CHAPTER V
CHAPTER V
St. Anselm
ST. ANSELM HAS BEEN CALLED "THE SECOND AUGUSTINE."
He believed that faith precedes all understanding, and that the wisdom philosophy seeks is given before it can be apprehended. Unbelievers, he taught, strive to understand but never can because they do not believe, for in religion
"faith plays the part played by experience in the understanding of the things of the world." Anselm sought a conclusive proof of the existence of God. As a biographer wrote: "mere affirmation did not satisfy him, he demanded proofs. This thought was continually before his mind. It caused him to forget his meals, and pursued him even during his worship. After a night spent in meditation he at last found what he had been seeking for years." What he found, the famous "ontological" proof of the existence of God, was denied by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), was rephrased by Duns Scotus (1265-1308), reaffirmed by René
Descartes (1596-1650), modified by Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), and refuted by Immanuel Kant (17241804), only to be revamped and reaffirmed by George
Hegel (1770-1831).
"I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe, that unless I believed, I should not understand." Thus Anselm begins his argument with the hypothetical fool, who, as is stated in Psalm 53, verse 1, "says in his heart, "There is no God.' " Anselm insists that even the fool
{ ...is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived.
For when he hears of this he understands it. And whatever
ST. ANSELM
is understood exists in the understanding. And assuredly that than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater.
Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.
And it assuredly exists so truly that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.
But how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.
But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity which the object is, is understood.
In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no
THE AGE OF BELIEF
one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any, or with some foreign, signification. For God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. And he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in concept can it be nonexistent. Therefore, he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.
It is certain, then, that the supreme Nature is not identical with what has been created. But no rational mind can doubt that all creatures live and continue to exist, so long as they do exist, by the sustenance afforded by that very
Being through whose creative act they are endowed with the existence that they have. For, by a like course of reasoning to that by which it has been gathered that all existing beings exist through some one being, hence that being alone exists through itself, and others through another than themselves—by a like course of reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever things live, live through some one being; hence that being alone lives through itself, and others through another than themselves.
But, since it cannot but be that those things which have been created live through another, and that by which they have been created lives through itself, necessarily, just as nothing has been created except through the creative, present Being, so nothing lives except through its preserving presence.
But if this is true—rather, since this must be true—it follows that, where this Being is not, nothing is. It is, then, everywhere, and throughout all things. }
BUT THE HYPOTHETICAL FOOL FOUND AN UNEXPECTED
defender: Gaunilo, a monk of Marmoutier, near Tours, made a reply "on behalf of the fool." Gaunilo argued:
{ The fool might make this reply:
This being is said to be in my understanding already, only because I understand what is said. Now could it not with equal justice be said that I have in my understanding all manner of unreal objects, having absolutely no existence
GAUNILO
in themselves, because I understand these things if one speaks of them, whatever they may be?
Unless indeed it is shown that this being is of such a character that it cannot be held in concept like all unreal objects, or objects whose existence is uncertain: and hence
I am not able to conceive of it when I hear of it, or to hold it in concept; but I must understand it and have it in my understanding; because, it seems, I cannot conceive of it in any other way than by understanding it, that is, by comprehending in my knowledge its existence in reality.
But if this is the case, in the first place there will be no distinction between what has precedence in time—namely, the having of an object in the understanding—and what is subsequent in time—namely, the understanding that an object exists; as in the example of the picture, which exists first in the mind of the painter, and afterwards in his work.
Moreover, the following assertion can hardly be accepted: that this being, when it is spoken of and heard of, cannot be conceived not to exist in the way in which even
God can be conceived not to exist. For if this is impossible, what was the object of this argument against one who doubts or denies the existence of such a being?
. I, so far as actual knowledge of the object, either from its specific or general character, is concerned, am as little able to conceive of this being when I hear of it, or to have it in my understanding, as I am to conceive of or understand
God himself: whom, indeed, for this very reason I can conceive not to exist. For I do not know that reality itself which God is, nor can I form a conjecture of that reality from some other like reality. For you yourself assert that that reality is such that there can be nothing else like it.
For, suppose that I should hear something said of a man absolutely unknown to me, of whose very existence I was unaware. Through that special or general knowledge by which I know what man is, or what men are, I could conceive of him also, according to the reality itself, which man is. And yet it would be possible, if the person who told me of him deceived me, that the man himself, of whom I conceived, did not exist; since that reality according to which
THE AGE OF BELIEF
I conceived of him, though a no less indisputable fact, was not that man, but any man.
