Precarious peace
Precarious peace Zurich, supported by Berne and their civic allies, was at war with the Inner States for sixteen days (8-24 June 1529), during which there was no fighting but which resulted in a qualified victory for the attackers. The first Land Peace of Kappel {der erste Landfriede), as the agreement which ended the war on 24 June was known, came after over a week of hard bargaining. Its provisions1 reflected the chief interests involved - the determination of Zurich to extend the evangelical faith and with it to increase its authority in eastern Switzerland, and the anxiety of Berne to keep the confederation in being while at the same time asserting its own authority together with its firm adhesion to a reformed church.
The peace terms were harsh, but were a good deal less severe than Zwingli had wanted. There was not complete submission; the right of each side to maintain its own faith and worship was upheld. The Catholics were not crushed or humiliated; they were not even to be forced to accept evangelical preachers without reciprocity. Instead, the first article called for freedom of belief; no one was to be compelled to adopt a particular faith.2 In the Mandated Territories the parishes (Gemeinden) were to be free to choose their own form of worship, Catholic or Zwinglian, by a majority vote if necessary, after which there should be no further governmental interference.3
1 EA 4, ib, 262, 321-2, 1478-86; Bullingeri?^/ n, 185-91. There is a useful summary in Z vi ii,
457-9 and a commentary in F. Straub, Zurich und die Bewdhrung des ersten Landfriedens
(Zurich, 1970). Also in W. Oechsli, Quellenbuch zur Schweizergeschichte2 (Zurich, 1901)
(modernised and abbreviated), 425 (No. 135).
2 'Des ersten, von wegen des gottlichen worts, diewyl und niemand zum glouben gezwungen sol werden, dass dann die Oerter und die iren desselben ouch nit genotiget; aber die zuogwandten und vogtyen, wo man mit einandern zuo beherschen hat, belangend, wo die selben die mess abgestellt und die bilder verbrennt oder abgetan, dass die selben an lib, eer und guot nit gestraft sollend werden; wo aber die mess und ander ceremonia noch vorhanden, die sollent nit gezwungen, ouch deheine predicanten, so es durch den merteil nit erkannt wiirt, geschickt, ufgestellt oder gegeben werden, sunder was under inen den kilchgnossen, die uf oder abzetuon, der glichen mit der spyss, so gott nit verbotten ze essen, gemeret wiirt, daby sol es biss uff der kilchgnossen gefallen bliben, und dehein teil dem andern sinen glouben weder fechen noch strafen.' EA 4, ib, 1479. Cf. E. Walder, Religionsvergleiche des 16. jfahrhunderts (Berne, 1945) 5. Z x, 195, 203-4, 213-14 n. 1.
3 P. Briischweiler, Die landfriedlichen SimiiUanverhaltnisse im Thurgau (Frauenfeld, 1932),
37r
ZWINGLI This critical article was, in fact, a model of ambiguity and was differently interpreted by each side. Zwingli thought it secured freedom for his followers to preach the Gospel unhindered anywhere, an interpretation which the Catholics would not accept. In practice, the reformed minorities looked to Zurich and Berne for protection, and Catholic minorities to the five Catholic states.
By the second article, as Zwingli had insisted, the treaty of Waldshut with Ferdinand was abrogated and the Catholic Christian Alliance was dissolved, in spite of its nominally purely defensive character. The actual parchment instrument was exhibited to all by Hans Aebli and then cut into shreds and burnt, to the astonishment of Thomas Platter, who was present at the time.1
The matter of foreign pensions and the recruitment of mercenaries outside their own territory by the five Catholic states again received less decisive treatment than Zwingli had asked. There was indeed a clause prohibiting recruiting, but this applied only to land controlled by the reformed cities, who could see to it themselves; and the acceptance of extraneous pensions, while declared undesirable, was left, as Berne wished, to the discretion of each state. By article five it v/as agreed that affairs involving the whole Confederation shouldnot be discussed in separate Catholic or Protestant diets; these might, however, deal with business affecting themselves only.
War damages or reparations were to be paid as assessed by arbitrators (who reduced a claim for 80,000 gulden to the much more moderate figure of 2,500 'Sonnen-Kronen' each to Berne and Zurich). Berne's claims from Unterwalden were also left to arbitration.2 Compensation was similarly to be assessed for the dependants of Jacob Kaiser.3 Continuity for reform in Thurgau, Toggenburg, Rheintal, Gaster and monastic
St Gall was thought to be secured by a provision that agreements already made to accept the reformed faith were to be maintained and no one was to be punished for having aided Zurich and Berne. Any future guardian
{Schirmhauptmann) of monastic property in Thurgau was to be an evangelical.
Thomas Murner,4 so much disliked, was to be handed over for trial on a 1 Z x, 181, 209; Thomas Platter: Lebensbeschreibung, hg. v. A. Hartmann (Basle, 1944) 84, 85.
2 EA 4, ib, 301, 371, 1483-6; Escher, Glaubensparteien 121, 169, 181; Bullinger, Ref. 11, 200,
203; Tardent, 285, 292; ZWA xn (1964), 267, 324. Negotiations about payment went on for a long while: something, but it is difficult to determine how much, was actually received, and how far the use made of the blockade weapon could be justly referred to this condition of the peace is equally debatable.
3 EA 4, ib, 1480; Steck & Tobler, 1458 (No. 3207). The arbitrators awarded 100 Kronen a month, charged on Lucerne.
4 EA 4, ib, 1481. He was an indefatigable journalist who had set up his own press at Lucerne and whose notorious Ketzerkalender was a thoroughly scurrilous performance, like many
Precarious peace charge of inciting to revolt, but apart from this there was to be 'no victimisation', no individual prosecution of adherents to either side. Linked up with this was a vague and ill-drafted clause demanding the cessation of slander and defamation1 and the punishment of perpetrators. Open abuse of those of contrary faith was to cease and offenders were to be dealt with by their governments. In the sixteenth century, when virulent personal denunciation was commonplace, such a provision was hardly capable of enforcement. It was, none the less, to be used later as a pretext for reopening hostilities.
Even worse was the practical application of the agreement that the localities should decide by an internal majority (durch den merteil) their doctrinal preference. Apart from uncertainty as to who might 'vote', the introduction of local option by majority choice in religious affairs was an almost unheard-of innovation. Unanimity, as has been seen, had been the normal expectation2 and it was for the government to decide the religion of its subjects. Now local assemblies (Gemeindeversammlungeny Landsgemeinden, Landrdte) had to meet, as well as local synods for the clergy, of which important use was made.3 If parishes were allowed to come to a majority decision why not other groups ? And what was to happen when, as in monastic St Gall, the administering authorities were half Catholic, half Protestant ? There was to be no acceptable answer to this for a long while.
