CHAPTER X

Duns Scotus

GREGORY X SUMMONED TO THE FRENCH CITY OF LYONS,

in 1274, the greatest of the medieval councils. The chief item on the council's agenda was the reunion of East and West, the ending of the Photian schism. St. Albert attended the Council, St. Thomas Aquinas died on his way there, and St. Bonaventura died during the Council. But the last had already taken part in the final negotiations with the ambassador of the Byzantine emperor and had preached at the bilingual mass which celebrated the reunion of East and West. It seemed the apotheosis of the idea of Christendom, the restoration of the seamless robe of Christ, the beginning of an Augustan age.

However, "the old order changeth, giving place to new, and God fulfills himself in many ways, lest one good custom should corrupt the world," as the Victorian poet

Lord Tennyson pointed out, and what seemed a beginning was instead an end; indeed 1274 is as final a date as 1603 or 1902, and the death of St. Thomas Aquinas marks the end of an era as surely as did the death of Queen Elizabeth I or Queen Victoria.

One of the unsolved—and possibly insoluble—historical mysteries is why St. Thomas Aquinas suffered such an immediate and complete eclipse. The chief opponents of Thomism were the Franciscans. Although St. Bonaventura was himself such a close friend of St. Thomas, by 1282 the Franciscan Order as such had already officially adopted an antagonistic attitude to St. Thomas, and the study of the Summa Theologica was discouraged, while the contemporary William de la Mare published a "formal criticism of a hundred and seventeen points of doctrine found in Thomas' works." This constituted the Franciscan mani-

ANNE FREMANTLE

festo, as it were. After the condemnation by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277, of Averroés and his opponent Aquinas in one breath, the Dominicans rallied around their greatest writer, and by 1278, through the decision of the General Chapter at Milan, Thomism became the official doctrine of the Dominicans.

While the Dominicans had no outstanding philosopher after St. Thomas, the Franciscan John Duns Scotus, born in Scotland around 1265, was to prove St. Thomas' greatest rival.

John Duns Scotus studied in Oxford and Paris, was teaching at Oxford from 1300 to 1302, then taught in Paris, then again in Oxford, and finally died in Cologne in 1308. His great commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, and his treatise On the First Principle were written in Oxford. He was a brilliant and "fair argumentative" man, like most of his race, and he attacked

"the majority of his contemporaries, Roger Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, the Averroists, Richard of Middleton (a fellow

Franciscan) and Henry of Ghent." "This critical attitude," comments Maurice de Wulf, "though courteous, was bound to make his teaching lively and popular. It makes his works a repertory of contemporary philosophy of incomparable doctrinal value

. At the same time he had a sense of tradition. He appealed to St. Bonaventura. He did not criticize for the sake of criticizing, but in order to construct."

Father Christopher Devlin, S. J., has made a brilliant comparison between St. Thomas and Duns Scotus:

{ I would therefore compare the mind, as St. Thomas represents it [he told the London Aquinas Society on March

15, 1950], to a limpid and motionless pool in which both the nature of the surrounding objects and the movements of the heavens can be clearly discerned. Everything is reflected in a two-dimensional surface, and yet there is no mistaking the differences of depth and distance, there is no confusion between earth and heaven. Yet when Duns

Scotus arrives, he complains that the pool fails to represent two things of vital importance without which it could not long exist. These things are the secret entrance and

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the secret exit by which there is a continual influx and a continual drawing-off of the water without which it could not remain fresh and sweet .

. the pool is the rational mind, and Scotus complains that if it is regarded as a closed circle sufficient unto itself, it does not adequately represent the human soul. The human soul is not co-extensive with reason or understanding

. it is a mistake to regard the other powers of the soul simply as functions or adjuncts to understanding. There is a power of the soul which is below understanding, but which has better evidence of the soul's origin, and there is a power of the soul which is above understanding and which is more in touch with the soul's destiny. The secret entrance to the pool is the point where the unconscious begins to influence the conscious mind. The secret exit is the point where the soul finds that its intellectual powers extended to their fullest have still failed to satisfy it, and that it must bring a higher faculty into play. In this way he returns to, and hopes to reinstate St. Augustine's hierarchy of memory, understanding and will. He sees these powers as the one soul operating on different levels of consciousness. }

ON MANY POINTS, DUNS SCOTUS ABANDONS ARISTOTLE

and goes back to Plato. Where Thomas and the Thomists said that God commands good because it is good, Duns

Scotus said good is good only because God commands it.

