CHAP. III. Of the Law.Here I thought it good to speak somewhat concerning the nature of the law, and therewithal to show
CHAP. III. Of the Law.
H ere I thought it good to speak somewhat concerning the nature of the law, and therewithal to show, how the Manichees and Pelagians understood it not: and what the same worketh in us, either before regeneration, or after we be justified. First, as touching the form thereof, the same must be affirmed, which Paul saith in his epistle to the Romans, when he writeth, that it is spiritual. But the universal end thereof, and which appertaineth unto all men, is to bring men unto the knowledge of sin. Which thing Paul signified, saying; that By the law cometh the knowledge of sin.
Here if thou demand wherefore the apostle said not rather; By the law cometh the knowledge of righteousness? I answer, because a man not yet regenerate, so long as he is without Christ, cannot have in himself the feel of good works, or of true righteousness, which may satisfy the law of God.
Wherefore, when he compareth his doings with the law, he perceiveth them to be only falls and transgressions. But if we do speak of the end of the law, as touching the elect; that is Christ. And this doth also Paul teach, saying;
The end of the law is Christ unto salvation: which yet he speaketh not
universally, but Unto everyone that believeth. For the law itself, by itself doth not bring a man to this end. The Ethnics said, that The end of the law is a knowledge, which it breedeth as touching things to be done. Whereupon
Chrysippus (as he is cited in the Digests) saith; that The law is the knowledge of things divine and human. Howbeit, this end, and this definition be to largely extended: for all wisdom, and all good arts, do teach some knowledge of divine and heavenly things.
Now there remaineth, that we diligently consider what is the matter and efficient cause of the law. And to comprehend these things briefly, I say, that The law is the commandment of God, wherein both his will, and also his disposition or nature is expressed. When I say, A commandment; I note the general word: for there be commandments of the people, of the senate, of kings, of emperors. But when I say, Of God; I make a difference, which betokeneth the efficient cause. Whereas I say, that in the law is expressed the will of God, that is more evident than needeth exposition. But perhaps it may seem more obscure, that I said, we be taught in the law concerning the disposition of God, and be stirred up to the knowledge of his nature: wherefore we will make the same plain by examples. When God commandeth us, that we should love him; he teacheth us thereby, that he is of a nature to be beloved: for things cannot rightly be loved, unless the very same are worthy to be loved. And unless he were well affected towards us, he would not set forth unto us that chief good, which we should love: wherefor he chiefly persuadeth us unto this, because he desireth to have us partakers of himself. We perceive therefore, that he is such a one towards us, as he also desireth us to be. And when he forbiddeth that we should not kill, first he showeth his own will. Further, he declareth himself to be a God, which detesteth violence and injuries, and he had rather do good unto
men, than hurt them. After the same sort these two things might be showed in the rest of the precepts.
And out of this definition those things may be also gathered, the which we spake above, touching the form and end of the law: because it is of necessity, that such a doctrine be spiritual, and that it breed an excellent knowledge. And we be taught, that it is no small benefit, that God hath thereby given unto men: for he bringeth to pass, that both we know our selves, and understand the properties of God. Plato in his books of the law of a public wealth, and in Minoe, seemeth thus to define a law; namely, that It is a right way of governing, which by profitable means directeth unto the best end; by setting forth punishments unto the transgressors, and rewards unto the obedient. This definition may very well be applied unto the law of God: yea verily, there can be no such law, unless it be of God. It is no marvel then, if the old Law-makers, when they would have their laws commended, did feign some god to be the author of them: for Minos ascribed his laws to Jupiter; Lycurgus, his to Apollo; Solon and Draco, theirs to Minerva; Numa Pompilius, his to Aegeria. And we are assured out of the holy scriptures, that our law was given of God by Moses in mount
Sina.
2. And these things thus ordered, concerning the nature and definition of a law; we may easily understand, how foully the Manichees have erred, which blasphemed the same, and cursed it as evil. For seeing the law commandeth nothing, but things to be commanded; and forbiddeth nothing, but things to be forbidden; how can it justly be accused? For there can be no just or honest duty found out, but that by the law of God it is commended; and nothing fowl or dishonest, but it is forbidden in the same: nor only wicked doings are prohibited by the law, but also wicked lusts are
condemned. Wherefore that showeth, that not only the outward works, but the mind and will must be corrected. And since a great part of felicity standeth in the acknowledging of God, and that philosophers do so greatly commend the knowledge of our selves; both which things, the law of God doth appoint: the same cannot (without grievous offense) be blamed as evil and pernicious. Yet the place wherein it is said; that The law entered in, that sin should abound, might seem to make somewhat for the Manichees. As also that to the Galatians; that The law was given because of transgressions.
And that in the 7th chapter of the epistle to the Romans; that Sin through the commandment killeth. And that which is said in the second epistle to the Corinthians; that The law is the ministry of death. All these seem to confirm the error of the Manichees.
