1. Philo of Alexandria and the Nature of the Logos
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on the Logos.2 By comparing Clement's reflections with those of Philo, I wish to highlight Clement's development of the doctrine of the divine
Logos, which contains important similarities with and borrowings from Philo. Moreover, this comparison contributes to the examination of Photios' critique of Clement. I shall then summarise recent debate on Clement's theory of the Logos. Thus, by confronting
Clement's exegesis of the Johannine prologue with the Valentinian approach to the same narrative I hope to explore another factor that influenced Clement's theology of the Logos. By these two steps it is possible to analyse not only Clement's theological position but also to answer Photos' charge.
1. Philo of Alexandria and the Nature of the Logos.
It is important here to sketch some features of Philo's doctrine of the divine Logos relevant to Clement's view and Photios' charge: a more systematic presentation of Philonic theory can be found in other studies.3 In Philo's theology, as in Clement's, the term ὁ λόγος referred, among many things, to the hypostasis which in the hierarchy of all beings was the second to God or the Absolute. In other words ὁ λόγος can be translated as a synonym for 'a divine being', 'a divine power' and the creator or the demiurge of the world. The Logos is rather somebody than something, who has been acting according to established rules and God's will. Following Berchman's critique of Wolfson's
2 This point was highlighted in Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 199 n. 6; R.M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in Transition, Brown Judaic Studies 69
(Chico: Scholars Press, 1984), 55; and, more recently, Hägg, Clement of Alexandria,
182. In this context I wish to introduce an insightful note presented by Annewies van den Hoek. She makes an interesting observation on the nature of Clement's dependence on Philo: "In her recent dissertation, Denise Buell notes the special rhetorical function that omitting his teachers' name could have for Clement. Not the individual identities of the teachers, but their role as mediators between the apostles and Clement's own time would have been important. To put the names of his teachers in the foreground would have overemphasised 'their importance as individuals, a charge that Clement makes against the followers of Marcion, Basilides, and Valentinus (see
Strom. VII.108.1)' Logically then, omitting Philo's name can be seen as placing him in the ranks of Clement's direct mentors" (A. van den Hoek, "Techniques of Quotation in Clement of Alexandria: A View of Ancient Literary Working Methods", Vigiliae
Christianae 50 (1996): 232–3; D.K. Buell, "Procreative Language in Clement of Alexandria" (PhD. Dissertation: Harvard University, 1995), 108–9.
3 See Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 158–61.
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interpretation,4 I accept the view that Philo distinguished two, not three phases of existence of the divine Logos. In the first phase, before the creation of the world, the Logos existed as God's Mind (ὁ νοῦς) or was fully identical with it.5 In the second phase, the same Logos became the active principle of creation.6 The Logos was engaged in calling into being the whole material world according to the pattern of the perfect ideas which he contains.7 In Philo's theory, the Logos creates the universe in his own image. The Logos as a realm of perfect ideas calls the material world into being as a reflection of his own harmony, wisdom and beauty. The important point is that while before the creation of the world the Logos is passive, so in the second stage, after the creation of the world, he is active. In the first stage he is an object of divine contemplation: that is God contemplates the perfect ideas of his own
Mind/Logos.8 In the second stage, the Logos is active as he performs as creator. It is in this latter phase that he can be clearly distinguished from God, as he creates and orders all things in proportion, according to each thing its correct measure and assigning to each thing its own place. During the second phase, he acts 'outside' of God or rather his activity is directed towards another reality that now exists as 'exterior'.
