21. The Third Dividing Practice: Men Not Keeping Within the Bounds That God Has Set Them
Chapter Twenty-One The Third Dividing Practice: Men Not Keeping Within the Bounds That God Has Set Them F irst, when men will be meddling with that which concerns them not, that is out of their sphere. 1 Thessalonians 4:11: "Study to be quiet, and do your own business." Proverbs 20:3: "It is an honor for a man to cease from strife, but every fool will be meddling." Choler in the gall is useful to the body, but if it overflows, the body grows into distemper presently. We may all be useful in our places if we keep to them, contenting ourselves with the improvement of our talents in them; thus both ourselves and others may have quiet.
When manna was gathered and kept in that proportion God would have it, it was very good; but when men must have more and keep it longer than
God would have them, then it breeds worms. Thus it will be in all that we have or do; let us keep our proportion God sets us, and all will be well. But if we think to provide better for ourselves by going beyond our measure, worms are presently bred in all.
But especially where men will not keep within their bounds in their power over others; for what is all our contestation at this time? Is it not about men
stretching their power beyond their line both in State and Church? From whence are our State-divisions, our wars, but because Princes have been persuaded their power was boundless? At least not to be kept within those bounds the State says it ought to be. They think there is such a distance between them and others that the estates, liberties, lives of all men within their country lie at their mercy; not considering how they come to be raised so high: that what they have above others is given to them by those above whom they are.
No man inherits more than was given to his forefathers and so to him, whereby they might see that they are not limited only by the laws of God but by the laws of men also, namely, the agreement between them and the people when they are raised to such dignities. There is nothing weakens their right more than pleading it by conquest; Princes have little cause to thank those who plead their right that way. The surest foundation for Princes to set their feet on is the agreement between the people and them or their progenitors; but if they go beyond this agreement, what stirrings, what woeful disturbances do they make!
Secondly, if either they or any governors of the State shall instead of being helpful to the government of the Church take it all from it into their own hands, in this they go beyond those bounds Christ would have them. It is by the civil power that the governors of the Church have the peaceable exercise of what power Christ has given them, but they do not receive their power from them. Civil authority cannot put any spiritual power into a man or company of men which they had not before; it can only protect, encourage, and further the exercise of that power that Christ has given.
"They are inconsiderate men," says Calvin, "who make magistrates too spiritual." This evil, he says, prevails in Germany and in the countries about
us; we find what fruit grows from this root, namely, that those who are in power think themselves so spiritual that there is no other ecclesiastical government. This sacrilege comes in violently amongst us because they cannot measure their office within its due bounds.
And for Church-governors, if they would keep within their limits, we might enjoy much peace. If first they would assume no more power than
Christ has given them; secondly, if they would not extend it over more congregations than Christ has committed to them; thirdly, if they would not exercise it in more things than Christ would have them. Let us look a little into these three, for the lack of a right understanding in them has caused and may yet further cause much disturbance.
For the first point, it is evident in Scripture, as seen in 1 Corinthians 12:28 and Romans 12:8, that Christ has appointed some to rule in His Church, and not all members are in the office of ruling. However, the notion that these officers, whether preaching elders or others, should have the sole power of ruling and act entirely within their own consistory or classis—without the Church having any role but to obey—assumes power beyond what is given to them. This has introduced tyranny into the Church, causing church officers to view the rest of the Church contemptuously, as if they were ignorant and weak, unfit to engage in governance matters or even to acknowledge or consent to the actions of church officers. Whether the congregation understands or agrees is deemed irrelevant; the decisions of those in authority must stand, and their censures must be submitted to.
Peter Martyr, in a letter to ministers and believers in Poland, exhorts them to establish discipline in the Church as soon as possible while people's hearts are fervent with love for and desire for the Gospel. He warns that it will be more challenging to introduce discipline later when their hearts
grow cold. He emphasizes that discipline is not a trivial matter, asserting that churches lacking it cannot be said to profess the Gospel truly or solidly.
He insists that discipline is not the least part of Christian religion and that neglecting it is akin to neglecting a significant portion of the Gospel. He anticipates objections that under the guise of discipline, ministers might tyrannize and impose their own will.
To this concern, he responds that tyranny among ministers need not be feared where Gospel rules for censures are observed. In cases of excommunication for those who refuse to reform, the consent of the Church is necessary; if done with this authority, no one can complain of tyranny by a few.
