4. On this probability see Hurd, 115–49.

The bibliography on this section of the letter over the past quarter century has increased incrementally more than for any other passage in the entire letter, so much so that I have made the very difficult twofold choice (1) of keeping the original commentary basically intact, despite its now being somewhat dated, and doing so on the grounds that the primary readership of this commentary series is not the biblical academy, but the pastor and student, most of whom will not need an elaborate interaction with all the nuances now available, and (2) of offering as an addendum to this introduction a considerable bibliography of the more readily accessible material, which will enable the more serious reader to go into greater detail and be much more up to date on many of the issues presented here.

Gk. εἰδωλόθυτα (lit. “things sacrificed to idols”), a word that comes from Hellenistic Judaism; in 10:28 Paul uses the Greek term ἱερόθυτα (“sacred food”). What was sacrificed became part of the meal in the pagan temples and shrines; what was left over from the “god’s table” was often sold in the marketplace. Jews were absolutely forbidden to eat such food. See m. Abod.Zar. 2.3: “Flesh that is entering in unto an idol is permitted, but what comes forth is forbidden” (Danby, 438; cf. b. Hul. 13b; 4 Macc. 5.2). It is not certain what the term means in the other instances in the NT. In the Apostolic Decree (Acts 15:29; 21:25) it probably refers to marketplace food, but most likely the issue there is not so much that of eating such food privately, but of eating it at the common meals where Jewish believers would be present. The two passages in Revelation (2:14, 20) are ambiguous; it could refer to the same thing as in Acts, to private meals, or to temple attendance. The second-century Christian writers who do refer to it forbid it to Christians, and in those cases it almost certainly refers to marketplace food (Justin, Dial. 34; Irenaeus, Haer. 1.6.3).

The term used in 5:10–11 is εἰδωλολάτραι (cf. 10:7); note the concluding prohibition in 10:14: φεύγετε ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλολατρίας.

On this probability see Hurd, 115–49.

These difficulties have been the chief cause of the partition theories for this letter. See the introduction, . Cf. Hurd, 42–47.

There are also considerable difficulties with 8:1–13 itself: e.g., the non sequitur nature of the first two paragraphs; how vv. 1–3 respond to the question of idol food; how vv. 7–13 relate to the matters addressed in 10:14–22 and 10:23–11:1.

For a typical, brief expression of this point of view, see Kugelman, 266. This was the position assumed or advocated in most of the commentaries in all languages that preceded this one (Parry excepted), as well as in most of the other literature. Among the more significant of these earlier items, see H. F. von Soden, “Sacrament and Ethics in Paul,” in The Writings of St. Paul (ed. W. Meeks; New York, 1972), 257–68 (ET of the article that first appeared in Marburger Theologische Studien [Gotha, 1931], 1:1–40); A. Ehrhardt, “Social Problems in the Early Church,” in The Framework of the New Testament Stories (Manchester, 1964), 275–312; C. K. Barrett, “Things Sacrificed to Idols,” NTS 11 (1964/65), 138–53; Theissen, 121–43; Horsley, “Consciousness”; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 87–128; and J. Brunt, “Rejected, Ignored, or Misunderstood? The Fate of Paul’s Approach to the Problem of Idol Food in Early Christianity,” NTS 31 (1985), 113–24.

Among others, (1) it fails to take 8:10 seriously (the single specific mention of their behavior in 8:1–13 deals only with going to the temples, not with marketplace food); (2) it has difficulty with the essentially contradictory nature of 8:1–13 and 10:23–29, if they are both addressed to the same issue (see the next paragraph); (3) it fails to see that 8:4–6 is related to 10:14–22, not to 10:23–29; (4) it neglects the combative, apologetic force of chap. 9, not to mention 8:1–13 and 10:1–22; (5) the effect (Paul’s vigorous argument and defense) is simply not adequate to the cause (a letter asking his opinion on issues on which they are internally divided).

Item (2) has always been a source of genuine difficulty for the traditional view, for which a variety of ploys are brought in to salvage the theory (usually that he is addressing two different groups—although nothing in the text suggests as much). Hurd, 148, frankly admits that “therefore, we reach the somewhat strange conclusion that Paul appears to have permitted the Corinthians to continue their current practices concerning idol meat virtually unchanged” and that “Paul devoted the major part of his reply to vigorous disagreement with them, and only at the close did he give them permission to behave as in fact they had been behaving.” This is hardly satisfactory. For the fully contradictory nature of 8:7–13 and 10:23–11:1 if they are addressing the same issue, see Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 176–78.

As elsewhere this does not mean that everyone in the community is so disposed, but that those who are leading the attack against Paul have considerably influenced the whole community. On this issue see the introduction, , and the commentary on 1:12 and 4:18–21.

For the advocacy of this position, see Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα.” In an earlier form it had been adopted by Parry, 125–27; it was then assumed in the dissertation by Willis (see ). It is also of some historical interest to note that a position that had to be argued for in the first edition of this commentary has in the past twenty-five years not only emerged as the “standard” view (with much “tweaking,” of course), but has done so with very little acknowledgement that another view ever existed.

In an earlier day it was also common to see the introduction of the Apostolic Decree in Corinth (either by Peter, or by Jewish Christians [e.g., Barrett, “Things Sacrificed,” 142–43], or by Paul himself in his previous letter [Hurd, 240–70]) as lying behind the whole issue. But this assumes that marketplace food is the issue, which 10:23–11:1 makes clear is no issue for Paul at all. Indeed, Paul’s response on this question makes his own relationship to the Decree a matter of some historical difficulty.

For a helpful overview of this phenomenon and the evidence for it, see Willis, 8–64, which has now been more finely honed in much of the bibliography noted in the addendum.

For the Canaanites, see Judg. 9:27; for Egyptian practices, which included sexual sins as well, see Exod. 32:6; for Moab (also with sex), see Num. 25:1–2; and for Babylon, Dan. 5:1–4.

The locus classicus is Deut. 14:22–26; cf. Exod. 24:11; 1 Sam. 9:13; 1 Kgs. 1:25; Hos. 8:13 (and perhaps Jer. 35:2; Ps. 23:5–6). The fact that this practice stopped in the postexilic period, despite the clear commandment in Deuteronomy, is probably attributable to the two factors of its close association with sexual immorality in Canaanite cults and the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem where such meals had been held.

The description of such a meal in the cult of Asclepius can be found in Aristides, or.sac. 2.27 (the cult of Asclepius had a prominent temple in Corinth). Thirteen papyrus invitations to such meals are now extant (11 for the cult of Sarapis; one each for Demeter and Isis; according to Pausanias, Descriptions of Greece 4.6, there were two “sacred precincts” in Corinth for both Isis and Sarapis). See the formal analysis of these invitations by C.-H. Kim, “The Papyrus Invitation,” JBL 94 (1975), 391–402; cf. the discussion in G. H. R. Horsley, New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, I (North Ryde, NSW, Australia, 1981), 5–9. The typical invitation reads: “Chaeremon requests your company at the table of the lord Sarapis at the Sarapeum tomorrow, the 15th at 9 o’clock” (POxy 1.110²); cf. POxy 2791, where the first birthday of a daughter is to be celebrated at a meal in the Sarapeum.

Cf. the description in R. K. Yerkes, Sacrifice in Greek and Roman Religions and Early Judaism (New York, 1952), 99–100.

See the description in D. H. Gill, “TRAPEZOMETA: A Neglected Aspect of Greek Sacrifice,” HTR 67 (1974), 117–37.

See the discussion in W. L. Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Cor 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, Calif., 1985), 17–61.

On the fundamentally religious character of the meals, see Horsley, New Documents, 8; Willis, 17–64, on the other hand, argues for their social character, but his argument is directed esp. against a sacramental interpretation. His latter point (the lack of a sacramental aspect, which included “partaking of the deity himself”) is almost certainly correct; but he has probably pushed the evidence too far in one direction, nullifying the religious aspect altogether. On this point Horsley’s brief analysis is an important corrective. See on 10:16–21.

Cf. Ehrhardt, “Social Problems,” 279.

As with 6:12 (cf. 10:23); 7:1, 25, one can make the best sense of the argument by assuming that Paul cites their letter at several points. This is esp. true of 8:1 and 4, where he actually uses a formula that implies quotation (“we know that . . .”); it is also likely at 8:8. In still other places (e.g., 8:10; 9:1; 10:1–4) he is probably alluding to their argument.

Hurley, “Man and Woman,” 34, makes the thoroughly improbable assertion that “the knowledgeable party is Jewish.” This simply fails to take seriously the nature of the present problem. Furthermore, this failure, which Hurley nearly brushes past, is what also calls into question his major thesis, that the Corinthians community was primarily Jewish. See the introduction ().

This view has had a long history. It was adopted, inter alios, by Weiss, 230; Moffatt, 110–11 (see esp. his translation); Jewett, Terms, 422–23; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 91–92. For an opposing view, see M. E. Thrall, “The Meaning of οἰκοδομέω in Relation to the Concept of συνείδησις (I Cor. 8,10),” in Studia Evangelica 4 (TU 102; ed. F. L. Cross; Berlin, 1968), 468–72.

The chief objection to this reconstruction lies in the tension some see between this passage, where Paul appeals to love, and 10:14–22, where he forbids such behavior outright. How can he begin in this way if in fact he intends finally to forbid it altogether? It should be noted, however, that because of 8:10 this is a problem for all interpreters. The answer lies with Paul’s understanding of the relationship between the indicative and the imperative (see on 5:6–8). Paul seldom begins with an imperative. As in 6:12–20, 1:10–4:21; 12:1–14:40, he begins by correcting serious theological misunderstandings and then gives the imperative. See Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 195–97; and v. 13 below.

As just one example see B. J. Oropeza, “Laying to Rest the Midrash: Paul’s Message on Meat Sacrificed to Idols in Light of the Deuteronomic Tradition,” Bib 79 (1998), 57–68, whose total disregard of v. 10 is esp. striking.

The Western MSS, followed by the MajT, add δέ, thus breaking Paul’s asyndeton. As Zuntz, 188, argues, this addition “obscures the argument.” See the commentary.

The MajT substitutes the more common εἰδέναι for ἐγνωκέναι, which quite misses Paul’s play on the word γινώσκω.

P⁴⁶ lacks the τι in this clause and (joined by Clement) the τὸν θεόν and ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ in the next one. The resultant text reads: “If anyone thinks they have arrived at knowledge, they do not yet know as they ought to; but if anyone loves, this one truly knows (or, is known).” This has all the marks of being the original text, as Zuntz, 31–32, argues, contra Metzger, 490–91. See the commentary.

P⁴⁶ and Clement lack τὸν θεόν; see the preceding note.

P⁴⁶ * 33 and Clement lack the ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. See above.

For the meaning of this term see in the introduction to this section.

This is confirmed by the structure of the Greek, and is now recognized in most contemporary English versions (NAB, NRSV, ESV, NEB [removed in REB]). The repeated οἴδαμεν ὅτι in vv. 1 and 4, and esp. the repeated ὅτι (οἴδαμεν ὅτι . . . καὶ ὅτι . . .) in v. 4, makes this certain. When Paul is expressing his own ideas he never repeats with a ὅτι; the simple καί joins such correlative sentences (cf. 15:3–5, ὅτι . . . καὶ ὅτι . . . καὶ ὅτι). Cf. G. H. Giblin, “Three Monotheistic Texts in Paul,” CBQ 38 (1975), 530. Furthermore, the semiredundancy in v. 4 of the two sentences following ὅτι almost demands that the ὅτι’s in these cases introduce direct discourse. Finally, this seems to make the best sense of the awkward second “we” in the sentence (see the following note).

