15.6 Grace (SCG 3,147–163)
So Aquinas thinks that final human happiness results from conforming to God’s law. But how does this conformity come about? Evidently, by people acting in certain good ways aiming at the goodness that is God. Yet where does this acting come from? Can it be attributed only to people acting by their natural powers? In SCG 3,147 and following, Aquinas maintains that in order to arrive at beatitude, people need divine help, which he refers to as grace.83
Why so? Because “our ultimate end is fixed in a certain knowledge of truth which surpasses our natural capacity” and because “if we are ordered to an end which exceeds our natural capacity, some help must be divinely provided for us, in a supernatural way, by which we may tend toward our end.”84 This point is repeated over and again in SCG 3,147.85
However, Aquinas does not think that God’s help in leading people to beatitude coerces them. That is because he takes people to have freedom of choice, even though he believes that all that people are and have is from God (see SCG 2,47 and following). For Aquinas, God’s creative activity in people is not a threat to their ability to choose; it makes them able to choose; it is a condition of them choosing. “God by his help,” says Aquinas in SCG 3,148, “does not force us to right action. … God also causes our works in us in accord with our measure, which means that we act voluntarily and not as forced. … Forced acts are not acts of the virtues, since the main thing in virtue is choice, which cannot be present without voluntariness to which violence is opposed. Therefore, people are not divinely compelled to act rightly.”86
From what he says in SCG 3,147 and 148, Aquinas takes it to be obvious that people cannot merit God’s help in advance—the thesis of SCG 3,149. We cannot move ourselves to obtain God’s help; rather, “we are moved by God to obtain it.”87
The movement of the mover precedes the movement of the movable thing in reason and causally. Therefore, divine help is not given to us by virtue of the fact that we initially move ourselves toward it by good works; instead, we make such progress by good works because we are preceded by divine help. … The soul cannot prepare itself to receive the influence of divine help except in so far as it acts from divine power. Therefore, it is preceded by divine help toward good action, rather than preceding the divine help and meriting it, as it were, or preparing itself for it.88
In SCG 3,150, Aquinas calls God’s help in leading us to beatitude “sanctifying grace,” and he takes it to be present in those who have it even when they are not consciously acting. It must be something that endures even when people who have it are, for example, asleep. It must be a “special goodness and perfection” in people.89 “The help of grace which we obtain from God in order to reach the ultimate end,” Aquinas adds, “designates a form and perfection present in us.”90 And in SCG 3,151, he goes on to maintain that sanctifying grace causes us to love God. He writes:
Sanctifying grace is an effect in people of divine love. But the proper effect in us of divine love seems to be the fact that we love God. Indeed, this is the principal thing in the lover’s intention: to be loved in turn by the object of love. To this, then, the lover’s main effort inclines, to attract the beloved to love of the lover; unless this occurs, the love of the lover must come to nothing. So, this fact that we love God is the result in us of sanctifying grace.91
Again, we read:
The ultimate end, to which people are brought with the help of divine grace, is the vision of God’s essence, which is proper to God alone. Thus, this final good is shared with people by God. So, we cannot be brought to this end unless we are united with God by the conformation of God’s will. And this is the proper effect of love, for “it is proper to friends to approve and disapprove of the same things, and to be delighted in and to be pained by the same things.”92 Hence, by sanctifying grace people are established as lovers of God, since they are directed to it by the end that has been shared with them by God.93
In SCG 3,152 and 153, Aquinas maintains that grace also brings about faith and hope in people. In his Summa Theologiae he lays emphasis on faith as belief in the key Christian doctrines, and he takes hope to be for what Christian doctrine promises.94 In SCG 3,152 and 153, however, he is not concerned to discuss faith and hope in detail and in specifically Christian terms. His biblical quotations in these chapters make evident where he finds his authority to lie when it comes to faith and hope; and one can recognize from SCG 1,1–6 what he means by “truths of faith.” But in SCG 3,152 and 153 he refers to faith only as faith in God as able to raise us to the vision of God. And he takes hope only to be hope that God will do this.
