Question 5. Whether manifest tyrants can lawfully be checked by armed force
means, without offense to God, check, or if need be, even expel by armed force, the evident tyranny of the supreme Ruler.
Question 5. Whether manifest tyrants can lawfully be checked by armed force.
To give a clearer answer to this question, I must first lay down certain principles constituting, as it were, the foundations of the whole question. Assuredly, it is clear that the people did not first originate from rulers; but whichever people desired to be ruled by a single monarch, or by the chief men elected by them, existed prior to their rulers. Hence it follows that the people were not created for the sake of rulers, but on the contrary, the rulers were created for the sake of the people — even as the guardian is appointed for the ward, not the ward for the guardian; and the shepherd for the flock, not the flock for the shepherd. This proposition is not merely obvious in itself, but it may be corroborated by the history of nearly all nations. God Himself, although he elected Saul to substitute for Samuel in accordance with the desires of the people, God willed that Saul be chosen and accepted as King by the vote of the people. 1 Thus David, though he had first been chosen as king by God Himself, would not undertake the administration of the Kingdom unless he were first confirmed by the vote and unfettered concord of the tribes of Israel. 2
On similar grounds, it happened even afterwards, that though the kingship had been granted by the will of God to the family of David, yet in the end, one from the descendants of David should rule — one whom the people had approved, and no other (unless perhaps something irregular happened to prevent it, as when the Egyptian and then the Syrian kings ruled as tyrants over the people of God). It was such that this kingship was hereditary as far as the family was concerned, but elective regarding the individual incumbent — i.e. it was dependent on the election of the people. This may be seen from the histories of Solomon,3 Rehoboam,4 Joash,5 Uzziah,6 and Jehoahaz.7 It is for this reason that Absalom grasped the occasion to usurp his father's throne.8 This is why
David's friend, Hushai, answered Absalom: "No, but whom the LORD, and this people, and all the men of Israel have chosen, I will be his, and I will remain with him." 9
In short, if we would also investigate the histories of ancient times, recorded by secular writers, it will be established — as indeed, Nature herself seems to proclaim with a loud voice — that rulers by whose authority their inferiors might be guided, were elected for a reason. It was that either the whole human race must perish, or some intermediate class must be instituted so that one or more rulers might be able to command the others by it, to protect good men, and restrain the wicked by means of punishments. This is what not only Plato, Aristotle, and the other natural philosophers have taught and proved with the light of human reason alone, but God Himself taught this by the utterance of St. Paul,
1 1Sam 10 & 11.
2 2Sam 2:7; 5:1-3.
3 1Chr 29:22.
4 1Kng 12.
5 2Kng 11:12.
6 2Chr 26:1.
7 2Chr 36:1.
8 2Sam 15: 1-13.
9 2Sam 16:18.
writing to the Romans. 1 So that, the rulers of nearly the entire world confirmed this with clear words. Thus the origin of all States and Powers is, with the best of reasoning, derived from God, the author of all good. Homer also recognized and freely testified of this when he called kings "the fosterlings of Zeus" and "the shepherds of the lost." 2
And therefore, since we are beginning a discussion concerning the power of Rulers, what prevents us from passing over to that prime origin from which they derived, and from considering to what end they were instituted? For it is obvious that every discussion of just or unjust things, must begin and end with the end for which those things exist. For we must judge that something is rightly and duly done, when it attains the end for which it was designed. Therefore, when the duty of the rulers is inquired into, all will admit that it is assuredly right to remind rulers of their duty, and also to roundly admonish them whenever they stray from it. But when a case occurs of either needing to restrain tyrants who beyond a trace of doubt have strayed; or of punishing them in accordance with their deserts, the majority so earnestly commend patience and prayers to God, that they consider and condemn as mutineers and pseudo-Christians, all those who refuse to bow their necks to torture.
