CHAP. II. Of Free will.Now it shall be good to entreat somewhat of the liberty of our will. And at this present we will

CHAP. II. Of Free will.Now it shall be good to entreat somewhat of the liberty of our will. And at this present we will

CHAP. II. Of Free will.

N ow it shall be good to entreat somewhat of the liberty of our will.

And at this present we will inquire how much freewill the natural corruption, which came by original sin, hath left unto us: specially, seeing whatsoever we do well, all that is said to be attributed unto the grace of God. And although this word Free will be not read in the holy scriptures; yet the thing it self must not seem to be either imagined or devised. The Greeks call it αὐτεξούσιον, which is, Of his own power, or, Of his own right: the which same thing the Latins signify, when they call it Libertatem arbitrij, that is; The liberty or the choice of will. For that is free, which followeth not the will of another, but his own will. But the choice seemeth herein to consist, that we follow, as we think good, those things which be decreed by reason. Then doubtless the will is free when as it embraceth those things, which be allowed of the considering part of the mind.

Wherefore the nature of free choice, although it do most of all declare itself in the will, yet doth the root thereof consist in reason. But they, which will use this power aright, must have a special regard, that there fall no error

into reason. Which error commonly is wont to come two manner of ways: for either it is unknown to us what is just, and what is unjust in the doings of things; or else if we do know it, yet we fail in giving judgment of the reasons, which are wont to be alleged on both parts. Forever, in a manner, our lust joineth itself unto the weaker argument. Whereof it comes to pass oftentimes, that the stronger and the better reason is neglected and forsaken.

And this we see doth oftentimes happen in disputations: for they which take upon them to defend the weaker part, are wont to set a show upon the same, with all the ornaments and colors that they can; to the intent the hearers being allured with eloquence and counterfeit speech, may not thoroughly weigh wherein the strength and weight of the argument doth consist. Moreover, it is to be understood, that men do not commonly deliberate concerning all manner of things; but of those only, which of the Greeks be called πρακτικαί, that is; Which are to be done of us. And in very deed, all the things, which either we prosecute or refuse, have not need of deliberation: for there be some things so manifest and undoubtedly good,

[or evil] as it sufficeth that they be named; for they be forthwith either chosen or refused: such are felicity, infelicity, life, death, and whatsoever is of the like sort. But there be certain other more obscure or indifferent, upon which things men are wont to deliberate. That God is to be worshipped, all men confess, without any doubting; but after what manner, and with what rites and ceremonies he must be worshipped; therein is great doubt. That it is profitable for men to be together in cities, and to maintain fellowship, all men do know: but by what laws they must be ruled, or what kind of Common-wealth ought to be used; there men many times do doubt very much. In these, and such other like things is free will occupied.

2. I define free will after this sort; Free will is a faculty or power, whereby we either take or refuse, as we lust ourselves, those things, which be judged by reason. But whether such a kind of power be in men or no, or how it is in them, cannot with one answer be defined. First we must of necessity distinguish the state and condition of man. There be verily found in man four differences of state at the least: for the state of Adam, when he was created in the beginning, was far differing from the state after his fall; such as is now also the state of all his posterity. Moreover, they which be regenerated in Christ, be in far better state, than they which live without Christ; for we shall become most happy, and most free, when we have put off this mortal body: wherefore we will make answer unto the proposed question, according to these four states. We must believe, that Adam in his first creation, had free will: which thing, before I shall declare, three kinds of works, that be in us, are to be noted. Of the which some do appertain unto nature; as to be sick, to be in health, to be nourished, to digest our meat, and such other like: in the which things, albeit the first man was a great deal more happy, than we be at this present; yet he was subject unto some necessity: for it behooved him both to eat, to be nourished, and to take meat. Nevertheless, he was free from all calamities, which might bring death. There are other works also, which after a civil or moral consideration, be either just or unjust. The third kind is of those works, which be liking and acceptable to God. As concerning all these, man was free from the beginning: for He was created unto the image of God, unto whom nothing doth better agree, than true and perfect liberty. And of him it is thus written; God hath crowned him with glory and honor: and again;

When he was in honor, he knew it not. And what honor can there be, where liberty wanteth? Lastly, God made subject unto him all things which he had

created: the which out of doubt he could not truly, and according to right reason have governed, if he himself had been created a slave unto affections and lusts. But in what sort that state was, seeing there wanteth scripture to show us; there can nothing be defined for certainty.

Augustine in his book De correptione & gratia, saith; that The help of the grace of God was bestowed upon Adam: and such an help it was, as both he might forsake it when he would, and therein might remain, if he would; but not that it should be as he would. And as touching this thing, Augustine dareth prefer the grace which we enjoy by Christ, above that grace, which Adam had in paradise: for now by the grace of Christ, not only we abide, if we will, but also (as Paul saith) We have both to will, and to perform: for the heart of believers is changed, so as of not willing, they be made willing.

And this same, To will, was in the very choice of the first man, neither was it the grace of God that wrought this in him. But why God gave free will unto Adam, in his first creation; Augustine bringeth this reason, in his second book De libero arbitrio; for that God had decreed to declare unto him both his goodness and his justice. And he would have declared towards him his goodness, if he had done well; which thing undoubtedly he could not have done, if he had not been free. But if so be he should behave himself dishonestly and naughtily, God was to use towards him the severity of his justice. But he, when he was free, fell miserably. And even as Christ describeth the man coming down from Jerusalem to Jericho, to have fallen among thieves, to be ill entreated of them: so he [to wit Adam] not only having his garment taken away, lost all his ornaments; but also having received many wounds, was left for half dead, and destitute of hope.

3. Wherefore we say, as concerning this second state [of man,] when we are strangers from Christ, there is but a little freedom remaining unto us: for

both we be subject to the necessities of nature, and are afflicted with diseases, will we or no; and last of all, we are stricken with death. Howbeit, there is some freedom left, as concerning works that be civil and moral: for these things are both subject unto our natural knowledge, and also they exceed not the powers of our will; and yet in them also men have experience of great difficulty, because licentious lusts do resist moral honesty. Enticements and pleasures do always hurt our senses, and these are set forward by wicked persuaders; Satan also doth continually urge us, and drive us forward. For he envying man's commodity, and perceiving that civil discipline, by such kind of works, is still retained; he coveteth by all means to overthrow them. But that man's power may do much in these civil matters, at the leastwise, in respect of judgment; many good laws set forth by Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, and by diverse other, do sufficiently declare.

And Paul to the Romans; Doest thou think (saith he) O man, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God, when thou dost the self-same things, that thou judgest?

Moreover, in these things there be two points, which must not be passed over. The first is, that God useth the will of man to those ends, which he hath appointed. The second is (which dependeth also of the first) that those events follow not, which they appoint that apply themselves to civil works: for oftentimes things do far otherwise happen, then they did ever imagine could be. And hereof it cometh to pass, that Ethnic men are wont very often to be troubled. Pompei, Cato, and Cicero thought to themselves, that they had intended excellent counsel: but when the same was come to naught, there remained nothing but desperation unto the authors; for they being disappointed of their purposes, did attribute all unto fortune and chance. But Jeremiah declareth, that the success and event of things is in the hands of

God; The way of man (saith he) is not in his own power, neither lieth it in man to direct his own steps. Which place the Hebrews expound of Nebuchadnezzar, who (they say) went forth of his house, not against the Jews; but to make war upon the Ammonits, as we read in the 21st chapter of Ezekiel: but when he came into a way that had two turnings, he began to deliberate, and to take counsel of the entrails of beasts, of idols, and of lots by the brightness of a sword: and having advertisement, he set upon Jury, and leaving the Ammonites, he besieged Jerusalem. These two things are not hidden unto the godly; namely, that God is the author of counsel, and giveth such a success to things as he will. And therefore they determine nothing with themselves, but they add this condition; If God will: which thing James warned us to do. And Paul in his epistle to the Romans saith, that He desireth to have a prosperous journey unto them, but yet by the will of God. Wherefore, if the thing happen otherwise than they looked for, they are comforted in themselves; because they know, that God their most loving father, better provideth both for his own kingdom, and their salvation, than they could have provided for themselves. And they have always in their mouth that which David sang; Unless the Lord build the house, in vain do they labor which build it. Therefore it is their care, that they may frame and apply their counsels unto the word of God; and the event they commit unto

God: and so they work surly on every part.

4. But in those works, which be acceptable and grateful unto God, such men as are strangers from God, have no freedom at all: whereupon came that saying of Augustine in his Enchiridion; that Man abusing his freewill, hath lost both himself, and also the liberty of his will: for when sin gat the upper hand in battle, it brought man into bondage. I know there be some, which thus interpret this sentence of Augustine: that Adam lost freewill, as

touching grace and glory, wherewith he was adorned; but not as touching nature. Verily I will not much labor here, to deny that the reason and will, which belong unto nature, were left unto man after his fall: but that the same nature is imperfect and wounded, they themselves cannot deny. For this the Master of the sentences also affirmeth in his second book and 25th distinction: for he saith, that A man now after his fall is in such a case as he may sin; and that it so fareth with him, as he cannot but sin. And although

Augustine, and others, did not so affirm; yet most sound reason might teach it us: for holy works depend upon two principles; namely of knowledge, and of appetite. Concerning knowledge, Paul saith; The natural man doth not understand those things which be of the spirit of God, yea verily no more he cannot; for they be foolishness unto him. But now, if we know not what is to be done, and what is pleasing unto God; by what means may we show the same in our work?

Moreover, in what sort our appetite and cogitations are toward those holy works, it appeareth by the sixth chapter of Genesis; My spirit (saith God) shall not strive in man forever, because he is flesh. And a little after; God saw that the malice of man was great, and all the imagination of the thought of his heart was only unto evil every day. And in the eighth chapter; The imagination of man's heart is evil even from his infancy. And those things doth God himself speak; and there is none to be believed better than him that made us, when he giveth a testimony of his own work. In the 18th chapter of Jeremiah, the people said; We will follow our own imaginations.

Which place Jerome expounding, writeth thus; Where is therefore the power of freewill, and the judgment of man's own will, without the grace of God; seeing it is a great offense unto God for a man is follow his own thoughts, and to do the will of his wicked heart? That we be subject unto

servitude, Christ teacheth us in John, saying; He that doth sin, is the servant of sin. Wherefore, seeing we commit many things, and have sins cleaving unto us from our mother's womb; we must of necessity grant that we be servants: But then we shall be free indeed, if the son shall set us at liberty; otherwise we serve in a most bitter bondage. Whereupon Paul said, that he was sold under sin, and so sold, as in his flesh, he confessed that there dwelt no good thing; and that he did the things which he would not, and which he hated; and that he felt another law in his members, resisting the law of the mind, and leading him away captive to the law of sin. And unto the Galatians he saith; that The flesh doth strive against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do what we would.

Which things being true, touching so worthy an apostle, and touching holy men regenerated by Christ; what shall be thought of the wicked, which belong not unto Christ? And unto him they cannot come, unless they be drawn: for Christ saith; None can come unto me, unless my father shall draw him. He which would go before of his own accord, is not drawn, as Augustine saith; but is led. If therefore we must be drawn unto Christ, in that we would not before, the same is a most grievous sin: and therefore we will not, because The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject unto the law of God, no verily, nor cannot be. And as many as are not set at liberty by Christ, do live under the law, and (as Paul addeth to the Galatians) are under the curse. Which thing should not be true, if they could fulfill the law of God: for they incur not the danger of the curse, unless they transgress the law. Further, Paul expressly saith; It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. For our salvation is his work, and not the work of our strength; It is he that worketh in us, both to will, and to perform. Before he do that, whatsoever he doth

with us, either by the law, or by the instruction of his word; he dealeth with stones: for our hearts be stony, unless God do change them into fleshy hearts; which he promiseth in Ezekiel that he would do, and would bring to pass, that we should walk in his ways.

And surly, if we might live well and rightly without grace, we might also be justified by our own works: which doctrine is utterly condemned, both by Paul, and all the holy scripture. Jeremiah saith; Convert me, O Lord, and I shall be converted. And David saith; A pure heart create in me, O God.

The which thing that it cometh not to pass in all men, we perceive by the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, where it is thus written; The Lord hath not given unto you eyes to see, nor an ear to hear, nor a heart to understand.

And in the thirtieth chapter, God promised, that he would circumcise their hearts, and the hearts of their seed, that they should walk in his commandments. For he both beginneth and finisheth our salvation: for this

Paul saith to the Philippians; I hope that he who hath begun in you, will perform it even unto the day of Christ. This thing the holy men right well understanding, do pray with David; Incline my heart unto thy testimonies: and with Solomon; The Lord shall incline our hearts, that we may walk in his ways; and with Paul unto the Thessalonians; The Lord direct your hearts in patience, and in the expectation of Christ. And Solomon in his proverbs saith; The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclineth it to what end he will. These testimonies do sufficiently declare, that it is God's work, and not ours, to be converted unto him, and to do uprightly.

5. Here some object unto us the commandments, which are set forth unto us in the holy scriptures: for they seem to signify, that it lieth in ourselves to observe those things, which we be commanded. For Isaiah saith; If ye will, and will hearken unto me, ye shall eat the good things of the land. And the

Lord oftentimes commandeth us, that we should convert ourselves unto him; Be ye converted (saith he) unto me, I will not the death of a sinner, I had rather that he converted and live. And when he had published the law, he said; that He had set before them life and death, blessing and cursing.

And an infinite sort of other such like testimonies might be brought. But here it must be considered, that these things in very deed are commanded unto men: but we are nowhere taught; that a man is able to perform them of his own proper strength. Neither is it meet, that we measure the greatness of our own strength by the precepts of God's law; as though so much can be done of our own accord, as God's law hath commanded: nay rather our infirmity is to be measured hereby; that when we see the excellency and worthiness of God's commandments to excel our strength by innumerable degrees, we may remember, that the law hath a certain other end, than that it should be performed of us.

