1. Found inter alios in Findlay and Grosheide.

Found inter alios in Findlay and Grosheide.

A few have seen the issue to be whether or not sexual intercourse within marriage is desirable (see Lietzmann, 29; Héring, 48). In more recent years this view has often taken the form of the Corinthians’ asking four separate questions about marriage and divorce. See Hurd, 157.

Among earlier writers who attempted such a solution, see W. F. Orr, “Paul’s Treatment of Marriage in 1 Corinthians 7,” Pittsburgh Perspective 8 (1967), 5–22; J. K. Elliott, “Paul’s Teaching on Marriage in I Corinthians: Some Problems Considered,” NTS 19 (1972/73), 219–25; Bartchy, 161–72; G. D. Fee, “1 Corinthians 7:1 in the NIV,” JETS 23 (1980), 307–14; Murphy-O’Connor, “Divorced” (Keys, 32–42); J. Moiser, “A Reassessment of Paul’s View of Marriage, with Reference to 1 Cor. 7,” JSNT 18 (1983), 103–22; D. E. Garland, “The Christian’s Posture toward Marriage and Celibacy: 1 Corinthians 7,” RevExp 80 (1983), 351–62. Not all of these agree on all the details, but they do agree that the two sections deal with essentially different topics and that the whole is a logical, basically consistent argument.

Although in the case of those already married, vv. 1–7, 10–11, and 12–16, the exceptions are more apparent than real. For example, the married woman in v. 10 is “allowed” divorce, provided she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband!

For a selection of opinions that Paul had a very low view of marriage, see Moiser, “Reassessment,” 103–4, and W. E. Phipps, “Is Paul’s Attitude towards Sexual Relations Contained in I Cor. 7.1?” NTS 28 (1982), 129–30. As the commentary points out, this is to miss Paul by a long way.

That Paul is quoting from their letter at this point has now become a nearly universal point of view; nonetheless is not assumed in the NEB.

See, e.g., R. Scroggs, “Paul and the Eschatological Woman,” JAAR 40 (1972), 283–303; W. A. Meeks, “The Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity,” History of Religions 13 (1974), 165–208; Bartchy, 127–55.

Cf. Bartchy, 128–32.

Cf. the discussion in P. Richardson, “ ‘I Say, Not the Lord’: Personal Opinion, Apostolic Authority, and the Development of Early Christian Halakah,” TynB 31 (1980), 65–86, who argues, not altogether persuasively, that this reflects the “rabbi” Paul developing Christian “halakah.”

Although this is something of a “ho-hum” phenomenon for the majority of current English-speaking North Americans, it might be helpful for the reader to be reminded that women’s suffrage was a comparably recent phenomenon when this commentary first appeared. My own mother was in fact a teen-ager when the 19th Amendment to the American Constitution was ratified; and at the time of the first publication of this commentary there was still very little equality of pay for equal labor in the vast majority of the American work force, and female exceptions were esp. rare—all of which should perhaps cause the contemporary reader to appreciate the significance of this material in Paul.

For the implications of this passage and 11:2–16 regarding the spurious passage eventually inserted into two different places in Paul’s letter in our chap. 14 (mostly as vv. 34–35), see the full discussion below (pp. 780–92).

Although recognizing many of the features outlined here, Hurley, “Man and Woman,” 125–41, offered the particularly improbable reconstruction that the concern was basically Jewish and had to do with discarding or not discarding Levitical regulations for purity; it is of little surprise that no one in the NT academy has taken this hypothesis as a serious alternative.

Not surprisingly, this passage has received considerable attention in the biblical academy in the quarter century since the first edition of this commentary. I note the more significant ones here, in their chronological order of appearance (for brief comment and evaluation of each, see Thiselton, 487–93): O. L. Yarbrough, Not Like the Gentiles: Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul (Atlanta, 1985); V. L. Wimbush, Paul, the Worldly Ascetic: Response to the World and Self-Understanding according to 1 Cor 7 (Macon, Ga., 1987); A. C. Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets (Minneapolis, 1990); B. Rosner, Paul, Scripture, and Ethics: A Study of 1 Cor 5–7 (AGJU 22; Leiden, 1994); W. Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Cor 7 (SNTSMS 83; Cambridge, 1995).

But see Murphy-O’Connor, “Divorced” (Keys, 32–42). To illustrate the difficulties with such reconstructions, it may be noted that Murphy-O’Connor and I are in basic—and independent—agreement on both the nature of the problem (i.e., the Corinthian position) and the structure of Paul’s answer. Yet he sees the woman as the offended party; I see her as part of the cause of the problem. The differences lie with our understanding of v. 10 (q.v.).

Many of the early versions and the MajT add μοι (“to me”). It is absent in P⁴⁶ B C 33 1739 1881 2464 pc r, which is nearly impossible to account for had μοι been original. This is a clear case of scribes’ clarifying an author’s intent.

The original NIV, without quotation marks, read, “It is good for a man not to marry” (cf. GNB). The third edition mg. then read: Or “It is good for a man not to have sexual relations with a woman.” On the present NIV, see the commentary; cf. Fee, “1 Corinthians 7:1.”

The Greek here is plural τὰς πορνείας (lit. “the sexual immoralities”; cf. NRSV and NAB, “cases of sexual immorality”), which has caused no end of difficulty for both the early and the more recent church. The early Latin tradition alleviated the difficulty by making it singular (F G latt sy), which seems indirectly echoed in the KJV’s “to avoid fornication.” The original NIV got around it by the nebulous but ultimately misleading “because there is so much immorality” (cf. the ESV’s even worse “because of the temptation to sexual immorality,” which is an esp. improbable, if not impossible, rendering of Paul’s clause, while the NEB’s “have nothing to do with women” was perhaps the worst of all). Other contemporary English versions keep it literal (REB, NAB, NRSV [which amounts to not translating at all, since the point of translation has to do with meaning, not literal wording]).

Instead of ὀφειλήν (“duty”), the later Syriac versions and the MajT (the 9th c. K and L being the earliest extant Greek evidence) read ὀφειλομένην εὔνοιαν (“the kindness that is her due”). This is the first of several variants in this paragraph in which ascetic elements in the early church influenced the text itself. Not all later Christians shared Paul’s view on the obligatory nature of mutual sexual fulfillment in marriage!

The Syriac versions and MajT (K L again being the earliest Greek evidence) collaborate in adding νηστείᾳ καὶ τῇ (“fasting and”) before “prayer.” This is the second “ascetic” variant, which in this case runs counter to Paul’s own clear instructions. With this addition, abstinence becomes a good thing rather than a concession.

The best text reads ἦτε (P^11vid A B C D F G 33 81 365 630 1175 1739 1881 2464 pc b r); the MajT has a reading that goes back as early as P⁴⁶ (συνέρχησθε; P⁴⁶ P pc have the impv. συνέρχεσθε), which reflects Paul’s intent but is unlikely what he actually wrote; cf. Metzger, 488. This is an assimilation to Paul’s usage in 11:20 and 14:23. Was it also ascetically inspired? “Being together” as the norm seems much stronger than “coming back together.”

Re those who see vv. 6–7 (e.g., ESV) as a separate paragraph, see .

As a translation policy the NIV tends to leave many Greek conjunctions and particles untranslated (we speak English after all, not Greek). In this case there is variation between a δέ (“now, but,” P⁴⁶ * A C D F G 81 326 pc) and a γάρ (“for,” B Ψ Maj vg^cl Cyprian), which is probably another in the string of “ascetic” variants. Here the δέ is almost certainly original (cf. Zuntz, 205; Metzger, 489). By the end of the second century most of the church was reading the text ascetically (= the traditional interpretation). Thus a γάρ in v. 7, which explains why he concedes marriage in v. 6, would be such a natural reading that it is difficult to imagine how anyone would have substituted a δέ—esp. since the preceding δέ in v. 6 is already adversative, making a δέ in this clause cumbersome (both would have been adversative to the whole of what had preceded, which explains why the second one was changed).

The original NIV had “man,” which, in light of the perfect balance between men and women in the rest of the argument, was unnecessarily sexist.

For the ὁ μέν–ὁ δέ of * A B C D F G P 6 33 81 630 1739 1881 2464 pc, P⁴⁶ and the MajT have ὃς μέν–ὃς δέ (favored by Zuntz, 52, on the grounds that it is an Atticism, which scribes would not likely have rejected). The original is almost certainly ὁ μέν–ὁ δέ. But since this would otherwise be the only exception to the rule in the NT that the relative, not the article, is used in the indefinite “the one–the other,” probably it should be accented ὃ μέν–ὃ δέ, referring to χάρισμα, rather than to the differences in people as such.

Although this is a collage, it represents the view of all the older commentaries (see esp. Godet, Lightfoot, Findlay), as well as many of the more recent ones (e.g., Grosheide, Morris, Conzelmann, Mare).

See Conzelmann, 115.

This view is at least as old as Origen (early 3rd c.). In English it appeared as early as F. W. Farrar, The Life and Work of St. Paul (New York, 1879), 390. It was adopted, or approved, in several of the earlier commentaries: Goudge, 53; R-P, 132; Parry, 109. Recent advocacy can be traced to J. Jeremias, “Zur Gedankenführung in den paulinischen Briefen. (3) Die Briefzitate in I. Kor 8,1–13,” in Studia Paulina in Honorem Johannis de Zwaan Septuagenarii (ed. J. N. Sevenster and W. C. van Unnik; Haarlem, 1953), 151–53. It is probably the currently prevailing view, although D. L. Balch’s assertion that “it is generally accepted” is perhaps an overstatement (see “Backgrounds of I Cor. vii: Sayings of the Lord in Q; Moses as an Ascetic θεῖος ἀνήρ in II Cor. iii,” NTS 18 [1971/72], 352). Of the recent English versions, only the REB does not enclose it in quotation marks, which is somewhat surprising in light of what they do in the immediately preceding passage (6:12–13).

C. H. Giblin (“1 Corinthians 7—a Negative Theology of Marriage and Celibacy?” Bible Today 41 [1969], 239–55; cf. Hope, 145–49) argues that the quotation also includes v. 2, but both the structure of vv. 2–4 and the lack of a qualifying conjunction in v. 3 speak against this option. Cf. the further objections in Murphy-O’Connor, “Divorced,” 603 n. 13.

This rendering is an attempt to keep the durative force of Paul’s present tense imperative. Although “Don’t do it” works, it seems far more likely in the present context that Paul is saying, “Stop doing it.”

The only thing comparable to this in the Pauline corpus is found in 1 Thess. 4:9 and 5:1 (but see 4:13). But a letter from Thessalonica to Paul is most unlikely (cf. the commentaries by Best, Marshall, and Bruce).

On the letter itself see the discussion in the introduction, pp. 6–10 (cf. 5:9 and the introduction to this chapter).

For a brief history of its use, esp. as justification for the Christian ascetic tradition, see Phipps, “Attitude.”

Gk. ἄνθρωπος, the generic term, but intended to be masculine here. The slogan is expressed in the broadest general terms; Paul’s qualification will deal with the specifics of husbands and wives.

See Plato, leg. 8.840a; Aristot., Pol. 7.14.12; Gen. 20:6 (LXX); Ruth 2:9 (LXX); Prov. 6:29 (LXX); Plutarch, Alex.M. 21.4; Jos., Ant. 1.163; Marc.Aur.Ant. 1.17.6. These are given in English translation in Fee, “1 Corinthians 7:1,” 308. For an even more extensive list, see now R. E. Ciampa, “Revisiting the Euphemism in 1 Corinthians 7.1,” JSNT 31 (2009), 325–38, who has tried to fine-tune this to suggest that it had basically to do with “men who continue to visit prostitutes or sleep with household slaves, etc.” While this may very well be a more case-specific way of putting the issue, Paul’s overall response remains the same.

It is esp. difficult to fathom how the original NIV translators came up with “It is good for a man not to marry,” since there is no evidence of any kind to support such a view, despite Godet, 321; Grosheide, 155; and Morris, 105. This is in fact a position held by the Cynics. Cf. Stobaeus, Ecl. 4.22.28, “It is not good to marry” (οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γαμεῖν).

Hurd, 160–61, followed by Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 34, argued strongly for this meaning, but he failed to take seriously enough the genuine exceptions as to what is καλόν in vv. 8 and 26, and esp. that in the latter it is placed totally in the context of what is to their advantage (v. 35) in light of the present distress. This would seem to temper the suggestion that καλός is the antonym of κακός.

Cf. BDAG 2dβ (so also vv. 8 and 26b below); W. Grundmann, TDNT 3:549. Even though such a usage has very little support in the Greek world, it is already found in the LXX (cf. Gen. 2:18; Jon. 4:3, 8).

Schmithals, 235, had asserted otherwise, but as Conzelmann observes, “This is to attribute to the community a high degree of ignorance of language and morals—even to the point of stupidity” (115).

Except for Qumran and the Essenes, marriage was the rule in Judaism, both expected and at times thought to be commanded.

See, e.g., Craig, 76.

This is the matter that seems finally to have convinced Conzelmann, 115 n. 10.

Otherwise Dungan, passim, whose whole interpretation is based on Paul’s alleged asceticism.

The letters are widely held to be inauthentic, 1 Timothy and Ephesians more so than Colossians. For arguments for authenticity see the commentaries by O’Brien on Colossians (Waco, 1982), Fee on 1 Timothy (San Francisco, 1984), and M. Barth on Ephesians (Garden City, 1974). In any case, the thought and content of the letters are thoroughly Pauline; it is well-nigh unimaginable that later “Paulinists” would “correct” their master on this issue, since the entire history of the early church moves in the other direction.