More obvious were the clauses dealing with obligations and accomplished facts. Thus tithes and other customary offerings for the upkeep of the churches and their ministers were to continue to be paid as previously.
Similarly, where altars and images had already been removed, the old regime was not to return, existing arrangements were to be frozen, and no one was to be punished for earlier iconoclasm.4 others of the age. He had been equally violent in his satirical attacks on Luther. At Strassburg his activities were such that he was expelled from this unusually tolerant city: Berne was specially annoyed by his publications, particularly, Hie ipiirt angezeigt das unchristlich frevel
.. .einer loblichen herrschaft von Bern (1528). His later escape via Valais to his native Alsace, and thence to Heidelberg, made possible by the connivance of Lucerne, was much resented.
'Die boseste Zunge in der Eidgenossenschaft war stille geworden' (Brandly, 93). See also
Salat 141, 239; Th. v. Liebenau, Der Franziskaner Dr. Thomas Murner (Freiburg, 1913)
238-48; Schmid, 35, 37, 39; P. Scherrer, Thomas Murners Verhdltnis zum Humanismus
(Basle, 1929); W. Kawerau, Th. Murner und die deutsche Reformation (Halle, 1891), Thomas
Murner und die Kirche des Mittelalters (Halle, 1890); W. Pfeiffer-Belli, Thomas Murner im
Schweizer Glaubenskampf. Corpus Catholicorum 22 (Miinster i.W., 1939), 39-86.
1 A. Blatter, Schmdhungen, Scheltreden, Drohungen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Volksstimmung zur Zeit der schweizer. Reformation (Basle, 1911) provides samples.
2 In the Burgrecht between Zurich and Berne of 25 June 1528, the possibility of majority acceptance of evangelical preaching had been agreed on as a working arrangement. EA 4, ib, esp. 1334, 1521-5 Art. 8 'Weliche ouch unser gmeinen underthanen das evangelium und wort gottes mit merer hand ir gmeinen kilchgnossen annemen'. See above, 348-9.
3 Egli 4, 84-5, 90-4.
4EA 4, ib, 1480-1.
ZWINGLI The occupation of Thurgau and monastic St Gall was to continue until these conditions were fulfilled and, by a kind of appendix, the evangelical cities were permitted to maintain an economic blockade against their former opponents should the articles be transgressed or the indemnity remain unpaid.1 The last article, inserted at the wish of Berne, called for a renewal of the oath of Confederation, to include mention of this peace. In practice it proved impossible to reach agreement on any acceptable formula for this, and after long and inconclusive discussions no such action was possible until 1798.
The results of the first, bloodless, war of Kappel did not satisfy the ambitions and demands of Zurich. There had been no trial of strength; and complete, unrestricted freedom to spread the Zwinglian creed throughout the Confederation had not been secured. Foreign pensions continued to be paid, and hopes of expansion into Aargau by Zurich had not been fulfilled. There were, however, substantial gains in eastern
Switzerland. Schaffhausen became entirely Zwinglian,2 and in Rheintal, Gaster, Weesen, Bremgarten, Mellingen, in the county of Baden, and in a number of parishes in Sargans, reformed majorities were relatively easily secured.3 Berne remained an ally, but without enthusiasm for the expansionist activities of its neighbour. Its support in June 1529 had been a little reluctant, motivated chiefly by the need for help in the event of a war with Savoy, now acting in cooperation with the five Catholic states.4 In contrast, the city of St Gall, which had made every effort to assist its ally with provisions, ammunition and a few men, was highly satisfied by the outcome of the war, as was its chief citizen, Vadian.5 The chapel of St James there was completely wrecked, and the nuns, who had already been forced to abandon their habits, were expelled, their corporate income being confiscated to the city. The walls of the monastic church were whitewashed, verses from the Bible replacing the earlier mural paintings, and a new, enthusiastic Reformed minister, Christopher Schappeler,6 was installed
1 'feilen kouf und spiss abschlagen', Proviantsperre, Proviantabschlag, i.e. economic sanctions.
The harvest in 1529 was bad and this made the threat the more serious. R. Bosch, Der Kornhandel der Nord-Ost-Innerschweiz und der ennetbirgischen Vogteien im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert
(Zurich, 1913), 109.
2 J. Wipf, Reformationsgeschichte der Stadt und Landschaft Schaffhausen (Zurich, 1929).
3 The terms of the peace did not apply to Murten, Orbe-Eschellens and Grandson, which Berne continued to administer jointly with Catholic Fribourg. In fact Berne secured the reformation of these areas without much difficulty. Feller 11, 355,359; P. Weissenbach, 'Die
Reformation in Bremgarten' (in Argovia. jfahresschrift der Historischen Gesellschaft des
Kantons Aargau VI (1871), 3-65, with an appendix of documents).
4 Liithi, 57-8. See below 385. s Naf, Vadian 11, 309-10; Miiller, 115-16, 192!!; Muralt/Fast, 597, 598.
6 Miiller 192-3; Bullinger Ref. 11, n 5-19. Schappeler had published articles against the Catholics and had sided with the peasants in 1525. O. Clemen, Flugschriften aus den ersten
Jahren der Reformation n, 4. hg. A. Gotze (Leipzig, 1908).
Precarious peace there. At least fourteen church bells were melted down, the metal being used for making a cannon able to fire a stone ball weighing thirteen pounds.
The first peace of Kappel, like many another relatively common-sense arrangement, satisfied neither side. The Catholics had been humiliated by heretics without being defeated, and this rankled. The Zwinglians, equally, were confident that, but for the armistice, they would have crushed their immediate opponents whom they outnumbered. The Gospel would then have been able to make its way unimpeded, and the mass would have given way before it, with the implication of a Zurich-dominated
Protestant confederation. The peace was, in fact, in advance of its time.
Hardly any one, in 1529, thought it possible for two opposed religious communities to live side by side in peace in the same state. This, it was supposed, and with a good deal of justification, merely meant civil war, which must end in the final triumph of one party. In Switzerland, indeed, a conflict could scarcely be regarded as civil war so loose was the constitution of the federation. Religious affairs were the exclusive concern of each state1 and others were not involved, but even so the Reformation intensified antagonism. Even limited cooperation was difficult, if not impossible, between 'orthodox' and 'heretics', the adherents of the 'true' and the 'false' religion. All were agreed that it was the duty of a Christian government - die Christliche Obrichkeit - to see to it that its subjects were properly instructed in the Christian faith, evangelical or Catholic. The government must be obeyed. To this accepted conviction there were important qualifications. For the Catholics, a government that upheld heresy was detestable and must rightly be eliminated; for the Zwinglians, one that impeded or resisted the promulgation of God's word could be lawfully disobeyed. Thus in areas where the government was in the hands of a plurality of states, as in the Mandated Territories, each side could have a case for intervention in a parish which disobeyed its rulers, i.e. the majority of the controlling states.2 Zurich could use this argument in eastern Switzerland to its own political advantage.