Thomas Aquinas had insisted that existence (esse) was more fundamental than essence (essentia), and had insisted on the higher dignity of the intellect than of the will.

John Duns Scotus challenges these positions. He has been opposed to Thomas Aquinas as Immanuel Kant to Gottfried Leibniz; John Duns Scotus, the critic, has been assumed to be the destroyer of Thomas, the dogmatic. But the subtlety, the complexity, the feeling-after-and-finding technique of the former is at least as constructive as it is critical, and D. J. B. Hawkins goes so far as to say that "he is a systematic thinker in the grand manner, second only to St. Thomas in the middle age, and presenting another synthesis of Augustine and Aristotle."

For Duns Scotus, the will is superior to the intellect,

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and, for him, philosophy does not give man enough dignity: Christianity provides man with a greater natural dignity (upon which the supernatural is laid) than ever philosophy found. "God who so wonderfully didst constitute the dignity of the human substance," says the priest in the Mass, and this naturally constituted dignity is at the heart of medieval humanism. Although "every intellect as such is capable of apprehending the whole range of being," as Duns Scotus said, that tremendous quality of being capax

Dei, capable of (the vision of) God, is what made man as seen by Duns Scotus the whole man of the Renaissance, of whom Pico della Mirandola was to cry "L'anima mi S'aggrandisce"' (my soul swells).

Duns Scotus took up the problem of universals from where Abelard had left it. When the mind separates redness from things red, the mental activity isolates elements which do not exist apart in isolation. Yet redness exists in each red thing, but only in the mind apart from all things red. This distinction, though unreal, has a foundation in fact: what, asked Duns Scotus, is this foundation in fact?

Duns Scotus "drew up a list of varying kinds of unity and the corresponding degrees of distinction." There was the unity of aggregation, the unity of order, the unity of qualification, the unity of essential principles, the unity of simplicity, and "the most absolute kind of unity which is formal identity." So, according to the Scotist school, humanity in Peter and humanity in Paul are formally identified, although not really.

Duns Scotus denied the distinction between essence and existence, because neither accounted for the individuality of real things. "Hence, beyond all that in reality corresponds to universals

. he claims that things exhibit a principle of individuality, a thisness, which is not reducible to any other factor. The singular adds an entity over and above the entity of the universal. Consequently the apprehension of the universal is not the complete ground of an apprehension of the singular adequate to the whole knowability of the singular."* Thisness is not a universal like

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-other universals like redness or fatness, for it is the very principle by which I am I, you are you. And we cannot understand anything until we have understood its thisness, and the difference between thisness and thatness. Actually, as Dr. Hawkins points out, Duns Scotus' thisness (haecceitas, as he calls it) is much the same as St. Thomas' existence.

Both great philosophers refused to remain among airy abstractions. The one by his thisness, the other by his existence, brought philosophy down from the thin speculative skies to the workaday world, by emphasizing the realness of what exists. In fact, for Duns Scotus, the individual is the only existing thing, and it is not the being of being but the being of the individual which is investigated by philosophy. God is God because He is more fully individual, more fully himself, than anyone else is himself, and He is Pascal's God, the God of Abraham, not of the philosophers.

It is in his theory of form that Duns Scotus most obviously clashes with St. Thomas Aquinas. The formal perfection of man for Duns Scotus, for example, is humanitas.

Either, in extramental existence, this is identified with life, or with specific elements, such as rationality. In either case, each one is not the other, and the individual humanitas, apart from its ideal existence, has a reality in each individual, apart from its conceptual reality. Every essence has its own existential being, according to Duns Scotus, and "the generic and specific concepts utilized by the mind in its scientific constructions attain to univocal realities and have the same value in the indefinitely numerous being to which these concepts apply. Even the notion of being, which we apply to substance and accident, to creatures and to God, is characterized by univocity, and corresponds, in the measure in which it signifies opposition, to a homogenous determination in all that is or can be."*

God, for Duns Scotus, is demonstrable in physics, which arrives at an unmoved mover, and in metaphysics, which arrives at a first being.

