CHAPTER III

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knowing that it is so, he corrects not as an examiner, but as an inventor [discoverer] he is pleased.

But, if this truth were on the same plane with our minds, it too would be changeable. For our minds at one time see more clearly, at another time less: and from this they show that they are changeable. While it (truth) is neither more true when it is seen by us, nor less true when we see it not: but entire and inviolate, it delights those who are turned to it by its lights, and those who are turned away it punishes by blindness.

How then about the fact that upon our minds we form judgments in accordance with this (truth); while upon the truth itself we can not pass a judgment? For we say that one understands less clearly than he ought, or, he understands as well as he ought. So much, indeed, ought the mind to understand (proportionately) as it can be brought to adhere more closely to the immutable truth. Wherefore, if (truth objective) is neither inferior nor on the same plane, it follows that it is superior and more excellent (than our minds).

But I had promised, if you remember, that I would show you that there is something that is higher than our mind and our reason. Behold, you have it—truth itself. Embrace it if you can, enjoy it, and be glad in the Lord.* }

CHAPTER III Boethius

AUGUSTINE WAS MUCH INFLUENCED BY PLOTINUS, AND,

in his turn, Augustine influenced Anicius Manlius Boethius (2480-524) who was born about half a century after Augustine died. Rome had fallen to the Goths, and effective authority in Italy was administered by the Gothic king

* Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, trans. Francis Tourscher (Peter Reilly Co.).

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Theodoric, who was an Arian. The Arians were Christian heretics who believed that God is one and all alone, and that Christ was not begotten, but created, out of nothing, before all else. Though He assumed a human body, He was filled, not with a human soul, but, rather, with the Divine

Word. Thus, though all other things were made by and through Christ, He neither shared the human soul's condition, nor, through His martyrdom, raised it to the plane of the immortal. The Arians were more powerful and numerous than the Catholics throughout the fourth and a great part of the fifth century, and the Arian heresy lasted for a full four hundred years. Theodoric, who employed

Boethius as one of the chief officials of his court, grew alarmed when a Catholic became emperor at Constantinople, and thought his own subjects would waver in their allegiance.

So he first imprisoned Boethius at Pavia, and then had him executed, in 524. Boethius had intended to translate all of Plato's and Aristotle's works into Latin, and to write commentaries on them. He only completed translating the logical works of Aristotle, writing some theological treatises of his own, and the famous Consolation of Philosophy, one of the two steady best sellers throughout the Middle Ages. (The other was the Treatise on the Divine Names of someone who called himself Dionysius the Areopagite, but whoever he was, he was certainly not St. Paul's convert, being born some centuries later.) Boethius continues many of the arguments Augustine began, and his light, lively style and the clarity of his mind make him still most readable.

It was while he was in prison, between his condemnation and his death, that Boethius wrote the Consolation of Philosophy, which even after the Reformation enjoyed a great vogue, being many times translated into all the European languages.

It is a dialogue between "my nurse Philosophy" as Boethius calls her "in whose house I had remained since my youth" and Boethius, weeping in his misery and banishment. Their arguments are interspersed with verses, and Philosophy, after many lovely statements "that what is, is good," states that:

BOETHIUS

{ "Reason doth in such sort demonstrate God to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly good. For unless

He were so, He could not be the chief of all things. For there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness, which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. For it is already manifest that perfect things were before the imperfect. Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we have concluded that perfect goodness is true happiness, wherefore true blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high God." "TI agree," quoth I, "neither can this be any way contradicted." "But I pray thee," quoth she, "see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we said, that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign goodness." "How?" quoth I. "That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of God who hath it, were diverse. For if thou thinkest that He had it from others, thou mayest also infer that he who gave was better than the receiver. But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all things.

Finally, that which is different from anything, is not that from which it is understood to differ. Wherefore that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of God, than whom, we know certainly, nothing is better.

For doubtless the nature of nothing can be better than the beginning of it. Wherefore I may most truly conclude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in His own substance the chiefest good." "Most rightly," quoth I. "But it is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness?" "It is," quoth I. "Wherefore," quoth she, "we must needs confess that blessedness itself is God." "I can neither contradict," quoth I, "thy former propositions, and I see this illation followeth from them."