Here we are doubtless on dangerous ground. I would therefore once again beseech my readers to bear in mind my remarks immediately preceding, lest they draw inadmissible conclusions from what must be said in the sequel. I admit that I most strongly approve of Christian patience as laudable beyond all the other virtues; and I admit that it is never sufficiently commended; I admit that men should be zealously exhorted to it, because it contributes largely to the attainment of eternal bliss. I detest rebellions and all disorder, as awful abominations, I am of the opinion, especially in affliction, that we should depend upon God alone. I recognize prayer, accompanied by a serious recognition of our error, as the true and necessary remedy for the overthrow of tyranny — since this evil is rightly counted among the scourges sent by God for the chastisement of His people. But I deny that all these considerations somehow deprive nations crushed by manifest tyranny, of their right to safeguard themselves against it, by means of prayers and repentance, as well as other just remedies. And I will corroborate this as I reply to the following powerful arguments.
Since these principles have been established concerning the origin of kings and other rulers (as demonstrated above), it follows that those who by force or deceit, usurp that authority which by no right belongs to them, are not legitimate rulers. There are two kinds of such tyrants: for some, in violation of the laws laid down and received, usurp tyranny over their fellow-citizens. Julius Caesar, under the feigned title of Perpetual
Dictator, took possession of the Roman commonwealth. And many other tyrants, particularly in Greece, crushed the liberty of their country. Others, however, not content with that absolute power which they rightfully acquire over their own people, extend their dominions at the cost of their neighbors' liberty; they increase them by means of fortified boundary-lines. It is for this reason that monarchies, ever since the origin of the world, have achieved such wide dominions. The sacred writings offer us an example of this in
1 Rom 13:1-5.
2 For "Fosterlings of Zeus" see Homer passim, e.g. Iliad, XVII, 652; XXIV, 803, and Odyssey, IV, 391; XV, 155, 167.
For "Shepherds of the lost" see ibid., e.g. Iliad, II, 85, 105; V, 566; XX, 110, and Odyssey, IV, 24, 532; XX, 106; XXIV,
368, 456.
Nimrod;1 we also see that the Israelites were generally oppressed in this way, by the neighboring peoples. Hence, since those tyrants had no lawful right over the people of God, I maintain that the Israelites were free not merely to disobey the sinful commands of these peoples, but even to set a just defense against their unjust violence. And therefore the leaders of the tribes of Israel did a grievous wrong whenever they failed to oppose the foreign foe with united courage and strength, in defense of the liberty of their country — provided that an occasion for opposing them presented itself. For there is no doubt that even private individuals are bound by the laws of both God and men, to succor their country with all their power, when it is oppressed and in distress — especially when its religion and liberty are simultaneously endangered. For it was a true remark which the captive pirate dared to utter when he was dragged before Alexander. He declared that he differed in no way from the king; but that the king plundered the world with a multitude of ships, whereas he did so with but a single vessel.2
Objection. These remarks are not countered by an objection which certain people are prone to make; namely, that it is God by whom kingdoms and empires are transferred and exchanged; and therefore tyrants frequently gain the victory with the approval of God.
Answer. Far be it for me, on that account, to either support the view of Lucan, 3 who dared to write that "license had been granted to crime;" or to condemn Demosthenes' cause as unjust, because he was overcome — compelled to yield while defending the liberty of his country against the violence of Philip of Macedon; whereas Philip came off victorious.4 I don't use these examples so the consciences of pious men may rest upon them as upon rules, but because they are famous and very well known to most people. And I use them for the further reason that, though these events occurred among heathen nations, they are not so far removed from the standard of justice, that it may not justifiably be said that justice was on one side and injustice on the other. For I would not hold that we must judge by the favorable or adverse result alone, whether an undertaking was just or unjust — as indeed Demosthenes answered his opponent, Aeschines, that the source of his reproach was the unfortunate result of the battle of Charoneia. To rather speak as Christians, God is generally prone to punish the sins of men, or to so test His people, that he assigns to their undertakings — however good and just in themselves — an outcome far other than they had expected. This may best be seen in the war which the remaining tribes of Israel waged against the children of Benjamin.5 But for all that, God remains no less just, by whatever means He enforces His judgments; nor must it be held that the nations had a less lawful cause against their hostile tyrants, merely because they were cast down by some just judgment of God, and fell into ruin. Hence, I could never approve of the view of those who, without any distinction or exception, at once and indiscriminately condemn all tyrannicides on whom the Greeks formerly bestowed such exceptional rewards.6
1 Gen 10:8-18.
2 Augustine, De Civ. Dei, IV, 4, 25. Cf. Cicero, De Repub., 3, 14, 24.
3 Lucan, De bello civili, 1, 2: "Iusque datum sceleri canimus." Cf. the Latin text of Beza: "ius sceleri datum" (Ed. Sturm, p. 36.).