This point is seldom noted by those who advocate the traditional point of view. But in contrast to the rest of the letter, where the new topics are introduced to them in some fashion, this one has the same abruptness as in 6:12.

Other suggested backgrounds for their attitude on the basis of Philonic influence are given by Balch, “Backgrounds,” 351–64; and Horsley, “Marriage.” Both of these are full of intriguing suggestions but on the whole are less than convincing.

On this matter see .

Cf. the following translations: The NASB renders it literally (“because of immoralities”); NAB (“to avoid immorality”; cf. KJV); original NIV, GNB, NEB (“because there is so much immorality”); Lamsa (“because of the danger of immorality”); Norlie (“because of the temptation to impurity”; cf. ESV).

See, e.g., Lightfoot, 221: “The phrase hints at the profligacy of all kinds which prevailed in the dissolute city.”

This despite B. Malina, “Does Porneia Mean Fornication?” NovT 14 (1972), 10–17, who has only demonstrated that it does not necessarily mean fornication. Thus he misses Paul’s own understanding by a wide mark. Cf. J. Jensen, “Does porneia Mean Fornication? A Critique of Bruce Malina,” NovT 20 (1978), 161–84.

Murphy-O’Connor thinks just the opposite. See .

The latter would be suggested by the use of the singular; but the plural, plus the definite article, points to actual occurrences; cf. M. Hill, “Paul’s Concept of ‘Enkrateia,’ ” RTR 36 (1977), 74 n. 24.

When such an idea needs to be expressed, it is usually with a form of λαμβάνω. See the Western variant in 7:28 which substitutes λάβῃς γυναῖκα for the γαμήσῃς of the rest. Two texts are instructive here: T.Lev. 9:9–10: “Be on your guard against the spirit of promiscuity [τῆς πορνείας], . . . therefore take [λάβε] for yourself a wife [γυναῖκα] while you are still young”; Tobit 4:12: “Beware, my son, of all immorality [πάσης πορνείας]. First of all take a wife [γυναῖκα λάβε] from among the descendants of your fathers.” In both cases πορνεία (singular) is seen as a reason for getting married (λάβε γυναῖκα). Paul’s usage is clearly different from these. Furthermore, the suggestion that a woman “take a husband” is quite foreign to first-century cultures.

It occurs eight times in the LXX (Exod. 2:1; Deut. 28:30; 2 Chr. 11:21; 1 Esdr. 9:12, 18; Tob. 3:8 [BA]; Isa. 13:16; 54:1) and nine times in the NT (Mark 6:18; 12:23 [= Matt. 22:28]; Luke 20:28; John 4:18 [twice]; 1 Cor. 5:1; 7:29).

For these data see Fee, “1 Corinthians 7:1,” 310–11.

Lightfoot, 221, argues that the distinctions between ἑαυτοῦ and ἴδιον imply that the husband “is considered the lord of the wife”; cf. Grosheide, 155 n. 1. While it is true that Paul is consistent with this usage, and that he does indeed reflect the normal way of speaking in antiquity, to make these kinds of distinctions, which are not warranted by the words themselves, is to fly full in the face of the clearly opposite point of view in vv. 3–4.

Despite every kind of attempt to get around it, the verb ἐχέτω is an imperative and should be so understood.

E.g., R-P, 133; Grosheide, 155.

Hodge, 109; cf. Lenski, 274, who combines the two suggestions.

But it is never made clear why either (1) it was necessary to say this at all (after all, people who get married to fulfill sexual desire would not seem to need this admonition), or (2) Paul makes such a point of mutuality (full sexuality could easily have been stressed without this emphasis).

Gk. τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδότω; used frequently in the papyri for the payment of debts.

See the textual variation, .

The original NIV was less than precise here: “The wife’s body does not belong to her alone, but also to her husband.” The italicized words are neither in the text, nor are they implied; this seems to have been a clear case of translators making the text say what they wanted it to mean.

However, see Musonius: “The husband and wife, he used to say, should come together for the purpose of making a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of regarding all things in common between them and nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own bodies. . . . But in marriage there must be above all perfect companionship and mutual love of husband and wife” (trans. C. Lutz, 89).

Even Grosheide, 157, allowed that “this shows that there was abstinence in marriage at Corinth,” although he did not easily fit that into what he saw as the point of the passage.

Again it is difficult to understand why this prohibition, if people were being encouraged to get married because of sexual need or as a prophylactic against fornication.

The difficulties for this view can be seen, e.g., in Conzelmann, 117–18, who argues that the prohibition “results from v. 4” as “a prohibition against turning abstinence [Paul’s own position] into a matter of principle,” but then has considerable difficulty making sense of the rest of the verse.

As in T.Naph. 8:8: “There is a time for having intercourse with one’s wife, and a time to abstain for the purpose of prayer.”

Gk. εἰ μήτι ἄν (the ἄν is omitted in P⁴⁶ B r [perhaps the earliest attempt to give it the meaning of the original NIV!]); see BDF 376.

Gk. ἐκ συμφώνου (“on the basis of agreement”), a NT hapax legomenon, but see the papyrus examples in MM.

Gk. πρὸς καιρόν, as over against an indefinite time. This esp. stands quite over against the perspective of the original NIV’s “for a time,” which implied that the emphasis lay with the exception, rather than with the prohibition itself (“Do not deprive each other except by mutual consent and for a time, so that you may devote yourselves to prayer”).

Cf. Lightfoot, 221, who would supply γένηται. R. Hanna (A Grammatical Aid to the Greek New Testament [Grand Rapids, 1983], 295) is considerably misleading here. He indicates that Moule, 145, considers the first ἵνα clause to be imperatival, which he does not (Moule cites an article by Cadoux in JTS [1941], 170, who suggests the final ἵνα clause, following Moffatt). Hanna then proposes that “the clause introduced by ἵνα is dependent upon the impv. ἀποστερεῖτε. Consequently, ἵνα has an imperatival sense, although that idea is not inherent within the particle itself (‘do not deprive each other . . . except . . . that you may’).” This seems to be what lay behind the original NIV, but it is grammatically impossible if one reads the ἄν, and improbable even without it.

See T.Naph. 8:8 (). The comment of Sevenster, Paul, 50, could scarcely be further from Paul’s intent (“It is of great benefit to marital relations now and then to set aside time for prayer”).

The NEB is an exception, but still makes it an independent clause: “Afterwards you may come together again.” The NASB in its wooden literalness is ambiguous.

Moffatt, “You must not let Satan tempt you through incontinence.”

See H. Seesemann, TDNT 6:23–36; cf. Hill, “Enkrateia,” 73. Cf. the story of Jesus’ testings in the wilderness, and the final petition of the Lord’s prayer (“but deliver us from the evil one”); cf. 1 Thess. 3:5, where Paul calls Satan “the Tempter.”

Gk. ἀκρασία; self-indulgence, not having ἐγκράτεɩα. On this word group in Paul, and esp. its use here and in v. 9, see Hill, “Enkrateia.”

Gk. συγγνώμην; a NT hapax legomenon. In the papyri it more often has the extended meaning of pardon; but in the LXX and Josephus it carries the sense of being indulgent to someone.

E.g., Hodge, 110–11; Findlay, 824; Grosheide, 158; Mare, 229.

E.g., R-P, 135; Morris, 107; Conzelmann, 118.

See, e.g., the assertions in Conzelmann, 118, that “the imperatives must not be pressed.” But that is to argue against grammar on the basis of prior conclusions.

Interestingly, Grosheide made this his very point for rejecting the “this” as referring to v. 5, “since the words by way of concession do not fit the peremptory words: defraud ye not” (158). But the command, of course, is not part of the concession, which begins with “unless perhaps.”

Orr, “Treatment,” 11; Garland, “Posture,” 354 (commentary, 267–71), and more recently B. W. Winter (“1 Corinthians 7:6–7: A Caveat and a Framework for ‘the Sayings’ in 7:8–26,” TynB 48 [1997], 57–65, repr. After Paul Left Corinth, as an appendix to chap. 10, 233–40), who variously offer 7:26 and 11:17 as examples. But these are less than helpful examples, since in the first case the following ὅτι clause functions epexegetically, “This . . . namely that . . . ,” as is most often the case with this idiom in Paul. The example of 11:17 might serve, but one would then need the variant γάρ in v. 7. It is simply not true, however, as Garland maintains (360 n. 23), that if γάρ were original then this τοῦτο must point forward. Furthermore, it is difficult under any reading to perceive the content of v. 7 to function as a concession to the promotion of sexual abstinence by some; cf. now the balanced discussion in Thiselton, 510–12. In the final analysis, the combination of ordinary usage and meaning in context should win the day exegetically. Despite the difficulties with this view, however, it has now made its way into the ESV, where vv. 6–7 are printed as a separate paragraph; and Garland chooses to discuss vv. 6–9 as a unit, although nothing in Paul’s Greek seems to lead easily in that direction.

This view also has the advantage of taking this δέ seriously—as a clear adversative to the immediately preceding concession: “. . . unless perhaps. . . . But. . . .”

The traditional view, of course, sees this sentence as capping Paul’s argument for celibacy by appealing to his own example. Thus in v. 1 he states a general principle in favor of celibacy. After conceding marriage because of their fallenness, he now comes back to that principle by way of his own personal preferences; but here too he concedes marriage, only now in terms of “gifts.”

This is Conzelmann’s translation of δέ, which makes more sense of the whole paragraph as sequential than as adversative.

Gk. ἀνθρώπους, again, as in v. 1, the generic term. Does it also imply “men” as such, or is it as elsewhere simply reflecting the basic perspective of the culture? Surely it is the latter.

Barrett, 158, makes the attractive suggestion, based on Paul’s usage elsewhere, that he does not intend an unattainable wish here (“I wish it were, but it cannot be”); rather, he is wishing that they all were as he actually is in obedience to his gift. Although this does correspond to Paul’s usage, the strongly adversative “but” (ἀλλά) that follows implies that he is referring to status, not to obedience as such.

This second use of this word in this letter (see on 1:7), along with its usage in such passages as 2 Cor. 1:11 and Rom. 6:23, is the clear evidence that the concept of “Spiritual gift” is ancillary to this word at best, not inherent to it (see further GEP, 138); cf. 12:4.

Moiser, “Reassessment,” 106–7, takes a different view. On the basis of Pauline usage elsewhere, he suggests that it “need be no more than a general reference to the different responses of individual Christians, each living the new life in his or her own way in matters where important principles are not at stake.” Cf. Dunn, Jesus, 206–7. To the contrary, the usage here is so case specific that it probably means that we will need to broaden our understanding of what constitute so-called spiritual gifts.

Most MSS read γαμῆσαι (including P⁴⁶ B D F G 1739 Maj); * A C* P 33 81 945 2495 read γαμεῖν. The questions are two: which is original, and whether there is a distinction in meaning. Both Turner, Syntax, 79, and Barrett, 159, 161, read γαμεῖν and suggest that it means to be in a married state, rather than simply to get married. Conzelmann, 119, on the basis of 1 Tim. 5:14 and a similar interchange with χωρίζομαι in v. 10, rejects that nuance for the present tense. However, his use of the variation in v. 10 is irrelevant (despite his exclamation point), since the same nuance could have prevailed for the copyists there as well. Even the passage in 1 Timothy may be putting emphasis on living in the married state rather than on simply getting married. What cannot be known is whether such nuances influenced either Paul or subsequent scribes. Since internal evidence is not decisive (scribes may have conformed an aorist to the following present, or a present to the preceding aorist), the external evidence tends to prevail here in favor of γαμῆσαι.

This has now been changed in its two progeny; both the NRSV and the ESV keep “unmarried” here; the ESV has the ambitious rendering “betrothed” in v. 25, which is a considerable departure from the committee’s otherwise esp. conservative, sometimes wooden, approach to putting Greek idioms into (frequently awkward) English.

This was suggested, apparently independently, by J. M. Ford, A Trilogy on Wisdom and Celibacy (South Bend, 1967), 82–84; and Orr, “Treatment,” 12–14. It was further adopted, inter alios, by Giblin, Hope, 153–54; E. Arens, “Was St. Paul Married?” Bible Today 66 (1973), 188–91; Moiser, “Reassessment,” 108; and Garland, “Posture,” 354; it is now the more common view. Since so much of this is based on “reasoned guessing” on our part, it is also possible that Paul had “divorced women” in view as well. Despite Thiselton and others to the contrary, since the basic pattern of the entire passage alternates between men and women, a recognition of both that pattern and its present position should probably trump other options.

Note that even in English, where historically in most male/female words the root was male and the female counterpart had the suffix (e.g., host/hostess), widow/widower is precisely the opposite.

See, e.g., LSJ.

The grammar seems to require this sense (cf. GNB, NAB) rather than the “I am” of the original NIV and several others (NRSV, ESV). The κἀγὼ assumes the repetition of the verb μένω. Thus: “If they remain as I also remain (unmarried, being implied).”

