14. The Eighth Dividing Principle: If others oppose what we believe to be true, we may judge them as going against their
Chapter Fourteen The Eighth Dividing Principle: If others oppose what we believe to be true, we may judge them as going against their own understanding.
T his is a worse, more divisive principle than the former; it is worse to make our judgments the rule of other men's actions than to make other men's judgments the rule of our actions. This causes men who differ to have exceedingly harsh thoughts about one another; it causes a mighty spirit to rise in them against each other. A man cannot judge worse of another than this: that he goes against his own light. Of all things, conscientious men do not know how to bear this; yet how often will men who are weak judge those who are strong because they cannot see into the reasons for their actions? Therefore, those who do them must necessarily do them against their own light.
If they see another man's style, manner of conversation, and way of life differing from their own, they immediately judge him as sinning against his own conscience, acting with ulterior motives, doing what he does merely
out of cunning and craftiness. This stems from the pride and bitterness of men's spirits. It is far enough for you to judge your brother by thinking,
"Were I in his condition, should I do as he does, I would go against my light; I would act with ulterior motives." But to conclude that he goes against his light and acts with ulterior motives is very sinful.
Many carnal men think that if they were to make such a show of religion or do such things as certain men do, it would be hypocrisy in them, and they judge correctly because their principles would not support their practice.
However, to judge all who do such things as hypocrites is considered a very wicked thing. If you had any spirit of humility or wisdom in you, you would rather think, "It may be he sees what I do not; I am to look to my own heart and ways by what principles I go myself." Men who are weak and can see but a little way into things must take heed not to censure others who know how to manage matters better than themselves. Some may do what is acceptable to God that you could not do without an evil conscience.
The same honesty and sincerity may continue in a man, though in true wisdom and discretion he applies himself diversely according to different occasions, just as the hand remains the same whether closed into a fist or extended abroad or bent this way or that way as occasion serves.
Wherefore, for your direction in this, take these five rules:
First, we are bound to give the best interpretation of our brethren's actions we can if they are not apparently wrong. We should not do as the logicians,
"Sequi partem deteriorem," but incline to that which may any way be conceived or hoped to have any goodness in it. We must rather wrong ourselves by thinking too well of them than wrong them by thinking too ill of them. This would help exceedingly much to peace.
Secondly, we should rather be suspicious of ourselves than others, knowing more of the evils of our own hearts than we can know of any others.
Thirdly, if we know certainly we are right and others are not, our hearts should rather be taken up with admiring and blessing God's goodness to us for what He shows us than in censuring our brethren for what He has denied them.
Fourthly, we must remember that not long ago we were ourselves of another mind, and yet we did not sin against our light.
Fifthly, we must consider also that in other things our brethren see what we do not, and we would be loath to have such measures from them—that they should judge us as going against our light and acting with ulterior motives in that we differ from them. We must grant that liberty to our brethren that we would have ourselves; that is, not to be involved in the judgments of others but to try all things and keep what God makes known to us to be good. This liberty, says Luther, Paul has given me, and I will stand by it; I will not suffer it to be captivated.
The Ninth Dividing Principle: Rules of Prudence Are Sufficient to Guide Us in Natural Things and Civil Affairs and May as Well Suffice Us in Spiritual and Church Affairs A great part of our divisions about church affairs comes from this principle. If God would help us with right apprehensions about this, our divisions would largely vanish. Those whose consciences are taken with a contrary principle—namely, that there must be institutions for all things that are properly ecclesiastical and spiritual—cannot yield to any such thing until they see the stamp on it, an institution upon it. Others who think that because prudence is enough to order civil affairs there needs no institution
for these things think those who stand for them are too rigid and stiff in their way.
It divides also upon this ground: In the corrupt state of the Church (such as ours yet is), if we bind to institutions, we shall be sorely pinched with many things that will be very troublesome to us. But if we go according to the rules of common prudence, we may decline or alter what would pinch and take up what may be commodious for us. Hence the principle is very desirable if it can be maintained; men will strive hard before they will lose it. On the other side, God is seen as a jealous God who will not allow man's wisdom to share with Him in the things of His worship, which are spiritual and holy—to appoint and leave out as may be most convenient for their freedom from trouble. Therefore, they dare not yield to any ordinance beyond civil matters without some institution of Christ in His Word, and this divides.
Now for your help in this: As God has given two lights to the world—the Sun, the greater, to rule the day; and the Moon, the lesser, to rule the night
—so He has given two lights to man to guide his course: the Scriptures, the greater, to guide man especially in his spiritual condition in those more immediate references he has to God for his worship and enjoyment of communion with Him; the other, the lesser, the light of reason, to be his guide in natural and civil things in ordering his life for his natural and civil good. And though it is true that religion makes use of reason and we have help from the Scriptures in our natural and civil affairs, yet these two lights have their distinct special use according to those distinct conditions of man.
When I say we must have Scripture, and in it institutions for those things which are spiritual and properly Church affairs, I mean whatsoever is used for drawing my soul nearer to God, or God nearer to me; or for offering my
homage to God, beyond what is inherent in the nature of the thing, as ordained by God. For that, I must have an institution; I must not create any such thing for myself. If I use anything of my own for such an end that I may worship God by it, or that God might convey some spiritual efficacy to me through it, because I think it as suitable for such an end as other ordinances I find in the Word, and yet have no institution for it, in this I sin against Christ the Lord, who alone has the power to set apart the use of what He pleases for offering homage to God or conveying any spiritual efficacy from God into the hearts of His servants.
