6. See further on v. 10.

See below on 11:17–34, esp. v. 18, “in the first place I hear. . . .”

Murphy-O’Connor, Keys (144), seems less than precise to speak of “the emotional tone of this passage.” To the contrary, it lacks almost all of the evidences of rhetoric and emotion that pervade most of the rest of the letter (chaps. 7 and 12–13 being excepted). E.g., instead of starting with the more rhetorical “do you not know that?” v. 3 begins “I want you to understand that”; the two rhetorical questions (vv. 13–15) lack “rhetoric”; the appeal is to custom, personal shame, “nature”—hardly the apostle’s ordinary kind of argument when he strongly disagrees with them. Moreover, the two opening sentences of the next two issues taken up in succession stand in clear contrast to each other by the way each begins (“I praise you”/“I have no praise for you”).

This has led some to excise the passage altogether as a non-Pauline interpolation. See the articles by Walker, Cope, and Trompf in the addendum bibliography. This is a counsel of despair and is predicated not on grammatical and linguistic difficulties (pace Walker), but on the alleged non-Pauline character of the passage, which borders on grandiose subjectivity of the worst kind. There would appear to be a certain danger in assuming that one knows so well what Paul could or could not have written that one can perform such radical surgery on a text, esp. when nothing in the language or style is non-Pauline! Even more unhistorical are those few who have attempted to reread this passage in light of the actual spurious sentences later in the letter (14:34–35).

These include “head” (vv. 3–5); “having down the head” (v. 4); “uncovered” (vv. 5, 13); “glory” (v. 7); “authority over her head” (v. 10); “because of the angels” (v. 10); “in the place of a covering” [NIV, “as a covering”] (v. 15); “such a custom” [NIV, “no other practice”] (v. 16).

The books written on this subject tend to express far more certainty about these matters than the data would seem to allow. Indeed, chaps. 10–14 serve to remind us how little we really know about early Christian worship, mostly because it was παράδοσις—handed down orally, or simply experienced. There are plenty of hints of various kinds, but hardly a full explanation of anything. We know next to nothing, e.g., about (1) the time/frequency of gatherings, (2) the place(s) of gatherings, (3) the kind(s) of gatherings, or (4) the role of leadership. Thus, e.g., the picture that emerges in 11:17–34 is that the Lord’s Supper was eaten in conjunction with a meal; yet in 14:26 the picture of worship is of a considerably different kind. Did these happen at the same gathering? Was the meal one kind of worship, and the teaching, singing, prophesying, and praying of 14:26 another kind altogether? We simply do not have enough information to know. See the introduction, .

See further on v. 10.

Besides those mentioned on , see (Eng. titles only in chronological order): A. Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple: A Study with Special Reference to Mt. 19:3–12 and 1 Cor. 11:3–16 (ASNU 24; Lund, 1965); W. J. Martin, “I Corinthians 11:2–16: An Interpretation,” in Apostolic History and the Gospel: Biblical and Historical Essays Presented to F. F. Bruce on His Sixtieth Birthday (ed. W. W. Gasque and R. P. Martin; Grand Rapids, 1970), 231–41; R. Scroggs, “Paul and the Eschatological Women,” JAAR 40 (1972), 283–303; N. Weeks, “Of Silence and Head Covering,” WTJ 35 (1972), 21–27; J. B. Hurley, “Did Paul Require Veils or the Silence of Women? A Consideration of I Cor. 11:2–16 and I Cor. 14:33b–36,” WTJ 35 (1973), 190–220 (see also his unpublished Cambridge dissertation of the same year, “Man and Woman in 1 Corinthians,” some of which now appears in revised form in Man and Woman in Biblical Perspective [Grand Rapids, 1981], 162–84); W. A. Meeks, “The Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity,” HistR 13 (1974), 165–208; B. K. Waltke, “1 Corinthians 11:2–16: An Interpretation,” BibSac 135 (1978), 46–57; Murphy-O’Connor, “Sex”; A. Padgett, “Paul on Women in the Church: The Contradictions of Coiffure in 1 Corinthians 11.2–16,” JSNT 20 (1984), 69–86; and W. L. Liefeld, “Women, Submission and Ministry in 1 Corinthians,” in Women, Authority, and the Bible (ed. A. Mickelsen; Downers Grove, Ill., 1986), 134–54.

I have purposely left out of consideration a large number of books on “women’s issues” that have a section on this text, since for the most part they do not break new ground, but rest on the work of others. There are three exceptions. The first is Katherine C. Bushnell, God’s Word to Women (n.d. [1923?]; repr. North Collins, N.Y.), who acknowledges indebtedness to John Lightfoot but whose presentation is frequently bold and unique. The second is Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins (New York, 1983), 226–30. The third is P. B. Payne, Man and Woman, One in Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Paul’s Letters (Grand Rapids, 2009), 109–215, an even-handed must read for those on either side of this sometimes divisive issue. See the Appendix.

This is both good and bad for exegesis. It is good because it has caused scholars to look at the text with unusual care, thus supplying us with a wealth of helpful information and possibilities for understanding; it is harmful, however, when the prior conclusions both for and against women’s equality determine how one is going to understand the text. On this issue the present writer is also a person of his times, for good or ill. For a helpful overview both of the history of exegesis and how it has been influenced by culture, see Linda Mercadante, From Hierarchy to Equality: A Comparison of Past and Present Interpretations of 1 Cor 11:2–16 in Relation to the Changing Status of Women in Society (Vancouver, 1978).

This subparagraphing is that of the standard published Greek text (NA²⁷) but has been followed by almost none of the more contemporary English translations except for the present NIV, nor interestingly enough by any earlier commentators. The paragraphing in the original NIV (2, 3–10, 11–16) seemed to have missed the structures of Paul’s argument almost altogether. Other English translations have equally not fared well: the NEB/REB has vv. 2–12, 13–16; while the NRSV/ESV have removed any such helps for the English reader by making all of vv. 2–16 a single paragraph, which runs roughshod over both Paul’s own signals and the published Greek text (UBS⁴), which honors those signals.

Gk. μέν . . . δέ, structural signals that are run over rather roughshod by those who attempt other arrangements. See esp. Padgett, “Paul,” who breaks the paragraph between vv. 7b and 7c, with the μέν clause functioning as the conclusion of the Corinthians’ argument (vv. 3–7b) and v. 7c beginning Paul’s response. There seems to be no precedent for such usage in Greek literature (Padgett appeals to alleged examples in Rom. 7:25; Gal. 4:8–9; and Heb. 9:23; but these are not parallel to what he advocates, including a break in paragraphs and point of view).

The word κεφαλή appears nine times in vv. 3–10, the metaphorical usage in v. 3 (and probably vv. 4–5) being called forth because that is where the literal problem lay (see on v. 3).

See below on the introduction to this paragraph.

Some (e.g., Bushnell, God’s Word, par. 249; Padgett, “Paul,” 82) argue that this is an indicative. See the commentary.

