II. Arguments from Analogy
and with excessive credulity, it assumed that all his descendants would also be like him.
Shall we on that account declare that all things that he may wish, will be permissible to that ruler? Wouldn't those things which by their nature are just and lawful, have to be regarded as if they had been expressed? For otherwise, what would be the end of the matter? Or what kind of life would men finally have, if a ruler of this description wantonly proceeds to such a pitch of license, that he savagely slays the parents of his subjects, ravishes their wives and daughters, pillages their houses and possessions, and murders them individually as the fancy takes him; because the people reposing their trust in his worth, have from the outset admitted him as their ruler without any conditions?
II. Arguments from Analogy Furthermore it would be most unfair to refuse to an entire nation and people, that which justice itself freely grants to private persons, such as minors, women, people of an unsound mind, and those who complain that they have been defrauded beyond half the fair value (laesio enormis) — particularly if there is proof of the bad faith of those towards whom such persons have bound themselves.1 But can anyone be found of worse faith than that tyrant who is so shameless that he wishes people to believe that he may do anything he wants, lawful and unlawful, just because he so covenanted with the people, or because he received such power from his ancestors? Meanwhile, as was abundantly shown above,
I admit that in such a case, the authority of the Estates or Orders should be invoked and interposed, so that private citizens may not be free to undertake and attempt anything against the public order, and so that subordinate magistrates may not go beyond the limits of their calling.
But I put the further question, whether the obligation of subjects towards their kings is greater than that of children towards their parents, of slaves towards their master, or of freedmen towards their patron who set them free. Let us listen particularly to what Cicero, guided by justice and reason, writes concerning the duty of a son whose father strives by violence to seize control of his country:
"If a father, by open violence, attempts to grasp tyrannical power or to betray his country, shall a son remain silent? No, not at all; but he shall as suppliant, beseech his father not to do so. But if by his entreaties, he does not avail at all, then he shall reproach his father and frighten him with threats. But if the matter has already gone so far that there is reason to apprehend that this country may at length be overwhelmed, the son shall set greater store by the preservation of his country, than by the life of his father." 2
Listen to what that man's opinion was, which was not merely in agreement with reason, but also carried the greatest authority.
As regards servants or slaves, there was a proviso in Roman law that a slave whom his master did not tend to in illness, should be regarded as free.3 And what is even more important, by a provision of the written law, a slave is free to accuse his master of high
1 See Corpus Iuris Civilis, Codex, 4, 44, 2 and 8.
2 Cicero, De Officiis, III, 90: "'Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam prodere conabitur pater, silebitne filius?' 'Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet, accusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriae res spectabit, patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris.'"
3 Corpus Iuris Civilis, Codex, VII, 6, 3; Digeste, 40, 8, 2.
treason.1 But who is more liable to this accusation than the tyrant who openly subverts all rights, divine as well as human? But, you may rejoin, before whom shall he be accused? I answer, either before those who, having possessed the authority to elect him, also possess the authority to judge him; or else, before those who are the chief defenders of the supreme power, and from whom there is no appeal.
Freedmen owe every respect to their patrons; so much so, that in ordinary law they can institute only civil actions against them. And yet for special reasons — that is, if they have suffered some terrible injustice at the hands of their patron, or have caught him in adultery with their wives — under the civil law, they can lay a capital charge against him.2
My purpose with these arguments is not to tighten the conscience by means of the civil laws, or by the pronouncements of philosophers, as if these are the most reliable rules.
But it is only to show as clearly as possible, how unjust the opinion is of those who would leave men no means at all by which to break the onset of imminent or openly aggressive tyranny, however cruel and unjust the matter might be.