"Consider," saith she, "if the same be not more firmly proved hence, because there cannot be two chief goods,

-THE AGE OF BELIEF

doubtless a being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, others from the power of the doers.

And therefore we said not without cause that these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are necessary; and if they be considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to reason, is universal; if thou considerest the things themselves, it is singular or particular. But thou wilt say, 'If it is in my power to change my purpose, shall I frustrate providence if I chance to alter those things which she foreknoweth?' I answer that thou mayest indeed change thy purpose but because the truth of providence, being present, seeth that thou canst do so, and whether thou wilt do so or no, and what thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.

"But yet thou wilt inquire whether God's knowledge shall be changed by thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another, it should also seem to have divers knowledges. No. For God's sight anticipateth all that is to come and recalleth and draweth it to the presence of His own knowledge; neither doth He vary, as thou imaginest, now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving anticipateth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of comprehending and seeing all things, God hath not by the event of future things but by His own simplicity.

"God's knowledge also surpassing all motions of time, remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and comprehending the infinite spaces of that which is past and to come, considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now in doing.

"For which cause it is not called praevidence or foresight, but rather providence, because, placed far from inferior things, it overlooketh all things, as it were, from the highest top of things. Why, therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things necessary which

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they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon those things which thou seest present?

"No. But the present instant of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge doth not change the nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in His presence as they will after come to be, neither doth He confound the judgment of things, and with one sight of His mind He discerneth as well those things which shall happen necessarily as otherwise. As you, when at one time you see a man walking upon the earth and the sun rising in heaven, although they be both seen at once, yet you discern and judge that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary, so likewise the divine sight beholding all things disturbeth not the quality of things which to Him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so this is not an opinion but rather a knowledge grounded upon truth, when He knoweth that such a thing shall be, which likewise He is not ignorant that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest that cannot choose but happen which God seeth shall happen, and that which cannot choose but happen, must be of necessity, and so tiest me to this name of necessity, I will grant that it is a most solid truth, but whereof scarce any but a contemplator of divinity is capable. For I will answer that the same thing is necessary when it is referred to the Divine knowledge; but when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities: the one simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortal; the other conditional, as if thou knowest that any man walketh, he must needs walk. For what a man knoweth cannot be otherwise than it is known. But this conditional draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity. For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding of a condition. For no necessity maketh him to go that goeth of his own accord, although it be necessary that he goeth while he goeth. In like manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be, although it hath no necessity of nature. But God be-

-_THE AGE OF BELIEF

doubtless a being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, others from the power of the doers.

do so or no, and what thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.

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they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon those things which thou seest present?

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holdeth those future things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore, being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtless all those things come to pass which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceed from free-will, which though they come to pass, yet do not, by coming into being, lose, since before they come to pass, they might also not have happened.

"Tet us be then lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind, for there reason shall see that which she cannot behold of herself. And that is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things which have no certain issue, and this is no opinion, but rather the simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within no bounds. For it is the common judgment of all that live by reason that God is everlasting, and therefore let us consider what eternity is.

"Eternity therefore is a perfect possession altogether of an endless life, which is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever liveth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past to times to come, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace all the space of its life at once. But it hath not yet attained tomorrow and hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in that movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, whatsoever suffereth the condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time, yet it is not such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fullness of an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent, nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself, it may always be present to itself, and have an infinity of movable time present to

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BOETHIUS

it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever have any end, think that by this means the created world should be coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing to embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is manifestly proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to seem more ancient than the things created, by the quantity of time, but rather by the simplicity of His divine nature. For that infinite motion of temporal things imitateth the present state of the unmovable life, and since it cannot express nor equal it, it falleth from immobility to motion, and from the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an infinite quantity of future and past, and since it cannot possess together all the fullness of its life, by never leaving to be in some sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that which it cannot fully obtain and express, tying itself to this small presence of this short and swift moment, which because it carrieth a certain image of that abiding presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not stay it undertook an infinite journey of time, and so it came to pass that it continued that life by going whose plenitude it could not comprehend by staying. Wherefore, if we will give things their right names, following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world perpetual."* }

BOETHIUS IN FIVE BRIEF TREATISES DEFENDED THE CATH-

olic position against the Arians, and in one of these, "a letter to John the Deacon," Boethius proved how "substances can be good in virtue of their existence without being absolute goods."