This seems to be the best explanation of the awkward double “we.” A few of the earlier interpreters suggested that οἴδαμεν should read οἶδα μέν (so also Jeremias, “Briefzitate,” 151). But this is an unnecessary expedient. See Hurd, 120. In more recent times Willis, Idol Meat, 68–70 (following an earlier suggestion by W. Lock, “I Corinthians viii.1–9: A Suggestion,” Exp, 5th ser., 6 [1897], 65–74), argued that the citation itself begins with οἴδαμεν. This is possible but seems to dismiss too easily the formulaic character of οἴδαμεν ὅτι. See BDAG 1e, ὅτι, “The formula οἴδαμεν ὅτι is freq. used to introduce a well-known fact that is generally accepted.”

This phrase, along with their apparent insistence that this knowledge gives them ἐξουσία, has led more than anything else to the belief by many that we are here dealing with some form of gnostic influence in Corinth. See esp. Schmithals, 141–55, 218–29. As useful as this book was for a possible understanding of Corinthian attitudes, its major thesis was flawed by Schmithals’s circular reasoning that divided the two Corinthian letters into several letters on the basis of a prior commitment to a gnostic scheme and then argued for the scheme on the basis of the partitioned letters. The same major flaw also considerably weakens the presentation by Jewett, Terms, 23–40. Moreover, to call Paul’s Corinthian opponents “gnostic” is thoroughly anachronistic, since those systems do not emerge until the second century. Much more likely what appears here is part of a stream that became the gnostic systems of a later period. Others see Jewish backgrounds to the theme. See esp. J. Dupont, Gnosis, and Horsley, “Gnosis” and “Consciousness”; cf. Ellis, 45–62.

Five of its ten occurrences are in this chapter (vv. 1 [twice], 7, 10, 11). The cognate verb γινώσκω also occurs four times in vv. 2 and 3.

Some have suggested that the fundamental difference has to do with how each understands the gospel, and that for the Corinthians γνῶσις was the way of salvation. This, of course, is fundamental to Schmithals’s view (see above); cf. Willis (), 71. But the argument that unfolds does not seem first of all to be a question of salvation or existence predicated on knowledge, but of behavior—or the grounds for behavior. The question of existence does surface as fundamental to the argument in 1:10–2:16, where wisdom and the cross are in contrast; but here Paul is dealing with the outworking of their stance in the ethical realm. Their γνῶσις is a gift of the Spirit, which enlightens them to act in a certain way; it is not a way to salvation as such.

Gk. οἰκοδομέω. Although this is clearly a Pauline word, both for his own apostolic ministry (cf. 2 Cor. 10:8; 13:10; Gal. 2:18) and for how believers are to relate to one another (1 Thess. 5:11) and to the community as a whole (1 Cor. 14:6–17), it seems likely to be a term with which the Corinthians are also already familiar. Cf. O. Michel, TDNT 5:410–12, and BDAG.

Paul’s reworking in 10:23 of the ἔξεστιν slogan that appears in 6:12 further strengthens this suggestion: “All things are permitted (ἔξεστιν = “I have ἐξουσία in all things”), but not all things build up.”

One should note how many items in this section are similar to what was said about “wisdom” in chaps. 1–4. They both lead to pride (3:18–21); they both are deceptive and destructive (3:16–18); and he attacks them both with similar irony (“if anyone thinks he is wise” [3:18], “has knowledge” [8:2]).

Gk. ἀγάπη, the basic Christian understanding of ethical behavior. This understanding goes back to Jesus, but becomes thoroughgoing in John and Paul (e.g., 1 Thess. 3:12; 1 Cor. 13; 2 Cor. 2:8; Gal. 5:6, 13, 22; Rom. 13:8; 14:15). Cf. V. P. Furnish, The Love Command in the New Testament (Nashville, 1972), 91–117.

Cf. Rom. 14:13–15 for the same kind of argument; in that case walking according to love (v. 15) means not to put a stumbling block in the way of a brother (v. 13).

See –.

Gk. perfect ἐγνωκέναι, implying having come to the full state of knowledge. This unusual usage may have led to the dropping of τι; more likely τι is not original, and once it was added ἐγνωκέναι was eventually changed to the more common εἰδέναι, which had lost its perfect force.

Gk. ἔγνωσται, perfect, either passive or middle. On this reading it is probably middle (has come to know for oneself); if passive, it means “is known” or “recognized,” “by God” being the implied subject. Very likely the reading of this verb as a passive led to the double addition of “God” and “by God” in the two parts of this clause.

Gk. τι.

Otherwise Willis, 82 (), who concludes that they are seeking “to establish a relationship with God on the basis of knowledge” and that is what Paul is here counteracting; cf. O Wischmeyer, “ΘΕΟΝ ΑΓΑΠΑΝ bei Paulus. Eine traditionsgeschichtliche Miszelle,” ZNW 78 (1987), 141–44. But even if one accepts the standard text, this does not seem to be the issue. See .

The ordinary solution (e.g., Barrett, 190–91; Conzelmann, 141–42; Willis, 78–81), which may well be correct, is that the real question shifts from the Corinthians’ acting out of knowledge or love to the ground of their being, in which Paul thus plays on the two words. Thus the one who loves God does so because God has already “known” him or her. Cf. Rom. 8:28, where “loving God” is equated with being called by God. All of this is true, of course, with regard to Pauline theology. But the problem still remains that “knowing God” is not the issue raised by the Corinthians in saying “we all possess knowledge.”

So Zuntz, 32.

One should not miss what seems to be a clear relationship between what is said here and in chap. 13. There again the issue is love toward one’s neighbor, not one’s relationship with God. In 13:2 γνῶσις without ἀγάπη is nothing; and in v. 8 γνῶσις as a spiritual gift will come to an end, but ἀγάπη is forever. Hence the latter is “greater,” without negating the former. Contrary to Willis, 81–82, Paul’s struggle in the present passage is not with γνῶσις as such, but with their making it the predicate of Christian ethics, without ἀγάπη.

The MajT followed the Syriac versions in adding ἕτερος (“no other God”). This is a clear gloss based on the OT theme of “other gods” (e.g., Exod. 20:3).

P⁴⁶ B 33 b sa Irenaeus “cleaned up” this awkward sentence by omitting the ἀλλ.’

A few later MSS (0142 234 460 618 630) fill out the sentence with a Trinitarian formula (“and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things, and we in him”). Such a form was known as early as Gregory Nazianzus (early fourth c.), although one cannot be sure it was actually in his bible. See Metzger, 491.

Gk. οὖν.

Gk. βρῶσις; not found in the original rubric in v. 1. It is a verbal noun, emphasizing the actual eating of food. Hence the problem, as Paul sets it forth, is not with the food per se, but with the eating of it. This also points to the temple meals, since that is the place of eating such food.

As noted above (see ), the repeated “that” (“we know that . . . and that . . .”) makes it almost certain that he is here quoting them.

This surely reflects what must have been a basic part of the teaching that accompanied the preaching of the gospel in the Greco-Roman world. In this case, of course, the early Christians had been preceded by an aggressive Judaism, which by the time of Paul was generally well known for its monotheism, a faith that repulsed many because of its exclusiveness and insistence on circumcision but at the same time was very attractive to others because of its higher morality. All of this made much of the discussion by R. A. Horsley (“Gnosis in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 8:1–6,” NTS 27 [1980], 37–39) nearly irrelevant. His concern was to establish that the Corinthian “gnostics” were Hellenistic Jews of the Philonic type, who had converted to Christianity. But even though he has mustered considerable evidence in parallel, nothing in these parallels nor in the present passage demands an “enlightened Judaism” as the background. The early converts had become Christians, after all, and that is adequate to inform their present stance.

Gk. οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ. The οὐδέν can be understood either attributively (“no idol exists in the world”) or as a predicate (“an idol is a nothing [i.e., a nonentity] in the world”). The formal correspondence between the two clauses (οὐδὲν εἴδωλον/οὐδεὶς θεός) suggests the former. Otherwise Murphy-O’Connor (Keys, 89), who comes out at the same place, but believes one does so best by taking οὐδέν as a predicate.

M. Trèves (“I Corinthiens VIII.5–6,” Cahiers Cercle Ernst Renan 25 [1977], 22–23) suggested that the sentence is a post-Pauline interpolation. But the passage sets up the argument of v. 7 so perfectly that one must offer extraordinarily convincing reasons to see it as non-Pauline, which Trèves fails to do.

Some (e.g., Findlay, 841; Parry, 87; Grosheide, 192; cf. the discussion in Hurd, 121–22) have suggested, and W. L. Willis (Idol Meat, 83–88) has argued at some length, that vv. 5 and 6, excepting the parenthetical ὥσπερ clause, are also part of the Corinthian argument. Willis’s argument is based primarily on what he considers the appropriateness of the argument to the Corinthian position, on the one hand, plus the strong qualifying ἀλλ’ that begins v. 7, on the other. But that is an unnecessary expedient and rather overlooks the Pauline nature of the grammar and structure: (1) the explanatory γάρ is a strictly Pauline feature, esp. in this letter; (2) the anacoluthon makes little sense as a Corinthian statement to Paul, but good sense as an ad hoc creation by Paul; and (3) most importantly, as the structure of the argument indicates (see the display), the terms “god” and “lord” in the “creedal” statement of v. 6 are dependent on the Pauline interruption with its “gods many” and “lords many,” and do not easily follow the original protasis. This latter item seems to make the hypothesis largely untenable.

Gk. γάρ.

Gk. καὶ εἴπερ; see BDF 454 for this concessive usage.

There is a formal correspondence between the original protasis and this insertion that is difficult to translate. Thus:

και γὰρ εἴπερ

εἰσὶν

λεγόνεμοι

θεοὶ . . .

ὥσπερ

εἰσὶν

θεοὶ πολλοί. . . .

Gk. λεγόμενοι; cf. the usage in Eph. 2:11.

Even though this anticipates the full qualification in 10:19–20, Conzelmann, 143, probably brings that argument in too soon in his comment on this passage. By “heaven” and “earth” Paul is probably not asserting their “creatureliness,” but the whole range of their types and abodes.

See, e.g., the papyrus invitation quoted in the introduction to chaps. 8–10, , where Sarapis is called κύριος Σάραπις. A. Feuillet (“La profession de foi monothéiste de 1 Cor. viii,4–6,” SBFLA 13 [1962–63], 7–32) thinks v. 5 too contradictory to v. 4 and suggests that Paul here refers not to pagan deities as such, but to the divinization of Hellenistic and Roman emperors who appropriated these titles for themselves. But that tries to “save” Paul by an unnecessary expedient that, in light of other passages (vv. 6, 7, and 10:19–20), seems to miss Paul’s point. Even more distant is the attempt to equate “lords” with angels by B. G. Wold, “Reconsidering an Aspect of the Title Kyrios in Light of Sapiential Fragment 4Q416 1 iii,” ZNW 1995 (2004), 149–60.

On the basis of this “for us” H. Lietzmann (“Symbolstudien XI,” ZNW 22 [1923], 268–71), followed by Conzelmann, 145 n. 51, argued that the creed is basically a “confession.” But as Murphy-O’Connor (Keys, 63–66) points out, these words belong to Paul’s own sentence, not to the more formal material that looks creedal.

See the thorough discussion of these texts (excepting 1 Tim. 2:5) in C. H. Giblin, “Three Monotheistic Texts in Paul,” CBQ 38 (1975), 529–35.

Cf. Marc.Aur.Ant. 4.23, speaking of Nature, “of you are all things, in you are all things, unto you are all things.”

Cf., e.g., Philo, who thinks of God as the origin of all things, which he brought into being through the Logos (cher. 127: “we shall see that its [the universe’s] cause is God, by whom it has come into being, . . . its instrument the word of God, through which it was framed”; cf. leg.all. 3.96; op.mund. 24–25). Cf. the discussion in Horsley, “Background,” 130–35, who dismisses the possible Stoic influences altogether (as does Murphy-O’Connor [Keys, 59–62], but for different reasons).

See, e.g., Conzelmann, 144 n. 38: “The phrasing has not been chosen by Paul ad hoc. The content is not ‘Pauline’; and it reaches far beyond the context.” For an overview of opinions on this question see Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 63–66.