Various Objections Answered a) Assuredly, the usual objection that the king is not bound by the laws, cannot and should not be accepted as a general proposition, as the flatterers of kings and destroyers of kingdoms inauspiciously proclaim.3 For not to mention the example of so many nations, adduced above, what is the purpose of so many weighty maxims of the jurists of old, that were derived from the law of nature? Such as: the legislators are beholden to the laws, so that each must observe the same right which he has decreed against another; that nothing is more profitable to imperial power, than that the king should act according to the laws; and that it is a fit saying, that the ruler professes himself the subject of the laws.4 Hence, the proposition which would appear to be made elsewhere by the jurists, that the ruler is above the laws, or that the ruler is legibus solutus (not bound by the laws), must be understood only of the civil laws and the individual rights of private citizens — e.g. concerning wills, or the deduction of the Trebellianic 5 or Falcidian fourth 6 — but not of public law, and the so-called constitutional law, much less natural or divine law. For since men collectively and individually are subject to the public law, in so far as they are born men, it clearly follows that either kings are not men, or else they too are bound by this law. b) Again, if someone raised the objection that public law — referring to the constitution of the people or nation (for that is the kind we are discussing) — differs widely from the law of nature common to all nations, I concede that this is indeed true in certain matters.
But it is with this limitation, that the entire distinction is connected with circumstances which cannot prevent general fairness and equity from so far remaining steadfast and invariable, that every polity acting in violation of it should be utterly condemned and
1 Ibid, Digeste, 48, 4, 7.
2 Ibid, Digeste, 48, 5, 39: "...Liberto patroni famam lacesser non facile conceditur: sed si jure mariti velit adulterii accusare, permittendum est, quomodo si atrocem injuriam passus esset..."
3 Ibid, Digeste, I, 3, 31: "Princeps legibus solutus est."
4 Ibid, Codex, I, 14, 4, the Lex Digna.
5 Ibid, Digeste, 36, 1 – The Tebellianic and Facidian rules are part of inheritance laws. – WHG
6 Ibid, Digeste, 35, 2
cast off. For example, if undisguised impieties, robberies, and similar crimes against God, the law of nations, and good morals, were to meet with approval under the law. c) A further exception might be raised, that the supreme ruler does indeed stand arraigned if he rules contrary to his undertaking; but he has no other judge than God
Himself. This might be proved by the example of David. For though he was an adulterer and a wicked slayer of men, yet he was judged by no mortal man. I answer, first, that it is apparent from what has been said above, that the nations themselves, and the Estates of the people, generally reserved for themselves the right to curb their rulers; and that no antiquity or prescription can be urged against this right. Further, there is a great difference between someone who on one occasion, or even repeatedly, committed some crime, and the man who openly professes that he has abandoned himself to every kind of crime. And there is also a great difference between the ruler of a dissolute way of life, and the other ruler who subverts every just method of rule in his kingdom. For I would not be inclined to think that the supreme ruler ought to be corrected in the same way as his subjects, for private wrongs which are personal in the strict sense of the word. Yet I do think he can become so abandoned, that he can and should deservedly be visited with penalties and punishments. How much fairer would it be, when the order of the state is at stake, that those upon whom this duty rests should be free to take precautions and to strive, lest the commonwealth suffer any harm? And if they neglect to do so, let them be regarded as traitors towards God and their country, both of whom they have bound themselves to by oath. When these distinctions are duly weighed and brought into relation with the general character of David, and also with the public amends by which David did penance for his public crimes, no one will be surprised that nothing more severe was decreed or attempted against him. Moreover, it is in principle an illogical conclusion of the argument, to draw the inference that no punishment should have been inflicted for some wrong, just because none was in fact inflicted. d) But perhaps there will not be lacking those who would furnish the example of the authority of the Turkish emperor over his subjects. I wish these to have their answer in a single word: an empire of that description does not deserve to be called either kingly or human, but wholly barbarous, tyrannical, uncivilized, and detestable. Especially because however many faults the other monarchies and empires may have been subject to, they were still instruments suitable for the preservation of human society. It is obvious that, on the contrary, this Turkish tyranny is an awful scourge of God, by means of which God, in accordance with his just judgment, threatens this world with its final ruin and overthrow. Therefore, if there are men to be found today who are counselors to kings, so that these may fashion an example and an image of their rule from that source, then I proclaim with a clear and loud voice, that those Turks should be deemed the public enemies of humankind, and should be cast out in banishment.1 e) But to pursue the analogies concerning the right of one private citizen towards another, which I set out above, will any obligation which is more stricti juris than that of marriage, arise between human beings? 2 For God Himself intervenes in it, as if He were the chief guarantor of this contract; and by marriage those who were two, become