"It is because we find that the things around us are * Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy,

Vol. ii (Longmans, Green).

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_ manifold, contingent and composite that we are able to see that they must have an ultimate cause which is one, necessary and metaphysically simple." The most obvious attribute of contingency is finitude. And infinity is the "most essential characteristic which thought must attribute to the necessary being." For St. Thomas, therefore, God is the infinite being, for Duns Scotus, He is the infinite being. Only in God is the will in total harmony with the intelligence, and God's first motion is toward Himself. But for Duns Scotus "the second motion of God's will is towards the creation of persons who will be able to love him in their degree, and the third towards the creation of the means which those persons will require."

In his De Primo Principio (Of the First Principle) Duns Scotus works out clearly and completely his own proof of the existence of God. This work, probably a late one, is generally regarded as genuine.

{ CHAPTER I:

May the First Principle of things grant me to believe, understand, and make known those things which may please His Majesty and elevate our minds to the contemplation of Him.

O Lord our God, when Moses thy servant asked Thee, the most true teacher, about thy Name, so that he might tell it to the Children of Israel, Thou, knowing what the intellect of mortals could conceive of Thee, didst answer:

I AM WHO AM, thus disclosing thy Blessed Name. Thou art true Being, Thou art total Being. This, if it be possible for me, I should like to know. Help me, O Lord, in my inquiry as to how much knowledge our natural reason can attain concerning the true Being, which Thou art, beginning with "being," which Thou hast predicated of Thyself.

There are many properties of "being," the consideration of which would be valid for the pursuit of our purpose.

_ However, from the essential order as from a more fruitful means, I shall first proceed in the following manner: In this first chapter I shall set forth the four divisions of order; from these divisions it will be gathered how many essential orders there are.

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For the manifestation of a division this much is required: first, that the resultants be made known and be shown to be thus contained under that which is divided; secondly, that the resultants be shown to be mutually exclusive; thirdly, that it be proved that the resultants exhaust the content of that which is divided. The first requirement will be met in this chapter, the others in the second chapter.

Here then I shall simply set down the divisions and assign the meanings of the resultants.

I do not take essential order in the strict sense, as some do who say that the posterior is in an order but that the prior or first is above order. Rather, I take it in its common meaning, in so far as order is a relation of mutual comparison predicated of the prior with regard to the posterior, and conversely—that is, in so far as that which is ordered is sufficiently divided into that which is prior and that which is posterior. Hence at times there will be mention of order and at others of priority or posteriority.

First Division. I say then first that essential order seems to be divided by a primary division, as an equivocal term into its equivocates, namely, into the order of eminence and the order of dependence.

In the first mode the prior is called the eminent, and the posterior is called that which is exceeded. To put it briefly, whatever is more perfect and noble according to essence is thus prior. In this manner of priority Aristotle proves in the ninth book of the Metaphysics that act is prior to potency, when he calls the former prior according to substance and species. For he says that those things which are posterior in generation are prior in species and substance.

In the second mode the prior is called that upon which something depends, and the posterior is called that which depends, With regard to this prior I understand the following meaning (which Aristotle likewise shows in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, using the testimony of Plato):

The prior according to nature and essence is that which is able to exist without the posterior, but not conversely.

I take this in the following sense: Even if the prior necessarily causes the posterior and therefore cannot exist without it, still this is not because it needs the posterior for

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_ DUNS SCOTU

its own being, but conversely. For if it be assumed that the posterior does not exist, the prior will nevertheless exist without the inclusion of a contradiction. The converse will

— not be true, because the posterior needs the prior; this need we can call dependence. Thus we can say that everything which is essentially posterior depends necessarily upon its prior, but not conversely, even though sometimes the posterior necessarily follows it. These can be called the prior and the posterior according to substance and species, as the others were called above. However, for the purpose of speaking clearly, let them be called the prior and the posterior according to dependence.