The first peace of Kappel was an agreement made between the antagonists only and was in no way binding on the other states of the Confederation. The contracting parties, however, agreed that the special local arrangements applied to the Mandated Territories in which they were
1 At a meeting in Zurich in February 1527, followed by another in Berne, it had been accepted that the Confederation dealt 'only with external affairs, mutual help, advice and care for widows and orphans, land and people'. EA 4, ia, 1050, 1063. It was pointed out that in Germany, in spite of religious divisions, Lutheran and Catholic cities met their allies for political and economic discussions and the cities were summoned to Imperial Diets irrespective of sect. Similar arrangements should be possible for the Swiss. Escher, Glaubensparteien,
45.
2 Haas, Kappelerkricg, 86.
ZWINGLI severally involved. It was accepted that two faiths could exist side by side in one district; but within this each village or Gemeinde decided its acceptable form of worship to be applicable to all its inhabitants. It was, perhaps, on a very small scale the appearance of the cuius regio eius religio principle of 1555. The obscurely worded clause, which permitted preaching of the Gospel generally, was unworkable. If it meant that Zwinglian evangelists were to occupy Catholic pulpits, Lucerne would obviously refuse, the more so since Catholic priests could not administer the sacraments in Zwinglian states. There were local difficulties over the interpretation of the 'majority clause' of the first peace almost from the beginning.1 At Flums, for example, where Martin Mannhart evangelised actively but not entirely successfully, there was profound disagreement about its application.2 Again, there was trouble at Rapperswil. Hans Schindler of Weesen complained that he was slandered by the Catholic priest of Rapperswil,
Hans Ofner, contrary to the provisions of the treaty, and sought a remedy.
Rapperswil refused to hand over Ofner for trial when requested to do so by Zurich, which had no special rights in either Weesen or Rapperswil.
Ofner was supported by Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden, while Glarus refused to intervene. Schindler died before the matter came to a head, but many in Zurich regretted a lost opportunity.3
The abandonment of the Christian Alliance by the Catholics was no irreparable disaster. Austria, not for the first or the last time, had proved an unreliable ally, and the lesson was duly learnt. Its evangelical counterpart, the Christian Civic Union, remained in existence but was not notably effective. Constance, indeed, had already been included, but the attempts that were made to secure recognition for Constance as a fourteenth component of the Confederation were unsuccessful.4 Another citystate member would alter the balance of town and country states; Constance, ruling no territory outside its own walls, had little to offer; it would not be easy for it to be assimilated even into an evangelical Confederation, and in fact the city-states did not cooperate very readily.
Many of these considerations likewise applied to Strassburg, the last city to join the Christian Civic Union. A special relationship had long existed between the Swiss and this free imperial city. When both were in danger of attack by Charles the Rash of Burgundy, Strassburg had sought
1 At Bremgarten, Bullinger, who had certainly been more useful there than he would have been at Marburg, was indefatigable in his evangelical sermons. There was violence at Muri, where the Catholics secured a majority of 40; elsewhere there were frequent arguments about eligibility to vote. Indeed the very notion of voting was hardly a comprehensible one then.
Could a servant of the monastery vote in the Alte Landschaft? Were youths of 13 eligible ?
2 Z x, 494, 536-7. See below p. 384 n. 3.
3 Strickler 11, 657 (No. 1641).
4 See above 352-3; below 385.
Precarious peace and obtained inclusion in the Lower Union {die Niedere Vereinigung) with Sigismund of Austria and had thus become the ally of the Swiss in the fifteenth century.1 The city, under the guidance of Bucer, Capito and Sturm (all of whom had been present at the Berne disputation), had accepted the Reformation without being Lutheran; its position could be described as quasi-Zwinglian. This meant that its situation was somewhat precarious and isolated, but it was in close contact by the Rhine with Basle and so with the other cities of the Christian Civic Union. To Zurich and Basle it could offer a northern bulwark and a link with Hesse. It was vulnerable to attack from the Austrian forces in Alsace and the Black
Forest and if forcibly Catholicised might be a threat to Basle. An alliance was obviously advantageous. It could supply grain, provender and gunpowder, and the spiritual and intellectual support of its leading divines was appreciated. Strassburg abolished the mass in February 1529, Basle in April; the first Kappel peace was in June. A meeting at Aarau in July favoured an agreement with Strassburg, which Zwingli visited in September, and this city was belatedly accepted into Burgrecht with Zurich and as a full member of the Christian Civic Union on 5 January 1530.2 The delay had been caused by long discussions about exactly what Strassburg could offer and about precedence which Zurich successfully insisted upon maintaining.3
By that time, however, a good deal had happened, involving both Zurich and Zwingli personally. He was now at the height of his intellectual powers, and his position at home was never stronger.4 It is probably a misuse of words to speak of Zwinglian Zurich as a theocracy,5 but after the expulsion of the Anabaptists and the abolition of the mass, the external aspect of the city had altered decidedly for the better. There was less swearing, gambling, dancing and drunkenness. A code of compulsory conduct issued in March 15306 enforced public morality as well as regular church-going, attendance at sermons, and closing hours for vendors of wine (joined a little incongruously with regulation of weights and measures),
1 E. Toutey, Charles le Temeraire et la ligue de Constance (Paris, 1902) 86-8, 243-4. Miilhausen, a member of the Christian Civil Union, was in a similar position but in the long run had to break away, as did Rottweil where 300 Protestants were expelled. Z vi ii, 672; Oechsli 2,
26-30, 88-94, Il&- 2 EA 4, ib, 498, 1488-93; Wyss, 149 n. 2; Z vi ii, 468-77; R. Reuss, Histoire de Strasbourg depuis ses origines jusqu*a nos jours (Paris, 1922), 129-31.
3 The question of precedence was settled, 22 Dec. 1529. Strassburg wanted the alliance to be called Christlich nachbarlicher Verstandy but this fell flat. Z x, 352, 355-6; Escher, Glaubensparteien, 101-7, 140-42; EA 4, ib, 353; HZ 40. 131.
4 Hauswirth, Philipp, 196. 'Von der Riickkehr aus Marburg bis iiber die Jahreswende war
Zwingli fast unmittelbarer Fiihrer der ziircherischen Aussenpolitik gewesen.'
5 R. C. Walton, ZwinglVs Theocracy (Toronto, 1967); L. v. Muralt, 'Zum Problem der Theokratie bei Zwingli', Discordia Concors 11, 367-90; Locher, 198.