1 The "Turks" refers to the Ottoman Empire, which was in the process of conquering most of the known world. It had not suffered a single naval defeat until 1571, the year before Beza penned this. – WHG
2 Mat 19:5. Stricti juris means a strict or narrow interpretation of the law. – WHG
one flesh. But even in marriage, if one party deserts the other, the Apostle proclaims the deserted party is relieved of every obligation,1 because the deserter violates the principal condition of marriage. But let us imagine that someone declares himself willing to keep his wife with him, and that he attempts to do so, yet if it becomes known that this man desires to keep his wife in order to kill her, or to remove her in some other way, would he not have to be regarded as a manifest deserter? 2 But assuredly the design of tyrants does not differ from this man's, since they do not strive to have subjects in their power for any other reason than to persecute and crush them to their destruction, while they indulge their own lusts. Why then, should those who wield judicial authority, not pronounce the same judgment on both? But if not even the canons of the Church conclude that a wife who cannot safely live with her husband, should be compelled to live with him,3 then why should a subordinate magistrate not be allowed to take precautions on behalf of himself and his people, and have recourse to the Estates against a manifest tyrant? f) Furthermore, since kingdoms and empires themselves are deemed to be a feudal authority, owing fealty or subordination or even servitude to the supreme power of man, let us inquire what the nature of the feudal law is. From Book 2, tit. 26, parag. Domino and tit. 47, it appears that the lord can no more commit the crime of treachery against the vassal or client, than the vassal can against the lord. In that case, the feudal estate of the lord does not devolve upon the vassal, but it reverts to the immediate lord of the estate from whom it derived in the first place, or to the male descendants of the lord.
Yet this remains fixed and certain: that the lord upon being convicted of treachery, forfeits every right he might have against the vassal. And the reason is that the lord is duty-bound in all respects to requite a faithful vassal; otherwise, he is deservedly deemed an evildoer, as stated in tit. 6, de forma fidelitatis, ad fin.4
In the question under discussion, I therefore declare that a king, or even an emperor, whose rule is dependent upon the supreme power, if he is guilty of that crime of treachery towards his vassals, that is, his subjects — would that this never happened! — forfeits his feudal estate. This is not in the sense that it is judicially awarded to his vassals, but that those who recover that supreme power, may dispose of it. That the strength of this argument may be recognized, it should be noted that such mediate (or as they are commonly called, subaltern) lords swear no oath to their vassals other than they make their grant to them. Thus, the rule which we mentioned as applying to those who commit treachery, is supported by no other consideration than that of natural justice; even if it is unexpressed, it must always be understood. So that the comparison may proceed from the lesser to the greater, what will have to be decided about someone who has committed that crime against his subjects, towards whom he has bound himself by express oath? Furthermore, even if we were to concede the point that the lord can never incur the charge of treachery against his vassal so as to forfeit his feudal right, no one doubts that the vassal, if he were guilty of this crime against his lord, is deservedly
1 1Cor 7:15.
2 He has deserted the covenant of marriage, and abandoned his wife, even though he physically remains. – WHG
3 Corpus Iuris Canonici, Decretal., Greg. IX, IV, tit. 19 ("De Divortiis"), cap. 1: "Homicidium necessarium non spe conjugit, sed machinatio in mortem conjugis sic."
4 Corpus Iuris Civilis, Consueudines feudorum, 2, 26, art. 24. Cf. Hotman, De Feudis Commentatio Tripertita (Lyon,
1573), p. 246 and 300.
deprived of his right. Therefore, the emperor himself, as pointed out above, owes obedience (or homage as the people say) to the imperial power, being its first and most exalted subject. And a fortiori,1 or at least with equal reason, kings in their kingdoms must be regarded as being in the same position. Who would therefore doubt that emperors or kings forfeit their feudal power if they recklessly go to such lengths of treachery, as to degenerate into undisguised and regrettable tyranny? For we proved that it was approved of everywhere. g) Lastly, upon reliable grounds, and as the result of countless examples, it has long since been the firm conviction of all men of sober judgment (even of those who call themselves Roman Catholics), that the Ecumenical or General Council is the superior of the Pope; and it possesses authority to depose him for the crime of heresy, at all events.
