Epilogue and Conclusion about the Authority of the Estates
the kingdom, then will that promise or condition be deemed less fair or lawful, which the people stipulates from the king (either at his election or at his investiture), since it is supported both by the greatest fairness and by common reasonableness — namely, that the king shall direct his entire administration in accordance with the provisions of the laws, of which he himself is, or should be, the supreme guardian and defender?
Epilogue and Conclusion about the Authority of the Estates The purpose, therefore, of all that has been said above, is as follows: namely, that the highest authority rests with kings or other supreme rulers with this proviso — that if they violate the noblest laws and sworn conditions, and degenerate into unabashed tyranny, and do not give heed to sound counsels, then it shall be lawful and permitted to the subordinate magistrates, to take precautions for themselves and for those over whom they exercise guardianship, and to offer resistance to the tyrant of the people. Thus the Estates or Orders of the realm, upon whom this authority has been conferred by the laws, can and must so far oppose the tyrant, and if need be, even inflict just and deserved punishment upon him, until matters have been restored to their former condition. And if they do so, so far from deserving to be regarded as guilty of sedition or high treason, they should, on the contrary, be deemed only to have conscientiously carried out their duty and their oath by which they were bound to God and their country. By means of these clearest examples of kingdoms and empires, both ancient and modern, we have demonstrated the practice in these matters. And yet, to answer the objection that this should be judged by legal arguments rather than by examples, I will add as many other grounds as possible to lend greater support to our point of view.
I. Argument from Natural Law and Equity To begin with, I maintain that there are two propositions which justice as such — or that law of nature upon which alone the maintenance of all human society depends — does not allow to be called into question. The first of these is that, in all compacts and covenants which are contracted by mutual and sole agreement between the parties, those by whom the obligations were entered into, can of themselves cancel and annul it, whenever reason so demands. Accordingly, those who possess authority to elect a king, will also have the right to dethrone him. The second proposition is that, if there is any just occasion for the annulment of a compact or covenant, by reason of which the obligation would of itself disappear and be held void, it only arises when the essential conditions for which the obligation was particularly entered upon, are manifestly violated.
Therefore, let those who so far exalt the authority of kings and supreme rulers, as to dare maintain that they have no other Judge but God alone to whom they are accountable for their deeds, furnish proof that there has been any nation anywhere which has consciously and without intimidation or compulsion of some kind, subjected itself to the arbitrary rule of some supreme ruler, without the express or tacit addition of the proviso that it be justly and fairly ruled and guided by him.
But if someone were to furnish an example of peoples who, upon being defeated in war, surrendered at their discretion, and swore to the conditions dictated by the victors, it would not be enough for me to answer with the lawyers, that being extorted by violence or intimidation which rule their consciences, does not easily permit oaths of that kind to
be heedlessly violated.1 But I would further add that even if any people has consciously and of its free will, granted assent to an undertaking which, as such, is evidently sinful and opposed to the law of nature, such an obligation is null and void. There is so little ground for reasonable doubt, whether that obligation which was contracted as a result of violence or intimidation, or from open deceit and malpractice, should be regarded as valid and binding. For this general rule of law and justice, sustained by the common principles of nature which still linger in man after the Fall, however corrupt, is so firmly established and so lasting, that nothing which is openly opposed and repugnant to them should be regarded as just and valid between men. Moreover, this must be understood of matters that are utterly unjust and manifestly sinful. Everyone who is not entirely destitute of human insight, realizes that these cannot be exacted or performed by anyone, with a good conscience. Such was the compact which, as the story goes, came about in the earliest times between Minos, King of the island of Crete, and the Athenians — namely, that every year they should deliver to him seven youths and seven maidens, that they might be devoured by the Minotaur2 (as the tale records it), or that they might serve his lust and tyranny, which seems more credible.
The condition offered by the Ammonites to the inhabitants of Jabesh was of that kind 3 — namely, that they would spare them and receive them into their custody, provided that they each put out an eye. Yet the condition offered to the citizens of Jerusalem by the detestable tyrant Antiochus,4 was more intolerable, and it was accepted by the majority of them — namely, that they should abjure the true faith for the sake of saving their lives.
But if a condition offered by the victor, and accepted by the vanquished, is merely burdensome and distressing, and it comprises disadvantages in this life alone, then in that case, I grant that it is the oath that should be regarded, rather than any advantages or disadvantages. Therefore God most sternly rebuked and punished Zedekiah, the last king from the house of David, because he had revolted from the king of the Chaldeans in violation of his sworn oath.5 Assuredly the inhabitants of Gibeon, though they were reduced to the most distressing slavery by Joshua, yet nowhere do they complain about him.6 But particularly when it concerns religion, the greatest care should be exercised that no one covet permission to heedlessly abandon the promises which he has made under oath to God. And yet, in this matter too, a limit of the following kind will have to be observed — namely, that just as in religion no one should lightly change anything, even so (since we cannot be misled in this without the gravest loss) no one may obstinately enforce those promises which, it is clear, were wickedly and unlawfully made to God under the pretext of religion. And because till now, this has not been sufficiently and carefully noted, many serious and dangerous revolutions have occurred in the world.
But let us suppose that there was some nation which submitted itself to some ruler, without any express condition. This was either from lack of foresight or as a result of blandishments, or lastly, because it once chanced upon a good ruler from a certain family,
1 Ulpien in Corpus Iuris Civilis, Digeste, 4, 2, 1: "Ait praetor, 'Quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo.' olim ita edicebatur 'quod vi metusve causa.'..."
2 see, inter alia, Plutarch, Thesus, 15, 1 3 1Sam 11:2.
4 1Mac 1:43-55.
5 Eze 17:16.
6 Jos 9:22-27.