1. The Origin of the Logos in Philo of Alexandria's Philosophy
the assumption that the son of god is a creature
Logos-theology, at least in his existing oeuvre. In this approach I shall pay special attention to the origin of divine Wisdom, as a synonym of the Logos, in Hebrew Sapiential literature. I will also recall some evidence from Jewish-Christian sources, as they reveal that the notion of Christ as 'the first-created' was not a foreign one in early Christian theology. This examination highlights yet another understanding of the origin of the divine Logos in second-century theology. Later, in the post-Nicene period this specific understanding sounded highly controversial. Consequently early theologians such as Clement who investigated this specific model or used particular terminology to denote the origin of the divine Logos were either accused of heresy or viewed with suspicion. After discussing the main characteristics of those ancient sources, I will pay special attention to the passages from Excerpta ex Theodoto, where Clement's Logos-theology appeared in confrontation with some of the Valentinian concepts. And finally I will try to explain the origin of the problems in Clement's theology by reference to the Gnostic theories of the Saviour, as they were the main challenges to Clement's views.
1. The Origin of the Logos in Philo of Alexandria's Philosophy It was important to the later, post-Nicene historians such as Photios, that when Clement expressed his views on the divine Logos, his doctrine should be within limits set by the Scriptures and the Apostolic tradition of the primitive Church. Accordingly, Clement of Alexandria when speaking about the Son of God ought to have primarily kept to the Gospel testimonies, such as the Johannine documents about the divine Logos, and kept his views in agreement with other ecclesiastical authors of his time in order to safeguard doctrinal correctness. But this was hardly a reasonable expectation of Clement, who firstly read much more widely than the canonical Gospels and secondly, freely pondered upon the Scriptures with insights derived from Platonism,
Middle Platonism and Stoicism, while also using rather complex allegorical interpretations in his theology. When Clement of Alexandria read the Scriptures, on his desk we would find, for instance, various anthologies, dictionaries, notebooks together with the piles of excerpts from Plato's dialogues, Aristotle's treatises, Greek literature and poetry, but also some Gnostic synopses and other early Christian doc-
clement of alexandria on trial
uments.5 Still, one important addition is needed. Clement of Alexandria read the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures in a particularly Philonic frame of mind. This last factor cannot be underestimated in the context of the current charge.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is already an extensive academic literature on Clement's various degrees of dependence on Philo of Alexandria, which provides a very useful insight into this intellectual relationship.6 However, for the sake of the current investigation, only one aspect needs to be examined. The crucial philosophical issue of Philo's understanding of the origin of the Logos. As the Logos was identified by Philo with divine Wisdom,7 the noetic world, the 'place' of Ideas, or the totality of powers8 this gave him an exclusive status and unique role. Using more metaphorical language it is correct to say that the Logos was with God as his adviser, companion, highest servant, the architect and chief constructor of all reality. To perform that function the Logos must have been from the beginning with God.
More detailed evidence from three Philonic works provides some insight into the origin of the Logos. In De Abrahamo (51), De confusione linguarum (46) and De somniis (1.215) Philo denoted the Logos as πρωτογονός υἱός 'the first-born son', 'the first-created' being.9 It is apparent from Philo's philosophical theology that the Logos is the first power after the Absolute, the first generated being, but it is difficult to be more specific about the nature of that origin. It is highly unlikely that Philo would consider the Logos as 'born' of the One (i.e., God) in a similar way to later Christian 'orthodox' interpretation of the origin of the divine Logos. This comprehension of the relation between God and the Logos would sound to Philo like yet another anthropomorphic view, which was a mark of paganism.10 It would suggest the origin of the transcendent Logos was akin to generation as we know it from the material world of humans and animals. Ultimately, such a view could not be reconciled with his highly philosophical, apophatic
5 See J.A. Brooks, "Clement of Alexandria as a Witness to the Development of the New Testament Canon", Second Century 9 (1992): 41–55; Hoek, "Techniques of Quotation in Clement of Alexandria".
6 Some aspects of Clement's Philonic legacy are examined by Hoek, Clement of Alexandria. On Clement's assimilation of Philo's Logos-theory, see Berchman, From Philo to Origen. This study was discussed in Chapter 3.
7 e.g., Philo, Leg. 1.65.
8 e.g., Philo, Opif. 24–25; Sacr. 83; Somn. 1.62.
9 See Liddell and Scott, Greek—English Lexicon, s.v. πρωτόγονος.
10 Philo, Opif. 69; Post. 1–4.
the assumption that the son of god is a creature
notion of the divine,11 which he saw as free from any characteristic taken from visible reality, and therefore incapable of 'giving birth' to another being, even a divine one. The One, the Monad or the Absolute was understood by Philo in some of his works to be, as the Neopythagoreans taught,12 the ultimate ground beyond any multiplicity.13 The One could neither generate nor create any other 'equal' being, and that is the crux of Philo's philosophy. The One could only call into existence ontologically lower beings and realities, among which the Logos is the first brought forth. In this coherent philosophy and strictly monotheistic theology,14 the emergence of the Logos as the totality of God's thought or ideas demanded some form of expression.
Philo uses a language of opposition to describe the appearance and the relationship between the Absolute and his Logos. This language contrasts the 'uncreated/unborn' Absolute with the 'created/begotten'
Logos, the Monad and the Divider,15 God with his Archangel-Logos.16
Philo only used the term 'begetting' to emphasise the Logos' direct dependence, ontological closeness and unquestionable high status.
Also, this particular idiom distinguishes the origin of the Logos from the way in which the material world came into existence.17 Philo's language concerning the origin of the Logos was confusing and offered much room for further interpretation to Christian readers, including
Clement of Alexandria. With the Christians' claim that the divine Logos was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth new, serious issues were raised. One of them was the way in which the Logos was generated by his divine Father, as Philo's description of the origin of the Logos was insufficient at best. Clement of Alexandria inherited from Philo a number of philosophical and theological ideas, methods and models, but with them came also some lack of clarity in crucial areas of 11 Philo, Somn. 1.67.
12 See Dillon, Middle Platonists, 156.
13 e.g., Philo, Leg. 2.3; Opif. 8; Praem. 40.
14 I am aware that in some passages, Philo of Alexandria denoted the Logos as 'God', but this title must be understood in relation to Philo's use of metaphors to communicate the reality of the Logos' nature. I agree with the comment made by R. Williams who noted about Philo's language: "here we are dealing with relations in which the terms define yet do not exhaust each other. The paradox of something that 'is and is not God' is only disturbing if that something is indeed accorded an identity of its own—which is precisely the early Christian problem" (Williams, Arius, 124). To define the Logos as divine and generated was a Christian problem not a Philonic one.
15 I owe this title to John Dillon, Middle Platonists, 160.
16 e.g., Philo, Conf. 146; Her. 205
17 See Philo, Leg. 3.175; Migr. 1.6.