6.5 Oneness and Infinity (SCG 1,42–43)
6.5 Oneness and Infinity (SCG 1,42–43)
Given what Aquinas argues in SCG 1,37–39, the contents of SCG 1,40–41 are somewhat predictable. In SCG 1,42 and 43, however, Aquinas breaks new ground while arguing that God is one and that God is infinite.
Actually, to say that Aquinas breaks new ground in SCG 1,42–43 is a bit of an overstatement since, in his view, the contents of SCG 1,42 follow from what he has already written in the SCG. He writes: “From what has been shown it is evident that God is one.”13 But how so? Here is a summary of the arguments provided in SCG 1,42.14
1. There cannot be two highest goods since “that which is said by superabundance is found only in one being.”15 Yet God is the highest good.
2. There cannot be more than one absolutely perfect being since there is no way in which members of a class of absolutely perfect beings could be differentiated from each other.16
3. If something can be brought about by one thing, it is best to suppose that it is one thing that has brought it about. Yet “all things are sufficiently fulfilled by a reduction to one first principle” and “there is, therefore, no need to posit many principles.”17
4. As first mover, God is a perfect, single, and continuous mover. God cannot be a collection of movers moving together. Nor can he be one of a group of movers not moving together. Neither can he be a mover who is not always moving in a regular way.18
5. There is no physical motion apart from the first mover, who is incorporeal. But by “God” we mean “first and incorporeal mover.” So there is only one God.19
6. God is the first ordering cause active in all things considered as a whole and considered as a unit containing diverse things that interact in a nonaccidental way, thereby implying a single governing cause. So “there is only one governor for all things, whom we call God.”20
7. If there are two absolutely necessary beings, they must be distinct in some way even if they are both absolutely necessary. But if X and Y are distinct from each other while each being absolutely necessary, then one or both of them must be composite. Yet God is totally simple.21
8. There cannot be many beings each of whom by itself is absolutely necessary in the sense of existing without the activity of anything external to it. If there are two necessary beings, it cannot be their being necessary that distinguishes them since they share this. So they will be different as having different accidents. In that case, however, neither of them is absolutely necessary since accidents require causes and causes imply something totally uncaused. Absolute necessity in something has to belong to it by nature, meaning that what is absolutely necessary is something whose very nature is to exist, not something with accidents that are somehow added to it considered as what it is by nature.22
9. If we speak of there being many gods, we are using the word “god” either univocally or equivocally when saying that one of them is god and that another is as well. If we use the word univocally, then our many gods will be exactly the same insofar as they are gods, meaning that “there must be in both one nature.”23 But this nature is either derived from something else, or it is not. If it is not, then it is had by only one thing the very nature of which is to exist, as is the nature of God. “There cannot be one being for two things that are substantially distinguished.”24 So things that can be substantially distinguished are not things the essence of which is to exist, as is the essence of God.
10. What makes something this thing as opposed to another thing cannot be shared by many things. But being absolutely necessary is what God is, and, since he is entirely simple, his being necessary is not to be distinguished from the individual that he is. So the nature of God, which is God, is therefore not something that can be shared by other individuals any more than the individuality of a particular thing can be.25
11. If there were two gods, then the divine nature would not be identically the same in each and something else must be added to effect the distinction. But nothing can be added to the nature of God considered as wholly simple.26
12. The being that is proper to something is one. But God is his being since he is totally simple.27
13. A thing has being insofar as it has unity. But God is Being Itself and is therefore not subject to division.28
14. Things belonging to a genus have some one thing or principle running through them, something that is one and not a multitude. Now, all things that exist have being in common, and the principle of being in things must be one, not many.29
15. Rulers desire unity, and “one to whom rulership belongs should have unity.” So “God, who is the cause of all things, is absolutely one.”30
When it comes to God’s infinity, Aquinas focuses on the notion of infinite perfection. He agrees that God cannot be infinite as comprising an infinite number of things or as being infinite in terms of bodily quantity. That God is not infinite in either of these senses follows from the fact that there is but one God and from the fact that God is incorporeal. Yet Aquinas sees no harm in asking whether God is infinite in power, goodness, or perfection, and he maintains that God is infinitely powerful, good, and perfect. There is “no terminus or limit to his perfection.”31
What follows this remark is a restatement of what Aquinas has already said in the SCG concerning God’s perfection. He notes, for example, that God somehow contains the perfections of everything other than God. Again, he reasons that God is supremely independent and unlimited since “He is his own being” and contains no potentiality since he is “infinite in his actuality.”32 Yet again, he maintains (1) that God is not a being limited by what causes it, since God is the cause of the being of all that is not God, (2) that nothing better than God can be imagined since God is essentially perfect and is his own goodness, and (3) that God accounts for the existence of everything that can be thought of as finite.