But there must a choice diligently be made of those things, which of themselves belong to the law; from those which follow it by reason of another thing, and by accidental means: for sin, death, damnation, and other things of this sort, do spring out of the law, by reason of the corruption of our nature. But if thou compare not the law with our nature, but consider the same by itself; or if thou refer it to a sound and uncorrupt nature: thou canst not otherwise pronounce of it, then that which Paul saith; that It is spiritual, holy, good, and that it was ordained for life; and that rather it must be said to declare, than to work sin. Wherefore, if deformed men lying hidden in the dark, should say unto one, which by chance bringeth a light;
Get thee away hence, least thou make us deformed by this thy light: certainly, we would not gather by their words, that the power and nature of the light is such, as it can make men deformed; but this rather, that those things, which of themselves be deformed, are by the light discovered and showed what they be. Even so fareth it altogether with the law: for after a
sort it bringeth in light, and bringeth forth to our knowledge the sins which before lay hidden.
But some man will say; If the law be good and holy, why are men so discontented therewith, and have it in hatred? Even because it calleth men back from those things, whereunto by nature they are inclined: for it grieveth them to be forbidden those things. And when we look in the law, we see the things which we ought to do; and by reason of the pride, which is naturally planted and engrafted in us, we would not be restrained by any rules. Moreover, we perceive that our actions be wrested from that uprightness, which is set forth in the law; and that (which is more grievous) we feel our selves to be so weak, that we cannot correct them, and revoke them to the rule prescribed. But in the mean time we look upon the punishments, and upon the wrath of God, which for sin we do incur. All these things so offend our mind, as we be angry, not with ourselves and our sins, as meet it were; but with the law that is given by God: whereas otherwise the same is most perfect and most holy. Howbeit, this discommodity may be remedied; and it may be brought to pass, that that which before displeased, may please us afterward: and this will come to pass, if we join the law together with Christ.
For as the waters of Marath were most bitter to the children of Israel in the wilderness; and yet the very same, by casting in the wood, which God had appointed, were made sweet: even so, although the law of itself be bitter; yet if Christ (whom God hath set forth unto us to be an only savior, and the very just end of the law) be added thereunto, then shall we feel it to be sweet. The which thing that it happened unto David, it is manifestly perceived by the 19th Psalm, wherein the praises of God's law are wonderfully set forth: for it is called pleasant and sweet, above honey and
the honey comb. And this is it, which is promised us in the prophet, that God would write a law in our hearts: which is nothing else, than that he would give unto us the spirit of Christ, by whom we should be inclined to those things, which the law hath commanded to be done; that at the leastwise the commandments of God may be pleasant unto our hearts. Which thing the apostle also teacheth, when he saith; I serve the law of God in my mind. Whereof the regenerate have experience, who though they be not able to perform a perfect obedience unto the commandments of God; yet do they love them, and exceedingly desire them, and embrace them as the chief
God; and do continually pray unto God, that they may draw most near to the perfection of them. By these things it appeareth, how the commodity and righteousness of the law is defended against the Manichees.
3. But on the other side, the Pelagians are no less to be shunned, which attribute more unto the law, than is convenient; for they judge the same to be sufficient unto salvation: and say, that men, if they have once understood what is to be done, may be able (by the very strength of nature) easily to perform the same. Wherefore Pelagius, for fear least he should have been condemned by the bishops of Palestine, as one which utterly denied the grace of God, confessed the same grace in word: for he affirmed, that it is needful to have the grace of God unto salvation. But by grace he meant no other thing, but nature itself freely granted unto us by God; insomuch as God hath made us reasonable, and endued us with free will. Moreover, he called grace a law, or a doctrine: because of our selves we be ignorant what is to be done, or what to be believed; unless God do reveal those things unto us. Whereupon Augustine, in his book De gratia Christi, against Caelestinus, writeth; that They affirm the possibility of nature to be holpen by grace. But he addeth; that If their meanings be examined, and thoroughly
sifted, we shall perceive, that by grace, doctrine, and law, they mean nothing else; but that a man, having only received the knowledge of the law, hath power enough of himself to do the commandments.
Unto which error the School-divines draw very near, when they teach; that A man, by the very power of nature, is able to keep the commandments of God, as touching the substance of the work; although not according to the intent of him that commandeth. By which words this they signify, that we be able to perform the very works, although not in such sort as God hath commanded them to be done; namely, in charity, and in the spirit: which latter part I suppose they added, that they might be seen in some point to disagree from the Pelagians. But Augustine so far disagreed from these kind of opinions; as unto those, which be regenerate, while they live in this flesh, he granteth not a perfect observation of the commandments of God: which evidently appeareth by his retractations. And that his judgment therein is most true, Paul declareth in the epistle to the Romans.