Hence, I am not able, in the way in which I should have this unreal being in concept or in understanding, to have that being of which you speak in concept or in understanding, when I hear the word God or the words, a being greater than all other beings. For I can conceive of the man according to a fact that is real and familiar to me: but of God, or a being greater than all others, I could not conceive of at all, except merely according to the word. And an object can hardly or never be conceived according to the word alone. }
GAUNILO, POSING AS THE FOOL, THEN ARGUES CRAFTILY
that before we can say that the being than which nothing greater can be thought necessarily exists, we must have evidence that He does, in fact, exist. Otherwise, we might imagine a most beautiful of all conceivable islands, and say that because we conceive it, it must exist. If, Gaunilo says, { .
. someone should tell 'me that there is such an island, I should easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: "You can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent."
If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly. exists, and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had established with
GAUNILO
any certainty the existence of this island. For he ought to show first that the hypothetical excellence of this island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.
This, in the meantime, is the answer the fool could make to the arguments urged against him. When he is assured in the first place that this being is so great that its nonexistence is not even conceivable, and that this in turn is proved on no other ground than the fact that otherwise it will not be greater than all things, the fool may make the same answer, and say,
When did I say that any such being exists in reality, that is, a being greater than all others?—that on this ground it should be proved to me that it also exists in reality to such a degree that it cannot even be conceived not to exist?
Whereas in the first place it should be in some way proved that a nature which is higher, that is, greater and better, than all other natures, exists; in order that from this we may then be able to prove all attributes which necessarily the being that is greater and better than all possesses.
Moreover, it is said that the nonexistence of this being is inconceivable. It might better be said, perhaps, that its nonexistence, or the possibility of its nonexistence, is unintelligible. For according to the true meaning of the word, unreal objects are unintelligible. Yet their existence is conceivable in the way in which the fool conceived of the nonexistence of God. I am most certainly aware of my own existence; but I know, nevertheless, that my nonexistence is possible. As to that supreme being, moreover, which God is, I understand without any doubt both his existence, and the impossibility of his nonexistence.
Whether, however, so long as I am most positively aware of my existence, I can conceive of my nonexistence, I am not sure. But if I can, why can I not conceive of the nonexistence of whatever else I know with the same certainty?
If, however, I cannot, God will not be the only being of which it can be said, it is impossible to conceive of his nonexistence. }
THE AGE OF BELIEF
ST. ANSELM RETURNED TO THE FRAY, AND, INDEED, HIS
comeback was better than his first attack:
{ I say: if a being than which a greater is inconceivable is not understood or conceived, and is not in the understanding or in concept, certainly either God is not a being than which a greater is inconceivable, or else he is not understood or conceived, and is not in the understanding or in concept. But I call on your faith and conscience to attest that this is most false. Hence, that than which a greater cannot be conceived is truly understood and conceived, and is in the understanding and in concept. Therefore either the grounds on which you try to controvert me are not true, or else the inference which you think to base logically on those grounds is not justified.
But you hold, moreover, that supposing that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is understood, it does not follow that this being is in the understanding; nor, if it is in the understanding, does it therefore exist in reality.
In answer to this, I maintain positively: if that being can be even conceived to be, it must exist in reality. For that than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived except as without beginning. But whatever can be conceived to exist, and does not exist, can be conceived to exist through a beginning. Hence what can be conceived to exist, but does not exist, is not the being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Therefore, if such a being can be conceived to exist, necessarily it does exist.
Furthermore: if it can be conceived at all, it must exist.
For no one who denies or doubts the existence of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, denies or doubts that if it did exist, its nonexistence, either in reality or in the understanding, would be impossible. For otherwise it would not be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. But as to whatever can be conceived, but does not exist: if there were such a thing, its nonexistence, either in reality or in the understanding, would be possible. Therefore if a being than which a greater is inconceivable can be even conceived, it cannot be nonexistent.