It assuredly follows, that kings possess greater authority than pontiffs, and that the crime of heresy is of less consequence than that of tyranny; or in any event, that the people possess as much power against kings who have become tyrants, as the Council possesses against a heretical Pontiff.
This, then, is our opinion about this inquiry into the problem as to the right possessed by subjects, whatever their rank, against the supreme ruler who has become an undisguised tyrant.
Question 7. What must be done when the Orders or Estates cannot be summoned to impede or to check tyranny?
There still remains a considerable difficulty in this discussion. The question is, What should be done when tyranny has attained such influence that the meeting of the Estates,
(which we declared to be the lawful remedy against such tyranny) is so hampered by connivance, or intimidation, or malice on the part of the majority, that it can in no way be assembled? I answer that private citizens, unless they have authority from a subordinate magistrate or the saner part of the Estates (concerning which more is discussed shortly), have no other just remedy here than reflection, combined with patience and prayers, which God will assuredly not always reject; and without which, all other remedies, however legitimate, will be subject to His curse. But there is no reason why subjects in private station should not approach the intermediate magistrates and take them to task concerning their duty. And if all of them, or the saner part of them, are prepared to make use of such help from private citizens, then I have sufficiently shown above what they are bound to render to God and their country.
It is assuredly the duty of the subordinate magistrates to at once unanimously insist on an assembly of the Estates. Meanwhile, as far as they can and may, it is also their duty to defend and protect themselves against undisguised tyranny; lastly, this duty also rests upon the several Estates, to earnestly secure a lawful and general assembly of all the Estates, so that the wicked may not check and obstruct the good, nor the slothful the diligent, nor the vulgar herd the more sober. Moreover, in a crisis of that description, all private citizens are under an obligation to attach themselves to their subordinate magistrates, and to perform the duty of subjects. And if the occasion demands it, the saner
1 A fortiori - with greater reason.
section, upon being oppressed, would even have the right to procure support from abroad, especially from the allies and friends of the kingdom.
Examples.
In support of this opinion, I will quote some excellent examples. a) Behold, two whole tribes, those of Reuben and Gad and half the tribe of Manasseh, when suspected of having fallen into idolatry, were attacked with armed force by all the remaining tribes.1 And yet no tribe had any right and authority against another, since all twelve constituted but one collective whole. Hence it appears that the better part can reprove the other part, without awaiting the unanimous agreement of all, if all cannot simultaneously assemble. b) The same may also be seen in the war that was most justly undertaken by the eleven tribes against the tribe of Benjamin, when the latter defended a horrible crime committed in Gibeah.2 What if, instead, those two tribes with half the tribe of Manasseh, or the tribe of Benjamin itself, had tried to seize tyrannical power against their brethren? c) So too, the Romans invoked the help of Constantine against Maxentius when he ruled over the Empire of the West, when he undisguisedly acted as the cruelest tyrant. This war was waged not only with the favor of God, who heard their prayers, but it also receives testimony of approval from all the historians.3 Yet Constantine did not wield supreme power over Maxentius, since the latter possessed the highest imperial authority in the East, no less than the other did in the West. d) By what right, or by what title, did Charlemagne obtain the empire of the West? By what right if not that as a result of the cowardice of the emperors of the East who were taking cover in Greece, he was summoned against the tyranny of the Lombards by the more powerful part of Italy; and particularly by the patricians of Rome who had not yet then, nor for many years afterward, passed into the power of the Pontiffs.
I therefore consider that my point of view has so far been abundantly established and proved, provided only that the following three axioms are steadily kept in view in all these definitions; namely:
1) That the tyranny must be undisguised and notorious; 2) That recourse to arms should not be had before all other remedies have been tried;
3) Nor should recourse be had before the question has been thoroughly examined not only as to what is permissible, but also as to what is expedient, lest the remedies prove more hazardous than the disease.
