Question 8. What may be done against unjust oppressors?
the end, they became its lawful lords. This was partly by the just judgment of God, and partly by the consent and approval of, if not all, certainly the more powerful majority of Jews. They indicated this quite clearly when they nearly all acclaimed, "We have no king but Caesar." 1
Question 8. What may be done against unjust oppressors?
Someone might ask, "But what if the ruler crushes the people with excessive taxes?" When he has been properly warned, those who wield the chief and highest authority in accordance with the laws of the kingdom, assuredly can and even should consult the commonweal. But here it should also be noted that a ruler who exceeds the due measure in such matters, because he is wasteful or avaricious or addicted to other vices, shouldn't immediately be regarded as a tyrant. For the mark of tyranny, and as it were, its peculiar concomitant, is a persistent malice which strives with might and main, to subvert the constitution and the laws upon which the kingdom rests as its foundations. I add the following remark also: that however just an occasion of offering resistance to manifest tyranny may present itself at one time or another, the excellent maxim expressed by a heathen should continually be considered and followed if possible: "It befits a wise man to test all things by deliberation, before armed force." 2 Therefore, when Petronius attempted to introduce the image of the emperor into the Temple, the Jews did indeed seem to have just cause for seizing arms, as the zeal of Mattathias urged, rather than allow the Temple of God to be desecrated by means of an idol. But they adopted a much more prudent counsel which also received the blessing of God, when they boldly gave Petronius to understand that indeed they had no desire to fight against him; but as long as there were any survivors, they would never allow that idol to be placed in the Temple.3 Even though the exaction of Albinus and Florus supplied them afresh with a most just cause for complaints;4 and even though religious matters were, in some degree, also concerned — yet all the acts of the Jews clearly indicated that they were striving after nothing but rebellion and revolt, pure and simple; and these have nothing in common with the lawful remedies which we have discussed.
Question 9. Whether subjects can contract with their rulers?
An answer must now be given to those who are of the opinion that it is not proper for subjects to contract with their superiors. I therefore begin by asking upon what foundations they rest. For if we are to proceed by means of arguments, then I must ask what sufficiently convincing arguments will they adduce to prove it is characteristic of subjects, to depend upon the authority and commands of their rulers, and not contrariwise? It would therefore follow, they declare, that subjects can indeed lay their complaints before their rulers in a modest and respectful way, and frankly offer them their advice if they are asked for it, but that they can in no way go beyond that. I answer that subjects may not at all approach their magistrates, whether subordinate or supreme, except with the greatest respect. And this is not merely for fear of their indignation, but
1 Joh 19:15.
2 Terence, Eunuchus, 789: "omnia prius experiri quam armis sapientem decet." (Loeb Classical Library ed., I, 316.)
3 An allusion to the Jewish resistance, although passive, to the order of the governor Petronius, introduced statues of the emperor Gaius in the Temple, 40-41 C.E. See Josephus, The Jewish War, II.
4 For the Roman procurators in 62-64 and 64-66 C.E., see ibid, II.
also for conscience sake, as the Apostle teaches,1 since this magisterial authority has been instituted by God. But I refuse to admit that such a conclusion may be drawn from that premise — namely, that whenever it concerns political affairs and, as the saying goes, affairs touching the constitution of the kingdom, these subjects, once they have discreetly and respectfully brought to the notice of the ruler what they regard as just and fair, and what is in accordance with the laws under which he was elected and appointed, they should immediately, of necessity, completely subject themselves to his will; and they should utterly, and without any reservations whatsoever, obey what to him is subject to limitations. I may, on the contrary, indeed boldly maintain that the magistrate suffers no injustice if he is constrained to his duty; and he suffers no injustice if, when no further room is left for reason, an even more drastic procedure against him is followed. For since the administration has been entrusted to him only upon specified conditions, we should not in the least judge that new covenants are being concluded with him, whenever he is called upon either to ratify the previous conditions and observe them in the sequel; or to give way to another who seems more likely to be concerned about their observance. And if this must be established by means of example, I think a sufficient number of them have been adduced by me above. They abundantly established that such a proposition, that the mere will of the king should suffice for all his subjects, cannot rest upon or be defended by means of any rational argument, nor by any practice or experience of a well-ordered monarchy.