6 Egli /, 702-1 r, No. 1656; Bullinger, Ref. 11, 276-88.
ZWINGLI while prohibiting blasphemy,1 card-playing, dicing, skittles, chess and other games likely to lead to disorder. A Christian government, Zwingli always insisted, would be a good government because it followed Bible precepts, and Zurich did just that. There were indeed still a good many clerics, but their learning, dress and conduct were strictly checked and regulated; disrespect to them, however, could lead to exclusion from church services, which might well be followed by more tangible penalties
Sermons and church-going were a conspicuous feature of civic life.
Zwingli constantly accused his Catholic rivals of hypocrisy, but there are some indications that this same fault was not always absent from among his own followers now that they were supreme.
At the same time the Marburg conference, to which, significantly, no representative of Berne had been invited, had left the Zwinglians in a lonely position. The continued theological disharmony had its political repercussions, since after October 1529 cooperation between Lutheran princes and Zwinglian cities was almost bound to be limited strictly to defence.2 The important political discussions at Marburg further meant that Zwingli was now closely involved in German affairs. His teaching had made remarkable progress among the south-German cities from Constance to Ulm, and he was now directly in touch with the Landgrave Philip of Hesse.3 This remarkable young ruler, whose contacts with Zwingli at Marburg have already been considered, had succeeded in 1518, scarcely aged fourteen, to almost absolute authority in a powerful and wealthy state stretching from Kassel to Giessen. He had shown from the outset vast energy and ambition, great ability and determination to advance his power still further. Physically rather small, sometimes reckless and aggres1 It is characteristic of the age that in 1529 and 1530 two farmers from the Kelleramt were put to death for swearing and for irreverent and careless speech on the way to the Christmas communion service: little comment seems to have been aroused. Farner iv, 398; Egli /, 693
(No. 1632), 701 (No. 1654).
2 Bender, Ref, 155, 173; Schmid, 40.
3 A good biography of Philip the Magnanimous is a desideratum. The documents in D. C. von
Rommel, Philipp derGrossmiithige, Landgrafvon Hessen (3 Bde., Giessen, 1830), supplemented by W. Heinemeyer, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte des Landgrafen Philipp des
Grossmiitigen (Marburg, 1954), are useful. P. Hoffmeister, Das Leben Philipps des Grossmiithigen, Landgrafen von Hessen (Kassel, 1846) formed the basis for later accounts, including the article by Friedensburg in ADB (1887). The German background is in D. C. v. Rommel,
Geschichte von Hessen (8 Bde., Marburg, Kassel, 1820-43) III i, m ii. G. Egelhaaf, Landgraf
Philipp der Grossniiithige (Halle, 1904); Philipp der Grossmutige. Beitrage zur Geschichte seines Lebens und seiner Zeit: ed. J. R. Dieterich & B. Miiller, Historischer Verein fur das Grossherzogtum Hessen (Marburg, 1904), have little about Switzerland. J. W. Wille,
Philipp der Grossniiithige von Hessen und die Restitution Ulrichs von Wirtemberg (Tubingen,
1882) is valuable, and Rene Hauswirth, Landgraf Philipp von Hessen und Zwingli: ihre politischen Beziehungcn, iS2g-joy ZWA xi (1962), 499-552, and Philipp are essential. They correct and amplify, but do not supersede, Lenz, articles which first decoded the symbols used in the correspondence between Philip and Zwingli. H. J. Hillerbrand, Landgrave
Philipp of Hesse 1504-1567 (St Louis, Missouri, 1967) is a very brief sketch. Fabian, 331-2 has a useful note.
Precarious peace sive, highly class-conscious, and connected by birth and marriage with the ruling princely caste,1 he was later known as 'the magnanimous', an epithet Zwingli used of him in 1531.2 As a result, perhaps, of Melanchthon's preaching, he became a sincere and broad-minded evangelical in 15243 and the backbone of the opposition to the Catholics and the Habsburgs.
Convinced that God had conferred a special, almost unique, position on a 'godly prince', he had made himself the leader of the attack on the knights under Franz von Sickingen, and on the insurgent peasants in 1525.
He had profound political sense and real ability, was a good judge of men and was in many ways in marked contrast with his equally influential eastern neighbour, John 'the Steadfast', Elector of Saxony. This deeply religious man was likewise determined to uphold the reformed faith but was by nature mild, lethargic and primarily interested in his own state.
Unlike Philip, he had considerable respect for the office and person of the Emperor, and he opposed Philip's efforts to expand his possessions at the expense of the neighbouring bishoprics.
Even so, in 1526 Philip hoped to join with Lutheran Saxony, Brunswick,4 Mecklenburg, Mansfeld and the Protestant cities, especially
Strassburg, Nuremberg, Augsburg and Ulm, in defence of their liberties as set out at the Diet of Speier. Support might reasonably be expected from Frederick I, King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, a Protestant who could be relied upon to oppose Charles V, whose sister,
Isabella, had married the rival claimant Christian II.5 Brandenburg under Elector Joachim I was indeed still Catholic, but its ruler was neutral and wavering. In any case Philip was capable of keeping religion and politics apart and had no objection to an alliance with the Catholic King of France or with the Catholic Dukes William and Louis of Bavaria, the Wittelsbach rivals of the Habsburgs and strongly opposed to the choice of Ferdinand as King of the Romans, a position Philip was believed to covet for himself.
For them, as for Philip, loyalty to an elected Emperor was an outmoded tradition; territorial independence and expansion were what mattered.
At home in all the bewildering family connections and rivalries of Germany,6 the Prince of Hesse had intelligence enough to look further
1 His (first) wife, Christine, was the daughter of Duke George of Saxony; his sister Elizabeth married Duke George's son John; his daughter Agnes married first Maurice of Saxony and secondly the Elector John Frederick II of Saxony.
2 Z xi, 559 (June 1531 to Lambert Maigret): 'De Cattorum principe sic intellige: iuvenis quidem est, puta: 28 natus annos, sed super hanc aetatem prudens, magnanimus et constans, apud ilium possumus fere quicquid volumus.'
3 F. Hugh,' Landgraf Philipp und die Einfiihrung der Reformation in Hessen', Zeitschrift des
Vereinsfiir Hessische Geschichte und Landeskunde 80 (Kassel, 1900), 210-42. C. L. Manschreck,
Melanchthon (New York, 1958), 100.
4 Dukes Ernest and Francis of Braunschweig-Liineburg-Celle and Henry of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel. s K. Brandi, Kaiser Karl V3 (Munich, 1941), 121-2, 166.