4 Demosthenes, De corona, 180.
5 Judges 20.
6 Aristotle, Politics, V, VIII, 7 and also 9.
As little does the view of those commend itself, to whom the majority of liberations recorded in the Book of Judges seem so foreign and strange,1 that they are of the opinion that these can in no way be adduced as examples.. For however true it may be that those
Judges of the people of Israel were moved and stirred to perform famous deeds by some divine and exceptional instinct, it does not immediately follow that the Israelites themselves — whether holding office or even as private citizens — could not in accordance with their ordinary right, have expelled the tyranny of strangers who had been neither elected nor approved by the people. That those liberations were effected by means of those men alone whom God summoned forth in a special way, does not disprove my contention.
Rather, it demonstrates that the spirit of the Israelites had been stunned and broken by the just judgment of God, for their transgressions. Therefore, to follow those examples rightly and lawfully, I am of the opinion that the following true means should be held fast: namely, if anyone strives to seize, or has already usurped, an unjust tyranny over others
— whether he is a stranger, or like a viper, he leaps from the womb of his country, that by his birth he may cause her death — then private citizens, before all else, shall approach their legitimate magistrates in order that the public enemy be cast out by the public authority, and with the common consent of all. But if the magistrate connives at the attempt, or in some way refuses to perform his duty, let each private citizen bestir himself with all his power, to defend the lawful constitution of his country to which (after God) he owes his entire existence, and to defend against the one who cannot be deemed a lawful magistrate — since either he has already usurped that rank in violation of the public laws, or else he is endeavoring to usurp it.
Next, it should be noted here that a defect which originally adhered to a usurpation, may afterwards be rectified — so much so, that the one who originally was a tyrant, may become a lawful and inviolable ruler — that is, of course, if afterwards the free and lawful consent is gained of those who have the power to elect and appoint a true and lawful ruler.
For example: The war undertaken against Caesar under the leadership of Pompey was just, even though Caesar emerged victorious in it. But if it was true that Caesar, by the free and voluntary assent of the Roman people, afterwards obtained the supreme power under the pretense of a perpetual dictatorship, it would no longer be necessary to raise the question whether the conspiracy against him was just and lawful — unless it were quickly shown that he clearly abused those very dictatorial powers. I venture to declare most positively that those leading citizens of Rome could have, and even should have, defended the Commonwealth against the Triumvirate. But I would not venture to maintain that Cinna and his associates could lawfully have conspired against the life of Augustus after the "Royal Law" 2 (as they called it) had been promulgated and passed.
But here too we must distinguish. It will readily be conceded, I think, that an agreement
— whether freely manifested by, or extorted by, means of violence or intimidation from the whole people or a majority of them, should be annulled rather than observed, if it were established beyond any doubt, that such an agreement was clearly incompatible with fairness and honor.3 For who would persuade himself that some nation would freely,
1 Jdg 3:15-25.
2 An allusion to Lex Regia. See Corpus Juris Civilis, Inst., I, 2, 6: "quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem comcessit." Cf. Dig.,
I, 4, 1.
3 That is, a tyranny of the majority is still dangerous; tyranny always produces evil fruit, even if it's popular. – WHG
wittingly, and unconstrainedly wish to subject itself to some ruler to this end: that it might subsequently be murdered and utterly destroyed by him? But surely, here again, two considerations should be heeded whenever those undertakings have to be annulled or set right, to which agreement has been granted without due consideration. First, nothing should be attempted or done recklessly; and secondly, nothing should be done by way of insurrection, but in due order and in a disciplined fashion, so far as possible.