Philo develops a whole vocabulary to denote the Logos' creative deeds: the Logos is portrayed anthropomorphically as a gardener who 'plants' things and 'cultivates' them.9 He is also the administrator of that visible order and its ruler.10 All these functions and activities without doubt show that the Philonic Logos successfully binds together the Platonic character of the demiurge from Timaeus (41b) and the Hebrew, Sapiential notion of Wisdom (Prov. 8:22; Wis. 9:9). This account of the way in which the demiurge or Wisdom participated in the creation/organisation of the world was thus based on the fusing of two traditions. It would be correct to conclude that according to Philo,
4 Cf. Berchman, From Philo to Origen, 32. Wolfson believed that Philo suggested three stages of the existence of Logos, two before the creation of the world and one after the creation of the world (see H.A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam [Cambridge, MA: Howard University
Press, 1947], 1:239).
5 Philo, Opif. 20; see also Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato,
446–51.
6 Philo, Opif. 24–25; Conf. 172.
7 Philo, Opif. 16; Her. 156.
8 E.g. Philo, Opif. 24–25; Sacr. 83.
9 Philo, QE 68.
10 Philo, Her. 38, 138.
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during the first 'period' the Logos, as identical with God's Mind, existed intra mentem Dei, while in the second 'period', which began with the creation of the world, the same Logos was a different hypostasis and became extra mentem Dei. In addition, the Logos acted as 'the ontological bridge' between divine transcendence and the material world. Philo, a Hebrew and Middle Platonist, aimed to bring together created, visible sensual reality with the ontological Source, to connect the divine demiurge with the material product. To him, the Logos was the crucial link between the noetic and the sensual worlds, spiritual and material reality, or even between the divine and the created realms.
Clement of Alexandria adopted parts of Philo's characterisation of the divine Logos which he assimilated into a new Christian framework. As has been noted, it is generally acknowledged that Clement's view was dependent on and guided by Philo's theory of the Logos, but the degree of Clement's closeness to Philo's thought remains an open question. Lilla's study of Clement's assimilation of Philo's doctrine of the Logos argues that, for Clement, there were three stages of selfrevelation of the Logos. In Lilla's interpretation, during the first phase of the divine Logos, God's Mind was identical with God, a familiar
Platonic theme.11 In the second phase, he became a separate hypostasis representing the immanent law of the noetic universe and held the universe together in peaceful unity, a view which in terms of its derivation was a Stoic elaboration of a Platonic motif.12 In the third stage, mentioned briefly by Lilla,13 both Philo and Clement of Alexandria proclaimed the Logos the cause of the visible, material world. Although
Lilla's distinction has some value, I am inclined to favour Brechman's critique of it. According to Brechman, Philo only distinguished two phases in the Logos' existence. Nonetheless, Brechman accepts that Clement distinguishes three phases of the Logos' self-disclosure: (1) as the Mind of God, (2) as a separate mind or hypostasis, (3) as the 11 Lilla provides the following examples of Clement's dependence on Philo in this interpretation: Clement, Strom. 4.155.2; 5.73.3 and Philo, Cher. 49; Opif. 20; Clement,
Strom. 5.16.3 and Philo, Opif. 17–19; Clement, Strom. 4.156.1–2 and Philo, Opif.
24–25; Sacr. 83; Conf. 172; Somn. 1.62; see Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 201–5.
12 Lilla points the following analogies: Clement, Strom. 2.5.4 and indirectly Philo,
Her. 188; Fug. 110, 112; Clement, Protrep. 5.2 and Philo, Plant. 9 as both Clement and Philo are influenced by fusion of Platonic and Stoic notions of the world-soul/anima mundi.
13 Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 212.