Second Division. Leaving the order according to eminence undivided, I subdivide the order of dependence.

For, either the dependent is an effect and that upon which it depends is its cause, or the dependent is a more remote effect of some cause and that upon which it depends is a more proximate effect of the same cause.

With regard to this second division the meaning of the first member is sufficiently known, as well as the fact that it is contained under what is divided. For it is clear what a cause is and what an effect is, likewise that an effect essentially depends upon a cause and that the cause is that upon which it depends, according to the above meaning of the first member of that which is divided here.

But the second member of this second division is not evident in itself, nor is it clear how it is contained under what is divided.

The first part is explained thus: If of the same cause there are two effects, one of which is by its nature fit to be caused by that cause in a prior and more immediate way, and the other only through that more immediate effect already caused, I say that this other is a posterior effect with regard to the same cause, and the more immediate one is a prior effect. This is the meaning of this member.

From this I show, secondly, that this member is contained under that which is divided, that is, that the more

- remote effect depends essentially upon the more proximate effect. For first, it cannot exist if the more proximate effect

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does not exist; secondly, the causality of the cause is related to them within an order; therefore .

. .; and conversely, they have an essential order between each other, being compared to a third, which is the cause of both of them; therefore, they also have an essential order between each other in an absolute way; thirdly, such a cause of itself is understood only as the proximate cause of the proximate effect alone; and if that one is not caused, the cause is understood as somehow remote with regard to the others; but if that one is already caused, the cause is understood as proximate with regard to the second effect. However, from the remote cause only in so far as it is remote, no effect follows. Therefore the second effect depends upon the cause which has brought the more proximate effect into being; consequently it depends also upon the more proximate being.

Third Division. Each member of this second division is subdivided, and I subdivide the second member first, because this is in harmony with what has already been said.

For the prior, which is the more immediate effect of the cause, is declared to be the more immediate effect not only of a proximate cause of both but of a remote cause as well.

Take for example: The proximate cause of one effect— let it (viz. the proximate cause) be A—is in no way the cause of the other effect, B. But some other prior cause is the proximate cause of this B and is the remote cause of that effect of which the other (viz. A) is the proximate cause. Nevertheless, between these effects there will be an essential order as of a prior effect to a posterior effect, and this is true if the causality of the common cause of both according to an essential order is related to them as to its effect.

It is not so apparent that the second member of this division is under that which is divided. However, it is proved in this way: Since each effect is in an essential order with reference to a third, which is the cause of both of them, it follows that they are in an essential order with reference to each other. Besides, the common cause is understood as if it were a remote cause with regard to

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posterior, if the prior is not caused. Moreover, the posterior cannot exist without the prior .

In summing up I gather together the fruit of this chapter.

The essential order is exhausted through six orders which divide it; viz., four orders of cause to effect; and one of effect to effect, by including here under the same order the two members of the third division; and one of eminent to that which is exceeded. }

FROM THE NATURE OF THE CREATOR, DUNS SCOTUS GOES

on to the nature of the created.

{ CHAPTER III: The three-fold primacy in the First Principle.

First conclusion: It is possible that among beings there is some nature which effects.

This is shown: It is possible that there is some nature which is effected; therefore, it is possible that there is some nature which effects. The consequence is evident from the nature of correlatives. The antecedent is proved: Some nature is contingent; therefore it is possible for it to be after not being; therefore not from itself, nor from nothing

—in both these cases being would be from non-being.

Therefore it is possible that there is a nature which is effected by another. The antecedent is proved furthermore:

It is possible for some nature to move or change, for it is possible for it to lack some perfection that is possible to be in it. Therefore, the term of motion can begin, and so be effected.

In this conclusion and certain following ones, I could propose the actual thus: Some nature is an efficient cause, because some nature is effected, because some nature begins to be, because some nature is the term of motion and contingent. But I prefer to submit conclusions and premises about the possible, for if those about the actual are conceded, those about the possible are conceded, but not conversely. Also, those about the actual are contingent, though manifest enough; those about the possible are necessary. The former pertain to existing being, the latter can properly pertain also to being quidditatively taken. And

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later on there will be shown the existence of that quiddity about which there is now shown the efficiency.