The present condition of the Christian Commonwealth furnishes us with two examples of this; both are assuredly of the greatest importance. The first is that of the unjust and sinful submissiveness with which kings and nations have bound themselves by oath to the Roman Antichrist. I maintain that they are no more bound by that oath, than if they had expressly and openly sworn to Satan that they would subvert all the rights of God as well as men. The other example is that of the so-called temporal jurisdiction to which the ecclesiastical prelates have laid claim. Because this is diametrically opposed to the command of Christ, as well as to the clearest examples of Him and of all Apostles — as Saint Bernard has particularly shown 1 — it assuredly follows that, of itself, it is void, since the civic rulers could not divest and deprive themselves of that jurisdiction, nor could the ecclesiastics receive it from kings or nations, or acquire it at a price. Much less should they have usurped it by force and cunning tricks, as they certainly did in by far the greater part of the world.
Let these remarks be made against tyrants who have unjustly grasped authority over their fellow-citizens, or over foreign nations.
Question 6. What is the duty of subjects towards their superiors who have fallen into tyranny?
It now remains for us to address the other question which has not without reason been debated by numerous people in these present times. That is, what may subjects of good conscience do when their supreme rulers, who are legitimate in other respects, degenerate into manifest tyrants? Must the authority of the supreme rulers who have become undisguised tyrants, remain so sacred and inviolate that the subjects are obliged in all circumstances to endure it, such that they may in no way offer resistance to it? Or if indeed resistance is allowable in some way, may they go so far as to seize arms?
Three kinds of subjects I answer that there are three kinds of subjects in all, or that subjects are characterized by a threefold differentia. For some are private citizens performing no duty of public administration; others do indeed hold a magistracy, but these are subject to the supreme rulers (what we call subaltern or inferior magistrates); the third class, though they do not indeed hold the highest authority, nor yet wield supreme and regular power, they are placed in such a station that they are, as it were, the bridles and reins to keep the supreme ruler to his duty. However, just as these kinds are different, so a different reply must be given concerning each.
Private citizens may not offer resistance to their lawful ruler who is a tyrant
1 St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione... ad Eugenium tertium, book 1, cap. 6. (Migne, P.L., 182, 735-36).
Whether those of private station have freely and openly agreed to the rule of an unjust usurper (as the Roman people submitted of their own free will to Augustus and his successors), 1 or the one who was their lawful ruler has become a manifest tyrant (as were
Abimelech among the Israelites,2 the Thirty at Athens,3 the Decemvirs at Rome,4 and others elsewhere) — I maintain that (apart from a special injunction from God, which I do not discuss here) no private citizen is entitled, on his own private authority, to oppose the tyrant with violence against violence. Rather, it behooves him in every way, either to depart from the realm of that ruler and change his domicile, or to bear the yoke of the tyrant patiently by taking refuge with God in prayer — provided only (as we have remarked from the beginning) that he not be constrained to become the instrument of that very tyranny against someone, or to refrain from performing any of those acts which are due to God or to his neighbor.
Objection. But against this reply, an objection may be urged: namely, the proposition which we established above concerning that twofold class of tyrants to whom we declared that even private citizens could, and indeed should, offer resistance with all their power.
For whether a private citizen usurps power, or someone not satisfied with his lawful supremacy exercises tyrannical rule, it would at first sight appear to fall within the same category; hence it might seem to follow that the same decision would apply in either case.
Answer. But as we look closely into these matters, it becomes clear that these two classes are entirely different, even though they seem very similar. For he who launches an attack on those who are in no way subject to him, even if his desire is to rule fairly and in accordance with goodness and justice (as we read concerning Peisistratos and Demetrios of Phaleron, among the Athenians),5 he may yet lawfully be prevented — even by force of arms, and by any citizens whatsoever; even those of the humblest station, to whom he desired to do violence, since they are not bound to him by any obligation. But once he has been approved and accepted by his people, even if he abuses his right, he yet retains the basis of his authority as against his own private subjects, since an obligation entered upon publicly, and by mutual consent, cannot be dissolved and broken by the will of any private citizen. For if it were otherwise, endless disorders would ensue, even worse than tyranny itself; and in the place of a single tyrant whom it might be our intention to cast down, a thousand would succeed him.