The stylistic considerations that cause Murphy-O’Connor (preceding note) to view it as pre-Pauline are significant, but not decisive, as he himself admits.

Murphy-O’Connor (Keys) argues that the formula is not cosmological at all, but strictly soteriological. But his argument rests too heavily on a suggestion by M. M. Sagnard (“A propos de 1 Cor. VIII,6,” ETL 26 [1950], 54–58) that the δι’ indicates movement, or direction, on the basis of which he asserts that “the unity of the text derives from the unity of a single movement.” He is right in seeing the main concern as soteriology, but that does not preclude that the first member in each clause refers to creation. That the early church easily brought these two ideas together can also be seen in Heb. 1:1–3 and John 1:1–13.

Gk. τὰ πάντα (cf. 15:27–28; Rom. 11:36). Murphy-O’Connor (Keys) argues that this term here refers to the new order of salvation, not to the creation of the universe as such.

In the Pauline corpus see Col. 1:15–20; 1 Tim. 2:4–5; elsewhere see John 1:1–3 and Heb. 1:1–3.

In place of συνηθείᾳ (* A B P Ψ 33 81 630 1739 1881 pc cop sy^hmg) the Western and Byzantine traditions read συνείδησις, probably an assimilation to the following συνείδησις (so Metzger, 491). Otherwise M. Coune, “Le problème des Idolothytes et l’education de la Syneidesis,” RSR 51 (1963), 515–17 (see the refutation in Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom,” 551–52).

Gk. τοῦ εἰδώλου (“the idol”), implying the “god” whom any one of them worshiped and whose temple they frequented.

The NIV’s “as having been sacrificed” is quite gratuitous here—and probably misleading; no tense is implied in εἰδωλόθυτον; Paul simply has “as sacrificed to an idol [= ‘a god],” thus implying the temple precincts as the locus of the sacrifice.

The NIV here reflects the Western and Byzantine traditions that read the present tense instead of the future of the Egyptian tradition. This shift (from παραστήσει to παρίστησι) is probably a generalizing tendency in the tradition.

A few MSS (* Ψ 33 365 1241 1881) read ὑμᾶς.

This reflects the word order of P⁴⁶ B 81 630 1739 pc vgst cop. Although this reading is confined to Egypt, it seems to be the lectio difficilior. The vast majority of witnesses, both East and West, read “For we are no better off if we eat, and no worse off if we do not.” Zuntz (161–62, 194) argues for both this word order and the γάρ as original—on the grounds that “Paul could not but begin with the claim under discussion.” But that is precisely why the original (Egyptian) reading was changed—early and often. Zuntz explains the Egyptian reading as a scribal blunder (haplography due to the double οὔτε, with a later incorrect reinsertion). This seems highly improbable. Murphy-O’Connor (Keys, 77) argues for the singular reading of A^c (his inclusion of Tischendorf’s codex 17 [Gregory 33] is incorrect): “We are no better off if we do not eat, and no worse off if we do.” He dismisses the use of external evidence here as “mechanical” and argues that this reading alone accounts for the other two. But that will not do. The external evidence is part of “rational criticism”; readings either have pedigree—which this one does not (the “correction” is by the original hand at the time of copying)—or they arise spontaneously, as this one did. Far from being the original reading to which the scribe had access as he was copying, it represents his confusion between the other two readings, one of which he was copying and the other of which apparently he also knew. In changing from the one to the other he switched verbs but left the negative in its original position.

The σέ is omitted in P⁴⁶ B F G latt. Zuntz, 92, leans toward the omission, on the grounds that it could have been added on the basis of the σέ in v. 11; but Metzger, 491, has correctly argued that “copyists are more likely to have omitted the pronoun, thus generalizing the apostle’s statement, than to have inserted it.”

See .

The MajT replaced the γάρ (the more difficult reading under any view) with a καί.

P⁴⁶ and Clement omit ἀσθενοῦσαν. See Metzger, 491.

Several Western witnesses omit μου in both instances.

See .

Gk. ἀλλά. Because of his unique understanding of vv. 4–6 as a quotation from their letter in its entirety, Willis (Idol Meat, 87–96), understands v. 7 to belong to vv. 4–6, as Paul’s rejoinder. The content of v. 7, however, indicates that it introduces what follows.

This is true even though the word “love” does not occur in the section. That is because for Paul love is not some subjective feeling toward others. It is expressed first of all in the death of Christ for us (v. 11), which in turn finds concrete expression in actions toward others. Cf. Conzelmann, 149.

The NIV translates γνῶσις here as a verb, “not everyone knows this.” This captures the relationship to vv. 4–6 but misses the formal tie to v. 1 and the play on the word γνῶσις.

This seems to be the most natural explanation of the alleged contradiction between vv. 1 and 7. Paul allows their slogan only theoretically. The knowledge that there is only one God does not immediately eradicate the idolatrous beliefs and practices of a lifetime. Cf. Murphy-O’Connor, Keys (95–98). The difficulty which Willis, 87–88, sees (which leads him to view all of vv. 4–6 as a quotation) is more apparent than real.

On the textual variant, see . The desire of Coune to read “conscience” here is related to a concern to see the “weak” as Jewish Christians who are being tempted to eat marketplace food. Others who see the problem here as referring to Jewish Christians are Schlatter, 101; T. W. Manson, “Corinthians,” 200–203; Dupont, Gnosis (Louvain, 1949), 265–377. But Paul’s attitude toward that food in 10:25–30 stands in such sharp contradiction to what is said here that such a view seems impossible.

Gk. τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου; the dative is causal (= “by reason of”), and the genitive is objective: thus, lit., “by their being accustomed up to this very time to the idol.” The singular “the idol” suggests that the problem is not with idolatry in general, but with their devotion and allegiance to a given god.

See .

On this issue see the introduction to .

Paul is thus using his Jewish vocabulary to describe what they do: eat idol food. But for the participants themselves the “idol” represents a “god.”

The weak conscience, it should be noted, has to do with idols, not with food as such. The most likely place for such failure of conscience and “defilement” to take place is at the temple where the idol actually stood.

Gk. συνείδησις. The verb appeared in 4:4. The word occurs eight times in 1 Corinthians, all in 8:7–12 and 10:25–29. In the Pauline corpus it appears three times in Romans, three in 2 Corinthians, and six in the Pastoral Epistles. It also occurs in Acts, Hebrews, and 1 Peter.

The literature here is considerable. Among other items, see H. Osborne, “Συνείδησις,” JTS 32 (1931), 167–79; C. Spicq, “La conscience dans le NT,” RB 47 (1938), 50–80; C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (SBT 15; London, 1955); C. Maurer, TDNT 7:898–919; B. F. Harris, “Συνείδησις (Conscience) in the Pauline Writings,” WTJ 24 (1962), 173–86; M. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of συνείδησις,” NTS 14 (1967/68), 118–25; Jewett, Terms, 402–46; H. C. Hahn and C. Brown, NIDNTT 1:348–53; T. McCaughey, “Conscience and Decision-Making in some Early Christian Communities,” IBS 5 (1983), 115–31; see esp. P. W. Gooch (“ ‘Conscience’ in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10,” NTS 33 [1987], 244–54), who argued for three different renderings in this passage (“feel polluted” [v. 7], “regard himself as strengthened” [v. 10], “self-estimation” [v. 12]).

Although it is equally clear that (1) the word “heart” in the OT (cf., e.g., Job 27:6) sometimes carries the weight that “conscience” does in Paul, and that (2) the conviction of a former time, that Paul borrowed the term from Stoicism, is no longer tenable. See esp. Pierce, Conscience, 13–28.

Besides Pierce, Maurer, and Jewett (see ), this is the position taken by Horsley, “Consciousness,” 581–82; Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom,” 548–55; and Willis, 89–90. Pierce argues that it came into Paul’s theological vocabulary by way of Corinth and that his later uses stem from this encounter. But that puts too much weight on silence in 1 and 2 Thessalonians. The diversity of later usage suggests that it was a term otherwise available to him.

Part of the debate has been whether or not συνείδησις pronounces only on past actions (as Pierce argues) or whether it also gives guidance beforehand. The evidence as evaluated in the articles by Osborne, Harris, and Thrall (see ) suggests that it probably does at times function to guide the future, even though most often it pronounces on past actions. Thrall in particular argues that for Paul in Romans it functioned among the Gentiles very much the way the law did for Jews.

Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom,” 554. The context suggests that this is far more likely than the suggestion of BDAG (under συνείδησις) that “weak conscience” means “one that cannot come to a decision.” Cf. Horsley, “Consciousness,” 581–83, followed by Willis, 90–92, who argues unconvincingly that it means consciousness only, without any moral overtones. Thus, “those who were ‘weak’ in συνείδησις were simply those who were ‘not knowing’ (8:7) the truth about idols and idol meat” (Willis, 92). Such a view does not take seriously enough the deep anguish involved for these people, who are “destroyed” by such actions. Their problem is not in coming to a decision, nor in not knowing about idols, but in carrying through with a decision that creates too great a moral dissonance for them, and thus leads them back into idolatry.

Gk. μολύνεται; the only appearance in Paul (cf. the cognate noun in 2 Cor. 7:1). Some (e.g., Dupont, Gnosis, 284) have seen this usage to indicate that the “weak” are Jewish Christians; but such an argument needs to be made of “sterner stuff.”

It is often noted that Paul says nothing about “how the weak consciences could be strengthened” (Conzelmann, 147; cf. Barrett, 194–95: “they are scrupulous where scrupulosity rests on pure error. . . . All this is foolish, and Paul does not defend it”). But that assumes that the problem is basically an internal struggle over marketplace food, not one between them and him over temple attendance. This is precisely what makes this issue differ from that in Rom. 14, where the issue is food per se and he addresses both sides to live together in the community of faith.

The sentence begins with a δέ, which the NIV renders “but” (cf. Hurd, 123; “however,” NRSV, ESV). Most likely it is mildly consecutive (“now” [NAB] or untranslated, as most commentaries; cf. REB). It is in fact very difficult to make sense of it as Pauline instruction in contrast to what has been said in v. 7, esp. if one assumes, as the context demands, that Paul is addressing those “in the know.” In v. 7 he has set up the “weak” as not being able to handle the knowledge of such “gnostics.” If this is in contrast to that, then he is here trying to get the latter to “back off” with regard to “idol food” (marketplace food being the assumption), since eating such food will not present people before God. But how is such a sentence in contrast unless it reflects a perspective that eating such food might so present one? And where would such an idea have come from if not from them, and how does it help Paul’s argument over against them at this point? The alternative view is to take the “presentation before God” as negative, i.e., for judgment (see e.g., John Fotopolous, “Arguments concerning Food Offered to Idols: Corinthian Quotations and Pauline Refutations in a Rhetorical Partitio [1 Corinthians 8:1–9],” CBQ 67 [2005], 611–31). For a helpful analysis of these clauses from the perspective of Greco-Roman rhetoric, see J. F. M. Smit, “The Rhetorical Disposition of First Corinthians 8:7–9:27,” CBQ 59 (1997), 476–91. From this perspective the sentences serve as the two theses that will be taken up through chap. 9.

It is of some importance to note that neither the word “strong” nor a synonym appears anywhere in the argument. The contrast is between those with “weak consciences,” as just defined in v. 7, and those “having knowledge.” It should not be surprising that Paul takes the side of the “weak” since from his view that is the only proper stance for Christians in the present age (cf. the previous note). This reflects his understanding both of Christ and of his own apostleship (see on 4:8–13). In 2 Corinthians this becomes a key issue in his struggle with this church, who tend to put down weakness as less than Christian.

See esp. the discussion, including an overview of opinion, in Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 76–86.

Gk. βρῶμα (also in v. 13; cf. 6:13). Since Paul does not refer to εἰδωλόθυτα (“idol food”), this word seems to put the argument for a moment into a broader framework (see on v. 13).