ST. ANSELM
But, assuredly, in no understanding is a being than which a greater is conceivable a being than which a greater is inconceivable. Does it not follow, then, that if a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is in any understanding, it does not exist in the understanding alone? For if it is in the understanding alone, it is a being than which a greater can be conceived, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
But, you say, it is as if one should suppose an island in the ocean, which surpasses all lands in its fertility, and which, because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called a lost island; and should say that there can be no doubt that this island truly exists in reality, for this reason, that one who hears it described easily understands what he hears.
Now I promise confidently that if any man shall devise anything existing either in reality or in concept alone (except that than which a greater cannot be conceived) to which he can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing, and will give him his lost island, not to be lost again.
But it now appears that this being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived not to be, because it exists on so assured a ground of truth; for otherwise it would not exist at all.
Hence, if anyone says that he conceives this being not to exist, I say that at the time when he conceives of this either he conceives of a being than which a greater is inconceivable or he does not conceive at all. If he does not conceive, he does not conceive of the nonexistence of that of which he does not conceive. But if he does conceive, he certainly conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist. For if it could be conceived not to exist, it could be conceived to have a beginning and an end. But this is impossible.
He, then, who conceives of this being conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist; but he who conceives of this being does not conceive that it does not exist; else he conceives what is inconceivable. The non-
THE AGE OF BELIEF
existence, then, of that than which a greater cannot be conceived is inconceivable.
You say, moreover, that whereas I assert that this supreme being cannot be conceived not to exist, it might better be said that its nonexistence cannot be understood.
But it was more proper to say, it cannot be conceived.
For if I had said that the object itself cannot be understood not to exist, possibly you yourself, who say that in accordance with the true meaning of the term what is unreal cannot be understood, would offer the objection that nothing which is can be understood not to be, for the nonexistence of what exists is unreal: hence God would not be the only being of which it could be said, it is impossible to understand its nonexistence.* }
AND SO ST. ANSELM CONCLUDES TRIUMPHANTLY:
{ Whoever, then, denies the existence of a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, at least understands and conceives of the denial which he makes. But this denial he cannot understand or conceive of without its component terms; and a term of this statement is a being than which a@ greater cannot be conceived. Whoever, then, makes this denial, understands and conceives of that than which a greater is inconceivable.
Moreover, it is evident that in the same way it is possible to conceive of and understand a being whose nonexistence is impossible; but he who conceives of this conceives of a greater being than one whose nonexistence is possible. Hence, when a being than which a greater is inconceivable is conceived, if it is a being whose nonexistence is possible that is conceived, it is not a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. But an object cannot be at once conceived and not conceived. Hence he who conceives of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, does not conceive of that whose nonexistence is possible, but of that whose nonexistence is impossible. Therefore, what he con- * ee by Sidney Dean (The Open Court Publishing Co.,
ANNE FREMANTLE
ceives of must exist; for anything whose nonexistence is possible, is not that of which he conceives. }
ST. ANSELM'S
CONCLUSIONS WERE ACCEPTED
FOR A little over a hundred years. Then his argument was rejected by St. Thomas Aquinas, who said: "Even if it be granted that everyone understands this name God to signify what is said (namely, that than which a greater cannot be thought), it does not follow from this that he understands that which is signified by the name to be in the nature of things, but only in the apprehension of the understanding.
Nor can it be argued that it is in reality, unless it be granted that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought—which is not granted by those who maintain that God is not."* But it was reaffirmed by René Descartes: "It is no less inconsistent to think of a God (that is, a being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is, to whom any perfection is lacking) than to think of a mountain to which a valley is lacking."
** Rejected again by Immanuel Kant: "I simply ask you, whether the proposition, that this or that thing
. exists, is an analytical or a synthetical proposition. If the former, then by its existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing...
. If... you admit .
. that every proposition involving existence is synthetical, how can you say that the predicate of existence does not admit of removal without contradiction?' +
It was given a new look by Hegel (as pointed out by Dr. Burch in his Early Medieval Philosophy: ""Undoubtedly God would be imperfect, if he were merely thought and did not also have the determination of Being. But in relation to God we must not take thought as merely subjective; thought here signifies the absolute pure thought, and thus we must ascribe to him the quality of Being."
* Reprinted from Summa Theologica 1, 2. 1 and 2, with the permission of Benziger Brothers,
Inc., publisher and copyright owners.
**Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, V.
{ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Miller, Vol. I, Ill (The Macmillan Company).