So, he says, those who look forward to beatitude do so by God-given faith, since we do not know what God is and since the beatific vision is not within our natural power to grasp. “It is,” Aquinas argues, “necessary that, above our natural knowledge, there also be added to us a knowledge which surpasses natural reason. And this is the knowledge of faith, which is of the things that are not seen by natural reason.”95 He continues:
We are directed by the help of divine grace to our ultimate end [see SCG 3,147]. But the ultimate end is an open vision of the First Truth in Itself [see SCG 3,50 and following]. … Therefore, before it comes to this end, our intellect must be subject to God by way of belief, under the influence of divine grace which accomplishes this.96
When it comes to hope, Aquinas’s line in SCG 3,153 is that the faith he has just been speaking about leads those who have it to hope, by virtue of grace, for the vision of God. So, he argues:
If by grace someone is made a lover of God, there must be produced in that person a desire for union with God, according as that is possible. But faith, which is caused by grace, makes it clear that the union of people with God in the perfect enjoyment in which happiness consists is possible. Therefore, the desire for this fruition results in us from the love of God. But the desire for anything bothers the soul of the desirer, unless there be present some hope of attainment. So, it was appropriate (conveniens) that in people, in whom God’s love and faith are caused by grace, there should also be caused a hope of acquiring future happiness.97
In SCG 3,154 Aquinas goes on to speak of gratuitous grace (gratia gratis data). He takes this to be grace provided so as to convey to others truths about God that cannot be demonstrated. He describes such grace as including an ability to teach divine truth, an ability to preach truly to the accompaniment of genuine miracles (not just events that seem amazing), and an ability inspired by God infallibly to predict (prophesy) future events. In short, Aquinas takes gratuitous grace to be given by God when revealed divine truth is truly preached, sometimes accompanied by events that can only be brought about by God. He also argues that the preaching of divine revelation needs people graced so as to interpret it and discern what is and what is not true when it comes to what is presented by others as being divine revelation. He finds this approach to gratuitous grace to be found in 1 Corinthians 12:8–10.98
Given what he has been saying in SCG 3,147–153, we will not be surprised to find Aquinas maintaining in SCG 3,155 that people need grace to persevere in what is good or with a view to their ultimate good. “In order that we may immovably continue in the good, which is to persevere,” says Aquinas, “we need divine help.”99
For that which surpasses the power of free choice, we need the help of divine grace. But the power of free choice does not extend to the effect of final perseverance in the good. … The power of free choice applies to those things which fall within the scope of election. Now, what is chosen is some particular operation that can be performed. But such a particular operation is what is here and now present. Hence, that which falls under the power of free choice is something that is to be done now. But to persevere does not mean something as now operable, but the continuation of an operation throughout time. Now, this effect, of persevering in the good, is beyond the power of choice. Therefore, we need the help of divine grace to persevere in the good.100
Can someone who falls away from the pursuit of God and goodness come back to it? In SCG 3,156 Aquinas responds to this question in the affirmative, while noting that such a return to God will be the work of grace. He says:
It pertains to the same power to maintain the continued salvation of a person and to restore it when it has been interrupted, just as health is continually maintained by the natural power in the body, and an interruption of that health is repaired by that same natural power. Now, people persevere in the good by means of divine grace, as we showed [see SCG 3,155]. Therefore, if one has fallen as a result of sin, that person may be restored by means of the same grace.101
This line of thinking leads Aquinas to go on immediately, though briefly, to argue that we cannot be freed from sin without divine grace (SCG 3,157). He clearly takes this conclusion to be implied by what he has just said, as it indeed seems to be.