Question 10. Whether those who suffer persecution for the sake of their religion, can defend themselves against tyrants without hurt to their consciences.
It finally remains for me to solve a question of the greatest moment — namely, whether it is allowable, in accordance with the condition and distinctions laid down above, to offer resistance by armed force, to that tyranny which assails the true religion, and even stamps it out as far as possible, and to contend against persecution. The following may be the principal reasons for entertaining doubts about it.
First, since religion touches the conscience, which can in no way be subjected to violence, it would appear that it should not be rendered secure, nor be defended, by means of any armed force.2 For that reason, we perceive that religion has thus far been propagated by the preaching of the Word of God, by prayers, and by patience. Besides this, there are many passages to be found in the Scriptures, from which the difference between the kingdoms of this world, and that of the spiritual kingdom of Christ, is made apparent.3 To these examples may be added that of the holy Prophets; and in the last instance, that of Christ Himself, our Lord. For although all authority, power, and virtue dwelt in Him, He never adopted this method of defense; the Apostles, and all the martyrs after them, also refrained from doing so. Entire legions of the faithful of Christ, abundantly furnished with arms, likewise submitted to death, rather than defend themselves by drawing the sword and assailing the very enemies of truth.4
1 Rom 13:5.
2 That is, because no one can force you to believe something, you have no right use force to prevent it. – WHG
3 For example, Joh 18:36; Jas 2:5. – WHG 4 A probable allusion to the legend of the massacre of the Thebian legion, commanded by Saint Maurice.
I answer, first, that it is an absurd and indeed a false opinion, that the means by which the objects and affairs of this world are defended (such as courts of law and armed force), do not merely differ from the means by which spiritual things can be defended, but are diametrically opposed to them — that they are so incompatible, that such defenses neither can nor should find any application in a matter of religion. On the contrary, I declare that it is the principal duty of a most excellent and pious ruler, that whatever means, authority, and power have been granted to him by God, should apply to this end entirely: so that God may truly be recognized among his subjects, and that being recognized, He may be worshipped and adored as the supreme King of all kings. Therefore, the man of that description will not merely apply all the power of his jurisdiction, and the authority of the laws, against the despisers or disturbers of the true religion — those who have shown themselves to be not the least amenable to ecclesiastical words of rebuke and admonition
— but will even punish with armed force, those who cannot otherwise be restrained from impiety.
In support of this view, the Scriptures themselves furnish us with innumerable reasons and examples. The reasons are of the following kind: a) Since the purpose of all well-ordered polities is not simply peace and quiet in this life
(as some heathen philosophers have imagined), but the whole present life of men should be directed towards the glory of God. It therefore follows that those who are set over nations, should bring to bear all their zeal, all the faculties they have received from God, to this end — that the pure worship of God on which His glory depends, should be maintained in the highest degree, and increased among the people over whom they hold sway. b) Finally, even if we were to concede that the ultimate purpose of polities was the undisturbed preservation of this life, we would still have to admit that the sole reason for obtaining and preserving it is namely, that God, who is both author and director of our life, be piously and rightly worshipped.