Cyprian, in his sixth epistle, declares his intention to do nothing without the counsel of the elders and the consent of the people. Our brethren in Scotland, opposing the prelates, attribute significant authority to the people in matters of excommunication. They assert that it pertains to the whole
Church collectively to deny Christian communion to wicked individuals who persist in disobedience; therefore, it pertains to the whole Church to excommunicate them. Furthermore, they argue that since it pertains to the whole Church to admit someone into communion, it also pertains to cast someone out. They cite that when the Apostle wrote to the whole Church of Corinth, he instructed them to deliver an incestuous person to Satan when gathered together; thus, every particular church or congregation has the power to excommunicate. They provide arguments to show that the Apostle did not excommunicate by his own authority alone but by the authority of the Church collectively, not just by its ministers or elders.
Let no one say this was merely one minister's opinion. At the beginning of this Parliament, I, along with a reverend brother, asked Master Henderson—
accompanied by two or three ministers from Scotland—whether we could consider that book as representing the judgment of the most godly and capable ministers of Scotland regarding church discipline. They affirmed that we could.
The second way church officers exceed their limits is by extending their power over more congregations than Christ has charged them with. The chief church controversy today concerns this extent. I will only outline where the difference lies between opposing views. The question is whether a pastor set by Christ over a particular congregation for teaching through Word and Sacraments may retain pastoral duties for one congregation but extend ruling authority over hundreds more.
Some argue that no minister can have ruling authority over people beyond his charge for Word and Sacrament; they believe those who can say to a minister that his charge does not extend to their souls for feeding cannot be ruled by him either. If he thinks he may preach or administer sacraments arbitrarily without claiming authority over them, then at most he may exercise rule only in this manner.
Others contend that a minister may respond by acknowledging his particular congregation as his flock while occasionally helping another congregation without having charge over their souls as pastor. However, they believe his ruling power extends with others over hundreds of congregations according to their association. They claim supreme ruling power over these congregations beyond what local ministers or elders possess; even if all local leaders disagree with them on matters concerning a congregation, they will judge and determine, exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction as they see fit—even if none have ever met any members of that congregation.
This is where the major dividing controversy lies; determining which view is right or wrong is not my task here. My role is merely to present what the controversy involves and why there is so much debate.
Though I do not resolve this issue either way, I will leave two considerations to aid your thoughts on it.
First, the extent of the power of Jurisdiction must be defined by its institution as well as the power itself; all juridical power whatsoever, either in state or Church, receives its limits or extent from the same authority from which it first originated. This is impossible to deny: If a man is made a Mayor of a town by a Charter, he cannot therefore claim the power of a Mayor wherever he goes, unless the authority that first gave him his power also extends it. Now, the Charter by which any Church Officer is invested with power is the Word; therefore, we cannot restrict or enlarge the power of a Minister other than how we find it in the Word. For civil power, it may be restricted or enlarged as the Governors of State see fit because their
Charter is from man; it is ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις (human creation).
Secondly, man is naturally more impatient about having Jurisdiction claimed over him unless he sees the claim to be right; and in the matter of spiritual jurisdiction, man is most sensitive because, in that, men come in the Name of Christ to him, claiming authority to exercise the power of Christ over him—not over the outward man so much as over his soul, to deliver it up to Satan. Surely there needs to be shown a clear and full
Charter that any men have that gives them such power as this, to which men in conscience shall be bound to submit. Now then, here lies the division: one says his Charter does extend so far; the other says he does not find it so in the reading of it.
There is yet a further consideration of stretching either Civil or Ecclesiastical authority beyond their bounds, which has been and may be the cause of much division; that is, their claiming and exercising power in things indifferent, beyond what God has given them. For the opening of which we must know:
First, no man either in State or Church has any authority given him by God to command anything merely because he wills it; especially when the things concern the worship of God. Our Brethren of Scotland, in their dispute against English Popish ceremonies, part 3, chap. 8, page 127, have this passage: Princes have enjoined things pertaining to the worship of God, but those things were the very same which God's written Word had expressly commanded; when Princes went beyond these limits and bounds, they took upon themselves to judge and command more than God has put within the compass of their power. And page 136 of the same Book they say: The Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:23, forbids us to be the servants of men; that is, to do things for which we have no other warrant besides the pleasure and will of men. This was the Doctrine in Tertullian's time: You exercise, says he, an unjust dominion over others if you deny a thing may be done because you will, not because it ought not to be done.
It is only the Prerogative of God and Jesus Christ to command a thing because they will.
God has appointed Civil Governors to be his Ministers for our good (Rom. 13). Those things only which they can do in God's Name as his
Ministers and are for the good of a State are the objects about which their power is to be exercised; they are not to require a thing because there is nothing against it but because this thing is for God. And Church-governors are to require only such things as Christ requires; all the exercise of their
power ought to be in the Name of Christ, hence not because they will or because nothing can be said to the contrary.
In all they require of us, they must be able to say as Paul did in 1 Cor.
14:38, giving rules about order and decency: If any man thinks himself to be a Prophet or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things I write unto you are the Commandments of the Lord.