Paul showeth that end to be manifold; By the law (saith he) cometh the knowledge of sin: which he saith was therefore made, that the number of transgressions might be increased. For by this means, The law is become a school-master to lead men unto Christ; that when they see themselves overcharged with the heavy burden of the commandments, and the greatness of their sins, they may perceive their salvation to consist only in the mercy of God, and redemption of Christ. For the weakness and unworthiness of ourselves being considered, we forthwith begin to pray unto God; that both he will for Christ's sake pardon our sins, and give us sufficiency of his spirit, that we may endeavor to follow his will. Give what thou commandest (saith Augustine) and command what thou wilt. Further, another use of the law is, that we should see whereunto we must apply our selves. Also it may be, that if through the grace of God there be an access of

obedience begun, men may apply themselves unto the law. Lastly, though in this life it be not given unto us, that men can in every condition satisfy the law; yet we shall fully obtain the same in another life, when we shall cast away all this corruption. Yet God ought not to be accused of injustice by reason hereof: for he is not in fault, that men be not able to keep his commandments. Neither can any of us be excused, because that willingly and greedily we do break the law, that is appointed unto us. The same was given in such sort, as it might best agree with our nature, when the same was first instituted: for the image of God could not by any other means more plainly and effectually be expressed. But and if by reason of sin we be not able to accomplish the law; yet this at the least-wise we see, namely, what manner of persons we ought to be.

6. But that sentence, which is commonly objected; that Nothing is to be counted sin, which dependeth not of election, must be understood (as Augustine doth interpret it) of that kind of sin, which is not the punishment of sin: for otherwise, original sin is neither voluntary, nor received by election. But thou wilt say; Seeing the matter standeth thus, we shall seem of necessity to stick fast in sin: which thing indeed I deny not; although such is this necessity, as it hath no compulsion joined therewith. God is of necessity good, and cannot sin by any means: and yet is he not driven by force to be good. Which thing Augustine, in his 22nd book De civitate Dei, and thirty chapter, doth very well declare; Because God himself (saith he) cannot sin, therefore shall we deny that he hath free will? Ambrose, in his second book, and third chapter, De fide, unto Gratian the Emperor, testifieth, that God is free, when he saith; that One and the same spirit worketh all things, dividing unto all as pleaseth him, according to the choice of his free will, and not for to obey necessity. In these sentences of

these fathers, free will is so taken, that it is contrary unto violence and compulsion; not that it is equally bent to either part. Whereupon Jerome in his homily of the prodigal son, which he wrote unto Damasus, because he took free will in another sense, therefore he wrote otherwise; It is only God

(saith he) on whom sin falleth not, nor can fall: but others, forsomuch as they have free will, may be bowed every way. Also it is agreeable unto blessed spirits and angels, that they cannot sin; seeing their felicity is already confirmed.

Wherefore Augustine in his 22nd book De civitate Dei, and thirty chapter, saith; Even as the first immortality, which Adam through sin lost, was, that it was possible he should not die: even so the first free will was, that it was possible he should not sin; but the last free will shall be, that he shall not possibly sin. Yet nevertheless, there is granted a certain kind of liberty unto them: not whereby they can be bowed to either part; but such, as (although that which they do is of necessity) yet thereby they be not compelled, or violently driven. For even as there be certain true things so manifest, as the mind cannot but consent unto them; so the presence of God now revealed and made manifest, is so good a thing, as the saints cannot fail or forsake the same. So likewise, although we of necessity do sin, before we be regenerated in Christ; yet are not therefore the powers of the will violated: for whatsoever we do, both we do it willingly; and also we are led to do it upon some hope.

And yet we must not be therefore accounted to differ nothing from brute beasts: for they, notwithstanding they be moved with a certain kind of judgment; yet it is not by a free judgment. But in men, although they be not yet renewed, there is (as we have said) much liberty remaining, as touching civil and moral works. Further, among the very sins, wherein they be of

necessity conversant, they have a choice to choose one, and refuse another; though they cannot attain unto those things which please God. These things do not accord with brute beasts: for they be rather driven by the force of nature, than that they can do anything by any liberty or free choice. Men may be said to be free, either in respect of compulsion, or in respect of sin, or in respect of misery. The first liberty from compulsion, is given unto all men; howbeit, unto sin and misery all men, which have not attained unto

Christ, are altogether subject. But after what sort men, which be regenerate, be subject either to sin, or to misery, while they live here, I will afterward declare. In the mean time we ought to be sure, that the will is not constrained to sin, through this necessity which we speak of.

7. But that we may with the more perspicuity and plainness, declare all this whole matter, it must be first determined what these words Free,

Violent, and Willing do signify. We call that Free, which having two, or more things set before it, can choose, as it lusteth, what it will. And therefore we deny, that the will of men not regenerate is universally free: for it cannot choose those things which do belong to salvation. Violent is that, which is so moved of an outward beginning, that it of itself nothing helpeth unto that motion, but rather resisteth it: as when a stone is cast on high. That is said to work of his own accord, or willingly, which hath an inward beginning inclining to that motion, whereby it is driven. By these things it is manifest, that to do of his own accord, and to do of necessity, are not contrary one to another: for they may be joined together, as it is plain in our will, which of necessity embraceth felicity; yet it embraceth it not against his will, or by compulsion; but of his own accord, and gladly. Neither is it possible, that the will should be compelled, to will that which it will not.

Yea, Augustine thinketh it to be so absurd, that a man should will that which he will not; as if one should say, that anything can be hot without heat.

But yet that necessity, whereby the wicked are said to sin, is not absolute and perfect; so as it cannot be otherwise: for so soon as the grace and spirit of Christ cometh, that necessity is straightway loosed. Wherefore Augustine saith, that it is of nature to be able to have faith, hope, and charity; but to have them indeed, is altogether the gift of grace: for that power or ability breaketh not forth into act, unless grace be given from God. Herein

Augustine agreed with the Pelagians; that To be able, is of nature. But this Augustine added, which Pelagius did not allow; that To will well, and to live uprightly, is to be attributed unto grace only. But I think, that as touching this power of nature, there must be made a distinction: for if they mean this, that our nature is so made of God, as neither faith, nor hope, nor charity do strive with the same, if they be given of God, but rather accomplish it, make it perfect, and adorn it; I confess it to be true that they say: but if they will have the power of nature to signify some strength of the same, whereby it can challenge to itself these things; I yield not to them in any wise; for it is a wicked and damnable opinion.

We say therefore, that the will of man hath respect both unto good, and unto evil; but after a sundry fashion: for it may embrace evil of his own accord; but it cannot embrace good, unless it be restored by the grace of God. For we have need of a certain divine inspiration, to perform those things which are good; which thing indeed the very Ethnic writers also, being forced by the truth, have sometimes declared. For Aristotle, in his first book of Ethics saith; If there be any gift of God, we must verily think, that it is felicity. And Felicity he defineth to be nothing else, but a most excellent action, proceeding from the chiefest power of the mind, by a most

notable virtue. And Plato confesseth in a certain place, that virtues are engendered in men by divine inspiration. The School-men also, if there were any somewhat sounder than the rest, confessed, that the grace of God is necessary to assist man's strength unto every good work. Howbeit, afterward they forgetting themselves, I wot not how, decreed; that a man, not being renewed, may do some good deeds, which may please God, and which may merit the grace of Christ, of congruity (as they term it.)

8. That they call congruity, which we may call meet and good; which is, when the rigor and sharpness of the law is remitted: but condignity they call that, which is of right due. But they which first invented these terms, considered not, that those goodly civil works, though in show they seem good unto men, yet before God they be sin; as Augustine by most certain reasons proveth. For before we be converted unto God, we be the children of wrath. And John saith; He that believeth not in the son of God, hath not life everlasting, but the wrath of God abideth upon him. And what can be offered unto God by his enemies, and by such as hate him, that may be acceptable unto him? Paul to the Ephesians saith, that We, before we did come unto Christ, were dead in our offenses and sins. But the dead, as they feel nothing, so can they bring nothing to pass, whereby they should be called back unto life. Paul unto the Philippians counted all things, whatsoever he did before he was converted unto Christ, but loss and dung; so far off was he from placing any merit in them. God in the first chapter of Isaiah testifieth, that he did abhor, detest, and counted abominable those oblations, which the Jews offered without faith and godliness. The same prophet compareth all our righteousness unto most vile and filthy rags. And our savior Christ saith; I am the vine, and ye are the branches. And even as the branch cannot bear fruit, unless it abideth in the vine; so ye can bring

forth no fruit, unless ye abide in me. And straightway he addeth; Without me ye can do nothing. And in another place he saith, that An evil tree cannot bear good fruit; for the root must first be good, before any good fruit can be hoped to come from it; but good trees we cannot be, before we be grafted in Christ. This engrafting in the holy scriptures is called regeneration. And even as no man helpeth anything to the generation of himself; so no man can help anything to the regeneration of himself. Paul also saith, that Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. Seeing therefore the wicked be without faith, whatsoever they do, is to be reckoned for sin. If so be thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be single; but if thy light be darkness, how great shall that darkness be? Unless faith be present, we be conversant in darkness; and of necessity do cleave unto sin.

Moreover, if we follow the opinion of these men, we utterly overthrow the nature of grace: For grace, if it should be of works (as Paul saith) it now ceaseth to be grace. Paul also addeth, That the Israelites following after the law of righteousness, attained not unto righteousness: for that they sought it by works, and not by faith. Also unto the Colossians he teacheth plainly, what we be before we are justified; We be alienated (saith he) from God, enemies in mind, and conversant in evil works. And in the epistle to the Romans; men not yet engrafted in Christ, he calleth wild olive trees: and we know, that wild olive trees be barren, neither can bear any fruit. Besides this, works cannot be good, unless they either satisfy the law; or else if they stray anything from the law, it is not imputed unto them, because of Christ.

But men, that be not renewed, cannot satisfy the law: for even the regenerate cannot do it. For seeing they be not joined unto Christ by faith, they cannot attain unto the benefit of Christ, whereby these imperfections be made whole and sound.

And he that teacheth, that a man is able, without the grace of God, to do works which be acceptable unto God; must also of necessity teach, that Christ is not the redeemer of the whole man. For he which teacheth that we, without the grace of Christ, do work well, and live uprightly; the same ascribeth unto our nature no small part of salvation without Christ. Paul also in the epistle to the Romans saith; When we were servants unto sin, we were free unto righteousness; which is nothing else, but that we had no trade nor acquaintance with righteousness. Furthermore, he exhorteth us, that Even as we have served sin, so we will be now servants unto righteousness. And he also teacheth, that we should now altogether serve righteousness without any sin; forsomuch as we served sin before altogether without righteousness. Lastly, he hath left no mean at all between the servitude of sin and righteousness. But these men contrariwise fain a sort (I know not who) which although they be not yet justified; yet notwithstanding do good and just works, which may be acceptable unto

God. All these things sufficiently teach, how absurd and fond these men's opinion is.

9. Yet in the mean time they cry out, that we be blasphemous, which avouch the whole nature of man to be evil. But (as Augustine doth prudently write;) Under the praises of nature, be hidden the enemies of grace. It were meet, that they should consider, unto what ground we refer that evil, whereof we complain: for we ascribe not the same either to nature, as it was created; or unto God: but unto sin, whereunto there was an entrance laid open by the first man. For we, by all manner of means, do disagree from the Manichees: for they dreamed, that both our nature is evil, and that it was created evil by God. But we confess and acknowledge; that man was created free: and in that he hath now lost his freedom, we ascribe

not God to be the author thereof, but man's own fault. They which deny freewill, have been called heretics by the church. But this must be understood concerning the first creation of our nature; for otherwise there is not one of the fathers, which (if the truth be well weighed) bewaileth not the calamity of man, whereinto he fell through sin.

Our adversaries rather come near unto the Manichees, which affirm, that Our corrupt affects, as they are now, were so created by God: for so they affirm, that he created them evil. But we, forsomuch as we perceive that these troublesome affections be not void of sin, deny that they were so created by God; but that through our own default they are become unbridled, and be repugnant to the word of God. Certain it is, that man at the beginning was made unto the image of God; and there is nothing more beseeming unto it, than liberty. But seeing that image was in a manner blotted out in us, so as there was need to have the same restored by Christ; what marvel is it, if our liberty be also for the most part taken away from it?

When they reason that man is free, they do even as if they should say, that man is a two-footed creature, and therefore he is able to go upright. But if they would so conclude of a lame man, it should easily appear how much they be deceived: for the properties of man, which would be agreeable unto his nature, being perfect, when they be applied unto the same nature being corrupt, do not agree.

Neither be the opinions of our adversaries much dissenting from the Pelagians: for they taught, that nature being holpen by the grace of creation, and doctrine of the law, may live uprightly. And these men say, that nature being holpen by grace preventing and knocking, is able to do good works, which may please God. The catholic church resisted the Pelagians, neither did it contend about the grace of creation, or of the law, neither about the

grace preventing: but it taught, that without the grace of Christ, wherewith we be justified, none is able to work aright. And by the judgment of Augustine, who vehemently contended against these men, there is no difference between doing rightly without grace, and doing rightly without the faith of Christ. He, upon the 31st Psalm, to show that there is no good work without faith, writeth thus; A good intent maketh the work good, but faith guideth that intent: wherefore consider not what a man doth, but what he hath respect unto while he is doing.

10. And whereas in all the holy scriptures, there is not one sentence repugnant to our doctrine; yet they continually object unto us the example of Cornelius, who being not yet (as they think) regenerate, neither believing in Christ, yet did such works as were acceptable unto God. Indeed we grant, that both the alms and prayers of Cornelius were pleasing unto God: for the angel affirmed the same. But these men add of their own; that Cornelius, when he did these things, was not yet justified, nor yet believed in Christ.