The use of the word “veil,” most often associated with this view, is an unfortunate one, since it tends to call to mind the full veil of contemporary Moslem cultures, which covers everything but the eyes. This is unknown in antiquity, at least from the evidence of paintings and sculpture. Most often the “covering” was either the loose end of an outer garment known at the ἱμάτιον (himation) or a loosely fitting light linen cloth. See and .

Cf. Martin, “Interpretation”; cf. NIV^mg ().

Cf. –, plus the commentary on these verses. It is completely forced to make the passive “let her be shaved” read “let her be for now with short hair” (as Martin, NIV^mg). Paul could easily have said that, and this imperative does not.

This was first argued by Isaksson, Marriage, 166, and followed without acknowledgment by Hurley, “Veils,” 197–200; it was refined by Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 147–48, and followed by Padgett, “Paul,” 70. Cf. Fiorenza, Memory, 227, who offers evidence from the mystery cults that disheveled hair often accompanied the women prophets and liturgists. This view has now been pursued with special vigor and considerable documentation by P. B. Payne (see ).

The answers to this are varied. See on v. 15.

Since none of these is free from problems, other alternatives have been suggested: (1) Isaksson argued that the problem has to do with hairstyles, but that it was strictly limited to the coiffure of “prophets” and “prophetesses” in the “new temple,” the church. But despite his arguments for it, this assumes a distinguishable order of prophets in the early church that is less than convincing. (2) Padgett argued that vv. 3–7b are a Pauline quotation or restating of the Corinthian position, and that vv. 7c–15 are his response. Vv. 13–15, therefore, are to be read as indicatives (“It is fitting for a woman to pray to God uncovered; not even nature itself teaches you that if men have long hair it is a disgrace for them, etc.”). But there are no hints of any kind that Paul is citing the Corinthians, and to make a paragraph break between vv. 7ab and 7c is an unnatural reading of the Greek text (see ). (3) Payne suggested that Paul is simply responding to Corinthian questions on the whole matter of dress and hairstyle in the assembly. Thus Paul rules that neither men nor women should wear the traditional tallith (prayer shawl; vv. 4, 7 for the men; v. 15 for the women) because through the Spirit one comes to Christ without such a “veil” (cf. 2 Cor. 3:12–18). As for the women, he instructs that although they have authority over their own heads (v. 10), they should not let their hair down in public because of the shame it brings upon both themselves and their husbands. As attractive in some ways as this solution is, it does not seem adequately to deal either with Paul’s relationship with the church as a whole (see the introduction) or with the structure of the argument in particular (concern over men’s dress does not seem to be in purview at all).

That is, that the “covering” is a loose shawl, not a veil.

See the introduction to chap. 7.

It was traditional for exegetes, esp. in some Protestant traditions, to argue that women did not really pray and prophesy, but that Paul’s language had to do only with their being present in divine service when prayer and prophecy were going on, or with their private praying. This view had been revived even as late as the mid-twentieth c. by F. C. Synge, “Studies in Texts—I Cor. 11:2–16,” Theology 56 (1953), 143; and Weeks, “Silence.” But v. 13 completely disallows such a view; the woman “prays to God,” and the context makes no sense at all if it is not in the gathered assembly. Cf. the discussion in Isaksson, Marriage, 153–57.

That is, the problem is probably not simply with their appearing in the assembly in this way, but with their prophesying improperly “attired.” One is tempted to see in this some kind of linkage to what went on in the contexts of pagan “ecstasy” (cf. Bruce, 105; R. Kroger and C. Kroger, “An Inquiry into the Evidence of Maenadism in the Corinthian Congregation,” in SBL Seminar Papers, 4 [1978], 2:331–36; Fiorenza, Memory, 227).

The Western and MajT traditions have added the vocative ἀδελφοί. As Zuntz, 176, notes: “The pronoun [ὑμᾶς] all but called for the addition. Had the vocative been there originally, its omission by so many outstanding witnesses would be inexplicable.” Cf. Metzger, 495.

A few MSS (B D² 6 629 945 pm) resolve the issue as to whose “head” is being shamed by changing αὐτῆς to ἑαυτῆς.

The original NIV omitted this very important explanatory “for,” and thus altered the sense of the whole verse (see the next note).

The original NIV also left out the καί (“also”; present NIV “might as well”), which changed the sense of the verb to a true imperative, and failed to see the δέ as adversative, which alone makes sense of the corresponding conditional sentence that follows. See the commentary.

The NIV has the following marginal reading for vv. 4–7a: 4Every man who prays or prophesies with long hair dishonors his head. 5And every woman who prays or prophesies with no covering of hair dishonors her head—she is just like one of the “shorn women.” 6If a woman has no covering, let her be for now with short hair; but since it is a disgrace for a woman to have her hair shorn or shaved, she should grow it again. 7A man ought not to have long hair. This is a most unlikely option, since it does disservice to the Greek at too many places to be viable. One might allow any one of them at a given point, but their cumulative effect requires the acceptance of too many contingent improbabilities. This appears to be a case of “throwing a bone” to some in the evangelical community who have taken a quite strong position on this matter, as unlikely as it is exegetically.

See the introduction to chap. 7.

Gk. παραδόσεις (NIV, “teachings”), which with its cognate verb παραδίδωμι (“I handed down” [NIV, “passed on”]; cf. 11:23; 15:3) is a technical term in Judaism for the oral transmission of religious instruction. In this case it almost certainly does not refer to “teachings” (as it does in 15:3), but to some “traditions” that have to do with worship (as in 11:23). For the term in Judaism, see B. Gerhardsson, Memory and Manuscript (ET, ASNU 22; Lund, 1961); for Paul, see K. Wegenast, Das Verständnis der Tradition bei Paulus und in den Deuteropaulinen (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1962); idem, NIDNTT 3:772–74.

Gk. ἐπαινῶ, a verb that occurs in Paul (apart from an LXX citation in Rom. 15:11) only here and in vv. 17 and 22 (twice).

The obvious solution to this, of course, is that he is here taking up a new topic, as the next words, “holding fast the traditions,” imply.

See, among others, Hurd, 182–84; Moffatt, 149.

Cf. Conzelmann, 182 n. 13, who sees the captatio as a mere literary device, with no “specific grounds for it.” More likely, as with the thanksgiving (1:4–9), this speaks to actual areas where they are continuing the traditions. Thus he can freely correct them where they are not.

Cf. Hurley, “Veils,” 191–93.

The word πάντα (“in everything”) makes one think he is quoting them. They would tend to have a higher view of their obedience than is realistic.

Gk. δέ, almost certainly adversative to v. 2 (cf. NRSV, JB, NASB, NEB, GNB, Moffatt, Montgomery) rather than consecutive as the original NIV’s “now” suggested.