Doubtless, if the matter were so, as the Pelagians taught; there was no need of Christ's coming, and of the sacrifice of the cross: for these things were therefore given, because by our own strength we could not attain to the righteousness of works. Which Paul plainly testifieth, saying; That which was impossible to the law, forsomuch as it was made weak by the flesh, &c. These things do manifestly teach, that man, by reason of the infirmity of the flesh, might not fulfill the law. Further, he saith; The wisdom of the flesh is enmity towards God, for it is not subject unto the law of God, neither can it be. For although the law hath power to teach, and to give light unto the mind; yet doth it not therefore minister strength, or change the will. Wherefore Ambrose in his book De fuga saeculi, saith; that The law can stop the mouth of all men, but yet cannot convert the mind.
And a little after; The law in deed maketh the fault evident, but taketh not away the naughtiness. Wherefore grace must be added thereunto; the which, because the Pelagians contemned, they wandered from salvation, and were justly condemned of the church.
4. As concerning then the office of the law, these few things must be observed; first, that the same is not altogether unprofitable, even without regeneration: for it may be available to some civil discipline. For, if men do the outward works of the law, in such sort as they may: although they be sins unto them, which do them; yet through them, civil order may be preserved. For where there is no observation of these things, all things are confounded; wrongs be done, naughty lust rageth out of measure, the wrath of God is kindled; so as he suffereth those common-wealth's, which be thus corrupted, not long to continue. Also there is another work of the law, which is inward, appertaining to the conscience, that it should perpetually accuse, vex, whip and condemn the same. And by this mean, as we have said, God doth at the length bring men to justification: which justification being obtained, the law doth not yet lie idle; but is like unto a glass, wherein the regenerate behold what fruits of faith they ought to bring forth, how much they ought every day to profit, what they have to give thanks for, and how much they want of the just restitution, whereby they may the more earnestly pray unto God therefore. Also, the law setteth a mark before our eyes, whereunto they ought to level in all their actions: unto the which, although they cannot attain in this life; yet they must apply their endeavor to depart but a little from it. By these things it appeareth, how much the law doth avail in outward works; what it worketh in the conscience, and how much it helpeth them which be regenerate.
Of Philosophy, and of the comparison hereof, especially moral, with Divinity; taken out of the beginning of the Commentaries upon Aristotle's Ethics.
5. All the knowledge that we have, is either revealed, or gotten by endeavor: in the former part is divinity, and in the latter is philosophy. The name of philosophy is compounded. Wisdom of some is called a knowledge of all the things that be extant. But since that wisdom comprehendeth nothing but a certain and undoubted knowledge, it cannot be as concerning all things; for some certain things are unknown: things that come by chance and casually, cannot be known, because of their uncertainty. Others say, that the same is a knowledge of divine and human things: howbeit, between divine and human, there are found many things; namely, the circles of heaven, stars, elements, meteors, stones, mines, plants, herbs, and brute beasts. But they refer heaven unto God; because it is a thing immortal: but inferior things, they say, belong unto men, forsomuch as they be corruptible. But in what place will they account the science Mathematical?
Howbeit it seemeth meet that it be defined; to wit, that It is an habit given to men's minds by God, increased by diligence and exercise, whereby all things that be, are comprehended, so far forth as they can certainly and by firm reason be comprehended, that man may attain unto felicity. And here be all the kinds of causes. The form, which is the habit. The matter, wherein it cleaveth; that is to wit, the mind and reason of man, and those things about which (as about objects) the same is occupied; namely, about all things that be extant, yet not simply and absolutely, but so far forth as they can be certainly known. The worker is specified; namely, in that God is appointed to be the author: for he hath planted light in our minds, and hath sown in us the seeds, which are the originals of all sciences. Whereupon
Cicero in the first book of his Tusculane questions, saith, that Philosophy is the gift and invention of the gods. And this doth Lucretius also grant, although he were an Epicure. And forsomuch as an assured knowledge of all things may rather be desired than hoped for, and is sooner loved than possessed; and that the more we give ourselves to the same, so much the more are we stirred up towards it: therefore it is called philosophy. The author of this name was Pythagoras: he, when he was come to Philonta, and had spoken with Leontes, which in this place was a tyrant; marveling at the wit and eloquence of the man, demanded of him what art or science he would profess: who would not say, that he was a wise man, but one that desired wisdom, that is, a philosopher.
6. And this being defined on this wise, it is divided into the part active and contemplative: both which Aristotle entreated of, according as the subject required. These do so differ, as contemplative alonely beholdeth, and active practiseth those things that be known. So as they differ in their ends: for contemplative reposeth itself in the very contemplation of things; for it is not able to exercise them. But active doth therefore behold, that it may in work express the thing which it knoweth. And we see undoubtedly, that in man there be two works: for he understandeth, and afterward he worketh.