Gk. παραστήσει, which as a transitive means “to present” or “offer” something or someone to another person; it was sometimes used as a technical term for bringing someone before a judge. The KJV’s “commendeth” (cf. RSV) belongs more properly to the verb παρατίθημι (so also the NIV’s “bring near to” and NAB’s “bring us closer to”); for the option that this is intended as negative, see J. Fotopolous ().

Gk. ὑστερούμεθα; it ordinarily means to lack in some way. Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 80–81, suggests on the basis of the future tense in the first sentence (which he understands to refer to being brought before the judgment seat of God: eating idol food, the Corinthians have argued, will not do so), and the present in the second, that this refers to “spiritual gifts” (cf. 1:7). Thus the “strong,” as he views them, are arguing, “Eating idol food will not bring us under God’s judgment; furthermore, if we do not eat (as the weak), we are not abounding in spiritual gifts (as the weak give evidence), and if we do (as ourselves), we are not lacking the same (as is also evident).” But this not only rests on a most improbable textual choice (see ) but also is weakened by the complete lack of mention of spiritual gifts in the context.

As most English translations and commentaries.

As argued for by J. Fotopoulos ().

Cf. Barrett, 195: “to observe food laws does not constitute a claim on God.”

This is the traditional view, but in most cases the contextual question is simply not spoken to and the difficulty with the formulation of sentence 2 is overlooked. One looks in vain for an answer to the question “why,” esp. in relationship to v. 7.

For a list of some who take this position, see Hurd, 68, to which may be added Holladay (tentatively), and Barrett, Murphy-O’Connor, and Willis (see the next note). Otherwise, Hurd, 123, and Conzelmann, 148, who says that it is “a positive declaration on Paul’s part.” But neither he nor Hurd wrestles adequately with the contextual question.

This was pointed out long ago by Lietzmann, 38, and has been frequently noted since. Among those who take this position, but recognize the problems, three different solutions have been offered. Barrett, 195, takes sentence 1 as from the Corinthians, with sentence 2 as the beginning of Paul’s response. Murphy-O’Connor (“Food”) sees the whole as a quotation but opts for an improbable textual solution (see and ). Willis, 97–98, opts only for sentence 2 but without the οὔτε’s, thus making them say, “If we do not eat, we are the worse for it; if we eat, we are the better.”

Cf. Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 190–91, where this was first proposed.

This usage in 1 Cor. 6:12–13 adds to the probability that Paul is here dealing with a Corinthian position, as does the fact that both sentences, as in vv. 1 and 4, are in the first person plural, in contrast to v. 7 which speaks of the “weak” in the third plural and v. 9 which addresses the “gnostics” in the second plural.

As Conzelmann, 148, nicely put it: “The neutrality of food does not mean neutrality of conduct” (italics his).

Gk. δέ, frequently rendered “however.”

Gk. βλέπετε; cf. 3:10; 10:12; Gal. 5:15.

Gk. πρόσκομμα; found only here in 1 Corinthians (but cf. Rom. 14:13, 20). In v. 13 Paul uses the synonym σκανδαλίζω. Both of these words, as their usage in the Synoptic tradition makes plain, refer not to “offending” someone but to becoming the cause for someone to fall. The context here demands such a meaning as well.

The word ordinarily means “authority,” but the substitution of ἐλεύθερος/ἐλευθερία in 9:1, 19 and 10:29 suggests that the ideas are at one point nearly synonymous in this argument.

For an overview of the debate as to its origins in Corinth see Willis, 98–104. He is probably correct in seeing it as an adoption of “popular philosophy” since this is quite in keeping with their attitude as it emerges in 1:10–4:21 (see esp. on 1:12 and 17). As in 6:12 they have possibly taken a Pauline idea and remolded it within the framework of their own views on “wisdom” and “knowledge” so that in its present form it is their own, not Paul’s.

The concept of “freedom” in popular philosophy was highly individualized, moving toward self-determination. Thus it meant to be free from restraints imposed by external forces, including other people. Obviously for Paul (9:19) it means exactly the opposite. See H. Schlier, TDNT 2:487–502.

Gk. ἡ ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὕτη; despite voices to the contrary, the original NIV here (“the exercise of your freedom”) was at once both too tame and probably misleading. The difference in English between one’s being “free to” and “having the right to” do something at one level can be viewed as synonymous, but at another level the latter can very easily carry a feisty edge to it that the former never would.

Otherwise Hurd, 125, who thinks the syntax points to what is hypothetical. But he is arguing that even the so-called “weak” are hypothetical, which does not seem to take seriously enough either the urgency of this response or the still greater urgency of 10:1–22.

Gk. σέ (second person singular). For this usage cf. 4:7; 7:21, 28; 14:17; 15:36. The usage here is very much like that in 4:6–7, where the first sentence has a general introduction in the second person plural, followed by a sentence in the second person singular (and introduced with an explanatory γάρ) specifying as to how they are being “puffed up.” Thus at this point Paul is no longer arguing with the community as a whole, but with a single individual who thereby represents the view being advocated by several (many?).

Gk. οἰκοδομηθήσεται, lit. = “be built up”; cf. Turner, Syntax, 143, who sees this usage as “expressing a measure of effect” (language apparently borrowed from Burton, Moods, 411).

Cf. G. W. Dawes (“The Danger of Idolatry: First Corinthians 8:7–13,” CBQ 58 [1996], 82–98), who is in basic agreement with the analysis suggested here but has refined it slightly in suggesting that the issue for them was ultimately that this “knowledge” of theirs would lead others into what would be “sin” for them; cf. J. M. G. Barclay (“Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline Christianity,” JSNT 47 [1992], 49–74), who emphasizes the sociological dimension of this passage, where the wealthy are once more abusing the poor.

Gk. ἐν εἰδωλείῳ κατακείμενον (“reclining at table in the idol’s temple”). For the archaeological evidence of these dining rooms in Corinth, see C. L. Thompson, “Corinth,” IBDSup, 180; the most helpful recent discussion of the background to this passage is by B. W. Winter (After Paul Left Corinth, chap. 12, 269–86).

The commitment of interpreters to the “marketplace food” view can best be seen from the way this verse is treated. Some simply ignore it altogether (most of the older commentaries); others circumvent it as “an extreme case” (e.g., R-P) to which Paul will return by way of “digression” in 10:14–22. Schmithals, 227, is more candid, dismissing it with a footnote: “Even in 8:10, where of course Paul chooses an extreme example, he is concerned only with the eating of εἰδωλόθυτα, not with participation in the cult as such.” To this effect is Paul’s one explicit statement in chap. 8, which leads directly to the argument of 10:1–22, ruled to mean something other than what it says in order to fit a prior scheme. This dismissive attitude toward this crucial passage, with an equally puzzling interpretation of 10:14–11:1, can still be found in the literature (see esp. J. Delobel, “Coherence and Relevance of 1 Cor 8–10,” in The Corinthian Correspondence [ed. R. Bierenger; BEThL 125; Leuven, 1996], 177–90).

After all, “Freedom” that feels compelled to set others “free” is often an expression of bondage. See on 6:12.

This in itself seems to deal the deathblow to the idea that the “weak” are only concerned with eating marketplace food. Paul does not suggest that they “discover” that others are being so bold as to eat even at the temples, which in turn gives them boldness to eat marketplace food. This frequently repeated idea (e.g., Grosheide, 196; Lenski, 345) needs to be laid to rest. They might be “offended” by what the “gnostics” are doing and most likely would “judge” them for it, but it is difficult to imagine how their discovery of the action of the “gnostics” would lead them to take this lesser action of a totally different kind. Such a suggestion takes all the force out of the example by making it a non sequitur. If for the “gnostics” attendance at the temple meals is the issue, then they would scarcely be gratified in encouraging others to buy and eat marketplace food; and if the “weak” were not being pressured into it in some way, what would cause them to do it on their own?

Gk. οἰκοδομέω (NIV, “emboldened,” for which there is no known parallel). On this matter see in the introduction to chaps. 8–10. Cf. Godet’s comment: “He enlightens and strengthens him to his loss! Fine edification!” (426).

Cf. Rom. 14:15: “Do not by your eating destroy [RSV, ‘cause the ruin of’] your brother for whom Christ died.”

The Greek reads literally: “For being destroyed is the weak one by your knowledge, the brother for whom Christ died.”

Gk. ἀπόλλυται (cf. 1:18; 10:9–10; 15:18). Note the present tense; already he is experiencing ruin.

Since Paul does not have a prior system to salvage, he sees the danger as real. Cf. Conzelmann, 149 n. 38: “He of course presupposes the idea that the Christian, too, can lose his salvation.” This is not a happy thought, but it reflects Paul’s own theology with sober realism. Otherwise Bruce, 82, who sees καὶ τύπτοντες (v. 12) as epexegetic, therefore explaining what “destroying” means.

Those who have been involved in the rescue of drug addicts and prostitutes, e.g., or of people involved in various expressions of voodoo and spirit worship, have an existential understanding of this text that others can scarcely appreciate. Many such people must be forever removed from their former associations, including returning to their former haunts for evangelism, because the grip of their former life was so tenacious. Paul took the power of the demonic seriously; hence his concern that a former idolater, by returning to one’s idolatries, will be destroyed—that is, such a person will return to former ways and be captured by them all the more, and thus eventually suffer eternal loss.

Gk. οὕτως, in the first position, correctly translated “in this way,” i.e., in the way just described.

Gk. τύπτω, lit. to beat or strike; figuratively, as here, it means to be responsible for the wounds that such a person has received.

This is the position argued by Murphy-O’Connor, Keys (103–4 [originally RB 75 (1978), 543–74]), followed by Willis, 107.

Gk. διόπερ, only here and in 10:14 in Paul (there is a variant in 14:13).

Gk. βρῶμα. Conzelmann, 148 n. 26, makes the unsupported assertion that βρῶμα here means “eating.” But βρῶσις (cf. v. 4) is a verbal noun; there is no evidence that βρῶμα can be so used. For the distinction between the two words, see T. Reub. 2:7: γίνεται βρῶσις βρωτῶν . . . ὅτι ἐν βρώμασιν.

Gk. κρέα (NIV, “meat”), a word that specifically refers to animal flesh and therefore stands in contrast to the food eaten by a vegetarian (cf. Rom. 14:21). Theissen, 121–45, may be pointing in the right direction when he suggests that part of the problem is sociological. Since the poor would ordinarily eat meat only at such meals, meat itself took on a nearly religious quality for such people.

In this case the language changes from the πρόσκομμα of v. 9 to the synonymous verb σκανδαλίζω, probably because it more truly reflects what has been said in vv. 10–12 about his “being destroyed,” and esp. “sinning against” him (cf. the usage of this verb in the Synoptic tradition: e.g., Matt. 5:29–30; 18:6–8).

This is an attempt to capture the full force of the future emphatic negative οὐ μὴ φάγω, reinforced in this instance by τὸν αἰῶνα (“forever”).

Most often this verse and chap. 9 are regarded as instances of Paul’s setting himself up as a model for the conduct argued for in vv. 7–13 (e.g., Willis, Idol Meat, 108–10, and “An Apostolic Apologia? The Form and Function of 1 Corinthians 9,” JSNT 24 [1985], 33–48). There is a sense in which that is true; Paul always sets up his own conduct as something to be “imitated” (cf. 11:1). But that is not his point in chap. 9. See the introduction and commentary on chap. 9.

Cf. Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 195–97.

Cf. Willis, 112–22.

This is where both von Soden (“Sacrament,” 264) and Conzelmann, 148–49, seem to miss Paul’s argument rather widely. Conzelmann, e.g., says of 8:10: “Paul declares: your conduct does not affect you; your inner freedom to go to these places is no problem. The problem is the demonstration you give to your brother, not purposely, but in an objective sense—in other words, the way in which he understands your conduct.” Paul declares no such thing, as 10:14–22 makes clear (a passage that Conzelmann seems to find embarrassing to Paul). The problem lies in our inability to think that there might be absolutes without at the same time feeling that Paul is betraying himself by bringing back the law. But no such tension existed in Paul. Imperative there is aplenty in him, but he never lets it be turned into law (i.e., as a means of securing oneself before God). Obedience does not secure one before God; nonetheless obedience is expected of one whom God has secured.