Elsewhere only in Col. 2:1. Cf. the rhetorical “Do you not know that?” (see on 3:16), and the more common negative “I do not want you to be ignorant” (see on 10:1). Padgett, “Paul,” 78–79, makes the improbable suggestion (1) that “the three-part formula of headship” is a Corinthian rephrasing of a Pauline position on which they are ultimately at odds (they think head = authority; Paul, that it = source of being), and (2) that this introductory formula therefore is Paul’s partial affirmation of their formula, which functions similarly to the “we know” formula in 8:1 and 4. Therefore, the phrase “does not indicate that Paul is teaching something new, but that he wishes to bring out a new aspect of what is already known.” This puts considerable stress on the plain sense of “I want you to know”; furthermore, this introductory phrase differs altogether from the formula “we know that,” which is followed by grammatical clues that he is citing them (see on 8:1 and 4).

It is common to understand this as referring to husbands and wives (cf. NRSV: “the husband is the head of his wife”—although they translate the rest of the section as “man” and “woman”!). This is possible, but in light of the argument as a whole it seems less likely (see on v. 5). The ESV is even more bold, translating the entire passage (through v. 13) in terms of “husband and wife”; the translators’ difficulty with the “jewel” of consistency emerges very early(!), rendering v. 3 “wife” and “her husband,” then having “every man” in v. 4 but “every wife” in v. 5.

The statement in v. 8, repeated in v. 12, that “woman is from man,” is very likely an oblique reference to v. 3. V. 7 is often viewed in this way, but with a strange turn of logic that says: (1) Christ is the head of (= authority over) man because (2) man was created in God’s image and for God’s glory. That seems obtuse at best, since man is said to be God’s image and glory, not Christ’s, and the concept of “authority” does not appear in v. 7.

That is, they are not yet as the angels, without gender, and therefore neither marrying nor given in marriage (cf. 7:1; 13:1; Luke 20:35).

All commentaries up to Barrett and Conzelmann—although even they opt for some form of “subordination” as inherent in the metaphor—as well as some of the studies on (Weeks, Hurley). For an early objection to this view, see S. T. Lowrie, “I Corinthians XI and the Ordination of Women as Ruling Elders,” PTR 19 (1921), 113–30.

Cf., e.g., LSJ, MM; this was first brought to the attention of the scholarly world by S. Bedale, “The Meaning of κεφαλή in the Pauline Epistles,” JTS 5 (1954), 211–15, who states the problem concisely: “In normal Greek usage, classical or contemporary, κεφαλή does not signify ‘head’ in the sense of ruler, or chieftain, of a community. If κεφαλή has this sense in the writings of St. Paul (it certainly has it nowhere else in the New Testament) we must suppose it to have been acquired as the result of LXX use of the word to translate ” (211). He then goes on to demonstrate that the latter is unlikely. More recent studies have confirmed his initial probings. See R. Scroggs, “Paul and the Eschatological Women: Revisited,” JAAR 42 (1974), 534 n. 8; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 148–49; B. Mickelsen and A. Mickelsen, “The ‘Head’ of the Epistles,” CT 25 (1981), 264–67; idem, “What Does Kephalē Mean in the New Testament?” in Women, Authority, and the Bible (ed. A. Mickelsen; Downers Grove, Ill., 1986), 97–110; and P. B. Payne, “Response,” in ibid., 118–32; C. C. Kroeger, “The Classical Concept of ‘Head’ as ‘Source,’ ” in Equal to Serve, by G. Gaebelein Hull (New York, 1987), Appendix III, a paper that appears to be decisive. For many of the statistics used here, I am indebted to Payne’s “Response.”

The two references in BDAG are both quite worthless: The reference from Zosimus dates from the 6th c. A.D. and most likely refers to “dignity,” not authority; the word κεφαλή does not even appear in the second instance (Ps.-Aristotle)! Cf. Payne, 120.

A contrary view was taken by W. Grudem, “Does κεφαλή (“Head”) Mean ‘Source’ or ‘Authority over’ in Greek Literature? A Survey of 2,336 Examples,” TrinJ, n.s., 6 (1985), 38–59. For all its attempt at objectivity by means of computer research, this article was considerably misleading in its presentation and conclusions. The number 2,336 in the title is esp. so, since only a very small percentage of these are metaphorical, and these are the only ones that count. Furthermore, Grudem’s conclusion that 49 of these mean “authority over” is esp. ungrounded—for several reasons: (1) these 49 include 12 NT examples, which the author prejudges exegetically to mean “authority over” when these are the very passages in question; (2) of the 37 that remain, 18 are from Greek translations of the OT, which for reasons outlined below are the exceptions that prove the rule that this is not an ordinary meaning for this Greek word (see esp. ); (3) for most of the remaining 19 there is a serious exegetical question as to whether the authors intended a metaphorical sense of “authority over”; and (4) since he used Philo in his calculations, he seems quite mistaken, in light of the passages from Philo cited in below, to conclude that “no instances were discovered in which κεφαλή had the meaning ‘source, origin.’ ” What Grudem had demonstrated was that the metaphorical usage of “leader” can be found (it is not at all clear that it ever means “authority over”); but he is quite wrong to assert that the idea of “source” or “origin” is not to be found. Cf. below.

The debate goes on. See the following since the first edition of the commentary: P. S. Fiddes, “ ‘Woman’s Head Is Man’: A Doctrinal Reflection upon a Pauline Text,” Baptist Quarterly [London] 31 (1986), 370–83; J. A. Fitzmyer, “Another Look at ΚΕΦΑΛΗ in 1 Corinthians 11.3,” NTS 35 (1989), 503–11; idem, “Kephalē in I Corinthians 11:3,” Int 47 (1993), 52–59; A. C. Perriman, “The Head of a Woman: The Meaning of κεφαλή in I Cor. 11:3,” JTS 45 (1994), 602–22; W. Grudem, “The Meaning of κεφαλή (“Head”): An Evaluation of New Evidence, Real and Alleged,” JETS 44 (2001), 25–65; P. G. Bolt, “Three Heads in the Divine Order: The Early Church Fathers and 1 Corinthians 11:3),” RTR 64 (2005), 147–61; A. F. Johnson, “A Meta-Study of the Debate over the Meaning of ‘Head’ (Kephalē) in Paul’s Writings,” Priscilla Papers 20 (2006), 21–29; C. C. Kroeger, “Toward an Understanding of Ancient Conceptions of ‘Head,’ ” Priscilla Papers 20 (2006), 4–8.

In 226 of 239 instances. The other 13 are translated differently for a variety of reasons. See Payne, Man and Woman, 119.

In only 6 of 171 instances, and half of these are variants in a single MS or were required to preserve a head/tail contrast. The only clear instances of roʾsh = κεφαλή = leader/chief are Judg. 11:11; 2 Sam. 22:44; Ps. 18:43; Isa. 7:8, 9; Lam. 1:5. Cf. Payne, Man and Woman, 119–23. As Murphy-O’Connor notes, these “exception[s] (even Homer nods!) do not change the picture.” Indeed, these statistics seem to make this a clear case where the exception proves the rule. Grudem’s unfortunate failure to note these translational phenomena considerably mars his study (see ).