Answers to certain objections I think it remains for me, by way of conclusion to this treatise, to answer the chief arguments which are commonly adduced to support the contrary point of view, except those which we have already touched upon incidentally and as occasion arose.
1 Jos 22:10-12.
2 Jdg 20.
3 Eusebius, Hist. Eccl., book IX, cap. 9, 1; Socrates in Hist. eccl. trip., book I, cap. 4
a) Now the following argument especially is commonly bandied about, namely, that it is the characteristic of magistrates, particularly supreme magistrates, to issue commands and to exercise authority. I myself also agree with that; but I add that this power is limited by both divine and human laws. b) They further add that if kings degenerate into tyrants, nobody should indeed be or become the servant of their unjust commands; but it is the part of subjects to suffer and to patiently endure the vagaries of the supreme ruler, and not to offer resistance to them by means of any violence. I would not be inclined to readily concede that point, without applying the above distinctions. The gist of them is that unless they can defend themselves upon the authority of some lawful subordinate magistrate, or of the Estates of that nation, private persons must assuredly either go away until such time as a better light will shine upon them, or bow their necks to the yoke while urgently asking God in constant prayer for patience, and meantime, proceeding under His chastisements. But it is the part of the subordinate magistrates to strenuously preserve all the good laws, whose defense they have personally sworn, each in accordance with the station he has obtained in the constitution of the community. And in general, all should strive to prevent the laws and conditions upon which that constitution rests, from being undermined by any violence from without or from within. Finally, emperors, kings, or other supreme rulers acquire the highest authority on the understanding that, if it becomes notorious that they are instead plundering the territory which they have undertaken to govern, doing it cunningly and without self-control, setting themselves against law and reason, and wantonly breaking their sworn promises, they can and should be forced, compelled, and brought to their duty, even by armed force if it cannot be otherwise, by those who have raised them to this high office upon special conditions. c) Further, they seek support in the example of David. For though the succession to the kingship had been promised to him, and he held the office of chief commander in war, yet while he was being tyrannically attacked by Saul,1 he gave proof that the Lord's anointed bore so much authority, that when David had caught him, he refused to do him any harm, or to have him hurt by others. And he immediately ordered the man to be executed who boasted of Saul's death by his hand.2 And finally, he signally honored Saul, both alive and dead, though he was a most unjust tyrant. All this I recognize; and I even readily grant that the faithfulness, patience, and goodness of David were incomparable and most commendable qualities. It would be seemly for all Christians to imitate them as far as they may, and to set them before themselves as a pattern of conduct. I even add that all, without distinction — whether superiors, equals, or men of lower station — must requite evil with good. But at the same time, I deny that the patience and gentleness which we require in Christians, would prevent a man from employing lawful remedies to repel an injury which is being done to him.
It is certainly permissible to claim one's property from an unjust possessor in court, and to lodge complaints with the supreme magistrate concerning the injustice of an inferior.
Why, then, by the same reasoning, should it not be permissible to go to law against a tyrant before the Estates? But if as a result of tyranny, there is no way leading to justice, then the example of David is so far from tending to refute our arguments, that clearly,
1 1Sam 24:5-7; 26:9.
2 2Sam 1:1-16.
it even supports us. For David did not yield to the madness of Saul without gathering about him considerable military forces; and he would doubtless have employed them more freely to defend his own life and those of his followers, if he had been reduced by God to such dire necessity that he would not have been able to ward off the violence offered him without joining battle. The fact that he spared the tyrant's life when he had fallen into David's power, was certainly a just and dutiful act, for Saul still occupied the royal throne. And neither David nor anyone else had the right to deprive him of his royal power or his life; that belonged to God alone, or to the Estates, as pointed out above.