And even as God not only understandeth himself, and is happy and perfect to himself; but also by his providence doth create, and things being brought forth, governeth them: so likewise is there two sorts of man's felicity; the one, which we may call active, and thereof doth Aristotle write in his first book of Ethics; and the other, which is far more perfect and exquisite, is contemplative, and of that he disputed in the tenth book. Whereby it appeareth, that man, if he become perfect in this double felicity, draweth very near unto the similitude of God. Wherefore Plato, in his book of the
immortality of the soul, said: that Philosophy is the imitating of God, according to man's ability. Neither is this distinction of practice and speculation given (as some think) by the works of our own understanding and will: for it ought not thus to be; because knowledges are distinguished by their objects. But if a man will somewhat more diligently consider of the matter, he shall see, that it must be taken according as those things be which are understood: for those either have God and nature for their causes, and then they belong to the kind speculative; because such things we cannot do by our own choice. But there be other things, which have us for their causes, in respect that we do will and choose: and these be of the active faculty.
But let us see whether of these is the more excellent. By the common and received opinion, the speculative is preferred before the active: for action is ordained unto contemplation; but not so on the other part. And no man doubteth, but that which is ordained to another thing, is of less worthiness than that thing. But they again object, that the general word of contemplation belongeth unto action: for therefore do we behold nature, that we may love the author thereof; and therefore do we seek to know God, to the intent we may honor him: and for this cause is our divinity of some, called active. Howbeit, these men, in reasoning after this manner, are very much deceived: for there is no science therefore called active, because there followeth a work of that knowledge, unless the self-same thing be performed which was first known. When we behold nature, and the heaven, albeit of the same there follow a worshipping and loving of God; yet must not such a knowledge be called active, forsomuch as that is not brought to pass which we do behold: for there is no man that can make nature and heaven, and other works that follow thereof. Accidentally they are said to
be done: for not all they which do behold these things, do love and honor God; nay rather, they be oftentimes furthest of all from him. And further, the works following that knowledge, and also our divinity, have respect unto this; that we may know God more and more, until we behold him face to face in the kingdom of heaven.
And our savior Christ confirmed this opinion, when he said; This is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. And not only do these two points divide philosophy, but they also divide our understanding: whereupon the one is called active, and the other speculative; not as though there can be two powers or faculties of the mind; but because the understanding, according as it is conversant about such and such other things, so is it called either speculative or active. That philosophy which is speculative, is divided into three parts. For there be some things even utterly sundered and severed from the matter; so is God, and so are the intelligences, and they are called supernatural: or else they are things so inherent in the matter, as without it they cannot so much as be defined, and in that sort they are natural: or else they are after a middle sort; for that they cannot be without a matter, either of iron, or wood, or such like, and yet may be defined or understood without those things; as are the Mathematics.
7. These things may be yet further distinguished; but I cease, and I will so divide active philosophy, as therein may be taught precepts touching the life and instruction either of one or of many. If it be of one, it is a book of moral philosophy: if of many, they are either more in number, or fewer. If they be fewer, they concern household government: if they be more, they belong to the common weal. But in what place shall we leave arts? They are comprehended under the third active kind, and belong unto politic
government; neither must they be excluded from the nature of wisdom. For art is σύστημα εγκαταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρός τί τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. In this definition there appear two things. First, that art is a habit belonging to knowledge, whereby some things are certainly comprehended; namely, through exercise and experience, so as it cannot be excluded from wisdom. And it is not to be doubted, that the ancients called them, Wise men, which found out these arts, or else did excel in them.
Whereupon Bezeleel and Aholiab in the holy scriptures are called wise men. The other thing that we speak of is, that this knowledge is active; for these things are known by exercise: and by these habits somewhat is done and brought to pass, which helpeth to maintain the life. Wherefore the walkers upon ropes, and jugglers, and such other like, which do nothing profitable unto man's life, must not be called artificers; but deceivers and triflers.
But arts may be divided into those, which bring forth some work; and into those, which in the very action are consumed. Now doth it appear by these things, what we are to judge concerning Logic: for even the same also must be reckoned among the arts, and it worketh most profitable things in the life; so as it ought not to be divided from wisdom, especially seeing it is a ready mean, instrument, and way to procure wisdom unto us. Neither must the way be cut off from his scope appointed. Yea moreover, Cicero distinguished the parts of philosophy; so that it is partly touching life and manners, partly touching nature and things hidden; or else it concerneth the art of disputing: in the first of his Academ. which he rehearseth out of Plato.
Neither doth Galen disagree from this opinion. But as concerning the authors of philosophy, we must understand, that they brought more profit to the world, than did Ceres, that invented the increase of corn and grain; than
did Bacchus, that found out the wines; or than Hercules, that rid the world of monsters: for these things belong to the maintenance of bodily life; but philosophy nourisheth and instructeth the soul itself.
