CHAP. IX. Wherein is treated upon the sixth Precept; and first of Friendship.This word Amicitia, that is, Friendship, is

CHAP. IX. Wherein is treated upon the sixth Precept; and first of Friendship.This word Amicitia, that is, Friendship, is

CHAP. IX. Wherein is treated upon the sixth Precept; and first of Friendship.

T his word Amicitia, that is, Friendship, is so called, of Amor, that is, Love: as saith Augustine against an epistle of Parmenianus, the first book and first chapter. And this is faithful and continual in Christ only. It behooveth, that the bond of friendship be steadfast and durable. But it behooveth that there be a reconciler of friends, to lead them unto felicity; and that an eternal and true felicity: for other felicities are uncertain and transitory. Howbeit, these things can no man perform, but Christ. Now let us see, what is properly, To love. Aristotle saith, that, To love, is, To will well, and (if thou canst) to do well unto any man for his sake, not for thine own. This definition, although it may seem probable, yet must it be amended: for we ought to will well to no man for his own sake, but for God's. But the philosophers stayed upon the second causes: as if so be that they saw a man godly and good, they said that he ought to be beloved for his own sake. But it behooveth us to ascend higher, and to place the causes of things in God. Cicero defineth friendship to be an agreement of divine and human things, through good will and charity. But Aristotle in his Ethics

speaketh somewhat more distinctly: for he saith, that friendship is a goodwill. But it happeneth oftentimes, that some man loveth an ungrateful person, and is not loved again: and for that cause, he addeth, Mutual.

Howbeit, some men do mutually love one another, who nevertheless know not that they are mutually loved again. Wherefore it behooveth, that either of them do reveal their friendship one to another.

Furthermore it is requisite, that this goodwill be stirred up in respect of some good thing. For we do not love, without it be for some certain cause: and the good things are referred either unto profit, or unto pleasure, or unto honesty. But they which are induced to love, either of pleasure, or of profit; they love unadvisedly, and accidentally. For if the cause of pleasure, or of gain, should cease; the friendship would straightway be loosed. But the friendship, which virtue hath joined together, is steadfast, and never dissolved: for virtue is a habit gotten by long custom, which cannot be removed. Such a constant amity was between David and Jonathan. Seneca, in his ninth epistle unto Lucillus reproveth Epicurus; because he had said, that A friend must be sought, to the intent that if thou have need, thou mayest have one to help thee; if thou be sick, thou mayest have one to sit by thee. For a far more sweet friendship is it (saith Seneca) which doth help another, than that which is holpen of another. Wherefore (saith he) a friend must be sought, that thou mayest have whom to help, and whom to sit by, if thou be sick. For Apelles (saith he) and Praxiteles took greater pleasure of their own works, when they were working them, and had them in hand; than afterward, when they had them made and finished in their chamber: even so a true friend is more delighted, if he himself do any good turn to another, than if he receive a benefit of another. So did Jonathan not refuse any danger that was to be taken in hand for David's sake. Saul also loved David,

but far otherwise than did Jonathan. Neither undoubtedly did Jonathan love David only in respect of that general commandment; Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: but because of that notable endeavor, which he found in him towards the Common-wealth and godliness. Further, he saw that the kingdom should be plucked away from Saul, and be given to one better than he: and he suspected, that the same other man should be David, as we may gather by the history. Yet did he love him so fervently, as he did not for this cause hate him anything at all.

Of Homicide, or Manslaughter.

2. Here will I treat of two things; the first, what manner of man-slaughter is condemned by the word of God, and to be punished by the magistrates; secondly, who are guilty of this crime. As touching the first, we must understand, that not every slaughter of man is condemned. For if one kill a man by chance, in exercising of an honest and lawful thing, he incurreth not the punishment of man-slaughter. Wherefore, in the old law, there were granted cities of refuge. For in very deed, he killeth not: but as it is there written; God (without whose will nothing is done by chance) delivered him, that he should so be killed. A judge also and a magistrate, when he punisheth heinous offenders, is not to be accounted a man-slayer: for it is not he that killeth, but the law; yea rather God himself, who would have it so done, and so commanded it. Furthermore, he that in a desolate place, or where he cannot be holpen by others, is set upon by thieves or enemies: if, in defending himself, and according to the laws, by repelling violence by violence, he slay a robber or thief, which invadeth him; he is not guilty of man-slaughter, forsomuch as in that case, he is armed both by the laws and the magistrates. For the Common-wealth would not, that a subject should so perish: therefore it giveth him leave to defend himself by weapons. For this

cause Cicero defended Milo, because he had killed Clodius, who first by a secret lying in wait set upon him. Also the woman of Thecua obtained of David, that the magistrate should not kill her son, who had slain his brother being at variance with him in the field; They were alone (saith she) and therefore it is not known, which of them first invaded the other. Soldiers also, when in a just war they slay their enemy, commit no unjust thing.

Wherefore, that man-slaughter, which must be punished, and is condemned by laws, is then judged to be done, when a man of set purpose is killed by private men. And they, which are to be condemned of this crime by the Roman laws, are not called man-slayers, but murderers. In the law

Cornelia, the title is De sicarijs; and not De homicidis: and they are so called, which do wear about them a short skein to kill a man. And by the figure Synecdoche, under the name of a short skein, is understood every kind of weapon. And not only they which kill, are guilty of this crime; but also they which either by deed, or by counsel do help, and in their sayings and assistance have respect hereunto, that some man should be killed: yea, the will is to be punished, though it had not this purpose. But this in civil judgment is not used, except in three kinds of crimes only; to wit, of murderers, of ravishers, and of traitors. Wherefore, that murderer is to be punished, which throweth a weapon at any man, to the intent he would kill him; or having that mind, woundeth him, though the party die not thereof: as we have it in the Digests, in the same title, in the law Diuus; where

Adrian the emperor maketh answer, that we must have respect to the will, and not to the event. But that is understood, when the will manifesteth itself by any apparent token. Yet I did not without cause say, that these things are thus concerning civil judgment: because otherwise, before God, the desire and determination of the mind, as touching all kind of sins, is condemned

for sin. Christ saith; He that beholdeth a woman, and lusteth after her, hath already committed adultery in his heart.

And that the will, in those crimes, is esteemed as the fact, even the holy fathers, and the canons do decree. Jerome upon Isaiah, as it is in the title

Poenitentia, distinction the first chap. Omnis habet; Thou hast not killed with the sword, but thou hast killed with the will. Yea and Cyprian in his sermon De mortalitate, writeth; He that desireth martyrdom, is a martyr before God. It is one thing (saith he) for the will to want martyrdom, and another thing for martyrdom to want the will. These things are found in the same distinction, in the chapter Nunquid. And in the same place, in the chapter Periculose, Augustine is cited, who saith; that the Jews no less killed Christ, than the Romans did; although they laid not hands upon him.

By this distinction he accordeth the two evangelist's, who seem to disagree touching the hour of the Lord's death. The one saith, that he was nailed in the third hour; the other saith, in the sixth hour. Augustine affirmeth both to be true: for the Jews, at the third hour cried; Crucify, crucify. Wherefore as concerning them, they then killed the Lord, who nevertheless was crucified afterward in the sixth hour, by the soldiers of Pilate.

Of the fact of Elias, and that a perverse imitating of him must be avoided.

3. The king was very angry against Elias; partly because he hindered his ambassage, and partly because he threatened him with extremities, that is, with death. And it is likely to be true, that he was provoked by his mother

Jezebel. Wherefore he sent a captain over fifty with his soldiers, that should take him, and bring him unto him, that at length he might put him to death.

Howbeit the singular goodness of God did not only defend Elias, but also took most heavy revenge upon his enemies, and that justly no doubt: for it

is not meet that a prophet, being the minister of the word of God, should be violated by a soldier or guarder of the king. God is present, and oftentimes suffereth not these things to be done. Also although he sometime give leave that his ministers be afflicted by the wicked, yet this he doth not as being weakened by their power, as who would say he were so feeble that he cannot revenge; but he hath other ends, whereunto he directeth the afflictions of the godly. Wherefore to disquiet prophets, cometh not of the power of man, but of the patience of God; who assuredly is able to deliver them, seeing his power is no whit lessened. But he useth their adversities for the performance of his counsels: and therefore Christ said; Could not I ask my father, and he would give me twelve legions of angels, that I should not be delivered to the Jews? The same Christ also, when he should have been apprehended, asked of the company; For whom they sought? And when he had said: I am he, immediately they fell backward. And many times did the Scribes, Pharisees, and princes send soldiers to apprehend him, while he preached, who could not lay hands upon him, but returning again, said; that There was never man spake like this man. Wherefore they, which preach the word of God, have hereby a most sweet consolation, considering themselves to have God to be their defender; than whom, nothing can be found more strong, nor more mighty.

4. But now let us consider, what God did respect in burning of the captains over the fifties, and their soldiers. Certainly, he would show himself to be a revenger of the prophesy being contemned, and of the holy ministry that was despised. In old time he revenged the Mosaical priesthood, because it was scorned by the seditious. Also he revenged the ark of the covenant, because it was unworthily handled both by the Philistines, and also by the Bethsamites. Furthermore, he restored to liberty

the temple in the time of Nicanor and Heliodorus. These things did he therefore not permit to be unrevenged, because they should be instruments of godliness. But a great deal more doth prophesy, and the holy ministry belong thereunto. We ought not then to marvel, if he were so angry for the defense of his word, and of his prophet: for he doth not easily suffer his ordinances to be contemned: since he that repugneth them, repugneth God himself. And that should no less be spoken, touching the holy ministry, than touching the civil magistrate; He that heareth you (saith the Lord) heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth mine own self. But these offices are joined together, and so ordained by God, as he being not hurt, they cannot be despised. Wherefore justly doth God revenge both prophesy, and the holy ministry, when they be contemned and overtrodden by the wicked.

Howbeit, this is sometime done upon the sudden, and even while the contempt is; as it happened in those bands of fifties, and as it came to pass in Jeroboam, when his hand dried up, which he had stretched out against the man of God in Bethel. Suddenly also were Chore, Dathan, and Abiram sunk, who made a commotion against Moses, because of the high priesthood of Aaron. But sometime the punishment is deferred for a certain space; as in Ahab, who long time afflicted the prophets, and yet was not straightway killed. Also Christ endured cruel injuries all his life long: he was beaten, and finally was crucified like an evil doer. Neither did the punishment fall upon the murderers and rebels, till after certain years. These things doth God diversely, according as the counsels of his providence do permit.

5. There remaineth to see, wherefore it was admitted to Elias, that he should destroy with fire from heaven, those princes and their soldiers: and yet it was denied to the apostles, which in like manner desired, that the

same might be lawful for them against the Samaritans, who most cruelly excluded Christ from harboring among them, when he journeyed from Galilee to Jerusalem: for James and John desired this of Christ. Some say, that hereof cometh the difference, that the spirits of the law, and of the Gospel, be very contrary. For the property of the law is to condemn, punish, and slay; but the property of the Gospel is to forgive, preserve, and quicken.

So that Elias was to kill them, which did openly violate the law of God: but the duty of the apostles was to help and to heal men, and not to destroy them. Wherefore the Lord added; Ye know not of what spirit ye be. I do not think, that these words are so to be understood, as though Elias was so much addicted to the law, that he had nothing common with the Gospel; for he himself was sometime a help to men. For in a very great dearth he fed the widow of Sarepta, together with her son and family; yea, and when her son was dead, he restored him unto life again: and heaven being opened, he gave rain most plentifully.

Also the apostles of Jesus Christ were not so addicted unto goodness, as that they never hurt any: for Peter by his word destroyed Ananias and Sapphira, Paul made blind Elimas the sorcerer, and delivered very many unto Satan to be tormented according to the flesh. Howbeit, I grant that the spirit of clemency and gentleness flourished more in the apostles of Christ, than in the ancient prophets: and again, that the spirit of severity and revenge was more uttered in Elias and his fellows, than in the evangelical disciples. And I think good to add, that the apostles were therefore warned of the Lord; because they were moved against the Samaritans by a human anger, and not by a divine persuasion, to wish evil unto them. But it is very likely, that they were urged to ask that thing, through the site of the place: because in the same place Elias procured fire from heaven unto those

princes. For king Ahaziahu was in Samaria, when he commanded that Elias should be brought unto him. Wherefore there was a certain fond zeal in the apostles, wherewith they endeavored to imitate Elias. Nor in the meantime did they make any difference between the nature of their vocations. For thereto was Elias called, that he should execute the judgments of God's severity: neither did he so sharply behave himself, of his own accord, but by the warning of God, and of his angel. Indeed in outward show he might seem to be a man-killer: yet must he not so be reputed, seeing he was only the minister of God.

And so we must beware, that we do not by any example of our forefathers, assure our selves of those things, which we earnestly and extraordinarily desire. Thus undoubtedly did the silly woman of Samaria, who reasoning with Christ at the well side, labored to prove, that God should be worshipped in that mountain, because Jacob had worshipped him there. Indeed he did that, which was lawful for him to do in that age, wherein he lived: but afterward, when the law was given, the worshipping was to be done at the tabernacle, and after that, in the temple of Solomon.

Neither must the examples of the forefathers, done against the law of God, be taken as rules to imitate and follow. The which if we shall do, we shall not be counted as followers of the fathers, but as mockers of them.

Wherefore, when we will take unaccustomed things in hand, against the ordinary commandment of God; it is not enough to allege an example of the forefathers: but we must descend into our selves, in examining by what spirit we be led; least under a certain glorious pretense, we follow the wisdom and affection of the flesh. For this cause Jesus said to his apostles;

Ye know not of whose spirit ye be: Ye purpose with yourselves to follow Elias, but ye be not led with his spirit.

6. Two ways we see there is offense committed in this age of ours. The Christian princes have diverse times taken in hand wars against the Turks, pretending a just cause, for that they thought meet to recover those lands, which the barbarous nations and wicked tyrants had taken away from the Christians. But whether they were stirred up by a good spirit, it is very doubtful. Peradventure they were moved by a greedy desire of bearing rule, or for worldly glory sake, or else by other inventions of man's wisdom; and therefore had seldom any good success. Again, there have been some, which endeavored by arms and human power, to spread abroad the Gospel and propagation of churches. These perhaps did not well try, with what spirit they did it. This is it, whereof Christ warned his apostles, that they should descend into themselves, and examine with what spirit they were led; namely, whether they could be like unto Elias. And when they had desired of their master, that it might be lawful for them, by his leave, to undertake and do it, he denied that request; because he was not sent, to the end he should afflict or destroy men, but rather to help them; and that therefore he would not pass the limits of his vocation. Whereby he also warned them, that they should not rashly endeavor, to arrogate such things unto themselves.

But that Christ was not sent to punish, and take revenge of wicked deeds; his life and acts do testify. For he was a succor unto all men, and he helped them that were in misery, so often as occasion was offered. And when he was with most bitter taunts reviled, he did not revile again. And being fastened to the cross, he prayed most patiently for his enemies. Wherefore the places, which at the first sight seemed to vary, are reconciled. And we be all warned, that when we are to take in hand anything against order and custom, we must first discern with what spirit and instigation we be moved.

Neither let us be of the mind, to imitate Helias in revenging; unless we understand for a certainty, that we be led with the spirit of Helias. Yet is not therefore the power, which the magistrate hath, of just revenging, taken from him: for he hath laws prescribed unto him by God, which he ought to follow. But those things, which we have spoken, belong unto private persons.

Whether Helias did well, in killing of the Baalits.

7. While the people was hot and fervent in confession of the true faith, Helias used an occasion, and prevented the kings commandment, and provided that the prophets of Baal should be taken and slain. They must not (saith he) be better instructed and provoked to repentance, but he would have them forthwith to be slain. For he was assured by the spirit of God, that they would not convert or be changed. And seeing they had now led away many from the true God, and would still have deceived many, if they had remained alive; he accounted it a just thing, that their ungodliness should be ended with their life. God undoubtedly might by another occasion, means, and way, have confounded and destroyed the Baalits: yet seeing he thought best to deal after that sort, we ought to think that this was the best way. But some man will say, that Helias in the meantime seemeth to be guilty of murder: for he slew, and caused to be slain, four hundred and forty men. Chrysostom treateth of this matter upon the epistle to the Galatians, when he expoundeth that place, wherein he said; I went not unto them, which were apostles before me: At the first sight (saith he) he seemeth to diminish the authority of the other apostles, and to extol his own self: which thing could not be without fault.

But unto this he answereth, that the sayings and deeds of the saints must not be barely and simply weighed. For otherwise, Samuel might have

seemed to be a murderer; who killed Agag the king. In like manner might Phinehas and also Helias. It behooveth (saith he) to look upon the causes, and to consider why, and to what end those things shall be either said or done. Paul (saith he) was not so arrogant, as he would contemn other apostles, in comparison of himself; only he would win authority unto the Gospel, which was preached by him. For he had to do with false prophets, who said; that unto Paul, which forbad the ceremonies of Moses, credit should not be given; but to the greater apostles, who suffered them. Briefly, he would prove, that as touching things manifestly revealed unto us by God, nothing should be withdrawn, or changed, by the authority of men.