6 Seeabove, 309, 316-18, 331-4.
ZWINGLI afield, to the cities, fearful and jealous of the Emperor, and to the Swiss, as a source of military manpower. This was to introduce a new dimension into the situation. Hitherto the Swiss had been regarded with some dislike and distrust as, at best, providing some good infantry for hire who might also be competitors with the German Landsknechts. This was based not so much on German hostility as on their ignorance about and indifference to the Swiss Confederation.1 For Luther and his Elector, the Swiss were sectaries and revolutionaries whose notions of self-government and citizen-participation in public affairs were as deplorable as their misinterpretation of the New Testament. Now, with Philip and Zwingli in agreement, Zurich and its supporters were to be directly involved in German affairs for the first time, and the relations of prince and preacher were to be of decisive importance in 1530 and 1531.
One reason for this was that Philip of Hesse was now actively committed to the cause of the restoration of Duke Ulrich of Wlirttemberg.2
This violent, ostentatious and impetuous prince, highly unpopular in his own duchy, had married in 1511^ at the age of 24, Sabina, daughter of Duke Albert IV of Bavaria. They were ill-matched, and the marriage seemed a fruitless failure. The duke then fell in love with Ursula von
Thumb, daughter of his Court Comptroller (Hofmarschall) and wife of his Master of the Horse (Stallmeister), Ludwig von Hutten, who was himself reputed to have made advances to the duchess Sabina. After a strange scene in which the duke was reported to have knelt before his own servant and avowed his love for the latter's wife, he killed Ludwig while hunting with him in the Boblinger Wald on 7 May 1515. Shortly after this, Sabina, who had given birth to a son, Christopher, fled for protection to her brother, Duke of Bavaria. The Hutten family took up arms, the matter was brought before the Emperor Maximilian, who decided that Ulrich should be deprived of his authority (Regierung) for six years, pay a fine, and provide an income for Sabina. On his refusal to accept these conditions, he was put to the ban (Acht) of the Empire in 1516 and again in 1518, but this had little effect, even when repeated on the accession ot
Charles V in 1519. At this juncture, two citizens of Reutlingen, a free imperial city, killed one of Ulrich's officials. Thereupon Ulrich, with the help of Swiss soldiers whom he had been able to hire with French money, attacked the city, reducing it to a dependency (Landstadt). This was manifestly a renewed act of open war against the Empire; an imperial force, led by William of Bavaria and supported by the Swabian League,
1 K. Mommsen, Eidgenossen, Kaiser und Reich (Basler Beitrage zur Geschichtswissenschaft,
Bd. 72. Basle, 1958).
2 1487-1550. B. v. Kugler, Ulrich^ Herzog zu Wirtemberg (Stuttgart, 1865); Do., Christophy
Herzog zu Wirtemberg, 2 Bde. (Stuttgart, 1868-72) 1, 5-7; Z vin, 379-80 n. 1.
Precarious peace brought about Ulrich's defeat at Asperg in May. He took refuge in Basle,1 where he was patronised by Oecolampadius, whose teaching he accepted.
'Saul became Paul.' He was admitted to co-citizenship there, and in 1524 he moved to Zurich, where he met the Great Council and attended
Zwingli's sermons. He was much impressed: 'he taught me to pray', he said later.2 After his expulsion from his duchy, where the rights of his son
Christopher were ignored, his territories fell, in 1521, to Charles V's younger brother, Ferdinand. Ulrich, however, with Philip's help, retained a hold on Hohentwiel and upheld Philip's claim to the small but rich county of Katzenelnbogen (which included Darmstadt and St Goar), although the imperial government insisted that he had no legal rights there.3 He never ceased to hope to regain his possessions with their capital at Stuttgart, all of which would then inevitably become Protestant. This would also break the Catholic-Habsburg ring which surrounded Zurich from the Vorarlberg to Alsace, and although Ulrich's success was not settled in Zwingli's lifetime it was constantly hoped for and anticipated4 and made Ulrich a much more acceptable neighbour than Ferdinand. As the ally and supporter of Ulrich, Philip of Hesse had a permanent excuse for an attack on the Habsburgs should a favourable occasion arise, and a united Hesse and Wiirttemberg would alter the balance of power in south Germany. It was through Ulrich that Zwingli came to realise the significance of the position.
The initial contact between Philip, Ulrich and Zwingli had been made in 1524,5 and the parties were now ready to push matters much further.
While the first Kappel war was moving to its inconclusive end, the German situation was transformed by the second Diet of Speier in April
1529.6 Although Charles V had not been present in person, his own European position was steadily improving. The Pope was no longer actively antagonistic, hostilities with France were suspended, Florence was surrounded by imperial forces, and preparations were in train for the coronation of the Emperor at Bologna. After the Protest of Speier, the German princes had reason to fear lest the return of Charles V to Germany
1 A. Feyler, Die Beziehungen des Hauses Wiirttemberg zur schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft in der ersten Hdlfte des i6.Jahrhunderts (Zurich, 1905), 247, 251. Z viii. 226. In November 1521
Ulrich had been accepted by Zurich as a citizen.
2 Farner iv, 340-1; Muralt-Schmid, 28 n. 1; Z VIII, 380.
3 There was a stronger claim to it by Counts Henry and William of Nassau. Otto Meinardus,
Der katzenelnbogische Erbfolgestreit (Nassau-Oranische Correspondenzen 1, Wiesbaden,
1899); W. Koehler, Der Katzenelnbogische Erbfolgestreit im Rahmen der allgemeinen Reformationsgeschichte bis zutn jfahre 1530 (Mitteilungen des Oberhessischen Geschichtsvereins,
N.F. 11 (Giessen, 1902), 1-30).
4 Jakob Wille, Philipp der Grossmiittige von Hessen und die Restitution Ulrichs von Wirtemberg
1526-35 (Tubingen, 1882).
5 Z VIII, 226; ZWA xiii (1969), 152.
6 See above, 318-19.
ZWINGLI might lead to a diminution of their power and, above all, to an edict of restitution depriving them of the episcopal and monastic territories that they had seized. They might soon have to fight the house of Habsburg for their lands and liberties. For this they needed the support of the wealthy cities,1 including those of south Germany and Switzerland, many of which were now Zwinglian. If these cities could obtain an alliance with the militant Swiss Confederation, so much the better. Out of it might arise a reformed north-south axis from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, embracing Denmark, Holstein, Frisia, Guelders, Liineburg, Mecklenburg,
Brunswick, Brandenburg, Saxony, Hesse, Wiirttemberg, Zweibrucken, Strassburg, Basle, Zurich, Berne, Constance, Schafthausen, St Gall, and even Venice and France.2 How unsubstantial all this was, events were soon to prove.