8. Now must we remove a certain small impediment: and it is that which Paul saith in the second chapter to the Colossians; Beware least there be any man that spoil you through philosophy. By which words in very deed he seemeth to terrify Christian men from the study of philosophy: howbeit, if ye mark well the apostles meaning, I am sure that ye will be nothing troubled. True philosophy, since it is gathered by the knowledge of the creatures, and by those propositions concludeth many things as touching the justice and goodness, which God planted naturally in the minds of men, it cannot be justly accused. For it is the work of God, and without his special gift it cannot be had of men. But Paul reproveth that philosophy, which is corrupted through the inventions of men, and ambitious contentions of philosophers. For if they had kept themselves within certain bounds, and had only pronounced those things, which the knowledge of the creatures did by most assured reasons declare, as touching God and nature; they should not have erred from the truth. Wherefore the apostle saith; Through philosophy and vain deceit: and he addeth; Which are according to the traditions of men, and rudiments of the world. Not the creatures, but men did teach, that the world should be everlasting.
It was not nature that showed, but it was vain cogitations that devised the world to be compact of the concourse of such small and indivisible motes as we see in the sun-shine, and to consist as it were of no ground. And who doubteth, but that the fate and impassibility of the Stoics, the perpetual doubting of the Academics, and the idle and unoccupied deity of the Epicures, was this vain deceit? Men dreamt of a community of things, of
the intermingling of wives one with another in Common-wealth's, of pleasure to be the chiefest good, and of gods to be worshipped after the manner of common people; but they took no knowledge by a natural light, and by usual propositions known of themselves by assured reasons. These in very deed are the venoms and corruptions, wherewith the devil by naughty men corrupteth philosophy, being the gift of God; and this being so defiled and corrupted, Paul would have to be eschewed.
9. Howbeit, now must we see how these things that we have hitherto spoken, will agree with the holy scriptures; for there also have we philosophy active and contemplative. Those things that we believe, and are comprehended in the articles of the faith, do belong unto contemplation; for those we perceive by knowledge, but we do them not: and albeit they are not comprehended in science, yet nevertheless are they understood. Unto the active kind are those referred, which are contained in laws, counsels, and exhortations. Thus far do these agree: yet do they differ, because in philosophy, that which is active goeth before that which is speculative. For (as it hath been said) we cannot with human strength behold either God or nature, till first our affections be at quiet. But in the holy scriptures, speculation taketh the first place; insomuch as we must first believe and be justified by faith: and then afterward do follow good works, and that the more and more abundantly, as we be daily renewed by the holy Ghost. Thus doth Paul set it forth in his epistles: for he first handleth doctrine, and afterward he descendeth to the instruction of manners, and framing of the life. And so were the children of Israel first gathered in Egypt under the faith of one God the savior; and afterward in the desert they received laws, which serve unto the knowledge, which consisteth in practice. Again, in the table of the ten commandments is observed the same order, for it saith first;
I am the Lord thy God: the which thing belongeth to faith, or speculative knowledge: afterward do follow precepts, which belong to the works required of God. The cause of this difference is, that human contemplations are gotten by searching out, and by the endeavor of meditation; and therefore moderate affects are necessary. But those things that we believe, are received by the inspiration of God; so that there is no need of those preparations. And in man's reason, it behooveth men first to do just things, before they be justified. But the order of divine sanctification, is far otherwise appointed: for we first believe, and afterward be justified; then by the spirit and by grace are our minds renewed; finally, there follow just and honest deeds.
10. Moreover, the end of philosophy is, that we should obtain that blessedness or felicity, which may be gotten here by man's strength: but the end of Christian godliness is to have repaired in us that image, whereunto we are made in righteousness and holiness of truth, that we may daily grow up in the knowledge of God, until we be brought to see him even as he is, with face discovered. Besides this, in the moral philosophy of Aristotle, we shall not hear of the remission of sins; nor of the fear and confidence towards God, nor of justification by faith, nor of Christ, or such other like things: for these things are opened by the will of God, being such as cannot be gathered by a natural knowledge from the creatures. And we deny not, but it oftentimes happeneth, that the self-same things are commended in Aristotle's Ethics, which are commanded by God in the holy scriptures; but then are those all one in matter, but not inform, properties, and principles: for in them there is a sundry respect, a difference of properties, and their originals not all one.
Even in like manner as the rain water, and any fountain water is all one in matter; but the strength, property, and originals be of great diversity: for the one cometh by a heat of the heavens, and by the clouds and coldness of the middle region of the air; but this other is either gathered from the sea, out of the hollow places of the earth, and is so strained as it becometh sweet; or else it cometh by converting the air into water, through the coldness of the place where the spring ariseth. Even so, those things that a Christian doth, he doth them by the drift of the holy Ghost: for they which be driven by the holy Ghost, be the children of God; but they which deal by philosophy, according to moral rules, do work by the guide of human reason. Such be stirred to do these things, because they so judge it to be honest and right; but the Christians, because God hath so decreed it. Those think, that if they so do, they profit and make perfect themselves; but these, because they may obey the majesty of God. Those do believe their own selves; but these do believe God, and the words of the law which he hath made. Those be carried with a love of themselves; but these with the love of God alone.
Doubtless, of this manifold diversity it cometh to pass, that one and the same thing, as concerning the matter, both pleaseth God, and by his judgment is condemned of him. And thus much of these differences, and of the consent that is between the holy scripture and human philosophy.