Moreover, he seemeth to affirm, that the intent or end is chiefly to be regarded; as though a work (which seemeth absurd) can be made good and holy, by an intent (as they call it.) This (under correction of so excellent a man) do not I easily allow; because there be many works so wicked and corrupt, that how good an intent so ever come unto them, yet are they not thereby so amended as they be made good. Let no man, (under this pretense) say, that we must steal, to the intent that alms may be given to the poor. Neither let any man be absolved, if he have committed adultery, by saying that he did it with an upright mind, or to a good end. For (as saith the apostle) We must not commit evil, that good may come thereof. Further, in things that be indifferent, which may sometime be done well, and sometime ill, an intent may be of some force. In which kind of things, slaying is easily placed. For sometime men are justly slain, and sometime unjustly. For the magistrate hath the sword, and it is prescribed him by God, that he should punish offenders. And if he do it with a good mind, and a right purpose, his work is counted both good and holy: but if he shall do it to satisfy his malice, and to prosecute his quarrels, or to yield to his rage and cruelty, he

doth not well. Also a private man, who hath not the right of the sword, if he kill any man, he doth amiss: unless he be moved unto it by God, through a certain prerogative or privilege, whereby the common law is debarred. But then must he, which is stirred up by God, be very certain of his impulsion.

And therefore men must not deal rashly herein; but a firm and perfect certainty must be expected.

Now then I would affirm, that those things; which at the first sight seem to be absurd, are by faith made honest and right. For they be allowed by God, because they be done by the prescript of his word; when as men cleave effectually unto him by faith: neither maketh it any matter, whether that word be of the common law, or of peculiar inspiration. Wherefore the goodness of works dependeth of faith. So that, even as it is said;

Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: so on the other side may be inferred; That which is of faith, is just: for faith itself justifieth, as the apostles writings do testify. Also the goodness of works dependeth of the spirit that moveth: for if any man be moved by the spirit of the flesh, he doth unjustly; but if it be by the impulsion of the spirit of God, he worketh justly. And unto this had the Lord regard, when in forbidding the apostles, that they should not call down fire against the Samaritans, he saith; Ye know not of what spirit ye be.

And Helias shall be excused, not only through his intent, faith, and spirit; but for because that God delivered unto him his judgments to be executed, and appointed him to be a judge of the Baalits. So that he shall not be accounted a private man, but a man of God; who even as by an ordinary way in the earth he would have magistrates to be his deputies, so likewise can he promote to that place of dignity, whom soever he shall think good.

8. But passing over these excuses, I say, that it is decided by the law. For in Deuteronomy the 18th chapter it is decreed, that the prophet should be

slain, which speaketh lies in the name of God, or which prophesieth in the name of other gods. And in the 17th chapter is the very same thing, even as touching private men and women, which worshipped idols. But in the 13th chapter of that book, not only death is assigned to the prophet which seduceth; but there is also a commandment added, that none should spare his own brother, or the son of his mother, neither son, nor daughter, nor servants, nor those which were most deer and nearest friends unto him.

Thirdly, it is commanded, that the whole city, when it is infected with idolatry, should be destroyed with fire and sword. Further, in the 24th chapter of Leviticus it is decreed, that the blasphemous man should not be suffered to live. Herewithal add the justice of rendering like for like: for the prophets of Baal had caused the ministers of the true God to be slain, as well by Jezebel, as by king Ahab. But, will some man say; By these laws and reasons it is proved, that these Baalites had indeed deserved death, but perhaps they should not have been slain by the prophet, for avoiding suspicion of man-slaughter. Howbeit this I answer, that the king was also present, and consented unto the slaughter. Helias indeed prevented the king's judgment; yet it appeareth not, that he did against it, because the king being present, did not withstand it.

But wherefore he held his peace, many reasons may be brought. First, it might not be, but that by seeing so great a wonder, he also was astonished, and exceedingly amazed: wherefore he could not but spurn against the prick. Add also, that the king durst not stand against so great a consent of the people. Also it might be, that he was very desirous of rain, and that therefore, least he should be disappointed, he gave some manner of consent unto this slaughter. He caused the false prophets to be brought to the brook

Kison; to wit, that their dead bodies should be cast into it: a brook otherwise

noble, for the victory gotten of Jabin and Sisara, by the leading and conduct of Barach and Deborah, as it is written in the book of Judges, and mentioned by David in the Psalms. But to some it seemeth an unworthy and cruel thing, that the prophet himself, with his own hand, as the history reporteth, slue some of them. As though it were not read, that Samuel smote

Agag the king of Amalech. Moses also with the Levites destroyed many thousands of idolaters.

But and if thou wilt say; that Moses was prince of the people, and as a lawful magistrate used the Levites instead of soldiers: I grant. But what should we say of Phinehas, who being a private man, slue Zimbri and Cozbi, which were taken in whoredom? Did not Moses also, before he received the principality, slay an Egyptian man? It is not lawful to blame that fact, seeing Stephen in the Acts of the apostles alloweth and commendeth it. We know in deed, that it is the part of prophets and ministers to deal by the word, not by violence, and by the sword. Wherefore

Peter and Paul, if they punished or put any to death, they did it by the word, not by the sword. But we say, that these things, which Moses and Helias did, were not ordinary, but certain acts out of use, and common order. Yea and whereas Helias exercised the office of a priest, and sacrificed out of the place chosen by God: Augustine upon Leviticus, question 56. excuseth it, by the same reason, by which was excused the deed of Abraham, who meant to slay his own son. All these things were done by the private instinct of God, against the common law set forth. The law-giver himself, when he commandeth anything to be done against his laws, his commandment must be counted for a law.

Of Parricide or slaying of parents.

9. Of the wicked crime of parricide, there are many things written in the civil laws Ad L. Corneliam De parricidijs. And (as far as may be gathered out of the laws and histories) in old time, the name of that crime was given unto those, which murdered their parents, grandfathers, and great grandfathers, &c: to those also which murdered their children, and children's children, &c. But afterward by Pompeius the signification thereof was further extended. And they were also called parricides, which killed their brothers, their sons in law, their daughters in law, their fathers or mothers in law, and such other. Although there be an old law, and given by Numa Pompilius; If any man wittingly bringeth a free man to death, let him be taken for a parricide. And Augustine, in his third book De civitate Dei, the sixth chapter, counted Romulus guilty of parricide, because he slew his brother. And there he derideth the Ethnics, which affirmed, that their gods suffered Troy to be destroyed; because they would take vengeance of the adultery of Paris. But how (saith he) were they favorable unto Rome, when as the builder thereof committed parricide, straightway at the beginning?

Howbeit, the same Augustine in his book De patientia (which nevertheless is counted none of his) in the 13th chapter, appointed a certain latitude or degrees between parricides: for (as he saith) he sinneth more heinously, which killeth his parents or children, than he which murdereth his brethren.

And he which slayeth his brethren, offendeth more than he, which destroyeth those, that be further of kin.

And the wicked crime of slaying parents or superiors, seemed to be so horrible, that at Rome, for the space of six hundred years after the building of the city, it was not committed. Yea and Romulus, that made no mention of it in his laws, being demanded why he left it out, answered; that he could not be persuaded, that any such thing can happen unto men. Solon also

being asked why he likewise, by his laws, did not restrain parricide; answered, that he would not by any occasion of his laws, give men knowledge of so horrible a wickedness, and by his admonishment, to stir them up after a sort unto it. For it oftentimes happeneth, that they, which forbid certain vices, provoke men to fall into them; who very often will endeavor to do such things as they are forbidden. The murder of brethren and kinsfolk, hath undoubtedly been from the beginning; as all histories do testify. And the punishment of those parricides, which slue their parents or children, was by laws (as it is perceived Ad legem Corneliam de parricidijs) that they should be sowed in Culeo, that is, in a leather sack, and with them also were put an ape, a cock, and a viper, and were thrown into the depth of the sea, or else in the next river adjoining. But they, which slew of their kinsfolk or cousins, were punished with the sword only.

These punishments if at any time they were either passed over, or winked at, by the magistrates, God himself punished them; as the history of Samuel declareth of Absalom, which killed his brother, and most cruelly set upon his father. He also striketh them with rage and madness, which commit such horrible wicked acts: as both the poets, and also historiographers write of Nero and of Orestes. For both of them having killed their mothers, became mad. And it is a common saying, that they, which commit so great wickedness, cannot be quiet in mind. Wherefore Cicero in his oration for Roscius, saith, that certain young men of Terracina, which were accused of murdering their father, were by this means quit; because in the morning they were found asleep. For the judges thought, that they could not sleep, which had committed so heinous a crime. Domitian also, which slue his brother Titus, was killed by the vengeance of God. And in like manner

Bassianus Caracalla, when he had destroyed his brother Geta. And that we

overpass not Abimelech, God sent an evil spirit between him and the princes of the Sichemits: and either party was taken with a certain fury, so that in the end, one of them destroyed another.

Of Sword-play.

10. Whereas God by most weighty words pronounced, that man's blood should not be shed; this in the sword-play, among the ancient Romans, was held for a game: which devise of theirs cannot by any means be excused. L.

Florus saith, that D. Junius Brutus, at the funeral of his father, exhibited for a show, 22 couple of sword-players. This (forsooth) was to purge his father's soul by sacrifice, or rather to appease the devil. But very excellent was that saying of Theodosius the emperor. For when the people in the Theatre made petition to him to have sword-players; he answered, that A godly prince not only ought to reign with clemency, but ought also to behold games, which be without cruelty. And at Athens, when the people had determined to have a public show of sword-players, because the same was a custom among the barbarous: Demonax answered, that the altar of mercy was first to be subverted, before so great a cruelty should be openly received. Augustine in his sixth book of confessions, the ninth chapter saith, that his friend Alypius, otherwise a good man, being at Rome, had his mind wonderfully delighted with sword-players, and did gladly feed his eyes with human blood. But what pleasure could be therein? Was it to see men die valiantly? No, this was not true fortitude: for that hath consideration of the place and time. But this was to be utterly mad, and lavish of their life.

Seneca in his first book De tranquillitate, and tenth chapter saith; that Cicero writeth, that those sword-players were hated of the people, which would desire life of him, of whom they were overcome; and that the people liked them, which make a show that they can contemn death. Howbeit, this

was not the part of men, but rather of beasts. Therefore, both Abner and Joab were to be reproved, which so caused their soldiers to kill one another.

But there is yet another kind of sword-play far more wicked. For there be some, which provoke learned men to contention, about the weightiest points of our religion; not for the truth sake, but for the desire of contention. There is exclaiming, contending, and breaking of charity. And the common multitude doth so often change, as it cannot tell now what it ought to believe. This of all other, is the worst kind of sword-play. Indeed I diswallow not moderate conference of religion; but I reprehend chiding and clamors about hidden and secret matters.

Whether it be lawful for any man to kill himself.

11. Now must I discuss a question, which I hope will not be unprofitable: whether it he lawful for any man to kill himself. And least I should be over long, first I say, that death of its own nature is evil: for God threateneth the same, and doth cast it upon us as a punishment. Moreover, it is put as contrary unto life, which we doubt not but is good. And Paul, in the first to the Corinthians, the 15th chapter, calleth it the enemy of God; The last enemy (saith he) that shall be destroyed, is death. The same thing, if need were, I might prove by other reasons. But now I only ask this; If death be evil, why is it sometime wished for: for nothing can be desired but hath some consideration of good? But thou wilt say, that even this hath then some consideration of good, when men are thereby delivered from the grievous evils, which they think, that either they be not able to bear, or that in abiding of them they shall be grievously troubled: or else, when by the same they obtain some notable good thing. Wherefore, though it sometime appear lawful to wish death for any of these; yet is it a doubt, whether one may kill himself for those things. Now will I entreat of that matter.

But I speak nothing here of them, which slay themselves through frenzy and madness. For albeit, that those men may be condemned for other sins, which they committed when they were whole; yet it may rather seem here, that they should be pitied. For they have no free choice of things; as it is written in the 15th cause, question 2. in the chapter Insanientes. Neither will

I dispute of them, which by chance being otherwise occupied, happen into their death against their will. And we will use this proposition; It is not lawful for one to kill himself, for any of those things which I have showed.

This I prove by the law of God: by that law I mean, which was made long before Moses was born. For in the ninth chapter of Genesis, thus God spake after the flood? Your blood will I require at your hands, at the hand of man, at the hand of his neighbor, and at the hand of beasts. At your hands he saith; that is, if one shall kill himself. In the law of Moses, thus it is written;

Thou shalt not kill. And that is spoken in general, not only against killing of another, but that undoubtedly thou shouldest not kill thine own self.

Moreover, there is engrafted in every man a certain loving affection by nature, that every man desireth to have his own life preserved and defended.

He that procureth death to himself, fighteth against God the author of nature. Besides this, life is the gift of God; therefore it cannot be spilled without heinous offense. And he that slayeth himself, doth injury to mankind, and to the common society of men: for he taketh away a citizen from the Common-wealth.

Add withal, that neither the prophets, nor the apostles, nor patriarchs, would at any time kill themselves. Job, when he was miserably afflicted;

My Soul (saith he) hath wished to perish and die: yet did he never slay himself. Christ sent out his apostles, as sheep among wolves; yet he had them fly out of one city into another but not to kill themselves. And Christ

himself, although by his death he was to deliver mankind; yet did he never offer to kill himself, but tarried to be slain by others. And when the Amalechit had said, that he stood upon the body of Saul, while he was dying, and did press him down, that he might die the more easily: David answered; Thou art the son of death. But if it had been lawful for Saul, to have killed himself; how could the young man, which hastened his death, be worthy of death? For it is lawful for one to help another in an honest matter, and especially his prince. And if the law forbid thee to kill another man, it much rather forbiddeth thee to kill thyself: since that which is not lawful for thee to do to another, is unlawful for thee to do to thyself. For the rule of charity must be taken from that charity, wherewith we love our selves. Furthermore, thou killest either an offender, or an innocent. If innocent, thou doest injury to the law; if an offender, yet art thou injurious against the law: for thou bereavest thyself of time to repent. And if so be

God would suffer thee, that thou mightest repent; surly thou that art not a magistrate, oughtest to suffer thyself. Thus much out of the holy scriptures.

12. Augustine in his first book De civitate Dei, from the sixth chapter unto the 20th disputeth hereof at large. And the cause why he wrote these things in so many words, was; for that when the barbarous nations, after the sacking of Rome, did injury unto young maidens and matrons, many rather killed themselves, than they would abide such things. But Augustine counseled, that they should not so do. And in the 17th chapter he saith, that It is not lawful for any to kill themselves, either for obtaining of good things, or for avoiding of evil: for it is murder, which is forbidden by the law of God. And Judas, when he killed himself, undoubtedly did slay a wicked man: yet is he guilty (saith he) not only of the death of Christ, but of his own also. The same father, in the second book, and 19th chapter against

Petilianus; Thou sayest (saith he) that a traitor hath perished by a halter, and for such hath left the halter. As if Petilianus would say, that it is lawful for a Christian man to revenge his own sin upon himself; and they, which would so do, should be accounted for martyrs. But we (saith Augustine) account not such to be martyrs. The same father, in his 60th epistle, and in the 204th doth much more plentifully dispute of this matter. Jerome in his epistle to Marcella, concerning the death of Blesilla, under the person of God, saith; I receive not such souls, which against my will went forth of their bodies.

And those philosophers, which so did, he calleth the martyrs of foolish philosophy. The same father upon Jonah saith; that It is not our part to pluck death to us violently, but when the same is offered, to take it patiently: except (saith he) it be where chastity is in danger. Chrysostom upon these words of the first chapter to the Galatians; He hath delivered us out of this wicked world: If so it were (saith he) that this life were evil, they should not do evil, which kill themselves; but we say, that they be wicked, and worse than murderers. The canons condemn those also, which geld themselves.

And those canons, which be called The canons of the apostles, do call such men murderers of themselves. But and if it be not lawful for one to geld himself, much less is it lawful to kill himself. But yet it must be noted, that it is not there meant of them, which for disease are cut by the Physician.

13. Hereunto also agree the better sort of the philosophers. The better I say, because I know that there were many (as Cleanthes, Empedocles, Zeno, and others) which slew themselves. Plato in Phaedone saith, that This thing for two causes is not lawful. First, because it is not lawful to slay the servant of another; and that all we be the servants of God. Secondly, for that soldiers be condemned, if they forsake their station without their emperors commandment. He saith that God hath set us as it were in a station:

wherefore he that without his commandment shall leave his place, is a traitor. Aristotle in the fifth of his Ethics saith, that It is not lawful to kill a citizen, without commandment of the law and magistrate: and therefore they which kill themselves, ought to be grievously punished; for they are noted with infamy. These things he said, although it be reported, that afterward, for the avoiding of danger, he did willfully kill himself. Virgil placeth these kinds of men in great torments in hell, saying:

Then lowering next in place been they, that fell with willful death, And guiltless slue themselves, with hasty hands abhorring breath,

And shook from them their souls. How gladly now in skies again, Would they full poor estate and hardness of their life sustain?

The destinies them resist, and lake unlovely them detains, And belly fen that nine times flows, among them fast restrains.

And one that wrote Epigrams, saith; Death to contemn in poor estate, an easy thing it is:

In thrall to live who can abide, doth valiantly certainly.

14. In the Digests, De bonis illorum, qui ante sententiam sibi manus attulerunt, aut corruperunt accusators. L. Qui rei. It is decreed, that they, who shall kill themselves, their goods shall be confiscate: and the reason is, that they must be taken for such, as have confessed themselves guilty. Yet is the sharpness of that law mitigated by Antonius the emperor: for he decreed, that that law should be of force, if the crime be worthy either of death or of banishment. Wherefore they, which for theft kill themselves, are excepted. They also be excepted, which being weary of life, or impatient of sorrow, do slay themselves. Also Adrian excepteth the father, who being suspected of killing his son, killeth himself: for it should seem (saith he) that he did it rather for the love of his son, than for guiltiness of the crime.