Furthermore, a single reason derived from the authority of the Word of God should be of greater weight here, than anything else that could be adduced to the contrary. St. Paul, in prescribing their duty to men in private station, forbids them not merely to resist their rulers (supreme rulers as well as subordinate) but enjoins us to obey them for conscience' sake also.6 St. Peter also bids us to honor the king,7 probably being mindful of that reproof which he heard from the Master when, as a private citizen, he drew the sword against the power of the state (even though that power was abusing its authority against the Lord).8
1 Another allusion to Lex Regia, established by the Emperor Augustus. See Question 5, note.
2 Judges 9.
3 The thirty tyrants of Athens, 404-403 B.C..
4 The Decemviri, governors of Rome, 451-449 B.C.
5 Peisistratos was a ruler of Athens, 560-527 B.C.; Demetrios of Phaleron governed the state from 317-307 B.C.
6 Rom 13:5.
7 1Pet 2:17.
8 Mat 26:51-54; Joh 18:10-11.
But everyone knows of what nature the Caesars were then — Tiberius, Nero, and the other rulers over provinces. The holy Martyrs afterwards followed this example while the inhuman tyrants persecuted them most cruelly, not only under the emperors who raged against the Christians in accordance with the laws of the Romans, but also under those who treacherously violated the edicts issued in favor of the Christians, as happened under the emperor Julian the Apostate.1
In short, to conclude this part of the inquiry, I maintain that no one in private station is allowed to set himself in open violence against a tyrant to whose domination the people, of its own free will, previously consented. 2 For if we must so far abide by private contracts, pacts, agreements, and undertakings that we suffer damage rather than break our word, how much more should private citizens be on their guard lest in any way they refuse to honor an obligation entered upon by a solemn and public agreement?
Concerning subordinate magistrates I now come to the lower magistrates, who are intermediaries, as it were — subalterns as the common people call them — between the supreme magistrate and the people. By this title, I do not mean the domestic officers of the King personally (that is, those who perform some duty within the royal palace, and serve his person rather than the kingdom); but rather those who perform public duties. That is, the duties pertaining to the condition of the kingdom, either as regards its courts of justice or matters of war, and who therefore, even in monarchies, are styled servants not of the King. but of the Crown or Kingdom (for there is a highly important difference between these). Of this kind in Rome, were the consuls, the praetors, the city prefect, and the governors of provinces. Their election used to be entrusted to the people itself, and then in the time of the Emperors, even to the Senate. It included similar officials of the Republic or the Empire, who for that reason were called magistrates of the Roman people, even under the last Emperors.
Such were also among the Israelites — the leaders of the several tribes, the leaders of thousands, hundreds, fifties, tens, and the elders of the people. These political functions, first regulated by Moses, were in no way abolished afterwards when that aristocratic constitution was transformed into a monarchy. Indeed, under Solomon they were carefully established and observed. Even today, various classes of magistrates of this kind are to be found in most Christian kingdoms. Among them should be counted those who are styled dukes, marquises, counts, viscounts, barons, and squires, having formerly been chosen (in due order and lawfully) to certain public duties and tasks, so that they might perform them. And though these subsequently became hereditary titles of honor, yet they have in no way lost their original right and authority. Among this class should further be included those who are elected with a view to a variety of duties in civic communities, such as those who are generally called majors, vicars, consuls, capitolini (municipal judges), syndics, scabini (aldermen), and the like.
Subordinate magistrates are dependent not upon the person of the supreme magistrate, but upon the supreme magistracy as such.
1 Julian, or Julian II, was Roman Emperor from 361 to 363. – WHG 2 Notice "the people" is singular, not a collection of individuals who must each consent. Beza rightly asserts that the people "has" a voice, as an entity. This is essential to his argument. – WHG
Further, although these are all subject to the supreme magistrate, they receive their commands from him, and are instituted and approved by him. Yet they do not, properly speaking, depend upon him but (so to speak) upon the supremacy as such — that is, upon that supreme power and authority of the empire or kingdom. Hence, upon the death of the one who wielded the supreme power, they each remain in their own station as before, just as the supreme power remains the same. The one who succeeds to the place of the one who has died, confirms such subordinate magistrates, just as he also confirms the privileges of cities. Suetonius records in his Life of Vespasian, 1 that Tiberius Caesar first introduced this custom in the Roman Empire. In earlier times, it was not in use in Gaul,2 except perhaps when the kingship passed not from fathers to sons, but to strangers. This confirmation, I declare, does not entail that the supreme magistrate should be regarded as their originator — that is, as the prime source of their being, from whom they derive their origin. For the supreme magistrate himself, before he can be placed in possession of his highest administrative power, in turn takes the oath to the supreme power, in accordance with the conditions expressed in the formula of the oath. And afterwards, he receives the oath from the officials severally also. Thus, such a confirmation bestows no new right, any more than the investiture of a new vassal does so, or that performed by a new lord. It is merely a fresh recognition of an old right, by reason of a change of person.