For this usage see Orphic frag. 168, cited by LSJ: “Zeus is the κεφαλή, Zeus the middle, and from Zeus all things are completed.” As Barrett, 248, points out, the fact that some MSS of this fragment have ἀρχή for κεφαλή is esp. significant in terms of its meaning. Otherwise Grudem, “κεφαλή,” 45–46; but the discussion by Payne, “Response,” 125, has the better of it here. See also Philo, congr.qu.er. 61: “And of all the members of the clan here described Esau is the progenitor, the κεφαλή as it were of the whole creature [meaning the source of the whole clan]” (Loeb, 4:489); and praem. 125: “The virtuous one, whether single man or people, will be the κεφαλή of the human race and all others like the limbs of a body which draw their life from the forces in the κεφαλή at the top” (Loeb, 8:389); cf. Artemidorus, oneir. 1.2: “Another man dreamt he was beheaded. In real life, the father of this man, too, died; for just as the κεφαλή is the source of life and light for the whole body, he was responsible for the dreamer’s life and light” (Teub., 16); and 1.35: “For the κεφαλή resembles parents in that it is the cause of one’s living” (Teub., 34). See esp. Eph. 4:15–16.

Grudem, “κεφαλή,” 56, makes the unsupported assertion that “head coverings in the first century were a sign of relation to authority.” Since the evidence is so ambiguous, both for the wearing of head coverings and the reasons for it, one would need to demonstrate such a universal statement with hard evidence.

Gk. κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ; probably ὁ ἀνήρ is the subject, κεφαλή a definite predicate noun (according to “Colwell’s rule”; cf. ).

In the sense of 8:6 or Col. 1:15, that he is the one through whom God created all things. But see the objection by Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 152–53. This view can be traced back at least as early as Cyril of Alexandria (Arcad. 5.6): “Thus we say that ‘the head of every man is Christ.’ For he was made by [διά] him . . . as God; ‘but the head of the woman is the man,’ because she was taken out of his flesh. . . . Likewise ‘the head of Christ is God,’ because he is of him by nature [ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν].”

Argued by Payne, Man, 41. On the other hand, this order may be only accidentally chronological, since it has been set up by vv. 4 and 5.

Cf. Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 152–54.

As Cyril, e.g., assumes (); cf. the discussion in Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 151–52. This is the difficult clause for those who take “head” to mean “authority.” The usual solution is to make a distinction between ontological equality and functional subordination. Only in the latter sense is God (= the Father) the one with superior rank within the godhead. Cf. Grudem, “κεφαλή,” 57.

Perhaps some kind of tonsorial tomfoolery, as argued by Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 142–47; see the discussion below.

For the possibility that had to do with men in the fellowship actually wearing some form of head apparel in worship, in keeping with the “habitual propensity of Romans” to follow some Roman customs, see R. E. Oster, “When Men Wore Veils to Worship: The Historical Context of 1 Corinthians 11.4,” NTS 34 (1988), 481–505.

This is the first occurrence in the letter of this word, which will figure prominently in the argument of chaps. 12–14 (cf. 1 Thess. 5:20). For a discussion of its meaning see on 12:10.

The leading advocate of the contrary view was Bachmann, 350–51. See the refutation in Grosheide, 252–53. What appears to be a new version of Bachmann’s view is presented by Ellis, 27, who argues: “The instructions in 1 Cor 11,5 on praying and prophesying probably reflect the procedures used within the prayer sessions of the pneumatics” (cf. 36).

Otherwise, Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 144–45. Hurley, “Veils,” 202, argues for “deliberate double meaning.”

Murphy-O’Connor (previous note) too easily dismisses reasons 2 and 3. He argues on the basis of evidence from H. Schlier, TDNT 3:674, that, since it is possible for “head” to be used as a metaphor for one’s person, there should “no longer be any objection” to taking “shames his head” as a synonym for “a dishonor to him” in v. 14. But the possibility of “head” as a metaphor for oneself is not the problem. Rather, it is to have this sentence follow v. 3 so closely, with all of the signals that tie it to the metaphorical use in that verse, and then argue that it has a completely different metaphorical meaning here, based on an allegedly parallel sense with v. 14.

Gk. κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων.

E.g., Isaksson, Marriage, 166–67; Hurley, Man, 169; Martin, “Interpretation,” 233. Hurley’s earlier view (“Veils,” 202) was that the man was prophesying “with his hair up as a woman’s.” This is similar to Murphy-O’Connor’s position (next note), except that he missed the homosexual overtones of having longer hair so that it might be artistically decorated like a woman’s.

Keys, 142–47.

Mor. 200F (κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔχων τὸ ἱμάτιον). This is identical to Paul’s idiom except for the expressed object of the verb. The ἱμάτιον was usually part of a robing garment, either the toga or tunic, although it also could be separate. This was esp. so among the Jews, for whom it eventually came to be their tallith, or prayer shawl. For a discussion of this phenomenon in these cultures, see E. R. Goodenough, Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period, vol. 9, Symbolism in the Dura Synagogue (New York, 1964), 124–74.

See now the considerable refutation of this in Payne, Man and Woman, 123–37, which, for all of its careful argumentation, I still find less than convincing. After all, the Greeks did have a word for hair!

See, e.g., the collection of illustrations in vol. 11 of Goodenough’s Jewish Symbols. Two notable exceptions, interestingly enough, are in the painting from the Isis temple in Pompeii (fig. 98), where the priest reading the scroll has on a winged hat/helmet, and the relief of the Isis procession (fig. 99), where the “prophet,” who is carrying the holy pitcher, has a himation (part of his tunic) covering his head (while the priestess herself is uncovered!).

See John Lightfoot, A Commentary on the New Testament from the Talmud and Hebraica (Oxford, 1859; repr. Grand Rapids, 1979), 229–31, followed by Bushnell, God’s Word, par. 241, and Payne, Man, 42–44. Payne has easily refuted Hurley’s objections to this view, but has also assumed too easily that this was a first-century practice.

That is, it might be an allusion to an actual tallith worn at the reading of the law.

The evidence can be found in Str-B, 3:424–26, and John Lightfoot (). See, e.g., b. Sabb. 10a, 12b; Abot R.Nat. 6. Unfortunately, some of this evidence is ambiguous as to whether the head itself was actually covered, and in any case none of it is certain for customs of the first century. The possibility that it goes back to the time of Paul is to be found in the basic conservatism of such practices; i.e., that even though these references are late, they may well reflect a tradition that goes back to a much earlier time.

See .

This sentence is joined to its companion (v. 4) by a δέ, which the NIV renders as a consecutive (“and”). That may well be, but more likely it is intended as a contrast of some sort, hence “but” (NRSV, NASB) or “on the contrary” (REB); but note the NAB’s “similarly,” which perhaps in this case best captures the sense in corresponding English.