Zwingli had re-established contact with Philip by sending him a copy of Arnica Exegesis in June 1527,3 so that the correspondence of 1529-30, of which probably only fragments survive, was facilitated. Both men were sanguine and optimistic by nature, and they soon came to have confidence in each other. Zwingli was naturally pleased and encouraged to receive the attentions of a prince whose faith he could strengthen by his deep conviction of the sure triumph of his cause. He liked to work out on paper alliances that would forward the expansion of the gospel and the influence of Zurich. The state of affairs in central Germany seemed to offer him opportunities for this, just as that in Switzerland could help Philip. Each wanted action as against the essentially negative and passive attitude of Wittenberg and Berne, and neither really succeeded in obtaining it.
Philip of Hesse hoped for a general Protestant alliance against Pope and Emperor which was not just passively defensive. His attempt to unite
Lutherans and Zwinglians at Marburg failed, but politically the outlook was a little more hopeful. At Schmalkalden he again tried unsuccessfully to unite Swiss and Germans, but this also was not his fault. Both Zwingli and Philip miscalculated. Zwingli, the preacher, prophet and religious leader, failed to perceive that Philip was not as sincere as he was himself.
He likewise did not appreciate the looseness of the Swiss Confederation, which acted only in self-defence or for manifest economic advantage and was now more deeply divided than ever before. He also far too readily assumed that help would be forthcoming from other Protestant cities,
1 Including, particularly, Strassburg, where Sturm had convinced Philip of the value of its support. Saxony, Hesse, Strassburg, Nuremberg and Ulm agreed in principle to a defensive military alliance on 22 April 1529. Kiihn, Speyer, 233-4.
2 See below 393-5. Escher, Glaubensparteien, 185; Z x, 379, 444; Lenz, 60-1 n. 2. The instructions from Zurich of 28 October 1529 dealing with this (Z vi ii, 607-8; EA 4, ib,
419-21) are from StaZ. A. 229. 2 (No. 159 Kappelerkrieg). The numbering is not as in the original.
3 Z ix, 161-2.
Precarious peace particularly Strassburg and Constance. Philip mistakenly thought of Zwingli as responsible for the policy of Zurich, which he was not, and of Zurich as able to dominate the Christian Civic Union, which it did not.
Philip wanted to hire Swiss mercenaries for his own personal and political aims in Germany, Zwingli expected Hessian soldiers to join him in overthrowing the Catholic states of Switzerland, and both were wrong.1
The situation in Switzerland had been profoundly altered by the adoption of the Reformation by Berne, Basle, St Gall, Schaffhausen and Constance, accompanied by the strengthening and expansion of the Christian Civic Union.2 Even before this had happened, Zurich had emerged from the partial isolation caused by its opposition to mercenary service and by the religious innovations. It was soon apparent that only the central states, cautiously supported by Fribourg and Solothurn, were inexorably hostile - with Basle, Berne, Glarus, Appenzell, St Gall and Schaffhausen intercourse continued on a basis of common economic and political interests. Consultations with Strassburg and Constance, however, inevitably led to consideration of the state of affairs in south Germany, but to any intervention there or to any entangling alliance Berne was resolutely opposed. Berne, in continuous touch with Catholic Fribourg and Solothurn, never indifferent to what was happening in Lausanne and Geneva, with its eyes fixed on the west and the south, had no interest in Zurich's expansionist ideas, whether for secular interest or for religion, across the Rhine.
However, in 1529 the northern Swiss cities had all finally rejected the church of Rome, and the Zwinglian Reformation was advancing rapidly.
This encouraged Zwingli in his conviction of the assured triumph of his Bible-teaching. Now that Berne had adopted the evangelical creed, the avowed hostility of the Inner States might be ignored, and Zurich could seek for allies and even take the offensive. There were openings to be exploited in the Mandated Territories for which Zurich shared responsibility, as well as possibilities in St Gall and among the Zwinglian-minded cities of Swabia. If, however, there was to be something more than this, an evangelical Swiss Confederation, united in opposition to Rome and the Habsburgs, with Zurich at its head, it could only be brought about with the help of Berne. Zwingli now insisted that if, after the humiliation of the Inner States at the first Peace of Kappel, Zurich and Berne had pressed their advantages, their opponents might have been reduced to acquiescence and submission. The thirteen states had indeed been working together for 1 Hauswirth, Philipp 245, 256-7. Lortz recognised that 'Philipp und Zwingli waren iiberhaupt die einzigen protestantischen Fiihrer, die in grosseren politischen Zusammenhangen zu denken fahig und geiibt waren.' J. Lortz, Die Reformation in Deutschland* (Freiburg, 1962)
11, 65.
2 Above, 376-7.
ZWINGLI over a decade, but with increasing difficulty; the time had come, Zwingli was to argue, for a new united confederation to emerge which was to be coherent and effective. Zurich and Berne together were powerful enough to dominate the others.1
This implied agreement as to aims, ends and means. Berne, however, was certainly not prepared to underwrite its ally's ambitions either in eastern Switzerland or north of the Rhine. If, as was apparently taking place, the peace terms were to be pressed to the full and the parishes of the Mandated Territories allowed freedom of choice in matters of religious worship, all the territory between the Limmat and Lake Constance might become Zwinglian. Thus, Zurich's influence in Thurgau, the Rheintal,2
Gaster and Sargans3 would amount to a protectorate, and its power would be proportionately enhanced.
This suited neither Berne's interests nor its traditions. Its interests were western, and Zurich's success in the east, added to close connection with south German Protestants, was not to Berne's liking, nor was it necessarily in the interests of the Confederation as a whole. Berne took its federal responsibilities seriously, and was anxious to hold the traditional confederation together and to avoid war. There was no leader of Zwingli's calibre in Berne, nor would one have been tolerated by its ruling class however much its form of government by Blirgermeister and councils resembled that of its neighbour. There was also a tradition of consultation between city and countryside such as did not exist in Zurich, and this helped to make Bernese policy realist, cautious and cool.
In March 1530, the one man who might have kept Zurich and Berne in line died suddenly at the age of 45. This was Zwingli's friend and supporter, Niklaus Manuel, leader of the Bernese Council. With his disappearance, the last chances of happy accord between the two states vanished and Berne reverted to its traditional conservatism. This state in any case refused to be associated with any measures implying the formation of an all-Protestant Confederation by coercion. This became manifest when Zurich accepted what had been discussed at Marburg, an alliance with Hesse. With this the government of Berne was not prepared to be
1 See below, 402.
2 T. Frey, Das Rheintal zur Zeit der Glaubensspaltung (Altstatten, 1947).
3 Sargans was the responsibility of seven states, and the provisions of the first Peace of Kappel were consistently applied there, but it remained Catholic. At Flums there was an actively evangelical minister, Martin Mannhart, who made himself unpopular by the violence of his denunciation of the Catholic mass, which was still permitted for the minority. When, in February 1530, Gilg (Aegidius) Tschudi from Glarus became Governor and showed signs of supporting the Catholics, there were strong demands that Zurich should intervene to prevent this. Instead, however, Mannhart was removed and provided with a benefice elsewhere directly under Zurich's control, where he continued to give trouble. Farner IV, 419-21;
Z x, 494 n. 4, 536 n. 1, 544~5; Straub, 117-30.