{ I have [he wrote] therefore followed the example of the mathematical and cognate sciences and laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that follows.

I. A common conception is a statement generally ac- * Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, trans. Rev. H. F. Stewart (Loeb Classical Library, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926).

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cepted as soon as it is made. Of these there are two kinds.

One is universally intelligible; as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same class of common conceptions; as. "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.

II. Being and a concrete thing are different. Simple Being awaits manifestation, but a thing is and exists as soon as it has received the form which gives it Being.

III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute Being can in no wise participate in anything.

For participation is effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has acquired Being.

IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.

V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different; the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.

VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being through the fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate in something else.

VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its particular Being.

VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one and the same.

IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it seeks.

These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose.

The intelligent interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to each point.

Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good.

For all the learned are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must, however,

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inquire how they are good—by participation or by substance. If by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual Being to absolute Being.

Their absolute Being therefore is good; therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good.

Therefore they are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness. But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.

Hence all things that are, are God—an impious assertion.

Wherefore things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good.

This problem admits of the following solution. There are many things which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from matter.

Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive from the Prime Good. This process leads me to

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perceive that their Goodness and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it must be admitted that its substance, roundness, color, and goodness are all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as its substance, weight would be the same thing as color or goodness, and goodness would be the same as color; which is contrary to nature. Their Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good. Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good substances, and were neither heavy, nor colored, and possessed neither spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They are called good simply because their

Being is derived from the Will of the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness are rightly predicated as identical.

Their absolute Being therefore is good; for thereby it resides in Him.

Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple reason that their absolute

Being is not good under all circumstances, but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the Prime

Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime Good is good throuzh the fact that it exists, irrespective of aul conditions, for it is nohing else than good;

BOETHIUS

but the second good if it derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good through the fact that it exists.

For in that case it might possibly participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good, would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial

Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we need not say that white things are white through the fact that they exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the fact that they exist because one who was good willed them to be good. Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the same sort of Being in virtue of our existence.

Therefore all things are good, but all things are not just.

Finally, good is a general, but just is a species, and this

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species does not apply to all. Wherefore some things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.* }

THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OF BOETHIUS' WORKS, HOWEVER,

was his Commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry. One C.

Marius Victorinus, called Afer, a native of Africa (died circa 370), had already translated Porphyry, and Boethius used this translation. Since Porphyry's Isagoge was already a commentary on Aristotle's Categories, Boethius was already commenting at one remove; by the end of the Middle

Ages, the ripples caused by the stones Aristotle threw had reached the edge of the pond—the limits of possible speculation—and all the answers were known; today, as has been remarked, "we know all the answers, it is the questions that we do not know."

The following are some extracts from Boethius' Dialogues on the Isagoge.

{ When winter blows upon the Aurelian mountains, and the east wind in those parts has broken the peace of the night and disturbed its quiet, then is a time to go over in the mind what the wisest men have illuminated with the sharp sword of their intellect, piercing the darkness. Fabius did just this, when he came to me as I lay in bed, thinking and meditating on such things, and as we freely talked, all domestic noises being hushed, he asked me to explain to him what Victorinus the orator, a very wise man in his time, had translated from Porphyry's Isagoge, that is, his introduction to the Categories of Aristotle, and what are the preliminary devices of commentators used to prepare the minds of their readers. I replied, "they always first explain the intention, the utility, the genuineness, the originality and the division of philosophy."

"What then," asked Fabius, "is the intention, into which this work falls?" And I replied, "Philosophy is a genus, and there are two species, one called theoretic and that is speculative, and the other practical, and that is active. And Aristotle, who himself is our bridge and the introduction to * Boethius, Quomodo substantiae, trans.

Rev.