And if so be that one going about to kill himself, and others coming in the meantime do let him of his enterprise (so he do this through an unpatiency of sorrow, or weariness of life) him also Adrian doth except: but if he shall do it for any other cause, he appointeth him to be punished. For he that will not spare himself (saith he) how will he spare others? In the Digests De jure fisci, in the law, In fraud, in the Paraph, Si quis; If any through shame of debt shall kill himself, he also is pardoned.

And in the Code, De illis, qui possunt facere testamentum; If one shall lawfully make his testament, and afterward killeth himself, it is a doubt whether that testament ought to be of force. And it is answered in like manner. But if he be taken in the crime, or made guilty, it shall not stand.

And, as we have in the Digests, De re militari, in the chapter Omne delictum; If a soldier would kill himself, and cannot; if he do the same, either through irksomeness of life, or impatientness of sorrow, or else for shame, he also is pardoned; yet so, as he be discharged from the war, and let go with shame: but if he be not able to excuse himself, he is punished by death. In the Digests De injusto & fracto testamento, in the law Si exhaeredato filio, in the Paraph, Irritum. All these have seen, that it is sin for a man to kill himself. But the Atheniens decreed more sharply as touching this matter. For they ordained, that he which so died, should not be buried in the territory of Athens. They did not only confiscate his goods, but also they would have his body carried forth of their bounds. And why the Romans dealt more mildly, I perceive not; unless perhaps they remembered, that they had in their city, such as were Lucretia, Caro, and Curtius, whom they would not number among the wicked. By these so many arguments, I think it is evident enough, that it is not lawful for any man to kill himself,

neither for the escaping of tyranny, nor yet for obtaining of immortality, which thing Cleombrotus Ambraciota did.

15. But there be objected unto us the examples of Cato, of Curtius, of Lucretia, and of Jonah, which willed himself to be cast into the sea, and of Razis out of the books of Macchabeis, and of certain holy women, whose memory is celebrated in the church, who for defense of their chastity and religion, slue themselves. Cato killed himself, least he should come into the power of a tyrant. But if examples ought to take place, we also may object examples of patriarchs, apostles, and martyrs, who suffering patiently all manner of most grievous torments, yet did they never kill themselves. And these, insomuch as they be our own citizens, they should more move us by their example, than do strangers and foreigners: especially seeing the acts of these men are grounded upon the eternal law, and express will of God. And as touching Cato particularly, Augustine answereth in his first book De civitate Dei, that that was not fortitude, but weakness of courage: for that he could not endure adversity. The same Augustine, in the 19th book, and fourth chapter, marveleth at the Stoics, who do place the blessed state in virtue, and reckon not misfortunes among evil things: and yet think, that they are to be shunned even by death. For what reason (saith he) is this, that calamities be not evil, and yet must be avoided even by death? O goodly felicity (saith he) which must be performed by the help of death! And if so be that life be blessed, we ought to abide therein: but if we will finish and perform the same by death, it is not happy. For what felicity is this, that can be overcome by those things, which ye will deny to be evil? Cato (saith he) killed himself, did he it patiently, or unpatiently? Surely unpatiently, and in bitterness of mind. For his patience was vanquished, through the authority of Caesar.

Others thus excuse him, as though by his example he would teach how mischievous a thing tyranny should be in a free Common-wealth: and that the public freedom of our native country ought to be more deer unto us, than life itself. Indeed our life must be spent for the liberty of citizens; yet that must be in battle and conflict. But it is not lawful for any man to kill himself by his own hand. And it is lawful to warn the people of their duty, by all just means; but it is not lawful to teach them by naughty examples.

And if so be that Cato were so careful of his country, what profit did he to it, by dying? By his life he might peradventure have profited the same, but being dead, he could by no means do it. A thousand ways better did our

Paul: for he, when he was in prison, and had suffered many most bitter punishments, and would have accounted it great advantage, if he might have died; yet, because he saw that he might profit others, he rejected his own commodities, and for other men's sakes desired to remain alive. This undoubtedly is the part of a good citizen, to think upon the public utility of his own citizens. But Cato, before he should die, warned his son, that he should hope well of Caesar, and join himself unto him. If this were dishonest, by what reason persuaded he his son? If it were honest, why did not he himself take the counsel that he gave his son? But it seemeth, that Caesar sufficiently perceived, with what mind Cato did this. For when he heard, that he was dead; He envied (saith he) my glory, he would not have me to be the author of his safety. But he was ashamed to live in that city, which should be held with the rule of a tyrant. Howbeit, he should have considered, that that sin was none of his own, but another man's. And we ought to be ashamed of our own sins, and not of other men's; unless they be such sins as are gathered by our own default. Seeing Cato procured not that tyranny unto Caesar; but ever as Caesar grew in honor, so he put himself

against him, there was no cause why he should be ashamed of another man's fault.

But it is a very great matter (say they) that a man can kill himself. I grant: yet sins also are very great. Greatness may be no less considered in vices, than in virtues. But these men, forsomuch as they be Ethnics, if they cannot be persuaded by our examples, yet at the least wise let them acknowledge their own examples: [whereof there be many found in the ancient histories.]

Marcus Artilius Regulus would not slay himself, but chose rather to return unto Carthage, when he knew he should go to most extreme punishments.

Whether of these two seem to be of the greater courage? Undoubtedly Regulus; since Cato was overcome with impatience. Also Lucretia is objected. But Augustine saith, that she could not abide the note of unchastity, and for that cause she killed herself. For Sextus Tarquinius entering into her chamber, in the night, with his sword drawn, threatened that he would slay her, unless she would yield to him; and that he would place a servant slain in one bed with her, as if he had been taken in adultery with her. Here did she first begin to deliberate with herself, and afterward she obeyed. Hereby (saith Augustine) there is offered a great scope of matter unto Rhetoricians, for so much as some would praise that fact of Lucretia, and others would reprove it. As for her praisers, they were wont to say, that two indeed committed the wicked fact; but that only one was the adulterer. But (saith Augustine) the chastity of Lucretia cannot be praised, unless her murder be condemned. For if she were an adulteress, why is she praised? But if she were chaste, why did she kill herself? And so he concludeth, that the same in Lucretia, was no valiant courage, but a faint heart, because she could not abide the people's ill suspicion of her.

But this fault was peculiar unto the Romans, that they were infected beyond measure with the desire of praise. Wherefore very well wrote Virgil; that The love of country, and immeasurable desire of praise, had the overhand. But if thou demand, whether Lucretia were an adulteress, or no? I answer that she was. For Aristotle, in his third book of Ethics, when he disputeth of certain actions, whether they be voluntary or not voluntary, demandeth; that If one in a tempest throw out his merchandize, rather than the whole ship should perish, what manner of action that is to be reckoned?

And he answereth, that the same is a mingled action: for that it hath some part that is voluntary, and a part also that is not voluntary. But to make a more exquisite answer, he saith, that the action is voluntary: for the merchant had rather it were so for that time. And that an action must be weighed, according to that time, wherein it is taken in hand. And he addeth another reason; that such a kind of action falleth out under the free choice of man: for the merchant deliberated with himself, afterward he made choice, and fully determined that this should be done. Seeing then Lucretia chose rather to commit that adultery, than to be stained with infamy after her death, of necessity the action was voluntary. For she would rather be an adulteress, being alive; then so to be accounted being dead. I grant indeed that the action had some mixture but yet (as I have said) we must measure the fame by that time, wherein it was taken in hand.

But we on the other side, against this example, will object the example of Susanna. I know, that that story is not canonical; yet, howsoever it be, the example must not be contemned. When those elders stood about her in the garden, and threatened that they would accuse her of adultery, unless she would yield unto them; she answered, that She had rather fall into the hands of men, than into the hands of God. Even so ought we also in such

distresses, not to cleave unto our own good intents, and to imagine what may happen on each part; but to make ourselves conformable unto the will of God, and to leave unto his judgment whatsoever shall happen. Also

Curtius is objected, who, at such time as the earth opened wide in the midst of the market place, and that the gap could not by any means be filled up; and that an answer was made by the sooth-sayers, that our mother the earth desired that thing, which in the city was most excellent: he came armed on horseback into the market place, saying; Think ye that the city of Rome hath anything in the city more excellent than armor and men? And spurring his horse, he lept down into the gap, and forthwith the earth returned to her own estate. What can here be said, but that these things were done by the deceit and fraud of devils? Nevertheless, if we will compare this Curtius with Cato, we shall perceive, that he was of a far greater courage. For he did not kill himself through impatience, but thorough a care and love of his country: for he was led by some feel of religion. But this was evil, in that he gave credit to the devil, whom he thought to be God. Neither was that otherwise, which Plutarch showeth of the virgins of Lemnos: for they hanged themselves, without any certain cause. And when there could be no end made of this their fury, those which had so come to their death, were, by public consent of the city, drawn naked by a hook, with great ignominy among the people: and after that, they ceased to hang themselves.

16. But to set aside profane examples, they say, that Jonah also willed himself to be cast into the sea: and that this was no other thing than to kill himself. But we must remember, that Jonah was a prophet, and perceived the will of God, and by his instinct commanded these things to be done.

Furthermore also, God would that in him should be a figure of Christ: that even as he had been three days in the belly of the fish; so Christ should be

three days in the heart of the earth. Razis also in the history of the Macchabeis killed himself: for when he saw that he was enclosed on every side by Nicanor, and that he could not escape, he struck himself with his own sword; afterward, when he saw his wound was not mortal, he cast himself down headlong. Here Augustine taketh very much pains. For the Donatists were wont to take hold on this example. Nevertheless, he first answereth thus; that Some things perhaps were lawful unto them, which in our time may not be lawful. Howbeit, this is but a weak argument: for the law of God, especially the moral law, is everlasting. But he addeth, that certain acts doubtless are mentioned in the holy scriptures, but not allowed of. Such are the drunkenness of Noah, the incest of Loth, the selling of Joseph, the adultery of David, and other such like. But against this answer it is objected, that in the 14th chapter, this act is commended by the author: for thus he writeth; He would rather die honorably, than suffer anything unworthy of his progeny. Howbeit, this doth not much trouble me: for perhaps the author speaketh these things according to the opinion of Razis; who thought, that if he should live in such sort, it would be a great shame, both to his stock, and his name. Howbeit, another answer is much better; namely, that those books are not among the canonical scriptures, neither may any opinion be confirmed by them. But thou wilt say, that they were read in the church. I grant they were. Augustine saith, that those books were accustomed to be read; because of that noble virtue of the martyrs, to the intent, that godly men might be encouraged against tyrants. But it is incredible, how desirous those Donatists were of voluntary death. This they did, to bring our bishops in hatred, who had obtained against them the assistance of the emperors. And now, to the end they should deal more mildly, they threatened that they would kill themselves. And when it was

objected by our men, that it was not lawful; they used to fly to that example, which we have mentioned of Razis, and unto the place in the epistle to the Corinthians; If I shall give my body, that I be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Wherefore, it is lawful (say they) so it be done in charity: for Paul reproveth not the same, save where charity faileth. But they fondly and unlearnedly depraved the words of Paul: for they (as Augustine said) are thus to be meant; If of necessity we must either die, or else admit some mischievous act, it is much better for a godly man to die; yet not so, as any man ought to be the author of his own death, but to be ready to abide anything done by the tyrant and executioner. So may it seem, that those fellows of Daniel delivered themselves, when they said, that they would rather die, than worship the image of Nabuchad-nezar. And Christ is said to have given himself for our salvation. Yet saith Paul, if a man even so give himself, that he be burned of a tyrant, if it be not in charity, it shall profit him nothing. Yet this, also did the Donatists vaunt, that man hath free will in his own matters; and therefore it is lawful for any man to kill himself, if he will. But this is ridiculous and vain; since our will must evermore be drawn back from sin. For this both the holy scriptures exhort, and good magistrates, and godly parents, in their subjects and children, do the same.

17. But Jerome upon Jonah saith, that It is our part, not violently to pluck death unto us; but with a good courage to suffer it, when it is offered; unless perhaps it be, where chastity is put in danger. As if he had said; It is lawful for one to kill himself, for preserving of chastity. Of the same opinion

Ambrose seemeth to be, in his third book De virginibus: for so he writeth of Pelagia the virgins, that the tormentors threatened her, that unless she would worship idols, they would ravish her; and that she, to avoid as well the one

as the other, cast herself down headlong. This act did Ambrose commend: and he addeth, that her mother did escape away with other two daughters; and that when in flying away, they were hindered by a river, they of their own accord rushed headlong into the same, and by that means they were drowned. Eusebius also, in his eighth book, and 15th chapter, when he reckoneth up the lewd lusts of Maxentius, saith, that he, bearing inordinate love unto a certain matron of Rome of singular beauty, privily sent ministers of his lewdness, to bring her unto him. Who having bound her husband, and used all threatening's towards him, lastly obtained of him, that he yielded his wife unto the lust of the tyrant. But she, as though she would seem to obey, when she had obtained a time to make herself ready, being retired into a parlor, did thrust herself through with a sword. And that fact is not blamed, but rather allowed. Here Augustine somewhat doubteth, what answer to make. First he saith, that on the one part he seeth that law of God;

Thou shalt not kill: and on the other part, that they be celebrated in the church as martyrs. As touching the word of God, he is resolved: and concerning the judgment of the church, it might be, that God by some revelation made it be known, that their doings pleased him, and that they were stirred by the motion and instinct of the spirit, and by the special counsel of God. And like to this is that which we read to be done by Samson, in the book of Judges.

But by Augustine's leave, this comparison doth not sufficiently agree: for as touching Samson, that he was set on by the spirit of God, it is certain: also God restored his strength unto him, which he before had taken away.

And Samson, when he died, did call upon the Lord. And the epistle to the Hebrews giveth him a testimony of faith and godliness, and reckoneth him in the number of the saints. Which cannot be said of these virgins: for they

have no testimony out of the word of God. Augustine addeth; that that law (Thou shalt not kill) is certain and well known. But no man must be persuaded to kill himself, through a divine motion; unless he know and have a certain trial, that it is the motion of God. Indeed I confess, that God sometimes doth certain things by extraordinary means. For he commanded the Hebrews to rob the Egyptians, and Abraham to kill his son: yet may we not hereby pronounce anything, more than we see is evident by the holy scriptures. Verily, I for my part cannot allow of the facts of these virgins: for whether they were done by the motion of God, I know not; neither do I think, that the same can certainly enough be known of any. Yet may it be, that they acknowledged their sins, before they departed out of their life, and that God forgave them. Undoubtedly, the endeavor of defending chastity and religion is very laudable: yet must we take heed, that we defend the same by good means, and right considerations. Those virgins, which did these things, be praised. Admit they be so. But sometimes things, which be done amiss, be praised also. The word of God is such, as in commending thereof, we cannot be deceived.

18. I know there be some of the latter writers, which thus decree; that If any man, for his own sake, because he cannot endure either sharpness of punishment, or reproach, doth kill himself, he sinneth very grievously: but that if he only lay before his eyes, the glory of God, because he perceiveth that those things, which he shall suffer, will redound to his dishonor, he may so be excused. For so Samson killed himself, because he saw that his misery was a dishonor unto God. And that same Razis also, and those other women, which we now spake of, did so likewise. But this distinction doth not weaken the truth, which we defend: for it is a steadfast and everlasting rule; that We must not commit evil, that good may come thereof. Yea and

the martyrs also could easily perceive, that their death would redound to the glory of God's name; yet was there none of them that killed himself. Even so might that Amalechite have excused himself, which furthered Saul's death: for the Philistines, if they could have taken Saul alive, would not only have reproached him, but God also. Nevertheless, David commanded him to be slain. Yea and Augustine himself answereth this reason; What sin

(saith he) did they fear? Surely the sin, which seemed to be at hand, was none of theirs, but of wicked men. But if it be lawful for us, to kill ourselves, for the escaping of our sin, then should everyone slay himself immediately after baptism. By all these reasons it is concluded, that Saul, in that he killed himself, cannot be excused. But the Hebrews defend him on this sort; That when he knew he should die, yet he manfully returned to his camp, and failed not anything at all of his duty, but submitted himself to the judgment of God, which was declared by Samuel. Nay rather, he sinned two times grievously in one and the self-same matter; first, in that he took counsel of a witch; secondly, in that he gave credit unto her, or rather unto the devil. For both those deeds of his were against the law of God. These things have I reasoned at large, but (as I hope) not unprofitably. For these days of ours be very dangerous, and the life of godly people is open unto prisons, unto banishments, unto torments, unto burnings, and finally unto all kind of evils. Howbeit, although we should enter into all kind of adversities, yet must none lay violent hands upon himself. Also, doubtful and intricate cogitations are oftentimes suggested unto us by the devil, touching some sin of ours, as of offense towards God, our shame or infamy.

But these assaults we must valiantly resist, and not suffer ourselves by any persuasion of the devil, to be carried away from God.

Of resisting of violence.

19. A Christian man is not forbidden, but that he may repel violence by violence; when either he is suddenly set upon in a desolate place, or cannot otherwise call for aid and help of the magistrate. For seeing the laws made by a just magistrate, do give this leave unto him; he doth not this act as a private man, but as a public minister, armed by just and public laws. Christ said, If a man give to the a blow on thy right cheek, turn unto him the other.