Precarious peace associated and this meant that Zwingli's wider aims were impracticable.
It also meant that Basle, which had hoped with German help to annex all the territory ruled by its bishop, had to abandon this attempt and, in turn, was less enthusiastic about the other purposes of the Christian Civic
Union.1
Constance, which Zwingli once called 'the key to Switzerland'2 and to which Zurich turned hopefully, was no adequate substitute for Berne. It had no territory, and could hardly resist indefinitely the efforts of its bishop to regain his authority there with Austrian help, unless support was forthcoming from the Swiss side, which was not in fact available. Its only hope was to be accepted as a full sovereign member - gleichberechtigter und ranghoher Ort - of the Confederation, and this was strenuously resisted by the central states as upsetting rhe balance of power. Berne would agree to accept Constance only as an ally {zugewandter Ort)y and even Zurich was hesitant about the wider demand because it might mean recognition of the city's claim to juridical rights in Thurgau, which would conflict with Zurich's ambitions there.3
1530 was, in fact, a year of concealed rivalry between Berne and Zurich.
Cool, realist, secular-minded and traditionalist, the Bernese patricians had constantly to consider the security of their state and their relations with their own subjects, their neighbours and the Confederation. They were in close contact with the Catholic powers, France and Savoy, and, still nearer at hand, with the hostile communities of Valais and with their immediate obstinately Catholic neighbour Fribourg. Berne, Fribourg and Solothurn joined to defend Geneva when attacked by the Duke of Savoy who, on 19 October 1530, had been obliged to agree to the peace of Saint-Julien.4
The Vaud was then placed under Berne-Fribourg protection, and free trade with Savoy was promised as well. For security and further possible expansion a proportion of Bernese forces must therefore remain in the west. Hence Berne could not deploy the whole of its force to defend
Zurich even if attacked, and it certainly was not prepared to support a preventive war for religion which could also mean that eastern Switzerland came under the control of its already too-powerful neighbour. The Confederation must not be altered out of all recognition for the sake either of religion or of German ambition.
Events in Germany, however, forced the pace. With the opening of 1530 it became ever more obvious, as the Diet of Augsburg came nearer,
1 Z x, 401 n. 7, 513-14; Escher, Glaubensparteien, 142.
2 Z xi, 559: 'Constantia vero velut clavis est Helvetiae.'
3 For similar reasons, involving claims to the monastic property, in spite of the fact that St Gall was also a free imperial city and one of the 'protestants' of 1529, Zurich was not prepared to admit it to anything more than a defensive alliance (Burgrecht).
4 EA 4, ib, 1501-5.
ZWINGLI that a religious war was imminent. Gatherings of Lutherans at Schmalkalden and elsewhere culminated in an offensive and defensive league matching the Christian Civic Union.1 That this should be expanded was very much Zwingli's wish, but the initiative remained with Hesse. From Zurich, Zwingli hoped, the civic alliance would be expanded to include
Strassburg, Constance and Lindau,2 but it was not easy to move even as far as this. The Prince of Hesse was a genuine Protestant who used the faith to which he was converted for his own political and territorial ends; compared with him Zwingli was an amateur politician, convinced that the security and expansion of his creed involved opposition to Pope and Emperor. Philip's was the master mind, but prince and theologian were equally sanguine. Zwingli's confidence was unshakeable. 'God', he wrote,
'is old but not sick and has strength and wisdom enough for us.'3
Proposals for an extended alliance of the cities of the Christian Civic Union to include Philip and Ulrich had been canvassed in 1529 and 1530.
There were discussions in February4 and March, and in April 1530 the Zurich council agreed, by a small majority with several abstentions or absentees, to the principle of cooperation with Hesse, Ulrich, Basle and Berne.5 The refusal of Berne to participate was followed by further meetings6 and by the acceptance by Zurich of the principle of an alliance, christliche Verstand, with Strassburg, Basle and Hesse even without Berne.7
In spite of the fact that Constance and St Gall were prepared to cooperate,8 in October9 the abstention of Berne was confirmed on the grounds that the conflict between Geneva and Savoy demanded prior attention and that if Philip were defeated by the Emperor Berne might be in danger.
This refusal by Berne to be associated with any alliance or understanding with Hesse was of real significance for Zwingli, Switzerland and Germany.
If Berne had been an active and willing associate, the other Zwinglian states would have shown greater interest, which, in turn, through the Swabian cities, must have made a German-Swiss common front a reality.
Before this, imperial hostility might well have crumbled and a broadened Schmalkaldic league must have greatly restricted Charles V's activities. It
1 Fabian, 102-3, 181-2.
2 'das von oben hinab hie diset Ryns bis gen Strassburg ein volck und piintnus werden.'
Z vi i, 201; EA 4, ib, 309. E. Kobelt, Die Bedeutung der Eidgenossenschaft fur Huldrych
Zwingli MAGZ 45 (134. Nbl. Zurich, 1970) 190.
3 Z xi, 252.
4 z x, 445.
5 Hauswirth, Philipp, 208; Escher, Glaubensparteien, 146. EA 4, ib, 964.
6 EA 4, ib, 426ff, 57off, 674ff; Z x, 401 n. 7; Z xi, 21 n. 1, 153 n. 2; Lenz ZKG in, 22off;
Steck & Tobler 1270 (No. 2830).
7 Z xi, 97 n. 7. Zwingli continued to encourage Philip: 'Hallt an, frommer achermann, hallt an.' Z xi, 35 (22 July, 1530).
8 Fabian, 49 n. 12.
9 EA 4, ib, 805; Z xi, 200, 211 n. 8; Feller 11, 210-11.
Precarious peace would also have implied the acceptance of Zwingli's wish and purpose that the Confederation should become a Zurich-Berne dominated, and therefore Protestant, state. This must have changed the whole outlook and policy of the rulers of Berne and to their potential disadvantage. In all this
Berne was more 'Swiss' in outlook than was Zwingli for all his devotion to the Federation. Berne was not a Lutheran state and was not willing to be associated with Lutherans or to participate in any Bucerian compromise which might extend to extra-Swiss affairs. Zurich, however, persisted, and the 'Hessian understanding' or Christian agreement (Hessische, christliche
Verstand) of Zurich, Basle, Strassburg and Hesse was sealed on 18 November 1530.1 It was a simple defensive pact along familiar lines, each party agreeing to help its allies in the event of an attack or rebellion.