H. F. Stewart (Loeb Classical Library, G. P. Putnam's, 1926).

BOETHIUS

philosophy, could not see that any arguments could be understood unless we were prepared to understand the very things about which we were to dispute. Then Porphyry seeing that in all things there was a first nature, from which all others arose as from a fountain, considered those things which were first to be subsistents and called them by the name of genus. But nothing could be a genus unless certain other things were contained within it, and these he called species, but no genus could be the genus of only one species but must be of several. Yet many species could not be multiplied unless some distinction separated them. For were there nothing dissimilar among them, there would seem to be but one species, not many. These divisions and dissimilarities of species are called by the name of difference, and it follows from this that every difference appears first in the seed and occurs also in the substance, so that neither can there be accident without substance nor substance without accident. For no accident can exist without a foundation of substance, and substance cannot be perceived unless by means of accident. In order that color, which is an accident, exist, it must be in a body which is a substance. So also, when you see a body that is a substance, you see this accident of color. Thus it is that neither is there a substance beyond accident, nor can there be an accident abandoned by substance.

. Porphyry speculated about these things, that is, accident and substance, genus, species, property and accident and difference, and what genus is of and by itself, and what difference plainly is. And he began principally to deal with genus, species, difference, property and accident. Now the knowledge of these five things is for us a sort of root and many-sided source which flows into all parts of philosophy. For in order to define a thing, you must first give its genus. In order to define what is man, you must first say man is an animal. Then, when you define man as an animal, the genus animal and man, a species of animal, is defined by you, but it does not suffice only to give its genus. For if you merely say man is an animal, do you define a man any more than a horse, a cow or a donkey?...

"Let this be a definition of man. Man is an animal, that is his genus, but man is a species, reasoning, that is the dif-

THE AGE OF BELIEF

ference, capable of laughter, that is his property. So far in this definition no use has been made of accidents. But there is no doubt that accident adds nothing to definitions. For a definition seeks to describe substance, and accident does not describe substance, so accident is useless in a definition.

Much has been written and argued by the ancients on these subjects, but they are only briefly touched upon in this further problem which now arises .

. ." "Which is that?" asked Fabius. "This," I replied, "which can be asked of any and all genera and species: whether they really exist, or are merely perceived by the intellect alone and the mind, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal and whether once separated, they can be attached to sensible objects.

This, then is the first question, whether genera and species are true, or whether they are but naked and empty figments of the imagination. This question can be phrased thus. Because man has a many-sided intelligence, he apprehends the quality of sensory objects subjected to his senses, and from these, having obtained some sort of an idea, he has thus provided himself with a way to the understanding of incorporeal objects. I, when I see individual men, and know that they seem men, and that they are men, I believe that I understand myself. Then my intelligence, having brought me so far, lifts itself higher, and is carried to this idea of a species of man, which has been posited under the genus animal, and understands that incorporeal thing that it was before it assumed particular bodies in individual sentient and intelligible men. Then there is this analogous question, whether certain things are wholly incorporeal, which never suffer from bodies, such as the soul or God, or whether such cannot exist with bodies, as for example, a primary limitless incorporeality.

"Once it has been established that genus truly exists, then there is no doubt another question will arise, whether it is corporeal or incorporeal. But this would be a frivolous or an absurd question, whether genus is corporeal or incorporeal, unless its existence had first been established. But this essential question can be disposed of in this fashion.

No one doubts that incorporeal things can exist, although they are not apprehended by any of the senses, for men's

BOETHIUS

minds make clear what they are by thought. Now because the first nature of these things is incorporeal (i.e., thoughts in the mind) it may be that the incorporeal is the parent of the corporeal. Genus, actually, is of itself neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but can become one or the other, but species are, some corporeal, some incorporeal. Genus, as 'animal,' species, as 'man,' difference, as 'reasoning,' property as 'can laugh,' accident, as 'white': this is a brief and succinct division...

"But although genus is one, it can produce many species.

Thus it embraces many things just as it is divided into many species. For man, crow and horse, which are species, when it comes to animal, are equally animal. Thus the name of animal is shared by all the species among themselves. But species are a division of genus in some fashion, and are multiplied, for when you divide genus into species, you accept the same species for only as many as heretofore you accepted as one. For the infinite variety of individuals can be named under one generic term. Thus all individual men belong to the species man, are one mankind. Yet the same species in us is broken up into us all. So that everything which is single and individual is divided from what it was born, and everything that is not single or individual, but can be divided, does not divide itself otherwise than to the same extent that it can be brought together. For you can say that every man is an animal, and it is true. But if you say that every animal is a man, that is false ..