But this must be done, when thou seest, that by this means thou mayest profit thy brother, or that it furthereth the advancement of God's glory. And out of these cases, it is not necessary so to do, as both Christ and Paul by their example have taught. But while we repel violence by violence, we must use a moderation of a just defense of ourselves, (as the lawyers speak,) that we seek not to hurt or to kill him, that doth us violence. And this must be diligently regarded, that with as little harm to him as thou canst, thou repel from thee his force or violence. Undoubtedly, if it had not been lawful to repel violence by violence; the apostles following Christ would not have borne swords with them. But they had swords: for they said unto Christ, at his last supper; Behold here be two swords. And Peter, when Christ should be taken; Shall we smite (saith he) with the sword? Hereby it is manifest enough, that the apostles to this use wear swords. If this had been repugnant to the law of God, Christ would never have permitted it: for he was a most earnest maintainer of the commandments of his father.

Of cursing's, imprecations, or banning's.

20. It shall now be very convenient for us, to entreat somewhat of imprecations, and of banning's, or cursing's. The use of malediction and cursing is very ancient in the holy scriptures. Noah cursed his nephew

Canaan; Cursed be Canaan, let him be a servant to his brethren. Baalak also the son of Zippor, called Balaam to curse Israel. In Deuteronomy we read;

Cursed shalt thou be in the town, and in the field, in the barn, and in the store. Cursed be the fruit of the womb. These execrations were to be recited upon mount Hebal. The law of jealousy hath also, in the book of Numbers, proper imprecations; namely, that The belly should swell and break, and the thighs rot. All which things could not hurt the woman, if she were innocent: but unto an adulteress they were recited, not without force and effect.

Joshua cursed him, which would re-edify Jericho, with the death of his children. And this happened under Ahab, as the history of the Kings mentioneth. And Nehemiah's saith; that he not only rebuked those, which had married strange wives, but also cursed them. In the New Testament also, there want not examples, the which shall be afterward alleged.

Yea and the Ethnics likewise used cursing's. Acteius a Tribune of the people of Rome, (as Plutarch declareth in the life of M. Crassus) when he could by no other means dissuade him from his expedition into Parthia, at the length, in the way, by the which Crassus should pass out of the city, he set a chafing dish of coals, in the midst of the street. And when Crassus came against it, he cast in certain perfumes, and with most horrible and bitter curses, cursed the general, and all his host. Which curses were not in vain, as the event over well declared. Oedipus also (as the Poets tell) with banning's cursed his two sons Adrastes and Polynices; namely, that they should be without city and house, that they should be beggars and wanderers abroad, and so at variance in themselves, that the one should kill the other. Which effects, according to his wish, came to pass. And Horace saith; I will utterly curse you, and this bitter curse can no sacrifice appease.

Neither is that to be passed in silence, which Augustine mentioneth concerning Paul and Palladia. For they being cursed of their mother,

miserably wandered about from country to country; until at the last they were delivered at the tomb of S. Stephen.

21. Seeing therefore so great plenty of cursing's and banning's hath always been, as well among the Jews, as also among the Gentiles; is it possible, that it should altogether be unjust, or be sin, to curse, or to wish evil unto any man, so that it should be lawful at no time? Augustine undoubtedly was of this mind, that it is not lawful: and he entreateth of this matter, towards the end of his first book De sermon Domini in monte. He also writeth, that those imprecations, which are read in the prophets, pertain only unto prophesies; so that, under that form of prayer, they only foretold the things, which they saw should come to pass. And whereas they use the Optative mood, instead of the Indicative, that (he saith) is not to be wondered at among the Hebrews: seeing they often times use such figures in their speeches. For many times they use one Tense for another, putting the time past for the time to come: as; Wherefore have the Gentiles raged, and the people imagined vain things? Again; They divided my garments among them. These things were for to come, and were forespoken concerning Christ; when as nevertheless they were written, as things already past. Howbeit, he confesseth, that otherwhile we pray, that some may be punished and chastised for their amendment: which is not (saith he) to pray against them, but for them. And he citeth a place out of the Apocalypse, the sixth chapter, where the martyrs cry under the altar; Take vengeance upon the earth for our blood, which is shed.

And it seemeth unto him, that thereby is meant, that these martyrs prayed against the kingdom of sin. And sin may be destroyed two manner of ways.

First, if a contrary disposition be induced: so that sin being excluded, there succeedeth mortification of lusts, righteousness, honesty, and all kind of

virtues. Again, sin is subdued unto God, when punishment is applied unto the same; for while it is unpunished, it hath nothing in it that is good: but so soon as it is punished, forsomuch as that punishment is a part of justice, sin is at the least wise somewhat restrained and bridled thereby, from ranging any further abroad. And this also is profitable unto wretched sinners.

Wherefore, if we will judge uprightly; the martyrs, in so praying, prayed rather for them, than against them. Neither also were it absurd, if they should pray for the end of the world, wherein they have suffered so grievous things, that ungodliness may once have an end. Although I think not, that all the elder fathers are of this mind, that we should pray for the end of the world; seeing rather on the contrary part, Tertullian in his apology saith, that the Christians in their congregations, pray for prolonging of the end of the world. And in the same place he writeth, that our men, by the determinate rule of the holy scriptures, prayed not only for emperors, but also for the long preservation of the world. For after this monarchy of the Romans, as Paul writeth to the Thessalonians, shall come Antichrist, and the end. Wherefore some of the godly sort prayed, that the time might be prolonged; partly, that the tribulation which should come through Antichrist, might be deferred; and partly, that the children of the election might be gathered together.

The Greek Scholies write, that those holy martyrs prayed against the devil, that his power might be bridled and brought to an end. And thus much of Augustine's opinion, who was also of the same mind against Faustus, who saith; These words of execration, which we read in the prophets, seem to be the words of those, which fore-speak, not desires of them that accurse. But as touching this matter, I would think it should thus be determined; to wit, that when there is an enemy, which both wisheth evil

unto us, and also to the uttermost of his power worketh evil against us; we first of all should make a distinction of the cause, for the which he hateth us. For either it is our own proper cause, human and civil; or else it is, because he hateth God and his truth. Next that, we make a distinction as touching men: for some are led by an accustomed affection of their own; and other some are moved by God, who revealeth to them, both what he will do, or what is the state of the wicked, and stirreth them up to speak the things, which they do speak. Neither is this in the meantime to be passed over, that the evils, which we pray for, are either temporal, or eternal. After these distinctions, I think we ought thus to say; That if our own cause only be in hand, therein we ought to be patient, long suffering, and gentle. Bless, and curse not: thus the scripture commandeth. We must also pray for them that persecute us. We are by God created men, let us not spit out the venom of serpents: and forsomuch as we are men, let us not suffer ourselves to be changed into brute beasts. They which hurt us, are mad, and are forced by fury; and therefore are rather worthy of compassion, than of revenge or cursing's. A mouth is given unto us, by it to help and remedy; and not that we should curse and ban with the same. Otherwise God saith of such execrations; I commanded thee, that thou shouldest pray for thine enemies, why doest thou provoke me now against them? Wilt thou have me to be a helper of thee to transgress my laws, and to be thine executioner?

A certain priest of Athens could not be induced to curse Alcibiades: for he said, that he was made a priest to pray for men, and not to curse them. And among the Romans it was not lawful for the high priest of Jupiter to swear; for that oftentimes, the end and conclusion of an oath is execration. For they say; Let these or those things fall upon me, unless I perform this or that.

And seeing it was not lawful for the priest to curse himself, much less was

it lawful for him to curse others. Wherefore, if our own cause be in hand, we ought not to use cursing's, but rather prayers, compassions, and blessings. But when God's cause is in hand, and that this indignation cometh on us, by reason of sins and wicked acts; there is nothing to let, but that we may sometime use imprecations, in such manner as we shall express. And it oftentimes happeneth, that our own cause is joined with the glory of God; and is so joined, as it cannot be distinctly judged of, but only by a diligent and attentive consideration. As if a minister of the church see himself contemned and derided, although he often times regard not his own dignity: yet notwithstanding, neither can he, nor ought he, quietly suffer the word of God (which he ministereth) to be contemned. For this cause, the prophets seemed many times to be very angry, for that their messages and prophesies were derided. Wherefore I grant, that in this case, both imprecations and cursing's were justly admitted.

22. Howbeit, this I think necessary to admonish you of, that we deal very warily. For our flesh is wont, under the pretense of God's glory and honor, to fight and brawl for our own honor and estimation. Moreover, it must not be neglected, that we diligently sever sins from nature, and that in any wise we wish well unto nature itself, that is, unto men: but let us curse and hate sins. And for so much as it happeneth oftentimes, that men, when they have been corrected by some afflictions and punishments, do repent: so, if unto wicked men, being strangers from God, and transgressors of his laws, we sometimes wish some discommodities and adversities of the flesh, to the end they may feel the wrath of God, I see nothing to the contrary. And this without controversy we may wish unto ourselves, and that justly; that God will rather afflict and scourge us, than suffer us to fall into sins: or if we sin, that he will at the least wise, by this means, call us back to him. And if we

may wish these, and such like things unto ourselves; why should we not wish them unto others, seeing we are commanded to love our neighbors as ourselves? So Elias shut up heaven. So God drew home again unto himself some of his elect, which went astray: for there be some dispositions of men so blockish, that they cannot be brought home again, but by this means.

Wherefore the psalm saith; Fill their faces with ignominy, and they will seek after thy name. So then, we may wish the cross of affliction, both unto ourselves, and also unto others, for amendment and correction. In which cause yet nothing ought over hastily to be done: for often times it happeneth, that some by afflictions are not amended, but rather made worse.

But the better way were to pray unto God, to correct them: and not to wish adversities unto them, except it be with this condition, to convert them, or that the glory of God may thereof ensue. And this way (saith

Augustine) we should not pray against them, but for them. Howbeit we must understand, that among men there be some, which are the ambassadors of God, who deal not as private men; but they execute an extraordinary ministry. And these by the spirit of prophesying doubt nothing of the will of God: for in their prayers they talk together with God, and in that talk they see and understand many things, as concerning the mind, and are wonderfully affected. Seeing then, that God showeth unto them, that sinners shall be brought to amendment of some kind of punishments, and that he hath determined to punish them; or else that some are now past all hope of salvation, and shall without doubt be punished with eternal misery: seeing (I say) that such things are showed unto holy men, and that they in no wise doubt, but that they are decreed by the most excellent God (the which being chosen by him, must of necessity be good) how can it be but that they please them, how can it be chosen but that they are wished of

them, when as they continually pray; Thy will be done? Wherefore when they see those things, they pray, they make imprecations, they pour out such execrations and cursing's, as we read in the prophets and holy histories.

23. Hereof the godly do take consolation, who thereby understand, in what sort wicked men shall at the length be handled: and the weaker and wandering sort, which pertain unto the flock of God, are by these things corrected, and do take heed unto themselves, that they deserve not the like.

For this cause Gregory, upon those words of Job, wherein he cursed the day of his birth, prudently wrote, that the execrations of the saints proceed not of malice; that is, from a fleshly desire and worldly hatred, but from a just consideration, namely, in that they do see the same to be allowed by the will of God. But (saith he) these things are not prayed for by wishing and desiring. Unto which last saying of his I assent not: for (as I have already said) the saints cannot but allow, and earnestly wish that, which they see

God willeth; so that they be assured, that God hath thus firmly decreed. In this manner Paul made blind Elimas the sorcerer: Peter slue Ananias and Sapphira. So likewise the same Peter said unto Simon the sorcerer; Thy money and thou be destroyed together. Paul delivered unto Satan, him that committed incest, and said; I would to God they were cut off, which trouble you! Neither did Elias any other wise command the fire to come down from heaven, the which devoured the captains over fifty, with their fifty soldiers.

Elisha also cursed the children which derided him, and they were torn in sunder of the bears. What difference is there, whether God execute by himself, or by others, whom he hath appointed to be his ministers?

Wherefore, that which he doth by himself, he can do in like sort by his saints and prophets.

24. Furthermore, if any man have a great desire to curse other, and pretend the imitation of the prophets and apostles; let him fore-see, whether he have their spirit. For even as no man ought to use the sword, but a magistrate only; so let none use these execrations, but they which are most privy to the will of God, and which are moved by the spirit to give those curses. This place is alike, yea rather all one with that place, which concerneth revenge. Private revenge is forbidden; yet not public revenge, and that which is done by princes. So then, let them, which be of the common sort abstain from execrations: especially let them not wish any cross to any man, as touching eternal damnation, but upon condition, that it may do good. And let them know, that they are bound by this common rule;

Bless and curse not; pray for them which persecute you. And they, which by God's motion use any execration or imprecation, let them always have before their eyes the amendment of sin: or at the least-way, the diminishing of the malice thereof, through pains and punishments, that the righteous may not be hindered from the worshipping of God, and also may not stretch forth their hands unto iniquities: and finally, let them only seek, that the will of God may have place; and let them not be desirous of their own commodities.

Neither ought it to seem a wonder to any man, that that common rule (which prescribeth to us To bless, and not to curse, and to wish well unto them which persecute us) admitteth any exceptions: for that happeneth also in other commandments. Is it not else-where ordained, that We should pray for all men? And unto Timothy the reason is added; for that God will have all men to be saved. And yet John saith; that Some do sin unto death, and for them (saith he) we ought not to pray. Which yet we ought to understand, when we plainly perceive, that they have sinned unto the death. Now then,

as touching that trope or figure of Augustine, wherein he saith, that these imprecations of the saints, were predictions or foretelling's (as we do not utterly reject it:) even so we say, that it is not necessary. Neither do we grant, that in the execrations of the prophets, and of the apostles, there were not earnest requests and desires. For how could they but desire that, which they saw God had willed and decreed; unless peradventure by request and desire he meant the sense of the flesh, or of reason, as it is led by men's counsels? Last of all, this is to be noted; that it is not absurd, that in one and the self-same will of godly men, are contrary motions: since they happen not in respect of one and the self-same thing, but in respect of diverse. For, in that they look upon the will and decree of God, and the destruction of sin, and such like; they cannot but rejoice in the punishments of the wicked: but as they look upon them being men joined unto them by nature, of one and the self-same flesh and lump, they are exceedingly sorry for their destruction. Thus Samuel mourned for Saul being rejected by God: as we have it in the 15th chapter of the first book of Kings.

How far it may be lawful to rejoice in our enemy's overthrow.

25. Wherefore, if it be demanded, whether it be lawful for a man to delight in the miserable state of an enemy: first I answer this in general, that for his ruin into sin, not only we should not rejoice, but also we ought earnestly to lament. As touching adversity some doubt there may be.

Solomon saith in the Proverbs, the 24th chapter; Rejoice not thou at the fall of thine enemy, and let not thy heart be glad when he stumbleth, least the Lord see it, and it displease him, and he take away his wrath from him.

How then (wilt thou say) did Moses (when Pharaoh was destroyed and dead) sing that triumphant song; Sing we unto the Lord: and not only rejoiced in mind, but also appointed timbrels and dances? Some men do

thus distinguish this question; That so long as the enemy is afflicted, we should not rejoice, because we are uncertain of the will of God: for that every man ought to remember, that he also is a man, and that the self-same may happen unto him [that happeneth to another;] for that no human thing is strange from him. But when God, by the slaughter and destruction of his enemy, hath declared his will and purpose, then we ought to rejoice. Thus have they said.

But I say, that when thou dost thus rejoice, we must see whether thou seek thine own, or not thine own. For there be some, which only have consideration to their own: and when the enemy is afflicted, they think that their injuries be revenged of God. But if thou withdraw thy mind from these cogitations, unto the glory of God; and considerest, that God doth therefore revenge his own cause; that thine enemy may be bettered, that sin may be hindered, that the Gospel be no more disturbed, or the word of God repressed: then are we to rejoice earnestly, and from the heart. And in very deed, we must not in this matter take examples from holy men, but from the law of God. For David wept at the death of Absalom, of Abner, and of Saul: but at the death of Nabal he rejoiced. Samuel mourned for Saul, but not for Agag. For so do sundry affections follow in godly men, according as they be diversely stirred up by the spirit of God. In these affections we must altogether seek, not what is for own profit, but what furthereth the salvation of our neighbor, and the glory of God. Yea and these two affections are oftentimes joined in one man. For so far forth, as we see our enemy is a man, humanity itself causeth, that we bewail his calamity: but if, on the other part, we cast our eyes upon the will of God, godliness requireth that we should rejoice in his judgments.

26. But there is none to be found of so evil and lewd a nature, but a man having due consideration, may see some gifts of God in him, for he is either active, or strong, or learned, or noble, or eloquent, or witty. These things, though we be provoked by injuries, we ought not to deface, or keep in silence; if any opportunity be offered to speak well of our enemies.

Aeschines an Ethnic neither dissembled, nor diminished before the Rhodians, the eloquence of Demosthenes his most professed enemy; but rather amplified it, as much as he could, and recited unto them that most venomous oration, which Demosthenes had written against him: and he added, that it was nothing without the action and pronunciation of that Orator. David both in words and deeds reverenced Saul being his enemy, for that he was the anointed of the Lord. And the apostle therefore commandeth the same, because the world judgeth that man should deal far otherwise. For either it delighteth in cursed speakers, and enemies of the truth; or it thinketh it an honesty to requite injuries. Wherefore Vespasian

(when as there arose a contention between a certain Senator and a knight of Rome) did with this sentence appease the strife; Doubtless, to revile a Senator, it is not lawful; but to revile again when a man is reviled, that is both lawful and civil: for that he, which first provoked, did deprive himself of the prerogative of his honor. But Paul commandeth us far otherwise: for we must not consider what our adversary deserveth, but what becometh our own selves.