On the thorny question of whether Paul was ever married (which includes the related question of whether he was a rabbi—he almost certainly was, and therefore had to have been married), see J. Jeremias, “War Paulus Witwer?” ZNW 25 (1926), 310–12; idem, “Nochmals: War Paulus Witwer?” ZNW 28 (1929), 321–322; Ford, Trilogy, 82–84; Arens, “Married?”; all of these argue that Paul was both a rabbi and a widower. Hurd, 275, thinks otherwise, but his case rests on his dubious reconstruction of the earlier teaching of Paul in Corinth. That Paul is not now married is certain; that is supported both by this text and the normal reading of 9:5. But this passage suggests that he very well may have been formerly married.

A position also argued by Hurd, 166.

Not only is this what the verb means, but the conditional clause (εἰ with the present indicative) is present particular, emphasizing the reality of the assumption. Cf. Barrett, 161; M. L. Barré, “To Marry or to Burn: πυροῦσθαι in 1 Cor 7:9,” CBQ 36 (1974), 193–202; Hill, “Enkrateia,” 75; K. C. Russell, “That Embarrassing Verse in First Corinthians!” Bible Today 18 (1980), 338–41. See now the longer, esp. helpful discussion in Thiselton, 516–19. Granted that in everyday English “cannot” often comes close to meaning “not supposed to” (as in “you can’t do that” = you must not do it), but in this kind of context one must argue for precision, lest Paul be radically misunderstood.

Gk. γαμέω, the two occurrences in this verse being the only ones in vv. 1–25 (the occurrence in v. 10 refers not to getting married but to the already married).

R. K. Molvaer has offered a most unlikely view that Paul is here permitting sex between partners committed to each other, even if they are unmarried and have not promised each other marriage (“St. Paul’s Views on Sex according to 1 Corinthians 7:9 and 36–38,” StTh 58 [2004], 45–59).

See .

For “burning” with sexual desire, see esp. Sir. 23:16 (LXX 23:17) (referring to incest): “The soul heated like a burning fire [πῦρ] will not be quenched until it is consumed; a man who commits fornication with his near of kin will never cease until the fire [πῦρ] burns him up” (RSV). On the other hand, the verb πυρόω is used regularly in the LXX to denote the purifying fire that burns away the dross (e.g., Isa. 1:25; Jer. 9:7; Dan. 11:35). Barré, “Marry,” 194, suggests that some of these latter texts refer to judgment, which they do; but it is never final judgment, only the judgment that purifies; the same mistake was repeated by W. Binni, “1 Cor 7,9. Un ‘midrash’ paolino,” RivB 52 (2004), 87–95. A closer example is m.Abot. 1.5: “He that talks much with womenkind brings evil upon himself . . . and at last will inherit Gehenna” (Danby, 446).

This stands over against the study by Barré, “Marry,” in which he makes the methodological mistake of tracing only the verb πυρόω and the noun πύρωσις. But since the usage is metaphorical, the search needs to be broadened to include all words for burning to see whether they carry these metaphors as well. They do.

Barré recognized this and in a further article argued for a similar meaning regarding this text as well. See “Paul as an ‘Eschatologic Person’: A New Look at 2 Cor 11:29,” CBQ 37 (1975), 500–526. But see the refutation in Furnish, II Corinthians, 520, 538.

Cf. Findlay, 825; Moffatt, 78; but see Murphy-O’Connor, “Divorced” (repr. in Keys, 35–42), who argues the exact opposite, namely that an ascetic husband has divorced his wife and this is Paul’s word to the wife that she should resist the divorce, and esp. not remarry, for the sake of reconciliation. As Murphy-O’Connor himself recognizes, v. 15 creates difficulties for this view, to which he replies that Paul is simply not consistent; it is therefore not surprising either that no one has taken up this view or that it is not even noted in some of the more recent commentaries. The more traditional approach sees these verses as an answer to a polite inquiry about whether divorce is permissible; but that does not take seriously enough either the order of this answer or its relationship to their slogan in v. 1b. Dungan, 83–93, 128–29, 132, comes to the improbable conclusion that the real point is the exception itself (v. 11a), that is, that “Paul intends a prohibition of remarriage, with this rejection of divorce” (132), “wording to the contrary notwithstanding” (128). But Dungan’s exegesis is based on some questionable assertions taken over as fact (e.g., that Paul is an ascetic who barely tolerates marriage [cf. ]; a nonverifiable sense to the present general condition [see ]); he also misses the role of the “exception” clauses (eight in all) in the argument as a whole, as well as the prevailing motif to remain as one is, not to mention the structure of these two verses in particular. Yet another view is offered by H. H. Rex, “An Attempt to Understand I Cor. 7,” RTR 14 (1955), 44–46, who suggests that not real divorce, but the separation of vv. 1–7, is in view. He reconciles the two by making these verses refer only to the widows and widowers of vv. 8–9.

Moiser (“Reassessment,” 108–9) makes a point of the perfect as indicating that they were already married (to a pagan) when converted. That is moot. How else might Paul have addressed the already married if not with the perfect?

Gk. παραγγέλλω (cf. 11:17; 1 Thess. 4:11; 2 Thess. 3:4, 6, 10, 12; 1 Tim. 1:3; 4:11; 6:13, 17). The word is used in almost all cases in the NT with regard to the Christian walk. Cf. O. Schmitz, TDNT 5:761–65.

Cf. the discussion in Dungan, Sayings, 133–34, who concludes, “The question . . . must be left open.”

Since we know how Paul used the OT—sometimes precisely, but more often in an adapted form—we may assume that he would do the same with the oral materials from Jesus. Meaning and intent are most often the rule for Paul, not verbal precision. In this regard cf. the conclusion of M. Zimmermann and R. Zimmermann, “Zitation, Kontradiktion oder Applikation? Die Jesuslogien in 1 Kor 7,10f. und 9.14. Traditionsgeschichte Verankerung und paulinische Interpretation,” ZNW 87 (1996), 83–100.

Matthew has two unique features: (1) in the double tradition (Q) version he concludes, “he makes her to become adulterous”; and (2) the excepting clause for sexual immorality, of which Paul shows no knowledge. Mark, on the other hand, expands the saying to include women divorcing men, indicating the basically Greco-Roman milieu of his gospel.

The Hillelites and Shammaites debated the allowable grounds of divorce on the basis of the meaning of “something indecent about her” in Deut. 24:1. See esp. m. Git. 9.10. The Hillelites took the extreme view, which allowed divorce even for a spoiled dish, a mole (b. Ketub. 75a), or if the husband found one fairer to his eyes. This is nothing more than a “hypocritically legalized caving in before the pressure of sexual passion” (Dungan, 121), and Jesus opposed it vigorously.

This would be the direct form of the indirect command in Paul’s Greek (εἰ with the infinitive following a verb of command).

Gk. χωρισθῆναι. No point can be made of the passive, as Murphy-O’Connor argues (“Divorced,” 601–2 [Keys, 37–42]). The passive of this verb functions as a middle when used of “divorce” (“be separated from” = “separate oneself from”) and does not imply that the other person is the initiator of the action; cf. κοιμάω (“fall asleep”), which is invariably passive when referring to death. See BDAG and the papyrus texts listed in MM; cf. the discussion in R. L. Roberts, “The Meaning of Chorizō and Douloō in 1 Corinthians 7:10–17,” RestQ 8 (1965), 179–84.

E.g., R-P, 140; Deissmann, Bible Studies, 247; Elliott, “Teaching,” 223–24; R. C. Campbell, “Teachings of Paul concerning Divorce,” Foundations 6 (1963), 362–66.

Gk. ἀφίημι. This is the rarer word; the one used in the Gospels, which is the more common synonym of this one, is ἀπολύω.

Through the kind service of Prof. E. A. Judge, D. C. Barker of Macquarrie University made available to me a section of the draft of his unpublished dissertation entitled “Divorced Wives Living in the Household of Their Ex-husbands.” Dr. Barker has shown that there is some evidence from papyrus census declarations in Egypt that divorced wives sometimes remained in the households of their husbands (P.Berl.Leibg. 1.17; P.Flor. 3.301). If this were a common and more widespread phenomenon, some aspects of the present text would make a great deal of sense. However, as Mr. Barker points out, one must use great caution here, since in both cases the divorced wife was also a sister of the husband, so that her remaining in the household might be on those grounds.

See the texts cited in MM. E.g., P.Ryl. II.154²⁵: “but if any difference arises between them and they separate from one another [χωρίζονται ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων].”

See, e.g., m. Yeb. 14.1: “The man that divorces is not like to the woman that is divorced; for a woman is put away with her consent or without it, but a husband can put away his wife only with his own consent” (Danby, 240); cf. Jos., Ant. 15.259: “Some time afterwards Salome had occasion to quarrel with Costobarus and soon sent him a document dissolving their marriage, which was not in accordance with Jewish law. For it is (only) the man who is permitted by us to do this, and not even a divorced woman may marry again on her own initiative unless her former husband consents” (Loeb, 8:123). There has been considerable debate on this question as to whether a wife could initiate a divorce, which seems to be the case, but only in the sense of getting her husband to do the actual divorcing. See J. D. M. Derrett, Law in the New Testament (London, 1970), 386–88; and B. Brooten, “Konnten Frauen im alten Judentum die Scheidung betreiben? Überlegungen zu Mk 10,11–12 und 1 Kor 7,10–11,” EvT 42 (1982), 65–80, and “Zur Debatte über das Scheidungsrecht der jüdischen Frau,” EvT 43 (1983), 466–78.

See .

This, despite Seneca’s bitter complaint: “Is there any woman that blushes at divorce now that certain illustrious and noble ladies reckon their years, not by the number of consuls, but by the number of their husbands, and leave home in order to marry, and marry in order to be divorced?” (benef. 3.16.2; Loeb, 3:155). This reflects the Roman moralist’s remorse over the breakdown of Roman custom that historically forbade divorce altogether, and deals essentially with the citizen class.

Allo, 163, following Weiss, 178, suggests that this implies that an action has already occurred or is known; cf. Dungan, 90 n. 1, who cites this approvingly. But it does no such thing. The combination ἐὰν (εἰ) δὲ καί occurs elsewhere in this same pattern, where it repeats but qualifies a previous verb or idea (4:7; 7:28; 2 Cor. 4:3). In each case it merely emphasizes the repeated verb (see Burton, Moods, 282; and M. E. Thrall, Greek Particles in the New Testament [Grand Rapids, 1962], 78–82). The present general condition, as opposed to the present particular, belies this suggestion (see the following note).

Both Dungan and Murphy-O’Connor (see ) rest their cases on this clause, which they argue represents a single case that was already going on in the church. Dungan (89) suggests that this clause can also be translated “but if she has separated,” which, he asserts, is “equally possible” with a future sense (cf. Conzelmann, 120). But that is simply not true. Paul uses present and past particular conditions on numerous occasions when such is the case; but the present general condition has nothing to do with the tense of the verb (this is the point of O’Connor’s argument, which equally comes to grief grammatically), and it regularly represents for him a hypothetical “if ever such a condition exists.” For clear examples see 7:28 and 39. Cf. the review of Dungan by B. A. Pearson in Int 26 (1972), 350–51.

Thrall, Particles, 81. Dungan, 89–93, sees this as contradictory, which in a certain logical sense is true. But the ad hoc formulation of responses such as this does not always yield to our own views of logic. To press for the ideal, and even to urge it as a command of the Lord, does not make it binding law; and the possibility that exceptions will occur is simply a concession to reality. But if the exception does indeed occur, it may not turn about and become an excuse for adultery.

This is not stated, of course; but since Paul is appealing to the teaching of Jesus, in which this is the central issue in the matter of remarriage, one would be hard-pressed to argue that for Paul it did not mean the same.

This would be even more understandable if divorced wives sometimes remained in the households of their ex-husbands (see ); but the point is moot.

On the decision between εἴ τις and ἤτις, see Metzger, 554.

Paul has τὸν ἄνδρα (“her husband”); the NIV translators chose to substitute the pronoun here, for the same reason that the MajT, against all early evidence, made the same change; it makes for better English, as it did Greek.

The Western tradition (D F G latt Iren Tert) balances the clause by adding “believing” to “wife.”

This is an unfortunate shift back in the present NIV from the TNIV, which understandably translated Paul’s almost certainly original ἀδελφῷ, since it is the reading of all the early and best evidence (P⁴⁶ A B C D F G P maj) and is thus the text found in NA²⁷ (with an “A” rating). The present text renders the τῇ πίστῃ, which is found only in the generally unreliable “Western” tradition (D F G 629 latt). The word “brother” is unexpected here, where the contrasts have been ἀνήρ and γυνή; so much so that the MajT text assimilated by reading the ἀνδρί of the preceding context.

This is generally recognized by all commentators. Moiser (“Reassessment,” 109–10) makes the improbable suggestion that vv. 10–11 deal with mixed marriages where the believer has abandoned the pagan partner and this section with believers who have been abandoned by pagan partners. That flies full in the face of vv. 12–13, not to mention that v. 15 specifically makes such an option the exception to the rule given in vv. 12–14. More improbable still is the suggestion by Ford, Trilogy, 73–82, that purely Jewish questions lie behind the Corinthian letter to Paul and that ἄπιστος here means “of doubtful stock” or “half-breed Jew.” Indeed, Paul’s regular use of ἄπιστος (see ) to refer to unbelieving pagans makes both Hurley, “Man and Woman,” 122–78, and Ford’s positions tenuous in the extreme. Now equally off base is the attempt by E. Christian (“1 Corinthians 7:10–16: Divorce of the Unbeliever or Reconciliation with the Unfaithful?” JAdvThSoc 10 [1999], 41–62), to turn Paul’s ἄπιστος into “unfaithful,” esp. since such an option is not even recognized in BDAG, nor is it an option in its other occurrences in the NT.