As in v. 4, this is clear evidence that women participated in the worship and ministering gifts in the Christian communities. Those who argue otherwise (see ) are guilty of special pleading. As A. J. Gordon had correctly observed, “it is quite incredible that the Apostle should . . . spend his breath condemning a forbidden method of doing a forbidden thing” (cited by Bushnell, God’s Word, par. 242).

In light of vv. 5b–6 it is possible that “her head” is more ambiguous and refers also to her own shame. Nonetheless, as with v. 4, the primary reference must be metaphorical and go back to “the man is the head of the woman” in v. 3. Otherwise there is little reason for Paul’s having begun with that statement.

It is always possible that in both cases (i.e., the man’s and the woman’s) the Corinthians themselves would not have considered the matter shameful, and that that is why Paul felt the need to give his argument the theological starting point of v. 3.

These kinds of problems render generally useless a large amount of the literary evidence that is often cited in reference to this text. This is esp. true of the large collection of otherwise helpful texts, both Greek and Jewish, in Conzelmann, 185 nn. 39–40, since they deal for the most part with “going out in public.” The question is whether women in Christian worship in Corinth would be thought of as “going out in public,” or whether, in light of their gathering in homes and calling themselves “brothers and sisters,” the wearing of ordinary home “attire” would be proper—not to mention all the difficulties that may obtain from the fact that the gathering is also “religious” and that the women are prophesying.

See . Cf. fig. 99 (where a priestess of Isis is uncovered) and 101 (another Isis example, where one woman is covered while the other is not). With this compare the literary evidence from Apuleius, Met. 11.10, regarding the Isis festival in Corinth: “The women had their hair anointed, and their heads covered with light linen [cf. fig. 101 in Goodenough]; but the men had their crowns shaven and shining bright” (Loeb, 555). See also the two frescoes from Pompeii (nos. 117 and 118), where in scenes that “unquestionably represent religious ceremonies” (Goodenough, 9:137) the central figures (women) are covered with the himation, while in fig. 117 the flute girl is not. The same ambiguity prevails in fig. 218, where the woman “crowning the dead” is covered while the (apparently slave) woman holding the umbrella is not.

Cf. Lev. 10:6, where the Hebrew says that Aaron and his sons are not to “unbind their heads.” Murphy-O’Connor (Keys, 147) is probably correct in identifying this, by means of the LXX, with the turban that bound the hair to the top of the head.

Gk. ἀποκαλύψει τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς γυναικός (“he shall uncover the head of the woman”).

Philo (spec.leg. 3.60), in commenting on this passage from Numbers, uses Paul’s exact language (ἀκατακαλύπτῳ τῇ κεφαλῇ). Almost certainly, however (despite Padgett, “Paul,” 70), he is referring to an external covering, not loosed hair as such, since he says the ritual begins with the priest “removing her kerchief” (τοὐπίκρανον ἀφελών) so that she may be “bareheaded” (ἐπικρίνηται γεγυμνωμένη) during the rite.

This is made more plausible by the evidence from the rites of Dionysus, Cybele, and Isis that “dishevelled hair and head thrown back were almost trademarks” of the frenzied worship of women in these cults (see Kroeger and Kroeger, “Inquiry,” 331–33; cf. Fiorenza, Memory, 237). There is also evidence that “sex reversal” (usually by means of dress) played a role in some of these cults. This would also help to explain why “shame” was involved, since part of the “shame” for the men would lie in the widespread appeal of these cults to women, who by their frenzy also received bad press from the predominantly male literary establishment. Hurley (“Veils,” 202) suggests that the shame was related to their looking like adulteresses. But the problem with that is both the lack of first-century evidence that long, loose hair would have been associated with adultery in any way and the inability to find an adequate reason why the women would have acted so. The connection with the pagan cults would answer the latter question; they had simply carried over to Christian prophecy what they knew about cultic prophecy. See further on 12:1–3 and 14:26–40.

Especially since the evidence shows that “put-up hair” did not always rest in tier fashion on the top of the head, but at times took the form of braids down the back of the neck. Among several examples in Goodenough, Jewish Symbols, Vol. XI, see esp. the two women in the Isis procession (including the priestess) in fig. 99.

Perhaps the women were doing both, esp. if there is a relationship to cultic prophecy. They would be “uncovering” by removing the customary himation so that they might “let their hair loose” in the more frenzied fashion of the cultic women.

Nonetheless, the suggestion by Martin (“Interpretation,” 233) that ἀκατακάλυπτος refers to cut hair has neither linguistic nor contextual evidence in its favor.

Without textual (or contextual) warrant, the otherwise generally conservative ESV translators chose to render this “have a symbol of authority”! This appears to be commentary more than translation.

The fact that a shaved head for a woman constituted shame is found in such diverse texts as Deut. 21:12 (although in this case it is probably also a sign of mourning); Aristophanes, Thes. 837 (the mother of unworthy children should have her hair shorn); and Tacitus, Germ. 19, where the husband of an adulterous wife drives her from the house shaved and naked. This latter text has been used by some to argue that the shaved head was the sign of an adulteress. But that will not work, since Tacitus is referring to customs of Germanic tribes that he thought significantly different enough from Roman customs to relate.

It was commonly suggested that short hair or a shaved head was the mark of the Corinthian prostitutes (cf., e.g., Grosheide, 254). But there is no contemporary evidence to support this view (it seems to be a case of one scholar’s guess becoming a second scholar’s footnote and a third scholar’s assumption). Even Martin, for whose interpretation this possibility would be esp. helpful, admits the lack of evidence (“Interpretation,” 233 n. 4). Nonetheless, on the basis of the article with ἐξυρημένη in v. 5b he postulates “the existence of a specific class to whom this designation could be applied” (234), which in turn apparently “created” such a class for the NIV marginal reading. That is probably more historical weight than a single article in an ad hoc letter can bear. If a “class” is involved, it would certainly be the “masculine” partner in a lesbian relationship. See the next note.

Two texts in Lucian illustrate that short hair on a woman was considered “mannish”: of a fugitive wife in the company of three runaway slaves, “a woman with her hair closely clipped [κεκαρμένην] in the Spartan style, boyish-looking and quite masculine” (fug. 27; Loeb, 5:85); and of a Lesbian woman Megilla, who after pulling off her wig revealed “the skin of her head which was shaved close [ἀποκεκαρμένη], just as on the most energetic of athletes” (dial.het. 5.3; Loeb, 7:383). The homosexuality involved in this dialogue demonstrates where the “shame” lay.

Gk. τῇ ἐξυρημένῃ. Of the two verbs used in this argument (ξυρόω and κείρω), this one would refer to the head being shaved, the other to the hair being cut short. For the differences see an aphorism from Tiberius, quoted in Dio Cassius’s History of Rome: “I want my sheep shorn [κείρεσθαι], not shaven [ἀποξύρεσθαι]” (15.10.5; Loeb, 7:137). For ξυρόω in the NT see Acts 21:24; for κείρω, Acts 18:18.