But they mark not that the scripture in that place called him religious, and one that feared God: wherefore Cornelius believed, and in Messias believed he, being instructed in the Jews learning; but whether Jesus of Nazareth were that Messias, he knew not for a certainty, and therefore Peter was sent to instruct him more fully. But here, to blear our eyes, they say, that Paul, in the 17th of the Acts, attributeth some godliness unto the people of Athens, when as notwithstanding they were idolaters: for thus he saith; Ye men of Athens, I show unto you, that God, whom you ignorantly worship. But even as if a man that can handsomely draw someone letter, shall not therefore be straightway counted a good writer; neither he that can sing one or two verses, shall for that cause be taken for a singing man; (for these names require consideration and art, and it may come to pass by chance, that a

man may draw well, or sing well once or twice:) even so none is to be counted verily and out of doubt good, which setteth forth one good work or two, that have some show of godliness. But Paul called not the Atheniens godly, without adding some terms of speech, which should diminish godliness; Whom ye ignorantly (saith he) worship. But what piety can that be, which is joined with the ignorance of the true God? Moreover, a little before he had called them δεισιδαιμωνεστέρους, that is, Very superstitious: by these two words he much diminished their piety.

But Luke absolutely calleth Cornelius religious, and addeth; that He feared God: which addition is of so great force, that in the book of Job, a man fearing God, is translated of the seventy interpreters, ἀληθινός και θεοσεβής, that is, A true and religious man. And David saith; Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord. And if so be he be blessed which feareth God, how is not the same man also justified? But besides these things, which after a sort, by the causes, declare the justification of Cornelius; we have also another testimony of the effects: for that he gave alms, which were acceptable unto God. But we have already, by many reasons proved, that none can do works acceptable unto God, but he which is justified and regenerate. Further, he distributed these alms upon the people of the Jews, as of whom he having been instructed in the skill of godliness, would impart unto them in like manner some of his temporal goods. For It is meet

(as Paul saith unto the Galatians) that he which is instructed, should communicate unto him, which doth instruct him in all good things.

Moreover, that soldier, which was sent unto Peter, declareth, that he had a good testimony of all the Jews. All which things do sufficiently show, that although we read not, that he was circumcised; yet he came so near unto the doctrine of the people of God, as that all men commended his piety. It is

written besides, that he prayed, and that continually. And if so be we diligently weigh the whole history, we shall find, that he observed the same hour, which the Jews had appointed for common prayer: for it saith, that At the ninth hour he saw an angel standing by him, which gave him to understand, that his prayer was heard. But out of the first chapter of Isaiah, and 15th of Proverbs, and many other places, we be taught; that The ungodly and sinful sort be not heard of God. Which nevertheless must be understood, so long as they would be sinners, and retain with them a will to sin.

11. Neither is that, which Augustine writeth against the Donatists, repugnant to this doctrine; namely, that The prayers of wicked priests be heard of God: for he addeth, that it so cometh to pass, by reason of the people's devotion. But Cornelius, when he prayed, was holpen by his own faith, and not through the faith of others which stood by. And Augustine in his epistle unto Sixtus, saith; that God in justifying of a man, is wont to give his spirit, whereby he may pray for those things which be profitable for salvation. And seeing Cornelius prayed for those things, there can be no doubt, but he was justified. Hereunto add, that no man can rightly pray unto

God, unless he have faith. And that we be justified by faith, it hath been sufficiently testified and declared already. Peter also, before he began to preach unto him, saith; that He perceived in very truth that God is no accepter of persons, but that he is accepted by him, of what nation so ever he be, which worketh righteousness: which words teach us plainly enough, that Cornelius was even already accepted of God, before Peter came unto him. But I marvel, that there be any, which dare affirm, that he had not the faith of Christ; when as Christ himself, in the eighth chapter of John saith, that He knoweth not God, which believeth not in the son of God. And in the

14th chapter he admonisheth his disciples; If ye believe in God, believe also in me: and if so be ye believed Moses, ye would also believe in me.

These things assure us, that Cornelius believed verily in God, and therefore did also believe in the Messias which should come; even as he had been instructed by the Jews: although he knew not that he was already come, and that Jesus of Nazareth, whom the Jews had crucified, was the same Messias. He had the same faith, wherewith the fathers believed that Christ should come; wherefore seeing they were justified by the same faith, how dare we be so bold as deny the very same unto Cornelius? Nathaniel, which believed that Messias should come, and thought that he was not yet come, is by Christ pronounced to be a true Israelite, in whom there was no guile: which two things cannot concur in a man not yet justified. But Peter was therefore sent to Cornelius, that he might more plainly and expressly know that thing, which he had before intricately believed of Christ. Of this mind was Gregory in his 19th homily upon Ezekiel: for he saith, that Faith is the entry whereby we come to good works; but not contrariwise, that by good works we can come unto faith. And so he concludeth, that Cornelius did first believe, before he could bring forth any laudable works. And he citeth that place unto the Hebrews; It is impossible without faith to please

God. Which sentence, as it appeareth by the self-same place, cannot be otherwise understood, then of faith justifying. Beda, expounding the third chapter of the acts, is of the same mind; and citeth the words of Gregory.

Neither is the Master of the sentences of any other judgment, in his second book, and 25th distinction.

But our adversaries object unto us Augustine, in his 7th chapter De praedestinatione sanctorum, where he reasoneth against those, which taught, that faith is of our selves; when yet in the mean time they confessed,

that the works which follow, be of God; but yet obtained by faith. Indeed Augustine confesseth, that the works, which follow faith, be of God; but denieth that faith is of our selves. For he saith, that Paul writeth to the Ephesians; By grace ye are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves: for it is the gift of God. But that is a hard saying, which he addeth; namely, that the prayers and alms of Cornelius were accepted of God, before he believed in Christ. But we must here weigh the things which follow: for he addeth; And yet prayed he not, neither gave he alms without some faith: for how did he call upon him, in whom he believed not? These words do plainly declare, that Augustine took not away from Cornelius all manner of faith in Christ; but only a unfolden and distinct faith. Which thing that place chiefly declareth, which is cited out of the epistle to the Romans; How shall they call upon him, in whom they have not believed? For those words be written of the faith and invocation of men regenerate, as the next sentence following plainly declareth; Everyone which calleth upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved: for we cannot attribute salvation, but to them which be justified. But Peter was sent unto Cornelius, to build up, and not to lay the foundation: for the foundations of faith were laid in him before.

12. But those things, which Augustine addeth, seem to bring a greater difficulty: for he saith; But if he could, without the faith, namely of Christ be saved, that singular workman the apostle should not have been sent to edify him. But seeing he already before attributed unto him faith and invocation, after which of necessity followeth salvation, whereof the apostle speaketh in the epistle to the Romans; how can he take salvation from him: unless we peradventure understand, that faith and salvation in men justified is not perfect, while they live here? For our salvation cometh not in this life to that degree, nor to that quantity, which Christ requireth in his elect: for

no man may doubt, but that we shall not attain to perfect salvation, before the resurrection and eternal salvation; although we have begun to enjoy the same already after a sort. Paul to the Ephesians affirmeth, that We be now saved by faith. And yet unto the Philippians he exhorteth us, With fear and trembling to work our own salvation. Which places cannot be brought to one consent, unless we say, that the salvation begun in us, through justification, is daily to be made perfect in us: for we are always more and more renewed, and faith is made more full, more expressed, and of more efficacy. These words of Augustine, unless we interpret them on this sort; either of necessity they must be none of his, or else he is repugnant to himself. That the book is Augustine's, we cannot deny: but that he is repugnant unto himself, that is not likely.

But if thou say that these things may agree well enough together, if we grant that Cornelius was not yet justified; when as nevertheless he did some works well pleasing and acceptable unto God: I answer, that this can by no means agree with Augustine's meaning. For he, in his 801st treatise upon John, and in his fourth book, and third chapter against Julian, and upon the 31st Psalm, doth prove by most sure reasons, that all works, done before we be justified, be sin. But that faith is more expressly set forth, and made perfect in them that are justified; we may easily perceive, by that which Christ said unto his apostles; Many kings and prophets desired to see the things, which ye see, and saw them not. Yet notwithstanding, those kings and prophets were men godly and justified; although they knew not so expressly all the mysteries of Christ, as the apostles did. And Christ, when he prayed, thus spake concerning the apostles themselves; The words which thou gavest me, have I given unto them: those have they received, and have known that I came forth from thee, and that thou hast sent me. These things

do show, that the apostles believed in Christ; and therefore were justified.

Yet the very history of the Gospel sufficiently declareth, that they were ignorant of many things: for it is showed oftentimes, that either they had their eyes closed, that they should not see; or else, that they understood not those things which were spoken. Wherefore Augustine denieth, that Cornelius had salvation before Peter was sent unto him: yet not altogether, but that he had no perfect and absolute salvation.

13. But they further object the same Augustine in his questions unto Simplicianus, in the second book, and second question: where he plainly teacheth, that faith goeth before works. After that he putteth a certain mean between grace, and the celebration of the sacraments: for he saith, that it may be, that Catechumenus [or one newly converted unto Christian religion,] and that he which is conversant among the Catechumen, may believe, and have grace; and yet the same man is not yet washed by baptism. Moreover he saith, that grace is more plentifully poured in after the sacraments. By which words he signifieth, that it is one and the selfsame grace; but is afterward made more abundant. And that thou mayest know he entreateth of a justifying faith, he citeth a place out of the epistle to the Ephesians; By grace ye are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God. But our adversaries will say, that they also teach, that grace goeth before good works; and that by this grace, some faith is bestowed upon men. But this at the beginning is so weak, as it cannot have the power to justify: howbeit, there may some works be done, which may be acceptable to God.

But we will call to mind what Augustine writeth of Pelagius, in his hundred and fifth epistle unto Innocentius bishop of Rome: he saith, that Pelagius, in the council of Palestine, to the end he would not be accursed

[himself;] did curse all those, which should say, that they could live uprightly without grace. But he, by grace, meant no other thing, than the gift bestowed upon us in our creation; as free choice, reason, will, and the doctrine of the law. The Palestine bishops, being beguiled by this colorable craft, did absolve him. Augustine excuseth them, because they dealt plainly and simply: for when they heard that Pelagius confessed the grace of God; they could not understand it to be other, than that grace; which the holy scriptures do set forth; namely, the same, whereby we are regenerate and engrafted in Christ. Wherefore it appeareth, that they, which feign unto themselves another grace, then that whereby we are justified, and engrafted in Christ, do thrust upon us a thing imagined by man; or rather a Pelagian refuge, which the holy scriptures acknowledge not.

Moreover, Augustine in the same place, which we now spake of, doth affirm; that the Catechumen, and such as believe, though they be not baptized; yet nevertheless be conceived: but they which are now conceived to be the sons of God, cannot be strangers from him, or enemies unto him; wherefore it followeth, that they also be already justified, though not in such perfect sort. And this also is manifest, in that Augustine calleth the grace following, a more full grace: as that which differeth not from the first in kind and nature, but only in degree and quantity: and seeing it is of the self-same kind, that the other is, the same shall also justify.

14 & 15. ---- There are 2pgs missing from source text. This English translation being a very rare text to obtain has made it impossible to find other copies. Sections 14 & 15 are omitted as a result. This is the only text missing from this book.

16. But many suspect, that by this doctrine is opened a window unto many vices: for if all the doings of civil men, while they seem to work upon

virtue, be sins; they may easily be pulled away from those goodly works. I answer, that we teach not, that civil discipline is to be let go; for the same by God's providence is as it were a bond, wherewith civil society is preserved. God can suffer cities and Common-wealth's, so long as in them flourisheth integrity of manners and honesty; but when those things be altogether vitiate and corrupt, then God is so provoked unto wrath, as he will punish those things, which long before he had winked at. So long as men be without Christ, they sin, even when they show forth notable works: but yet they sin far less, than if by setting aside all civil duties, they should utterly abandon themselves to all manner of sins: for we are not Stoics, to think that all sins are alike.

Further, if these men omit the doing of those things, which by the very light of reason they acknowledge to be honest; they wrestle against their own conscience. And if so be we will more manifestly see whether doctrine, ours, or our adversaries, doth open the greater window unto vices; let us compare them one with another. They verily, when they teach, that the wicked can do good works, such as may please God, and through them can deserve grace (as they speak) of congruity; what thing do they else, than foster and nourish the miserable souls in that their damnable state? For they cause them to like of themselves for works of theirs, I know not what; and to hope it will come to pass (at least-wise in the end of their life) that they shall for those works sake obtain of God to be truly and earnestly converted: but in the meantime, they live securely; neither do they with a just and true repentance turn away from their wicked facts. But we contrariwise, when we admonish them daily to come unto Christ, and to be reconciled by true repentance (for otherwise good works shall profit them nothing at all, when as, although they be goodly to the show, yet they be

sins before God;) do we not earnestly set them on, that leaving impiety and corrupt kind of life, they should convert themselves unto the righteousness of God?

These things if thou prudently consider, thou shalt easily perceive, whether of us doth make the way more open unto lusts. This thing doubtless all they may judge, which are touched with the desire of truth and godliness; for besides that, which I have said, they shall easily perceive; that all the good works, which are attributed unto men not regenerate, be a derogation and a robbery unto the grace of God. For if we be able to do many things without the grace of God, which may be grateful and acceptable to him; then are we not wholly redeemed and restored by him: which is a thing so impious and strange from the catholic truth, as nothing can be imagined more impudent and more wicked. For what godliness doth there remain, when Christ is deprived of his own honor? Or what honor is left unto Christ, if we teach, that he hath not brought unto us all the power we have to live uprightly?

