1.4 Aquinas Explains Himself
Aquinas begins the SCG by talking about “the office of the wise man.” “They are to be called wise,” he says, “who order things rightly and govern them well” (SCG 1,1).36 He adds that “the rule of government and order for all things directed to an end must be taken from the end.” So, he argues, “a thing is best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end.” But what if there is a universal end for all things? In that case, the “absolutely wise person,” as opposed to someone wise in some particular art or skill, will be concerned with “the end of the universe, which is also the origin of the universe.”37 Here Aquinas is thinking of God as “the first principle whereby all things are.” Yet, Aquinas quickly adds, thinking about God not only involves the truly wise person meditating on God. It also “belongs to that person to refute the opposing falsehood.”
Hence, in SCG 1,2 Aquinas observes that “in the name of divine Mercy, I have the confidence to embark on the work of a wise person,” which is “the task of making known, as far as my limited powers will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the errors that are opposed to it.”38 Aquinas’s focus in the SCG, therefore, is on truth and error concerning God in general. Indeed, as he continues with SCG 1,2 he makes this quite clear by referring to different kinds of people subscribing to what he takes to be error concerning divine things. More specifically, he mentions those censored by “ancient doctors of the Church” in their criticisms of “Gentiles”—by which Aquinas means people who are neither Jewish nor Christian. He also refers to (1) heretics (by which he means people who claim to be Christian but do not adhere to orthodox Christian belief), and (2) Muslims and Jews (whom he takes to be religious but non-Christian in their beliefs). He also mentions “pagans,” presumably referring to anyone who is not a Christian, a heretical Christian, a Muslim, or a Jew. But how does Aquinas think that he is able to refute all of these classes of people?
When it comes to Jewish people and Christian heretics, Aquinas notes that “the wise person” can at least appeal to biblical texts. So, “against the Jews we are able to argue by means of the Old Testament, while against heretics we are able to argue by means of the New Testament.”39 Yet Aquinas adds that Muslims and pagans “accept neither the one nor the other,” which leaves him concluding with three sentences that effectively indicate the basic line of thought behind the SCG:
We must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to which all people are forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matters, that the natural reason has its failings. Now while we are investigating some given truth, we shall also show what errors are set aside by it; and we shall likewise show how the truth that we come to know by demonstration is in accord with the Christian religion.40
By “natural reason” here Aquinas means what we might call “philosophical insight” or “philosophy” or just “reason.” He is referring to what we can figure out on our own by trying to think well and clearly and without recourse to anything that we might take to be divine revelation. More specifically, however, he is thinking of reason as able to demonstrate certain truths. As I will show, Aquinas distinguishes between different kinds of demonstration. Following Aristotle, however, he always takes a demonstration to be an argument that proceeds from evidently true premises while entailing a conclusion that cannot be denied given that the premises are accepted. In the passage just quoted, therefore, Aquinas is saying that he is going to try to demonstrate certain things about God, while adding that he will also be arguing that what he has demonstrated accords with orthodox Christian teaching, this, in turn, being what Aquinas takes to be found in the Bible, in creeds such as the Apostles’ Creed or the Nicene Creed, and in the teachings of church councils prior to his time. In that case, however, what does Aquinas have in mind when he says that “in divine matters the natural reason has its failings”?
Here Aquinas is anticipating a conclusion for which he argues later in the SCG and elsewhere in his writings. We can express the conclusion as “Articles of Christian faith cannot be demonstrated.” At this point I should again note that Aquinas frequently refers to what he calls “the articles of faith.” He takes these to be the uniquely Christian teachings: that God is Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), that Christ was divine, and that people shall be raised from the dead. Aquinas does not take “God exists” to be an article of faith since he knows very well that there are Jews and Muslims who accept much that he does when it comes to the existence and nature of God. Aquinas thinks that the truth of “God exists” is what the articles of faith take for granted or presuppose, and he holds that one can demonstrate that God exists. Yet he consistently denies that one can demonstrate the truth of the articles of faith. Why? Because he does not think that we have premises known by us to be evidently true that guarantee their truth.
