3. Clement's own Considerations
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Alexandria with the appearance of various Christian factions and theological schools. Therefore, and this is my own conclusion, we have to wait until Clement of Alexandria to see more clearly the important role the exegesis of Genesis plays in the theological and philosophical battle against dualistic theology and religious doctrines. Expecting support for the Christian 'Catholic' position against Gnostic opponents from Philo would be an anachronistic error without support in the Philonic corpus.
3. Clement's own Considerations Having discussed the essential elements of the philosophical framework of Clement's exegesis, I shall now turn to his various statements on the existence of matter and Ideas. In Clement's oeuvre there are many passages which provide evidence of his opinions and show how closely his reflections followed the exegetical trajectory of Philo of Alexandria. However, this similarity does not overshadow Clement's own contribution to the whole debate. In reconstructing his opinion attention must be paid to the context of each statement.
First, I wish to discuss the evidence from Clement's commentaries on the crucial passage Genesis 1:1-3. One of the rare elaborations of this Scriptural theme can be found in Stromateis 5.94.1 (with its context: 5.93.4–5.94.3):
"In the beginning," [Genesis] says "God made the heaven and the earth; and the earth was invisible." [Gen 1:1-2] Then, it continues: "And God said, Let there be light; and there was light." [Gen 1:3] In the cosmogony of the material reality He creates a firm heaven, (as what is firm is capable of being perceived by sense), and a visible earth, and a light that can be seen.31
Here two distinguishable acts32 of creation resulting in two worlds: one invisible (ἀόρατος) and original, the second visible and chrono31 "ἐν ἀρχῇ" γάρ φησιν "ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος" εἶτ᾽ ἐπιφέρει. "καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς. γενηθήτω φῶς, καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς." ἐν δὲ τῇ κοσμογονίᾳ τῇ αἰσθητῇ στερεὸν οὐρανὸν δημιουργεῖ (τὸ δὲ στερεὸν αἰσθητόν) γῆν τε ὁρατὴν καὶ φῶς βλεπόμενον. Alain Le Boulluec sees in this important passage
Clement's direct dependence on Philo's exegesis from Opif. 36, 38, 55 (A. Le Boulluec,
Stromata V, Sources chrétiennes 279 [Paris: Cerf, 1981], 302).
32 I use the term 'acts' although being faithful to Clement's intention the first denotes a timeless process of emergence while the second, related to the visible world, took place in a moment of time. This distinction will be clear in the next part of my analysis.
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logically later.33 The first γένεσις produces the οὐρανός, the γῆ and the φῶς, and all of them represent the intelligible world (κοσμός νοητός).
This representation recalls Philo's exegesis from the De opificio mundi (36–7).34 The second γένεσις is related to τὸ στερεὸν αἰσθητόν and in an analogical way describes the origin of the existence of the material οὐρανός (1.9); the material γῆ (1.10) and the φωστῆρες (1.14). This distinction suggests, and rightly so, Clement's intention to separate the creation of the first, invisible reality and the second creation of the visible, material world. In this way, the three elements of the κοσμός νοητός are the prototypes of the material one: κόσμος αἰσθητός. In the Eclogae propheticae (3.1) the same thought is expressed with more clarity: " 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth', the things earthly and heavenly".35 This world is thus the synonym of the κόσμος νοητός. Earlier in the Stromateis (5.93.4), Clement revealed the source of the key distinction between κόσμος νοητός and κόσμος αἰσθητός:
Also, the Barbarian [Hebrew] philosophy knows about two worlds: one of thought/ideas and the second of sensual perception; while the former is an original pattern the latter remains the image of that which is called the model.36
The allusion to ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία is identified by Stählin as Philo's theory from the De opificio mundi (13–16). Philo and Clement assumed a double creation, one of the invisible world or world of Ideas, and the second of the material, visible reality of the sky, the 33 This distinction or two stages of creation are rightly observed by Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 191–2. Again, Clement's exegesis closely follows that of Philo.
34 For a more analytical presentation of Philo's theory expressed in De opificio mundi, see Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos, 174–86. Runia highlights Clement's original assimilation of Philo's idea of the creation (ibid. 173).