Second conclusion: It is possible that something which effects is simply first; that is, it is not possible that it is effected or that it effects in virtue of another.

It is proved from the first conclusion: It is possible that there is something which effects. Let it be A. If it is first, in this manner expounded, our purpose is soon attained.

If it is not, then it is a posterior possible efficient cause, because it is possible that it is effected by another or that it effects in virtue of another. If the negation is denied, the affirmation is posited. Let that other be given; let it be

B, and about that let it be argued as it was argued about A.

Either there will be an infinite process in possible efficient causes, of which everyone will be second with respect to a prior, or there will be a stop in some one not having a prior.

Infinity is impossible in ascent. Consequently a primacy is necessary, because that which does not have a prior is not posterior to anything posterior to itself, for the second conclusion of the second chapter destroys a circle in causes.

Here it is objected that according to those who philosophize an infinity is possible in ascent, as they posited about infinite generating beings, of which none would be first but every one would be second; and nevertheless this would be posited by them without a circle. In excluding this instance I say that the philosophers did not posit an infinity as possible in causes essentially ordered, but only in causes accidentally ordered, as is clear from Avicenna— in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, chapter S—where he speaks of the infinity of individuals in a species.

In order to show forth our purpose I explain what essentially ordered causes are, and what accidentally ordered causes are. Hence it must be known that it is one thing to speak of causes by themselves (per se) and incidental causes; and it is another thing to speak of causes per se or essentially ordered, and causes accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only a comparison of one to one, of cause, namely, to effect; and that is a cause per se which causes according to its own nature and not according to

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, AGL " something accidental to it. In the second there is a comparison of two causes with each other, in so far as there is an effect from them.

Essentially and per se ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes in three respects. The first difference is that in essentially ordered causes the second, in so far as it causes, depends upon the first; in accidentally ordered causes it does not, although in its being or in some other way it does depend. The second difference is that in essentially ordered causes there is a causality of another nature and order, because the higher is more perfect; in accidentally ordered causes there is not. This difference follows from the first. For no cause depends essentially in causing upon a cause of the same nature, because in the causation of anything, one of one nature suffices. The third difference follows, that all essentially ordered causes are necessarily required simultaneously for causing. Otherwise some proper causality would be lacking to the effect.

Accidentally ordered causes are not required simultaneously.

From these considerations our purpose is shown thus:

An infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible, and an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless it be posited that it is based on essentially ordered causes. Therefore, an infinity in essentially ordered causes is altogether impossible. And even if an essential order is denied, infinity is impossible. Therefore, it is altogether possible that something which causes is simply first.

Here there are three propositions assumed. For the sake of brevity let the first be called A, the second B, the third C.

The proof of these. First A is proved: The totality of essentially ordered effects is caused; consequently by some cause which is nothing of that totality; for then it would be the cause of itself; for the whole totality of dependents depends, and upon nothing of that totality. Furthermore, infinite causes essentially ordered would be simultaneously in act—from the third difference above—a consequent no philosopher posits. Thirdly, the prior is nearer the beginning—from the fifth book of the Metaphysics; consequent-

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ly, where there is no beginning, there is nothing essentially prior. Fourthly, the higher is more perfect in causing— from the second difference; consequently what is infinitely higher is infinitely more perfect and thus of infinite perfection in causing; it is therefore not causing in virtue of another, since every such a one causes. imperfectly because it is dependent in causing. Fifthly, that which is able to effect does not necessarily posit any imperfection—this is evident in the eighth conclusion of the second chapter; consequently it can be in some nature without imperfection, but if it is in none without dependency upon a prior, it is in none without imperfection; therefore, independent efficient causality can belong to some nature; that nature is simply first; consequently an efficient causality simply first is possible; this suffices, because later it will be concluded from this, that it exists in reality. Thus by five reasons A is evident.