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supreme mind of the world.14 Brechman also emphases that for Clement of Alexandria before the creation of the visible world the Logos existed in two forms: as God's Mind and then as a hypostasis, divine Wisdom.15 This distinction highlights another important difference between Clement and Philo.16
Mark Edwards has convincingly argued for a third approach to Clement's theory of the Logos.17 In the light of his careful examination of Clement's oeuvre, it becomes clear that Clement's theory of the generation of the Logos was produced in reaction to the views of his direct opponents, the Valentinian Christians. Therefore any attempt to discuss Clement's views in isolation from his polemic against the Valentinian theory of the Logos, may lead to miscomprehension. The Valentinian school, at least in its tradition known to Clement from Theodotus' theology, clearly distinguished between 'the higher Logos' and 'the lower Logos', who was the image of the original being. In addition, Gnostic theogony applied the same title, Logos, to a number of consecutive modes of spiritual beings.18 Against that kind of theology, Clement, in Edwards's interpretation, produced a doctrine of one
Logos, eternally generated by the divine Father, identical with the creator of the universe and with Jesus of Nazareth. Edwards concludes, against Lilla's and Brechman's19 interpretations, that Clement's Logostheology was not a three-stage or two-stage theory. Rather, the Alexandrian theologian emphasised only one, eternal process of emergence of the divine Logos from his Father, which culminated in incarnation.
Finally, the most recent examination of Clement's theology of the Logos comes from Hägg's study of Clement's apophaticism.20 Hägg
14 Berchman, From Philo to Origen, 60.
15 Ibid. 61.
16 Ibid.
17 M.J. Edwards, "Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos", Vigiliae christianae 54 (2000): 159–77. Edwards' insightful analysis places Clement's theory of the Logos closer to the context of the second-century Christian apologists than my reconstruction.
18 This aspect will be discussed in section 2.
19 Edwards does not mention Brechman.
20 See Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, 153–79. The author suggests an explanation of Clement's apophaticism: "there is a statement in Clement's main work, the Stromateis, which seems to express the essence of apophatic theology. After a detailed description of a process of thought which aims at the contemplation of God, Clement finally concludes—against the expectation of his readers—that 'we may somehow reach the idea of the Almighty, knowing not what he is, but what he is not' [Strom.
5.71.3]. This epistemological statement concerning man's inability to know God also indicates, I would claim, a meaningful approach to understanding Clement's theology
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suggests that Clement's intention was to highlight the existence of only one Logos, the Son of God known through the Christian revelation as Jesus Christ. He appeared or became known in three different ways.21 First, as the Mind (ὁ νοῦς) of the Father, second as the incarnate Son, and third as an 'emanation', 'effluence' (ἡ ἀπόρροια) of the Father's Logos in the hearts of men and women, for instance, prophets, sages and noble, virtuous people. These three stages of self-disclosure of the Logos would lead from his inner divine life within God
(intra mentem Dei) to his external appearance as the element of rationality that is common to all human beings (extra mentem Dei), and finally historically as Jesus of Nazareth. If this view is endorsed it implies that Clement accepted the real distinction of the divine persons that is the Father and the Son, while confessing their common nature. It implies that in contrast to docetic or Gnostic Christologies,
Clement believed in the incarnation of the divine Son. It further would suggest that Clement saw human reason as the rational ability to recognise the Creator of the world or accept Christian revelation.
Thus, Hägg's line of interpretation provides evidence for Clement's effort to belong to the mainstream tradition of Christianity.
It must be also noted, that Photios' charge suggests a blasphemous and rather complex theology supports Clement's putative error.
Photios stated that Clement of Alexandria wrote of two Logoi of the Father (λόγους … τοῦ πατρὸς δύο) as two divine beings, but Photios did not shed any light on the ambiguity of the crucial term ὁ λόγος.
Further, according to Photios' opinion and as far as we can understand his intention, Clement of Alexandria held the view that neither
Logoi revealed themselves to humanity, which means that Jesus of Nazareth was not identical with the divine Son/Logos. The person that appeared 'in flesh' as Jesus, was a lesser (τὸν ἥττονα) being, a sort of power of God (δύναμίς τις τοῦ θεοῦ), which in turn became a human mind (νοῦς γενόμενος) and penetrated or inhabited the hearts of men such as the prophets. The complexity of this theological scenario suggests either that Clement's speculation on the divine persons of the and philosophy in general" (Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, 5). I wish to add that Hägg's observation, in my view, introduces Clement's Christology, or rather Logos-theology, as the unique and exclusive way of 'knowing' about the apophatic God, as only through the divine Son we can attain some degree of knowledge about his Father.