Neither doth the apostle require only, that we should speak well of our enemies, but also wish well unto them: for so think I, that εὐλογεῖτε, (Bless ye) is to be taken in the second place, as an Antithesis to that which followeth; (And curse not.) Some think it is only a repetition for the greater vehemency. But I think it better agreeth, that we are first commanded to

speak well of our enemies, and then to wish them good, and in no wise to curse them as men commonly use to do. And if this seem a hard matter to be done, let us remember, that We are the children of him, who maketh his sun to shine upon the good and upon the evil: and that we are his disciples, who answered his apostles, when they required fire from heaven to burn the Samaritans; Ye know not of whose spirit ye be; namely his, which came not to destroy, but to save; his, who healed them that railed upon him; his, who restored unto Malchus his ear, who came with the other soldiers of the chief rulers, to take Christ; his, which both saluted the traitor Judas as a friend, and received him with a kiss; finally, his, which forgave the wicked thief, and promised him eternal felicity, which prayed for them that crucified him, and which of his own accord died for his enemies. It shall nothing profit thee, to recompense injuries with injuries, and taunts with taunts. Thou oughtest rather to commit the matter unto God, who will be a most just judge, and by no perturbation can be led away from justice.

27. Furthermore, thou shouldest hereby gather, that it is not lawful to speak ill of any man; nor yet to curse any man. For if it be forbidden to do these things against our enemies, (which otherwise might seem tolerable in man's judgment) much less may we suffer ourselves to do it unto others.

Chrysostom, to the intent he might persuade us to follow these words of Paul, reckoneth up the commodities which the cursing's and persecutions of adversaries commonly bring to the godly. First (saith he) they very well help us to the obtainment of the kingdom of heaven: for Christ saith;

Blessed are they, which suffer persecution for righteousness sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. And he addeth; Blessed are ye, when they revile you, and persecute you, speaking all manner of evil, and lying against you for my sake. Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is great in heaven, &c.

Besides this, they are an occasion or matter of most excellent virtues: for as Paul teacheth; Tribulation, worketh patience; patience, experience: and experience, hope. But where is the patience of the saints, where is their experience, where is their hope; if thou take away the wicked enterprises of our enemies against us?

Moreover, the glory of God can by no other means be highly advanced, than if we valiantly and courageously behave ourselves in those things, which are to be suffered for his name sake. For it is no hard matter, to cleave unto God, so long as all things go prosperously and quietly with us, and as we would desire. But when all manner of adversities happen, and yet we constantly abide in his obedience; this doubtless cometh of a manly and stout faith. And therefore I think James said, that Patience hath a perfect work. Unless peradventure a man will thus understand it, that perfection is not in any work, unless we persevere in the same. For when we leave off, we accomplish not the work, and so without patience it is left imperfect.

Add moreover, that by this means chiefly our enemies are terrified, that they proceed not to persecute us. For when they see, that we are not moved by their injuries, they think, that they lose their labor: and therefore they take not so great pleasure of the reproaches, wherewith they have exercised us. But if they shall perceive us to be vexed, and to take it in ill part; they will think, that their injuries have taken good success, and will be afterward more bold in their wicked endeavor. By this we may see, why the Lord said;

Blessed are ye, when men revile you, and persecute you, and speak all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake: rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven. This commandment of Christ the apostles executed; for they returned from the presence of the Council, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to be reviled for his name's sake. And Paul, in

the first to the Corinthians, saith; We are evil spoken of, and we bless. In Greek it is λοιδορούμενοι εὐλογοῦμεν.

28. But this persuasion Paul did not always observe: for to the Galatians he saith; I would to God they were cut off, which trouble you! And David saith; Let their table be made a snare before them, let their eyes be made dim, that they may not see, and bow down their backs always. All other books of the prophets are every-where full of curses and imprecations, wherewith they curse the enemies of the people of God. Here doubtless (in my judgment) it must be said, that we ought so to deal, as Paul now admonisheth, so long as we have a respect unto our own injuries; and that we walk the ordinary way, and common course, whereby we are bound by love to wish well unto our neighbors. But if so be God open unto us his secret will, and declare what shall without doubt come to pass, concerning our enemies, and those which persecute us; then, if we sincerely and truly love him, we ought undoubtedly to stay ourselves upon his will and counsel. Howbeit, this caution is added: first, to be fully assured, whether those things, which God hath opened unto us, pertain only to a threatening; or else wholly to declare his determinate and assured will. For where we suspect, that God only threateneth, to bring us to repentance, we ought not to cease praying even for the wicked. So did Moses, when he made supplication to God for his nation: so did Abraham for the Sodomites, so did Samuel for Saul, and so did Jeremiah for the people.

But when they be out of doubt, that it is the certain and fixed will of God, they do not only pray against the wicked by prophesying as thinketh

Augustine against Faustus, in his 16th book, and 22nd chapter (where he thus writeth; But curses, when they are uttered by the way of prophesy, proceed not of an ill desire of him that curseth, but of the foreknowing spirit

of him that denounceth them:) but also from the heart, God now consenting thereunto, and wishing the same with it. David, when as otherwise he was so merciful to Semei, to Absalom, and to Saul, and to other enemies; yet sometimes he so curseth and banneth the wicked, as he driveth a horror into them that read them. Christ also first bewailed the infelicity of the city of Jerusalem, for that she knew not the time of her visitation: and he saith;

How often would I have gathered together thy children, as a hen doth her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldest not? Howbeit, even he, knowing the assured and immovable will of God, burst forth into these words; I give thanks unto thee, O father of heaven and of earth, for that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to the little ones: even so Lord, for that it hath so pleased in thy sight.

Moreover, men of God, when they come to this point, they have not a respect to their own cause, neither do regard their own injuries; but consider, that by the wicked works of the ungodly, the church of God is harmed, the spiritual proceedings thereof are hindered, and the course of the Gospel is letted. And they most ardently desire, that the name of God might be sanctified, and his kingdom most amply spread abroad. And hereof it cometh, that when the godly pray against wicked men, they persecute not their own enemies, but the enemies of God, whom they wish to be most purely worshipped. David saw that he was called by God to the kingdom; and understood that the enterprises of the wicked were not so much repugnant to his own dignity, as to the will of God. Wherefore, worthily in his prayers, he wisheth rather, that they should perish, and that most vilely; than that any jot of the most just will of God should be hindered. So that both in this place, and in such other like, we are forbidden, not only to curse, but also to speak evil when we be overcome with the spites and

injuries of the wicked; by whom it is not meet that we should suffer our courage to be quailed, or to be led from the rule of charity. Herein doubtless consisteth the magnanimity of Christians, and their incredible valiantness of courage; not only not to curse them that persecute them, but also to speak well of them, and to pray unto God for them.

29. Howbeit, I cannot wonder enough, that Thomas Aquinas should say, that by the words of Paul, Christians are not compelled; by force of the precept to show particularly unto their enemies the affect of charity, or (as they use to speak) to show signs of benevolence unto them, except it be in case of necessity. For it is enough, if they exclude them not from the general bond of love, wherewith we ought to love our neighbors. Neither

(saith he) is it of necessity, that we should pray peculiarly for them. But this is sufficient, if we exclude them not from the common prayers, which we make for all men. And if any man (saith he) besides the case of necessity, do show unto an enemy tokens of special love, or do specially make intercession for him; that man followeth counsel, but obeyeth not the commandment. Yet Christ and Paul, when they spake of these things, taught not this distinction. This doctrine doubtless cutteth in sunder the sinews of Christian religion, it presseth down the vehemence of God's spirit, and taketh away the force and sharpness of the law of God. Let these men go now and cry out, that we be they, which dissolve the endeavor of good works, and open a window to licentious life; when as they cannot deny, but that themselves are those, which at their own pleasure change the certain and severe commandments of God into counsels. Doubtless Christ and Paul commanded those things, and do not give them only as counsels. But this is exceedingly to be lamented, that these commandments in this iron age of ours, are made like the laws of Athens. For they, although they were wisely

invented and published abroad; yet notwithstanding lay neglected, and were everywhere of all men violated. And we must think, that this came of no other cause, but that the whole juice and blood of Christian religion is in a manner dried up.

Of a curse.

30. The Hebrews did not utterly overthrow and destroy certain cities, which they had taken into their hands; but did inhabit them. Howbeit, some they cursed, and utterly rooted out. And their vow of the thing that was promised, was called Cherem, of the verb Charam, which is, To waste, To destroy, To kill, To deface, and To accurse. The Grecians called that word

Cherem, ἀνάθεμα: and they also called ἀναθέματα, ἀποκείμενα, καί ἀφειρώμενα, as things consecrate and put apart. And it may be, that they were so called, because they were hanged up in temples, and were sequestered from the use of men, and might not be removed from off that place. Yea, men were sometimes called by that word. Paul in very deed used that word many times: for he saith to the Galatians; Let him be accursed, whosoever shall preach any other Gospel. And to the Romans, he wished himself to be accursed for the brethren. And to the Corinthians the first epistle, he saith; He that loveth nor the Lord Jesus, let him be accursed,

Maranatha: where he taketh this word ἀνάθεμα, for this word Cherem, that is, A thing separated and disjoined altogether from the company and use of man: so as it was unlawful to touch it, or use it. A testimony whereof we have in the book of Joshua the sixth chapter, as touching the city of Ierico.

And it seemeth that it was so accursed, because it was after a sort the first fruits of the cities which were taken. For, after that they were passed over Jordan, it was the first that was conquered of all the cities, and that by no help of man; for that the walls thereof fell down of their own accord, and by

the will of God. Wherefore it was meet, that the spoils thereof should altogether be consecrated unto God.

31. But it seemeth to be utterly strange from the service of God, to destroy both cities and men: and these things have rather a show of cruelty, than of religion. I answer, that destructions indeed of their own proper nature, appertain neither to religion, nor to godliness: but so far forth as they be referred to the glory of God. And this may happen two manner of ways; as when that destruction is counted for a certain token of the severity and justice of God, against those people, whom he, for their wickedness, would have to be destroyed: or else, as a certain testimony of God's goodness and mercy towards the Israelites, whom in that expedition he mercifully helped.

Wherefore, the overthrowing of the city, houses, men, and beasts, did show the justice and severity of God: and the consecration declared the goodness, help, and mercy uttered to that people. Moreover, God would by that means prove the obedience of his people, in abstaining from the spoils which were consecrated to God. For we know, that soldiers, when they have gotten the victory, are hardly restrained from the prey. But they which obeyed not the curse, when if was published, were most grievously punished. Which the holy history of Joshua declareth to have happened unto Achan, because he usurped unto himself some of the spoils of Ierico. We know also, that Saul was for this cause bereft of his kingdom, in that he had reserved Agag the king, and certain oxen and fat cattle of the prey, which were already bound by the vow of the curse.

32. But touching the form and end of the curse, we have spoken enough.

For the form is the destruction of cities, men, and beasts: and the consecration of gold, silver, iron, brass, pearls, precious stones, and costly things, which were appointed only to the use of the tabernacle. But the end

was, that they might be monuments of God's goodness and justice; and also an exercise and trial of the Israelites. Now resteth to speak somewhat of the matter, and efficient cause thereof. Certainly, the matter was, whatsoever was to be found alive in those cities: for all that ought to be killed. And the buildings, and other garnishing's of the city to be clean destroyed: but as for the riches and ornaments, they (as it is said) were consecrated unto the worshipping of God. But there was to be noted, that none were vowed unto so horrible a destruction, except such as were already declared and openly vowed to be enemies of God. For it is not lawful to kill innocents.

Wherefore, they sinned most grievously, which so vowed Paul's death, as they would neither eat nor drink, till they had killed him. And at this day, they behave themselves more than wickedly, which confess themselves to have made a vow, most cruelly to kill all the professors of the Gospel. Yea and Jephthah without doubt was deceived, who because of this kind of vowing, thought that his daughter ought either to be slain, or else forced to perpetual virginity.

Agamemnon also is to be condemned, who (as Cicero in his book of Offices reporteth) vowed unto Diana the fairest thing that should be born in his kingdom: which foolish vow to perform, he sacrificed his daughter

Iphigenia. But the efficient cause of the vow Cherem, sometimes is God: as it is written in the seventh and tenth chapters of Deuteronomy. For there it is commanded, that places dedicated to idols, altars, images, groves and monuments, should utterly be destroyed: and that was a perpetual curse in the land of Canaan, and to be always observed. Sometimes the prince made such a vow, as we read of Joshua: and sometimes the people, as we find in the 21st chapter of Numbers. The prophet also sometime did this: and thus did Samuel charge Saul, that he should destroy all things which belonged to

the Amalechits. The name of this city, whereof there is mention in the first of Judges, was afterward called Horma; whereas before it was not so called.

And it was so called, of the word Cherem: for such a name were they wont to give the places that were destroyed, by reason of a vow or curse. In the book of Numbers, a certain portion, which the Israelites kept by force, was

(by reason of such a vow) called Horma.

33. But it would seem to be a question, whether these destructions were against charity? I say, they were not: for such enemies were chosen to be utterly destroyed of the Jews, by the judgment of God, and not at the pleasure of men. And as concerning the love or hatred of enemies, we must understand, that Augustine hath written toward the end of the former book of the sermon of the Lord upon the mount, that he doth ascend a certain step of righteousness, which loveth his neighbor, although he as yet hate his enemy. But he shall then perform goodwill and goodness, according to the commandment of him (which came to fulfill the law and not to break it) when he shall extend the same even to the love of his enemy. For the other degree, although it be somewhat, yet is it so small, that it may be common also with Publicans. Neither is that, which is said in the law; Thou shalt hate thine enemy, to be taken as a commandment unto the just, but as a permission unto the weak. Thus much writeth he. To whom if I shall say as the truth is, I do not agree, but am certainly persuaded, that to hate our enemies is not permitted by God; no not in them which be imperfect: for it is an everlasting precept, that we should love our neighbor as ourselves.

And he is our neighbor, upon whom we light by any occasion: as Christ declared in the parable of the Jews and of the Samaritan. Those undoubtedly were compared as enemies one to another: wherefor the condition of enmity, when it happeneth, cannot let, but that such as are

enemies one to another, be neighbors notwithstanding. Moreover, forsomuch as we see, that David and other prophets did oftentimes curse their enemies: by what means can we call them weak, to whom God gave liberty to hate their enemies? For they were holy men, and very perfect.

Neither doth that seem to make much to the purpose, which the same Augustine saith; namely, that The sayings of these holy men were no vows and desires, but rather forespeaking's, and prophesies of them, who living under the old testament, did oftentimes prophesy the event of things to come. For the apostles are also found in the New Testament, not only to have spoken words of cursing's (as Paul, when he saith; I would to God they were cut off that trouble you!) but also to have imposed most grievous punishments. For so much as it is written in the Acts of the apostles, that the same Paul deprived Elimas the magician of his sight; and Peter slue

Ananias and Sapphira. Wherefore it were better to say, that these great men did not such things of hatred granted to them against imperfect men; but forced thereunto by some other manner of means. And so me thinketh we must make this distinction: that they sometimes had to do for their own causes, and sometimes for God's cause. When they had to do for their own matters, they seasoned all their doings with all modesty and gentleness: as we see David did, who sundry times spared Saul his deadly enemy. Moses also, and other holy men, did very oftentimes sustain grievous things, both constantly and valiantly: but when God's business was to be handled, they behaved themselves severely and nobly. But this if they had done, while they tendered their own matters, they might have seemed to wrest the sword out of the hand of God, and of the magistrate: as they do, which revenge their own injuries.

33. This also is to be added, that men appointed to take in hand, and to defend God's cause, though they may then do things sharply and severely; ought notwithstanding precisely and diligently to beware, least under that pretense, they follow their own affections. The apostles when they desired

Christ to send fire from heaven upon the Samaritans (as they knew had been done in the old time, at the petition of Elias) were rebuked of the Lord; because they knew not of whose spirit they were: which without doubt was a most fit answer. For they, whom God sendeth to execute these offices, ought not now to be counted private or mere men, but such as were prepared and instructed by him to supply his room upon the earth. But whether is it lawful for private men to pray against ungodly and cruel tyrants, by whom the true worshipping of God is hindered, and to curse them? Augustine answereth, that it is always lawful for godly men to pray against the kingdom of sin; and that may be taken away, when the ungodly forsake their wickedness: for whose unfeigned repentance we must always pray unto God. But if they seem past all hope, it is lawful to pray, that their sins may once at the length come to an end; namely, that they, being taken away, might cease both to hinder the worshipping of God, and also to trouble the saints. For it is not convenient, that their sin should range abroad unpunished; since when it is left unpunished, it is mere injustice: but when the punishment of God is joined to it, then it hath in itself less deformity.

Wherefore, by the same Augustine, God is very well called, not a cruel punisher, but a just corrector. Moreover, seeing that holy men be very familiar with God, and therefore, so soon as by any heavenly revelation they be certified of his will, they having an earnest love unto him, cannot but allow his judgment: yea, they faithfully pray, that the same may be accomplished. Howbeit, insomuch as they be men, they be both sorry, and

also take it grievously, to have their neighbors so vexed. For which cause Samuel mourned for Saul, although he were not ignorant, that he was rejected of God. Jeremiah also wept for the captivity, which was at hand.

And Christ wept for the city of Jerusalem, that should be destroyed. For they, which be men indeed, cannot choose but be sorry for their neighbors, and for their own flesh, when it is afflicted. Neither doth God require of us a Stoical lack of compassion. But of this matter, if the reader desire to see more, let him peruse my Commentaries upon the Corinthians. And as concerning this present matter, I say, that the people of Israel, in destroying or cursing of these nations, followed not their own hatred; but the instinction of God. For they were his lieutenants, and might be called his workmen; seeing they destroyed those, whom God himself had declared to be his enemies, and commanded, that they should be destroyed by them.