Nothing was said about doctrine, although it was potentially a Protestant grand alliance. In fact it was a paper agreement only. A purely defensive pact, and one without Berne, was of little use to either Philip or Zwingli, who both wanted action,2 Even the adhesion of Constance made little difference. There was, in fact, no general Protestant front. In Germany,
Electoral Saxony, Hesse, Braunschweig-Liineburg, Braunschweig-Grubenhagen, the Counts of Mansfeld and Anhalt, with Magdeburg and Bremen, formed a Lutheran league at Schmalkalden in December 1530, and at first Zwingli thought that Zurich might be invited to join3 as Constance did in the summer of 1531 together with most of the south German cities. But the German princes would admit Zwingliahs only on the basis of an acceptance of the Tetrapolitana, and this was rejected by both
Zurich and Berne, although Basle might have been persuaded to agree.4
Strassburg had been pressurised into acquiescence, but the Swiss cities rejected it freely.5 There was no doctrinal compromise with the Lutherans, which, in the event, meant that Swiss neutrality in the later struggles in Germany was assured.6
There was also some talk of the formation of two circles, one of princes, with Saxony, Liineburg and Hesse as chief components, and one or more of cities.7 The Christian Civic Union could be combined with Strassburg,
Constance, Ulm, Isny, Kempten, Biberach, Reutlingen, Memmingen and Lindau, thus forming a powerful block. These cities were indeed prepared
1 EA 4, ib, 837,1514-16; Lenz, 222; Schmid, 40-1; Bender, Ref, 172. Zurich was represented by Biirgermeister Roist and Stadtschreiber Beyel. Zwingli was not present. Politische
Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der Reformation, Bd. 1,1 517-1530 bearbeitet v. H. Virck (Strassburg, 1882) 542-4 (No. 839) 550-1 (No. 844). The original document, handed over after the second war, is in the Lucerne archives.
2 EA 4, ib, 837, 1514-16; Schmid 40-1; Lenz ZKG in, 240-3; Hauswirth, Philipp, 221-6;
Bender, Ref., 171-2; Wyss, 151 n. 4; Fabian 211-16; Z xi, 21.
3 Z xi, 337; Fabian, 102-3, 181-2, 204-5.
* Z xi, 350 n. 3, 354-5. See above, 334-5 n. 4.
5 Z xi, 371 n. 4, 381.
6 Fabian, 229-32.
7 Fabian, 102-6; Lenz, 445.
ZWINGLI to help to defend one another if attacked, so as not to be crushed separately as Rottweil had been, but no more. Memmingen and Kempten were particularly apprehensive,1 but, being cities, they all thought in terms of resisting attack only. Princes and cities could neither cohere nor combine, and nothing happened. Moreoever, Zwingli, primarily concerned to promote the cause of the Gospel, which was also the greater glory of Zurich, and Philip, determined to restore Ulrich and thwart the Habsburgs, were drifting apart.
All this followed upon the Diet of Augsburg2 and the presentation of the Lutheran Augustana and Zwingli's own Fidei ratio. Notwithstanding his increasing involvement in German as well as Swiss public affairs,
Zwingli remained what he had always been - preacher, prophet, minister of religion and theologian. Right as Koehler was3 to emphasise the deterioration in Zwingli's idealism in the months between the armed encounters of 1529 and 1531, the reformer did not cease to preach and expound the Gospel. After the Marburg discussions, however, he had come to rate the support of Philip of Hesse very highly. Rightly apprehensive for the future of the evangelical faith, he misunderstood and exaggerated the Habsburg menace.4 The situation, as Bucer pointed out in September
1530, was serious enough.5 With France and the Empire at peace, northern Italy under imperial control, Florence submissive, Venice satisfied,
Charles III of Savoy an ally, Charles V seemed ready to maintain the Catholic faith by fire and sword even if this involved the end of civil and civic liberties, for the sake of uniformity of religion. Zwingli oversimplified the situation and saw in Philip of Hesse a zealot like himself in the cause of truth. In fact Philip was chiefly interested in the limited objective of restoring Ulrich of Wiirttemberg, while the Schmalkaldic League had much wider objectives than the security of Zurich.6
In an age when rumours flourished and exact facts were hard to come by, Zwingli readily believed that Ferdinand was collecting forces for an attack on Constance and the Vorarlberg followed by an incursion into Switzerland.7 As a Catholic prince he would come to extirpate heretics, and as successor to Rudolf I would seek to reoccupy his inheritance across the Rhine. It was also commonly suspected that the formation of an imperial
1 z x>523* 2 See above, 335 and n. 7. Zwingli had confidently expected to be invited. Z x, 525 (No. 1002);
Staehelin Briefs 11, 443-4 (No. 747).
3 Koehler, Zwingli, 198, 219, 229.
4 Knowing little of the history and politics of the Empire, Zwingli overrated its practical effectiveness. Schmid, 41-2; K. Mommsen, Eidgenossen, Kaiser und Reich, BasBeitr. (1958)
72; R. Hauswirth, Zur Realitdt des Reiches in der Eidgenossenschaft im Zeitalter der Glaubenskdmpfe, Festgabe Leonhard von Muralt (Zurich, 1970) 152-61, esp. 154-5, I59« s Z xi, 107-10.
6 ZWA xi, 547.
7 Haas, Kappelerkrieg, 50; Z x, 260-1.
Precarious peace army for use against the Turks was merely a blind to gather a force to crush the Swiss. For Zwingli Pope and Emperor were now identical.1
Hence his preoccupation with politics, which bulks so largely in his later correspondence.
To see the minister of religion as subordinate to the statesman is as wrong at the end of his life as to make the humanist override the Christian during his formative years. Zwingli remained to the end the singleminded servant of the Gospel that he had always been. His sermons, his pastoral work and his Bible exposition continued unabated. It is easy to overlook, or to relegate to a separate compartment, his continued contribution to the end of his life to the Prophezei^ especially his translation of and commentaries on Isaiah and Jeremiah.2 He would carry the Gospel and true religion to all his fellow Swiss. If conditions required the support of the secular arm, or of foreign allies, such was God's will. The Bible did not teach that combat was to be avoided in the cause of righteousness. It was as a prophet, in the Old Testament sense, that Zwingli lived and died.
Babstiim und Keisertiim, Die sind beide von Rhom. Z xi, 157.
2 These are printed with notes by F. Blanke and A. Farner in Z xiv, 5-679 and are of special value in explaining Zwingli's methods of biblical exegesis. They have also some direct contemporary relevance. The commentary on Jeremiah, for example, was dedicated to the city of Strassburg, and in both commentaries there are direct and indirect references to current affairs. The word of God, it was said, was overlaid by 'polita loquacitas', hypocrisy displaced virtue, force prevailed over equity and justice, the 'Catabaptistae' were continuously provocative. Z xiv, 107, 269, 513, 586, 600-1.