Take, for example, the doctrine of the Trinity. As I will show, Aquinas’s view is that this doctrine cannot be philosophically demonstrated since, while reason can prove that there is something that is divine, it cannot prove this something is a trinity of persons all of whom, according to orthodox Christian teaching, are equally divine. Again, consider the claim that Christ was divine. Aquinas typically denies that this can be philosophically demonstrated since nothing that we can know about the life of Christ can be used so as to construct an argument along the lines (1) Christ was evidently A,B,C; (2) anything A,B,C is divine (3); therefore Christ was divine. Aquinas’s view is that what we can know about Christ based on empirically based testimony is only going to give us knowledge of what a particular human being said and did. You might suppose that the miracles of Jesus establish his divinity without question. To this supposition, however, Aquinas usually says something like “The miracles of Jesus might show us that Jesus was graced by God, but they do not demonstrate that Jesus was God incarnate.”
Aquinas clearly has high standards when it comes to demonstration. As I have said, he thinks that we have a demonstration when we have evidently true premises leading inevitably to a certain conclusion. So where does this leave him as playing the part of the wise person in the SCG? It leads him to recognize that, while the articles of faith do not admit of demonstration, reason, without presupposing the truth of Christian revelation, can lead us to demonstrate much about the existence and nature of God. So we find that the first three books of the SCG are entirely devoted to a defense of this thesis. Then, in the fourth book, Aquinas argues that the articles of Christian faith do not present us with what is unreasonable to believe even though these articles cannot themselves be demonstrated to be true.
I take all of this to mean that Aquinas must have written the SCG so as (1) to reflect at length concerning what reason can tell us about God, (2) to note ways in which what reason tells us about God harmonizes with what revelation teaches, and (3) to defend the articles of faith against charges of irrationality. Whether or not he had missionaries and their aims in mind, this seems to have been what he was most intent on when drafting and correcting the SCG.41 As I have said, in The Metaphysics of Theism, Norman Kretzmann refers to “theology from the bottom up.” Correspondingly, he also talks about “theology from the top down.”42 By “theology from the top down” Kretzmann means “reflecting on God in the light of divine revelation.” By “theology from the bottom up” he means “reflecting on God without recourse to revelation.” And, although Aquinas is clearly writing as a Christian from the start of SCG, he might, I think, have been willing to accept Kretzmann’s distinction. I suspect that he might have been happy to describe SCG 1–3 as “theology from the bottom up” and SCG 4 as “theology from the top down.” Be that as it may, however, SCG 1–3 certainly amounts to a long treatise on natural theology, albeit that it comes from someone who clearly believes in God and is happy to cite biblical texts and various Christian authorities as he continues about his business.
Natural theology has been seriously criticized both by philosophers and by a number of theologians. Philosophers who attack it, or examples of it, tend to do so because they do not find certain philosophical arguments concerning the existence and nature of God to be plausible. Theologians hostile to natural theology are usually against it because they think it impious to hold God against the bar of human reasoning or because they think that to do so is somehow to act in opposition to the teaching of the Bible.43 Be that as it may, however, Aquinas is very much in favor of natural theology and thinks that he can provide a good and substantial amount of it. And the SCG is, perhaps, the work in which he most displays his interest in and talents for natural theology. It is a presiding thesis of Aquinas that truth cannot contradict truth. In the SCG he shows himself to uphold this thesis in the way in which he tries to apply reason even while accepting that there is such a thing as divine revelation.
Before he gets seriously down to business in his efforts on this front, however, Aquinas has some more things to say in SCG 1,1–9. In fact, he argues for three theses while going on to explain the SCG’s order and manner of proceeding.
The first thesis is that even though reason cannot demonstrate the articles of faith, it does not follow that those who assent to them are being foolish (SCG 1,6). The second is that truths that reason can discern do not conflict with any articles of faith (SCG 1,7). The third is that reason can seek to get a grip on some truths about God even though God exceeds the range of human reasoning in a serious way (SCG 1,8).
