9. The third dividing Principle is, Thatnothing which is conceived to be evil, is to be suffered.
Chapter Nine The third dividing Principle is, Thatnothing which is conceived to be evil, is to be suffered.
T his is the other extreme; some think all things should be tolerated, and they are lax and cause divisions on one hand; others think nothing should be tolerated, and these are rigid and cause divisions on the other hand. If anything is conceived as evil, either in opinion or practice, if instructions and persuasions cannot reform, there must be means used to compel. This is a harsh and sour principle, a disturbing principle to churches and states, to mankind. This principle seldom prevails with any but those who have gained power or hope to gain it. This must be a dividing principle.
First, because of the infinite variety of men's perceptions about what is good or evil, scarcely three men agree for any long time in their perceptions of some things as evil. If then nothing that is conceived as evil must be tolerated, there must necessarily be continual opposition between man and man.
This subjects the majority of men to suffer for many things which they see no evil in but are persuaded are good; this raises animosity against those by
whom they suffer. Though a man can subject his body and estate to another, he cannot subject his reason to another. In the common ways of justice, men are punished for those things which, if they are guilty of, they cannot but acknowledge themselves worthy of punishment, as in theft, murder, drunkenness, etc. And for the fact they are tried in such a way as they cannot but acknowledge is fit in reason to be subjected to; therefore, though they suffer much, yet they will yield to it without disturbance.
But if this principle prevails, almost every man is made liable to punishment for thousands of things that he can see no reason why he should be punished for. It is very hard to bring men's spirits to yield in such things.
But you will say, may not men be punished for things that they see no reason why they should be punished? For many malefactors may easily escape thus; guilt will quickly blind men; they will see no reason why they should be punished.
Answer: It is not what men say they see no reason for or what it may be they indeed see no reason for; but what men cannot see reason for, though they should bend their understandings and strength to the utmost; yea, what the majority of mankind and of that community of which a man is a part cannot possibly see reason for. It is impossible for the majority of mankind and the community of any church or state, though they should be ever so diligent in finding out what is good and what is evil, yet to be able to understand everything that is evil.
If you will have laws made against all things that those in authority conceive to be evil, then you must give them power to judge not only by the rules of common justice and equity and punish for the breach of them but by the perceptions that their own elevated parts shall suggest unto them and to punish men for not being elevated to that height of understanding
themselves have. But this power is more than is fit to be given to any men upon earth. This would bring tyranny both into state and church.
For first, from whence is the rise of all civil power that any man or society of men are invested with? Is it not from the majority of the men over whom they have power? Is it not the power which they themselves had and which they might have kept among themselves? For who can say that a democracy is a sinful government in itself? True; God establishes it upon particular men by His ordinance after it is given to them by the people; but the first rise is from them. And if so, then they should make no law to bring those men under punishment who gave them their power but such a law as these men may possibly come to understand as equal and just, for they act their power; and it must be supposed that they never intended to give a power beyond this. Those who give power may limit power; they may give part to one, part to another; they may limit the matter about which the power shall be exercised; it shall go so far and no further; the utmost limits cannot go beyond these rules of justice which they are capable of understanding.
Hence it is that all men in our law are tried per pares, by their peers because it is supposed that they are to be accounted offenders and punished only so as those who are equal with themselves shall judge them worthy. And this likewise is the reason that courts are public; no man is to be shut out because all men that will may behold the trial and justify the proceedings of justice against offenders. It must necessarily be supposed then that the rules by which the judges go must be the rules of common equity and justice that all men may understand; beyond what these rules will reach to, the civil state is not to punish—not everything that men of deep judgments and strong parts may perceive as evil.
The power of the church likewise does not extend to punishing everything that either may by its governors be conceived as evil or that is indeed evil.
As the rise of civil power shows that only such things are to be punished by it as are against common rules of justice and equity; so the rise of church power will show that only such things as are against common rules—such things as some way or other appear to be against conviction and are obstinately persisted in—are by church censure to be punished.
The rise of Church power is indeed different from the rise of the Civil, yet agrees in this: it limits the Church, as the rise of the Civil does the Civil power. The power of governors in the State arises from the people, and they act with the power that the Commonwealth gives to them. But the governors of the Church do not receive their power from the members of the Church, but from Christ. Neither do they act in the name of the Church, but in the Name of Christ. It is true that the members of the Church designate such men to such an office, but once designated, they are now invested with the power of Jesus Christ. They exercise His power and act in His Name, not in the name of the Church.
You might say, since the Church chooses their officers as well as the Commonwealth theirs, how does it appear that the officers of the Church do not exercise the power of the Church, as well as the officers of the Commonwealth exercise the power of the Commonwealth?