This sentence was originally written some years before Maudine and I spent several semesters teaching in a variety of Asian settings (the Philippines, Japan, Singapore, India). In those settings, almost to a person, this passage had a kind of “urgency” totally lacking with most North American and European students. In such moments one finally has some sense as to the intensity with which this matter came to Paul’s attention.

There are 16 in all. Paul begins with four straight (v. 1), followed by eight more beginning with v. 4.

This is another of the sections that has led to theories of partitioning. See the introduction, . Cf. Hurd, 43–47.

So much is this so that when Paul finally begins (v. 12b) to explain why he had given up those rights, he breaks off in order to add two more kinds of supporting evidence (vv. 13–14).

Willis, “Apologia” ( above) argues that “the claims or illustrations in 9:4–14 can hardly be a defense of Paul’s right to support, as if he were called into question by some in Corinth” (35). But his argument is based on unfounded assertions and reverse logic. He fails to take seriously the decidedly defensive nature of most of 1 Corinthians, esp. of chaps. 1–4. On the matter at hand he argues that no one in Corinth would have made an issue of Paul’s rejecting their support, but he misses the sociological dimension of the problem and fails altogether to note 2 Cor. 11:7–12 and 12:13. The sarcasm of the latter passage is hardly addressed to a nonissue! Regarding the affront his rejecting their support would have been to the Corinthians, see E. A. Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul: Some Clues from Contemporary Documents,” TynB 35 (1984), 3–24, esp. 15–23.

Even though both context and content speak against it, this view continues to find support in the literature; e.g., H. P. Nasuti, “The Woes of the Prophets and the Rights of the Apostle: The Internal Dynamics of 1 Corinthians 9,” CBQ 50 (1988), 246–64; and in lesser ways in some of the commentaries (e.g., Collins, “a clever rhetorical ploy” [328], Garland [396], Thiselton [661], but not C-R). Here is where one should perhaps apply the “duck test”; what is called a defense, looks like a defense, and functions like a defense is most likely intended to be a defense—esp. so in a letter where more than once the apostle comes across in a defensive posture.

In this regard cf. esp. 2 Thess. 3:6–10, where Paul uses some of the same language as here (e.g., v. 9, “not that we do not have the right to such help”) and explicitly says that the reason for giving up such rights was to give them an example.

Cf., e.g., Holladay, 113–14, who would attribute it to the style of the diatribe. But that will scarcely do, since the defense is so personal and so clearly directed at his relationship with them.

See the introduction to chaps. 8–10, pp. 398–400 above.

Cf. Ruef, 78, and Hurd, 127–28, who have also suggested this possibility.

The first two questions are reversed in D F G Ψ Maj a b sy^h, apparently in the interest of putting the more “important” one (that of apostleship) first. But that misses the structure of Paul’s argument. The text is read by P⁴⁶ A B P 33 104 365 629 630 1175 1739 1881 pc vg cop Tert.

Willis, “Apologia,” 34, asserts that because the questions expect an affirmative answer this is therefore not a “real defense.” That is reverse logic that quite misunderstands the nature of the rhetoric. The ἀλλά γε ὑμῖν (“but surely to you I am!”) makes it plain that the opposite prevails. Even more insensitive to the argument here, not to mention the historical situation, is Willis’s further assertion that “Paul’s apostleship cannot be contested by the Corinthians who are the seal of his authenticity as an apostle” (ibid.). If that were indeed the case, one wonders why the problem in 1:12 at all, or why 4:1–21 or 2 Corinthians as a whole!

Gk. οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος. The remarkable similarity with Epict. 3.22.48 has often been noted (“And what do I lack? Am I not without pain? Am I not without fear? Am I not free? [οὔκ εἰμι ἐλεύθερος]”). But the parallel is purely coincidental. Epictetus is trying to show the Cynic as the one who knows how to live without things. Paul’s purpose is defense pure and simple—of actions that include eating marketplace food in given contexts! On the correspondence of this “freedom” to the gospel he preaches (v. 19), see W. Harnisch, “Der paulinische Lohn (I Kor 9,1–25),” ZTK 104 (2007), 25–43.

On the word “apostle” see on 1:1.

Gk. ἑώρακα; cf. ὤφθη in 15:8. There has been considerable debate as to whether this language describes a merely revelatory vision (e.g., W. Michaelis, TDNT 5:355–60, and W. Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth [ET, Philadelphia, 1970], 98–111) or an actual objective seeing (G. O’Collins, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ [Valley Forge, 1973], 7–9). Paul surely believed the latter. See the discussion in Kim, Origin, 55–66; cf. F. Kerr, “Paul’s Experience: Sighting or Theophany?” New Blackfriars 58 (1977), 304–13.

This is unusual language in Paul. Cf. Rom. 4:24, which also refers to the Risen Lord. Probably this is semitechnical language for speaking of Christ in his resurrection. He is “Jesus,” the name of the Son of God in his incarnation, “our Lord,” having become so through his resurrection from the dead.

Although Paul does not mention this experience by name, only the most biased exegete would deny that this is what Paul is referring to here and in 15:8, and probably in Gal. 1:12–16 as well.

So Barrett, 200; Conzelmann, 152; Kim, Origin, 56–66.

For the argument that Galatians is not Paul’s first letter, see the Introduction to my Galatians, 4.

Luke picks up this aspect of Pauline theology in Acts 1:21–22; cf. the reports of the Damascus road experience in 9:15; 22:10; and esp. 26:15–18.

Gk. τὸ ἔργον μου; lit. “my work” (as NRSV, ESV, REB), which must mean as the NIV correctly has it, the result of his apostolic labors (cf. NEB, “my own handiwork,” a bit of overtranslation that was changed back to a literal rendering in the REB).

For this ἐν κυρίῳ see on 4:17 and 7:22. The precise nuance is uncertain here. As in the earlier two passages it is probably primarily locative; i.e., their existence is not “in Paul” but “in the Lord.” On the other hand, it may have a slightly instrumental ring to it. Even though they are Paul’s workmanship, the ultimate responsibility lies with the Lord.

Technically this is another conditional clause which the NIV translators have, probably correctly, interpreted as concessive.

Although, as was noted there, this may simply refer to those who are currently giving leadership to the community and are leading the charge against him.

Gk. ἀλλά γε ὑμῖν. For this use of ἀλλά in the apodosis see 4:15 and 8:6. With the γε it means, “yet at least to you.”

The γάρ here is causal, “for the very reason that.”

Gk. τῆς ἀποστολῆς (= the “office” of apostle), found here for the first time in Paul; elsewhere only in Gal. 2:8 and Rom. 1:5.

Paul uses the imagery elsewhere to refer to the Spirit as the “seal” of God’s ownership (2 Cor. 1:22; Eph. 1:13; 4:30; cf. Abraham’s circumcision, Rom. 4:11). The emphasis here is less on “ownership” than on “legally valid attestation” (Conzelmann, 152 n. 11).

Gk. ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα (= “a sister for a wife”). Several Western witnesses (F G a b Tert Ambst Pel) apparently take the “we” as a genuine plural and read γυναῖκας (“wives”; without a form of ἀδελφή). Zuntz, 138, contends for the Western reading on the grounds that it fits Paul’s “fervour” (cf. J. B. Bauer, “Uxores circumducere [1 Kor 9,5],” BZ, n.s., 3 [1979], 94–102). But he must also argue that ἀδελφήν is an interpolation—a most improbable option. It has recently been contested that Paul did not mean “sister for a wife” here but was referring to women who accompanied the apostles as their helpers (A. Zimmerman, “Wives of the Apostles,” HPR 104 [2003], 64–66), a point that can be neither proven nor disproven but seems highly unlikely.

This translates the τὸν καρπόν found in * A B C* D* F G P Ψ 0222 33 1175 1739 pc sa; cf. Zuntz, 50. The original NIV had “eat of its fruit” (ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ), found in P⁴⁶ Maj it bo Ambst; so also NRSV, ESV, but not NAB.

P⁴⁶, followed by A C* Maj sy^p bo, begins this question with ἤ (“or”). Although this textual choice is something of a toss-up, the ἤ was probably original and was removed by an early scribe to conform the clause to the preceding one (B D F G Ψ 81 104 630 1175 1739 pc latt sy^h sa).

For a discussion of the λαλῶ/λέγω variation see Zuntz, 97.

P⁴⁶ f Ambst omit Μωυσέως; D* F G read simply, “for it is written.” Zuntz, 138–39, argues that the Western reading is original but fails to recognize the overwhelming tendency in this tradition toward assimilation. All of the arguments he raises against the longer reading at the same time make it the lectio difficilior.

Paul’s κημώσεις has been conformed to the LXX (φιμώσεις; cf. 1 Tim. 5:18) in the entire tradition (incl. P⁴⁶) except for B* D* F G 1739. See Metzger, 492, and Zuntz, 37.

The final words of this “citation” exhibit considerable confusion. The translated text (supported by P⁴⁶ * A B C P 33 69 81 365 1175 1739 pc sy cop [cf. Metzger, 492]) reads ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν (“in hope of sharing”). The Western tradition (D* F G a b sy^hmg) reads τῆς ἐλπίδος αὐτοῦ μετέχειν (“[the thresher ought] to share his hope [i.e., of the plowman]”). This apparently arose because of the ellipsis of ἀλοᾶν after ἀλοῶν. The MajT conflated the two readings (“[the thresher] in the hope of sharing his hope”).

Gk. ἀπολογία; what follows fits the category “defense” so poorly that many believe v. 3 goes with vv. 1–2 and refers only to what has preceded. See the discussion on v. 3.

So also Weiss, 232, and Conzelmann, 154. This is contrary to the suggestion by Daube, Rabbinic Judaism, 395, that Paul here introduces the theme for the first time and that in v. 8 he somewhat apologizes for it, since it ran counter to Jewish practices. But the milieu of this church is Hellenistic, not Jewish.

On this possibility see D. Horrell, “ ‘The Lord Commanded . . . but I Have Not Used . . .’: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Reflections on 1 Cor 9.14–15,” NTS 43 (1997), 587–603.

For this information we are indebted to various studies on the sociology of the early Christians, esp. those by Theissen, 50–65; Hock, Social Context, 50–65; and Judge, “Conformity,” 15–23.

See the introduction to 1:10–4:21, pp. 50–51.

See the discussion in Hock, Social Context, 52–59; cf. A. E. Harvey, “ ‘The Workman Is Worthy of His Hire’: Fortunes of a Proverb in the Early Church,” NovT 24 (1982), 214–16.

This is not to say that he did not work earlier, nor that he did not accept provision later, as Hock, e.g., argues (see “The Workshop as a Social Setting for Paul’s Missionary Preaching,” CBQ 41 [1979], 440). Rather, it is to acknowledge that the hard evidence of Acts 18:3; 20:34; 1 Thess. 2:9; and 1 Cor. 4:12 places it for certain from this time on.

One reason may have been that it provided an opportunity for evangelizing, as Hock suggests (see the previous note).

See A. J. Malherbe, “ ‘Gentle as a Nurse’: The Stoic Background to 1 Thess. II,” NovT 12 (1970), 203–17; Hock, Social Context, 52–59; and the further discussion in Fee, 1 and 2 Thessalonians (NICNT), 31–34.

Otherwise Dungan, 15, who argues that “in short, it seems that everything depended upon the financial strength of each particular congregation.” But two pieces of evidence from Paul quite contradict this. He accepted support from Macedonia (2 Cor. 11:9; Phil. 4:14–20), even though by his own testimony they knew “extreme poverty” (2 Cor. 8:2); yet he rejected support from Corinth, a church that knew abundance (2 Cor. 8:13–14). Not the relative financial strength of the congregations but something more closely akin to the gospel itself is the reason (see on v. 12b).