Of Affects, or affections in general; out of the Commentaries upon Aristotle's Ethics.

34. An affect is a certain power or faculty, whereby we either seek or shun the objects laid before us. And in living creatures, in that they be living, and have sense, it doth ensue knowledge. And some affects do ensue touching; but some do accompany the cogitation and opinion. Those which follow of touching, forthwith, as the sense lighteth into an object, either agreeable or unagreeable, do either pursue it, or fly from it. For when the sense and the object do agree the one with the other, then it is pleasure: but when it happeneth otherwise, it is counted grief. And while the sinews are hurt, there ariseth a great grief; which grief undoubtedly is not an opinion or a cogitation, as many have fondly conceived: for, besides the cogitation or opinion, the body itself is ill affected. And it is not in the power of our opinion or imagination, to change such manner of objects: for those, which

do cause grief, will always hurt the sinews; which sinews do appertain to the feeling, and will vex the body. And on the other side, those objects, which of their own nature are pleasant, will always delight; so that the body be not ill affected with some ill quality. But those affects, which do not ensue in touching, spring and arise from the cogitation or imagination; although there be no outward object present. And they be the motions of the heart, whereby we pursue or shun objects; according as the cogitation, either truly or falsely showeth those things to be either profitable or unprofitable. Those affects are called πάθη, and therefore they be not cogitations, but are derived of them. Of these affects there be diverse sorts: for some of them be simple, and others compounded. Of the simple we reckon four; Gladness, Sadness, Hope, and Fear: for the object, which is presented unto us, is either good or evil. And the same is showed by the cogitation, either as present, or by and by to come.

If good be showed to be present, there ariseth gladness, which is a motion of the heart, whereby it openeth and spreadeth forth itself, sweetly embracing the present good. But if the good be not present, but is looked for; hope ariseth, being a motion of the heart, whereby it enlargeth and prepareth itself to embrace that good, when it shall come. But the evil, when it is presently showed, the heart doth shun it: for sadness is a motion of the heart, whereby it draweth itself together, that it might avoid the present evil. But if the evil that is to come be showed, then we fear. And that affect is a motion of the heart, whereby it draweth itself together, lest it should be oppressed by the evil to come. These are the simple affects, which are given unto living creatures, that they might not only use a knowledge for their own safety; but also, that if that knowledge should be but a weak help, such kind of spurs might be joined withal, as might stir us

up to our safety, and call us back from things that are hurtful unto us. They be as it were winds, whereby the ship is driven: and they are placed in the third kind of quality. And albeit that the first and second kind are of very great force, to the governing and ruling of living creatures; yet are those of more force to rule, and do work with a greater vehemence, than the habits or natural powers do. Howbeit, there are other affects of this sort, which are not simple, but are compounded of many things; as is anger, which comprehendeth grief and gladness together; and such other like there be.

35. Now it remaineth, that we see what be the organs or places of these affects. Plato did place anger in the heart; desire and gladness in the liver.

But Aristotle was of another mind, who placed as well anger as grief, gladness, and such like, in the heart: albeit that Aristotle placed also the natural affects; to wit, those which belong to the vegetative or growing power, in the organs, which be proper unto that faculty: and such are hunger, thirst, and the stirring up unto procreation. Neither would he deny, but that the liver is the chief among these inward parts; because therein is the principal storehouse of the blood; and that humor is both nourishment, and also is the proper matter of the seed. But setting aside these natural affects, which are not joined unto knowledge; let us deal with those, which are joined either to the apprehension of the senses, or else unto the cogitation. And since, according to the opinion of Aristotle, we place them in the heart; let us prove this opinion of ours by arguments. Certainly, this must be done, wheresoever they are to be placed, either in the brain, or in the heart, or in the liver. They shall not be placed in the brain, since there the actions and powers, which be repugnant to these affects; namely, judgment, and reason, have their abiding. But one and the self-same power bringeth not forth at one very time, actions which be repugnant. And that

the actions of the affects, and those of judgment and reason be one repugnant to another; even Medea herself in Ovid testified, who said;

Video meliora, probóque; deteriora sequor:

The better I allow, and view; But yet the worst I do ensue.

And by this very reason it appeareth, that these affects are not (as the Stoics thought) cogitations or opinions; since these actions consist in the brain. And therefore it remaineth, that if they be not in the brain, they must be placed either in the heart, or in the liver. And verily they cannot be ascribed unto the liver; because those affects, which belong thereunto, cannot be governed by judgment and reason, as hunger, thirst, and moving unto procreation may be. No doubt but judgment or reason may over-rule the power that moveth; to wit, that it shall not eat nor drink, nor procreate children: but it cannot let, that it should disclose itself, that it should provoke, disquiet, and stir up. But those affects, which follow perceiving or knowledge, may be stayed by reason and judgment: and so they be not of the self-same nature that those be, which are placed in the liver. Wherefore, they shall not belong unto that part of the body, but unto the heart. And with this opinion, which we think is Aristotle's, the holy scriptures do agree, which say; Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and thou shalt fear to offend him.

36. But we must note, that hunger and thirst are sometime understood for the defect itself, when we be quite empty; and in this respect they cannot be governed by judgment and reason, nor yet have their original from thence: but that grief, which doth follow, belongeth to the heart; since the first emptiness is in the organs, which do belong unto the vegetative power. And as touching the affects also, which follow the sense of feeling, there must be

two things considered; to wit, the dissolutions of the whole, the rending in pieces, and burnings: which things are done in the flesh and sinews. But the griefs, which follow them, be motions of the heart. Neither must we pass over this, that the heart hath two other motions, beside affects; namely, the pulses. But we are not now at this present to speak of them, and therefore I come again to the affects: which, since we have called them motions of the heart, we must not think them to be violent: because they have their original from nature itself, for they arise from the powers of the heart. But yet must we understand, that such is the course of nature, that those things which be over vehement, do hurt; yea they mar and corrupt. As for example: if the light be too great, it destroyeth the eyes; over-much heat, or over-much cold do destroy living creatures: but whatsoever is moderate; doth profit and preserve. Which self-same thing must be judged of the affects. Vehement grief, fear or gladness be hurtful; but when there is used a mean, they bring very many helps and commodities. Now have we spoken enough of the formal cause: for we have proved, that they be motions of the heart, which do follow the knowledge of the senses; or else follow cogitation or opinion, which nevertheless are natural and not violent. And we have also showed what we must determine as concerning the matter or subject.

Now it remaineth, that we speak of the efficient cause. As for this, it is the object, whereby the sense or cogitation is moved; namely, that good thing or evil thing, which offereth itself, either present or to come. And moreover, the efficient cause is a power of the heart, which forthwith moveth the same to pursue or to shun that which is offered. Howbeit, between the object and power stirred up of the heart, there cometh between a middle knowledge: for the power of the heart is not stirred up by the object, unless it be through knowledge. For immediately, so soon as the objects are apprehended, either

by the sense, or by the knowledge; the spirits faculties, which do attend upon the knowledge, do strike the heart itself, and the power of the heart is awakened, whereby it is moved either to fly from, or to pursue. But yet it must be noted, that according to the diverse temperature of the body, so is this motion of the heart, either slowly or speedily stirred up; and by reason of the affects, do become more vehement in some, and in other some more feeble. Hot and dry humors do easily and vehemently stir up; but those which be cold and moist, be somewhat slower: from which the affects must of necessity proceed somewhat slackly. And further, the humors are moved, according to the nature or condition of the affects. In grief or fear is raised melancholy; in gladness, blood; and in anger, yellow choler. Over this, the motions be either of the property of drawing together, or of spreading abroad. When the object, which is offered, shall be good; the heart spreadeth itself abroad to receive it: but if the object shall be evil, then the humors withdraw themselves to the inward parts. And hence proceedeth paleness of the face; and from hence arise blushing's, according as the blood either retireth unto the inward parts, or else poureth out itself into the outward parts. And thus much shall suffice as touching the cause.

37. Now remaineth, that we consider of two things. First, that these affects be not either cogitations, or opinions; as the Stoics thought them to be.

Secondly, that they must not be all condemned as vicious and evil. First it may evidently be proved in those affects that be called natural, as are hunger and thirst: which affects invade us without any cogitation. Also, who will call it a cogitation or opinion, when we be afflicted with a dissolution of the whole, with a breaking of the sinews, or burning by flame or fire?

They may as well persuade us, as touching the natural affections of parents towards their children, which are not only vehement in men, but in brute

beasts also. Howbeit, since the matter is plain; I think it needles to stand much thereupon. Now, as concerning the second; I will not deny, but some affects have their faults joined with them. But I will show, that many of them are good; and that those, which are evil, are evil through man's fault, not in their own nature. And first may we speak of the error of judgment, for we do not always judge aright of the objects which are before us. That which is evil, is otherwhile taken for that which is good; and that which is good, is esteemed to be evil. But the affects, as we have declared, do accompany the judgments of the mind; and so the fault passeth from the judgment unto the affect. The apostles judged the contumelies, which they suffered for the name of Christ, to be honorable unto them, and therefore departed with joy and gladness from the Council.

But contrariwise, when David was driven out of his kingdom by his son, he sorrowed; because he saw, that his casting forth would be an offense unto men, which knew what God promised unto David by the prophets. He saw moreover, that these things did happen through his own fault: and since that these were evils, he could not choose but sorrow. Either of these both

David as the apostles judged rightly of the things objected, albeit in diverse manners they judged of the things that happened. Vain men do esteem flatteries to be good things indeed, and therefore are delighted with them.

Others judge more rightly of them; for they perceive them to be but mockeries, and for that cause do dislike of them. Those that are good men, do rejoice in mere virtues; for they judge rightly of them. Again, thou shalt see others, which do hate them; because they be infected with a corrupt judgment: so as the naughtiness and goodness of the affects, proceedeth of the true or false judgment, concerning the things which are objected.

Howbeit, it is not requisite to say, that all the affects are evil; because many

men being seduced by error, do light upon those ill motions of the mind: for they which err not, are not hurt by the affects of error.

38. Another evil there is in the affects, which in very deed proceedeth not of error; but for that there be some, which are adversaries unto right reason: such is the desire of other men's goods, of murder, of adultery, and such like. These affects must of good right be condemned; but yet for these sakes must not sentence be given generally; since there be other affects, which are agreeable to right reason and sound judgment; namely, love towards virtue, and hatred and anger against sins. Which affects, being agreeable to reason, are not only honest and laudable, but also very profitable: for they are given as certain spurs to godly life. For it is not sufficient to know those things that are good, but we must be earnestly stirred up unto them. For the affects be as it were sinews, by whose stretching forth, or shrinking in, we are the earnestlier, or the lightlier stirred up. Who seeth not, that this is most true, that anger is as it were a whetstone unto fortitude? We should be very dull even unto honest actions, if we had not these provocations: we should be even as a ship in the sea destitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature itself of affects is not evil, since many of them be very profitable and honest.

Undoubtedly, God gave the organs of these affects, and he appointed humors to attend on them, and knowledges to accompany them: so as it cannot be denied, but that they are the works of God; and especially since he in his law requireth such affects. For he willeth us to love and to fear

God, to love our neighbors, and servants to fear their masters: and full of such precepts are the holy scriptures.

That same impassibility then of affects, which the Stoics would have (albeit that Basil, Nazianzen, and certain other of the fathers, otherwhile seem greatly to commend) must utterly be refused. Christ wept, was sad

unto death, was moved with mercy: so then he was not without affects. And therefore affects are not repugnant even to the perfection of our human nature. True it is, there happen evils many times, through the fault of our corrupt nature: but we must endeavor ourselves to correct our vicious affects, and to confirm and restore those that be good and agreeable to reason. And this we read, that the holy and godly heroical men did, both in the old, and in the New Testament. These fathers did not follow their affections, as guided by them; but used them unto those virtues and noble acts, which God commanded. And it is apparent in the holy scriptures, that those heroical men were stirred up of God, with certain more vehement affections, than other men are. But it may be doubted of, from whence the exceeding corruptions of affects, or else so great a disagreement from reason in some of them (such as is the greedy desire of other men's goods, of murder, rape, and adultery, which cannot any manner of way be allowed) had their original. Unto which question an answer may easily be made out of the holy scriptures; because that By one man, that is by Adams fall, sin entered into the world. But the philosophers, which understand not this, do fly unto temperatures of the body; and unto aspects and motions of the stars: howbeit, as the thing it self declareth, they cannot by those causes yield a perfect reason.

39. Now let us see, how those affects may be ruled and corrected. The first way is civil; to wit, through moral virtues. For those do reduce them to a mediocrity; and those would suffice; if we should only have respect unto the present life. But in truth, before God they are not sufficient; neither doth this civil justice suffice before his tribunal seat. And therefore another rule is yet necessary; namely, the rule of the divine scriptures, the which do profit nothing at all, unless they be apprehended by faith. This rule bringeth

two manner of commodities with it. The first is, that that which is wanting unto true righteousness (considering the moral state wherein we be) is not imputed to us, and that the whole fulfilling is ascribed to us out of Christ his fullness. Besides this, there is given unto us greater strength to withstand lusts. And finally by faith, the very actions of virtues, and good affects, are altogether referred to God: which without faith cannot be done. And therefore, in men, which are estranged from Christ, those moderate affects, how gorgeous soever they were, are sins; not that they be so in their own nature, but they so become through our natural corruption. For we be even as fusty vessels, the which do corrupt the wine, though it be good that is poured into us. And therefore, since God is the author of all creatures, and that he made nothing but is good, and made no bare substances, and such as are furnished with no kind of helps, but gave unto everyone a proneness and inclination unto those things which be wholesome and profitable: it followeth, that not only natures and substances be good; but also the affects, which are by God engrafted in them. Albeit, that in those which be wicked men, they draw unto them these two evils, which otherwise of themselves are good. First, by reason of original sin, nature is so corrupted and weakened, that good affects are not of such efficacy as they ought to be.

Secondly, they are not directed unto God, as it behooveth that they should be; but rather to the embracing of pleasures and earthly delectations.

Whereby we may perceive, there are four degrees of men. [ 1] The first are the basest, who be neither endued with moral virtues, nor yet with godliness: in these we may perceive all things to be fraught with perturbations and disorder. [ 2] Secondly, there be others as yet aliens from godliness; howbeit, civil men, who by a certain kind of habit, have after a sort revoked their affections to a mediocrity. [ 3] The third sort are believers

in Christ; who notwithstanding they are not without sin, no more than are other mortal men, yet is not their sin imputed unto them. [ 4] In the fourth and last place must those be put, which either were made by God at the beginning, or else are loosed from hence, and be now with Christ. They indeed have no corrupt affections, neither on the second, nor yet on the third cause; but they have them altogether good, absolute, and perfect.

Howbeit, in nature there be not any affects so corrupt, and so vicious, but in them may be seen somewhat that is good. For in all of them there doth appear some part of the institution of God. For that same first beginning, or (as I may so say) the faculty and strength of these qualities had his original from God; but the confusedness either of imperfection, or of deformedness, which cometh by reason of sin, hath corrupted the same. Neither do those evil affects hurt alone the grosser parts of the soul, but they also hurt the will and reason. For so did God fasten and bind together those powers of the mind, as they might serve one another; namely, that the affects should obey reason, and that reason should rule and govern the affects, and temper the motions of the heart. Howbeit, it fareth otherwise; and so great a feebleness there is of the will, as being compared with the affects, it may seem to be even a fearful child, sitting upon a very fierce horse. Wherefore, the moral philosophers have prefixed to themselves this end; namely, to qualify the affections by virtues, and to strengthen reason being weak.

40. But which be the parts of the mind, that being instructed by vehement affects, do disturb reason, and make it feeble; Plato declared, who in the chief place appointed ἡγεμονικόν, and in the inferior place, ἐπιθυμητικόν, and θυμοειδές. So that in these latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And these powers of the mind, as it was said before, he judged to be in the head, in the liver, and in the heart. But Aristotle, for the general word,

took ὀρεκτικόν, which he divided into three parts; to wit, ἐπιθυμία, that is, Greedy desire, Affectation, or Covetousness: θυμός, that is, Anger, or Vehemency of the mind: and βούλησις, that is, Will. Which parts, because they are apparent of themselves, there is no need to expound them any further. Yet this nevertheless will I add, that according to right order, the inferior appetites ought to be moved, governed, and ruled by that same superior, which is βούλησις; to wit, Will: even as the uppermost sphere doth guide the lower, as Aristotle writeth in his 3rd book De anima. And thus doubtless the case standeth: the inferior powers, when they be stirred up, and compel us to the doing of anything, are governed by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reason.

Yea, and every man hath experience in himself, that when any natural reason is applied, the disturbed affections are set in quiet: even as the winds are feigned to be suppressed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient unto the will itself; whereas in brute beasts, action immediately followeth upon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetually expect the commandment of the will, unless that some impediment do oppose itself: as in children, and in mad men we see it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt say; Do we not see, that in those, which are incontinent, the affects are moved even against the will? We answer, that indeed they rebel against the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to pass, unless that the will do command them. Indeed the affections do resist the will, and trouble it, and finally overcome it, and lead it away to their own opinion; which will, when it shall have given her assent, and shall have overruled the matter, actions do follow, not as it decreed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is overcome.