The obligation subsisting between supreme and subordinate magistrates is mutual It hence appears that the obligation between the king and the officials of the kingdom is mutual; and that the entire administration of the kingdom is not entrusted to the king alone, but only the highest rank of it; and that the subordinate officials severally hold part of it, each in accordance with his own rank; and that is on fixed conditions on either side.
If those conditions are not kept by the subordinate magistrates, the supreme magistrate is entitled to discharge them or to correct them. Yet this is only after their case has been heard in accordance with the regular procedure which the laws of the kingdom prescribe
— unless he himself also desires to break the oath by which he promised to rule in accordance with the laws.3
On the contrary, however, if the one who received the royal dignity 4 — either by being elected to it, or by hereditary right — openly departs from those conditions under which he was expressly recognized and approved as king, then who would be inclined to doubt that the subordinate magistrates of the kingdom, and even the very provinces and cities whose administration has been entrusted to them, are automatically (ipso jure)5 free from their oath. They have the right to set themselves against the undisguised oppression of that kingdom whose defense and protection they undertook by oath, each in accordance with his own office. "What then?" someone will say, "will the one who but recently was regarded as the supreme ruler (whose authority should be inviolable) — will he, by the arbitrary will of every subordinate, now be deemed a mere private citizen, so that it will be lawful to assail him as a public enemy?"
1 It was not initiated by Vespasian, but by his son, Titus Flavius Vespasinus. See Seutonius, De vita Caesarum, book
VIII, Divus Titus, 8, 1.
2 France.
3 This is the condition (or restraint) imposed on the monarchs of England by the Magna Carta of 1215. – WHG
4 Dignity: a high office, rank or station. – WHG 5 Originally ipso iure: by operation of law, or as a matter of law.
Not at all, I answer; for this would be to offer a loophole, as the saying goes, to every kind of sinful sedition and conspiracy. But we are discussing open and manifest tyranny — tyrants of the sort who cannot admit or endure any admonishments whatsoever.
Furthermore, we are not addressing the tyrant who must be utterly thrust and cast down from his throne. Rather, we are inquiring whether no one can and should, in accordance with his rank, set himself against his own open violence, since it was shown before that it is not right for anyone to arbitrarily dishonor an obligation publicly contracted, whoever he might be, and however just a cause of complaint he might have concerning the tyrant.
The duty of subordinate magistrates On the other hand, since those subordinate instruments of the kingdom have received this office from the supreme power as such, so that they may be on their guard for the observance and protection of the laws among those who have been entrusted to their care; and since they have bound themselves by oath to perform that duty in all faith — an oath from which they cannot be absolved by any fault of the one who, from being a king has become a tyrant and quite openly violates those conditions upon which he was appointed king, and the observance of which he undertook on oath — would it not be a just thing, according to all law, both divine and human, and because of the oath taken by them to ensure the observance of the laws, that somewhat greater liberty should be granted to these subordinate magistrates, than to those citizens who are of entirely private station, and without any public office? 1
I therefore maintain that, if they are reduced to such unavoidable compulsion, they are certainly bound, even by means of armed force if they can, to protect against manifest tyranny, the safety of those who have been entrusted to their care and honor. This is only as long as their public interests have been better consulted and fittingly provided for, in accordance with the collective counsel of the States-General or the Nomophylakes — that is, those with whom all the legislative authority of the kingdom or empire in question rests. Moreover, doing so is not being factious, nor a traitor towards your supreme ruler.
Rather, it is being a most faithful keeper of your oath towards those whose direction you have undertaken against perjury; and against the oppressor of a kingdom, who should have been its protector.