Yet how are people freed from sin? Aquinas’s answer, given in SCG 3,158, is that we are freed from sin as we move away from it, as we refrain from it. He means that our turning to God, and away from what conflicts with union with God, is itself God’s grace at work in us. He also means that we are freed from sin by acknowledging and accepting punishment due to sin, or by making up for our sin in some way.102 This punitive or retributive tone features a lot in SCG 3,158, and it does so because Aquinas thinks that wrongdoing needs to be compensated for if justice is to prevail. Indeed, in SCG 3,158 Aquinas explicitly says that “the order of justice demands that a punishment be assigned for a sin.”103 We should, however, notice that the punishment emphasis in SCG 3,158, considered as something imposed on repentant sinners from without, becomes somewhat muted as the chapter proceeds. I say this for two reasons.
First, in SCG 3,158 Aquinas does not seem to be thinking along the lines “If God makes me suffer, then that frees me from sin.” Rather, his idea seems to be “If I repent of what I have wrongly done, then I shall myself want to make up for my wrongdoing somehow.”
Second, he goes on to say that repentance might not require any punishment at all, whether willed by sinners on themselves or not. Thus, we find him arguing:
When the mind is turned away from sin the displeasure with sin can be so forceful, and the attachment of the mind to God so strong, that no obligation to punishment will remain. … The punishment that a person suffers after remission of sin is necessary so that the mind may adhere more firmly to the good; since people are chastised by punishments, these punishments are, then, like remedies. It is also necessary so that the order of justice may be observed, in the sense that one who has sinned must stand the penalty. But love for God is enough to set the mind of someone firmly in the direction of the good, especially if this love is strong; and displeasure for a past fault, when intense, brings great sorrow. Consequently, through the strength of one’s love for God, and one’s hatred of past sin, there is removed the need for punishments of satisfaction or purification. Moreover, if this strength is not great enough to set aside punishments entirely, nevertheless, the stronger it is, the smaller will be the punishment that suffices.104
So, in SCG 3,158, Aquinas’s position seems to be that our embracing penalties for doing what we have done can be a sufficient but not a necessary condition of us being freed from sin.
Suppose, however, that someone does not turn toward God. Can that person be held responsible even though grace is required for turning toward God? This question is the topic of SCG 3,159, and Aquinas’s answer is yes.
He begins by noting that it might seem as though one should not be held responsible for lacking grace since “someone cannot merit the help of divine grace, nor turn toward God unless God converts that person, for no one is held responsible for what depends on another.”105 But he goes on to say:
We ought to consider that, although one may neither merit in advance nor call forth divine grace by a movement of free choice, people are able to prevent themselves from receiving grace. … And since this ability to impede or not impede the reception of divine grace is within the scope of free choice, not undeservedly is responsibility for the fault imputed to those who offer an impediment to the reception of grace.106
Here I take it that Aquinas regards the choice to sin as impeding grace. He does not mean that anyone can block grace as, say, a boulder can block one’s attempt to enter a cave. Given his notion of divine omnipotence, and given his claim that grace is God at work in us, he cannot think of an impediment to grace as physically resisting God’s activity. As I have shown, though, he does think that people are able freely to sin and that divine causality does not negate human freedom. So he thinks of choosing to sin as culpable and as stepping out of the way of grace since sin is no work of grace and is nothing caused directly by God. Sin, he holds is an “obstacle” (impedimentum) to grace because it amounts to a turning away from God and is incompatible with grace. One cannot be both wet all over and dry all over. One’s being wet obstructs one’s being dry. By the same token, Aquinas maintains that sinning obstructs one’s being in grace. And sin, he thinks, is chosen by us in the face of God, so to speak. He writes:
Those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace; just as, while the sun is shining on the world, people who keep their eyes closed are held responsible for their fault, if as a result some evil follows, even though they could not see unless they were provided in advance with light from the sun.107
In Aquinas’s view, a will turned to sin is turned away from God, even though all that is good comes from God. Or, as he says in SCG 3,160:
Whenever someone’s mind swerves away from the state of rectitude, it is evident that the person has departed from the order of their proper end. So, what should be the most important thing in their affection, the ultimate end, becomes a less important object of love than that object to which their mind is inordinately turned, as if to an ultimate end. So, whenever anything comes up that is in agreement with the inordinate end but incompatible with their proper end, it will be chosen, unless they are brought back to their proper end, so that they favor this end above all things, and this is the effect of grace. However, in so far as they choose something that is incompatible with their ultimate end, they offer an impediment to grace, for grace gives direction to the end.108
As I explained in chapter 12, Aquinas believes that to sin is freely to turn away from a good that one ought to pursue, that it is grounded in love of what is not really good for the sinner. In line with this belief, he argues in SCG 3,160 and 161 that sinners culpably turn away from God and culpably remain in sin unless turned from it by God.