More on this point (see ibid. 227 –30).
21 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, 192. I shall return to this analysis in my conclusion.
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Father and the Son bore no relation to Scripture, or that Clement seriously misunderstood the nature of God and possibly felt under spell of some sort of Gnostic theogony.
As can be seen from the summary of recent debate on Clement's theory of the Logos, his view of his origin, status and nature still provokes some concerns. In this sense, Photios' doubts may be partially justified by the complexity of Clement's Logos-theology and his unsystematic and occasionally opaque approach to the subject. In order to answer Photios' concerns, I would like to propose the following interpretation of Clement's doctrine.
The divine Logos always existed as God's Mind, therefore the Logos was co-eternal with God. Reversing the order of elements of this statement we may say that the Godhead never existed without his νοῦς that is without his divine Logos. To use the terminology of Photios' synopsis, 'the paternal Logos' or 'the Logos of the Father' and 'the Logos of the Son' are one, which does not suggest that they were mixed but coexisted in unity as (1) 'the subject who thinks' and (2) 'the object or process of thinking'. At this stage there is already a process of generation, as 'thinking' is a way of being 'created' or 'coming from' the subject. So, these two divine beings were not separate, but distinct. Then, still intra mentem Dei, the Logos exercises a special function to become the principle (ἡ ἀρχή), the facilitator and the executor of all that is about to be created: the noetic world (ὁ κόσμος νοητός). At this stage the divine Logos is begotten or generated as a different being from the divine source.22 But this act does not imply any 'split' within divinity or dramatic Gnostic separation. The appearance of this spiritual perfect world is, according to Clement, confirmed by Scriptural revelation as 'the first creation' in Genesis 1:1-5.23 It is the first act of the divine
Logos. The 'begetting' or 'generation' of the Logos is also the moment when he becomes 'the Son' of God, now distinct from his Father. But this generation does not mean that God, called by Scriptural revelation
'the Father', was left without his λόγος. Clement clearly notes the difference between the Father (ὁ πατρικὸς/πατρῷος λόγος) and the Son
(ὁ υἱὸς λόγος). Later, in the history of salvation, the latter became visible (φανερόω) 'outside' of divinity.24 With the act of creation/order22 I discuss the origin of the divine Logos in Chapter 4.
23 This point was examined in Chapter 1.
24 Cf. Clement, Strom. 5.6.3: ὁ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων λόγος οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ προφορικός, σοφία δὲ καὶ χρηστότης φανερωτάτη τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμίς τε αὖ παγκρατὴς καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεία, οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀκατανόητος, θέλημα
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ing of the invisible/noetic world, the Logos is extra mentem Dei since this world, which although intelligible or spiritual, is not identical with God's substance and therefore is not divine. This spiritual world, in Clement's view, is not an extension of God's own οὐσία, but is a copy of the Logos himself. At this moment the Logos is also God's power
(δύναμίς τοῦ θεοῦ) to call everything into existence and to hold everything that exists together.
Secondly, the Logos 'steps outside' the spiritual realm in the act of creating the visible world, an event recorded in Genesis (1:6–31) as 'the second creation'. It is through this act that human beings are created with the intellectual power of human reason (ἡ νοῦς), which Clement believed had divine origin.25 The human mind is denoted as a gift of God to people, or even as the gift of the divine Spirit (τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα):
While we declare that the person who has believed is inspired by the Holy Spirit, Plato's followers claim that the mind exists in the soul as an emanation according to the divine arrangement and therefore the soul dwells in the body [Timaeus 30b] … But it is not that the divine
Spirit is in each one of us.26 παντοκρατορικόν. "The Logos of the Father of all is not the uttered word [λόγος προφορικός], but he is the most visible wisdom and goodness of God; his is the truly divine might of God, which can be recognised also by those who do not believe in it.'