Some boast, that other whiles many things happen to be done before regeneration, the which be as certain means to the obtainment thereof: and seeing it oftentimes cometh to pass, that by them we be justified, they cannot seem to be sins. Indeed we grant, that these are sometime certain means, whereby God doth lead us unto justification; but thereby it is not proved, that those be no sins unto them, by whom they be done. And doubtless, as concerning the nature of their works, unto some they be occasions of greater destruction: for there be many, which by reason of such works of theirs, do wonderfully puff up themselves, and please their own fancy, and prefer themselves before others; and when they be full, and have enough of their own opinion, although they be persuaded and set on [to

continue therein,] yet they refuse to proceed any further. In such kind of men works be preparations unto everlasting death. But as touching the elect,

God doth govern and temperate their works, and findeth the means that they work together unto salvation; although they be sins in their own nature, and must be esteemed as things corrupt, so long as the light of justification shineth not upon them. Wherefore we confess, that works are certain preparatives unto healthful conversion: but yet to none, but such as be predestinate and elect, whom God doth sometimes lead unto justification; not that they have this strength of their own nature, to prepare unto justification: for unto the reprobate and cast-aways, they serve unto condemnation.

17. But let us see what works those be, which our adversaries so highly praise in men not regenerate. In them (they say) there is a certain acknowledging of sins thereof springeth a terror, wherewith they be vehemently pierced; afterward there is stirred up a sorrow for the loss of the kingdom of heaven; and then they be moved with a less desire of wicked acts; and they take less pleasure in sins and allurements of this world: they seem also with some endeavor to hear the word of God. And how (say they) can these things seem to be sins? Yet they say that they be of no such efficacy, as a man thereby may be converted, and leave his old naughty life.

Here I would demand of these men, what manner of knowledge of sin that is, which is so had; that in the mean time we do prefer the same before the righteousness of God? Surely, for so much as it wanteth the end, which is proper unto it, and whereunto it belongeth; it cannot be any other, but sin: for to this end knowledge is given unto us, that knowing sin, we should forsake it; and that we should embrace God's justice: which end, unless it be present, the work is corrupted, and is made sin. This thing all the Ethnic

writers do confess, that that action is sin, which is deprived of the end due unto it.

Moreover, what manner of fear of hell-fire is that, when as they proceed every day in casting themselves headlong into it? Or what sorrow is there for the loss of the celestial kingdom, when as they continually refuse the same, being offered them by the holy scriptures, and by the preachers? If they be moved with less desire to sin, and take less pleasure of their sins; yet do they take so much delight in them, as they cannot be plucked away from them. If they hear the word of God with any diligence, yet having heard it, they have it in derision; for so much as they hope, that those things promised therein shall happen unto them, although they live in such sort as they do. Wherefore we see, that all these things do wander from the mark and end which is appointed. And seeing that all these motions be of small efficacy, and do leave men under the wrath of God; there can nothing that is sound be hoped for at their hands.

But let us hear what Isaiah, in the 58th chapter pronounceth concerning this same kind of works; Every day (saith he) do they seek me, and will know my ways, as it were a nation that wrought righteousness, and had not forsaken the statutes of their God. They ask of me the ordinances of justice, and they will draw near unto God. Wherefore do we fast (say they) and thou seest it not? We have afflicted our souls, and thou regardest it not. Behold, in the day wherein ye fast, ye find out that which ye desire; and ye all seek and require your debts. Behold ye fast to strife and debate, and to smite with the fist. Is this such a fast as I have chosen? These words of the prophet do teach most plainly, that it is sin before God, to seek after his ways, to fast, and for a man to afflict himself; seeing such works may be done without the true worshipping of God, and without piety. It cannot be

denied, but that these are indeed goodly and plausible works; but yet God the just judge doth refuse them.

Augustine, in his book of confessions, doth lay before us a plain example of himself, concerning this matter: for he showeth the motions which he suffered in his mind, before he was converted unto Christ. For thus he writeth in the eight book, and eleventh chapter; I lived in my bond, till the whole was broken in sunder, wherewith I was holden being now little: but yet was I holden. Thou O Lord by thy severe mercy didest double in mine eyes the scourges of fear and of shame. I said inwardly with myself; Behold now let it be done. Now in a manner I know it, and did it not. It wanted very little, but I even now touched it, and held it; and yet touched it not, nor held it not. And the worst that was grown in use, more prevailed with me than the better out of use. And that very instant, wherein I was to become a new man, the nearer it approached to me, the greater horror it drove into me. I was held back by trifles of trifles, and by the vanities of vanities, and by mine old wanton lovers, which privily whispered; Doest thou now forsake us? And shall we never anymore after this time be with thee? Doest thou?

And from this time forward wilt thou never use this or that? And I now began to hearken unto them a great deal less than half. These things he declareth, and accuseth them before God to be sins; which nevertheless are so greatly commended by these men. These indeed were means, whereby

God brought Augustine to salvation; yet in the meanwhile, they were sins in him: for he obeyed them not, but corrupted them with many abuses; so that he could not with efficacy be changed thereby. But whatsoever wanteth his due perfection, is sin.

18. But these Sophisters are like a kind of serpents called Hydrae: for when one argument is cut off, as it were a head, another ariseth. They object

to us the Publican, thus praying in the temple; God be merciful to me a sinner. And it is said, that he went home to his house justified: wherefore

(say they) he was a sinner, when he prayed; for we read that he was afterwards justified. But his prayer pleased God; wherefore (say they) we may do works acceptable to God before we be renewed. But these men should have remembered, that this man prayed; the which thing could not be done without faith, as we declared touching Cornelius; For how shall they call upon him, upon whom they have not believed? Wherefore he was justified, even at the same time that he prayed. Neither must thou so understand those words, as though he was then first justified, when he had finished his prayer: for although it is said to be afterward done, yet doth it not follow thereof, that the same was after no sort done before. He obtained a more perfect justification, a more ample spirit, and a more near feeling of God's mercy. He calleth himself a sinner, and that justly; partly because he felt still in himself that which he misliked, (for always how just soever we be, we be commanded to pray; Forgive us our trespasses;) and partly, for that he pondered in his mind how grievous sins he had committed before he was justified.

And godly men ought chiefly to consider, while they be praying, how great the burden of their sins is: for when they come unto God with their prayers, they be moved with true repentance to say with David; My bones are consumed away in my crying out; continually day and night thy hand is laid heavy upon me; my juice is dried up, as the moisture of the earth is dried up in the summer. Innumerable evils have compassed me about; mine iniquities have closed me in on every side, so as I cannot see, they be more increased than the hairs of my head; my heart hath failed within me. I acknowledge my wickedness, and my sin is always against me; against

thee, against thee have I sinned, and done evil before thee. And to the end godly men should the better beware of sins afterward, God doth stir up in them the sharp feel of his wrath; that they may know what they have deserved, unless God had holpen them by his son. Also he openeth the eyes of them, that they may perceive what his fatherly chastisement is towards them: and that the same may be the better felt, he oftentimes deferreth from them the taste and feel of his mercy. Therefore they cry; Make me to hear thy joy and gladness, that my bruised bones may rejoice; hide thy face from my sins, and blot out all my wickedness; a clean heart create in me, O God, and a perfect spirit renew within me; cast me not away from thy face; take not thy holy spirit from me.

Wherefore, they also that be justified do pray, that what infirmity is yet left, may not be imputed unto them. They call to mind those things, wherein they grievously sinned before; and they crave with tears to have some taste of God's mercy, and of the righteousness which is bestowed on them. And this is the very natural meaning of such godly prayers. Neither must we think, that the same Publican prayed otherwise: for he was not so minded, that he would still retain his old purpose to sin: but he truly and from his heart converted unto God. But our adversaries imagine, that they, which still persevere in their sins, and have not determined to change their life; yet that they do some good thing which pleaseth God. But we be taught, out of the holy scriptures, that He which believeth in God, hath eternal life, and therefore is justified: but as for other things, neither be they good, nor yet do please God. Wherefore, seeing the Publican prayed, and that faithfully; it is certain that he had eternal life, and was not destitute of justification.

19. But that all these things may be the perfectlier understood, it shall not be from the purpose; to know what things are required unto a good work, to

make it acceptable unto God. First of all, he that doth any good thing, it behooveth him to be moved by the spirit of God: for otherwise, in us, that is, in our flesh dwelleth nothing that is good; and they which be led by the spirit of God, those be the children of God. Secondly, it behooveth, that faith be present; by which it is understood for a certainty, that the work which we take in hand, is of those kind of things, which God willeth, and by his law hath commanded to be done; For whatsoever is not of faith, the same is sin. Neither ought we so to handle the matter, that our own heart should accuse us in that thing which we do. Thirdly, whatsoever we do, the same must be wholly directed to the glory of God: that hereunto chiefly and above all things we have regard, that the praise and glory of God may be set forth by our works; Whether (saith Paul) ye eat, or whether ye drink, or what other thing soever ye do, do it to the glory of God. Fourthly, forsomuch as, by reason of the infirmity, which is grafted in us, there is always some want in our works; yea even in those works, which seem to be done well, it is necessary that the grace and mercy of God, through Christ, be present with us, whereby that defect or want may be supplied.

For this cause David saith; Blessed are they whose iniquities be forgiven; blessed is the man unto whom the Lord hath not imputed sin. And Paul saith; There is now no condemnation to them which be in Christ Jesus.

Again; That which was impossible to the law, insomuch as it was made weak through the flesh, God sending his own son, &c. These testimonies sufficiently declare, both that our works do fail of their perfection and just end: and that also it cometh through Christ, and the mercy of God, that that blame mingled with our works is not imputed unto us. Lastly, this also is required, that no man glory of that which he uprightly doth; but that he glory in God only; and acknowledge that what he doth, he doth by his

goodness; and not of his own strength: for Who hath separated thee (saith Paul to the Corinthians?) What hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received it, why doest thou glory, as though thou hadst not received it? When all these things, which I have here recited, shall take place: the work without all controversy will be good and acceptable unto

God.

Here may the diligent reader, out of these conditions of a good work, gather the definition thereof. On the contrary part, if we have respect unto the nature of man, not regenerate: we shall easily perceive, that these conditions which we have said to be necessary unto a good work, cannot be found in him, For he is altogether void of the spirit of God, and of faith; and is so infected with the love of himself, that whatsoever he doth, he referreth it not unto God, but unto his own profit. Moreover, forsomuch as he is a stranger from Christ, it must needs be, that he is left under the law: so that, what defect or fault soever there be in his works, (as of necessity there must be much) the same cannot by any other means be recompensed. To conclude, if perhaps he have done any notable and goodly work; he doth not glory in God, but in himself: for he is ignorant of Christ, and of grace.

By these two descriptions of a work, good and acceptable unto God; and of a man that liveth without Christ: I think it is now manifest, that those works cannot be good and acceptable unto God, which proceed from a man that is out of the faith.

20. But our adversaries endeavor to wrest from us two very strong places, which we use for the confirmation of this matter. The first is, that we say;

An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit; the other is; Everything that is not of faith, is sin: of which things somewhat must be said in this place.

That metaphor of an evil tree, which cannot bring forth good fruit, Christ

used not only in the seventh chapter of Matthew; but also in the twelfth chapter of the same Gospel: and thereof he inferred; Ye generation of vipers, how can you speak good things, when ye yourselves be evil? But before I make open this cavillation, I think it good to declare, how

Augustine, in the fourth book, and third chapter against Julian the Pelagian contended for this self-same place. He setteth forth a goodly work of a man being an infidel; namely, to cloth a naked man: and he demandeth, whether this work may be called a sin? Surely, unless this work be of that kind that pleaseth God, I perceive not, that any other work of an infidel can be acceptable to him. And Augustine affirmeth, and proveth, that the same is sin: and least that he might seem to speak this without reason, he saith; It is therefore sin, because he that did that goodly work, glorieth in his work: for he doth not by faith acknowledge either God or Christ, to whom he should ascribe the doing thereof. Moreover, he saith, that To avoid the nature of sin, it is not enough that a good thing be done; but also that it be well and uprightly done.

Shall we their say, that an infidel hath done a good work, and wrought uprightly? If we grant not this, then we confess that he sinned. But if we do grant it, then we confess the fruit to be good; whereas the infidel without Christ, is an evil tree. By this means we shall grant, that an evil tree doth bring forth good fruit: which thing nevertheless Christ doth expressly deny.

Our adversaries therefore are driven to such a pass, that now they do not fight against us only, but even against Christ himself also: unless peradventure they will say, that a man being faithless, an infidel, and a stranger from God, is a good tree. But if they affirm this, how do they deny, that he pleaseth God; seeing that which is good, cannot be but acceptable unto our good God? But he which pleaseth God, must out of all doubt have

faith: for unto the Hebrews it is written; Without faith it is impossible to please God. But these men, by this their heresy, will obtrude unto us, that which the same epistle denieth can be done. But a man (say they) in that he is a man, is no evil tree. But Augustine saith; If we consider the natures only, then shall there be nowhere any evil tree: for both angel and man were created by God, and received good natures. But these natures must not be measured by us, according to that which they were made by God; but according to the state which came unto them afterward. A man endued with a good will, shall be called a good tree: but an evil tree shall be the man, which is endued with an evil will. And we say, that after the fall of Adam, and the first ruin of our kind, men be such, as they are not moved with a good will; but with an evil.

But to return to the alms of an infidel, whereof we began to speak; we may demand, whether this mercy, which is showed, be of faith, or be faithless? And forsomuch as it is done without faith, it must needs be faithless: wherefore it cannot be without vice and sin. It is not sufficient to have mercy of our neighbor, unless the same be also done faithfully and rightly: for mercy is not of itself alone good. For God hath disallowed many benefits bestowed upon our neighbors; as when the king of Israel spared the king of Syria; and Saul, Agag the king of Amalek. But faith which worketh by love, is always good, and can never be evil. But forsomuch as mercy is not of that kind, therefore it is necessary, that there be used an uprightness, whereby it may be done faithfully to receive commendation. They cry out, that this natural affection of showing mercy is good; which thing peradventure we will not deny. But they should have considered, that men not regenerate, abuse the good thing, when as they direct it not to God, who

is the only end of all our actions: neither surly doth he commit a slight sin, which perversely abuseth so great a gift of God.

