IX. Examples taken from Polish Institutions
learn from experience, how beneficial and blessed that moderation of royal power is, if only it is rightly employed; and also if the very kings, Godfearing men and lovers of their people, would not allow themselves to be swayed by power, as though wards — or as flatterers at court who stuff themselves with bread kneaded with the tears of the wretched, as commons usually say — but were directed and advised by it, yet with that respect and obedience which befits their majesty and is due to it.
IX. Examples taken from Polish Institutions Furthermore, if anyone still found himself in doubt about the people of Poland, whether in electing a king upon certain conditions, they reserved for themselves the right to break their oath if he didn't abide by his promises, he will have a clear understanding of it from that last election, by which they chose Henry as their King, the brother of the king of France. In that matter I am in entire agreement with Bishop Valentine,1 the representative of his king in this election. In an address to the people of Poland, which has been issued in print,2 he particularly commends them for having limited the authority of their kings by the wisest o f laws, and for having in a way confined it within bounds.
X. Examples taken from the Republic of Venice On the same principle, the Republic of the Venetians, judging from events, and in the light of human wisdom, regards the most happily and wisely constituted leader (the Doge) not as some idol or image — as certain writers too little versed in politics have made bold to say — but as their leader and monarch. Thus they may derive from him all the advantages of monarchy without any danger of tyranny.3 For assuredly, the so-called General Council has complete authority to elect the Doge, but with due observance of the ceremonies which have been introduced, and have become customary with them for this purpose. In the same way, that very Council has reserved for itself that power without which all else might easily come to nothing — namely, the power to depose the Doge and to punish him if he attempts, or has committed, any act of tyranny, as has often been proved by examples and in fact. Therefore, let the remaining peoples of Italy, who have a habit of speaking and reasoning so nicely about human affairs, and who have also published numerous treatises about civil government,4 consider whether they have all conducted themselves in this matter as wisely as the citizens of Venice.
XI. Examples from the Spanish Kings But what shall we remark about the Spaniards? The condition of this kingdom was certainly for a long time greatly disturbed and extremely unsettled. For numerous barbarous nations, both from the North and from Africa, overflowed there, as if in a deluge. This is a fact testified to by most reliable historical accounts, and also by their very language. But it must readily be conceded that this nation has always been shrewd and
1 John of Monluc, Bishop of Valentine during 1553, ambassador of the Crown of France after the Diet of Poland in 1573.
2 Oratio...ad ordines...Poloniae...in electione novi Regis...1573, d. 10 Apr., Krakow [1573]
3 For the debate over the role of the Doge in the Venetian government, see William J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty (University of California Press, 1968), p. 62-63, and the case he cites.
4 An allusion to the Florentine historians, especially Machiavelli and Guichardin. It is curious to note that the Latin edition of The Right of Magistrates, with the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, was printed along with The Prince of Machiavelli. See Sturm, p. 21-23, for the list of those editions.
cautious beyond all others. And though that remark of Aristotle is true, that barbarians are by nature slaves rather than subjects,1 yet the Spaniards have thus far — whatever barbarism may have invaded their country — given numerous peoples occasion to blush, and have deservedly put them to shame, in their method of establishing their polity. To prove this, I will quote two pieces of evidence which are remarkable beyond all others, and which deserve to be engraved in letters of gold on public tablets, so that kings might be taught to rule justly from them, and that in turn, peoples might learn to obey rightly.
The first of these is taken from the 74th chapter of the Fourth Council of Toledo which was held in A.D. 1544, according to the reckoning of Sigebert.2 The words of the Synod consisting of both ecclesiastics and the other orders of the kingdom, are as follows:
Let no one among us, in presumption, seize the royal power; let no one stir up seditious risings of the citizens one against another; let no one devise a rule of destruction, but after the ruler has died in peace, let the foremost men of the whole nation, with the priests, by a common resolution of the kingdom, appoint a successor to the Kingship, so that while the harmony of unity is held fast by us, he may attempt no disruption of the country and the people by means of violence and bribery. But if this admonition does not reform our spirits, and in no way leads our hearts to the common welfare, hear then our decision. Whichever of us from all the peoples of Spain, by any conspiracy or support, violates his oath of allegiance which he swore in defense of the constitution of his country and of the nation of the Goths, or for the preservation of the king's safety; or has committed murder against the king, or deprived him of his royal power; or with the high-handedness of a tyrant, has usurped the supreme dignity of kingly power — let him be accursed in the sight of God the Father and the angels; and let him be made an outcast from the Catholic Church which he has outraged by his perjury, and made a stranger to every gathering of Christian men — along with all the accomplices of his impiety, because it is fitting that one and the same penalty should apply to the guilty who have been found associated in the same error... And we repeat this a second time, declaring: Whoever from the manner, etc... And therefore, if it finds favor with all of you who are present here, ratify by the unanimity of your utterance, the decision repeated here for the third time. It was declared by the entire clergy or people: Those who presume against this our definition, let them be anathema, maran-atha — that is, perdition in the coming of the Lord; and may they have their portion with Judas Iscariot, and their associates also. Amen.