Elliott (“Teaching,” 224) argues on the basis of a differentiation between ἀφίημι and χωρίζομαι that vv. 15–16 “concern a new problem.” Vv. 12–14 are written to those wanting to separate; vv. 15–16 to those fighting separation. Cf. S. Kubo (“I Corinthians vii.16: Optimistic or Pessimistic?” NTS 24 [1978], 539–44), who arrives at a similar conclusion on the basis of his interpretation of v. 16 as pessimistic. However, the overall structure, with directives to “stay as you are” modified by exceptions, speaks against viewing it in this way. See on v. 15.

As Thiselton (527) notes, in contrast to the preceding four verses, there has been general unanimity among scholars regarding this material, except for the difficulty regarding the intended application of the “call to peace” at the end of v. 15.

On the basis of 1 Thess. 4:13; 5:6 (and Eph. 2:3), where Paul refers to pagans as “the rest,” Dungan, 93, following Lightfoot, 225, suggests that it refers to pagans here (“the nonbelievers who are the mates of the Christians”). However, it is specifically addressed to “the rest,” which can only mean Christians.

Gk. ἄπιστοι; Miss Ford notwithstanding (see ), this word in Paul most often refers to pagans, who have not come to faith (cf. 6:6; 10:27; 14:22–24; 2 Cor. 4:4; 6:14–15).

Gk. λέγω, as in vv. 6, 8, and 35. As elsewhere in the chapter, with the single exception of v. 10, Paul does not lay down rules, but speaks as one to be trusted (v. 25) because he has the Spirit of God (v. 40).

The only exceptions are: (1) The man is called “a brother,” the woman “a wife”; nothing can be made of this, since in v. 15 he speaks of the two believers as “the brother or the sister.” (2) The final object in v. 13 repeats the noun “husband” rather than the pronoun, as at the end of v. 12.

The verb συνευδοκέω implies more than simply “being willing” in a rather passive sense; it also means “agreeing with” it or “consenting to” it.

Together the three verses form a perfect triple chiasm:

A A brother having an unbelieving wife;

B A wife having an unbelieving husband.

B′ The unbelieving husband sanctified by the wife;

A′ The unbelieving wife sanctified by the brother.

The γάρ (“for”) is explanatory, modifying the twin imperatives “he/she must not divorce her/him.”

So much so that it has elicited considerable scholarly discussion, with nothing close to a consensus, although Conzelmann’s despair is probably extreme (“The explanations that have so far been suggested are almost without exception unsatisfactory” [122]; this also seems true of his, that “through the believing partner, the marriage between a pagan and a Christian is withdrawn from the control of the powers of the world”). For an overview of solutions, see Murphy-O’Connor, “Works.”

Gk. ἡγίασται, perfect passive indicative (= “is sanctified”).

Gk. ἅγιος (cf. 1:2; 3:17).

See the discussion on 1:2, 30 and 6:11. It should be noted that the word-group coheres in this case, that is, it means “holy” whether it be verb, noun, or adjective. For a good overview of Pauline usage, see Murphy-O’Connor, “Works,” 352–56 (Keys, 45–49).

Two of these require special notice because they have some esp. attractive features but finally do not seem to fit the context as well. (1) D. Daube (“Pauline Contributions,” 232–41; see ) argued that the entire passage reflects the rabbinic doctrine that in conversion a proselyte is as a newborn child; hence all former relations have been dissolved. Thus the Corinthian concern had to do with continuing that relationship, which now amounted to living in sexual immorality. Since in the rabbinic materials the verb qiḏḏeš (“to consecrate”) sometimes meant to consecrate a wife (i.e., a marriage), and since one of the means of such a “consecration” was through sexual intercourse (m. Qidd. 1.1; m. Ketub. 4.4), Daube suggests that the sense of Paul’s argument goes: Even though the marriage was dissolved through conversion, one should live on with the spouse in the hope of his/her conversion; by intercourse one “consecrates” the new marriage, otherwise one’s children (meaning any born to this relationship) would be “unclean” (illegitimate). Many things are attractive about this option; however, it assumes a Jewish stance on the part of both the Corinthians and Paul that is difficult to sustain.

(2) Murphy-O’Connor (“Works”) has argued that “sanctified” is to be understood in light of Paul’s usual usage, which he contends means basically to be separated from the world by divine call, but that this must consequently be exhibited in one’s behavior. Thus by choosing to stay with the believer the pagan has begun a behavioral pattern that is “holy” and that hopefully will result in actual salvation. Although correctly stressing the behavioral aspect of holiness in Paul, it is less than clear in the context that Paul’s use of the perfect tense, modified by the preposition ἐν, will sustain the suggestion.

Cf. esp. Barrett, 164–65.

For this argument see Beasley-Murray, Baptism, 195–97.

Murphy-O’Connor, “Works,” 350 (Keys, 44), rightly cautions about making such a reconstruction the basis for one’s understanding the text as a whole, since a degree of speculation is involved in trying to determine the specific “why” of their conduct. He allows minimally that the best one can say is “that some members of the community were in favour of the dissolution of mixed marriage.” This is true; but vv. 14 and 16 seem to be more argumentative (cf. v. 5) than much of the chapter and therefore lend credence to such a reconstruction. The present exegesis in not dependent on this reconstruction; it is only trying to give a viable reason for Paul’s unusual use of this language. For more recent attempts to untie this knot, see esp. M. P. Martens (“First Corinthians 7:14: ‘Sanctified’ by the Believing Spouse,” Notes 10 [1996], 31–35) and Y. M. Gillihan (“Jewish Law on Illicit Marriage, the Defilement of Offspring, and the Holiness of the Temple: A New Halakic Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:14,” JBL 121 [2002], 711–44), and now esp. the long discussion in Thiselton, 527–37.

Gk. ἐν; probably designating a relationship with the believer rather than a relationship to God “through” the believer.

The idea of some that the physical relationship “sanctifies” is completely foreign to Paul’s point of view. See, e.g., Lietzmann, 31.

On the unfortunate shift in the NIV from Paul’s original text with “brother” to “believing husband,” see .

Murphy-O’Connor (“Works,” 359 [ Keys, 51–52]) objects that the believer is not here called holy; but the implication is in the text itself, not to mention that in this letter in particular believers are referred to as “sanctified in Christ Jesus.” The children are “holy,” not because of their own behavior but because somehow they are affected by their relationship with the one parent who “has been sanctified in Christ Jesus.”

One of the curiosities of the use of Scripture in the church has been the use of this text to support infant baptism. It is argued that children are “holy” either because they have received the Holy Spirit at baptism or because they already participate in the parents’ baptismal incorporation into God’s holy people. See, e.g., Church of Scotland, Biblical Doctrine of Baptism (Edinburgh, 1958), 45ff.; cf. Jeremias, Infant Baptism, 38–43, who argues from the language of “unclean” and “holy” that Paul is alluding to the Jewish practice of baptizing the children of proselytes born before their conversion. For a refutation see Beasley-Murray, Baptism, 197–99. In a later edition Jeremias himself recognizes the improbability of using this text in this way. See Aland, Early Church, 33–35.

Gk. τὰ τέκνα; it is impossible to tell what this means in terms of age or when they were born (before or after the parent’s conversion). It probably includes children who have not yet reached maturity, or who are still dependent on their parents. In any case, the matter for Paul is so self-evident that this discussion would probably escape him. See G. Delling, “Lexicalisches zu τέκνον. Ein Nachtrag zur Exegese von I. Kor. 7,14,” in Studien zum Neuen Testament und zum hellenistischen Judentum (Göttingen, 1970), 270–80; and Murphy-O’Connor, “Works,” 360 (Keys, 52–53).

Cf. the Jewish understanding that the children of proselytes are themselves members of Israel in full standing (m. Ketub. 4.3; m. Yeb. 11.2).

Except for v. 5, this is the language of each of the exception clauses. Some are present general (vv. 11, 28, 39); the rest are present particular (vv. 9, 15, 21, 36).

In both cases the verb is χωρίζεται (“If he/she separates, let him/her separate”); cf. vv. 10 and 12–13. In this case, see esp. the papyrus examples in MM (), which use this verb for mutual agreement to dissolve a marriage.

This is the actual language of Paul. Since the NIV translates it “brother” in v. 12, one wonders why the change to “believing husband” in v. 14, or to “a believing man or woman” here. This anaphoric usage of brother and sister, which specifically refers back to vv. 12–14, presents insurmountable obstacles to Elliott’s and Kubo’s view (see ) that Paul is speaking to two different groups in vv. 12–14 and 15–16. This is esp. true of Kubo, who continually refers to “the second group” (543–44). Paul’s grammar simply will not allow that.

Gk. δεδούλωται, from δοῦλος, literally meaning “to enslave”; in every case in Paul it is used figuratively (9:19; Rom. 6:18, 22; Gal. 4:3; Tit. 2:3). His ordinary word for being bound to a marriage per se is δέω (7:39; Rom. 7:2), which implies bound by law and duty.

This is canon law in Roman Catholicism. The debate, therefore, has largely been within that communion. The literature is large, and not all of it defends this ancient position. Among others see P. Dulau, “The Pauline Privilige: Is it Promulgated in the First Epistle to the Corinthians?” CBQ 13 (1951), 146–52; T. P. Considine, “The Pauline Privilege (Further Examination of 1 Cor. vii,12–17),” AusBR 40 (1963), 107–19; B. Byron, “The Brother or Sister Is Not Bound: Another Look at the New Testament Teaching on the Indissolubility of Marriage,” New Blackfriars 52 (1971), 514–21. More recently see R. G. Olender, “The Pauline Privilege: Inference or Exegesis?” Faith and Mission 16 (1998), 94–117 (against “post-divorce remarriage [as] clearly alien to the teachings of Jesus” and not verifiable from the Pauline corpus); G. L Borchert, “1 Corinthians 7:15 and the Church’s Historic Misunderstanding of Divorce and Remarriage,” RevExp 96 (1999), 125–29 (a plea against condemning all remarriages).

As Thiselton (537) notes, here “we see Paul the pastor setting forth a dialectic between principles and circumstances.”

Gk. δέ; either adversative (“but, rather”), or consecutive (“and, now,” or simply left untranslated).

Part of the difficulty with this sentence is in finding an adequate understanding of ἐν εἰρήνῃ (lit. “in peace”). Most likely this means something close to εἰς (= “unto peace”), or to the admonition “Go in peace”; i.e., depart “in the ways of peace.” If the latter, then it would mean something like: “Rather, God has called us into the ways of peace.” Cf. Moule, 79: “The preposition may be used ‘pregnantly’: perhaps God has called you into a peace in which he wishes you to live.”

It should be noted that “divorce” was not a court proceeding with lawyers, etc., but essentially an agreement between two people, frequently legalized by a document of divorce.

These words are added in the NIV to give this sense.

Mare, 231; cf. Goudge, 57; Héring, 53; Holladay, 96.

See, e.g., O-W, 212 (“the separation is to take place without recrimination or anger”).

See esp. Kubo, “I Corinthians VII.16,” 542–43, who does an end run around this sentence. He maintains that “v. 15c is not crucial since its interpretation is dependent on our understanding of v. 16.” It would seem that quite the opposite should prevail. How one understands this sentence, and its relationship to the rest, determines how the explanatory γάρ functions in v. 16.

The common connective δέ.

See .

All the more so when one considers that a piling up of γάρ’s is a stylistic feature of this letter (see on 2:10–11; 3:3–4).

It should be noted that the textual variant ἡμᾶς, which is found in P⁴⁶ B D F G Ψ Maj latt sy sa, is preferable to ὑμᾶς and also supports this interpretation. Rather than speaking to them to live in peace by acquiescing to a separation, Paul is calling them to a broader Christian view of their present existence, which in v. 17 he will widen to include all believers, under the rubric of their “call.”

See, e.g., m. Git. 5.8–9 (“They do not try to prevent the poor among the gentiles from gathering Gleanings . . . in the interests of peace”; “moreover greetings [meaning ‘Shalom’] may be offered to gentiles in the interests of peace”). Cf. the discussion in Daube, “Contributions,” 234–35.

Cf. Rom. 14:19, where the strong are encouraged to defer to the weak “for the sake of peace.”

This apparent anticipation of v. 17 with this verb also speaks against the common interpretation of v. 15c. The whole point of vv. 17–24 is to justify “staying as one is at the time of one’s call” and understanding that as one’s call. To read v. 15c as referring to peacefully accepting the dissolution of the marriage would make God’s call refer to the exception to staying as one was at the time of one’s call, which hardly makes sense of the argument as a whole.

Cf. Moule, 154, “It is uncertain whether the direct question implied is intended to expect the answer yes or no.” J. Jeremias, “Die missionarische Aufgabe in der Mischehe (I Cor 7.16),” in Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann (ed. W. Eltester; Berlin, 1954), 255–60; and C. Burchard, “Ei nach einem Ausdrücke des Wissens oder Nichtwissens Joh 9:25, Act 19:2, I Kor 1:16, 7:16,” ZNW 52 (1961), 73–82, have mustered considerable evidence in favor of a positive answer. But as Kubo has rightly countered (“1 Corinthians VII.16”), at best they have shown that in some cases it may have that sense, but in fact it is generally ambiguous. Kubo goes astray when he argues that if it is ambiguous then it probably expects a nega- tive. To the contrary, as he points out, the context must finally decide, and in this case the context, esp. v. 15c (which Kubo neglects), points toward a sense of “perhaps you will save.”