Proofs or examples are quite innumerable in the Scriptures: a) For it is particularly clear that those patriarchs of old were simultaneously the highest priests, and also the supreme rulers among their people. This is expressly recorded concerning Melchizedek and Eli.1 Although these two offices were afterward separated by the Lord, this did not happen because they were incompatible with each other, but because one man could scarcely be equal to the performance of both. b) Furthermore, when the king is bid to have with him a book of the law, so that he may practice himself in reading it day and night, this is demanded of him not as it would be of a private citizen, but as of a king and a public magistrate.2 c) Among the laws of which the execution is entrusted to the rulers, those are deemed the principal ones which condemn to death the despisers of the true religion.3 The application of these laws we mark in the case of David. By means of fixed laws, he
1 Gen 14:19; 1Sam 1:9; Cf. 1Sam 2:27-28.
2 Deu 17:19.
3 Deu 13.
rendered inviolable the entire worship of God.1 And this was so in the case of Solomon, who supplemented the decree of his father against transgressors;2 and likewise in the edicts of Kings Asa, Jesohaphat, Hezekiah, and Josiah 3 — even of Nebuchadnezzar and Darius, when they were persuaded by the prophet Daniel to worship God.4 d) Lastly, when the Apostle declares that kings and princes have been appointed by God to this end,5 it is not merely that we may pass life honorably, but also piously. That is, it is not merely that we may live as it befits honest and respectable men, and in accordance with piety towards God, but it leaves no doubt that he has stated this whole question most succinctly. Hence we observe that the earliest Councils against heretics were summoned not upon the authority of the Roman Pontiffs — who had not yet appeared in the character in which they came to light much later — but by the decree of the emperors, that by means of this remedy they might hear the case in accordance with the persuasive arguments of the pious bishops. There are also innumerable constitutions
(i.e. laws) and canons of the Church surviving. These were enacted by the Emperor
Justinian, as well as by his successors, and even by Charlemagne and others approving of the same course. But to what end are monarchs, even today, being so furiously incited by that whore of Rome, to persecute with fire and sword, and to banish those whom they themselves style as heretics, unless it holds that this duty falls within their province?
And in this matter, it does indeed rest upon the best and surest foundation; but abuses it no less than innumerable other testimonies of truth, to support and defend its own impieties and blasphemies.
But you will say, why such a longwinded digression? For the question is not whether kings or rulers ought to defend and promote piety, but whether subjects can defend themselves by force or arms against persecutors. I therefore reply to the earlier of the two questions proposed above. It is one thing to introduce religion into some part for the first time; and another to preserve it once it has been received; or to wish to restore it when it has gone to ruin, and has been buried as a result of the connivance or ignorance or malice of men.
For I grant that it should initially be introduced and spread by the influence of the Spirit of God alone; and that is done by the Word of God, which is suited to teaching, conviction and exhortation. For this is the particular task of the Holy Spirit; yet He employs spiritual instruments.
It will therefore be the part of a pious ruler who wishes to entice his people away from idolatry and false superstitions to the true religion, to see to it in the first place, that they are instructed in piety by means of true and reliable argument — just as it is the part of the subjects to give their assent to truth and reason, and to readily submit to it. Finally, the ruler will be fully occupied in rendering the true religion secure by means of good and noble decrees against those who assail and resist it out of pure obstinacy. We have seen this done in our times in England, Denmark, Sweden, Scotland, and the greater part of Germany and Switzerland — against the Papists, the Anabaptists and other heretics. If
1 1Chr 28.
2 2Chr 1:9.
3 2Chr 15:13; 20:21; 31:2; 34:31.
4 Dan 3:28-29; 6:26-28.
5 1Tim 2:1-2 — "Therefore I exhort first of all that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men, for kings and all who are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and reverence.
the other nations preferred following their example, rather than trusting and obeying that bloodstained whore of Rome, is it possible that greater tranquillity could indeed be seen in the whole world in the sphere of religion as well as politics?
Therefore, what would subjects need to do if they are compelled by their ruler to worship idols instead? Assuredly, reason would not permit them to force their ruler to a complete change in their condition. They would rather consider it needful to patiently bear with him, even to persecution, while in the meantime they worship God purely, or altogether go into exile and seek new abodes. But once the free exercise of the true religion has been granted by means of decrees that are lawfully passed, settled, and confirmed by public authority, then I declare that the ruler is that much more bound to have them observed.