11. But to return to that whence we digressed; namely, whether this faculty be repugnant unto godliness: I affirm, that it is no more against the same, than is Astrology, than is the art of mariners or soldiers, than is fishing, hunting, and finally, than is the knowledge of the law of man, which all men know how necessary it is for the government of commonwealth's. Verily the same picketh out her laws and institutions, which be engrafted in our minds, concerning justice and goodness; the very which
notwithstanding, moral philosophers do discuss and turn most exquisitely, in such sort as they not only know these things very manifestly, but also can with great perspicuity teach them unto others. Hereof it cometh, that in Greek σοφία, which is, wisdom; is called as it were σάφεια, that is, perspicuity: and σοφός, wise, as it were σαφής, manifest or perspicuous; because it declareth and maketh very plain, those things which it handleth.
And so, by this means, the lawyers might easily defend their science to be a part of philosophy: albeit they by their laws do not so gravely decree touching virtue, goodness, and justice, as the philosophers dispute of them.
For example sake; Philosophy detesteth ingratitude towards all states of men, but the laws do not punish the same, unless it be committed by children towards their parents; or of late servants towards their patrons.
Human laws compel no man to give their goods to the poor; but philosophy commendeth bountifulness and liberality towards all men. And what shall I say more?
Cicero, in the commendation of this kind of philosophy pronounceth thus, in his fifth book of Tusculane questions; O philosophy, the guide of life! O thou that art the searcher out of virtue and expeller of vice! What could not only we, but altogether even the life of men have been without thee? Thou broughtest forth cities, thou gatheredst together the dispersed men into society of life, thou first of all joinedst them together in houses, afterward in marriages, and after that, in the unity of letters and words; thou wast the mistress of manners and discipline, &c. All men know what an excellent thing is the strength of herbs, stones, metals, and medicines; and this do not we also deny: but for all that, doth it not follow, that this is a worthy faculty, whereby the acts, the choices, the arts, the methods, the wits, virtues and vices of men be perceived? What can be accounted more excellent, than for
a man to know himself? And this do we singularly well know hereby. And moreover, we must call to mind that which Plato said; to wit, that It may easily come to pass, that earnest loves toward virtue, may be stirred up in us, if otherwhile some image thereof might be set before our eyes. And on the other side, we are a great deal to blame, that we do nowhere behold the same near at hand. There ariseth no small pleasure by this science, to know within what bounds the light of nature ought to keep it self, and how far in his own right it may extend. And Christian religion is exceedingly kindled, by considering the manners of the Ethnics: since by a comparison we perceive, how greatly those things, which be taught in the holy scriptures, do excel the philosophical precepts. For it is a common saying; that Contraries, when they are compared together, do shine with the greater light. And errors cannot conveniently be shunned, except they be first known. Wherefore, he that hath known both of these faculties, shall the easilier avoid the faults of the one; namely, of human philosophy, especially, when they shall be showed plainly in their own proper places.
Necessary rules as well for the expounding, as for obeying of the law.
12. First, we are to mark the order of the tables, which we see set forth in the ten commandments. For the first table is that, which treateth concerning
God, without any mean: but the other is directed unto our neighbor. And we must judge, that the dignity of the first table is the greater, because it containeth the other, and as a principal architecture hath the same under it; and further, that the end thereof is more noble, because the end of the latter table is ruled and governed by the former. Wherefore Luther in his catechism, very prudently in everyone precept of the latter table, rehearsed the end of the first table. For example sake; Because God must be loved with all the heart, and with all the soul; therefore thou shalt not kill. Again;
Because God must be loved with all the heart, and with all the soul, therefore thou must not commit adultery. In the ten commandments only, the sum of the law is set forth, and that after the plainer and homelier sort; wherein we ought to understand all the parts thereof. The head and sum of all deceitful things is πλεονεξία, which signifieth, Immoderate coveting of more, or, To carve himself a greater part than is just. Even as against all foul voluptuous pleasures, only adultery is expressly named, under which is comprehended all kinds of uncleanness. And touching the commandment of idolatry, therein is forbidden all kind of false worshipping, whereas that only is expressed which is most gross. Where two laws are made one contrary to another; the obedience must be done unto the latter. God commanded that the first fruits should be offered unto him, and sacrifices to be made unto his name: but he himself afterward commanded, that all the goods of the Amalechites should be utterly destroyed. Unto this latter commandment Saul should have obeyed.
13. This is to be observed in all precepts, as well ceremonial, as judicial, and moral. When two precepts of God seem one to be repugnant to another, so as the one is a hindrance to the other, that they cannot both at one time be observed; yea rather, it is necessary that the one of them for the time being be omitted: then, that which shall be judged weightiest and greatest, must be retained. But yet in the meantime, that other, which is reckoned to be less and lighter, is not violated; because in the same there is nothing done against the will of God. The law commandeth, that everyone should have respect to the safety of his neighbor: and if one be a magistrate, that he by arms defend his city. The same law commandeth, that We must not labor on the sabbath day: the enemy besiegeth the city, and that on the sabbath day; because he knoweth that that law was laid upon the citizens. Here seemeth a
contrariety of the precepts: for on the one part, safety must be maintained; and on the other part, the sabbath must be observed. The Machabeis judged it best to fight, because the safety of the common-wealth seemed greater and better than the ceremony of the sabbath.