B is proved: For if an accidental infinity is posited, this evidently occurs not simultaneously, but successively only, one member after the other; so that the second, although in some way it will be from the prior, nevertheless does not depend upon it in causing. For it can cause when the former does not exist, as, for instance, a son generates when his father is dead just as when he is living. For such an infinity of succession is impossible, unless it depends upon some nature of infinite duration, upon which the whole succession and everything of it depends. For no difformity is perpetuated, unless in virtue of something permanent which is nothing of the succession, because all the members of the succession are of the same nature; but it is something essentially prior because every member of the succession depends upon it, and this in a different order than that in which a member depends upon the proximate cause, which is something of that succession; therefore B is evident.

C is proved:

Since from the first conclusion of this chapter it is possible that there is some nature which effects, if the essential order of possible efficient causes be denied, then that nature causes in virtue of no other; and even if it be posited as caused in some singular, neverthe-

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less in some one singular it is uncaused, and this is the goal regarding the first nature. For if in every one it be posited as caused, a contradiction is already implied in denying the essential order. The reason is that no nature can be posited as caused in every one, so that there is an accidental order under it, without there being an essential order to another nature—from B.

Third conclusion:

It is possible that the simply first efficient is uncausable, because it is not effected and it effects independently.

This is evident from the second conclusion. For if it is possible that it is caused by another or that it causes in virtue of another, then there will be an infinite process, or a circle, or there is a stop in something uncausable and capable of causing independently; I say that that is first and the other, as is clear from your admissions, is not first.

It is concluded further: If the first is ineffectible, then it is uncausable, because it cannot be ordered to an end—from the fifth conclusion of the second chapter; and it cannot be caused from the matter—from the sixth conclusion of the same chapter; and it cannot be caused through the form—from the seventh conclusion there; and it cannot be caused from the matter and form together—from the eighth conclusion of the same chapter.

Fourth conclusion: The simply first efficient in the possible order is actually existing, and some nature actually existing is effective in this way.

It is proved: That to the definition of which it is repugnant to be able to be from another, if it can be, can be by itself. It is simply repugnant to the definition of that which can be the first efficient to be able to be from another—from the third conclusion; and it can be—from the second conclusion. Indeed, in that place the fifth proof of A, which does not seem conclusive, concludes this. Other proofs can be treated with regard to existence, and they are about contingent facts, though manifest; or with regard to nature and quiddity and possibility, and they are from necessary facts. Consequently that which can be the simply first efficient can be by itself. That which is not by itself cannot be by itself, because then non-being would bring

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something to being, and this is impossible; and besides, then it would cause itself and so would not be altogether uncausable. This fourth conclusion is declared in another way because it is inconvenient for the universe to be lacking the highest degree possible in being.

According to this fourth conclusion, note a corollary, that that which can be the first efficient is not only that which is prior to others, but that to be prior to which includes a contradiction; thus, in so far as it is first, it exists.

This is proved as the fourth conclusion was proved. For in the definition of this there is especially included the uncausable. Therefore, if it can be because it does not contradict being, it can be by itself, and so it is by itself.

Fifth conclusion: The uncausable is a being which is necessary of itself.

It is proved: For by excluding every cause different from itself, both intrinsic and extrinsic, with regard to its being, of itself it is impossible not to be. Proof: Nothing is able not to be unless something positively or privatively incompatible with it can be, because in any case one of two contradictories is always true. Nothing incompatible with the uncausable can be, either positively or privatively, because it would be either of itself or from another; not in the first manner, because then it would be so of itself— from the fourth conclusion—and so incompatibles would exist simultaneously; and for a like reason neither would be, because you concede by that incompatible that the uncausable does not exist; and so it follows conversely; not in the second manner because no effect has more intense or more powerful being from a cause than the uncausable has by itself, because an effect is dependent in its being, whereas the uncausable is not. Also the possibility of the causable to exist does not necessarily posit its actual being, as is the case with the uncausable. However, nothing incompatible with an already existing being can be from a cause, unless it receive from that cause 2 being more intense or more powerful than is the being ot that which is incompatible with it.

Sixth conclusion:

The necessity of being of itself belongs to only one nature.