21. Furthermore, the same Augustine affirmeth, that Whatsoever good thing can be perceived to be in the work of an infidel, the same is wholly of God. Wherefore, in that our neighbor is holpen, and some ordinance of reason observed, and some civil honesty retained; that cometh not any otherwise, then of God: but so far forth as it proceedeth from an infidel, and a man corrupt, it is sin, and displeaseth God. By these, and such other reasons, Pelagius was led to confess, that these men, which so by nature behave themselves aright, are good indeed, but yet without fruit. Augustine again replieth against them, saying; that Such is the nature of barren trees, that either they bring forth no fruit at all, or else evil fruit. But Pelagius still endevoreth to clear himself, and therefore he saith, that these men are to be called barren: for that, although those things, which they do, be good; yet help they nothing to the atteinement of the kingdom of heaven. But in saying thus, he saith nothing; nay rather, he hindereth his own self. Truly the Schoolmen of our time have even the very same opinion; the which thing Augustine withstandeth by all the might he can: for he saith; By this means the Lord, which is good, shall cut down and cast into the fire a good tree bringing forth (as ye say) good fruit. What manner of justice is this, which ye so severely defend everywhere? Upon this opinion of yours there follow many vain and absurd things. Thus much hitherto out of Augustine.

But our men boast, that they differ much from Pelagius: for we put (say they) a certain grace preventing and knocking, whereby in the hearts of men may be enclosed some good treasure, by which they may work some good thing: wherefore they are not plants utterly dead; for after a sort they bring forth fruit. And although that which they do bring forth, cannot bud forth

into flowers, and into tried fruit; yet are there boughs, which may and do come forth of some sap of the grace of God; whereof, even they, which be strangers unto the grace of God, be altogether destitute. But Pelagius confessed even the very same things: for he misliked not the name of grace, when as nevertheless, by the same name (as Augustine doth prudently discover him) he understood what he listed, rather than what he ought: and a far other matter, than that word signifieth among the catholic writers, or in the church of Christ, or in the holy scriptures. But these men, in their similitude, have small consideration: for they remember not, that the Lord in the gospel did curse the tree which only bare leaves without fruit, and also commanded, that the same should be cut off, and cast into the fire.

But there is nothing in the danger of God's curse, and of hell-fire; but sin.

But they have yet another color, whereby they would avoid this place: for they say, that these trees indeed be evil, but yet not utterly dead; for in them there is found out sap of grace. For they affirm; that there is in man a certain grace, which knocketh and preventeth; whereby in the hearts of men not regenerate, some good treasure may be enclosed, out of which may spring some blossoms from a man not penitent. For although they be not able to make that (which they bring forth) prosper unto a perfect and ripe fruit, or to bear flowers; yet at the least wise they bring forth boughs and leaves, which doubtless be a token of secret grace and life. It is a wonder to see, how these men stand in their own conceit, concerning this knocking and preventing grace: whereof we have declared before what is to be thought. But they, which speak and judge after this sort, are too much without consideration: for they mark not, that this grace of theirs, is no other, but a certain inviting unto Christ, but yet not of efficacy; for men therewithal are left under the wrath of God, neither are their hearts changed.

What good treasure then can be in them, from whence may bud forth works acceptable unto God?

But because we will not fly from their similitude: Whereas they say, that there be plants, which bring forth boughs and leaves, although they have no fruit; yet they should have remembered, that Christ (as we before have said) cursed those sort of trees: and when as he had sought for fruit upon the fig tree, and found nothing but leaves; he smote the same with so effectual a curse, as it dried up. We deny not, but that by men may be done some civil and moral good thing, which proceedeth through that power of God, wherewith all things be preserved: for as the Ethnics also confessed; In him we live, we move, and have our being. But that power, wherewith God governeth and moveth all things, doth nothing at all further men unto eternal life, which be not regenerate. But the state of our cause is; whether they, which be as yet aliens from Christ, can do anything, which may be allowed and acceptable unto God: that is it which we deny, and they affirm.

But how much the place maketh for us, which is brought concerning the evil tree, which cannot make good fruit, there hath been sufficiently spoken.

22. Now let us examine the other place, which these men go about to wrest from us; Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. This place did Augustine in a manner always object against Pelagius. Pelagius made answer, that this is no other, than a particular reason, which was spoken only of meats; and for that cause ought not to be extended unto other works, especially of infidels.

Indeed we confess, that that question sprang first by reason of meats. But after what sort the reason thereof is alleged, let us consider by the words of Paul; He which judgeth (saith he) that is, [he which putteth doubt in each part, and eateth] is condemned: this was to be proved. The reason which he gave, was; For that it is not of faith. But seeing this saying is but particular,

neither could that, which he had spoken, be reduced to a Syllogism, unless there should be added a universal proposition, therefore he added; that Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. By which sentence Paul's meaning is, that so often as we attempt anything, he would have us to be thoroughly assured, that the same shall be acceptable unto God, and is of him required by some commandment of the law: which certainty if it want, he saith, that whatsoever we do, it is sin.

And Paul's firm argument may thus be knit together; Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin; To eat meats prohibited in the law with a doubting, whether the same be lawful or no, is not of faith; Therefore it is sin. Although the apostle proveth a particular proposition, yet he useth an universal reason: the which as it is applied unto meats; even so it may be applied unto all other actions, so as all things whatsoever do want this faith, be sins.

Wherefore, neither we, nor Augustine do abuse that sentence, when we apply the same to the works of misbelievers. But in these days many cry out, that Faith in this place signifieth the persuasion of the conscience, and that Paul respected not that faith, which we say doth justify. But these men take too much upon them, which bring in a new signification of faith, without any testimony of the scriptures: wherefore we might well deny this unto them. But forsomuch as, if we grant them that which they would, yet are they still compelled to return to our opinion; therefore we will not much contend with them about the same.

Admit it be as they would have it; grant we that faith be the conscience.

But what persuasion should there be of conscience, concerning works, that the same may understand, which be good, and which be evil? Doubtless other rule can we not have (if we be godly) than the law of God: for that is the rule, wherewith the good and the evil must be judged. From thence must

appear the persuasion of our conscience, that by faith it may understand that work to be good, which it taketh in hand: and contrariwise to be evil, if it strive against the law of God. And this is nothing else, but that which we before spake concerning faith. Wherefore, let us leave these men, who, when they would be seen to speak things differing from us, do fall before they be aware into one and the self-same opinion with us.

But we be here taught, that whatsoever we take in hand, a special regard must be had, that we be assured of the will of God. And the same thing taught Paul, when he said; Let us try what is the good will of God. And as the same apostle writeth unto the Ephesians; Let us not walk as unskillful, which understand not what the will of God is. And that it be not thought, that this interpretation is of our own devise; I desire the reader to look upon Origin, upon Primatius the disciple of Augustine, and upon those

Commentaries, which be ascribed to Jerome: whom thou shalt find to be of the same judgment, when they expound even that place, which we have now alleged; for they acknowledge no other faith than that, which all men acknowledge.

23. But now to come to the principal point of this controversy: I think, that it is plentifully confirmed out of the holy scriptures, that all the works of infidels be sins. Of which mind not only is Augustine against Julian, but also Ambrose in his book De vocatione Gentium, the third chapter, for he saith, that Without the true worshipping of God, those things, which seem to be virtues, are sins. Basil, in his second book De baptismo, and seventh chapter, of purpose moveth this question, and maketh on our side. And he citeth places out of the scriptures: as out of Isaiah; A sinner, when he sacrificeth, doth all one, as if he should offer up a dog: and when he offereth sweet cakes, it is all one, as if he offered up swine's flesh. And he

added; He which committeth sin, is the servant of sin, and serveth it only.

Again; No man can serve two masters, God and mammon. What agreement is there between light and darkness, between God and Belial? Finally, he citeth that testimony, whereof we entreated before at large; An ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit: upon all these testimonies he concludeth the very same thing, which we teach. By these things I think it is now plain, what we are to judge of the state of men not yet regenerate; first, they are free from the servitude of compulsion; secondly, in moral and civil works they be able to do many things by their free will; lastly, among sins, they have some choice, and sometimes embrace this sin, and sometimes that sin, as their will serveth them: but yet they be not so free, as to do those things, which may please God: also they be bound to the miseries and calamities of this life, will they or no.

Now must we speak of the liberty of men regenerate, which, besides that it is not less than the same, which we have declared to be in the wicked; yet in this point it goeth beyond it, that it can attain unto good works, which be acceptable unto God. For who is ignorant, that the work of Abraham, wherein he was prepared to sacrifice his own son, was most acceptable unto

God? For he was therefore highly commended by God himself. Paul unto the Philippians calleth their alms, sacrifices having a good savor. And unto the Hebrews we be taught, that God is marvelously delighted with such sacrifices. And hereof it cometh, that Paul warneth the Philippians, that with fear and trembling they should work their own salvation. But what need is there of any other testimonies, when as the Judge himself, in the latter day, shall reckon up the good works which godly men have bestowed upon the members of Christ? Seeing therefore that men regenerate be good trees, it is agreeable, that they both can and do bring forth good fruits. Howbeit, they

which be thus regenerate, must never forget, that they obtained not this freedom by their own merits; but by the benefit of God: for he fashioned them anew, and instead of stony hearts hath put into them a heart of flesh.

Finally, it came not of themselves, but of the heavenly father, that they should be drawn to Christ: for, unless they had been with great efficacy persuaded inwardly in their minds by God the father, they had no less fled away from Christ, than other men. Wherefore, in that first change of impression of the holy Ghost, our mind only suffereth, as they use to speak: but after that we be once persuaded and changed, we are so restored, that we be able to work together with the holy Ghost, and with grace.

24. And in what sort this restoring of free will is, it must be considered by two principal points; out of which we at the beginning (when we described the nature of will) declared that every sin, and every error that is in election or choice, doth come; because that when we deliberate touching any matter, either we are utterly ignorant what is just or unjust; or else, for that though we see what is just and unjust, yet lust and perturbation intermingleth itself, which by their great force cause us to prefer the weaker reasons before sure and strong reasons. Wherefore, the knowledge of that which is right cannot take place. For the violence of the affections, and the whole attention of the mind, is fastened upon those reasons, which serve for pleasure and lust; and the honester arguments are not considered, and therefore do not break forth to effect. But by the benefit of regeneration, both these discommodities are holpen: for as touching the first, the light of faith is present, which by adding the rule of the law of God, manifestly understandeth in the practicing of things, what things are just and unjust.

Furthermore, by the power of the holy Ghost, although all corruption of the affections be not taken away; yet is it so broken and made feeble, that it

is not able, as before, to hinder the making of a right choice. Howbeit, for that this lust, so long as we live here, cannot utterly be consumed; therefore it comes to pass, that this liberty, which is given unto the godly, to do things which may please God, is not perfect and absolute; but weak and maimed: and in this sort it is set forth in the holy scriptures. For touching those works, which be acceptable to God, many men are greatly letted many ways, that they cannot do them as they would, and as the law requireth: for they always feel a law in their members, which fighteth against the law of the mind; that whether they will or no, they be led captive unto the law of sin. For even as we read to the Galatians; The flesh so lusteth against the spirit, as they do not the things which they would. And Paul complaineth, that he did not the good, which he earnestly desired, but rather the evil, which he hated. Godly men no doubt do in mind Serve the law of God, but in their flesh the law of sin: in whom yet this is a notable gift of God, that they exceedingly bewail and lament these impediments; that although they doubt not, but that they have the first fruits of the spirit; yet they groan, and fervently wish for the perfect restitution.

Moreover, there happeneth fallings unto them every day, which do admonish us how weak this our liberty is. For this cause John saith; If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us.

Also James saith; We all offend in many things. And the Lord hath taught us in our daily prayer, to cry unto the father; Forgive us our trespasses. But nevertheless, we are not hindered by this imperfection of liberty; but that we may work together with God, and to frame ourselves as apt instruments unto the holy Ghost. Wherefore Paul warned Timothy to stir up the grace that he had in him. And in the first epistle to the Corinthians, he admonished them to apply themselves to the free gifts of God, and to gifts

more excellent; as though their diligence were required to be able to use rather this gift of the spirit than that.

But those which are said to have these things, are not simple and bare men; but when they be endued with the grace and the spirit of God, they be called the men of God: and because they be the men of God, they be also called perfect, and instructed to every good work. Wherefore we grant, that men born anew in Christ, have all that freedom which we grant unto the ungodly: and moreover, that they be also able to do works which be acceptable unto God, although they be not free, neither from sin, nor yet from the calamities and miseries of this life. Now should we also speak of the fourth state of man; but we may answer in one word touching the same;

That seeing in our heavenly habitation we shall enjoy the chief felicity, no kind of liberty can there be found wanting: unless a man will call that a liberty, to be able to sin, and to fall away from God, that is, from the chief good thing [which there cannot be.] But because that is a chief liberty, therefore we hope well, that in that country we shall be most free.