The subjects of the two clauses are reversed in the MajT and sy^h; some MSS ( 629 1881 pc) have “God” as the subject in both. Almost certainly this is a conformation to the similar passages in Rom. 12:3 and 2 Cor. 10:13. Unfortunately it misses the subtleties of Paul’s sentence. See the commentary.

Both Tischendorf and WH prefer the perfect found in * B 81 630 1739 pc over the aorist found in the rest (and preferred by UBS⁴/NA²⁷). If original, then the aorist was an assimilation to Rom. 12:3 and 2 Cor. 10:13. More likely the early Egyptian MSS were assimilated to the perfect in the next clause.

In place of διατάσσομαι the Western tradition reads διδάσκω (an assimilation to 4:17).

Most of the Western and MajT witnesses add a καί (“also”). This is secondary, since there is no good explanation for its omission.

The concern over circumcision in this case, in contrast to that in Galatians, is first of all sociological, then religious; hence the unimpassioned way it finds expression.

Bartchy, 162–65, makes the intriguing suggestion that these two sets of social relationships were regularly linked with male/female relationships in Paul’s own thinking, as evidenced in Gal. 3:28, and that is why he chose them.

Cf. Bartchy, 140 n. 491: “He expected the examples in 7:17–24 to support his argument precisely because no tension in the areas of Jew/Greek or slave/free relationships was known to him.” This crucial point is sometimes overlooked in the scholarly literature, esp. from American scholars, whose lives even 150 years later have been affected by the slavery issue that has so thoroughly marked our history, and thus our psyches. It is seldom noted that the kind of slavery that so deeply marked us as Americans also existed in Paul’s time (as it was dramatically portrayed by Charlton Heston’s Ben-Hur). But Paul is focusing altogether on the basic well-to-do Greco-Roman household, where a freed slave might continue to exist as a part of the household.

Otherwise Bartchy, 127–59 (following Grosheide, 166–72, who previously followed Bavinck), who argues that the basic imperative means “Live according to your calling from God in Christ,” and has nothing to do with where one was at the time of one’s call. Therefore, the concern in the imperative is that they continue in their faith given to them at the time of their call and not fall prey to their new theology, which is leading them away from faith in Christ. This view rests finally on (1) the understanding of κλῆσις in v. 20 as referring to “remaining in your Christian calling,” with no reference to the circumstances in which that call came, and on (2) the similarities of vv. 17 and 24 to v. 20 that allow Bartchy to neglect their more significant dissimilarities.

Since the threefold imperative is clearly the framework for the entire paragraph, one could equally see vv. 17 and 24 as giving it opening and closure, with the middle sentence (v. 20) functioning simultaneously as the conclusion of the opening questions and affirmations (vv. 18–19) and the introduction to the concluding question (v. 21a) and its responses (vv. 21b–23).

The verb καλέω appears eight times; the noun κλῆσις once.

Cf. M. Tabet, “La situazione ordinaria di vita come ‘chiamata’ in 1 Cor 7,17–24,” RivB 53 (2005), 277–312.

Gk. εἰ μή; the closest example to this usage in Paul is Gal. 1:7, where the preceding clause negates the possibility that there really is another gospel; “nevertheless, some are troubling you,” he goes on. Since this usage “excepts” a preceding negative, it almost certainly goes back to v. 15b: “The brother or sister is not bound in such cases. . . . Nevertheless. . . .” See Zerwick, BG 470, who would make it the equivalent of ἀλλά; and BDF 376, who see it as the equivalent of πλήν (cf. Lightfoot, 226, who rejects ἀλλά as an equivalent). The English versions handle it variously: “however” (NRSV); “only” (RSV, ESV, REB—although the latter’s “only as . . . so let him” seems to be quite foreign to what Paul said); Thiselton’s “at all events” is a nice English equivalent.

Gk. περιπατέω; see on 3:3.

The NIV lacks precision here, both by translating Paul’s pregnant verb for Christian life as “retain” and by changing the two ὡς’s to that and to which. Paul’s concern is not that they do stay put, but that they see their present married situation as in keeping with God’s call and the Lord’s assignment, and therefore not calling for change.

This structural reality, plus the use of εἰ μή noted above (n. 184), tends to discount the suggestion of Rex (“An Attempt to Understand I Cor. 7.17,” RTR 14 [1955], 44–46), that the first of these clauses concludes vv. 12–16, while the second begins the new section.

As usual in Paul this refers to Christ, not God (cf. the usage in 3:5; see my Pauline Christology, 136–37; contra Bartchy, 137 n. 484, who actually paraphrases it: “and with the faith that God has distributed to him”; this is simply wrong, whether thoughtful or careless). It is difficult to escape the christological implications of this text, where the work of Christ is seen to be in union with the work of God. In Trinitarian terms, God the Father called; God the Son assigned. But both actions are the activity of the one God.

This doubling of ἔκαττος (“each one”), which recurs as the subject in each of the framework sentences (vv. 17, 20, 24), emphasizes both the individual character and the diverse nature of their social setting. “Each” is called in their specific situation, which is now “assigned” by the Lord, so they may not insist that the truly Spiritual all have one situation.

E.g., Conzelmann, 126; Bartchy, 137 n. 484.

See .

Gk. μερίζω; cf. the similar usage in 2 Cor. 10:13 and Rom. 12:3.

Greek perfect, implying a continuing state from the time of conversion till now. Grammatically there is no way that this clause can be stretched to mean “live according to the fact that God has called you,” as Bartchy, 151–55, repeatedly translates. Bartchy’s case finally stands or falls on his ability to make vv. 17 and 24 reflect his interpretation of v. 20. At best this attempt in both cases stretches normal usages to the breaking point. Cf. the critique in G. Corcoran, “Slavery in the New Testament II,” Milltown Studies 6 (1980), 69–72.

Bartchy, 137 n. 484, suggests, on the basis of Rom. 12:3, that what is apportioned to each is “faith,” but that puts Paul in a straitjacket; and how could the Corinthians have so understood it?

Weiss, 183–92, interprets the whole to mean that Paul is laying down the rule that Christians cannot change status. But to do so he must make κλῆσις in v. 20 mean “vocation” and must emend the text in v. 24. That is to turn Paul’s point on its head.

The others are 4:17; 11:16; 14:33; see also on 1:2 and 16:1.

The reader needs to be reminded again at this point that the whole of this argument evolved out of their slogan cited in v. 1b.

For a discussion of the attempt by some Jewish men to remove the evidence of their circumcision, see the discussion by four German M.D.’s (D. Schultheiss, M. C. Truss, C. G. Stief, and U. Jonas) entitled “Uncircumcision: A Historical Review of Preputial Restoration” (available online at www.cirp.org/library/restoration/schultheiss).

A Jew-Gentile struggle does not appear anywhere in this letter, not even in chaps. 8–10, where one might most expect it. What emerges there is a struggle over Paul’s way of relating to Jews and Gentiles, probably over the matter of eating food in their homes that had been sacrificed to idols (see 9:19–23).

Gk. τις; this use of the indefinite pronoun in a terse question, followed by an imperative, further indicates the general nature of the illustration. Cf. E. J. Goodspeed, “The Syntax of I Cor. 7:18, 27,” AJT 12 (1908), 249–50; idem, “A Patristic Parallel to 1 Cor. 7:18, 21,” JBL 36 (1917), 150.

As difficult as it might be for moderns to imagine, during the period of Hellenization many Jewish men had an operation of a kind that concealed their circumcision. See 1 Macc. 1:14–15: “So they built a gymnasium in Jerusalem, according to Gentile custom, and removed the marks of circumcision, and abandoned the holy covenant” (NRSV; cf. Jos., Ant. 12.241, who is reflecting on this passage); cf. As.Mos. 8:3, where such an operation by Gentiles on Jewish sons is seen as part of God’s judgment: “and their young sons will be cut by physicians to bring forward their foreskins” (OTP, 2:931).

For a helpful, balanced discussion of this passage within the larger framework of Paul’s view/use of the law, see F. Thielman, “Paul’s View of the Law: The Evidence of First Corinthians,” NTS 38 (1992), 235–53 (esp. 237–40).

See my Galatians (Blandford Forum, 2006) for the reasons for believing this is not Paul’s first letter but was written after 1 and 2 Corinthians, but before Romans.

Dungan, 134 n. 1, following Menoud (“Marriage and Celibacy according to Saint Paul”), seems to miss the point of this argument when he says, “In view of his belief that celibacy was a gift of the Spirit, such a formulation [as this present one] would have been impossible.” Dungan has gone astray both in believing that Paul was an ascetic—and that therefore celibacy was important to him—and in suggesting that only celibacy was a charisma. It is clear from v. 7 that both marriage and celibacy were charismata; it is equally clear from the tenor of the whole argument, and from this analogy in particular, that for Paul neither of them amounted to a thing in Christ, any more than circumcision did. And it will not do to appeal to Paul’s eschatology here, although that will come in due time. For now it is God’s call in itself that transcends—and therefore transforms—one’s present station.

The final clause is actually elliptical, but the context indicates that the ἀλλά contrasts the twofold οὐδέν; hence the NIV is quite correct in this translation.

Gk. ἐντολή; Paul tends to use this word ordinarily to refer to the individual commandments (e.g., Rom. 7:8–13, where the individual commandment is distinguished from the whole law; cf. Rom. 13:9). In 1 Cor. 14:37 he uses it to refer to his own instructions.

On the other hand, of course, one must not turn the ethical imperative of the gospel, which is our grateful response to God’s mercy, into a new form of law (= obedience in order to gain his favor). This becomes Christian legalism, at which Paul would be equally horrified.

Cf. Barrett, 169: “That we keep God’s commandments means an obedience to the will of God as disclosed in his Son far more radical than the observance of any code, whether ceremonial or moral, could be.”

Gk. κλῆσις, the only occurrence of the noun in the paragraph. See the discussion on 1:26.

The relative here modifies κλήσει; it is not possible to tell whether the sense is locative or instrumental. The locative nature of the similar expression in v. 24 would suggest that it is so here as well, as almost all translations and commentators. But see Parry, 116, “in the calling wherewith he was called.”

Grosheide, 169; Bartchy, 132–55 (see ). But in order to come to this, one must press the language and sense of vv. 17 and 24 beyond recognizable limits.

Even though the verb is ambiguous in each of the three “framework” imperatives (vv. 17, 20, 24), its usage with each of the four social conditions in vv. 18 and 21–22 makes it certain that the emphasis is not on conversion per se, but on a person’s social status at the time of conversion. And the whole argument is intended to validate that status by the very fact that they were called to Christ in that situation.

Cf. Lightfoot, 229: “[The word] is applied both to the act and (as here) to the circumstances of calling.” But it does not mean “vocation.” As Lightfoot further comments (228): “The sentiment which underlies this thought is essentially right, but as an interpretation of the apostle’s words here it is quite wrong.” Unfortunately, it is this latter position against which almost all of Bartchy’s argument is raised; but it seems to be a minority view against which he is reacting, and he reacts so strongly that he tends to push too hard in another unlikely direction (see ).

Bartchy, 181–82, suggests that v. 23b, “Do not become slaves of men,” might carry this nuance in part, but that seems doubtful. See on v. 23.

Besides the OT apodictic laws (“Thou shalt not”), cf. the teaching of Jesus, esp., e.g., the collection of sayings in Luke 6:20–38, which are generally in the second plural but in vv. 29–30 appear in the second singular.

Even so, this particular illustration of Paul’s overall point has (understandably) elicited its share of analyses; in this regard see esp. J. A. Harrill, “Paul and Slavery: The Problem of 1 Corinthians 7:21,” BibRes 39 (1994), 5–28; and W. Deming, “A Diatribe Pattern in 1 Cor. 7:21–22: A New Perspective on Paul’s Directions to Slaves,” NovT 37 (1995) 130–37, both of which incidentally take the “positive” view regarding Paul’s intent.

Gk. μέλει, “be a concern to someone” (cf. 9:9).

See Bartchy, 6–7, who has a convenient chart, in chronological order, of most significant scholars from Origen in 200 to Hunzinger in 1970. The list of those with whom one would disagree, on either side, is impressive!

Grosheide, 170, and Bartchy, 155–59, offer a third alternative. The verb does not here mean “make use of,” but, in keeping with a usage found often in Josephus, “live according to”; and the object to be supplied is “calling.” Hence Bartchy: “But if indeed you become manumitted, by all means [as a freedman] live according to [God’s calling]”; so also A. Callahan, “A Note on I Corinthians 7:21,” JITC 17 (1989–90), 110–14 (“if you can be free, act like it”). But even though that may well capture some of Paul’s sentiment in this section, in the end it seems too obtuse for the Corinthians to have grasped it.

Sevenster, Paul, 189, argues that “the καί is placed before the δύνασαι and not before ἐλεύθερος γενέσθαι,” which in his opinion “excludes the translation: furthermore, if you can gain your freedom.” But this quite misses Paul’s grammar; the καί goes with the εἰ and forms a strong exception: “if indeed” (cf. vv. 9 and 28). See esp. Thrall, Particles, 78–82.