This passage refers to the Stoic terminology and distinction between "the uttered word" (ὁ λόγος προφορικός) and "the thought/notion of which it is an expression" (ὁ λόγος ἐνδιάθετος). I owe to Mark Edwards's analysis the observation, that this Stoic distinction appears only in relation to one example on two occasions in SVF 43.18;
74.4. This example denotes rather two varieties of the same phenomenon, than two phases (see Edwards, "Clement of Alexandria", 161).
25 Clement comment on giving the 'breath of life' (πνοὴ ζωῆς, Gen. 2:7, lxx) to the newly created human being (e.g. Clement, Strom. 5.94.3) echos some of Philo's interpretations (e.g. Leg. 1.31).
26 Clement, Strom. 5.88.2: ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς μὲν τῷ πεπιστευκότι προσεπιπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμά φαμεν, οἳ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ θείας μοίρας ἀπόρροιαν ὑπάρχοντα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι κατοικίζουσιν … ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς μέρος θεοῦ ἐν ἑκαστῳ ἡμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα. This important pronouncement requires clarification as Clement of Alexandria mixes some passages from the Timaeus in order to make his theological point. First, the reference to Timaeus, 30b only confirms that Plato's treatise contained the idea that the order of the universe was established by the demiurge. Within this order, there is a special emphasis on the value of human mind as the gift from the demiurge. However, in Timaeus, 41c, Plato much clearly more pronounces the divine origin of human mind. In Clement's interpretation, the human mind has a divine origin, as given to all human beings at the moment of creation (see
Strom. 5.94.3), but receipt of this gift does not imply that human beings are naturally divine. While Clement accepts Platonic and Pythagorean intuition about the divine origin of the human mind, he expresses some reservation about the possible conclu-
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However, this does not mean that the human and the divine are mixed or that humanity is deified by this exceptional gift.27 Clement presented a process which was very sophisticated both metaphysically and theologically. For a reader who does not follow all the subtle distinctions denoted by the terminology, it is easy to fall into the trap of oversimplifying the theory or failing to grasp its main stages. I believe that Photios as he was not acquainted with Clement's metaphysical and Philonic background, easily concluded that Clement might have spoken about two Logoi, for example one within the divinity, in God's
Mind, and the second outside the divine realm manifested in the history of salvation through the prophets.28 The synopsis he provides in his Bibliotheca shows that Photios was confused by Clement's theory and vocabulary. The Greek terms are unclear to Photios, for although both scholars used the same language, the metaphysical and theological semantics have changed substantially by Photios' time. Thus,
Photios' account in the Bibliotheca of what he thought Clement of Alexandria had said in the Hypotyposeis did not come close to Clement's original intentions. Clement strongly believed in and professed only one divine Logos and various phases of his appearance related to various functions. For Clement of Alexandria these stages did not imply different hypostases, but only different parts of the same process. Photios was not able to penetrate this multifaceted theoretical construction; his summary was only a guess and a wrong one at that.
Yet despite all these caveats, Photios' charge still calls for further exami nation of Clement's oeuvre. sion that by the fact of having a rational faculty human beings are divine. The mind is not the cause of deification, but it can enhance this process. Further, Clement's theological interpretation identifies the 'Holy Spirit' as the source of mind or the rational faculty in human being. It is noticeable that in Clement's theology some functions of the Logos are assigned to the Holy Spirit and vice versa. A much clearer distinction of the second and third persons of the Holy Trinity and their specific activities will emerge in later patristic theology with contribution of Augustine and the Cappadocian Fathers, especially Basil of Caesarea (see L. Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006], 211–21).
27 Clement, Strom. 5.88.4.
28 This role was associated with the Holy Spirit, see P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, The Apostles' Creed and its Early Christian Context (London and New York: Continuum,
2009), 87–96.