it. However, in natural or civil matters, this way of arguing is strong enough; there is a need for such help, and therefore we should seek to have it.
Now, surely the need we have for such power is exceedingly great. We would be in a most miserable condition if we had no external civil power to restrain any kinds of blasphemies and seductions. The condition of the Jews
—oh, how happy it was in comparison to ours if this were denied us! For if any one of theirs blasphemed God or sought to seduce others from Him, they knew what to do with him, besides persuading him otherwise. But if anyone should seek to seduce the wives of our bosoms, children of our bodies, friends as dear to us as our own lives into those ways that we think in our consciences will undo their souls for all eternity, yet we must only desire them not to do so. We must only admonish and seek to convince or reprove them, but we cannot restrain them.
If the deliverance from the pedagogy of the Law has brought us into this condition, our burden is greater in this matter than any that the Law laid upon our forefathers. Has Christ delivered us from one burden to lay a greater upon us? Must we now see those who are dearest to us drawn into the ways of eternal destruction and stand by helplessly, with no way left to help them or ourselves unless we can persuade them otherwise? Surely our condition is very sad. Have we not cause to say, "Lord, let any burden of the Ceremonial Law be laid upon our necks rather than this?"
If there were a group of madmen running up and down the streets with knives and swords in their hands, endeavoring to harm and kill all they met with, and we must do nothing to restrain them; if we could persuade them to do otherwise, well and good: but that is all we can do for help; what a dangerous thing this would be! The case is the same when those who are mad with damnable heresies run from place to place, seeking to draw all they can from the truth. If we have no means of help but arguments, it is ill with us. Surely God has not put His people into such a sad condition as this;
He has provided better for His people than this.
Thirdly, we find in the records of Scripture mention of heathen magistrates who had nothing but the light of nature to guide them, involving themselves in matters of religion, and this the Holy Ghost relates in commendation of them for this thing.
The argument from these examples cannot be avoided, as that which is taken from the practice of the Kings of Judah. We read in Ezra 7:26 that Artaxerxes interposes his power in matters of religion, and Ezra blesses
God for it: "Whosoever will not do the Law of thy God and the Law of the King, let judgment be executed speedily upon him." And in the next words,
Ezra blesses God who put it in the heart of the King by these and other
means to beautify His house. The making of such a law was one notable means whereby the House of the Lord came to be beautified.
Thus also Nebuchadnezzar, in Daniel 3:29: "I make a decree that every people, nation, and language who speak anything against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego shall be cut in pieces, and their houses shall be made a dung-hill," etc. This Scripture records as a work of the King's repentance.
The King of Nineveh, in Jonah 3, by the decree of his princes and nobles, proclaims a fast and commands everyone to cry mightily to God and turn from his evil way.
Further, let us see how the Holy Ghost justifies this power of the magistrate in the times of the Gospel: First, in the prophecies of the times of the Gospel; secondly, in various places in the New Testament.
For prophecies, the aforementioned place, Zechariah 13:3, cannot be dismissed: Isaiah 49:23: "Kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and queens thy nursing mothers." The protection of their civil peace is not sufficient to give them such a denomination as nursing fathers and mothers.
Isaiah 60:10: "The sons of strangers shall build up thy walls, and their kings shall minister unto thee." They shall not only be favorers of them but as kings they shall minister to them even by their power. So Revelation
21:24: "The kings of the earth shall bring their glory and honor to the Church." There is such a time coming. This surely is more than merely protecting their outward peace.
In the New Testament, Romans 13:4: "He is thy minister for thy good." 1
Peter 2:13-14: "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme or unto governors who are sent for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those who do well."
Now seeing the Scripture speaks thus generally—"For thy good," and "for the punishment of evildoers and praise of those who do well"—we should not distinguish where Scripture does not distinguish unless the nature of the thing requires it.
You might say that the nature of what is spoken requires that it must be restrained to those things that belong to his cognizance. Such a limitation must necessarily be granted; therefore it is true that the magistrate cannot command every good thing nor punish every evil. The abstruse controversies in religion do not come under the cognizance of a magistrate as a magistrate; only such things as are against common justice and equity and the common light of Christianity where he governs Christians. For he is to enjoin and punish such things only as if he were not; the community of people which sets him up ought to enjoin and punish because he has his power from them. But more on this in the next principle.