This is because a matter of religion is of greater moment compared to all other matters — so much so, that he has no right to repeal them upon his own arbitrary decision, without having heard the case. That can be done only with the intervention of that same authority by which they were enacted in the first place. If he acts otherwise, I declare that he is practicing manifest tyranny. And with due allowance for the observations made above, that authority will be all the more free to oppose him. In the same way, we are bound to set greater store and value by the salvation of our souls, and the freedom of our conscience, than by any other matters, however desirable they may be. Therefore, it should be no surprise to anyone that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Prophets, the Apostles, and other martyrs too, being men in private station, confined themselves within the limits of their calling.
And as regards those who held public office, or those legions which in the midst of battle suffered martyrdom with their commanders, without offering any resistance, even though their attackers were acting in violation of the decrees previously passed in favor of Christians (especially under the Emperors Diocletian and Julian), there is a twofold answer. First, even though certain emperors before Diocletian had made the persecution somewhat less severe — as it is certain that Hadrian, Antonius and Alexander did — none of them ever permitted the public exercise of the Christian religion. Next, I also repeat the well-known saying that whatever is lawful, is not always expedient. For I would not be inclined to assert that a religion which is made lawful by public decrees, must always be defended and held fast by means of arms against manifest tyranny. Rather, that is the right and lawful course for those upon whom this burden specifically rests, and to whom
God has granted the opportunity. Consider the examples described above, of the people of Libnah against Jehoram; and of the people of Jerusalem against Amaziah; and the war of Constantine against Maxentius which was undertaken at the request of the citizens of Rome. These abundantly prove it. Hence I conclude that among the martyrs, should be counted not only those who defeated the tyranny of the enemies of the truth by no other defense than patience; but also those who devoted their strength to God in defense of the true religion as duly supported by the authority of laws; or those whose right it is to defend the laws.
I decided to urge these arguments thus far, in reply to the last objection, that I might satisfy those who raise it so as not to violate their consciences, because they are genuinely afraid of sinning against God if they attempt anything of that kind. There is that class of men who confer no other benefit upon the world than that they fill it with innocent blood while they abuse the authority of rulers. This done so that they may pursue and advance their own interests from the ruin of others. Meantime, they are characterized by such
shamelessness, that they dare to attack and assail with these objections, those who do not spontaneously present themselves to them for slaughter. Thus they cloak their cruelty and unbridled license under the false pretext of religion and zeal. This class of men, I say, would merit no other reply than what would deservedly be replied to robbers who summoned merchants and other travelers before the court, for not undertaking a journey without putting on a sword for their defense. The robbers declare that these men had no right to do so, though they themselves adopted every kind of weapon to murder them.
They put me in mind of that abominable Roman, Fimbria, whose like of hired assassins may be seen in large numbers at the present time. So insolent was his daring, or rather so shameless was his effrontery, that at the time of the Sullan proscription,1 when he had had a wound dealt to Scaevola.2 This was a man famous among the citizens of Rome for his extraordinary virtue and honesty; but he didn't succumb to the wound as Sullan wished. Sullan was bold enough to complain, and to threaten Scaevola that he would have him before the court. It was as though Sullan had been outrageously wronged because
Scaevola had not unresistingly allowed the dagger to enter his heart.3 But because all discussion with men of that kind is to no purpose, they should all be referred not so much to their own personal conscience (which the majority are entirely lacking), as to the tribunal of Him whose supreme authority and judgment they themselves have not been able to escape; and as unmistakable evidence, time, and reality, have at length proved.
1 The Sullan Proscription was a sentence of death or banishment issued by Sulla against Roman citizens in 81 B.C., while he was dictator. These were against his political foes, whom he labelled 'enemies of the state.' They were hunted down and removed. Some described these decrees as state-approved murder. – WHG
2 Quintus Mucius Scaevola, also called Pontifex (died 82 bc), founder of the scientific study of Roman law. – WHG
3 Cicero, Orationes, Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino Oratio, Art. 33.