25. But now there is another question to be entreated of; to wit whether this concupiscence, and those corrupt motions, which remain in the regenerate, be sins, and so ought to be called? These things are called by Paul, The law of sin; and the law of the members. And by an example of himself he taught, that they remain in godly men after regeneration. But whether these be sins or no, cannot rightly be defined, unless we first understand what sin is. Augustine saith, that Sin is whatsoever is spoken, done, or coveted against the law of God. But whether this definition belong unto all sins, or to those sins only, which be commonly called actual; it is uncertain, by the ambiguity of this word, Coveted or Lusted. For if the same be referred unto the full assent of the will, whereby we assent to corrupt

desires, then is the definition stretched unto actual sins: but if this word Coveted, be so largely taken, as is the last precept; Thou shalt not covet, the definition may be universal, and may comprehend all sins. The Master of the sentences, in his second book, and 35th distinction, cited that definition, when he had now largely entreated of original sin, and had disposed himself to the searching forth of other natural sins: wherefore it seemeth, that he thought the same definition to pertain only unto actual sins. But howsoever it be, touching this matter I will not much contend. Ambrose, in his book De paradiso, and eighth chapter, setteth forth indeed a most large definition of sin; Sin (saith he) is nothing else than a transgression of the law of God, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments. But to pass over the sentences of the Fathers, the matter must be brought to the trial of the scriptures, that by them we may certainly know and understand what sin is.

John, in the first epistle, and third chapter; Sin (saith he) is ἀνομία, that is,

Iniquity. That Greek word is compounded of the particle privative ἅ, and of this word νόμος, that is, A law. Here the nature of sin is very well declared; for it is said to be a privation or want, whereby is taken from it the good thing which it ought to have. If thou inquire what that good thing is, which by sin is removed; this Greek word νόμος expresseth it: for that good thing is taken away, which is expressed by the law of God. Wherefore we may say, that it is sin, whatsoever withstandeth the law of God. Now we are to see, whether this definition, which is taken out of the holy scriptures, be correspondent or answerable unto that corruption, which remaineth in the godly, after regeneration. This do we affirm, but our adversaries deny.

Howbeit the scripture, without all controversy is of our side: for Paul saith expressly, that The law of the members warreth against the law of God, and of the mind, and that the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, so as

neither it is, nor can be subdued unto the law of God. And it wholly striveth against the first and greatest commandment; Thou shalt love the Lord thy

God with all thy mind, with all thy heart, and with all thy strength. For if all our strength and ability, as meet it were, would yield unto God; this coveting would never be resident in us. Furthermore, the very same coveting or lusting doth also wrestle against the last precept; Thou shalt not cover. And Augustine testifieth, that these two precepts cannot fully be observed: and what the cause is, why they be given, seeing they cannot be kept, he alledgeth goodly reasons, which shall not here be needful to recite.

26. We have declared by the definition of sin, that this coveting, whereof we speak, is sin. Now let us consider of other arguments. One is taken of the institution of man; for Man is made to the image and likeness of God: and; We be predestinated, that we might be made conformable unto the image of the son of God. And we are commanded To put on the new man, which (as Paul saith in the third to the Colossians) is renewed to the knowledge and image of him, which hath created him: and which new man

(as it is written in the epistle to the Ephesians) doth consist in righteousness and holiness of truth. And the image of God, which we are commanded to put on (as Tertullian saith) herein consisteth, that we have one and the selfsame motions with God. And Paul, to the Philippians, exhorteth us To be of one and the same mind with Christ. But these motions and lusts do most shamefully corrupt and blot the image of God in us. Furthermore, that which we ought to crucify, mortify, and put off; the same of necessity must be sin: for if they were good things, the holy Ghost would rather have admonished us to nourish and maintain them. But Paul to the Colossians saith; Mortify your members, which be upon the earth. And unto the Galatians; They which be of Christ, have crucified the flesh, with the

concupiscence's thereof. And in another place; Put off (saith he) the old man. But and if so be these motions do so displease God, it is in no other respect, than because they be sins: for God is so very good, that there is nothing displeaseth him, unless it be sin.

Lastly, unto sin death is due as a reward: wherefore, where no sin is, there death can have no place. For this only appertaineth unto the son of God, to die an innocent; For he died for our sins: but we therefore die, because we be not without sin. And if it be so, then let us see what our adversaries can allege; why infants, which be now born anew in Christ, do die. For actual sins they have not, and the guiltiness or blame of original sin is taken away: there remaineth only lust and corruption of nature, not wholly amended: and corrupt motions, which Augustine in his eleventh book of Confessions saith, are found in infants; and he both confesseth, and accuseth them as sins: and therefore, seeing these be sins, they do not unjustly die for them.

Forsomuch then as it appeareth, by most substantial reasons, that the corrupt lusts, which remain in us after baptism, are sins; now it resteth, that we see, unto what kind or part of sins they belong. Sin may seem thus to be divided; that There is one thing, which may be forgiven; and another thing, which cannot. Transgression against the law of God, which is never forgiven, is sin against the holy Ghost. But if sin may be forgiven, that may be two manner of ways: for either it is so forgiven, as we must of necessity altogether depart from it; which we see come to pass in sore and grievous sins, which Paul saith, Do separate us from the kingdom of God, and commonly be called mortal: or else be so forgiven, as we depart not from them; partly, through ignorance engrafted in us, and partly, by reason of the infirmity, wherewith we be infected.

And those be called small or venial sins, without the which man's life cannot here be led. Paul hath put a notable difference between these sins, when he exhorteth us, that we should not suffer sin to reign in us. And of this third kind of sins the apostle complained, when he said; O unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? And of these sins do we mean, when we teach, that the works of men, notwithstanding they be godly men, be not without deadly sins; for that we do nothing without this kind of defects. And such kind of defects be deadly, because in their own nature they deserve death: for The reward of sin, is death. Further also, for that so long as we carry about with us these blemishes of corruption, we cannot enjoy the life eternal: for so long are we excluded from it, until by death we have put off all corruption. Moreover, it is written; Cursed be everyone, which abideth not in all the things, which are written in the words of this law. And he which complaineth with Paul, that he doth not the good which he would, doth not perform all the things, which the law requireth, nor is not utterly without curse: though the same, through the mercy of God, be not imputed unto him unto eternal destruction.

27. And so do the men of our part speak of the good works of godly persons; not that either we deny good works, or that we think not that the good works, which are done by the men regenerate, are pleasing unto God: but that our uncleanness and impurity may be acknowledged, to the perceiving whereof we are blockish, and more than blind. Wherefore, setting aside sin against the holy Ghost; other sins are divided into three degrees. In the first is coveting or lust, which is engrafted in us; secondly, out of it doth spring continually the first motions and impulsions unto diverse sorts of wickedness; thirdly, cometh a consent of the will, and

breaketh forth into act. Paul assigned these three degrees, when he said; Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, that ye should obey the lusts thereof.

Sin, which ought not to reign in us, is the engrafted lust and corruption of nature. The first motions are the lusts of concupiscence, which spring from thence, the which we are admonished not to obey. Then is added obedience, which doth consummate and make perfect the sin, which is commonly called actual sin.

It is not to be doubted, but that the corruption of nature appertaineth to original sin. Again, that sin, unto the which cometh the consent of the will, they call actual. But there is a doubt touching those first motions, by means whereof we, through the benefit of Christ, be not tied to a new blame and bond of the judgment of God) whether they be to be referred unto original sin, or unto actual sin. Surely they are between both, and they take somewhat of each part: for, so far forth as by them we do work, covet, or desire anything; they have some consideration of actual sin. And Paul useth the words, ποιεῖν και πράττειν; which out of all doubt signify some action.

But on the other part, because we suffer this kind of motion against our wills; therefore therein they communicate with original sin: for that sin is not taken by choice, and of our own accord.

Jerome upon the seventh chapter of Matthew, maketh a distinction between πάθος καί προπαθεία. πάθος (saith he) doth signify the first motions, after that the consent of will is come unto them: and προπαθεία, when they do move and stir up from the beginning. And he addeth, that although they have a fault in them; yet are they not held for great faults: but the passion is to be counted for a sin. Here thou must note, that Jerome confesseth, that the first motions have the blame of sin; although they be not counted for crimes, that is, although by the benefit of Christ they are not

imputed unto death: or else, although in man's judgment they be not counted for a crime. And sin is again divided into that which is only sin, and into that which is both sin, and also the punishment of sin. Of which distinction Augustine maketh mention, upon 57th Psalm: for he saith, that The first falling away from God is sin only; but those sins which follow, are both sins, and the punishments of sins, until the time that men come unto hell fire. Wherefore, what evils soever are committed between the first apostasy, or falling away, and [the time of] hell fire; the same as well be sins, as also the punishment taken for other sins. That hath Paul unto the Romans very well declared: for first he saith; that The Ethnics (no doubt) knew God, but they glorified him not as God. And for that cause he addeth, that They were delivered up unto wicked desires, being filled with all corruption and covetousness, &c. And at last he maketh mention of the condemnation of hell fire, saying: But thou, according to thy hardness and unrepentant heart, heapest up to thyself wrath, against the day of wrath, and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, wherein he shall render to every man according to his works.

But there be many which think not that these sins be the punishments of sin; because, of them men take no small pleasure. Howbeit, unless they were blind, they might easily understand by the apostle, that they are punishments, and such indeed as are most grievous. For he saith, that Their heart was blinded, and that they were made fools, although they boasted that they were wise men, and were given over by God unto a reprobate sense, to defile their bodies with shamefulness. And what are all these, but most grievous punishments? If when one hath committed theft, his hands should straightway be cut off, or his eyes plucked out; we would say that he were grievously punished by God. Paul saith, that These men were deprived

of their mind, that their heart was made foolish, and that their bodies were most shamefully defiled. And shall not these seem to be punishments?

How can we esteem our mind to be safe, sound, and uncorrupt, if sin do reign therein? Solomon saith; Can any man nourish fire in his bosom, and not burn his garments? Or can a man go upon hot burning coals, and yet not burn his own feet? And therefore sin is called a punishment; because it hurteth and corrupteth nature: for the unhappiness of original sin hath so marred the same, as it can scarcely seem to be half on live. And the corrupt motions, and violent rages, which often times spring out of that unhappiness; unless they be kept short, and mortified, do make it the more raging. Finally, if thou yield or give thy consent to them, they evermore become stronger and stronger; and so nature runneth evermore headlong to the worse.

28. All these things have respect hereunto, that we may understand, that lust grafted in us, and corrupt motions, which still remain in our minds, belong to this kind of sins; but yet so, as they are punishments of another sin going before; namely, of original sin; if it be not of some other sin that is more grievous. Yet nevertheless this is to be noted, that the first falling away also is in such sort sin, as it is also a punishment: for as we have said, there is no sin, which doth not most grievously hurt the nature of man; and so at the least wise it hath a punishment of itself joined with it. But every sin is not the punishment of another sin going before it: but those, whereof we now entreat, we affirm to be punishments of sin going before; yea, and we abide by it, that they be sins. But it seemeth a wonder unto many, that seeing these be of necessity, how they can be sins.

But touching this matter, let us hear what Augustine saith in his third book De libero arbitrio, and 18th chapter; Some things also (saith he) done of

necessity, are not to be allowed: as when a man would do well and cannot.

For otherwise, why were these words spoken; The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. To will is ready with me, but to perform the good, I find no ability. And this; The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these words are one repugnant to the other, that the things which ye would not do, those ye do. But all these things belong unto men, and proceed from that condemnation of death: for if they be not a punishment of man, but nature in man; then are they no sins.

For if we depart not from that state wherein man was naturally made, so that he could not be better; then, when he doth these things, he doth what he ought to do. But if a man were good, it should be otherwise: but now, since it is thus, he is not good, nor yet is it in his power to be good; either for that he seeth not what manner of one he ought to be, or else in that he seeth the same, and is not able to be such a one as he perceiveth he should be. Thus much Augustine.

In which words many things are most worthy the noting. First of all he confesseth, that there be many things which necessarily happening, are to be disallowed. Secondly, he alledgeth a reason why they are called sins; because we depart from that state wherein we are naturally made. Thirdly he saith, that a man is not good, neither hath it in his power to be good.

Fourthly, he bringeth two reasons why he cannot be good; either because he seeth not what is to be done; or else for that he seeth it, but by reason of infirmity is not able to perform it. Lastly, this is to be noted, that he meaneth these things of men which be regenerate. For he citeth the words of Paul to the Galatians, and those places which we have now alleged; which things we have declared, cannot be understood otherwise than of the regenerate. But against this saying of Augustine, that seemeth to be, which

Jerome writeth in his interpretation of faith; We say, that they do err, which say with Manichaeus that a man cannot eschew evil.

29. But these things may be reconciled easily enough: for Jerome speaketh of nature, as it was instituted by God. For he writeth against the Manichees, which taught, that we therefore cannot resist sin; for that we were by nature created evil, by an evil god. Yet there is none of us which doubteth, but that man, when he was created at the beginning, was most free. But that Augustine speaketh of nature after the fall, it sufficiently appeareth, in that he saith; All these things pertain to men, and came from the condemnation of death. Besides, he confesseth, that this is the punishment of man being fallen. Moreover, if these things be referred unto the regenerate, we may say, that the saying of Jerome hath a respect only to the grosser kinds of sins, which do separate us from the kingdom of God; from which sins we doubt not, but men born anew in Christ may abstain.

But Augustine speaketh most largely, and by sins understandeth those also, the which we are presently in hand with; without the which we cannot here lead our life. And this latter solution is cited by the Master of the sentences, in his second book, and 36th distinction.

But they will object unto us, that we do injury against baptism, if we say that sin is not taken away thereby. But we cannot justly be accused of this crime: for we affirm, that the guiltiness or imputation of fault is taken away by regeneration. For although these vices remain, as both the scripture declareth, and experience teacheth; yet their bond [of punishment] and guiltiness is discharged. Wherefore Augustine sundry times saith; that Concupiscence indeed remaineth, but the blame thereof is taken away by Christ. And he addeth, that sometime it cometh to pass, that the act and work of sin passeth away, as we see it is in theft, and in adultery; but the

guiltiness nevertheless abideth. And sometime it cometh to pass, that the blame is taken away, but the fault remaineth: which is plain to be seen touching this lust, whereof we speak. In deed the same remaineth, but yet we cannot there-thorough be accused as guilty of eternal destruction. If thou demand wherefore it is called sin, seeing the blame is taken away; I answer, because that in so much as it is not imputed unto us, it hath not that of his own nature: for touching his own nature, (as we have before taught) it deserveth death and damnation; but this cometh by another means, namely, by the mercy of God through Christ.

