2. Philo of Alexandria as an Important Precursor of Clement
the existence of eternal matter and ideas
The last point contributes a new insight into the whole problem.9
Taurus states that it is possible to use the term γενητός as an expression of 'dependence' (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς ὃν κεκόσμηται) on an outside source or creator. To clarify his position, Taurus referred to the relationship between the Sun and the Moon. While the latter possesses 'created' light from the former, there was never a time when the Moon existed without being illuminated by the Sun. In this way, the Moon's light is 'created' by the Sun, as it is totally dependent on the Sun. Interestingly, as also noted by Dillon, this aspect of γενητός as 'dependence' had appeared earlier in Philo's De opificio mundi (7–9).
The Jewish scholar brings us closer to Clement's position, therefore his elaboration of the Platonic cosmology requires close attention.
2. Philo of Alexandria as an Important Precursor of Clement10 The De opificio mundi begins with an assumption of pre-existent matter along with God, the Creator. As noted by Runia,11 Philo described the universe as ἀγένητος καὶ ἀίδιος,12 believing it had always existed and will never cease to exist. God and matter co-exist as two principles of the whole reality. God is the active element, and matter the passive one. Philo thought that the creation of the world refers to the dependence of the whole universe (the passive element) on its divine cause,
Mind (the active factor). This view shows a parallel to Taurus' later opinion. Following Plato (Tim. 28c), Philo called God the 'Maker and Father' (ποιητής καὶ πατήρ).13 However Philo also showed that the 9 For more details and the whole list of definitions, see Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 242–3.
10 D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, Philosophia Antiqua
44 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), 453–5; see also the very helpful summary of Philo's theory by G.E. Sterling, "Creatio Temporalis, Aeterna, vel Continua? An Analysis of the Thought of Philo of Alexandria", Studia Philonica Annual 4 (1992): 15–41. On Philo of Alexandria as a Middle Platonist, see G.E. Sterling, "Platonizing Moses: Philo and Middle Platonism", Studia Philonica Annual 5 (1993): 96–111; D.T. Runia, "Was
Philo a Middle Platonist? A Difficult Question Revisited", Studia Philonica Annual 5
(1993); 112–40; D. Winston, "Response to Runia and Sterling", Studia Philonica Annual 5 (1993): 141–6, T.H. Tobin, "Was Philo a Middle Platonist? Some Suggestions", Studia Philonica Annual 5 (1993): 147–50; J. Dillon, "A Response to Runia and Sterling", Studia Philonica Annual 5 (1993): 151–5.
11 Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos, 112–13.
12 Philo, Opif. 7, 171.
13 Ibid. 7. This epithet highlights God's nature as always active source/creator of the universe. For more information on this title in Philonic context, see Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, 107–11.
clement of alexandria on trial
process of creation is not a simple act. First, in Philo's view, Plato's theory and the statement from Genesis were compatible, as they both distinguished between the intelligible and visible worlds, where the former is the model/reflection (εἰκών, παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος, μίμημα)14 of the latter. For Philo, as for Plato before him, the beauty of the material world mirrored its intelligible and original model
(κόσμος νοητός).15 This dependence of the visible on the intelligible as the relation of model to product received further elaboration at Philo's hands. The invisible or original and perfect world was made of Ideas, or even numbers.16 This realm was also called 'the Logos'17 and as the generic Mind was 'a sphere' of their 'location' (τόπος).18 Those Ideas, the 'content' of the intelligible realm were the objects of God's thought.
Using terminology from Proverbs 8:2219 and Wisdom 9:9,20 Philo identified the Logos/divine Mind as 'Wisdom' (σοφία) and 'first generated being' (ὁ πρωτόγονος αὐτοῦ θεῖος λόγος).21 Therefore it is right to say that while the Logos actively assisted in the creation of the (sensible) world, its origin is 'beyond' or 'earlier than' the moment of creation, and dependent directly on God's Mind (ὁ νοῦς). The Logos, unlike the sensible world, was not created at a point in time, but originates 'before time and matter'. The Scriptural metaphor of 'first born'
(ὁ πρωτόγονος) stresses this unique relationship of the Logos to God, and through the central, irreplaceable role of the Logos, the intelligible realm of Ideas in toto precedes the appearance of visible reality, and with it, the appearance of time. In this context, that is in direct relation to the Logos, it is right to conclude that Philo assumed the eternity of Ideas as the objects of God's thought 'contained' in the Logos.
14 Philo, Opif. 16, 36, 129; Her. 280; Plant. 50; Det. 57; Ebr. 133; Conf. 172.
15 For more on this important notion, see D.T. Runia, "A Brief History of the Term Kosmos Noétos from Plato to Plotinus", in Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon, ed. J.J. Cleary (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 151–72.
16 Philo, Opif. 102. It is possible to see the Pythagorean origin of Philo's thought and this inspiration may have led Clement of Alexandria to call the Jewish philosopher 'the Pythagorean'. For more information, see D.T. Runia, "Why does Clement of Alexandria call Philo 'The Pythagorean' ", Vigilae christianae 49 (1995): 1–22.