Man's natural and civil good is not so high that reason and prudence cannot reach them; but for such things as these, all the reason and prudence in the world lie too low. They cannot, without sinful presumption, attempt to put anything of their own in the place of these. Therefore, there can be no other officers in the Church to act by any spiritual power than what we find in the Word; no new ordinances, no new courts erected, no kind of authority, no extent of authority any further than we find in Scripture. The proof is evident: all Church ordinances are for spiritual ends, to work by a spiritual efficacy beyond what is natural or civil. The efficacy of the power of government consists much in those who govern; if they do not have their charter to authorize their power and its extent, it loses its efficacy, though it be otherwise managed with never so much wisdom and justice. The same act that is an act of justice in one is murder in another; indeed, the same man's act done within such limits is an act of justice, and if done beyond those limits, it is murder.
But you will say, surely there is use of reason and prudence in spiritual matters; how far may their use extend?
To the doing of these two things:
First, by reason I may compare institutions and argue from one institution to another, and so find out institutions that lie more in the dark by others which are more apparent. Though the thing that I gather is not explicitly stated in Scripture, yet if I gather by necessary consequence from one or more institutions, it has the force of an institution in it. If I make reason the basis, the ground of my consequence, it will never rise up to that height as to constitute an institution; but if I make some other institution the basis of my consequence, then it may.
Secondly, when I have found an institution, then reason and prudence come in to help manage this in a fit and comely way, applying it to fit persons and times, making use of fit seasons, due order, and whatever natural or civil conveniences may further its due administration. The prelates abused that Scripture, "Let all things be done decently and in order," for they joined their own institutions to God's to make them decent and orderly. But that Scripture only shows you that when you have an institution of Christ, you are to apply by the use of reason and prudence whatever natural or civil helps you can for better managing this institution of His.
From hence we have an answer to the objection made against many things done by those who are in a Congregational way: What institution do they have for many things they do? What for their covenant?
Though there be no text of Scripture that holds forth this explicitly, yet it is grounded upon other institutions plainly held forth in Scripture.
First, it is clear in Scripture that besides the Catholic Church there are particular churches—saints embodied under such officers who are officers to them as they are not to others. These people can look upon this man as their pastor, and this pastor upon this people in a peculiar relation; they may
do some acts of power over one another in their congregation which they cannot do over others in another congregation. Now then it follows that they being a body must need something to join them together; and the least thing that can join them is the manifestation of their assent to join for those ends for which Christ has appointed such a body. And what is their covenant but this? Only some manifest this assent more largely, some more briefly. I know nothing more is required but to manifest their assent to join with that body to set up all the ordinances of Christ as far as they know.
If there be any other thing done in their churches wherein they make further use of reason and prudence than in the two aforementioned things, they cannot justify it but must acknowledge it as evil.
The Tenth Dividing Principle; or rather vain conceit: Every difference in religion is a differing religion.
What do you hear more ordinary than this: How many religions have we now? Shall so many religions be suffered amongst us? We cannot tell now what religion men are of. Upon this apprehension, they oppose such as differ from them in some few things with all the violence they can, as men bringing up new religions and would take away their religion from them.
How can they possibly accord with men that are of a different religion from them?
Surely we are more afraid than hurt. Though our differences are sad enough, yet they do not come up to this—to make us men of different religions. We agree on the same end, though not on the same means; they are but different ways of opposing the common adversary. Agreeing on the same means in the same way of opposing the common enemy would be very comfortable; it would be our strength, but that cannot be expected in this world.
Livy, in his story of a great battle between Hannibal and Scipio, says that at the joining of the armies, the shouting of Scipio's men was far more terrible than the shouting of Hannibal's because Scipio's men were all
Romans; their shouting had all the same tone. But Hannibal's army was made up of men from several countries, so that in their shouting there was a variety of tones in their voices, which was not accounted as formidable a shout as the other. It is true our adversaries do not look upon our opposition to them having so much diversity in it as formidable as they would if we were all but one in our way of opposing them. But still we are all shouting against the common enemy; although therefore the terror upon our adversary would be greater if our shout were more uniform, yet we hope the victory may be as sure.
Soldiers who march against a common enemy all under the same captain who follow the same colors in their ensign and wear them upon their hats or arms may win the day even though they are not all clothed alike and differ in things of less concernment.
Revelation 15:2 describes the Saints standing upon a sea of glass, mingled with fire. Master Brightman interprets this sea of glass as the doctrine of the Gospel, which is clearer and more transparent than the doctrine of the Law, symbolized by the sea of brass that Solomon made. However, there is fire mingled in this sea of glass, indicating, he says, contentions and divisions in the Church where this Gospel doctrine is taught. Yet note what follows: they gained victory over the beast, his image, his mark, and the number of his name, and they held the harps of God in their hands and sang the song of Moses, etc.
People in a crowd may step on each other, yet they all aim for the same door; they all wish to go the same way. Godly people may be divided in
their opinions and ways, but they are united in Christ. Though they may be separated from a particular society, they are not divided from the Church. It is with the Saints as with tree branches during a storm; you may see branches beating against each other as if to break apart, like armies fighting, but this lasts only while the wind and tempest rage. Wait a while, and you will see each branch standing in its own order and comeliness. Why?
Because they are all united in one root. If any branch is rotten, the storm breaks it off, but sound branches return to their former place. These times of division may break off men whose spirits were previously unsound; they will never join with the Saints again as they seemed to do before. But after a while, when this gust is over, others may come in and show themselves to be united and receive nourishment from the same root.