Can they be turned from sin to God? Aquinas thinks that they can. In SCG 3,161, he suggests that, just as God can work miracles, God can bring sinners back to seeking their ultimate end. But he adds that God does not always do so, just as he does not always bring it about that the blind miraculously receive their sight. This, Aquinas thinks, is obvious, for there are people who persevere in sin to the end. You might, of course, immediately ask “Why is this so?” Yet, while Aquinas partly replies to this question by saying “So that we might appreciate how God can be merciful,” his final answer is that we do not know, any more than we know why God has made the world to be as it is in all its diversity. Conversion of sinners, he says, depends on God’s will alone, “just as it resulted from his simple will that, while all things were made from nothing, some were made of higher degree than others.”109 Clearly, Aquinas does not think that God is obliged to make all people to be saints any more than he is obliged to make all living things to be creatures with understanding and the power to choose.
Inveterate sinners might reply that God is culpable for not making them to be saints. In SCG 3,162, however, Aquinas notes that sinners choose to sin and that God does not cause sin in anybody. Continuing to maintain his privation account of evil as I explained it in chapter 12, and continuing to maintain that human beings have freedom to act as they do, in SCG 3,162 Aquinas holds that sin is not directly caused by God. It is a defect that results from the moving power of the sinner. He says:
Every sin stems from a defect in the proximate agent, and not from the influence of the primary agent: as the defect of limping results from the condition of the leg bone and not from the motor power, for, in fact, whatever perfection of motion is apparent in the act of limping, it is due to this power. But the proximate agent of human sin is the will. Therefore, the defect of sin comes from the will of human beings and not from God, who is the primary agent; from God, however, comes whatever pertains to perfection of action in the sinful act.110
Having noted some biblical texts that seem to agree with this line of thinking, Aquinas also notes others that might be thought to point in the opposite direction.111 He argues, however, that the second group of texts should be understood only as teaching that “God does not grant to some people help in avoiding sin, while to others God does grant it.”112 He adds (1) that there are various ways in which divine providence keeps us away from circumstances that might tempt us to sin, and (2) that God has given us reason and other abilities that allow us to turn away from sin.
Winding up his SCG 3 discussion of grace, and drawing on other things he has said about providence, Aquinas concludes SCG 3 by alluding to predestination (praedestinatio), reprobation (reprobatio), and election (electio). These are biblical notions, and in SCG 3,163 Aquinas cites Scripture so as to register this fact. In this final chapter of SCG 3, however, he does not engage in detailed biblical commentary. Nor does he embark on a full-blown discussion of predestination, reprobation, and election. Instead, he contents himself with briefly observing that what leads up to SCG 3,163 has shown that “some of us are directed by divine working to our ultimate end as aided by grace, while others who are deprived of the same help of grace fall short of their ultimate end, and since all things that are done by God are foreseen and ordered from eternity by divine wisdom … the aforementioned differentiation of people must be ordered by God from eternity.”113 So, says Aquinas, “it appears that predestination, election, and reprobation constitute a certain section of divine providence, according as people are ordered to their ultimate end by divine providence.”114 Echoing what I have shown him saying about divine causality and contingency in what God has created (see chapter 8, section 4.12 and chapter 14, section 2.2 here), he notes that predestination, election, and reprobation do “not take away contingency in things.”115 If we are brought to the beatific vision, that is not because of some merit that we have prior to God giving us grace. Our coming to be beatified derives from grace, while “there can be no cause of the divine will and providence, although, among the effects of providence, and likewise of predestination, one may be the cause of another.”116