The first clause (v. 5b) is joined to v. 5a with an explanatory γάρ. This first conditional clause is joined to v. 5b by yet another explanatory γάρ; while the second one is contrasted to the first by means of a δέ. See the structural display on pp. 544–46.

These are simple present particulars; see Burton, Moods, 102–3.

This is the verb that causes the great difficulty for Martin’s interpretation, followed by NIV^mg (see –). His attempt to make the verb “jussive” (234–39) must be judged as less than successful, since it tries to make a remotely possible, but highly improbable, meaning of a verb say something that could have been said easily with a different verb altogether.

Gk. κατακαλύπτω; cf. .

The NIV here has unfortunately omitted an important explanatory γάρ, which is needed to help the reader see the connection between this and the preceding paragraph. On the present paragraphing see .

The original NIV, with no textual or linguistic evidence of any kind, had rendered this “sign of authority on,” a false understanding perpetuated also by the ESV (“a symbol of authority”), as if that could be possibly be wrested out of Paul’s Greek. The difficulty that some have with the plain meaning of the Greek goes way back, as evidenced in some early versions and Fathers, who variously substitute the word “veil” for ἐξουσία—with neither textual nor linguistic warrant. See Metzger, 495.

The MajT, with no early support, has reversed the order to man/woman, woman/man. See the commentary.

See the structural display on pp. 544–46.

Gk. μέν . . . δέ, omitted in most English translations—for good reason; it is cumbersome English. But they should do something to catch the intended contrast, which the NIV does only weakly.

Cf. Findlay, 873.

The verb ὀφείλει, which appears again in v. 10, usually carries moral overtones; this is something that should, or should not, be done. The negative in this instance negates the thought of the entire clause.

Gk. κατακαλύπτεσθαι; the same verb as in the preceding imperative about the woman. This verb in particular creates difficulties for the view that the “covering” is “put-up hair,” both because the compound verb itself implies an external covering (see LSJ; A. Oepke, TDNT 3:561–63) and because it implies that the man’s action is to be the opposite of the woman’s in v. 6, which can scarcely refer to his not having his hair “put up.” Those who advocate this position either ignore the problem or here posit a meaning for the verb for which there is no linguistic evidence.

See esp. Hurley, Man, 171–74, whose arguments from Gen. 1 are without exegetical warrant, yet control his entire discussion. Cf. the circuitous argument in Conzelmann, 183–84, 186–88, where he tries by means of Hellenistic Jewish wisdom texts to tie the κεφαλή of v. 3 to the εἰκών and δόξα of v. 7 as the source of Paul’s reasoning. But the ties Conzelmann seeks are not in the text, as he himself admits. There is simply no linguistic tie to v. 3 (except for κεφαλή, which does not count, since here it is literal, not metaphorical); it is doubtful whether there is a conceptual tie, since there is no logical connection between man’s being God’s δόξα and Christ’s being man’s κεφαλή. The fact is that Paul makes nothing at all of the language, which derives directly from Gen. 1 and does not need the mediation of Hellenistic Judaism.

It is on this point esp. that Hurley’s argument (see the previous note) seems to hang on air. Some have argued that “glory” is an interpretation of the word “likeness” of Gen. 1:26; but that seems unlikely. At best it is a substitution, and even that is doubtful.

Cf. Barrett, 252: “In this context Paul values the term image only as leading to the term glory.”

The only evidence is a text first cited by Lietzmann from a Jewish inscription, “blessed Lucilla, the δόξα of Sophronius.” See BDAG 1c.

P. B. Payne, in a private conversation, suggested the analogy of a work of art’s being an artist’s glory, since it both gives expression to a part of oneself and at the same time brings praise and honor to one’s skills.

Usually in terms of her subordinate position; but that makes little sense of the argument itself. Appearance does not mark roles of authority or subservience, at least not in this text. Furthermore, at the crucial point, their praying and prophesying, men are clearly not in hierarchical roles. The point is that women must continue to appear as women because they are men’s glory and have not arrived at the final spirituality where they are sexless. The most significant alternative to this view has been offered by Morna Hooker, “Authority on Her Head: An Examination of I Cor. xi,10,” NTS 10 (1963/64), 410–16, who suggests that the difference in δόξα has to do with being in God’s presence. Here man, who reflects God’s glory, must not be covered, while woman, who reflects man’s glory, must be. This is possible, but see the response in Payne, Man, 50.

This is made certain by the καὶ γάρ (“for also”) that begins the second sentence (v. 9), but which for reasons having to do with ordinary good English has been left out of most contemporary translations. Cf. BDF 452(3).

The language ἐξ ἀνδρός, repeated in v. 12 as ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρός, is a direct reflection of LXX Gen. 2:23; in the second instance there are no verbal ties, but the conceptual ties are unmistakable.

For a similar view see A. Feuillet, “L’homme ‘gloire de Dieu’ et la femme ‘gloire de l’homme’ (I Cor., XI,7b),” RB 81 (1974), 161–82.

Matters in a letter like this are ad hoc to a greater or lesser degree. To the lesser degree that something is ad hoc, the more an author will explain to his readers as he writes; to the greater degree, the less he will explain and the more he will assume between himself and them.

Gk. διὰ τοῦτο (cf. 4:17; 11:30).

There are four instances where it clearly points forward only, and each of these cases is followed by an epexegetical ὅτι or ἵνα (1 Thess. 2:13; 2 Cor. 13:10; Phlm. 15; 1 Tim. 1:16). In some cases it points only backward (1 Cor. 11:30); but most often it seems to function in both directions at once; i.e., on the basis of what has just been said, a conclusion is about to be advanced which will also give a further reason or restate the previous ones. Thus in 1 Thess. 3:7 the reason for Paul’s encouragement is Timothy’s report (v. 6), which is restated at the end of v. 7 as διὰ τῆς ὑμῶν πίστεως, which was the content of Timothy’s report. Cf. 1 Cor. 4:17.

R-P, 232, are candid: “The passage is unique, no satisfactory parallel having been found. There is no real doubt as to the meaning, which is clear from the context. The difficulty is to see why Paul has expressed himself in this extraordinary manner. That ‘authority’ (ἐξουσία) has been put for ‘sign of authority’ is not difficult; but why does St Paul say ‘authority’ when he means ‘subjection’?” (italics mine). What is “extraordinary” is how easily this is said, when nothing in the preceding context says a word about women’s “subjection.” That is based altogether on a faulty reading of “head” in v. 3.

It is not so once in its 103 occurrences in the NT, nor in the LXX, Philo, or Josephus.

Cf. W. M. Ramsay, The Cities of St Paul (New York, 1908), 203: “[That her authority] is the authority to which she is subject [is] a preposterous idea which a Greek scholar would laugh at anywhere except in the New Testament, where (as they seem to think) Greek words may mean anything that commentators choose.”