36 κόσμον τε αὖθις τὸν μὲν νοητὸν οἶδεν ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, τὸν δὲ αἰσθητόν, τὸν μέν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ καλουμένου παραδείγματος.
Alain Le Boulluec detects in Clement's philosophical construction of the process of creation a reflection of Philo's theory, which balances Scriptural revelation (Genesis) with Platonic metaphysics (Timaeus). Boulluec notes that both terms used by Clement, τό παραδείγμα and ἡ εἰκών, originate in Plato's Timaeus, the former in 28a–b,
28c, 31a, 48e, the latter in 28a–b. This borrowing shows that Clement read Genesis with a particular, Platonic mindset. In addition, another crucial term ἡ μονάς is a synonym of the divine Logos who was to Clement, "the unity of the ideas" (πάντα ἕν) or "the noetic / intelligible cosmos" (ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος) (Strom. 4.156.1–4.156.2,
5.93.4). Earlier, we can find the same identification in Philo, Opif. 15, 35, as noted by Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 207. Both Lilla and later Boulluec agree on Clement's assimilation of Philonic exegesis in this passage (see Boulluec, Stromata V, 300).
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earth and the light of the sun. As noted by Annewies van den Hoek, Clement's narrative: "is scarcely intelligible without Philo in the background".37 It is thus right to conclude that Clement believed in the existence of the intelligible world of Ideas prior to the material one.
The intelligible reality would be, in a Platonic sense, a model (τό παράδειγμα) for the material world. Clement agreed with Philo, as they were both at this point faithful heirs of Plato. However, Clement modifies Plato's concept of the Ideas, by making them totally dependent on God and, unlike Plato, allowing them no metaphysical autonomy from the Creator (or the demiurge). The world of Ideas was called into existence at the beginning and its 'location' (τόπος) is the Mind
(ὁ νοῦς) of God that is his Logos. The Logos contains all Ideas, as God's thoughts. In the Christian context, the Philonic Logos becomes the Son of God, and with him the Ideas receive their existence. An example of this develpment occurs in Clement's commentary on Genesis 1:1 in the Eclogae propheticae, 4.1, where he states: " 'In the beginning [was] the Son' [i.e. the Logos]'.38 The identification of the Ideas with the thoughts of God is expressed in Book 5 of the Stromateis:
"And an idea is a thought of God; and this the barbarians [i.e., the Hebrews but also the Christians] have named as the Logos of God.'39
In addition, Clement specified that the world of Ideas existed at its beginning as a unity which contained everything in itself or within 'the Monad' (μονάς),40 that is within the divine Logos/Son. Later, with the 37 A. van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the 'Stromateis':
An Early Christian Reshaping of a Jewish Model, Supplement to Vigiliae christianae 3
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 196.
39 Cf. Strom. 5.16.3: ἡ δὲ ἰδέα ἐννόημα θεοῦ, ὅπερ οἱ βάρβαροι λόγον εἰρήκασι τοῦ θεοῦ. In addition Stählin identifies the source of ἡ δὲ ἰδέα ἐννόημα θεοῦ as Plato,
Parm. 132b. Alain Le Boulluec points out that the concept of ἡ δὲ ἰδέα ἐννόημα θεοῦ appeared among the Middle Platonists such as Alcinous Didascal. 9, 1.2.3 and was assimilated by Philo, e.g., Opif. 17 –20, who was the direct source of Clement's inspiration. However, as Le Boulluec points out, Clement distinguished two Logoi. This controversy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. I accept also, following Le Boulluec's comment, that the term οἱ βάρβαροι refers to Hebrew and Christian theologians
(e.g., the Johannine tradition) (see Boulluec, Stromata V, 85).
40 See Philo, Opif. 15, 35. Runia notes that in the Philonic context the Monad (ὁ μονάς) sometimes becomes a synonym of God, for instance in Philo, Leg. 2.3; Spec.
3.180 (see Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos, 129). To Clement the same term refers to the divine Logos, while God is 'beyond' or 'above' ὁ μονάς, that is the divine Logos (see Strom. 5.93.4). On God's transcendence, see Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 216). Philo's understanding of God as the Monad sets the background of his theory and exegesis of the creation of Adam and Eve. For more information see section 1 of Chapter 7 below.