Cf. Sevenster, Paul, 189: “μᾶλλον would be virtually meaningless if Paul were advising: then make use of that opportunity to become free; but it fits in very well if he is advising those who are slaves to do instead the unexpected.”

Cf. Barrett, 171: “Particularly important is the for (γάρ) with which the next verse begins: You need not hesitate to put up with your servile condition, for. . . .”

See now inter alios G. W. Dawes, “ ‘But If You Can Gain Your Freedom’ (1 Corinthians 7:17–24),” CBQ 52 (1990), 681–97; and Harrill and Deming ().

Even more difficult is Bartchy’s proposal that it picks up κλήσει from yet another sentence earlier.

The word here is ἀλλά; it is δέ in the other examples. But the pattern is constant. “Remain as you are, but. . . .”

Given the proximity of the usage in 1 Corinthians, as well as similar usage in 2 Cor. 1:17; 3:12; and 13:10, Bartchy’s disregard of these data in favor of a usage in Josephus does not lend confidence to his interpretation (see above).

Pp. 62–120.

Bartchy gives considerable energy to the inclusion of the “positive” view here, too. That is, a slave did not have a choice for freedom either. But his own view, that the protasis means something like “but if indeed you are able to become manumitted,” works equally well for this view. It is not that the slave had the option of freedom; that was given to him. Paul’s word is, “If that be the case, then by all means make the best of it.”

Corcoran, “Slavery,” 73–74, following Weiss, argues “that Paul has directed his admonition against the striving after manumission itself.” But that is not what the text says; it is doubtful whether one can come to this even by implication.

Cf. W. Deming (), that regarding their disenfranchised state as a matter of indifference did not mean to forgo an opportunity to gain freedom; cf. now the discussion in Thiselton, 564–65.

Corcoran, “Slavery,” 66–67, tries to minimize this by arguing that in every other case a reason for the exception is given. But that is not so (v. 15c is not the reason for 15ab; none is given in v. 11).

The NRSV (cf. original NIV) takes the ἐν κυρίῳ to be instrumental, “called by the Lord”; but that seems to miss the sense of the whole passage. The calling is to be “in Christ,” which has to do with one’s relationship with him, not that he is the one who called. Furthermore, God, not Christ, is the expressed subject of the verb in v. 17 and the implied subject of all the passive expressions of this verb in the letter.

See F. Lyall, “Roman Law in the Writings of Paul—the Slave and the Freedman,” NTS 17 (1970/71), 78–79; and Bartchy, 70.

This is not a universal view, but it seems to make the best sense of its inclusion here.

For the improbable suggestion that sacral manumission is in view, see and .

Gk. μὴ γίνεσθαι. Mare, 234, would press this to have its full present tense force, “Stop becoming . . .” (cf. on 4:5; 7:5). But this is such a fixed idiom in Paul’s parenesis here that one can scarcely make a point of tense.

Bartchy, Slavery, 181–82, suggests that it might also carry a literal nuance; cf. Corcoran, “Slavery,” 75.

There are formal parallels with Stoicism (given in Conzelmann, 128 n. 34), but as Conzelmann comments: “The dialectic of freedom in servitude is alien to them.” Cf. Sevenster, Paul, 185–92.

By reworking these, Bartchy, 135, makes this say the same thing as v. 20. But that is done by fiat, not by showing how it is grammatically possible.

Gk. παρὰ θεῷ, which probably here means something very much as in 3:19, “in the presence of” or “before” God. See BDAG B2.

Bartchy, 135, suggests “that here it is equal to the use of ὡς in 7:17,” and translates “in accord with.” But there is no grammatical evidence for such an understanding (the appeal to Moule, 131, is not accurate). Even more strained is the suggestion that ἐν τούτῳ is masculine because of attraction to this ἐν ᾧ, even though it no longer has masculine force, and that ἐν ᾧ therefore really equals τούτῳ, which refers to the “calling” in v. 20.

Evidenced both by the alternative translations in the original NIV^mg and NEB for vv. 36–38, as well as the general hesitance that scholars bring to the text; cf., e.g., Murphy-O’Connor, 171: “This is probably the most difficult and controverted section of the letter”; and Orr (“Treatment,” 17), who begins, “I suggest with trembling hesitation. . . .”

The language is Conzelmann’s, 134, who believes so.

As throughout, it is unlikely in the highest degree that Paul is addressing a Jewish Christian community, as J. M. Ford, Trilogy, and Hurley, “Man and Woman,” 181–82, maintain. Almost every issue taken up implies a primarily Gentile readership.

Thus the section also follows the “a-b-a” pattern of argument noted by Weiss, 192; Allo, 319; and Hurd, 178, in which, just as in 8:1–10:22 and 12–14, Paul begins with a more general statement, follows it with an explanatory digression, and concludes with a very specific response to the problem. See the introduction, .

This seems to make better sense of all the data than the suggestion of H. Chadwick (“ ‘All Things to All Men’ (I Cor. IX.22),” NTS 1 [1954/55], 267–68) that it reflects Paul’s approach in Corinth of being “all things to all men”—although on my overall approach to the section I am in general agreement with Chadwick.

See Rex, “Attempt,” 48–51, for this suggestion.

Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Women Holy in Body and Spirit: The Social Setting of 1 Corinthians 7,” NTS 36 (1990), 161–81, quotation from 179.

For a helpful discussion of this passage, full of insight regarding the nature of social change during this decade, see chap. 11 in B. W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth.

The Western uncials D F G, probably influenced by the Latin versions, have λαβῆς γυναῖκα (“take a wife”). See comment on 7:2.

Four MSS (B F G 429) lack the article ἡ with παρθένος, against all the rest. One cannot tell whether the NIV is following B F G here or whether they are generalizing. In either case the translation is ill-chosen. M. Black (The Scrolls and Christian Origins [New York, 1961], 85) and J. F. Bound (“Who Are the ‘Virgins’ Discussed in 1 Corinthians 7:25–38?” Evangelical Journal 2 [1984], 6–7) consider the anarthrous reading to be original. But that is because they need this reading to support their view that the “virgins” are male celibates, an extremely unlikely option (the noun is feminine throughout; v. 28 is thereby rendered “grossly tautologous” [Barrett, 176]). Bound tried to escape the latter charge by suggesting that vv. 27–28a do not refer to this question, and that only with v. 28b does Paul return to the matter begun in vv. 25–26. But that puts a terrible strain on both the balanced structure of v. 28 (one of 12 such balanced male/female sentences in the chapter) and the sense of the text. The argument that the ἡ was added by dittography (repeating the final η from γήμῃ) carries little force at all, since the omission could equally—far more likely in fact, given scribal habits—have been haplography (accidental omission of a second η); cf. Metzger, 489–90.

M. M. Mitchell called into question whether with this language Paul is responding “point by point” and in order to the Corinthian letter (“Concerning περὶ δέ in 1 Corinthians,” NovT 31 [1989], 229–56). But the “order” of response is not really an issue. Given the close relationship with v. 1 and the related topic, it would make sense to think so here; but nothing is at stake exegetically as to whether this is so or not.

It will hardly do to answer, as Conzelmann, 131, does: “What is meant by the term παρθένοι is—superfluously enough—hotly disputed: it means virgins.” That would be fine if vv. 34 and 36–38 did not exist; but even he must make the latter a “special case” because in these later instances it obviously means more than just “virgin.”

For the view held by Black and Bound that Paul is addressing male celibates, at least in vv. 25–27 (Black) and throughout (Bound), see . J. M. Ford, “Levirate Marriage in St Paul (I Cor vii),” NTS 10 (1963/64), 361–65, followed by Hurley, “Man and Woman,” 189–96, proposed that the virgins are young widows who have been married only once, and that the question has to do with the levirate marriage of a sister-in-law. Paul’s answer basically releases him from this obligation. Not only did this proposal stretch the meaning of several words (esp. “virgin”!), but it assumed that the Corinthian church was essentially Jewish, concerned with essentially Jewish issues—all of this is highly improbable.

Other proposals are basically modifications of the major three, esp. of the “father-daughter” one, such as guardian-benefactor, master-female slave, and adopter-adopted. See J. O’Rourke, “Hypotheses regarding 1 Corinthians 7,36–38,” CBQ 20 (1958), 292–98, who prefers master-female slave.

Lightfoot, 231.

Virgines Subintroductae: ein Beitrag zum VII. Kapitel des I. Korintherbriefs (Leipzig, 1902).

Along with Hurd himself, 169–82, see the list in his n. 2, 170. To that list may now be added, among others, the commentaries by Thrall, Ruef, and Murphy-O’Connor, and esp. R. H. A. Sebolt, “Spiritual Marriage in the Early Church: A Suggested Interpretation of 1 Cor. 7:36–38,” CTM 30 (1959), 103–19; and G. Peters, “Spiritual Marriage in Early Christianity: 1 Cor 7:25–38 in Modern Exegesis and the Earliest Church,” TrinJ 23 (2002), 211–24; this became “Scripture” in the NEB (“partner in celibacy”), but was changed to “his virgin daughter” in the REB.

See, e.g., Acts of Paul and Thecla 5, from the middle of the second century: “Blessed are they who have wives as if they had them not, for they shall inherit God.” This is one of six beatitudes that bless continence and virginity.

The most thorough modern presentation was by W. G. Kümmel, “Verlobung und Heirat bei Paulus (I. Cor 7.36–38),” in Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann (ed. W. Eltester; Berlin, 1954), 275–95. It has been adopted by most recent commentaries (Conzelmann, Barrett, Collins, Garland; Thiselton prefers “those who have not yet married,” while Ciampa and Rosner favor this view but choose to leave the question more open-ended). The rather consistently conservative translators of the ESV went out on a limb here and rendered it “betrothed.”

This view does have the advantage that the word is used in the NT to refer to one who is betrothed (Luke 1:27; Matt. 1:18, 23), although in each case she is further described as such. Elliott, “Teaching,” 221, would also add the “virgins” in the parable of Matt. 25:1–13, but the meaning “betrothed girls” there is questionable.

The plural in v. 25 could possibly refer to both the man and the woman; however, the subsequent uses are singular and masculine, until v. 28b, where the “virgin” is addressed; cf. M. Y. MacDonald, “Women Holy in Body and Spirit: The Social Setting of 1 Cor 7,” NTS 36 (1990), 161–81.

See J. V. P. D. Balsdon, Roman Women: Their History and Habits (London, 1962), 177–79.

Gk. ἐπιταγή (cf. 7:6).

Since this is such unusual talk for Paul, some have argued that the Corinthians themselves have been using some of the sayings of Jesus circulating in their Q form (esp. Luke 20:34–36) and have turned them into support for their asceticism. Paul would then be opposing their use of Jesus in this way by saying that there is not a commandment of the Lord on this matter. See J. M. Robinson, “Kerygma and History in the New Testament,” in The Bible in Modern Scholarship (ed. H. P. Hyatt; Nashville, 1965), 127–31; D. L. Balch, “Backgrounds,” 351–64.

Gk. γνώμη (see on 1:10; cf. 2 Cor. 8:10; Phlm. 14), frequently rendered “opinion” (NRSV, NEB, NAB, Thiselton), which is allowed in BDAG, but probably should not be, since this English word most often carries a lower sense than this Greek word allows. See esp. the discussion by R. A. Ramsaran, “More Than an Opinion: Paul’s Rhetorical Maxim in First Corinthians 7:25–26,” CBQ 57 (1995), 531–41; cf. K. G. E. Dolfe, “1 Cor 7,25 Reconsidered (Paul a Supposed Adviser),” ZNW 83 (1992), 115–18.

Gk. πιστός; see on 4:2.

Gk. οὖν, infrequent in this letter (see on 4:16).

Gk. καλόν. This usage, which is picked up in its adverb form in v. 37, is sure evidence that it does not have moral connotations for Paul (contra Hurd; see ).

The words for “crisis” (ἀνάγκη) and “trouble” (θλῖψις) occur together in Paul’s catalogues of suffering in 1 Thess. 3:7 and 2 Cor. 6:4; ἀνάγκη appears without θλῖψις in 2 Cor. 12:10, and θλῖψις without ἀνάγκη in several texts (1 Thess. 1:6; 3:3; 2 Cor. 4:17; 8:2; etc.). θλῖψις is Paul’s ordinary word to express his hardships, although v. 28 is its only appearance in this letter.

For ἀνάγκη, see Luke 21:23 (the only known usage of the word in this way in all of Jewish and Christian literature); for θλῖψις, see esp. Rev. 7:14 (cf. 1:9; 2:9–10, 22). For the motif, but not the language, in Jewish apocalyptic see 4 Ezra 5:1–13; 6:18–24; 9:1–12; Jub. 23:11–31.

Cf. Montgomery, “in view of the time of suffering now imminent.”

Gk. ἐνεστῶσαν (perf. ptc. of ἐνίστημι, “to be present”); cf. 3:22; 2 Thess. 2:2; Gal. 1:4; Rom. 8:38.

This was the meaning preferred by Grosheide, 175–76, but his understanding of the sentence was esp. convoluted. He took the ἀνάγκη to refer to the virgin state of young unmarried women (v. 25). This now is Paul’s word of “comfort” to them, that if not asked by a man, they remain single (as though such were a choice under this view) because of the present need to do so.

However, see B. W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth (chap. 10, 216–20), who argues that it reflects actual famine conditions that recurred during this period, which would make a great deal of sense of a phrase that is so distant from us historically; see also C-R (335–37) for a more thorough discussion of the various suggested options.