Cf. R-P ( above), argued for more recently by I. Larsen, “1 Corinthians 11.10 Revisited,” BibTrans 48 (1997), 345–60.

The revisers changed this to “ought to have a symbol of authority on her head,” which was unfortunately retained in the ESV. This is pretension, not translation!

The oft-cited passage in Ramsay ( above) to the effect that the woman’s veil served as her “authority/freedom” to go about freely without fear of molestation fails on two counts: it assumes the veiling of the head from a later period, for which there is no evidence in the NT period; it assumes a custom having to do with a woman’s appearance in public, whereas this text deals with a woman’s praying and prophesying in the Christian assembly.

It is curious indeed that scholars assume that κάλυμμα (“veil”) would be the proper term (this is found only as early as Epiphanius), when Paul himself uses the term περιβόλαιον (“shawl”) in v. 15; ἱμάτιον would be the more common term. The attempt by G. Kittel (“Die ‘Macht’ auf dem Haupt [I Cor. xi.10],” Rabbinica [Arbeiten zur Vorgeschichte des Christentums 1/3; Leipzig, 1920], 17–30) to trace both words to a common Aramaic root is hardly tenable. See the refutation in J. A. Fitzmyer, “A Feature of Qumran Angelology and the Angels of I Cor. xi.10,” NTS 4 (1957/58), 52–53.

E.g., Hooker, “Authority,” 415–16, followed by Barrett, 255; cf. A. Feuillet, “Le signe de puissance sur la tête de la femme, 1 Co 11,10,” NouvRT 95 (1973), 945–54; Fiorenza, Memory, 228. See Bushnell, God’s Word, par. 236, who indicates that this interpretation already was well known in her day: “As to the veil, some declare that it is to be worn as an ‘authorization’ to pray and prophesy”; for more recent discussions viewing the passage as “empowering” women, see J. Winandy, “Un curieux casus pendens. 1 Corinthiens 11.10 et son interpretation,” NTS 38 (1992), 621–29; M.-L. Rigato, “A quali angeli allude Paolo nella Prima Lettera ai Corinzi (11,10)?” RivB 41 (1993), 305–13.

See, e.g., the five occurrences in the NT of ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν ἐπί (Luke 19:17; Rev. 11:6; 14:18; 16:9; 20:6); cf. ἐξουσίαν ἐπί (“authority over”): Luke 9:1; 10:19; Rev. 2:26; 6:8; 13:7.

Among those who take this position, see John Lightfoot, Commentary, 236–39; Lowrie, “Ordination,” 124; Bushnell, God’s Word, par. 247; Padgett, “Paul,” 78; Payne, Man, 50–51.

This is very close to the affirmation of 8:9: “Do not let this ἐξουσία of yours [NIV, the exercise of your freedom] become a stumbling block to the weak.” He affirms their “authority” about food, but denies their exercising it in the way they were demanding.

This seems to be the way the LXX understood the term. Only Codex Alexandrinus is available here, and the text is that of a corrector. However, it is clearly the text of both Philo (gig. 6) and Josephus (Ant. 1.73).

On the whole, this interpretation seems foreign to Paul and to the context. How are they envisioned as present so that they should become lustful? And what difference would it make in any case? Would they follow through on their lust? That is, are the women somehow to be understood as being in jeopardy? One is hard pressed to find such ideas in Paul or the rest of the NT.

Padgett, “Paul,” 31–32, argues that the term means “human messengers”; but one is hard pressed to find linguistic support in Paul for such a view. Moreover, it overlooks the significance of angels in the Corinthians’ own theology. See Fitzmyer, “Feature,” 53, for a selection of other, mostly farfetched, explanations.

See Hooker, “Authority,” 412–13.

See esp. Fitzmyer, “Feature,” 55–58, who argues that the unveiled woman is like one who in Qumran has a bodily defect and should therefore be excluded from the assembly “out of reverence for the angels.” A similar view was suggested independently by H. J. Cadbury, “A Qumran Parallel to Paul,” HTR 51 (1958), 1–2.

Fiorenza, Memory, 228, suggests that “women have such power through the angels, who according to Jewish and Christian apocalyptic theology mediate the ‘words of prophecy.’ ”

Gk. πλήν; common in Luke, but only here and in Eph. 5:33; Phil. 1:18; 3:16; 4:14 in Paul. According to BDAG, Paul tends to use it for “breaking off a discussion and emphasizing what is important” (= “in any case; nonetheless”).

Cf. the MajT reading (see )! I am indebted to Payne, Man, 54, for this insight. He also notes that two translations (Phillips, NEB) change the order to fit their understanding of the context (KJV also, but it reflects the TR).

For this formula see on 7:22, 39; 9:1, 2. In this case it refers most likely to the “sphere” of their existence in the new age. God has called them to be “in the Lord,” and in that new relationship they live out the life of the future, awaiting its consummation. In this new existence man and woman are totally interdependent.

This understanding is a step beyond the actual wording of the text. The problem lies with the lack of a verb. One must supply either “is” or “exists,” the latter being the more likely. The preposition “without” (“apart from”; cf. 4:8) then means not simply that they cannot exist without each other, but that they are not intended to exist independent of one another. Cf. the discussion in Payne, Man, 53–54. Otherwise, J. Kürzinger, “Frau und Mann nach 1 Kor 11.11f.,” BZ 22 (1978), 270–75, followed by Fiorenza, Memory, 229–30, and Padgett, “Paul,” 71, who argues that χωρίς here has the sense of “different from,” hence a declaration of equality in the Lord.

Gk. δέ; this could be slightly adversative, but in a continuative, not a contrastive, sense.

Apparently in an attempt to tie the two questions more closely together the MajT added an ἤ (“or”).

Although the NIV translators were using a Greek text without the αὐτῇ (absent in P⁴⁶ D F G Ψ Maj b; Ambst), the “to her” was probably added here for contextual, rather than textual, reasons, i.e., for readability in English. Two things speak against it as a part of Paul’s own text: (1) Omission is difficult to account for, esp. twice (the only way to account for its absence in both P⁴⁶ and D F G); whereas (2) an addition is easy to account for, even more so, since the word occurs in two different positions (after δεδοται: A B 33 81 365 2464 g sy^p; before δεδοται: C H P 630 1175 1739 1881 2495). Cf. Zuntz, 127.

This “other” has unfortunately been carried over into the current NIV from the original translation. The Greek is τοιαύτην, which means “such a kind”; there is no evidence that it ever means “other,” which is in fact somewhat misleading. Paul meant simply, “we have no such practice,” and the reader is left guessing a bit as to what his “such” refers to.

Both Bushnell (God’s Word, par. 247) and Padgett (“Paul,” 82) argue that this is not a question but a declaration, a position taken by Padgett because he has posited that vv. 3–7b are a Corinthian argument that Paul is here combating. See . But this does not seem to do full justice to πρέπον. If the Corinthians are arguing for a certain hairdo (as Padgett maintains), then Paul here is clearly arguing against it. Women’s authority, therefore, is not freedom, as Padgett insists. She should do what is πρέπον, which from the present point of view should mean no put-up hair!