You will say: But are Governors always bound to show a reason for their will to those who are under them? Or may they not obey except they know some good in the thing besides doing the will of those who command them?
Answer: Though no Governors may command but upon reason, yet the Governors of State need not always disclose the reasons for their commands.
We may give up our Civil liberties so far as to be bound to yield to our Governors' commands if we see nothing against what they command but have cause to suppose that they see some reason that we do not, which is not fit to make known to us. This is grounded upon this reason: that there are Arcana imperii (mysteries of State) that are not fit for every man to know; the secrecy of them conduces most to the good of the State. But it is otherwise in matters of the Church, which are spiritual; there are no such mysteries in the Church wherein any members of it can be required to be active but it concerns them to understand as well as do.
All actions of the Church as such must be done for spiritual edification; now a man cannot do a thing for edifying his soul or another's soul unless he understands his action and its rule; he must see it required by the Word or otherwise he cannot expect any spiritual efficacy in what he does. I may do a thing for a civil good wherein I may trust another man's reason and this may be sufficient to attain my end—the procuring of some good merely
civil—but this will never reach a spiritual good. I must see the reason, ground, and rule of the action myself; I must judge by the Word that this action at this time clothed with all its circumstances is by Christ fitted for such a spiritual good that I aim at.
Besides, if things merely indifferent are enjoined, then Christian liberty is violated. No, say some; Christian liberty is in the conscience. As long as a man keeps his conscience free, the thing may still be indifferent to him regarding his conscience though his practice is determined, and so Christian liberty is preserved. This is what the Prelatical party used against our
Brethren of Scotland many years ago when they pleaded that by their usurpation Christian liberty was taken from them.
To that answer of the Prelates, they thus reply: When the authority of the Church's constitution is imposed to bind and restrain Christians' practice in things indifferent,* they are deprived of their liberty just as if an opinion of necessity were imposed on their consciences. They urge that place, Col.
2:21, where the Apostle gives instances, say they, of such human ordinances as take away Christian liberty; he says not "you must think you may not touch," but "touch not"; you must not practice nor be subject to such ordinances; telling us that when practice is restrained from touching, tasting, handling by men's ordinance, then Christian liberty is spoiled though conscience remains free; if the outward man is brought into bondage, this constitutes spiritual thralldom (say they) though there be no more.
And further, the Apostle gives these two arguments against these things:
First, he says they perish with use; that is, there is no good comes from them.
It may be you will say, what harm is there in them? That is not enough, says the Apostle, to justify them. Even if there should be no harm in them, yet seeing they perish in the use, seeing there comes no good by them, you must not do them. But what if they shall be commanded by authority? May we not do them then? No, says the Apostle, that is another argument against them; they are after the commandments and doctrines of men. If it is a mere ordinance of man, and there is no other reason in the thing but because man enjoins it in the Church, you are not to do it.
Indeed, in some respects, we have less liberty in things indifferent if they are enjoined by men than we had before. This is thought to be a very strange assertion by some; but consider this one thing, and it will not appear so: Though I might do such a thing before, yet if man shall take upon him this authority to command merely because of his will and pleasure, if I now obey, I am in danger of edifying him, of strengthening him in this his sin.
He challenges this authority, and I seem to yield it to him; certainly, he is strengthened in it by my subjection unless I do this, at least profess against any such authority of man granted by Jesus Christ.
But some say, if you take from governors the power to command things indifferent, you take away all their power; for things necessary are required without them, and things sinful they may not command.
Answer: Surely this notion comes rather from tradition than from due consideration; for is it not power enough to see to the keeping of the commands of God, that the ordinances be kept pure, that there be justice between man and man, to reward those who do well, and to punish the evildoers?
Yet thus far must be granted to the officers of the Church: they have authority from Christ to declare dogmatically when a thing in itself
indifferent yet by reason of some circumstances comes to be a duty. This is to be regarded more than the declaration of any private brother or brethren, for they do it by way of office in the name of Christ. This we find in Acts
15: the Apostles and Elders sent their decrees, δόγματα κεκριμένα, their dogmatic determinations about some things in themselves indifferent. But as clothed with those circumstances, they call them things necessary; they determine them to be done from the reason of the things, not from their authority. Those things were duties before they decreed them and would have been had they never decreed them. Even forbearing the eating of blood was a duty in case of offense, though their decree had never been; otherwise, it was no duty notwithstanding their decree. For afterward Paul says that whatever is sold in the shambles, they might eat of it, asking no question for conscience's sake, and every creature of God is good if it is received with thanksgiving.
Thus we have seen what the bounds are which God has set for men in authority or at least the controversy about them: let them be careful to keep within their bounds as they are set to keep others within theirs. By this,
Church and State may enjoy much peace.