It is difficult to know what moved the original NIV translators to render it, “It is good for you to remain as you are,” esp. since they did not do so in v. 1b. Probably it anticipates the questions in v. 27; but any ordinary English reader will read this “you” as plural, whereas what follows is singular, and seems to be addressing the man directly.

Cf. Jeremias, “Gedankenführung,” 151; cf. Barrett, 174.

Thus the awkward ὅτι here is epexegetic to the τοῦτο (“I think this, namely that . . .”) and at the same time serves to introduce the quotation, just as in 8:1 and 4 (twice). Conzelmann’s suggestion, 132, that “the expression is not clear” simply is not true. The τοῦτο can only point forward to the ὅτι; and together they point to the slogan itself, whether it be from the Corinthians or from Paul. Cf. Hurd, 178.

There is only one question in v. 21; here and in v. 21 the questions are in the second person singular.

Gk. λῦσις, which has a variety of meanings (“unravel” [esp. secrets], “discharge” [as from a contract], or “release”).

It should also be noted that the verb λύω is not otherwise used to refer to divorce. For “divorce” verbs, see on vv. 10 and 12. It lies totally outside the present context to suggest that the two questions address the married and the divorced. The qualification of v. 28 makes that nearly impossible: (1) The first sentence would then contradict what is said in vv. 10–11; (2) the second sentence to the “virgins” would be totally irrelevant to such an issue; and (3) it would otherwise require one to separate these two sentences, which in fact form another of the perfectly balanced male-female pairs of this chapter.

This view was argued for, but without noting the linguistic data on λῦσις and λύω, by Elliott, “Teaching,” 222.

See esp. the data collected in MM, 382.

The traditional view also presented a problem that Grosheide, 176, felt constrained to address. He argued that the first question can scarcely belong to what is merely “good”; in light of vv. 10–11 it must be a true imperative. Yet the second is not an imperative; it is merely advice. But that destroys Paul’s balanced clauses.

This is clearly an alternative not an adversative δὲ καί (= “but if indeed you do marry”).

See above. There is no good reason for the NIV to generalize (“if a virgin”), since Paul’s ἡ seems to be case specific here; i.e., “the specific ‘virgin’ now in purview.”

There is no apparent explanation for the change to the first aorist in this sentence. Elsewhere Paul uses only the second aorist. It may have to do with the change in gender, but that is not likely in view of v. 34. For a full discussion see Lightfoot, 232.

Cf., e.g., b. Yeb. 63b: “R. Hama b. Hanina stated: As soon as a man takes a wife his sins are buried; for it is said: Whoso findeth a wife findeth a great good and obtaineth favour of the Lord” (Soncino, 423); b. Yeb. 63a: “R. Eleazar said: Any man who has no wife is no proper man; for it is said, Male and female created he them and called their name Adam” (419). Although these probably date from the second c. A.D., they almost certainly reflect opinions from an earlier time.

Gk. θλῖψιν τῇ σαρκί (lit. “tribulation in the flesh”; cf. 2 Cor. 12:7, σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί, which must mean literally in the body). It seems unlikely that he means that they will have more physical trials than others; rather, it seems to imply that as long as they are in the present life they will have more trials than others. Grosheide, 177, suggests that it refers to “the bodily difficulties of married women (cf. Mt. 24:19).” But that seems to abuse the plural οἱ τοιοῦτοι, which refers to the subjects of both preceding clauses.

Several Western MSS (and a few others) have an added ὅτι, which could either be epexegetic (as in v. 26: “This I say, namely that”) or causal (“I say this because”). Probably the latter was intended, but in either case it is secondary.

The majority of witnesses have added a τοῦτον (the MajT has the object in the dative case), probably as an assimilation to the sentence that follows.

The Latin tradition reads “God” for “Lord,” which may be more pleasing to the ear than the repeated “Lord,” but misses Paul’s point.

The text here has suffered considerable corruption. The major possibilities are:

(1) As with the UBS⁴ and rendered by the NIV, the καὶ μεμέρισται (“is concerned”) goes with v. 33, while the next sentence distinguishes between “the unmarried woman” and “the virgin,” who together are the subject of the verb μεριμνᾷ. This is the reading of P¹⁵ B P 104 181 1962 2495 t x z vg bo Eusebius.

(2) A variation of this is read by P⁴⁶ B A 33 81 1739 1877 1881 eth, in which the adj. ὁ ἄγαμος (“unmarried”) is read twice, modifying both “woman” and “virgin.”

(3) The Western MSS and the MajT differ from the above in two significant ways. First, they do not have a καί before μεμέρισται; second, ὁ ἄγαμος follows “virgin” and is probably to be understood as the subject of μεριμνᾷ, rather than as an adjective modifying “woman.” The net result is a new clause that introduces the pairs about women: “There is a distinction (μεμέρισται) between the wife and the virgin. The unmarried woman, etc.

This third alternative was vigorously defended by Godet, 381–84 (although he would translate; “The wife is also divided; and the virgin who remains unmarried cares for, etc.”), Lightfoot, 233–34, and R-P, 157, on the grounds that it keeps the parallelism of the two sets. That is an attractive argument, but this alternative finally falls short on two grounds: (1) It requires a most unnatural sense to the verb μεμέρισται (Godet tries to circumvent this, but the clause then becomes an intolerable intrusion and the parallelism is broken in any case by the cumbersome “unmarried virgin”). (2) It simply cannot account for the reading of B et al. Given the nice balance provided by the Western text, who would have created the text of B? Furthermore, the καί before the μεμέρισται is too well attested across the board to be a later addition; and its presence makes the verb go with v. 33. Its omission came about when Paul’s distinctions between the “unmarried woman” and the “virgin” were no longer understood and the compound subject with a singular verb was troublesome; cf. Metzger, 490.

Gk. εὔσχημον = in an orderly/right way.

On this question see esp. D. J. Doughty, “The Presence and Future of Salvation in Corinth,” ZNW 66 (1975), 61–90, who argues that “Paul’s primary concern here has to do not with speculation about the future of salvation, but rather with the existence of those who, as a consequence of God’s salvation deed in Christ, already stand at the end of history. The eschatological language functions to raise up a particular understanding of Christian existence” (68–69).

The “this” in this case, and in considerable contrast with v. 6 above (q.v.), clearly points forward; the next sentence is epexegetic and gives it content. Thus, “This is what I mean: The time is short.”

Gk. φημι (cf. 10:15, 19; 15:50). This is not Paul’s ordinary verb for this expression (as, e.g., in vv. 6, 8, 12, 35). The NIV nicely captures its sense: “What I mean is this.”

Otherwise Parry, 120, and R-P, 154, who see it as a kind of solemn declaration.

It is commonplace to see the ἵνα as an example of an “imperatival ἵνα.” See, e.g., Moule, 145; BDF 387 [3]; Turner, Syntax, 95; A. P. Salom, “The Imperatival Use of hina in the New Testament,” AusBR 6 (1958), 135. That is probably the result of seeing τὸ λοιπόν as the start of a new clause. But that is not a necessary expedient. While τὸ λοιπόν may be a connecting particle, here it more likely carries adverbial force and precedes ἵνα for emphasis (cf. Gal. 2:10). Thus the ἵνα clause expresses the purpose God has for his people in “compressing the time”: so that “for the rest” or “from now on” (meaning from the time of their conversion until the End) they might live in the following way. That comes close to an imperative, but is a more standard usage of ἵνα and τὸ λοιπόν. Some of the older commentators took τὸ λοιπόν with the preceding sentence (= “the time is limited as to what remains”), a view reflected by the word order in the Westerns and MajT, τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν. But that not only weakens the expression, it also runs counter to Paul’s usage elsewhere. For the meaning of τὸ λοιπόν see Thrall, Particles, 25–30.

Although this καί could mean “even the married are to think like celibates” (Godet, 377), that is an esp. unnecessary inference, since the καί forms the first in a series. If there were two members, one would translate “both . . . and.” With more than two it simply begins the series. Cf. R-P, 155.

See esp. the helpful lengthy discussion in Thiselton, 580–83.

Gk. καιρός, referring to a specific (right, favorable, appointed) time, to be distinguished from χρόνος, which has to do with a period, or duration of time.

Cf. Parry, 120 (this is a paraphrase).

Gk. συνεσταλμένος ἐστίν, which most likely is to be understood as a periphrastic perfect passive, not the verb “to be” with an adjective. Depending on context the verb συστέλλω means to constrict, reduce, restrain, or limit in some way. With “time” it means to “compress” it. The picture is that of one for whom the future was either nonexistent, as for most Greeks, or off in the vague distance; but the event of Christ has now compressed the time in such a way that the future has been brought forward so as to be clearly visible, not so much with regard to its timing as to its reality and certainty. See esp. B. Witherington, Jesus, Paul, and the End of the World (Carlisle, 1992), 27–30.

In this regard the “shortened time” is often seen to reflect the words of Jesus in Mark 13:20, which indicate that a coming time of suffering will be so great that for the sake of the elect the Lord has “shortened the days.” Paul is thus viewed as saying that because the married will have more of these sufferings, the betrothed would do best not to marry. The problem with this view, of course, is that this is not the point Paul himself makes in the elaboration that follows.

The analogy of the terminally ill comes to mind. For those who have made peace with it, the amount of time left is less in the forefront than is the change of perspective. They see, hear, and value in a new way. My former student Dr. J. Camery-Hoggatt suggested the analogy of the person who tells a joke. The speaker alone knows the punch line, and because they know it, the yet-to-come punch line shapes the telling of the joke in its entirety. Similarly, through the resurrection of Christ, believers know the divine “punch line” (which in this case is no joke but a vivid reality!); they see clearly how the story comes out, and they shape their lives and values accordingly.

It is in this sense that Paul counters their “overrealized eschatology.” Thus Käsemann is probably not quite right in saying that “for the Corinthians the end of history has already arrived” (NT Questions, 106). They had “arrived,” to be sure, but more in the sense of what Käsemann says later, “Christian existence here on earth meant for them solely the temporal representation of heavenly being” (124). That is, they were not so concerned about the future having come present as with a new spiritual mode of existence that had now become available to them and was already being realized. Thus Paul’s concern here is less with the futurity of the Eschaton as with the fact that they must learn to think eschatologically in the first place. Cf. the introduction to 4:1–5.

See, e.g., Epict. 3.22.67–76; 3.24.60; and esp. 4.7.5. Cf. Seneca, Ep. 1.2. But it has been regularly pointed out that the eschatological basis of Paul’s attitude is radically different from Stoic-Cynic aloofness. See Sevenster, Paul, 231–32; Conzelmann, 133; and now esp. the brief but helpful overview in D. L. Balch, “1 Cor 7:32–35 and Stoic Debates about Marriage,” JBL 102 (1983), 429–30.

This has been argued esp. by W. Schrage, “Die Stellung zur Welt bei Paulus, Epiktet und in der Apokalyptik,” ZTK 61 (1964), 125–54. The parallel with 6 Esdras 16:40–45 (see HSW 2:701) is striking, but the text is so much later than Paul as to give considerable reason for pause as to the direction of influence on Paul’s own thinking.

This would also include the concept of “detachment” found in Bultmann (Theology, 1:351) and C. Hierzenberger, Weltwertung bei Paulus nach 1 Kor 7,29–31. Eine exegetisch-kerygmatische Studie (Düsseldorf, 1967). Paul expects the Corinthians to continue to make use of the world in all of its present expressions. They are not to be “detached” or “aloof.” Rather, they are not to be conditioned or controlled by it or its values. They are as those “having all things, yet possessing nothing” and at the same time “having nothing, yet possessing all things” (2 Cor. 6:10). The world simply does not dictate their existence.

Cf. Doughty, “Presence” ().

Given the form this rhetoric takes, with the second part responding “as if not” to the first, he simply could not have used an illustration that already had a negative in its first part. To say “those who are not married, as if they were not” makes no sense at all—not even in rhetoric.

Gk. καταχράομαι (cf. 9:18), the only two occurrences in the NT; see the discussion in Doughty, “Presence,” 71 n. 47.

Gk. σχῆμα, which often means the outward form or appearance that something takes (Phil. 2:7). But here it means more than that; it is not simply the “outward form” that is on its way out, but the total “scheme” of things as they currently exist. Mare, 235, makes the improbable suggestion that it means “material things” here. That is quite to miss its relationship to the rhetoric that has preceded.

Gk. παράγει; this is its only occurrence in Paul, but cf. 1 John 2:8 and 17. Elsewhere Paul uses καταργέω to express this idea (see 1:28; 2:6; 6:13; 13:8–11; 15:24–26).

Cf. the discussion on 1:26.

An untranslated δέ joins this clause to what precedes. It may have adversative force (so Conzelmann, 130), but it is difficult to see how, if our understanding of vv. 29–31 is correct. More likely it flows out of the immediately preceding exhortation to eschatological living, thus δέ (“now”) not in its temporal but consecutive sense.

Gk. θέλω; if Paul intended that they live free from worldly cares, as the common interpretation has it, then this is a most unusual “wish.” In Jesus (Matt. 6:25–34) and elsewhere in Paul (Phil. 4:6) such a concern is addressed as parenesis and is expressly forbidden.

See, e.g., Mare, 235, whose language this is.