But it is a very different thing, on the one hand, to defend oneself against a tyrant, either in court or by force of arms; and on the other, to avowedly engage in some conspiracy against the life of the tyrant or against his authority. d) Subsequently, they declare that Zedekiah, the King of Judah,1 was severely rebuked and punished because he had revolted from the King of the Chaldeans in violation of his oath. And yet this king was not the lawful Lord of Judah,2 but the most unabashed usurper of the authority of another. Why then should greater license be allowed to subjects against a lawful king who has turned tyrant? I answer that Zedekiah, at the express command of God, and even by swearing an oath, had subjected himself with his people to the King of the Chaldeans, who offered him every occasion to pay tribute. And these circumstances entirely convict Zedekiah and the men of his nation, both of revolt and of perjury. Next, I also admit that subjects are not free to break their oath; nor do I approve of the sentiment expressed in the trite maxim, "Let faith be broken with the breaker of faith," 3 for I hold, on the contrary, that it is never permissible to break an oath justly sworn. But I deny that an oath is broken or violated by subjects towards a tyrant, whenever individuals among them — confining themselves to the limits each has of his own vocation — attempt to check the course of tyranny. For there is the general rule that any agreement which is concluded subject to a condition, either express or tacitly implied, is canceled by the party who acts in violation of the condition. But not by that party who had been bound only subject to the condition; he has been freed from his obligation, not by his own act (for then he would be a perjurer) but by the act of that party who first cut the tie of the obligation, that is, the condition added to it. When the supreme ruler has become a tyrant, he must therefore be deemed to have freed the people from their oath by his own perjury, and not to the contrary, when the people justly assert their rights against him. e) Furthermore, they use the command of God as a pretext, when He expressly bids the Israelites to utter prayers for the peace and happy reign of Nebuchadnezzar,4 a most cruel tyrant. Therefore, much less were the Jews allowed to steal away from his rule and from obedience to him. This too I admit; but I answer, in the first place, that the Jews were not merely subjects in a private station, but the majority were slaves under the rule of the Chaldeans. Now, we laid down above, the principle that citizens of private rank are not free to rise up against their rulers, nor to set themselves against them in open
1 2Chr 36:13.
2 Eze 17: 12-14, 41.
3 "Frangenti fidem, fides fangatur eidem" See Hans Walther, ed., Carmina Medii Aevi Posteriores Latina (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2 vol. in 6 tomes, 1959-1967), II/2, 182, for a list of authors who employ the proverb, both ancient and medieval.
4 Jer 29:7.
violence. Much less are slaves free to rise up against their masters, however harsh or unjust they are, since the latter hold their bodies and their goods in their power. This precept, therefore, in no way detracts from the principles which were laid down above.
Furthermore, I repeat once again — and this should be most carefully noted in this entire account — that the Jews had passed into the power of the Chaldeans during their captivity. But even before, they could not have set themselves against them with a good conscience, nor have defended the city of Jerusalem against their attack, since God had expressly bid them by the mouth of Jeremiah to surrender their city into the hands of the Chaldeans, and to subject themselves to them spontaneously.1 f) Here some people also vainly rejoin that this same will of God finds no application in every case of tyranny, since no tyranny prevails outside the will of God, or in spite of it.
I could turn this very argument against the tyrants. For it is no less dependent on the will of God, that the tyrants are expelled by their subjects and fellow countrymen (as has happened to many), than that these tyrants frequently oppress their peoples. But the following will be a truer reply — that is, if we say that the will of God must be heeded only to the extent that He Himself has deigned to reveal it to us. Otherwise there would be no crime so heinous that it could not be imputed to the Divine will, since not even those events which are regarded as fortuitous in the highest degree, occur by chance or accidentally. Hence the man who meets with highway robbers, by whom no one is murdered without the consent of the will of God — that man, in accordance with the authority of the laws, has the power to resist them in justified self-defense. This incurs no blame because, in truth, no one has a special command from God to meekly allow himself to be slain by robbers. Our conviction is entirely the same concerning that regular defense against tyrants which we are discussing. Yet this then ceases, at length, to find application when clear proof emerges of the contrary will of God. This happened in the case of that deed of Zedekiah which we recently mentioned. And before that, it happened in the case of his predecessor Rehoboam.2 For otherwise he would have justly attacked the other ten tribes revolting against him, if God had not expressly forbidden this to be done. On the other hand, Mattathias and his children are celebrated as deserving of the highest praise,3 because they so courageously resisted the cruel tyrant
Antiochus, when God did not forbid it by any decree — even though, without His just judgment, Antiochus would not have attacked the people of God; and he would even have been acceptable to many, and found favor with them. g) The further objection is raised that the revolt of the Israelites from Rehoboam, even though he was an unjust oppressor, deserves the strongest condemnation. I too answer that the Israelites double-wronged him. Firstly, because summoning the Estates of the people of Israel with the purpose of compelling Rehoboam to his duty, either willingly or unwillingly, they elected a new king. And thereby they rent asunder that kingdom which God desired to be one.4 Secondly, because they went outside the House of David, which they knew had been set aside by God Himself for the kingship. But these circumstances do not in the least invalidate our proposition. Nor will it at all avail them