On Paul’s accepting the demeaning character of working with his own hands, see 4:12; cf. Hock, “Paul’s Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class,” JBL 97 (1978), 555–64.

This would be even more so for the wealthy among them, who might feel slighted by this refusal on his part. In three of the articles collected in Social Setting (chaps. 2–4), Theissen has argued that the basic divisions in the church were between some of the wealthy patrons, who then also demeaned some of the poor both in the matter of idol food and of the Lord’s Supper that was celebrated in their homes.

An alternative to this, suggested by C. Forbes (“Comparison, Self-Praise, and Irony: Paul’s Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric,” NTS 32 [1986], 14–15), is that Paul was offered patronage while he was there, and that his rejection of it led to the anti-Paul sentiment on the part of some.

Some have argued that v. 3 goes with vv. 1–2 (e.g., Godet, 5; Ellis, 47 n. 8; Willis, “Apologia,” 34; and esp. K. Nickel, “A Parenthetical Apologia: 1 Corinthians 9:1–3,” CurTM 1 [1974], 68–70; cf. Helen Montgomery’s translation). But this is ruled out by the word order, which demands that what follows is what αὕτη (“this”) refers to. Cf. C. K. Williams: “My vindication of myself to those who are investigating me is this: . . .” This captures both the order of the Greek and the present aspect of τοῖς ἀνακρίνουσιν (“those who are investigating”; see ).

Gk. ἀπολογία, a speech or writing in reply to accusations; cf. Acts 22:1; Jos., c.Ap. 2.147; Xenophon, mem. 4.8; for those who think this is not really intended as a defense, see .

Conzelmann, 153, suggests that the “critics are (as yet) outside the Corinthian community.” He misses the force of 4:3–4 as well. See on 4:18–21; most likely this refers to the leaders of the opposition, who have generally taken the whole church down this path. See the introduction, .

Without grammatical warrant the NRSV translates this more suppositionally, “those who would examine me.” Willis asserts, again without grammatical support, that “τοῖς ἀνακρίνουσιν could legitimately be translated as future. . . . Then we could say that Paul is anticipating criticism rather than answering a previous complaint” (“Form,” 34). But neither the grammar nor the context supports such an interpretation.

At the same time vv. 5–6 give side glimpses into all kinds of interesting historical tidbits that are otherwise unknown to us, and which are not fully lucid here.

So much so that in my Study Guide (1979) I leaned this way.

In contrast to v. 1 (where there was a simple οὐ), each of these has the double negative μὴ οὐ. Ultimately these also expect a positive response, but they get there in a more circuitous way. The μή expects a negative response to a negatively expressed sentence. Thus (lit.), “Can it be that we do not have the right to food and drink?” This is intensely rhetorical.

This is another puzzling use of the first plural (cf. on 2:6). The entire paragraph, except for v. 8, is in the plural, while all of vv. 1–3 and 15–27 is in the singular. Probably it reflects the fact that Paul and his traveling companions all took this stance toward support. Thus he includes them with himself in this defense. Yet the context, and esp. the interchange of “we” and “I” for the same content in vv. 12b and 15, indicates that he is primarily concerned with his own ministry.

Although this may be a legitimate translation, the Greek text has the infinitives of the two verbs: “to eat and to drink.”

This has been argued by Bauer, “Uxores,” although he thinks vv. 4–5 are picked up again in vv. 24–27, not 19–23. Cf. Dungan, 6 n. 1, who cites this view approvingly. Their further suggestion that the first two questions reflect “eat, drink, and make merry” (= “eat, drink, and make love to one’s wife”) is farfetched at best.

Gk. ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα, which means “a sister as a wife.” See . On the question of whether Paul had been formerly married, see .

Gk. λοιποί (lit. “what remains”; = “the rest of”).

The problem lies with the verb περιάγω, which means to “lead about,” or “go about (in the sense of having someone in close companionship),” and its object “a sister as a wife.” Bauer, again followed by Dungan (see ), has presented evidence that the verb on occasion could be interpreted to mean “be married.” But why prefer an obtuse meaning when the ordinary one can be shown to make good sense in the context?

As Jervell (“Traditions”) has cogently argued, this text is sure evidence that traditions about the apostles as well as about Jesus would have been known in the early Christian communities.

Since Paul follows this with “the Lord’s brothers” and “Cephas,” and since Cephas is indeed one of “the rest,” there has been some debate as to whether it also includes the Lord’s brothers. Probably so, since Paul by implication includes James as an apostle in 15:7 and Gal. 1:19. Otherwise W. Schmithals, The Office of Apostle in the Early Church (ET, Nashville, 1969), 80–81, who quite unconvincingly excludes both James and Peter from being apostles in Paul’s view.

Paul elsewhere speaks of James as “the Lord’s brother” (Gal. 1:19). This is undoubtedly the same James as in 1 Cor. 15:7.

Although Roman Catholic scholarship rejects this. See the bibliographical data in BDAG under ἀδελφός, but that is an unfortunate reading of texts by way of a theological dictum that did not arise until centuries later. Exegesis must be based on “sterner stuff.”

On Paul’s use of this name for Peter see . There is something to be said for the possibility, suggested by Barrett, 204, that the opposition to Paul’s apostleship might stem from those who claim to be Peter’s people.

Cf. esp. 2 Thess. 3:9, “we did this [worked with our own hands] not because we did not have the right [οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν] to such help.”

On this question see esp. Hock, “Tentmaking.”

All the more so, since this is written sometime after their falling out recorded in Acts 15:36–41.

Which further qualifies the question of whether Peter ever did. That is, the fact that Barnabas can be singled out like this means that one cannot make too much of the singling out of Peter in the previous sentence, at least as to whether he had visited Corinth or not.

Cf. 2 Tim. 2:4–7, where the soldier and farmer are joined with the athlete to make the point that the true soldier, etc., must give wholehearted devotion to the task if one hopes to obtain the prize.

C. C. Caragounis, “ΟΨΩΝΙΟΝ: A Reconsideration of Its Meaning,” NovT 16 (1974), 51–52, has argued convincingly for this meaning, with the proviso that “ ‘expense’ must not be understood in any sense approximating that of ‘wages.’ ” The word has to do with “provisions,” not salary, and is almost certainly both how Paul understood it and what he is here arguing for himself. He is not to be “paid” for services rendered, but “provided for” by those who owe their lives to him. Dungan’s insistence, 28–29, that Paul is arguing for the right to a salary misses the historical situation by a considerable margin, not to mention the point of Paul’s rhetoric. Cf. Hock, Social Setting, 50 n. 1 (92).

The Greek verb translated “drink” is ἐσθίει (= “eat”). This suggests that milk is thought of as food for nourishment, not a drink; hence it is “eaten.” Nothing is to be made, as R-P (182–83) do, of the ἐκ with γάλακτος in comparison with the straight accusative in the preceding illustration.

Even though the Greek sentence is somewhat awkward, its general sense is clear. It begins with the negative particle μή, thus indicating a negative response (“I do not, do I?”). The ἢ καί (= “or also”) both joins the two contrasts (“I λαλῶ these things”/“the Law λέγει these things”) and recommends the second alternative (cf. Rom. 4:9). The awkwardness results because the recommended alternative, which is still part of the original sentence, expects a positive answer. (The MajT, followed by the TR, cleaned all this up by removing οὐ from before λέγει and beginning the second clause with οὐχί.)

Gk. κατὰ ἄνθρωπον; cf. 3:3, where the same phrase is used in a pejorative sense (= merely human perspective); here it simply reflects the difference between the divine and human perspective without necessarily being pejorative; the REB is esp. weak here (“after the measure of men”); that may work in Great Britain, but not in North America.

Daube (Rabbinic Judaism, 394–400) argues on the basis of similar usage of the full phrase (“I speak after the manner of humans”) in Rom. 3:5; 6:19; and Gal. 3:15 that this is a technical phrase from Paul’s Jewish background that is “an apology for a bold statement which, without such an apology, might be considered near-blasphemous” (394). That may be true of Rom. 3:5, but it is scarcely so here. Daube assumes a Jewish background for the church as well as for Paul and suggests that the content of vv. 4–7, which is contrary to Jewish practice, is being presented to them for the first time, therefore requiring the “apology.” But that seems to miss the historical situation by a wide margin. For a critique of Daube and a more useful study of the phrase, see C. J. Bjerkelund, “ ‘Nach menschlicher Weise rede ich.’ Funktion und Sinn des paulinischen Ausdrucks,” ST 26 (1972), 63–100.

Only here and in 14:21 and (perhaps) 34 in the extant letters.

Rom. 7:7 is no real exception, since the argument about the law in that context calls for the introduction “if the law had not said.”

Cf. Rom. 3:21, “the Law and the Prophets.”

Twice in Romans (10:5, 19) Paul speaks about what Moses “writes” or “says,” but he does not again use the formula “It is written in the Law of Moses.”

Gk. ἀλοῶντα (lit. “while threshing,” which is important to note, since the word is picked up again in v. 10). This passage aroused great interest among the rabbis, as is attested by the significant number of allusions to it in the Talmud. See Str-B, 3:382–99. Of particular interest are the two passages in which they treat it as an example of “from lesser to greater,” i.e., if God shows interest in the animals, how much more in us (see b.B.Mes. 88b; b.Git. 62a).

Although “us” here could arguably be more inclusive, the use of “we” throughout, and esp. again in v. 11, indicates that he intends himself, and perhaps his companions, as in vv. 4–6.

Besides the discussions in the commentaries, see W. Arndt, “The Meaning of 1 Cor. 9,9.10,” CTM 3 (1932), 329–35; G. M. Lee, “Studies in Texts: I Corinthians 9:9–10,” Theology 71 (1968), 122–23; A. T. Hanson, Studies in Paul’s Technique and Theology (Grand Rapids, 1974), 161–66; W. C. Kaiser, “The Current Crisis in Exegesis and the Apostolic Use of Deuteronomy 25:4 in 1 Corinthians 9:8–10,” JETS 21 (1978), 3–18; R. F. Collins, “ ‘It Was Indeed Written for Our Sake’ (1 Cor 9,10): Paul’s Use of Scripture in the First Letter to the Corinthians,” SNTSU 20 (1995), 151–70; R. E. Lohse, “ ‘Kummert sich Gott etwa um die Ochsen?’ Zu 1 Kor 9,9,” ZNW 88 (1997), 314–15 (suggesting that Paul’s readers may have a Stoic view of the world); J. F. M. Smit, “ ‘You Shall Not Muzzle a Threshing Ox’: Paul’s Use of the Law of Moses in 1 Cor 9,8–12,” EstBib 58 (2000), 239–63; J. L. Verbruggen, “Of Muzzles and Oxen: Deuteronomy 25:4 and 1 Corinthians 9:9,” JETS 49 (2006), 699–711.

See . The formal parallel is not precise, but the similarities are noteworthy. (1) Both are in two parts, joined by an ἤ, and the second is preferred to the first; (2) both begin with μή, expecting a negative response to the first part and a positive to the second; (3) both are followed by a γάρ clause that further explains or elaborates the second part, the preferred alternative. The solution by Lee (see the preceding note), in which he tries to make μή positive, may do “no violence to the Greek,” as he argues, but it is by all counts a most unnatural meaning.

Gk. πάντως (cf. 9:22; 16:12; and the οὐ πάντως of 5:10).

A passage in Philo is often noted: spec.leg. 1.260 (“for the law does not prescribe for unreasoning creatures, but for those who have mind and reason” [Loeb, 7:251]). But this text does not refer to Deut. 25:4; rather, it reflects Philo’s overall attitude. On the other hand, in virt. 140–47 he includes this passage (145) among several other “animal” laws as evidence of the splendid mercy of Israel’s God toward even the irrational creatures.