At Rome, Brutus and Lucretius lawfully exercised this right against Tarquin the Proud,2 who was openly practicing tyranny — although this cause was theirs for private reasons also. Lucretius as prefect of the city, and Brutus as tribune of the knights, summoned together the Roman people, so that by their authority the tyrant might be expelled from the kingdom, and his possessions confiscated. There can be no doubt that if they had been able to seize him, they would also have condemned him in accordance with the laws which he violated (whereas he should have been their upholder). For it is an entirely false maxim
— one spoken by a detestable flatterer, rather than a subject loyal to his ruler — that a supreme magistrate is subject to no laws.3 On the contrary, the man who has promised on
1 Beza suggests the people don't have a right, but subordinate magistrates have a duty, to oppose tyranny. This is to prevent mob rule and open rebellion, as with the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. It instead provides an orderly overthrow of tyranny, assuming those subordinate magistrates are not themselves part of the tyranny. — WHG
2 Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, the legendary seventh and final king of Rome, reigning from 535 BC until the popular uprising in 509 BC that led to the establishment of the Roman Republic.
3 The flatterer Beza speaks of, evidently cites the Corpus Iuris Civilus, Digeste, I, 3, 31: "Princeps legibus solutus est."
oath to be the defender and champion of all laws, should not fail to administer his rule upon the violation of any single law. Hence, he should rather hold fast the splendid saying of the emperor Marcus Aurelius: it is a worthy maxim that an emperor should profess himself subject to the laws.1 And Trajan, that mightiest of emperors (who has never received praise according to his merits), also approved of it by his action. For when he was appointing Sura as military tribune, and handing him the customary unsheathed dagger, he remarked:
"Take this weapon which you shall draw on my behalf only if I have given a just command; but if you should learn that anything wrong is being done by me, I would have you use it for my destruction." 2
But let us now turn to sacred history which will supply us with many true and irrefutable examples by which the consciences of the pious may be strengthened. When David was being sought for execution by Saul, a most cruel and treacherous tyrant, he had no one among the captains of the tribes, or of the thousands, or hundreds, or of the elders of the people, to champion his cause against the tyranny that was so unbridled, and inclining towards the destruction not only of David himself, but also of the entire kingdom
(especially after the fearful slaughter of the high priests). David therefore wandered to and fro as a fugitive to balk the fury of the tyrant. But since he was no longer a private citizen (indeed, he was one of the ministers of the kingdom, being a commander of the armies of Israel); and since, furthermore, the right of succession to the throne had been promised to him by God (a fact not unknown to Saul 3) — he safeguarded himself with arms and soldiers, after first trying all other means.4 Yet meanwhile, he confined himself to his own territory. And so far from contriving anything against the person of the king, he even allowed him to depart alive and unharmed when he had captured him. And so far from invading the kingdom itself,5 even after the death of Saul (whose successor he knew for certain), he did not even stir a foot to seize the royal palace — except in so far as God
Himself caused him to advance. And David was called by the unanimous consent of the people. 6
Yet it is quite certain that he had resolved to defend himself by force of arms for the reasons mentioned above.7 For what else was the purpose of those military forces by which he was attended? He anxiously consulted God as to whether the citizens of Keilah would give him and his men into the hands of Saul. This clearly shows that he had decided, if he learned he would be safe there, to resist Saul if he laid siege to the walls of that town.
And this conduct cannot be condemned, unless David is to be charged with sedition and high treason — we may not even suspect him of any of that. And the prudent Abigail would
1 Cf. the test of Theodosius and Valentianus in Corpus Iuris Civilis, Codex, I, 14, 4: "Digna vox maiestate regnantis legibus se principem profiteri." The combination of the two Roman principles of Lex Regia and Lex Digna are frequently found in the political treatises of the previous age and the modern age. See on the subject, Ernst H.
Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: a study in mediaeval political theology (Princeton University Press, 1957) pp.
104-107; also p. 95 and p. 135.
2 Dion Cassius, The Life of Trajan, book LXVIII, 16, 1.
3 1Sam 24:21.
4 1Sam 22:2.
5 1Sam 24:7.
6 2Sam 2:1-4.
7 1Sam 23:9-13.