Also the law is, that we should feed the hungry: and another law commandeth, that the show-bread should be eaten of none, but of the priests. David came hungry unto the priest, nothing he had but the showbread: wherefore here cometh together two contrary precepts. The wise priest followeth and observeth that, which is the worthier; namely, to feed the hungry: he brought out the show-bread, and helped David. There is also another law, that we must furnish the prince with armor; for he is to be holpen by his subjects: and contrariwise, it is commanded, that things consecrated unto God must not be translated unto other uses. David the king's son in law, which warred for him as his general lieutenant, was then unarmed: the priest had no weapon at hand, but the sword of Goliath. Here be two precepts, which seem contrary; the priest followeth the one, and delivereth the sword unto the magistrate: because he judged it better, to arm the magistrate, than to observe the ceremony.
Also there is a law, that the church must not be deprived of ministers, so as it should be destitute of them: and Paul hath another law, that a novice or man newly entered into religion, should not be a bishop. The church of Milane was much troubled, because it could not find a meet bishop, that as well was free from the heresy of Arius, as also that had great authority and learning given him of God: only there was Ambrose; but yet a novice, and newly come to the faith. Here are two laws met, in show contrary one to another; but it was meet for the lesser law to give place to the greater: for Christ so taught, when by the sentence of the prophet he saith; I will have
mercy, and not sacrifice. Howbeit, he meaneth not, that he will not have sacrifice: but that, if two commandments meet together, whereof the one belongeth unto mercy, and the other unto sacrifice; he testifieth, that he had rather have mercy, than sacrifice.
14. Hitherto also may be referred, that Augustine unto Publicola discreetly and largely disputeth, whether it be lawful for a Christian man to receive of an Ethnic an oath by false gods: and at the end he concludeth that it is lawful. For when as the Romans had on every side neighbors that were idolaters, it was of necessity, that they should keep with them some civil faith and covenants. Indeed it behooved, that they should have sworn by the true God; but when that might not be brought to pass, it remained, that the Roman Christians should abuse their naughtiness, and receive that oath which was offered by the names of the idols. For so Jacob received an oath of Laban, when he doubted not, but that he worshipped the gods of Nachor his father. There is an excellent history extant in the 41st chapter of Jeremiah, when Ishmael had slain Godolias, he encountered with certain men going to worship at Jerusalem; those also he led out of the way, and slew. Of these men there were ten that said; Slay us not, we have honey, oil, and grain; if thou wilt pardon us our life, we will show thee where those things be. Those men may seem not to have done rightly, in showing of their goods unto thieves: for that was to be willing to help manifest robbery.
For they could not have found nor taken away those goods, unless they had been showed unto them; howbeit, they in very deed used the wickedness of other to save their own life.
So may he be excused, which taketh up money upon interest; for that would he not do, except he were constrained through want and necessity: and when he is compelled to be at another man's devotion, he suffereth
injury, but doth it not. So Paul unto the Philippians saith; that There be some, which teach the Gospel through evil will: and yet (he saith) that Therein he rejoiceth, yea and will rejoice; for that they, if they do anything of an ill will, shall render account unto the Lord: not that he would warrant their offense. And here it must chiefly be considered, whether the thing itself in his own nature be evil. For if it be, then must we not in any wise allow the same by our consent: if it be not, there is no let, but that being forced by necessity, we may assent thereunto, so as the same may be undertaken without any fault of ours. But yet in the meantime must he, with whom we in such wise do compact or consent, be admonished of his fault.
15. Yet there cometh a question, whether that old man, which is spoken of in the 19th of Judges, and 14th verse, did right; when he promised his daughter, and the Levites wife unto the Gabionits, to the intent they should not do violence unto his guest. All the writers answer it not after one manner. Some say, that he had respect unto the greatness and grievousness of the crime, and preferred the lesser evil before the greater; and that he would not break the faith which he had given to his guest, and they think that by such reasons he was to be excused. None otherwise judge they as concerning Lot. And among the rest, Chrysostom greatly commendeth Lot in that matter. Which Ambrose also doth in his book of Abraham the Patriarch; for that he made less account of the injury of his house, than of so great a villainy. But Augustine in his questions upon Genesis, doth weigh these things more diligently and narrowly; and denieth altogether, that the recompensing of one fault with another is to be suffered. In his judgment it was not lawful for him, to yield his daughters to the lewd lust of the Sodomites, thereby to keep them from a more grievous sin. Neither is it lawful, that we in our own selves, should commit a less fault, to avoid a
greater: for the apostle doth plainly teach, that We must not do evil, that good may come of it. Wherefore, when the matter cometh to sin, although it seem to be but light; yet it must be wholly forborne. And if any matter more heinous might seem to ensue by the delay of sin, the care thereof must be committed unto God: but, we under that pretense must not commit any sin.