This word occurs elsewhere in the NT only in Matt. 28:14, where it is probably wrong to translate as “keeping out of trouble.” Rather, the lie of the chief priests will save the soldiers from the kind of anxiety properly due to those who have been remiss in their duties. Cf. T.Jud. 3:9; Wis. 6:15; 7:23 (the person who obtains wisdom is ἀμέριμνος); and Appian, Maced. 19.3. See also the examples in MM, 26. For its usage in Stoic debates about marriage, see Balch, “1 Cor 7:32–35,” 434–35.

I owe this important insight, as well as some others in this paragraph, to my son Mark, who during his seminary days wrote his exegesis paper on this passage.

See for the textual discussion.

Gk. πῶς with a deliberative subjunctive. As an independent sentence it would say: “How might I please the Lord?”

Repeated, e.g., by Holladay, 104.

Cf. the translation by Beck: “But once he’s married, he worries about earthly things, how he can please his wife.”

Favored also by Balch, “1 Cor 7:32–35,” 434–35.

This insight also comes from my son Mark. See .

Although this is the almost universal view, it has been contested by A. R. Guenther that it may be either epexegetic or a single noun “modified by conjoined arthrous adjectives,” thus “the unmarried chaste woman” (“One Woman or Two? 1 Corinthians 7:34,” BBR 12 [2002], 33–45).

On the textual variation see . Conzelmann suggests that the text of P⁴⁶ et al. means “in (the) body and (the) Spirit,” but that is both unnecessary and nearly impossible in this case.

See esp. Barrett, 181; cf. Ruef, 65.

Cf. Conzelmann, 134 n. 32.

On the word “holy” see on 1:2 and 7:14.

This confusion of ideas is perpetuated in much of the current literature as well. But celibacy is not the same thing as asceticism. The latter has to do with a worldview that negates the material order; the former may be a stance that emerges from an ascetic point of view, but it can also be the result of other things, including giftedness (7:7). The “gifted” celibate, as Paul was, may have a radically different view of the world from the ascetic, as Paul does.

The repeated preposition πρός followed by the substantival use of the adjectives marks the two prepositional phrases as the reason or purpose of what has been said.

Not the καλόν of v. 26, but σύμφορον (cf. 6:12; 10:23; 12:7).

Gk. βρόχον, a metaphor from war or hunting. See, e.g., Jos., War 7.250: “for a noose was thrown around him by a distant enemy who would have dragged him off, had he not instantly cut the rope with his sword and succeeded in escaping” (Loeb, 3:577). In POxy I.51.16 it is used by a physician to describe a hanging (see MM, 118).

Gk. εὔσχημον (“appropriate, proper, seemly”; cf. εὐσχημόνα, “presentable parts,” in 12:24).

Gk. εὐπάρεδρον; a rare adjective, combining εὖ (“well”) and παρεδρία (“sitting beside” or “near”). The noun παρεδρία can mean “service” or “constant presence.”

Gk. ἀπερισπάστως; cf. Epict. 1.29.59: “nay, sit rather free from distractions and listen” (Loeb, 1:203). This word also played a role in Stoic debates about marriage. See Balch, “1 Cor 7:32–35,” 430–34.

A few MSS (D* F G 2495 pc) change the plural to a singular, obviously in the interest of making better sense of the text and probably reflecting the father-daughter interpretation (= “let her marry”; cf. NASB).

The text reads ἕστηκεν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἑδραῖος (“stands firm in his heart”); several MSS (incl. P⁴⁶ F G) omit the ἑδραῖος, while the MajT has put it in its more logical position after ἕστηκεν. See the discussion in Zuntz, 96–97.

The text reads τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παρθένον (“his [own] virgin”), which is difficult for any interpretation. The words were eventually omitted, so that the MajT reads, “He who marries does well; he who does not marry does better” (cf. KJV).

For the ποιεῖ of the majority, P¹⁵ P⁴⁶ B 6 1739 1881 pc read the future ποιήσει, an assimilation to the future of the next clause—which the NIV translates as a present.

The current NIV has relegated the alternative reading re “father” and “daughter” to a footnote; it reads: “36If anyone thinks he is not treating his daughter properly, and if she is getting along in years (or if her passions are too strong), and he feels she ought to marry, he should do as he wants. He is not sinning. He should let her get married. 37But the man who has settled the matter in his own mind, who is under no compulsion but has control over his own will, and who has made up his mind to keep the virgin unmarried—this man also does the right thing. 38So then, he who gives his virgin in marriage does right, but he who does not give her in marriage does better.”

Some Western MSS, followed by the MajT, add νόμῳ (“by law”; K and bo add γάμῳ, “by marriage”), on the basis of Rom. 7:2. It is missing from all the early and best evidence (P¹⁵ P⁴⁶ * A B D* 6 33 81 1175 1739 1881 pc lat Tert Clem Cyp), although J. B. Bauer has argued, not totally convincingly, that Tertullian did know such a reading (“Was las Tertullian 1 Kor 7:39?” ZNW 77 [1986], 284–87).

A number of MSS (D² L Ψ 614 629 1241 2495 pm) add καί, conforming to the earlier pattern ἐὰν δὲ καί (“if indeed”; cf. vv. 11, 21, 28).

For this δέ a few MSS (B 6 33 104 365 630 1739 1881 2495 pc t) substitute γάρ. See the discussion in Zuntz, 204.

Two MSS (P¹⁵ 33) read Χριστοῦ here, a reading that “arose through faulty transcription” (Meztger, 490).

Reflected in the NIV fn. ( above).

See the discussion on v. 25. W. Barclay adopted the expedient of including all three options, one following the other, in his translation (The New Testament: A New Translation [London, 1969], 2:46–47); it should also be noted that it was changed in the REB to “virgin daughter” [with the italics].

This is the basic position of the traditional “father-daughter” view; it was still held by Conzelmann, 134, although he took the view about the “virgins” adopted here; it has more recently been argued for by P. Arzt-Grabner and R. E. Kritzer,” Bräutigam und Braut oder Vater und Tochter? Literarisches und Dokumentarisches zu 1 Cor 7,36–38,” BibNotiz 129 (2006), 89–102.

This first protasis is a present particular (εἰ . . . νομίζει), which probably implies that Paul knew that an actual situation like this existed in the community.

This protasis, ἐὰν ᾖ, is a supposition, reflecting something that might be so.

Gk. ἀσχημονεῖν, a particularly pejorative word describing disgraceful, dishonorable behavior.

This expression is one of the real difficulties for the “spiritual marriage” view. If they are already married spiritually, how might he now think he was behaving shamefully toward her? The “father/daughter” view answers this more easily, but not without difficulty. The father apparently had been considering keeping her a virgin (devoting her to the Lord on his own volition?), but now he is having some second thoughts. It should be noted that most commentaries that take this view do not really wrestle with the fact that the young lady’s wishes are not mentioned at all. The father is the prime actor throughout (see esp. on v. 37), which means that her virginity is not so much her “devotion” to the Lord as his.

The language “his virgin” here is one point in favor of the “spiritual marriage” view, since that would be her proper designation. It is sometimes objected that “his virgin” is a strange way of speaking about one’s betrothed, but that would be less so if the term comes from their letter and Paul is simply using it consistently throughout the argument. Here it would mean something close to “his girl” (Holladay, 105). It is even more difficult for the father-daughter view, since this is the place in particular where one would expect the word “daughter” to appear.

Unfortunately, there are no parallels in Paul to help us here. The closest is to be found in 7:39 and Rom. 7:2, 4, where the second person in the first clause is repeated as the subject in the ἐάν clause, so that there is no mistaking who died. In 2 Cor. 3:16 and Rom. 14:23 the subject of the ἐάν clause is the subject of the main verb in the preceding clause, but there is no ambiguity in those cases. While these data are in no way decisive, they do tend to favor the repetition of the subject of the main clause as the intention here.

This is the suggested translation of LSJ; cf. J. M. Ford, “The Rabbinic Background of St. Paul’s Use of ὑπέρακμος (1 Cor. vii:36),” JJS 17 (1966), 89–91, who argues on the basis of rabbinic sources that it has to do with fully developed breasts. As with her other suggestions in this chapter, to assume a full rabbinic background for either Paul or the Corinthians is to ask too much of this letter.

Cf. NRSV, “if his passions are strong”; NEB, “if, that is, his instincts are too strong”; Barrett, “if he is over-sexed.”

Cf. Barrett: “To renounce marriage may be a fine and spiritual act, but in some cases it may be unfair to the girl and impossible to the man” (184); cf. more recently, B. W. Winter, “Puberty or Passion? The Referent of ὑπέρακμος in 1 Corinthians 7:36,” TynB 49 (1998), 71–89.

Gk. καρδία; literally, “who stands firm in his heart.” “Heart” here means “mind” (cf. 2:9).

Gk. ἀνάγκη (see on v. 26); here it refers to necessity or compulsion, most likely from outside sources, although it could reflect the opposite of being hyperakmos, and “thus it ought to be,” in v. 36.

Gk. ἐξουσία (NIV, “control”); cf. 11:10. This is the first occurrence of this word in this letter (used 2 Thess. 3:9). It will be a predominant word (6x) in Paul’s vigorous defense of his apostleship in chap. 9.

Gk. κέκρικεν ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ καρδίᾳ; literally, “he has decided in his own heart.”

This strong emphasis on his making up his own mind is esp. difficult for both of the other views. Since the Corinthians themselves would favor such an action on his part, it is difficult to understand why Paul would so urge the partner in a celibate marriage. And why would Paul so strongly emphasize that a father must make up his own mind in this matter? In any case, it tends to leave the girl out completely, so that her remaining a virgin is scarcely related to her own volition. How can she be “concerned for” holiness in body and spirit (v. 34) when it is forced upon her by her father’s will, and not her own choice?

Despite many commentaries to the contrary, this is also a very unusual way for Paul to speak of a father not letting his daughter marry!

Cf. Achilles Tatius 8.17.3 and 8.18.2, where Callisthenes, desiring the hand of Calligone, promises not to touch her sexually until she herself would allow. In the first instance, speaking to Calligone, he says: τηρήσω δέ σε παρθένον (“I will respect your virginity . . .”). In recounting this to Sostratus, he says: παρθένον γὰρ τὴν κόρην μέχρι τούτου τετήρηκα (“I have kept the maiden a virgin to this very hour”).

This is the clause that offers strongest support for the “spiritual marriage” view. Hence the NEB: “to preserve his partner in her virginity.” But there are too many other strikes against this view, and this clause finally will mean nearly the same thing for all views.

This use of the adv. “well” (καλῶς) seems to confirm that the usage “it is good” does not carry moral overtones for Paul (see ), even though it probably did for the Corinthians in their slogans. That makes the NIV’s “does the right thing” an unfortunate choice, since “right” in such a sentence can carry strong moral overtones. It is even more unfortunate in the next sentence.

Gk. ὥστε; see on 3:7.

Cf. . In both instances Paul uses the future for this person.

The 2nd-c. A.D. grammarian Apollonius in fact distinguishes between the two verbs in this way (quoted in MM, 121). But since it is found in no Greek literature or papyri, one cannot tell what his “rule” means; esp. so, since the Atticists were trying to overcome koinē usage. He may very well have been trying to “correct” its being used as Paul does in this passage.

See esp. MM, 121.

It is often suggested that this final concern is whether widows should remarry. While the advice finally deals with that question, it does not begin that way. Had that been the question, it would have been more appropriate for Paul simply to talk about widows, as in v. 8. Conzelmann, however, sees this opening sentence as “paving the way” for his announcement about widows (136 n. 50).

See .

In Rom. 7:2–3 the idea is repeated, but in terms of being bound by “the law.” That almost certainly means the OT law, but the use of “law” in that case is determined by the context, where death to the “law” is the concern of the analogy (or at least is the point finally derived from it). It is unlikely that Paul is here thinking in terms of the Jewish law. Jesus has the final word on this one.

The Greek clause, ἐάν with the aorist subjunctive, is a future supposition (cf. vv. 11, 28, 36). This seems to run counter to the suggestion of Barrett, 185–86, that it might be speaking of a Christian husband who has already died. Granted that 11:30 implies that many in the community have already died, which may have widowed more than one woman, Paul is nonetheless speaking more generally.

Gk. κοιμηθῇ, lit. “fallen asleep”; a euphemism for death, used by Paul only to refer to believers who have died (1 Thess. 4:13–15; 1 Cor. 11:30; 15:6, 18, 20, 51).

Pace Ford, Trilogy, 98. The clause speaks of her own will in such a way that it is hardly conceivable that she is a young widow obliged by Jewish law to marry her brother-in-law. Dr. Ford seems to disregard the Greek here, which hardly allows that it is the same case as in vv. 36–37 but now from the woman’s point of view. Here the question is suppositional, not something that has already happened.

This does not eliminate the father-daughter interpretation for the former paragraph, but it does suggest that, since the widow had such freedom of choice, one would need overwhelming evidence to show that a young woman did not have some voice in the matter as well.

Almost certainly this means what the NIV translates, “but he must belong to the Lord.” That is, since she is a Christian, her new husband should be from within the community as well. Lightfoot, 235, followed by Barrett, 186, thinks this too limiting for the phrase μόνον ἐν κυρίῳ; but even he (Lightfoot) must allow that his view (simply a word that she remember her own Christian duty in this matter) comes out at nearly the same point.

Gk. κἀγώ (cf. 2:1, 3).

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