And therefore we ourselves and all priests admonish the Holy Church of Christ and the people, that this fearful and so often repeated decision may condemn no one of us by a temporal and eternal verdict, but that by keeping our promised word towards our most glorious Lord, King
Sisenandus,3 and by serving him in sincere devotion, we may not only appeal to the mercy of God's fatherly love in our behalf, but may even deserve to gain the favor of the aforementioned ruler. You also — the present king and the future rulers of subsequent ages — we beseech with due humility that you may prove moderate and gentle towards your subjects; that you may rule with justice and goodness over the peoples entrusted to you by God; and by reigning in humility of heart with a zeal for doing good, you may repay to Christ the giver the good interchange by which He has appointed you over us. And let no one of you, as sole judges in a cause, visit a captive or an accused with a sentence; but let the fault of wrongdoers be manifest by the agreement of the people with the leaders, in accordance with a clear verdict. Let clemency be observed by you in the case of crimes, that you may not prevail in them by severity rather than by indulgence. So that, while all these things are observed by you with the authority of God and
1 Aristotle, Politics, III, IX, 3.
2 Chron. D. Sigeberti, in M.G.H., Scriptores, VI, 324, 1 and 25.
3 Sisenand, King of the Visigoths in Spain, 631-636.
with dutiful government, the kings may rejoice in their peoples, and the people in their kings, and God in both. Indeed, we make this verdict known about future kings: that if any one of them, without respect for the laws, in arrogant despotism and royal pride, practice among the nations a most cruel tyranny in deeds of shame and in crime or covetousness, let him be condemned with a sentence of anathema by Christ the Lord. And may he be divided from God and receive judgment for presuming to do wrong and to bring the kingdom to ruin. But concerning
Simithilanis,1 who fearing the consequences of his misdeeds, deprived himself of royal power and laid aside the scythes of sovereignty, we have decided in consultation with the nation, that for the evils which they have committed, we shall never associate with either him, or his wife, or their sons without union, nor shall we at any time advance them to those offices of honor from which they have been cast down for their iniquity.2
This is indeed a remarkable example: I shall add to it another decree of the Sixth Synod of Toledo;3 in it the following words are added after the expulsion of the Jews from the kingdom was decided upon:
"In vain is the good striven after, unless provision is made for perseverance in it."
"Therefore after he has duly promised and has taken over the reins of government, if he himself is revealed as the violator of this promise, let him be anathema, maran-atha, in the sight of God eternal; and may he be made to feed the fire everlasting, and may whatever priest or Christian has been associated with his error, be destroyed with him by a like condemnation." 4
From this it may easily be inferred what authority the Estates of Spain possess against their kings if they commit any breach of their oath, since in accordance with feudal law
(which is also applicable to kingdoms and empires) the vassal owes no service to a lord who has been excommunicated; and indeed, he is freed from his oath of allegiance (as is stated in Book 2 of the Feudal Law, tit. 28, par. 1). 5
The second testimony which I promised to adduce, is the striking formula which the people of Aragon even today (unless it was altered quite recently) not only employ in the investiture of their kings, but also repeat at those triennial gatherings at which the king usually presents himself before his estates, both to dispense justice to them, and to receive justice at their hands. Many ceremonies are performed there between the man who is titled the "Justice of Aragon" (who represents the supreme power, and to whom the kings are compelled to bind themselves by oath) and the king himself (whether he has yet to be, or has already been, elected). Then the following formula is publicly proclaimed in so many words, "Nos qui valemos tanto comme vos y posenos mas que vos, vos elegimos rey: con estas y estas conditiones, intra vos y nos, un que manda mas que vos;"
That is: "We who are of like worth with you, and who are stronger than you, elect you king on such and such conditions; between you and us there is One with greater authority than
1 Suintila, King from 621-631.
2 For the text of the decree, see Mansi, X, 638C-640D, can. 75 (and not 74). See the commentary of the Council, held in 633 (and not in 644), in Hefele-Leclercq, Histoire des conciles, III/1 (Paris, 1909), 266-277.
3 Chapter 5.
4 Mansi, X, 664B, can. 3, "De custodia fidei Judaeorum." Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, Histoire des conciles, III/1, 279.
5 Corpus Iuris Civilis, Consuetudines Feudorum, II, 28, 1. Cf. Francois Hotman, De Feudis Commentatio Tripertita
(Lyon, 1573), p. 258-262