41. But some think, that the power of desiring, and of being angry, is all one; because contraries belong all unto one faculty: but things agreeable unto nature, and things hurtful to the same, are contrary; and therefore they be both objects of one part of the mind. As white and black, are objects of the sight; a right and crooked line, are objects of one and the same science; namely, of the science Mathematical; and a whole and a sick man, are objects of physic. Hereunto we answer, that the objects of the angry and of the desiring power, are not so to be distinguished, by that which is agreeable, and that which is hurtful, but that either of these parts hath respect unto good and evil; howbeit, not after the like manner. The power, which desireth, hath respect unto good and to evil absolutely; that is to wit, that it may attain the one, and avoid another. Nevertheless, otherwhile impediments and things that do corrupt it, do fall out between: so that it is a difficult thing to obtain this, or to avoid that. And there doth the power of anger show itself, for the overcoming of these difficulties; it wrestleth, and it earnestly resisteth the impediments, to the intent we may either apprehend the good, or avoid the evil, according as we do desire. So then the object of the angry power is good and evil, according as the thing difficult and hard offereth itself. Hope is chiefly an affection of the angry power: for it is carried unto that which is good, but yet a good that is absent, to the obtaining whereof must be devoured the impediment of expectation; yea, the power and the difficulty of the impediments must be overcome.

But in what order those faculties shall be placed among themselves, it hereby appeareth; in that the force of the angry power beginneth at the power of desire, and endeth also at the same. For when any man hath an injury done unto him, he is sad: but the affect of sadness pertaineth to the faculty of desire. Against this evil (whereby the offended party is made sad,

to the intent it may be avoided) doth anger interpose itself; which, by revenge, coveteth to repulse that evil. But revenge (as we all know) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then succeedeth gladness, which belongeth to the power of desire, and there we cease to be angry. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and also a striver against, and doth resist the desiring part. For the angry part flieth from labors and griefs, but the part desiring overcometh them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth her action, the other contrariwise doth slacken it. They which lust very inordinately after women, are not angry with them: and they which be angry with them, are less inflamed with the desire of them. Wherefore the object of the angry part, offendeth the desiring part; because (as we said right now) it flieth from labors and difficulties, whereunto the angry part offereth itself, and maketh itself ready to get the victory. And it is a manifest thing, that of those two powers of the mind, the angry part cometh the nearer unto reason; for it is a helper of the same, to execute wholesome counsels: but the desiring part cometh nearer to the sense. And to deal by examples, in a matter which yet I think is plain enough. Boldness and fear, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldness doth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But fear flieth an evil thing, which is hard to be avoided: for we fear not the evils, which urge us not, and may easily be avoided. And thus much of the affects in general; whereof not only the moral philosopher disputeth, but also the natural philosopher, and the Physician, and Rhetorician.

42. Now to set aside natural philosophers and Physicians, I will speak somewhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtless (as Aristotle testifieth in his second book of Rhetoric's) do first endeavor by arguments, to make men

believe, that those things be true, which they affirm. And then do they consider of the minds and affections of the judges, and of those which hear them: for that carrieth a great weight unto the cause. For they which favor him that is guilty, do believe, that either he sinned not, or else that he made a very small fault. But on the other side, if they shall hate him, they think with themselves, that either he is no innocent at all, or else that he is most guilty of all. These affections, unless that an Orator can change, qualify, or turn unto the contrary; he shall labor in vain. Wherefore Aristotle teacheth, that three things there must be considered. First, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondly, towards whom they are wont to be so affected. And finally, for what causes their affections are moved, either one way or another; to the intent that these things being known, they may easily make them serve their purpose. But there be some, which think, that this is not just, or to be permitted; that in pleading of causes, affections should be moved, since that the minds of the judges, in discerning, ought to be at quiet: which cannot come to pass if the affects be troubled by an artificial speech of Orators.

Howbeit, they which speak this, seem to me, that they distinguish not the nature of affects, by the use of them; because in very deed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the use of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile evil. Also swords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, do serve sometime to a just use; and sometime to an unjust. And wherein (I beseech you shall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and just cause, he shall see the judge ill affected towards the party accused, he do temper him with the art of eloquence, and do draw him unto a contrary mind, yea and stir up the motions of his heart to decree gravely and justly?

Here undoubtedly there shall be no offense committed; but human

affections shall be directed unto the ends prescribed unto them. For otherwhile the auditory, and also the judges become cold; as unto whom it shall not suffice to have showed what is to be done, unless they be drawn thereunto, by stirring them up with a very vehement affect. But those

Orators are to be reprehended, and restrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moving of affections; that the minds of the judges may be disquieted, and that they may not see what is just. But yet, for these men's ill demeanor, must not that profitable cunning be banished from the affairs of men. For so ought the holy scriptures to be blamed, wherein the spirit of God, not only warneth what things are to be done, and what to be avoided; but also stirreth up the affections, that we may be the more compelled to obedience. And this will I have to suffice as touching this matter.

Of some of the Affects severally.

43. But now we think it good to speak somewhat of the affects severally.

Affects, as it is manifest, do belong unto the general word of quality, and are contained in that kind, which commonly is called passion, and passable quality. But among these, there be two of a grosser sort, and very common;

I mean delectation and grief. They chiefly have their place in the sinews, which be dispersed in a manner over all the body: unto which sinews, when things, either agreeable to nature, or else repugnant thereunto be applied, then we be either delighted, or else do sorrow. Moreover, there be other affects, which follow knowledge itself: whereby, as the nature of them is, so the heart doth change his motion, according as good or evil shall be laid hold upon in the knowledge; and that, either present or imminent. For when we feel that good is present, the heart is pleasantly delighted, and sweetly affected therewith: and this affect is called gladness. But if so be we perceive that the good is not present indeed, yet not far off, but ready; and

that within a while we shall obtain it, then are we stirred up with hope to pursue the same: and the heart in like manner is pleasantly moved. But when we perceive that evil is present, the heart starteth back with a grieved motion: for it shrinketh, it abhorreth, and it is vexed. And this affection is commonly called as well sorrow as grief of mind. In Greek it is λύπη; so called, as the Stoics think of λύσις, that is, A loosing. For even as the body of him that is sick, is loosed through sickness; so likewise the mind seemeth, after a sort to be consumed with sadness.

There remaineth another knowledge of evil, the which indeed is not present, but such as is now near at hand: that doth the heart eschew, and evidently enough starteth from it by his motion: and such an affect is called fear. According to these principal affects, we will now entreat of those, which have their original from sadness or grief. And those are likewise reckoned to be four; that is to wit, mercy, indignation, envy, and emulation; of the which Aristotle did singularly well write many things in his book of Rhetoric's. But before I deal particularly with these, we must demand one thing; to wit, whether affects are to be reckoned in the account of good or of evil things? The Stoics accounted them in the number of evil, and condemned them generally: being led by this reason; that by them the mind, the judgment, and sound counsel is greatly troubled. For they so hale and draw the mind and reason to and fro, as it cannot peaceably behold things natural and divine; neither yet determine of doing things orderly and rightly.

And further, because with the heavy load of them, they drive men very often to commit dishonest and unjust things: yea, and when they be somewhat more vehement, they hurt the body itself. These in a manner were the reasons of the Stoics.

The Peripatetiks teach far otherwise; namely, that it is not true, which the Stoics declare, except when affections be not chastised by reason, but are suffered to have their immoderate scope. Because those affections, if they be comprised within certain bounds, are both good and profitable: as being the matter of virtues, and which by nature were given, as the whetstone of them. For fortitude is greatly furthered by the means of wrath: and compassion doth attend upon the virtue of clemency. And in the same sort it may be said as touching the most part of them. But among these philosophers, so disagreeing in themselves; sentence must be given according to the judgment of the holy scriptures. They declare, that man, in respect both of the body, and of the soul, was created by God: and they add; that All things, whatsoever God made, were good. Therefore, seeing he himself planted the affects in man (I mean not wicked nor corrupt, as now we have them, but perfect and sound, and which should obey and serve reason) they of necessity be good. Furthermore, the law of God doth in every place commend mercy unto us: it preacheth repentance, which cannot be without sorrow and grief of mind. David also wrote, and Paul repeated it;

Be ye angry, and sin not. Yea and the matter hath stretched so far forth, that affects are attributed even to God himself; namely, wrath, mercy, sorrow, repentance, and such like: which although they be not properly spoken of him, yet this we must observe, that in man, whatsoever by itself is vice and sin in his own nature, is never by the holy scriptures attributed unto God.

Of Shamefastness.

44. Shamefastness, which is a mean thing, is commended; yet is it no virtue, because men do naturally run thereinto, and sometime against their wills: for it is a sorrow or fear for some evil that hangeth over our head, or into which we shall fall. But thou wilt say, that affects are neither praised or

dispraised, since they be natural; how then can shamefastness be commended, and the extremities thereof condemned? I answer, that a mere affect is neither praised nor dispraised, but the measure thereof is. It is praised, when it is in a mean; it is dispraised, if it be extreme. Here likewise in shamefastness there is found an excess: and he which so exceedeth, is said to be κατάπλεος, that is, Astonied, or abashed, who is ashamed at everything. And on the other side, he is impudent, who although he be not altogether ashamed, yet he lacketh shamefastness more than becometh him.

Of Temperance.

45. Between pleasures and griefs, temperance is the mean; and intemperance the excess. The defect hath no name. But because pleasure is of two kinds; some be of the mind, and those be commended of all men; as when a man rejoiceth in the contemplation of God, and of nature: or delighteth in the remembrance of his well doing, either else taketh pleasure in the helping and benefiting of others to his power. But the other kind of pleasure is more gross, and is perceived of the senses, not of the reason: and those are called corporal pleasures. Whereupon Aristotle saith, that this virtue is not conversant about the former virtues: for those things being most pure, have no need of moderation. It remaineth therefore, that temperance is placed in this latter kind. And yet hath it not place about all corporal things; but in those only, which belong unto the sense of touching.

But with touching thou must also understand tasting: for those two senses (as it is written in the book De anima) are very near one to another.

Wherefore, temperance shall be a mediocrity in pleasures of meat and drink, and fleshly desire. But wherefore doth it not also moderate the pleasures, which come by the sight and by the hearing? Because the desire of those pleasures is not so great and vehement, as it is of these: neither are

those so hurtful as these be. For by these, if they be immoderate, men do in a manner degenerate into brute beasts; but so do they not through sounds, smells, or colors.

But admit that in this kind of pleasures also, which belong unto the other senses, measure be exceeded; and that there is need of some virtue, that kind of excess is never accounted or called intemperance: but they, which so sin, are accused of a certain other sin, not of intemperance. Wherefore, seeing that the virtue of temperance hath place, as well in pleasures, as in displeasures; whether of these affections is the more frequented matter thereof? Aristotle saith, that those be pleasures: for in the suppressing of them, we have greater labor; and unto the excess of pleasure we seem to be driven by nature. Neither is it so hard a matter to resist displeasure, as it is to temper a man's self from pleasure. Virtue in very deed is chiefly conversant about those things that be difficult. Furthermore, the grief of the mind, which belongeth to this virtue, ariseth of the defect or absence of pleasure. But it is far more easy, to abide the desire of a pleasure that is absent, than not to enjoy a pleasure that is present. The defect or want in this matter had no name. A reason is brought; because there be not many, nay rather, there be very few, which do altogether shun pleasures. Those things, which do seldom happen, or be in a manner never seen, do easily want a name. But yet, saith Aristotle, they be ἀναίσθητοι, that is, Astonied.

Nevertheless, we must think that they are properly so called: for that word doth also signify them, which being oppressed with the force of sickness, have no sense. And it may be, that some men, by reason of a sickness, or some dissolution of the sinews, feel no taste of pleasure and fleshly lust.

Of Mercy, and the affect called Nemesis.

46. But mercy is a grief of the mind, which we conceive for other men's adversities: or (as Cicero saith) It is a grief taken for another man's misery.

Aristotle taught, that mercy is stirred up, if we see any that do suffer grievous things, which they have not deserved. For if that the wicked do suffer just punishments, thereof ariseth no mercy. And besides, he thinketh, that those mishaps, whereby we are moved with mercy, be cruel; otherwise, if they were but light, we would be moved but little or nothing: to conclude, that those are moved with mercy, which consider that such things may happen to themselves, or to some other of theirs. Whereupon it is thought, that they, which enjoy prosperity, and do judge themselves blessed, are not inclined to mercy: nay rather, that they have been accustomed to triumph over poor wretches, as of those, whom they think are not able to hurt them.

In like manner, he removeth this affect from desperate and wretched men; because they fear, that nothing can happen unto them more miserable than they have: and thus, in that desperate fortune they seem to have become senseless. Howbeit, if this were true, some man might doubt how mercy can be ascribed unto God; since he without controversy is the most blessed, and that nothing is able to hurt him.

But hereunto we answer, that mercy is not properly attributed unto God; but by a metaphor taken of man; because he doth those things, which merciful men have been wont to do. For they doubtless do help the afflicted, the very which thing also the godly do. Howbeit, I would not herein subscribe unto Aristotle, that mercy is not to be showed to them, which do justly suffer punishment. For Samuel mourned a long time for Saul, who was rejected of God; not undeservedly, but most justly. And no less did Christ mourn for the destruction of Jerusalem, which without doubt hanged over the head of that city, not without desert, but for just cause.

Neither yet do we allow, that the sins, which are committed of some, do not stir up mercy; but that only calamities and adversities do the same. For godly men are no less aggrieved for other men's chances, when they fall into great wickedness, than when they be oppressed with unhappy fortune.

Wherefore we must not deny, that mercy is a good affect, when it followeth the word of God, and reason; especially, since the Lord hath pronounced with his mouth; that Blessed are the merciful, because they also shall obtain mercy.

47. Another affect, which ariseth of sadness and grief, is that, which they call Nemesis. The same hath no Latin word, albeit of some it is called

Indignatio, that is, Indignation: which yet, by that word doth not express all that affect. For indignation extendeth further than doth Nemesis. But omitting the word, we will thus define the thing; Nemesis is a sadness taken for the prosperity of wicked men, because they seem to be unworthy of that fortune. Just and godly men have sometimes this affect reigning in them.

David, when he saw the ungodly flourish, said; My feet had well near slipped. Also Abacuk took it grievously, that the wicked were of so great power, that they oppressed the saints, and devoured the just. And Job seemeth in a manner to complain unto his friends for the same thing.

Furthermore, Plutarch in the life of Homer praiseth this affect; and by reason thereof he far preferreth the Peripatetiks, in disputing of the affects, before the Stoics, and especially by the judgment of Homer: who affirmeth, that at the length God will angerly punish, after that the wicked have a certain while flourished. Howbeit, this is to be observed, that men in this respect are not grieved thorough this affect; for that they shall suffer any loss, by reason of the prosperity of the wicked, or because that they by their power can hurt them. For if they were by this means grieved, they should

not be troubled with Nemesis, but rather with fear. But Nemesis is then, when a man is moved of a stomach, and for that he hateth the unworthiness of the person.

48. This affect in two things communicateth with mercy; first, because that either of them both is a heaviness; secondly, for that each of them is stirred up through an unworthiness of the thing: Mercy, because good men are grieved and oppressed; Nemesis, because wicked men live fortunately.

But herein afterward they differ, because Nemesis hath respect unto prosperous fortune; but mercy unto sharp fortune. So that Nemesis is, as it were a mean affect between envy and mercy; for of either it seemeth to take somewhat: of mercy it taketh unworthiness; of envy, prosperity, which it hath a respect unto. And moreover, Aristotle teacheth, that none are affected with Nemesis, for other men's virtues. For if otherwise of vicious and corrupt men, they become moderate, strong and temperate men; we disdain it not: because when they are adorned with virtues, they are no longer counted wicked men. But then at the last we are affected with Nemesis, when unto wicked men there come those good things, wherewith we think that good men ought to be rewarded; as are riches, honors, authority, favor, and such like. Nevertheless, godly men must deal prudently with this affect, that when their minds are affected therewith, because of the fortunate state of the ungodly, let us have a regard unto God, who is the true governor and distributor of all good things. Wherefore, if men should bestow those outward good things upon the unworthy, their injustice might be justly reproved. Howbeit, such a reprehension hath no place in God, because he doth all things most justly. This, when David did not diligently consider, he said; My feet had well near slipped. As though he should have said; By reason of this Nemesis, I had almost grievously fallen. Wherefore we must

seldom give place to this affect, least we seem to reprehend the providence of God.

49. Mercy is an affect profitably engrafted in our minds by God, whereby we are stirred up to help and defend others. But we must take heed, that thereby we be not made so nice and effeminate, as thorough the same we should commit anything against the commandments and will of God. The holy scriptures reprehend Ahab king of Samaria, because he spared

Benhadad king of Syria, of whom he said; If he be alive he is my brother.

Also they condemn Saul, by the mouth of the prophet Samuel; because he saved Agag king of Amalech alive. And even as it was said unto another by the messenger of God; Thy soul shall be for his soul: so Saul, being a little before placed by God in the kingdom, was deprived thereof. What shall we then do? Shall not sins be forgiven? Seneca, in his second book De clementia, the sixth chapter; Pardon (saith he) is a remission of punishment due, whereby he is forgiven, which ought to have been punished. And so he thinketh it is not a wise man's part to give pardon; because a wise man will never commit that, which ought not to be done; or leave anything undone, which ought to be done. This reason of his seemeth to be good and effectual enough, yet least we should be deceived thereby, we must here make a profitable distinction of persons; namely, of God, of princes, and of private men. No man ought to doubt, but that God may forgive whom he will, since that he is not bound to any other man's laws. Wherefore, in forgiving, he is not said to remit that, which ought to have been punished. Besides this, he hath not so forgiven men their faults, but that he hath punished them in his only begotten son Christ.