If you shall say that those Scriptures speaking of civil magistrates must be understood only in civil things...
The magistrate has his civil designation because the power he exercises is civil, and the actions he performs are civil. He cannot perform the duties of a church officer, such as administering sacraments, with the power he possesses. However, this does not prevent him from using his civil power to perform external acts upon the outward person that are subservient to spiritual good. Indeed, what he does does not have any spiritual efficacy, for if it did, it would be worship. Although he cannot work in a spiritual way upon a person's soul through his power, as it is not an ordinance set apart by God for that purpose, he may, by exercising his power upon the outward person, restrain them from external acts of evil or bring them to external good. His power remains civil but is ordered to aid spiritual good by
removing hindrances, applying external means, or restraining from external evil.
Any commandment that requires a duty also requires us to use all things that may help us perform that duty. If there are any civil, natural, or spiritual aids, we are bound to use them all. The great question here is whether God has appointed the use of the magistrate's power as a help to religious matters. Has God made this an ordinance for the spiritual good of people?
That it is an ordinance for their civil good is clear from the Scriptures mentioned earlier. But how does it appear that God intended it to be an ordinance for their spiritual good?
Answer: Whatever natural quality exists in anything comes from God, for nature is God's work. If there is a natural quality in it to work upon the outward person for the furtherance of spiritual good, this is from God. If I were to use it to work upon the inward person expecting spiritual efficacy, then I would make it an ordinance for myself and sin against God by presuming to attribute more to a creature than God appointed. This was the error with ceremonies; they were used in a spiritual way to work upon the heart of man by virtue of an institution that man imposed on them beyond what God ever intended in their natural power.
But how can natural and external things help with spiritual and divine matters?
Answer: Any person's reason, even their senses, can tell them that removing external hindrances and employing various external means can prevent much evil and further much good that is spiritual and divine.
Although it cannot reach the spirituality and divinity of that good, it reaches the external action, without which divine and spiritual good cannot exist.
Therefore, since the New Testament outlines the power of magistrates and requires submission to them in general terms, we can conclude that the Lord intended Christians to be subject to magistrates according to the light of nature and the equity of general rules previously found in Scripture. If God were to say, "You are Christians; see that you do not part with the liberty
Christ has purchased for you," we could respond: "Lord, we found in your word that you once used the power of magistrates in religious matters; and in the New Testament, nothing was revealed to forbid their power in these matters. Indeed, Lord, you told us there that you appointed them for our good and to be a terror to evil works in general. From this, we gathered that in yielding to their power, it was your will for us to use those general rules in Scripture we found before the Gospel times and the light of nature. Being also persuaded it was your will for us to use all natural helps for our spiritual advantage, and finding it recorded in your Word that you allowed such power in religious matters even for those guided only by the light of nature, and since its use reached only the outward person, we did not see a necessity for a special institution for this. Knowing what natural quality it had as an external help was put into it by yourself, therefore we made use of it." God will accept this account.
1. When the apostles were brought before civil authorities about religious matters, we never find them pleading that authorities had no power over religious matters belonging solely to Jesus Christ as King and his church's governance. Their plea was only the justice of their cause—that what they professed and preached was God's truth and done in obedience to God.
2. If all men are bound to use all abilities, gifts, and talents they have for propagating the Gospel, then magistrates are bound to use those peculiar to them. If a man has more wisdom than others or a greater estate or more
friends, he is to use all these as aids for furthering religion. If a man has more power than others, he is also to use that power—not only by supporting what he believes is right but by all other means according to reason's dictates not forbidden by Scripture.
But we have often heard Tertullian's argument: If something is said to be lawful because Scripture does not forbid it, then it is unlawful because
Scripture does not command it.
Answer: This rule applies in matters of God's worship but not in civil or natural matters, even if they are subservient to worship; there reason may guide extensively.
But you might ask: Will you then make the magistrate a judge in all religious causes? He may be wicked or a heathen yet still a true magistrate.
Answer: Whatever he may be, he can judge matters of fact and as far as reason goes in matters of right. He can judge whether you act against your principles in your profession, acts of worship, or wrongs done to others. He can judge whether your principles contradict the common knowledge of God given to men and human justice rules. A magistrate unskilled in medicine or navigation can still judge physicians and mariners if they wrong others in their fields.