This is often suggested (e.g., A. Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History [ET, New York, 1957], 102–3; Moffatt, 117), though usually expressed in terms of the “literal” meaning of the OT text, which is already a loaded hermeneutical judgment.

This is also a frequent suggestion. See, e.g., R. N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period (Grand Rapids, 1975), 126–27; Hanson, Studies, 166; Ruef, 81; Conzelmann, 155. To call this allegory is to push that term beyond its recognizable boundaries. The OT text was chosen because in its original setting it meant precisely what Paul is arguing for here, that the “worker” should reap material benefit from his labor. The meaning of the text is not allegorized; rather, it is given a new application.

This is also frequently suggested (e.g., O-W, 241), but Paul himself does not make this kind of application.

Although no subject is expressed in the sentence, Paul is most likely referring to the Law, not to God, since the same subject is assumed for the verb ἐγράφη (“it was written”) in the succeeding sentence; and ὁ νόμος is the subject of λέγει in v. 8b (cf. NEB, Montgomery).

That this is the intent of πάντως is supported not only by the context but by Paul’s usage elsewhere. See the discussions in Ellis, Use, 47, and Longenecker, Exegesis, 126.

Precisely this feature caused the rabbis at a later time to feel obliged to “fine-tune” the law to meet almost every human circumstance; and it is also at this point that they had such difficulty with the “prophet from Nazareth,” who so thoroughly disregarded their “fine-tuning.” To them, as “guardians” of the Torah, Jesus either did not care about (or was careless regarding) God’s law or he was a deliberate “law-breaker.”

Cf. Kaiser, “Crisis,” who uses the paradigm from E. D. Hirsch (meaning and significance) to make this same point. But one is less certain about Kaiser’s conclusion as to its “meaning” in the OT passage (following Godet, he suggests it already refers to humans, as well as to oxen, in Deuteronomy; cf. Grosheide, 205). That is an unnecessary expedient in an attempt to salvage the apostle.

One should perhaps add here that, since this is such an unusual moment in Paul’s use of the OT, those of us who have been conditioned by another tradition with regard to reading ancient texts should probably leave Paul alone at this point, since we are most likely the ones who need to have our historical perspective adjusted just a bit. For a full defense of Paul’s use of a more universal application of a specific expression of the Law, see D. Instone Brewer, “1 Corinthians 9.9–11: A Literal Interpretation of ‘Do Not Muzzle the Ox,’ ” NTS 38 (1992), 554–65, a study that has been strangely overlooked in most of the recent commentaries (C-R being the notable exception).

This translates (properly) Paul’s γάρ; see BDF 452. It is used here to affirm what is asked in the final part of the rhetorical question (= “to be sure”).

This phrase is in the emphatic position in the first instance; it appears again in the second clause about the one who threshes. Thus it is the emphatic phrase in the sentence: “in hope” the one plows; and “in hope” the other threshes.

This does not mean that they hope to share together in the harvest, but that each labors “in hope” that he will enjoy a share of the produce.

This is a good attempt to translate a clause that is somewhat difficult because Paul’s original sentence (see ) is elliptical. One must supply a second ὀφείλει and the infinitive of ἀλοάω to complete Paul’s sense.

Some have argued that because of its somewhat poetic style, this final clause is actually a citation of some unknown (perhaps apocryphal) source (cf. Weiss, 237; Lietzmann, 41; Conzelmann, 155). Thus the γὰρ ἐγράφη is understood to introduce the quotation “it is written.” But that will not work. Nowhere else does Paul use the aorist passive as an introductory formula to a quotation. The verb refers back to the cited passage in v. 9 and the γάρ has a causal or explanatory sense (cf. Dungan, 11: “Clearly this was written for our sakes to show that the plowman, etc.”).

Dungan, 11.

One should not miss the strongly personal nature of this application. Note the repeated ὑμῖν, ὑμῶν, ὑμῶν.

Gk. μέγα (NIV, “is it too much,” i.e., is it something extraordinary that we should expect this?).

Although it is likewise possible that this was merely a momentary variation to relieve the monotony.

Gk. τὰ πνευματικά and τὰ σαρκικά; they are obviously being used in a different way than in 3:1.

This unfortunately gets lost in the NIV.

This is the position of R-P, 185–86.

This is affirmed by most interpreters with much more confidence than the evidence warrants. What finally seems to tip the scales is the word order. Elsewhere when Paul uses the possessive, or subjective genitive, with ἐξουσία it follows the noun (cf. 8:9); the enclosed genitive (as here) suggests a slightly different relationship to ἐξουσία.

Gk. οὐ . . . ἀλλά. The sentence begins with an ἀλλ’, which sets the clause in contrast to the apodosis of the preceding sentence; the second contrast is within the new sentence itself. Thus (formally): “Should we not all the more share in the right of support from you? But we did not make use of this right, but we put up with anything, etc.”

Gk. ἐχρησάμεθα (cf. 7:21, 31); the aorist here probably refers to his former stay in Corinth. The perfect occurs in v. 15, implying that even now as he writes this is still his stance.

Gk. στέγω (cf. 13:7; 1 Thess. 3:1, 5). This is not Paul’s ordinary word for “endure”; here it seems not to mean “endure sufferings,” but to put up with the kinds of hardships that working with one’s own hands and evangelizing at the same time would bring on (cf. 4:11–13, where the hungering, etc., may have been related to his having to work for his own sustenance). Cf. W. Kasch, TDNT 7:585–87.

Gk. ἵνα μή τινα ἐγκοπὴν δῶμεν (lit. “lest we give any kind of hindrance to”). This is the only occurrence of ἐγκοπή in the NT. The cognate verb occurs three times in Paul (1 Thess. 2:18, “Satan hindered us”; Gal. 5:7; Rom. 15:22).

A phrase that appears elsewhere in Paul in 1 Thess. 3:2; 2 Cor. 2:12; 9:13; 10:14; Gal. 1:7; Rom. 15:19; and Phil. 1:27, always in reference to preaching the gospel to non-Christians, esp. Gentiles.

In 1 Thess. 2:9 and 2 Thess. 3:8 he speaks of “not burdening” any of them; but the sarcasm of the similar expression in 2 Cor. 12:13 suggests that it was otherwise with regard to his relationship to this church (cf. ). Dungan, 14–15, after reviewing some of the alternatives, suggests that it should be understood in light of 8:9–12, where the Corinthians’ actions were an offense, and therefore a sin against a brother. Thus Paul has determined “not to injure” the Corinthians (16). Against this is the language of the passage (“hinder the gospel of Christ”), which, as vv. 19–23 make clear, refers to evangelizing, not relationships with fellow Christians.

Dungan, 16–17, insists that the background is Jewish and reflects Qumran motifs; but that cannot be proved, and it quite misses the larger context of the present argument. Undoubtedly Paul speaks out of his own background, but the Corinthians will just as surely hear in terms of theirs.

For Jewish practice see Lev. 6:16–18, 26–28; 7:6, 8–10, 28–36; Num. 18:8–19; for Greco-Roman religions see Willis, 15–17, and the references there.

This seems to be a little more precise for οἱ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐργαζόμενοι than the NIV’s “those who work in the temple.” Most likely the use of ἐργάζομαι here is intended to recall v. 6.

Most likely the text reads without τά. If so, then the ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ does not so much mean “from the temple” as “by means of the temple.” This is more precisely the analogy for which Paul is arguing and is exactly how he says it in v. 14. For this use of ἐκ see BDAG 3g (“source”) or Robertson (Grammar, 598; “cause” or “occasion”).

There is no καί in the Greek text. It is possible, indeed the absence of καί suggests probable, that Paul is not thinking of two kinds of ministrants here, as the NIV implies (cf. Findlay, 850), but that the second clause “repeats the first half in a more definite form” (R-P, 187).

Gk. παρεδρεύω, a NT hapax legomenon. Nor is it an LXX word. It is found in several pagan authors in cultic contexts, referring to doing the work of a priest. See BDAG.

As Robertson (Grammar, 521) suggests, this is an example of a “pure locative.”

Gk. οὕτως καί (cf. 2:11; 11:12; 12:12; 14:9, 12; 15:22, 42).

One should probably not make too much of it one way or the other that Paul concludes the argument with a word from the Lord (see the discussion in Dungan, 17–21), esp. since we cannot be certain whether vv. 13–14 were in mind at the beginning of the argument (less likely, it would seem), or whether they function as something of an afterthought. The one thing that is certain is that all the prior examples are analogies pure and simple, from which Paul extracts a principle. Here the example is precise, and the “command” a word related directly to his and their situation.

This is one of the rare instances where instead of the verb εὐαγγελίζομαι, which itself means “preach the gospel,” Paul uses another verb (in this case καταγγέλλω) with the noun εὐαγγέλιον as the object (cf. 1 Thess. 2:9). The reason for this usage here most likely arises out of the second clause, where the noun “gospel” appears again, as the intended source of the missionaries’ support.

This version is cited in a similar context in 1 Tim. 5:18.

Since Paul does not actually cite a saying of Jesus here, Dungan, 40–75, takes the entire “mission instructions” of Luke 10:1–12 and its parallels as the “command.” He may be right, but the concern here is strictly with their “living by the gospel,” which can be narrowed to vv. 4 and 7–8.

As Dungan points out, 42–48, this is also true in Luke’s version, although his redaction is more subtle and involves changes and additions in the block itself. In Matthew’s gospel the larger context becomes esp. clear in the collection and arrangement of sayings that follow in 10:16–42.

See the discussion in Harvey, “Workman,” 209–21.

Dungan, 3–40, makes it a considerable part of his thesis that Paul “set aside” (20), or deliberately disobeyed (3), an explicit command of the Lord. But this is to make far too much of Paul’s use of the verb “command” (despite Dungan’s remonstrance to the contrary, 20 n. 3). Paul certainly did not consider himself to be doing so. It is extremely doubtful that the Corinthians saw him doing such, as Dungan himself admits (39). Since that is so, he can hardly be charged with the kind of duplicity of which Dungan everywhere accuses him. The answer, of course, lies with the nature of the argument itself. In vv. 3–14 he is first of all defending his right to such support, for which analogies of various kinds, as well as Scripture and the “command” of the Lord, all play their part. As “command” the word of Jesus referred to here does not have to do with his (Paul’s) action but theirs (cf. Godet, 23). The command is not given to the missionaries, but for their benefit. His explanation of his own action, therefore, is not a relativizing of Jesus’ command—that would be foreign to Paul’s own view—but reflects his own attitude toward his rights and has nothing to do with what the Corinthians should have done.

Dungan, 27, makes a considerable point that the saying was well known to the Corinthians; but that simply cannot be known.

For the variants here—all attempts to clear up the grammar caused by Paul’s breaking off his sentence—see Metzger, 492.

A few MSS (* D* F G; Ambst) substitute χάρις for Paul’s undoubtedly original καύχημα.

For the variation between the present and aorist, and the subtle difference the latter makes, see Zuntz, 110.

For the sake of good English the NIV has rendered the noun εὐαγγέλιον by the pronoun “it.” In passing, it should also be noted that Paul’s own sentence (ἵνα εὐαγγελιζόμενος ἀδάπανον θήσω τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) makes it clear that, even though the verb εὐαγγελίζω may rightly be rendered “preach the gospel,” it is nonetheless a verb; Paul’s primary intent here is thus not just the activity, but esp. its content, hence the noun at the end of the sentence. The Western and Byzantine traditions fill out the sentence by adding τοῦ Χριστοῦ (from v. 12?).

See the introduction to chap. 9 above. In an otherwise helpful study of this passage, E. Käsemann suggested that these verses are a digression (“A Pauline Version of the ‘Amor Fati,’ ” in New Testament Questions of Today [ET, Philadelphia, 1969], 217–35, esp. 218). But that is because he rejected either a polemical or an apologetic understanding of chap. 9 as a whole (231).

In this regard see esp. D. Horrell, “ ‘The Lord Commanded . . . but I Have Not Used . . .’: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Reflections on 1 Cor 9,14–15,” NTS 43 (1997), 587–603.