Gk. πρέπον (cf. 1 Tim. 2:10; Tit. 2:1).

Gk. γυναῖκα; ordinarily πρέπον takes the dative. But it is probably a step beyond Paul’s intent to suggest, as Parry, 162, that the accusative implies that it is fitting “not merely for the woman, but as a Church rule.”

This addition of “to God” makes it certain that it is not simply a matter of her being “in church,” but that she is an active participant in the worship. Cf. .

Hurley, “Veils,” 214–15, argues that Paul is either quoting or paraphrasing a question in their letter to him. But that has very little to commend it. He also calls it a rhetorical question, which it is; but if so, how then can he be quoting them? A rhetorical question by definition has its answer implied in the question itself. Hurley also completely disregards vv. 14–15 as a follow-up rhetorical question, making them rather Paul’s answer to “each of the three groups involved in the controversy over hair.” Positing three groups, when nothing in the text hints at internal conflict in Corinth over this matter, is probably too much weight to place on the preposition ἀντί (v. 15) when there is another viable answer to that problem.

Bushnell (God’s Word, par. 247) and Padgett (“Paul,” 82–83), with even less success, also read these questions as indicatives (cf. ). In each case they have considerable difficulty with the final causal clause in v. 15 introduced by ὅτι (Padgett’s translation is esp. puzzling: “Nature does not teach you that . . . if a woman has long hair it is her glory. For long, loose hair is given to her instead of wrapped-up hair”).

Gk. οὐδέ; there is no other example in Paul of this negative conjunction starting a rhetorical question (but see Mark 12:10; Luke 23:40). Most likely, as O-W, 261, suggest, Paul was thinking οὐ δέ.

Gk. ἡ φύσις αὐτή; cf. Rom. 1:26; 2:14, 27; 11:21, 24 (three times); Gal. 2:15; 4:8; Eph. 2:3. Elsewhere in the NT only Jas. 3:7 (twice); 2 Pet. 1:4 (cf. φυσικός in Rom. 1:26, 27; 2 Pet. 2:12). For a discussion of the term see esp. H. Köster, TDNT 9:251–77; cf., on a smaller scale, G. Harder, NIDNTT 2:656–61. Köster (271) notes that its rare occurrence in the NT in comparison with its widespread use throughout the entire Hellenistic world must be “a deliberate theological decision which rests on the fact that there is no place for ‘natural theology’ in the thinking of the NT.”

Cf. Marc.Aur.Ant., “O φύσις (Nature), from you comes everything, in you is everything, to you goes everything” (4.23; Loeb). Hence for the Stoic the greatest good is to live according to Nature, i.e., according to the given, regular order of things.

Cf. esp. Epict. 1.16.9–14: “Come, let us leave the chief works of nature, and consider merely what she does in passing. Can anything be more useless than the hairs on a chin? Well, what then? Has not nature used even these in the most suitable way possible? Has she not by these means distinguished between the male and female? . . . Again, in the case of women, just as nature has mingled in their voice a certain softer note, so likewise she has taken the hair from their chins. . . . Wherefore, we ought to preserve the signs which God has given; we ought not to throw them away; we ought not, so far as in us lies, to confuse the sexes which have been distinguished in this fashion” (Loeb, 1:111).

Cf. Köster, 273: “The argument is a typical one in popular philosophy and is not specifically Stoic.”

After all, what “nature teaches” comes about by an “unnatural” means—a haircut.

As Hurley, “Veils,” 215, asserts, but without supporting evidence.

This literal rendering tries to catch the emphasis in Paul’s Greek: ἀνὴρ μέν . . . γυνὴ δέ, with the conditional clause following.

Gk. ἀτιμία, probably to be distinguished from the αἰσχρόν of v. 6. The latter seems to carry the stronger connotation of something base or disgusting, while ἀτιμία comes closer to personal dishonor, here contrasted with δόξα (cf. 2 Cor. 6:8); 15:43 has a similar contrast between exaltation and humiliation.

For the idea that hair is a woman’s glory, cf. Achilles Tatius 8.6 (of Leucippe): “She has been robbed of the crowning glory of her hair [τῆς κεφαλῆς τὸ κάλλος; lit. ‘the beauty of her head’]; you can still see where her head was shaved” (Loeb, 399).

Cf. Exod. 28:2, where the splendid garments of the priests are to give them “glory [NIV, dignity] and honor” (LXX, τιμία and δόξα). Thus garments distinguished them, or set them apart from others; but at the same time they gave them dignity and honor for their sacred task.

Gk. ὅτι; it may function here like an explanatory γάρ. But since Paul’s argumentation in this letter is full of the latter, he probably intended something more causal in this case.

This serves as part of the argument, e.g., in Isaksson, Marriage, 185; Martin, “Interpretation,” 233; Hurley, “Veils,” 215; Fiorenza, Memory, 227; and Padgett, “Paul,” 82–83. The boldness with which some assert that this is the only meaning of ἀντί outstrips the evidence. See .

See and –.

Hurley’s answer is to posit three groups, a “loose-hair” party, a “hair-up” party, and a “pro-veil” party, who are responsible for this part of the letter by asking Paul’s own judgment on these matters. Paul responds by putting it back in their laps (v. 13a). Vv. 14–15 respond to all three. The rhetorical question confirms the rightness of the “hair-up” party; the final sentence is a tack-on response to the “pro-veil” party. Such divisions of a unitary text into parts defeat the proposal.

Hurley does not speak to the problem at all. Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 147–48, has clearly recognized the difficulty and therefore rejects the meaning “instead of” for ἀντί (see his n. 32). But his own solution, that περιβόλαιον does not in fact refer to a garment, but to the put-up hair “wrapped around” her head in plaits, asks for an otherwise unknown meaning for this word (adopted without discussion by Padgett, “Paul,” 82). Furthermore, his final translation (499, “so that she may wind it around her head”) seems to wrench the Greek text beyond recognition.

BDAG 2; cf. LSJ A.III.2. Cf. Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 148, n. 32; and A. G. Padgett, “The Significance of ἀντί in 1 Corinthians 11:15,” TynB 45 (1994), 181–87.

See esp. T. Engberg-Pedersen, “1 Corinthians 11:16 and the Character of Pauline Exhortation,” JBL 110 (1991), 679–89.

Cf. 3:18; 8:2; 14:37, in each case of which the clause picks up one of the Corinthian bywords: σοφία, γνῶσις, πνευματικός.

Gk. τοιαύτην, “such a kind” (cf. 5:1); see .

Gk. συνήθεια; cf. 8:7, where it was used in its subjective sense; here it is objective, referring to a specific custom.

For this plural see the comment on 7:17 above.

See 4:17 and 7:17; cf. on 1:2 and see further 14:33.

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