"So in one way it is possible to know whether the name of this, whose division we wish to make, is equivocal, whether genus means that which is signified, or whether genera and species and such others are grasped only by understanding ...

"Genera and species either exist and subsist or are formed by the intellect and thought alone, but genera and species can also not exist. This can be seen from the following. Anything that is simultaneously common to many cannot at the same time be at one with itself. For whatever is shared by man, and wholly possessed in common by many things at the same time, is manifold. However many species there are, there is the same genus in them all, not

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that the separate species divide the genus into so many parts, but that every one of the species is in possession at the same time of the whole. From this it arises that the whole genus, present simultaneously in many individuals, cannot be one, for since it is totally in-so many simultaneously it can not itself be one. But if this is so, and genus cannot possibly be one, then it follows that it cannot be; for whatever is, is because it is one, otherwise it is nothing.

And the same may be correctly said about species .

. ."

[Boethius goes on to say that if genus and species are multiple in number, there will be an infinite regression and so reason must proceed for ever, since no end of the breaking-down process occurs.] "But when the intellect receives from the senses things confused and mixed up with bodies, it distinguishes between them with its own strength and thought. For thus sense brings to us incorporeal things which have their existence through these same bodies, and the intellect which has the power to unite the disjointed and to disjoin the composite among all the things brought to it by the sense, so distinguishes the incorporeal nature in itself without bodies that where it is concrete it looks and sees the incorporeal nature in itself .

. ." }

BOETHIUS ASKED "WHAT IS THE RELATION OF UNIVERSALS

to the individual material things that exemplify them, and to the human mind that knows them?" The whole of medieval philosophy concerns itself, one way and another, with answering this question.

It was Martianus Capella, an African writing about the year 430, who first listed the seven liberal arts which were to form the basic curriculum of medieval students.

He listed them in Books III to IX of an allegory, quite unreadable today, The Marriage of Mercury and Philology.

This also contains (in Book IV) a list of the five predicables (genus, species, difference, property, and accident) and the ten categories. Also he lists oppositions, propositions and syllogisms—all more or less cribbed from Aristotle, and all a bit garbled in the cribbing.

Cassiodorus (c.490-585) lived in the Ostrogothic kingdom of Theodoric too, but, unlike Boethius, he survived.

ANNE FREMANTLE

Born in Calabria, Italy, he became private secretary to Theodoric when only twenty, and later governor and senator. In 540 he retired to the monastery of Vivarium, which he had founded on his estates, and died at the age of ninetyfive. He urged his monks to read, and made a library list for them, which included Dionysius, Ptolemy, and Porphyry.

St. Isidore of Seville (7560-636) fled from one Spanish province to another. His fatherland was destroyed by the Goths. Isidore was a brother of St. Leander, whom he succeeded as Bishop of Seville, and was the last of the Fathers of the West. He was "above all a compiler, perhaps the greatest compiler who there has ever been." He compiled a summary of all human knowledge, and bequeathed to the Middle Ages a sort of encyclopedia of all pagan and Christian writings available at his time. He also wrote at least eight books, of which a history and a defense of the Catholic Church against the Jews are the best known. His only contribution to philosophy is that he listed the pagan philosophers and summarized their theories. With him the last echoes of the ancient voices died in the West.

The classical sunset had all but faded by now; in a broken Europe, cut up into many barbarian kingdoms,

Christianity was fighting for its life, and had little time or energy to try to save classical culture too. But at least it did not push classical culture off the raft to which both clung: the raft of a common language (Latin) and of a common law. Christianity and classical culture were linked by their shared survival, were to remain bracketed thereafter. The Greco-Judeo-Christian tradition, that anomalous, composite concept, had begun its joint fight for survival—which still continues today, although as Christopher

Dawson says, the "history of the early Middle Ages is remarkable for its discontinuous character: indeed, it seems at first sight to consist of a series of false starts."

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