17 On the Philonic concept of the Logos, see section 1 of Chapter 4 below.
18 Philo, Opif. 20; Leg. 3.96; Prov. 1.27.
20 καὶ μετὰ σοῦ ἡ σοφία ἡ εἰδυῖα τὰ ἔργα σου καὶ παροῦσα, ὅτε ἐποίεις τὸν κόσμον. Both references were also very important to Clement's theology of the divine
Logos/Wisdom.
21 Philo, Abr. 151; Conf. 46; Somn. 1.215; Leg. 1.65.
the existence of eternal matter and ideas
Philo's views on the creation of matter, call for careful examination as they may seem unclear.22 Dillon goes so far as to suggest they lack coherence. For instance, the statements from the Quis rerum divinarum heres sit (160) openly affirmed the pre-existence of matter, while in the Legum allegoriae (2.2) he held more Scriptural opinions on the creation of the universe out of nothing, and in the De
Providentia (18) he stressed the dependence of matter on God and his creative, unceasing task of organising it.23 However Lilla argues that the limited evidence in favour of a theory of creatio ex nihilo in the Philonic corpus strongly suggests that he assumed the pre-existence of formless matter as implied in the De fuga et inventione (9) and the De specialibus legibus (1.328).24 Lilla observed that for Philo, and later for Clement of Alexandria, the origin of the visible world begins only with verse six of the first chapter of Genesis:25 "And God said, 'Let there be a firmament in the midst of the water, and let it be a division between water and water, and it was so.'"26 Here στερέωμα refers to the visible world as confirmed by the passage from the De opificio mundi (36). Philo's comment on this particular Scriptural passage also introduced Plato's theory from the Timaeus and harmonised both narratives. Philo seemed to distinguish two meanings of γένεσις: the intelligible and the sensual. The first meaning was related to God's direct act in originating the intelligible realm, the realm of Ideas and pre-existent matter (Gen. 1:1-5). The second referred to the material or corporal world created not by the demiurge but by the Logos (Gen. 1:6-31). The second material world was created in the image of and following the model of the first. In this way Scripture was reconciled with Platonic dogma. Whereas the first intelligible world, which is the sum of the perfect Ideas, coexists with God as his
Mind, although dependent on him and organised by him, the second 22 Did Philo as a philosopher and theologian (exegete) change his views on the origin of matter? To demonstrate this we would have to trace some development of his opinions on the basis of his works. However, as the discussion about the chronology of Philo's work is ongoing, plotting a trajectory of Philo's views on this issue would be a matter of speculation (see A. Terian, "A Critical Introduction to Philo's
Dialogues", Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 21.1 [1984]: 272–94).
23 See Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 158.
24 See S.R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 194 –5 n. 3, with a review of the literature.
25 See Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 191.
26 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός γενηθήτω στερέωμα ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ ἔστω διαχωρίζον ἀνὰ μέσον ὕδατος καὶ ὕδατος.
clement of alexandria on trial
world was called into being as its reflection. Therefore it is possible to see its origin as creation out of pre-existent formless matter rather than out of nothing. Following Lilla's observation,27 the Greek term κτίστης used by Philo28 can be read in the light of Wisdom 11:17:
"create the world out of formless matter" (κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης).29
Recently Runia has re-examined Philo's view on the origin of the matter and added some valuable comments.30 According to Runia, modern commentators represent three main lines of interpretation.
The first claims that there is enough evidence to support the view that Philo accepted the concept of creatio ex nihilo but he never pronounced this opinion expressis verbis. The second is inclined to terminate debate around this controversial theme with the observation that Philo did not give a clear answer to this problem, as he was mainly interested in ethical and exegetical elaboration of Scripture.
The third interpretation, which is shared by Runia, is that Philo of Alexandria did not provide us with a precise explanation of the origin of the matter as his philosophy and theology were not confronted by Gnostic dualistic theologies. Unlike Clement of Alexandria, Philo remained untouched by the fervent debate which soon erupted in 27 See Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 194–5 n. 3.
28 Philo, Somn. 1.76: oὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα γεννήσας οὐ μόνον εἰς τοὐμφανὲς ἤγαγεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν, ἐποίησεν, οὐ δημιουργὸς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὤν. "So God when He gave birth to all things, not only brought them into sight, but also made things which before were not, not just handling material as an artificer, but being Himself its creator" (trans. F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, in Philo, vol. 5, LCL [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1934]).
29 It must be noted that against this lectio we find three testimonies, Philo, Leg. 2.2;
Somn. 1.76; Eusebius, PE, 7.21; all three suggest that Philo believed in creatio ex nihilo.
In response to this argument I would stress that the first reference highlights the sole existence of God, which cannot be compared to anything; therefore Philo stresses the uniqueness of God's existence even at the expense of his theory of the Logos. In Somn.
1.76, Philo deals with the existence of the intelligible world which cannot come out of material principles and therefore came 'out of nothing'. Finally Eusebius' record of Philo's Prov. 2.49 as εἰ γέγονε ὄντως refers to the substance of the visible world which is not eternal per se but became visible or received its form thanks to its intelligible model. Ultimately 'out of nothing' or just 'nothing' may have been used by Philo as the radical and logical opposition of 'something', that is the existence of the intelligible world, in the same way as he opposed the relative existence of 'something' (κόσμος νοητός) to the unconditional existence of God. This subtle distinction may help to understand Philo's position as well as providing a helpful context to Clement's assimilation of Philo's view.
30 Cf. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos, 152–5.