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It is proved thus: If two natures can be necessary of themselves, their necessity of being is common; therefore also some quidditative entity according to which the necessity is common to them and from which is taken, as it were, their genus; and besides this they are distinguished by their ultimate actual formalities.

From this there follow two incompatibles. First, each will be a necessary being first of all through the common nature, which is of lesser actuality, and not through the distinguishing nature, which is of greater actuality. For if it is formally a necessary being through that distinguishing nature also, then it will be a necessary being twice, because that distinguishing nature does not formally include the common nature, just as a difference does not include the genus. However, it seems impossible that a lesser actuality is that by which something is first of all necessary, and that by a greater actuality it is necessary neither first of all nor per se.

The second impossible consequence is that through the common nature, by which it is posited that each is first of all a necessary being, neither one is a necessary being, because neither is sufficiently through that nature. For every nature is what it is through the ultimate formal element. However, through whatever something is a necessary being, through that same element it is in effect regardless of every other thing.

If you say that the common nature suffices for its being, besides the distant natures, then it follows that that common nature itself is of itself actual and not distinguished, and consequently cannot be distinguished, because the necessary being already existing is not in potency to being in an unqualified sense; the being of a genus in a species is simply being with regard to it.

Besides, two natures under the same common class are not of the same degree. This is proved through the differences dividing a genus; if they are unequal, then the being of one will be more perfect than the being of the other; no being is more perfect than a being which is necessary of itself.

Moreover, if two natures were necessary of themselves,

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one would have no dependence upon the other in being; consequently neither would it have any essential order to the other. Therefore one of them would be nothing of this universe, for there is nothing in the universe which does not have an essential order among beings, because the unity of the universe derives from the order of the parts.

Here it is objected that because each has an order of eminence to the parts of the universe, that order suffices for unity. Against this objection: The one does not have that order to the other, because the more perfect being is of a more eminent nature; but none is more perfect than that very being which is necessary of itself. Likewise, one of them has no order to the parts of the universe; because of one universe there is one order, there is one order to one first. The proof: To two first natures, if they are posited, the nature next to the first does not have only one order or only one dependence, but two, as there are two termini ad quem, and so with regard to every lower nature.

Therefore, there will accordingly be in the whole universe two first orders, and so two universes, or there will be an order to only one necessary being and no order to the other.

However, because in proceeding reasonably it seems that nothing must be posited in the universe unless some necessity for it is apparent and some order towards other beings manifestly shows its entity, since plural beings are not to be posited without necessity—from the first book of the Physics—a necessary being shown in the universe from the uncausable; and that (viz., the uncausable) is shown from the first being causing, and that, in turn, is shown from the effects. It is not apparent from the effects that there is a necessity of positing more than one first nature causing; nay, it is impossible, as will be shown later in the fifteenth conclusion of this third chapter. Therefore it is not necessary to posit more than one uncaused or necessary being according to the nature. Consequently with reason they are not posited.

According to the first four conclusions of this chapter concerning the possible efficient cause,

[submit .

. simi-

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lar conclusions about a final cause, and these conclusions will be shown in a similar manner.

The first is:

Seventh conclusion:

It is possible that among beings there is some nature which is an end.

It is proved: It is possible that there is something which is ordered to an end. Proof: It is possible that there is something which is effected—from the proof of the first conclusion of this chapter; therefore, it is also possible that there is something which is ordered to an end. The consequence is evident from the fourth conclusion of the second chapter. This is more manifest with regard to the essential order—from the sixteenth conclusion of the second chapter—than it was with regard to the possible efficient.

F Eighth conclusion:

It is possible that something which is an end is simply first; that is, it is not possible that it is ordered to another or that it is fit to be an end for others in virtue of another.

It is proved by five proofs similar to those of the second conclusion of this third chapter.

Ninth conclusion:

It is possible that the first end is uncausable.

It is proved: because it cannot be ordered to an end; otherwise it would be first; and further, it is therefore ineffectible—from the fourth conclusion of the second chapter; further, as above in the proof of the third conclusion of this third chapter.* } * Duns Scotus, De Primo Principio, trans. by Father Evan Roche

(Franciscan Institute).

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