Answer: These two things show the difference clearly.
First, the officers of the Commonwealth can do nothing by their power that the Commonwealth could not do without them if they were not there.
They might have kept their government in a democracy and, if they had pleased, done any act of power by a majority vote. But it is not so in the Church. If the Church is without officers, they cannot do what belongs to
officers to do. They can have no sacraments among them, nor can they exercise any spiritual jurisdiction among them—only brotherly admonition and withdrawing from those who walk disorderly for their own preservation.
Secondly, the members of the Church cannot limit the power of their officers as the Commonwealth may limit theirs. Once a man is chosen to be an officer in the Church, all that power that any in that office had since
Christ's time, in any Church in all the Christian world, or ever can have until Christ comes again, falls upon him. If a man is chosen as a Pastor, he has as full power as any Pastor ever had on earth or can have by any pastoral power. The Church cannot limit him and say, "You shall be a Pastor for such ends and purposes, but no further." The same may be said of ruling; none on earth ever had or can have more power of ruling than this man who is chosen into that office. It is not thus in the State; all Kings do not have the same power. In some countries, kingly power reaches so far; in others, further, according to the variety of laws of the countries and agreements between them and the people. All Dukes, all States, all
Parliaments do not have the same power.
Now then, since the rise of the power of Church governors comes from Jesus Christ and they do what they do in His Name, they cannot punish any evil beyond what Christ would have punished.
You might ask, what evils would Christ have punished and what not?
Answer: Christ would have no evil punished that is repented of. If it is a known evil, then it must be repented of particularly. If it is a sin of ignorance, Christ forgives it upon general repentance, even if a man should never be convinced of it all his days. Yet, says Christ, I discharge him of all these, supposing that his ignorance does not arise from willful neglect. But
if it is a sin committed willfully or continued in obstinately, then says Christ, I will have this man suffer for such an offense. Now comes in the power of the Church officers to do in the Name of Christ what He would have done. But if they go further, then they exercise tyrannical power. If they punish everything they conceive to be evil—whether committed through ignorance and weakness or willfulness and obstinacy—in this they take upon themselves a higher power of punishing than Christ (according to the tenor of the Gospel) exercises. For my part, says Christ, I go only so far with my power; if I see any of my Church sin through weakness and ignorance, laboring to understand and do my will and mourning that they know no more or do no better, I will pass by all. But if anyone appears willful and obstinate, I will deal severely with such a one.
If you say that if men have means of knowledge and strength yet continue ignorant and weak, should not such be dealt with as willful and obstinate?
Answer: No, says Christ, I do not go by any such rule. For I have revealed my will in my Word; I labor by my Spirit and Ministers to convince men.
Yet I see after all means I use there are many who merely through their weakness are not convinced. I pity them; I deal gently with them; I pardon them. Those who go further and punish for every evil—and if they use means to convince them and they are not convinced—judge them obstinate and proceed against them accordingly; these challenge and exercise not the power of Christ but Antichrist. If Christ should deal with them as they deal with their brethren, it would go ill with them. If Christ should say whatever
I see evil in you, I will not suffer it in you; if you are ignorant despite means of light, I will deal with you as willful and obstinate and never stop inflicting punishment upon you until you are convinced and reform; could any of you stand before Christ dealing thus with you? Take heed of
exercising that power over your brethren (and that in Christ's name) that you would not have Christ exercise over you.
Both the Civil State and Church must take us as we are fallen from that integrity of our first creation, not as we came first out of God's hands. God the Creator may indeed punish us for not knowing or doing what is our duty to know or do because He once made us perfect; but man must not do so.
Man must deal with his fellow creatures as men imperfect; one man cannot require from another that perfection not only of heart but of external conversation that God may. Yea, God-man our Mediator looks upon us in a state of imperfection and deals with us accordingly, and thus He would have all do who have to deal with His people in His name.
But you said before all things must not be suffered; now you say some things must be suffered. Tell us then what must not and what must.
I am persuaded most of you yield to the falseness of both these dividing principles; you truly believe all things must not be suffered, and yet you think it too harsh to affirm that nothing is to be suffered. Only here lies the difficulty: what must and what must not be suffered? This has been the unhappiness of pleading for toleration of anything—even mentioning it— that men immediately cry out and say we would have everything tolerated.
I confess it is very hard to cut here right in the joint. Were I sure that none would blame or oppose what I shall deliver in this, except those who are willing to involve themselves in such a knotty business as this is, and to be helpful to us in understanding how to untie such a knot, whatever such opposers should prove otherwise, I should not fear them for being too numerous.
What I have, I shall present unto you.