But everything ought to be judged of, as it is in itself, and according to his own nature. Wherefore, seeing the proper nature of sin is to strive against the law of God; which thing we see cometh to pass in lust, and in these first motions, therefore they are to be called sins. Neither do we by this our declaration, fall into that foolishness, wherewith the Pelagians reproached

Augustine and other Catholics; as though they should say, that by regeneration is not blotted out sin; but only raced. For when as hairs be shaven, yet there remain still under the skin, the roots, whereby they grow up again. For although we affirm that in men regenerate remain still lust, and corrupt motions; yet do we not deny, but that God is perfectly reconciled unto us. Wherefore, although these in their own nature be sins; yet by the mercy of God they be so wiped out, as they cease to be imputed to us at all. So then, if we have respect to imputation, there remaineth nothing of them.

30. Last of all, they object unto us, that we do injury unto Augustine, in that we say he affirmeth, that these be sins; seeing he interpreteth himself, that they be called sins improperly. For as a scripture or writing is called a hand, because it is done with the hand: so these things are called sins,

because they come from original sin. And as cold is called slothful, because it maketh us slothful; so these motions are called sins, because they stir us up to sins: but yet properly they are not sins. So (say they) Augustine doth not only interpret himself, why he called these, sins; but also hath given us a way how we ought to understand Paul, when he calleth them sins.

Hereunto we answer, that if Augustine, or any other of the fathers, deny that these be sins; the same must be understood by way of comparison, if they be conferred with actual sins: but not that the nature of sin can wholly be taken away from them. Which thing Augustine in another place most plainly declareth: for against Julianus, in his sixth book, and eighth chapter;

For neither is it (saith he) any equity, when in one man either the superior parts, are after a vile sort servants unto the inferior parts; or the inferior parts after a vile manner resist the superior parts: although they be not suffered to get the upper hand. Seeing he calleth this sin, iniquity; he plainly teacheth, that unto it is agreeable the nature of sin, which we before described.

And in his fifth book, and third chapter against the same Julianus, he thus writeth; The concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusteth, is sin: because in it is a disobedience against the government of the mind, and it is a punishment of sin; for that it is rendered unto the merits of the disobedient person; and it is a cause of sin, through the falling away of him that sinneth. Here we see, that concupiscence or lust, is by Augustine three manner of ways called sin. Neither can it be said, that he writeth these things of a man not regenerate: for he saith expressly; Against whom the good spirit lusteth: for the spirit of God is not in the wicked, with whom he might strive. Wherefore we have out of Augustine three places; one, which we cited before, out of his fifth book De libero arbitrio, and two against

Julianus, wherein he expressly confesseth, that concupiscence is sin: and he bringeth a reason why he so thinketh. Neither ought our adversaries, as concerning the interpretation of Paul, to run unto a figure, to say, that this is not properly to be called sin: for both out of Paul, and out of other places of the scripture is brought good reason, why concupiscence, or lust, is truly and properly called sin. And it is to be wondered at, that these men, which are so ready else-where in every place with their figures, when as in this one proposition; This is my body, they so much contemn all kind of figures, where nevertheless a figure is most convenient for that sentence. And if thou desire other testimonies of the fathers, to prove that lust is sin; we have before cited Jerome upon Matthew: and in Augustine against Julianus, there are found cited many other sentences of the ancient fathers; all which do make with us.

These things which follow are taken out of the like place upon the first to the Corinthians, at the end of the second Chapter.

31. Now must we search out, whether the liberty of the will be taken quite away, by means of those things which we have rehearsed. But because Paul affirmeth, that A natural man cannot know those things which be of God: it seemeth a while to be against free will. For if we be not able, through our natural power to comprehend spiritual things; how can it come to pass, that we express them in our actions: seeing we see by experience, that there is much more business and labor in doing, than in understanding? And not only this, but also the predestination, or prescience, seemeth to be a hindrance to it. For it seemeth that this may be inferred; If God hath known all things, before they be brought to pass, and cannot be deceived, the liberty of our will is quite gone, and all things happen of necessity. Also, the power of God, wherewith all things be wrought, causeth no small difficulty

of this matter: for of such efficacy is the will of God, as Paul to the Romans said; Who is able to resist his will?

Moreover, the scriptures affirm sin to be of so great force, as by the same all things in a manner are corrupted and despoiled in us: wherefor the strength which is left unto will, is very feeble, the which is not able to do as reason hath appointed. Again, so much is attributed to the grace of Christ by divine oracles, as without the same it is said, that we are able to do nothing, which either may be acceptable or grateful unto God. And seeing the same is not equally given unto all men, it is thought that their liberty is destroyed; for so much as they have not this grace in their own power. The Mathematicians also extol the powers celestial, and in a manner persuade, that of them do depend those things which happen; so as there might not seem to be left unto us the perfect liberty of such things as are to come.

Finally, there have been such also, who would affirm, that there be definite causes of things to be done; the which being joined one with another, and tied with a sure knot, there is brought to them a certain necessity and destiny, which cannot be withstood.

32. But we need not stand much upon that argument, which was taken from the force of knowledge; because it expressly appeareth by those things, which we have already spoken, that this liberty is not judged to be in men not yet regenerate, as concerning works, which be in very deed good, and do please God: wherefor that kind of reasoning is not to be weakened, seeing it surly confirmeth the doctrine of the apostle. In the next reason there is a more difficulty and trouble: for there be few, which can perceive how the providence of God, or (as they term it) his prescience can suffer any free choice to remain in our will. And the place is so difficult and dangerous to be dealt in, as many of the old writers, in reasoning about this

matter, were brought to such a pass, as they judged altogether, that of those things, which be done, there ariseth a necessity: yea, and they supposed, that God himself is held with this necessity. Whereof came a proverb, that God also might not withstand necessity, so as he durst not attempt anything against the same.

Through this liberty of theirs, the poets went further, and said, that many things be done, even whether the gods will or no. And Homer brought in Jupiter to be sad, and to lament the necessity, or destiny, by the force whereof he was let from removing death, which approached unto his sweet son Sarpedones. And he maketh Neptunus to take very grievously the chance of his son Cyclops; of whom he being stirred up with a lust to revenge, would have driven Ulysses altogether from home, and complaineth, that this was not granted to him by destiny. And in Virgil, Juno doth no less outrageously bewail; because she had kept wars so long together with one nation, and yet could not remove (as she desired) from the coast of Italy the Trojan navy. But we Christians do not in such sort speak of God: for we have most certainly learned out of the holy scriptures, that there is nothing impossible to God; and we are taught by Christ himself, that all things are possible unto God. And our faith, after the example of Abraham, doth chiefly cleave to this persuasion; that God can do whatsoever he hath promised. Neither must we conceive in our mind, that Christ was either condemned unto the death, or forced to the cross against his will, or his father not willing. God would these things to be done, not being led thereto by an inevitable necessity; but by a superabundant and exceeding charity towards men. So the scripture teacheth us, which saith; So God loveth the world, as he gave his only son,

&c. And unto the Romans it is written; Which spared not his own son, but

gave him for us all. Christ himself by the same love, was moved to die for us; and he taught us, that A greater love than this can none have, that one putteth his life for his friends. And thereby he showed himself to have exceeded the measure of man's love; because he would suffer death for his enemies. And that he willingly, and of his own accord took death upon him, he sufficiently declared; when in the last banquet (which, according to the Paschal custom, he kept with his apostles) he said; I have earnestly desired to eat this passover with you.

33. By these places we perceive, that the Lord's death was thoroughly foreknown, and understood, and did in no respect infringe the liberty, either of Christ, or of the father. Therefore Cicero, otherwise a very learned man, is greatly to be wondered at: against whom Augustine, in his fifth book De civitate Dei, especially in the ninth and tenth chapters, earnestly disputeth concerning this question. The controversy dependeth upon this, that in the latter book De divinatione, all things are refelled, which were brought by Quintus, Ciceros brother, in the former book. And Cicero endeavoreth by all means, to overthrow all predictions of things to come, and of the prescience of God. Therefore Augustine affirmeth, that the Astrologians had reasons, which were better to be borne withal, than his: because, though they attribute overmuch unto the stars, yet they take not away all divination and prescience. And a certain Physician (as the same Augustine declareth in his book of confessions) being a grave man, and one that detested Astrology; when he was demanded, how it came to pass that Mathematicians did prophesy so many truths, he durst not (contrary unto all histories and experience) deny every divination; but he answered, that a certain destiny was spread over things: and he affirmed, that it was not incredible, but that reasonable souls did after a sort feel it. Surely there is nothing to be found

more repugnant, than of the one side to affirm God to be; and on the other side to take from him the prescience of things to come. The prophet Isaiah would these things to be so firmly knit together, as he said; Show us what things shall come to pass, and we will declare you to be gods. But that Cicero had small knowledge, and no good judgment of God; it appeareth by his book, which he entitled De natura deorum: wherein, disputing under the person of Cotta, he striveth utterly to take away the nature of God.

And surly, it is to be lamented, that so notable a man is to be charged with that, which the psalm of David ascribeth unto fools: for there it is written; that The foolish man hath said in his heart, There is no God. Upon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialogue unto Cotta, which was a bishop; I do not well understand: unless perhaps he considered, that none in a manner are to be found, which both more freely speak, and worse do esteem of God, than they do, to whose trust are committed ceremonies and holy things. And because it was not hidden to Tullius Cicero, that it is a very odious thing to profess an opinion, whereby God should be denied: therefore, when he had disputed as much as he thought good; in the end of his book he showed his opinion, yet in the behalf of Lucius Balbus; and so, as he saith to Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta is to be allowed. Cicero was a man very studious, as well of all kind of learning, as specially of the civil law. And whereas he thought, that the state of man's doings should be overthrown, if free will were denied: and he not knowing by what means this liberty might be retained, with a prescience of things to come; he rather yielded, that God's wisdom should be taken from him, than that we should be deprived of the freedom of our will.

Whereupon it may be gathered, into what darkness and obscurity of things the sin of the first man hath driven mankind: for what a madness is it to go

about to throw God, the creator of all things, out of the fortress of his wisdom, that thou mayest preserve man? This is that over self-love, which every-where in the scriptures is condemned: we would that all things should perish, rather than our selves. This doth not godliness require. Wherefore we, which be taught by the spirit of God, declare that both must be confessed; namely, that both God doth foreknow all things, and also that the freedom of our mind (as we have showed before) must be retained. So do the holy scriptures instruct us, wherein we read; Whom he foreknew, them hath he predestinate to be made conformable to the image of his son: and that We were chosen by God before the foundations of the world were laid.

In them do we learn, that The hears of our head everyone are numbered: that The little sparrows light not without the will of our heavenly father.

And seeing we judge, that God doth all things rightly and justly; we cannot think that he dealeth without reason and understanding.

34. But go to, let us more nearly consider the manner of Ciceros reasoning. If (saith he) things to come are certainly known before, things among themselves shall have some certain order: and forsomuch as nothing is done without a cause, of necessity also it shall be granted, that there is an order and knitting together of causes. Whereby will come to pass, that all things, which be done, be done of necessity; by which means just and wholesome laws shall perish: and no admonitions or rebuking's will be left, neither can there be any place for religion or prayers. Wherefore thou must choose, whether of these two evils thou wilt: either that there is divination, and prescience of God; or else to maintain the free power of man's will.

Both together cannot be had, they be repugnant one with another, as he thinketh. Wherefore unto him it seemeth altogether necessary, that one of these be maintained and defended; and that the other be refused, as false

and unprofitable. Which deliberation being taken, as Augustine no less wittily, than godly said; Cicero, otherwise a very prudent man, while he coveteth to make us free, maketh us impious and wicked persons, who should rob God of the knowledge, which he hath of things to come.

And we must diligently mark, that his arguments make no less against the foretelling's of our prophets; than they impugn the divinations of the Ethnics, whereof he at that time disputed. Wherefore thus I think best to answer his curious reasons. Let us grant him what he would; to wit, that for the establishing of God's prescience, we agree that there is a certain and determinate order before God, as well of things, as of causes. But that which he bringeth in at last; namely, that all things will therefore come to pass of necessity; that will we deny. For though there be an order of causes appointed, yet doth it not follow thereof, that there cannot be some causes found among them, which may keep their liberty, or (as they call it) their contingence. And in this point Cicero seemeth to err more than the Stoics: for he, to save the liberty of man, would that all order of causes, and foreshowing of things to come, should be utterly taken away; which things take so sure hold of the nature of God, that the same being spoiled of them, it cannot seem to consist. But the Stoics, because they would take nothing from the nature of God, do bring in their destiny: and that our entire and perfect will may have a place, they altogether remove the same from the order of causes joined together.

35. But here let us join issue with him, that we may steadfastly deny, that the knowledge of God doth nothing at all hinder our will; although it comprehend the things which are to come: for never shall the will of man bring anything to effect, unless God have both foreknown it, and wild it to be brought to effect. When he shall know before hand, that tomorrow I will

either run or read; indeed I shall run and read, yet not driven thereto of any necessity, but (as they speak) contingently: for as far as belongeth to myself, I might do neither one nor other. But if thou urge further, and say;

Yet nevertheless thou shalt do it, in such sort as God knew that thou shouldst do it. I grant: but thereof it followeth not, that I could not otherwise do; because we do not always that which we can do: nay rather, many things might be done, which in no wise be done. And in that I shall read or run, it proceedeth altogether of my own choice: for of all things it is most in our power, to will, or not to will. Wherefore when they say;

Because God knew before, that thou wouldest read or run; Therefore of necessity thou shalt read: we must demand of them again, whether under the name of necessity, they mean a compelled and a repugnant will.