As I have noted, Aquinas does not take the articles of Christian faith to be demonstrable. Yet he does not think that those who accept them are being unreasonable or foolish. For one thing, he argues, the articles of faith are revealed by God, who knows everything. Then again, he observes, while the articles of faith may not be strictly demonstrable, there are “fitting arguments” for their truth.44 In this connection, for example, Aquinas notes that even uneducated people can be filled with great wisdom concerning divine things and, in being so, appear to fulfill Old Testament prophecy. Such wisdom, Aquinas holds, is not to be found among the adherents of non-Christian religions.45
When it comes to the claim that truths established by reason do not conflict with the articles of faith, Aquinas argues that “only the false is opposed to the true,”46 and that what reason demonstrates to be true cannot conflict with truths divinely revealed by God. He also maintains (1) that our ability to know things by reason comes from God and cannot, therefore, be at odds with what God has revealed, and (2) that revelation cannot conflict with what we can know by reason since this would entail that God is hindering us from knowing truth, which is an impossible supposition. So, Aquinas concludes SCG 1,7 by writing:
Whatever arguments are brought forward against the doctrines of faith are conclusions incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident principles imbedded in nature. Such conclusions do not have the force of demonstration; they are arguments that are either probable or sophistical. And so, there exists the possibility to answer them.47
The main point that Aquinas is making here is that what reason can demonstrate cannot conflict with truths that God has revealed and cannot be proved to do so. One might, of course, wonder what might be said against claims to the effect that this or that article of faith can be shown to be false. Yet, as I will show, Aquinas goes on in the SCG to indicate how he thinks about this matter with respect to specific arguments against particular articles of faith. At this point in the SCG, however, he is basically laying down some general principles to which he will adhere as he continues. He is, so to speak, showing his hand, but not his full hand. And that is what he is doing again in SCG 1,8, in which he briefly says that we can profitably reason about God even though we cannot demonstrate the truths of the articles of faith so as to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of God. How we can profitably reason about God while not attempting to demonstrate the truth of the articles of faith will turn out to be the major topic of SCG 1–3, which brings us to SCG 1,9 in which Aquinas talks about his order and manner of procedure in the SCG.
As we might expect, he repeats some of what he has already said in SCG 1,1–8. Specifically he makes the following points: (1) The wise person should be concerned with what can be known of God by reason and by revelation; (2) The wise person should consider what can be known of God by reason unaided by revelation and should also be concerned to refute objections to truths about God known by reason and objections to truths about God revealed by God.
When it comes to what can be known of God by reason, Aquinas is thinking of what can be demonstrated concerning God. When it comes to what is true of God insofar as God has revealed it, Aquinas says that, since this cannot be demonstrated to be true, “our intention should not be to convince our adversaries by arguments; it should be to answer their arguments against the truth; for, as we have shown, natural reason cannot be contrary to the truths of faith.”48 So:
This, then, is the manner of procedure we intend to follow. We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates. This we shall do by bringing forth both demonstrative and probable arguments. … Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability.49
In short, Aquinas tells us that his intention in writing the SCG is to provide an extended essay in natural theology (which will occupy him through books 1–3) and then to offer defenses of the articles of faith (which will occupy him in book 4). And that, I think, is all that we can confidently refer to when it comes to the question “Why did Aquinas write the SCG?”
I have tried to indicate why the “missionary manual” account of the SCG is to be distrusted. But Aquinas’s own account of his purposes seems fairly clear and indicates that he thought of the SCG as a technical and somewhat apologetic work designed to offer a series of demonstrations concerning the existence and nature of God while concluding with reflections on reason and the articles of faith. The bulk of the SCG is an extended essay on natural theology and is, in Kretzmann’s phrase, concerned with “theology from the bottom up.” Its concluding book is much concerned with objections to articles of faith based on various grounds to which Aquinas responds with no intention of demonstrating that these articles are true.
Yet what kind of approach does Aquinas take to demonstration when it comes to the existence and nature of God? He starts to explain himself on this matter in SCG 1,10–14, to which I now turn.