But we must otherwise think of the magistrate, to whom it is not lawful to forgive the punishments of sins, because he is commanded to give judgment

according to the laws: to whom nevertheless it is commanded, either to release, or to aggravate the punishments, according to the weight or manner of the crimes. So now, when he that is guilty is curable, and hath not grievously offended; the magistrate is sometime content with an easier punishment; and sometime he useth a more sharp reprehension or admonition: and so he never leaveth sins unpunished. And even he in punishing is not cruel, nay he rather correcteth, amendeth and healeth.

Which work is both a just and merciful work: so far is it off that it should be ascribed to severity or cruelty. And this will I also add by the way, which is written by the same Seneca; that To have many executions, is no less dishonorable to magistrates, than many funerals to Physicians. But now, concerning private men, me thinketh it must be thus answered; It is their duty to forgive injuries done to themselves. Neither can Seneca his saying take place in them; namely, that a wise man will leave nothing undone that ought to be done, because revengement is forbidden them by the law of almighty God: and they are commanded after a sort to punish such as sin against them; I mean in reproving them. And they are willed to be content with that punishment, when those which have offended them, are amended and cured. But contrariwise, if they perceive them to be stubborn, they, by the commandment of God ought to complain to the church, by whom at the last they are excluded; unless they will be obedient thereunto. And when they are excluded out of the church, they may also be accused to the magistrate; wherein nevertheless there is not anything committed against clemency: for such is the mind and purpose of the accusers, that by all means possible, according to God's commandment, evil may be utterly taken away from among men.

Of Cruelty.

50. And as concerning cruelty, we may easily gather by the punishment done unto Adonibezeck, that too much cruelty displeaseth God: and thereof

I think it came to pass, that as well by God's laws, as man's laws (of those I mean which are accounted just and honest) there have been certain punishments prescribed for crimes, according to the grievousness of them; to the intent that judges might have the less liberty to exercise cruelty. Yea and lawyers have added this rule, that punishments should rather be diminished by judges, than augmented: which nevertheless must be understood so far forth as the nature of the fault and utility of the Commonwealth will suffer. Which I therefore speak, because otherwhile those conditions, which commonly they call circumstances, do make the crime so odious and horrible, that the judges must there of necessity augment the punishment, which hath been prescribed by the laws; to the intent they may terrify others from so great and detestable offenses. And so David, when

Nathan the prophet had set before him an execrable and horrible thing, decreed a more grievous punishment against him that was guilty, than the law had provided against common thieves, and stealers of cattle.

I have therefore made mention of these, because there were in the law three kinds of death appointed for evil doers; I mean, hanging, stoning, and burning: whereunto some of the Hebrews add a fourth; namely, the punishment of the sword. But because there is not (as far as I know) any mention thereof in the law, I have therefore passed it over. We read that Adonias, Joab, and Agag king of Amalech, were thrust thorough with swords; but we find it not prescribed by any law or precept, that the guilty should be put to death. Seeing therefore the matter is so, yet we perceive, that the children of Israel used in their tents a certain extraordinary kind of punishment against king Adonibezek. Neither will I believe, that they did

this without the instinct of God: for God would punish the cruelty of this tyrant, with an exquisite punishment, which nevertheless was a rendering like for like. Which kind of horrible doing, to the intent we may the easilier avoid, it shall not be grievous unto us to speak somewhat thereof.

51. This word cruelty, is derived either of this Latin word Cruor, which signifieth Blood, wherein cruel men like wild beasts do delight; or else of Crudae carnes, which signifieth Rawe flesh, which barbarous and beastly people do sometimes eat: and it may be defined to be an evil habit, by the which we are inclined unto sharp and hard things above reason. And sometimes it happeneth, that cruelty is counted for a pleasure: with which wicked affection or habit, how some wicked tyrants have sometime been infected, it is evidently to be perceived by many examples. For the holy history setteth before our eyes Adonibezek: and the evangelical history maketh mention of Herod. The Ethnic poets have made report of the cruelty of Atreus and Thiestes. And the most cruel fact of Xerxes king of the Persians is set forth by Seneca in his third book De ira, the 17th chapter.

When a certain man named Pythius, who had well deserved at his hands, came unto him, and desired of him to spare him one of his five sons from the wars, he commanded him, as though he would grant him his request, to choose which of them he would have to tarry at home from the wars. And he did as he was bidden. But this most cruel tyrant commanded, that the young man, whom he had chosen, should be drawn one side of him one way, and the other side of him another way, until at the length he was torn in sunder: the one part whereof he commanded to be fastened in one corner of the way, by the which the soldiers should pass; and the other in another corner: saying, that by this means he purged his army. Howbeit, not long after, he being most shamefully overcome and beaten by the Grecians, was

constrained to fly away through the overthrows and dead carcasses of his own soldiers.

Sylla banished an innumerable company of the citizens of Rome: but at the length he was most horribly eaten up of lice. Even after the like sort died that most cruel Herod, as it is most manifestly declared by Josephus.

Contrary to this exceeding great wickedness and most heinous mischief is clemency, which as a singular virtue doth very well become princes, and is an excellent ornament of Christian men. Augustine in his third book of Questions, question 31. defineth the same after this manner; It is a habit, whereby men being stirred up to hatred against any man, are through goodness kept back. This virtue is a mean between cruelty and foolish mercy. I call it foolish mercy, whereby our mind is so moved with other men's miseries, that it declineth from sound counsel and just reason. And for this cause are we overcome of this affect, because we would never suffer such things, as we see others justly and deservedly afflicted withal: and because we ourselves endeavor to avoid the same, therefore we cease to punish the wicked.

52. David, having overcome his enemies, did grievously punish them; he led the Ammonites forth of the city, and slue them, not after a vulgar manner, but he had saws, wherewith he sawed them in sunder. And this is also showed to have happened unto Isaiah. And in the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews, it is said of the saints, that they were hewn in sunder. This kind of punishment perhaps was usual in those parts. Moreover, he brought forth chariots and sleds, that they should be drawn upon them; and he also hewed them in sunder with axes and hatchets, he threw them into the kills of brick or tile: all which are cruel things. David perhaps in these punishments, might seem to have degenerated from his own nature: for he

was meek and gentle; but these seem to be parts of exceeding great cruelty.

What did he become another Phalaris? No: but if we will judge by things, as they were done, many of them may seem in the holy scriptures to have been cruel. For the Jews so punished king Adonibesek, as they cut off the thumbs of his hands, and of his feet. Joshua brought forth the kings, which had hidden themselves in a cave; and they being prostrated upon the earth, he would have them to be trodden upon by the children of Israel, in such wise, that they should tread with their feet upon every one of their necks: and afterward he hanged them upon five trees. Gideon, in the eighth chapter of the book of Judges, slue the elders of Succoth with thorns and briers. Saul's sons, by the will and commandment of the Lord, were hanged up. These things seem at the first sight to be cruel; but they be not so. Which that it may appear, do but consider this; that about the executing of punishments, there be found in the minds of men, habits of virtue, and of vices.

Clemency causeth minds to be bent unto the mitigation of punishments, according unto right reason. The vice that is in defect, is a certain remissness and slackness in punishing: for we may see many, which do not once touch heinous crimes. And on the other part, there is a certain habit of fierceness and cruelty, that passeth measure. Those be called cruel (if we give credit to Seneca, in his second book De clementia) which exceed a measure in punishing offenders. And, as we briefly touched, cruel men are so called either of Cruor, that is, Blood: as who should say, they be delighted therewith; or else of Cruditas, that is, Rawness. For even as those things, which be sodden, have a pleasant taste; so have raw things an unpleasantness joined with them, together with a certain taste that is horrible. Those be savage and cruel, which do torment without a cause, as though they were delighted with the torments of other men; even as beasts

that know not goodness and honesty, but have only respect unto sweetness and commodity: either for that the sight of blood is delightful, or else because they will be fed with flesh. Now, since cruelty consisteth in this, that therein is a going beyond the measure of right reason; let us see, whether David and others have passed the bounds of reason. Certes, they followed a mediocrity; and those things, which they did, belonged unto punishing justice: for those were worthy of the greatest punishments. David followed reason, but yet a divine reason; the which reason alone is called good. God stirred him up unto these things, not without a cause. And it was necessary for him, since he was a grand captain, to follow that reason, which God had showed unto him.

53. That the Ammonites were most wicked men, we may know it by many causes. First of all, they against the law of nations, shamed the ambassadors of David, in cutting short their beards and garments. They gave an ill judgment of the most godly king David; namely, that he had sent that ambassage with a feigned heart, not to comfort the son of the king of the Ammonites, which was dead, but to destroy him. Again, when the head city was besieged, and that they had slain Uriah, and other valiant men, they also vaunted against God. This did Nathan declare; Because thou hast provoked mine enemies (saith he) to speak evil of me, the child, which is born of thee, shall be slain. If God slue the child of David, because David had given an occasion of blaspheming God; how much more grievously were they to be punished, which did this thing? And further, whereas they had done injuries unto David, yet did they first move war against him. And neither would they only hurt David, but they also solicited others of his subjects and tributaries to forsake him. They disquieted all those regions of Syria and Mesopotamia: and that (which is most of all) they burned their

sons and daughters for their idol sake, which they worshipped. And what marvel was it, if they were thrown into the same furnaces, wherein they threw their own children? This was a punishment of like for like.

And always in those punishments, which are not reproved in the scriptures, we must fly unto this; namely, that God governed those fathers.

Some, to make these punishments the less, say that all were not so handled; but the seigniors and princes only, which were as the stay and succor of the people. But Josephus saith, that they were all rid out of the way. And the scriptures also seem to make it a general punishment. Howbeit, I would think that some were excepted: for in the 17th chapter of the second book of Samuel, we read, that Sobi the son of king Nahas, did help David, when he was driven out of the kingdom by Absalom. Whereupon it is gathered, that the one son of king Nahas was slain, and that the other was by David made ruler of the country. These things are not so much to be wondered at in him, seeing he was a figure of the true David, which at the last day shall say unto all men; Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels. Those punishments which God shall lay upon the wicked in hell, are not cruel. They shall be as it were intolerable punishments, but yet they proceed of a right punishing justice. He saith in the Gospel; Bring ye unto me all them, which would not have me reign over them, and slay them in my sight. Here let magistrates learn to have a regard unto right reason, when the guilty are delivered to them to be punished. It must not grieve their mind to execute those punishments, which are just, and commanded to be done.

Of Envy.

54. Now come we to envy: the same did Cicero think should rather be called Invidentia, than Invidia: the which word Invidentia we may in

English call Envying, or Enviousness; because among the Latinists, those that are envied, are said to suffer envy. But envying belongeth to them, which pine away with this kind of grief. And therefore he thinketh, that envy or envying is so called, because they, which be envious, do look too narrowly to other men's prosperity. Wherefore, envy is a grief taken at the prosperity of other men; especially of them, which have been of like degree with us. For a poor man envieth not a king; nor yet beggars, noble men.

Envy is of equals, and such as be like unto ourselves. And likeness is considered in kindred, riches, beauty, age, wit, dignity, and such like. The cause of envying is not in respect that we be afraid of harm to come unto us, by such men as we do envy; for that were fear: but that men of a certain hatred and stomach cannot abide the prosperity of others, especially of their like and equals: this worketh envy.

Envy is always had in evil things; and it is grievously reprehended in the holy scriptures; because it is most plainly repugnant unto charity itself. For in the first epistle to the Corinthians, the 13th chapter, the apostle said;

Charity envieth not. For Paul in that place did not take this Greek word ζηλοῦν, in his proper signification. But unto the Galatians he hath more plainly forbidden envy, saying; Be not desirous of vain glory, provoking one another, and envying one another. In which place, not only envy is reproved, but also the mother thereof is showed, that is to wit, the desire of glory. And this may we also note in the history of the Judges: for the Ephraits envied Gideon, because the glory of so great a victory seemed to have come unto him.

And this affect beareth rule in all those things, wherein we desire to excel.

Neither yet doth it forbear virtues: for he that is envious would not have his equals, and such as be like unto him, to excel in any ornament of virtue.

And the reason why envy is conversant among such as be alike, is, that although the prosperous fortune of our equals, and them that be like us, doth not pluck any of our goods from us, nor maketh us less than we be; yet the envious man doth so conceive of other men's goods, as if by them his honor and dignity, his gain and other ornaments should be diminished. Neither must we omit, that every envious man is a rejoicer in evil things: for he delighteth in the adversity of his equals. Yet must not both these be accounted for one and the self-same vice; seeing they appertain to contrary motions of the mind. For envy is a grief or sadness; whereas he that rejoiceth in evil things, is affected with delight. Otherwise these vices, although they be diverse, yet are they so linked together, as there can be no envious man, which is not moved with a gladness of other men's harms.

And hereby it evidently appeareth, that envy is mere repugnant unto mercy, seeing mercy sorroweth for another man's misery, but an envious man rejoiceth for the same, by reason of the delight, wherewith he is affected to other men's harm. This motion of the mind is in him also, that is vexed or angered at the prosperity of the wicked: for he that becometh sad for the prosperity of the wicked, the very same man taketh pleasure, when he perceiveth them to be suppressed and in trouble.

Of Emulation.

55. After this, we are to speak of Emulation; that is to wit, the grief of mind, which we run into for other men's goods, which we ourselves want, when as those things may become us, and we be able to obtain them. We desire not by this motion of the mind, to have other despoiled of those ornaments that they have; but it grieveth us that we ourselves be destitute of them: and it cometh of a good nature thus to be affected. Wherefore emulation is reckoned among commendable affections. Cicero in his

Tusculane questions defineth, that hereof cometh a grief of mind; when another man enjoyeth the good, which we ourselves desire. The same author observed, that emulation is otherwhile so taken, as it differeth nothing from envying; and therefore is sometimes reproved. But if we understand it in such sort, as we have said, it is a commendable affect; because it maketh men the better: for it is accustomed to engender the imitation of good things. But we must take heed of that, which indeed we are prone unto; namely, that it degenerate not into hatred, and that emulation have no such scope, as we should desire to despoil men, which be fortunate, honorable, and honest, of their ornaments and good things.

And for this cause Cicero said, that that emulation is praise-worthy, which is not like unto the emulation that is in wooing; seeing this is the property of wooers, that they would so enjoy their pleasures, as they may utterly exclude others. These cautions being had, emulation is both good and godly.

Wherefore Paul exhorted the Corinthians, that they should strive to excel one another in charity, and in the better sort of graces. This affection is most occupied about virtues, and about all such things as are had in honor and admiration: for whatsoever thing a man contemneth and despiseth, he doth not emulate. Emulation hath joined with it a perpetual hope of obtaining that which it desireth: for if a man despair, it is not possible for him to emulate. And so much of these affects.

Of Revenge.

56. Revenge is of two sorts; one public, and another private. And as for public, which ought to be exercised by the magistrate; so far is it off from prohibiting thereof, as God commandeth the same; warning always the magistrates, that they should execute justice and judgment, and not suffer wickedness to escape unpunished. But it is not lawful for private men to

revenge, unless it be, according to the proverb, To repel violence by violence. This is not prohibited them, when the magistrate cannot help them. For sometime the case happeneth so upon the sudden, as a man cannot straightway fly to the help of the public power. Wherefore we may then defend ourselves, using nevertheless great moderation; to wit, that we only endeavor to defend ourselves, and them that be committed unto us, not wishing with a mind of revenge to hurt our adversaries; in such sort as that action may proceed, not of hatred, but of charity. Yet nevertheless, public revenge (as we have said) is commanded by God. By the which precept, not only magistrates are bound, but the guilty also are bound, that they should with a patient mind bear the correction and punishment, that is laid upon them by the superior power, for the crime which they have committed.

Which if they do, let them understand, that it belongeth unto the commendation of justice.

But do not thou object unto me the saying of Aristotle, in his Rhetoric's, that according to other virtues, it is honest and laudable, not only to do, but also to suffer. And he only excepteth justice: for he saith; They which are punished, and do suffer justly, must rather be dispraised than praised. For that, which he here saith, is true; if thou respect the cause, for the which they be punished: that without doubt is not praise-worthy; since they are punished for offenses. Yet on the other side, if thou respect his mind in suffering, which for a public commodity, and for other men's instruction, because of the commandment of God, that he may obey him, and in detestation of the wickedness committed, doth willingly submit himself to the laws which are decreed; it must not be denied, but that such a one doth justly, and is to be praised in such a steadfastness, and just determination of his mind. But yet the prayer of Samson may seem at the first sight not to be

very godly: for he prayeth, that it might be granted him to take revenge upon his enemies; because they put out both his eyes. In very truth, if he had meant to fulfill his wrath, we might not justly allow of his prayer: for he should no more have been allowed of God, than if he had said expressly;

I beseech thee Lord to prosper either my theft or my adultery.

Augustine saith, that Samson did these things, not of his own accord; but by the drift and counsel of the holy Ghost. Besides, we must not think of Samson, as of a private man; but as of a magistrate, whom God himself had appointed. And surly, it was not lawful for him, as a private man, to revenge injuries; but as a magistrate, both he might, and should do it. If we speak of a private cause, that must be of force, which Paul said; Give place unto wrath; vengeance is mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord. But in a public cause, the magistrate, by the commandment and authority of God, must revenge the injury done unto him: for he is God's deputy upon the earth.

And God himself, although that oftentimes he revengeth sins immediately, as they say, by himself; yet doth he for the most part punish by magistrates.

Wherefore those words; Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, do nothing at all hinder the severity of magistrates, whereby they punish offenders. For they be the ministers of God; and that which they do, God himself doth it by them.

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