1 Jer 38:17-18.
2 1Chr 11:4.
3 1Mac 1 & 2.
4 1Kng 12: 18-20.
to use as an argument, the calling of Jeroboam by the prophet Ahijah,1 since the entire account clearly proves that the people had no regard to it when they revolted from the House of David, and slew Adoram who was over the levy.2 The road which they took was manifest revolt; whereas they could and should have opposed his tyranny with the lawful and just use of arms. Thus often something is done unjustly, which yet nothing prevents from being just in itself. h) Furthermore, our opponents urge that it is an argument in their favor that Saints
Peter and Paul asked that prayers be openly said for kings and other rulers,3 who yet in their own times were not merely heathen, but the cruelest tyrants too. By all means, I grant that. But apart from the fact that those exhortations are directed to private citizens who, we have consistently maintained, have no other remedy but prayers and patience left to them, bear in mind here too, that when we declare that the subordinate magistrates or Estates of some kingdom can and indeed should offer resistance to tyranny, that in no way detracts from the duty of the faithful of Christ in private station, by which they are forbidden to requite evil with evil, but to overcome evil with good, and even to pray for their enemies. Such defense by the magistrates does not prevent them from being suppliants before God for the conversion of that very tyrant whom they are resisting, and from manifesting towards him, truly and sincerely, as much respect as possible while they resist him. And yet it should be noted that a tyrant can sink to such depths of sinfulness, and can perform such abominable acts of hostility towards God, that it may not only be allowable, but on occasion it may even be worth the effort, to expressly formulate public prayers and imprecations against him. The ancient and primitive church once proved this by example, when it not only publicly imprecated the emperor Julian, surnamed the Apostate, but was heard by God.4 i) Finally, they quote the example of Christ Himself, who paid tribute to Tiberius
Caesar,5 even though he was the unjust usurper of Judah, and a monster rather than a man. On the other hand, there is no doubt that however many Jews resisted the Roman emperors by revolt, they perished miserably. Especially mentioned are the well-known
Judas Calonites,6 Theudas and other revolutionaries, and finally the whole Jewish nation, who revolted that they might not be compelled to embrace the false religion of the heathens. To these arguments, I answer that there is a great difference between the right of kings, and tyranny. Therefore, although Jesus Christ was the Lord of heaven and earth, and the kingdom of the Jews rightly belonged to Him as the descendant of David, rather than to the Romans or Herod — yet, He had not come into the world to the end that he might rule in human fashion. Instead, He came that He might pass His life here as a private citizen in these parts, and with the renunciation of the prerogative of the House of David. Therefore, He wished to prove by His example, 7 that tributes and other contributions are rightly owed and rendered to kings and other rulers. For although the Roman emperors initially seized the kingdom of the Jews unjustly, yet in
1 1Kng 11: 31-39.
2 1Kng 12:18.
3 1Pet 2:17; 1Tim 2:1-2.
4 See Rufinus, Hist. Eccl., book I, cap. 35; Artemius, Comm. Hist., cap. 56.
5 Mat 17:27.
6 Acts 5:36-37.
7 Rom 13:7.