This was Augustine's opinion, which I do very well allow.
And least we go from the history which we have in hand: although this old man was to keep his faith with his ghost; yet should he also have used faithfulness and protection towards his daughter, and the Levites wife.
Neither was it lawful for him to show a more faithfulness unto his guest, than the word of God permitted. Wherefore, he could not in right, humble unto them either his daughter, or the wife of his guest: for the father hath not so much power over his daughter, as he may set her forth to be abused by other men; neither ought the daughter herself to obey in anything that is sin, although her father would will her, and command her. But they say, that the lesser evil must be preferred before the greater. I know, that so it hath been customably spoken. But it must be rightly understood; namely, that it taketh place in outward affections, and in the troubles of the body, and of the life: because in such manner of discommodities, as often as we are to take deliberation what we should prefer, the lesser loss must be preferred before the greater; because it hath a respect of good. But in sin there is no consideration of good; and surly whatsoever is sin, the same must straightway be rejected, let there afterward follow what will. But Augustine after a sort excuseth Lot, and that old man; because they offended by reason of a sorrowful and troubled mind.
It oftentimes happeneth unto wise men, that when their mind is disquieted, they do those things, which afterward, when they come to
themselves, they do not allow. But this excuse doth not utterly discharge men of sin, although it somewhat relieveth them. Howbeit, if a man will say, that Paul did prefer the less sin before the greater, when he said; that He would be accursed from Christ for his brethren, rather than they should continue in that blindness and obstinacy wherein they were holden: he that objecteth this against us, let him consider that he doth not rightly understand the place of Paul. Doubtless the apostle desired to redeem the Jews with the peril of his own self: not undoubtedly with sin, but with his loss and hurt; namely to be accursed of Christ: not that he meant to be an Apostate, or to forsake his belief in Christ; but only to be without the fruition of eternal and happy life. Augustine hath also many things against this redeeming of sins: and among other things saith; What if a man require either of a maiden fornication, or of a married woman adultery; and threateneth to kill himself, unless he may obtain his desire; shall the pure and chaste woman give any care unto him? No forsooth: neither if he shall afterward kill himself, must the chaste woman seem to be guilty of his death. They ought indeed to be sorrowful for his mishap, and to bewail his fact; but they shall not think themselves to have done amiss: because they consented not unto him in unlawful things.
The same Augustine, upon the 146th Psalm, writeth; that If a man shall deny unto his wife due benevolence, to the end he may live continently, and in the meantime, his wife fall into adultery; he committeth sin, and his devise is not to be allowed: for that vice is not to be permitted in the wife, for exercising of his continency. God (saith he) doth not redeem so great a loss, with such a gain. Wherefore the sentence of Leo the first, in distinction
46, chapter Non suo, is to be liked, which said; that It is an unmeet thing, that any should direct their crime to other men's commodities. Augustine
De mendacio ad Consentium saith; that We must do what we can for the safety of others: but if the case so stand, that it cannot be holpen without committing of sin, there resteth nothing else for us to do. And he addeth that none must be brought unto heaven by making a lie. The same father saith in another place; If the poor see a rich man cruel and covetous, and would privily steal something from him, to help either themselves, or some other poor; they diminish not sin, but increase it. And Gregory bishop of Rome, in an epistle unto Siagrius, saith; that To commit a less sin, for to avoid a greater; is to offer sacrifice to God of a wicked act: as we read in the 21st chapter of the Proverbs. But where as Chrysostom and Ambrose, in this respect do commend Lot, they must be thus understood; namely, that they allowed of his faith and charity towards strangers; and that they had a consideration of the horribleness of that sin, which the citizens were ready to commit: not, that they allow the making of their women common.
16. Over this, we must observe, that all the commandments of God, either command, or forbid something. And they command not, to the intent only that anything should be slightly done; but that it should be also done with all the heart, with all the mind, and with all the strength, and that most exactly; so as there be not one jot in us, but is obedient unto the will of God.
And what they forbid, that do they not only so forbid, that it shall not be in us; but also, that there be not left in us so much as any motion or inclination thereunto. And therefore God pronounced; Thou shalt not lust: to the intent, that those things which God hath forbidden, we should abhor in mind, in will, and wholly in all the parts, as well of the mind as of the body. And after this manner these two commandments answer one unto another; Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul, and with all thy heart, &c. which is to be repeated in all the precepts that do command anything: and
the latter; Thou shalt not lust: which in like manner must be understood touching all things which be forbidden. Wherefore in these two commandments, the efficacy, and (as I may say) the very soul of the law is understood; as without which the rest of the commandments of God cannot be full and perfect.