Paul’s Greek reads (lit.) “I would rather die than—my boast no one shall nullify.” It is this kind of nearly untranslatable Greek that should also help the reader to recognize how intense the present issue was for him.

Beginning with v. 15c, there are five consecutive γάρ’s (15c, 16a, 16b, 16c, 17a), which are necessarily, but in some ways also unfortunately, modified by most English translations; after all, we are now dealing with English, not Greek. Even the ESV dropped one of them but also, by keeping the other four, created some very cumbersome English; the NRSV, in contrast, has kept only two of them. It is the translators’ common dilemma: do we speak ordinary English or offer the reader Greeklish; and unfortunately there is a considerable division of the house on this matter. On the positive side, with so many good translations available, the English-speaking reader can very often catch a sense of the complexity of the problem for the translator!

Cf. J. D. M. Derrett, Jesus’s Audience (New York, 1973), 167–74 (Appendix 1: “Cultural Ignorance: St. Paul’s Boast of Disinterestedness”).

See C. Maurer, “Grund und Grenze apostolischer Freiheit,” in Antwort. K. Barth zum siebsigsten Geburtstag (Zürich, 1956), 636–37, who has esp. emphasized this point.

Gk. δέ, which is clearly adversative here (cf. ἀλλ’ in v. 12b, which in that case was in an οὐ/ἀλλά contrast).

With this ἐγώ, which stands in the emphatic first position, Paul returns to the first person singular, which he had abandoned in favor of the plural beginning at v. 4 (except for v. 8). The change to the singular in this sentence that is otherwise basically resumptive of v. 12b indicates that vv. 4–14 were about himself personally (cf. ); at the same time the change is esp. appropriate because from here on he speaks only for himself and not for his associates or others.

The verb is now in the perfect (cf. ). Dungan, 22–23, 28–29, 36–40, insists that because Paul did accept gifts from the Philippians (Phil. 4:14–20) he is less than honest here. But that quite misses the nature of the Philippian relationship to Paul. They did not put him on salary, as Dungan suggests, but simply sent him gifts from time to time. That is a far cry from patronage. It is clear from 1 Thess. 2:9; 2 Thess. 3:8; 1 Cor. 4:12; and Acts 18:3 that Paul’s material support came from his own hands, not from Philippi. Cf. the critique of Dungan in Hock, Social Context, 50 and n. 1 (92).

Gk. οὐδενὶ τούτων (lit. “one of these”). Dungan, 21 n. 2, translates “I have not used any of these reasons, arguments, nor did I write them.” He argues that the plural τούτων cannot refer to “rights” as such, which is a singular concern, and thus that the first two sentences are formally parallel. But that is unlikely. Paul is repeating the idea of v. 12b, which has to do with making use of his ἐξουσία (cf. v. 18), not with using the preceding analogies. The following sentence is not the second member of a synonymous parallelism (τούτων and ταῦτα do not refer to the same thing); it is the further explanation that he is not by this letter trying now to secure what formerly he abstained from. The plural is to be explained on the basis of vv. 4–6, which are the “rights” being contended for even if they are variations on the single concern of his right to their material support.

Gk. ἔγραψα; an epistolary aorist (cf. on 5:11), as the NIV translates. It refers to vv. 3–14, which is past tense from the point of view of the recipients, but present from the point of view of the writer.

Gk. ἐν ἐμοί (lit. “in me”), meaning “in order that thus [= what has been argued for in vv. 4–14] it might happen in my case” (cf. REB). For this usage see Robertson, Grammar, 587.

This does not seem to be quite the same thing as the NIV’s “I would rather die than. . . .” This is not so much a matter of personal feelings as such, as it is a concern for the gospel. It would be better if he were dead than that the gospel were hindered in some way by what he had done; cf. the REB’s “it would be better for me to die than . . . ,” which is unfortunately followed by “any man,” since Paul’s οὐδείς simply means “no one.”

This is called aposiopesis, a sudden interruption of thought in the middle of a sentence (cf. Gal. 2:6). For its significance in expressing Paul’s deep emotion here, see Omanson, “Comments,” 136–38.

Gk. κενώσει (= “to make empty”); cf. Thiselton, “invalidate.”

This is implied in the NIV’s “deprive me of this boast,” which seems to narrow Paul’s concern a bit too much; even more difficult to justify is the “my ground for boasting” of the RSV, unfortunately kept in the NRSV and ESV; Paul’s boast is in the act itself, not in its justification.

Cf. Dungan, 23 n. 1.

This is commonly suggested, but the point is moot. If Paul had intended a contrast with the “others” of v. 12, he has not hinted at such in this paragraph.

Derrett (Jesus’s Audience) argues that “boast” here has to do with the Eastern notion of “prestige,” which is “upheld by giving much and taking little, and he who takes least is the most prestige-worthy” (167). Such an understanding may have operated in Paul’s case, but that is not what boast refers to here, since that term is conditioned by its meaning elsewhere in 1 and 2 Corinthians.

See .

As Thiselton has rightly pointed out, Paul’s καύχημα here borders on the sense of “glorying” in something.

Gk. γάρ; the NIV’s “yet,” which in English always has a slightly adversative sense to it, seems in this case unjustifiable grammatically.

This paraphrase is an attempt to capture the nature of the present general condition. Preaching the gospel is Paul’s regular activity. But doing so in itself offers him no grounds for the “boast” that no one can nullify.

Although both sentences begin with γάρ, the second γάρ elaborates the first, so that both together offer the explanation.

Gk. ἀνάγκη μοι ἐπίκειται (“necessity constrains me”). For ἀνάγκη see on 7:26 and 37; cf. also S. Kreuzer, “Der Zwang des Boten-Beobachtungen zu Lk 14:23 und 1 Kor 9:16,” ZNW 76 (1985), 123–28; cf. Thiselton, “compulsion presses upon me.”

See “Pauline Version,” 228–29, and esp. the several variations on the psychological theme noted there.

Although Käsemann (“Pauline Version,” 229) has shown that the language of this text has close affinities with some pagan parallels, he has also pointed out that in Paul its meaning differs radically. For Paul “necessity” or “destiny” is not some kind of fate to which he must yield; it is divine gift as well as obligation, and leads to freedom and joy, not heaviness.

Cf. in this regard the “call” and divine “necessity” that some of the prophets experienced, esp. Amos (3:8; 7:14–15) and Jeremiah (1:4–10; 20:7–9).

The verb is now aorist, in contrast to the present in the opening sentence. As Zuntz, 110, suggests, this implies, “if I were once not to preach.”

On this point cf. now J. Byron, “Slave of Christ or Willing Servant? Paul’s Self-Description in I Corinthians 4:1–12 and 9:16–18,” Neotestamentica 37 (2003), 179–98.

The sentence is joined to what precedes by the fifth consecutive explanatory γάρ. See .

Gk. τοῦτο πράσσω (lit. “do this”), which clearly refers to the εὐαγγελίζωμαι (“preach the gospel”) of v. 16; hence the NIV’s “preach.” But that also causes one to miss the metaphorical nature of this verse, which moves over to the broader category of “work” of any kind, with his own specific “task” as the primary exhibit.

The contrast is clear in the Greek (ἑκών vs. ἄκων). That “free” and “slave” are most likely intended emerges in the metaphor in the second sentence, “entrusted with an οἰκονομίαν.” Cf. Derrett, Jesus’s Audience, 169–71.

Gk. μισθός (cf. on 3:8 and 14–15).

This was a long-standing view among older exegetes, esp. Roman Catholics, for whom it served as the basis for the doctrine of works of supererogation. See the considerable discussion in Käsemann, “Pauline Version,” 218–23. For more modern espousals of this position (that this is Paul’s real situation), see inter alios Weiss, 241; Grosheide, 210; G. Didier, “La salaire du désintéressement (I Cor. ix,14–27),” RSR 43 (1955), 235; Reumann, “Οἰκονομία-Terms,” 159; Hock, Social Context, 100 n. 113. This view sees Paul as saying in effect, “Even if I must preach because of divine compulsion, nonetheless if I now do it voluntarily I have a reward.” The rest of the argument is then seen as dealing with “reward” as such. This view is based partly on the form of the conditional sentence (εἰ with the present indicative, which usually expresses a real condition). But that is not helpful in this case, since the two clauses are in balanced contrast, the one setting up the other, which is the real condition. Two other matters speak against the view. First, the grammatical structure of the two sentences demands that the first (signaled by γάρ) be explanatory to v. 16, and the second (signaled by δέ) be in contrast to the first. That means, second, that the two sentences together further illustrate v. 16, which has to do with his task as one that “presses upon” him, not one that he has voluntarily taken up.

Along with the answer in v. 18 that his pay is to receive no pay, this set of questions makes quite irrelevant a considerable literature on this text as to the nature of Paul’s expected “pay,” whether it be eschatological or present. It is obviously neither.

As Käsemann nicely puts it, “One can demand no reward from ananke, one can only bow to it or rebel against it” (“Pauline Version,” 231).

The translation is Barrett’s; cf. Bachmann, 320; Munck, Paul, 22; Reumann, “Οἰκονομία-Terms,” 159.

The problem lies with the combination εἰ . . . οὖν, which is found nowhere else in Paul. He tends to use the combination εἰ . . . ἄρα for this idiom (cf. 15:14; Gal. 2:21; 3:29; 5:11).

This answer is a clear indication that the question in v. 17a does not reflect his actual situation.

Dungan, 23, suggests that this is a joke; at least it is a play on words.

Cf. Moffatt, 121; Käsemann, “Pauline Version,” 231–32; Dungan, 24 n. 1 (from 23). This interpretation stands over against all those that would see his reward in terms of his own inner satisfaction over his “unselfish renunciation,” which is so often suggested of this text (e.g., H. Preisker, TDNT 4:699; Grosheide, 211). Cf. the discussion in Käsemann, 223–25, of the many who take this stance.

The NIV quite gratuitously translates the final ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ as “in preaching it.” That is not quite Paul’s point. His authority comes from the gospel itself, not from his preaching it.

That is, “I did not accept support so that my ‘reward’ will be that I did not accept support and thereby not make use of my authority in the gospel.” The problem is not so much tautology itself (v. 17b seems to border on such), but that the change of verbs indicates that Paul himself did not intend such.

Although this view is often rejected in the commentators, as well as by Käsemann (“Pauline Version,” 218 n. 5), it is difficult to understand why Paul would have used the stronger construction if he intended nothing by it (so Weiss, 200; cf. Dungan, 24 n. 1; Doughty, “Presence,” 71 n. 47). The difference may be slight, but the usage in 7:31 indicates that it is real.

With no grammatical or contextual justification the original NIV rendered this “make”; cf. Thiselton’s ambiguous, “yet I put myself into slavery to every human person.” Paul’s emphasis is clearly not on what he is currently doing but on his past behavior.

A few scribes (F G* 6* 326 1739 pc), apparently feeling the dissonance of a Jew saying that he became like a Jew, omitted the ὡς.

This clause is missing in the MajT (hence the KJV), most likely due to homoeoteleuton (cf. the ὑπὸ νόμον of the previous clause). See Metzger, 493; Zuntz, 140 n. 5.

For both θεοῦ and the following Χριστοῦ the MajT reads the dative. This is the easier reading, and probably reflects the sense of the genitive (objective). See the commentary.

In this instance Paul did not use ὡς, although it was added by some early scribes and became the MajT reading. The text is read by P⁴⁶ * A B 1739 pc lat Cyp.

For Paul’s πάντως τινάς the Western tradition (D F G latt), joined by 33 and Didymus, reads πάντας (= that I might save all people), thus conforming it to the preceding clause (cf. Metzger, 493).

In place of πάντα (P⁴⁶ A B C D E F G P 33 69 81 104 365 1175 1739 1881 al latt) later scribes substituted τοῦτο, which became the MajT reading. This narrows Paul’s perspective considerably.

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