For if this be their mind, that we utterly deny: because it may be, that God foreknew that I would do something, and that neither unwillingly, nor with a constrained mind; but that I would do it willingly. But if by necessity, they mean that this should in any wise be done of me, we will not deny it: for so much as the controversy now is, not of the thing which is done, or is not done; but the disputation between us is only of the manner and form of doing. Neither (as he thought) are admonitions, laws, rebuking's, or religious prayers taken away: these things doubtless will be of force, and that more frequently than he could persuade himself; because God not only hath man's safety in his foreknowledge, but also he comprehendeth in his understanding, the ways and means, whereby he will help them. Wherefore if we shall perceive our brother to have need of the remedies, which we have here mentioned, we must boldly use them: for they have so far forth appeared, as God before hand knew, and would, that they should be profitable. Neither must we desist from our duty, although it may be, that all

mortal men would affirm that we labor in vain. For we must follow the law prescribed unto us, and not the secret prescience of God, whereof we have no surety what he hath decreed of things to come.

And seeing the prescience of God is not the nature, or (as they term it) the essence or being of our mind; we must give judgment of the actions which proceed from the same, according as they ought to be esteemed by the nature of the mind and will; and not by that which is placed out of the same.

Wherefore, seeing the nature of will is, that it is moved, neither unwillingly nor by constraint; it cannot be excluded from it by any outward means. It may sooner be abolished not to be at all, than that the violent action can be taken there from: even as thou mayest easilier rid any of us from being men, than when we be men to make us that we shall not be furnished with a reasonable soul; for it followeth immediately, that the soul being abandoned of reason, he cannot any longer be a man.

36. But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessity, that I shall read tomorrow; seeing God hath this foreknowen: we answer, that upon condition, or supposition, some necessity may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessity, which we grant, the choice of free will may very well agree. Moreover, Aristotle in his Ethics, disputeth, and that learnedly (as he doth all other things) whether the casting forth, which is done in the sea, when shipwreck is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntary. And although he there confesseth a certain action, that is mixed with willingness and unwillingness: yet nevertheless he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong unto the voluntary sense; seeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogether make choice of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingness in this kind of action,

whereas men by a certain force are tried to constrain themselves, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not been) they would never have done; then how much rather shall not we take willingness from our usual and common actions, when we perceive ourselves, of our own accord, and with a mind most willing, to do and endeavor those things, which we think good; although we doubt not, but God did long before understand of the same?

And that the necessity of this kind which we have taught to be by supposition, doth not overthrow the free power of our will; Chrysostom doth plainly show, while he writing upon the first epistle to the Corinthians, and interpreting these words; It behooveth that heresies be, that they which be tried among us, may be made manifest, saith: Not unlike this form of speech Christ used, when he said; It is necessary that offenses do come, but woe be unto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooved Christ to have suffered, and so to enter into his glory. All these things in holy matters are so to be expounded, as when they be called things of necessity; yet nothing must be taken away from the nature of man's will. And this among the School-men is wont to be called,

A necessity not of the consequent, but of consequence.

37. There be some which commonly say, that doubtless these distinctions help us nothing at all; if God have known before hand of things, those shall in any wise come to pass. Yes verily, they are profitable unto us, and that not meanly: for because thereby we understand, that man's will is not compelled; but that willingly and without compulsion it desireth whatsoever it will. For otherwise I will ask thee again, whether thou wouldest be saved against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldest be saved according to his will, he of necessity is not ignorant of thy salvation:

for so it is ordained, that none willeth that which he is ignorant of. It happeneth unto us very often, that we together behold players; yet dare we not say, that the sight and knowledge which we have, bringeth any necessity to them which play: and yet, while we see them in play, it is of necessity, that they do play. Wherefore, as that necessity infringeth not the nature of their will; even so the excellency of God compelleth not the will of man.

Some brawl at us, and say, that this similitude is far from the question proposed; because none at any time do behold players, which be not, and play not indeed. Whereas it is ascribed to God, that he hath had a knowledge beforehand, of all our doings even from the beginning: when as yet, neither we, nor any of our actions appeared to be. To these men I might answer, that unto God all things are no otherwise present, then they which do play are conversant in the fight of them which behold. Let everyone therefore take heed to himself, that he cast not the causes of his sins upon God; and when such a kind of cogitation entereth into his mind, let him have respect unto lust, voluptuousness, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountains let him seek for the causes of his sins. Neither must there be much credit given unto the Peripatetiks in this matter, which deny, that God hath understanding of particular affairs; least they should seem to think, that the mind of God were abject and vile, if he should draw his knowledge from frail and transitory things. This thing is not agreeable unto our documents: for we do believe, that God of himself hath a perfect knowledge of all things; neither that he hath any need to challenge knowledge else-where to himself.

38. And whereas touching the third point, it was judged, that the power of God is a hindrance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong.

For, although that God by his infinite power, wherewith he is endued, doth what his pleasure is; yet doth he suffer the state and nature of things to stand whole: neither doth he violate them, or wrest them any other way, than the condition of them doth bear. Wherefore it is said in the book of Wisdom; that God doth mightily reach even from one end to another, and doth pleasantly dispose all things: or (as the Greek text saith) χρηστός, that is, Profitably. Which might not be said, if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The sum is, that God doth here moderate his power in ruling of the world, that he may fitly apply his action unto all manner of things. In the fourth place sin seemed to be a hindrance to the liberty of the will; as if it so weakened the powers of man, that after a sort they might be able to do nothing anymore. But there needeth not now many words about this matter; because there hath been plenty enough spoken in those things which we have declared, how much our liberty hath been diminished by reason of sin; and that specially as touching very perfect and good actions, which might be acceptable and well pleasing unto God.

Besides, it hath been declared, that our liberty is not by this means utterly taken away; but rather, that there is as yet a great deal of it remaining.

39. Moreover, concerning the powers celestial, there shall be no great need to entreat; seeing the Astronomers do glory in their own books, that The wise shall bear rule among the stars. But and if so be that these things, which they pronounce, might not be escaped, all their gains would fall away: for no man would bestow cost upon the skill of those things, which he thought he should not be able, neither to avoid, nor change, either by endeavor or study. Which thing without controversy would ensue, if so be they should ascribe a mere necessity unto their foreshowing's. By this means all prayers, piety, and worshipping of God would be taken away: for

who would pray to God for obtaining of anything, if he were already persuaded, that the same should not be granted unto him? Wherefore

Augustine said; They which thus think, do great wrong unto heaven: for there they believe is a court appointed, wherein are notable acts decreed, which cannot be avoided: the which if it were in the earth, it should needs be taken away. How much less must we think, that the same is done by God in the celestial parts? I beseech you what judgment would be left, if so be we did all things upon constraint?

This matter some excuse, saying, that from heaven is only signified what shall come to pass: yet that we be not thereby driven by any necessity. And they bring forth a place out of the book of Genesis, wherein it seemeth to be spoken; that The stars be put as signs. But that place is to be understood concerning seasons, winds, rains, tempests, and such like sort. But how can they affirm, that in heaven they see certain signs of things to come? They shall hardly prove it, especially touching man's affairs. For what answer can they make of twins, which being conceived at one time, and have all one aspect of the heavens; yet (as experience teacheth) the chance and success of them is altogether differing?

Augustine, in his fifth book De civitate Dei, and second chapter, is worth the reading; where he writeth, that sometime there happened two brothers to be like affectioned, that when one sickened, the other also was diseased: and when the one recovered, the other was also eased. Concerning which thing Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, made answer, that he thought them to be twins; and that therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their body all of one nature. But Possidonius the Mathematician did ascribe the whole cause unto the stars; because in their nativity they occupied all one aspect of the heavens. But what (saith

Augustine) will these men say of twins, and innumerable living creatures, which are born in hours and moments alike; and yet attain to such diversity of fortunes? And Augustine witnesseth, that this example was taken out of Cicero; the which nevertheless we read not in his books at this day extant, unless perhaps he found the same in his book De fato, which remaineth amongst us all torn, mangled, and diminished.

40. Moreover, destiny, which the Stoics appoint to have mere necessity, hindereth not our matter; forsomuch as we admit not the same to be. They severed it from the wills of men, because they thought that all things would go to naught, if together with other causes they comprehended will under destiny. Howbeit, it seemed not good to them, utterly to sever man's will from destiny; saving in respect of the first choice, which they would have to be wholly in our will. But whiles we shall choose any cause that might be under destiny, they would have it follow of necessity; that what things soever they were, they should be joined unto it. Even as Euripides said unto

Laius, that It was free for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessity he should suffer even those things, which Apollo prophesied to be contained under destiny.

But we, as we declared at the first, deny not, but that things are knit together, as God ordained, and knew before hand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remaineth whole and sound. For unto whom soever a thing contingent (as the School-divines speak) is due, they have the same: and to whom soever necessity belongeth, with necessity they be constrained. But in very deed, grace, which finally seemeth to resist free will, doth not take the same away; but rather helpeth and restoreth it. But now we will cease from these matters, least we dispute more curiously of them than beseemeth Christians. Let everyone follow their own vocation;

and let us leave inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let us follow that doctrine of God, which is plainly laid out before us in the holy scriptures.

Look another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this book. Now we think it convenient to join unto this disputation certain other discourses; namely, of Voluntary and Not voluntary, and also of man's choice, and such like.

Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary.

41. Aristotle in his first book of Ethics treateth at large of that which is voluntary, and of that which is not voluntary: the reason whereof is, because praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercy be voluntary. The argument is taken from the consequents. Praises and dispraises serve unto moral knowledge; for as commendable manners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blame-worthy are to be avoided. Howbeit, such praises and dispraises cannot be judged of, unless we know whether they be done with a willing or unwilling mind. Further, he added another cause; to wit, that this doctrine is a part of the civil faculty, whereto belongeth the making of laws. And laws set forth rewards and punishments to the observers and transgressors of them: it is needful therefore that they know which be voluntary things, and which be not voluntary. For men that be unwilling, do not obtain rewards; and they which sin by compulsion, should not suffer punishments. Some wrest this reason of law-makers hereunto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things, which of necessity must be done, nor those things, which are impossible to be done; but only those, which be in our own power: and that therefore it behooveth them to know what is the nature of voluntary and not voluntary. I know in

very deed, that this is the definition of law; that It is a reason commanding honest things, and calling back from things that be dishonest. But that which these men avouch, to wit, that it commandeth things which be possible, I would only grant it as touching civil laws, but not of divine laws: for those require things that be impossible, especially in respect of the state of nature, corrupt and defiled. Howbeit, Aristotle used not this reason; he only touched these things which I have mentioned of punishments and rewards. But why did he speak of the affects, since those be not voluntary, but are naturally planted in our minds? The Greek scholies answer; that, albeit as touching substance and root they be of nature, yet may they some kind of way be called voluntary, insomuch as by use and exercise they may be enlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer, that Aristotle made mention of both, of affects I mean and of actions; but voluntary must only be referred to the actions. The which thing being done, it will also belong unto the virtues, which are conversant in the affections: for those also are gotten by actions, which when they be right and commendable, must be accounted voluntary. Moreover, why doth Aristotle say, that sometime pardon, sometime mercy must be showed? Because we do not always take mercy on them whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself, killed him which set upon him; he did it not willingly, he is forgiven, but we take not pity on him.

42. But how the knowledge of that which is Voluntary and Not voluntary, may help to moderate the punishments which laws appoint, it may many ways be showed. They which have committed anything against their wills, or of compulsion, are not punished: And in the civil laws there be very many titles, which provide remedy in the case of ignorance or compulsion: even as they do likewise concerning those things which be done for fear,

and by crafty collusion, and touching them which be under 25 years of age, &c. Also he that is taken with madness or frenzy is forgiven; yea and a mad man, although he kill his father; shall not be punished. The laws of God quit the hewer of wood, which by chance and not willingly shall kill another, because perhaps the axe might fly out of the helve, and certain cities were appointed for refuge. Also Plato in his ninth book of laws, showeth that many things are to be forgiven, where the will did not consent. So as it greatly availeth law-makers and judges of the law, because of giving punishments and rewards, to know what is done voluntary, and what is not done voluntary. We will speak first of Not voluntary: for in this matter the privation seemeth to be better known, than the thing itself. By darkness is the light better known, and sickness doth make the goodness of health the more manifest. This definition of Not voluntary appeareth by the reckoning up of the parts thereof, so that it is rather a division than a definition; albeit that just and full divisions have sometime the place of a definition. And we then chiefly use them, when that which is common to the parts, cannot be expressed by any one certain point thereof. Howbeit we must understand, that it is called Not voluntary, of these two forms or kinds, which be of one signification: for even that which is done violently and unwittingly, is not voluntary. And we prove, that the division of these two parts is rightly made: for Voluntary, which is contrary to Not voluntary, standeth of two things; of knowledge, and desire. First we must know that which we must desire, then are we stirred up thereunto by a motion of the desire. But either of these two may be hindered: ignorance taketh away knowledge, and violence letteth the desire. For good cause therefore be these two put contrary to that which is voluntary. Violence is defined what it is after this manner; It is a vehement enforcing, which either not at all, or very

difficultly can be abidden. But some man will marvel, how two things may be set against one: for against Voluntary is set that which is done by violence, and also that which is done unwittingly. Hereunto we answer, that there is but one set against one: constraint or Not voluntary, is set against willingness or voluntary. But this unwillingness or not voluntary, is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is done by violence, and another which is done by unskillfulness.

43. And as touching violence, Aristotle saith that the beginning of the motion thereof must be outward: for those things which be moved by an inward beginning, are moved naturally, not violently. But some cut off the latter particle which Aristotle hath in that place, so as that which suffereth or doth, bringeth not any help to that beginning. Howbeit, those which so say are deceived: for as we perceive of a wrack that is made in a great tempest, the beginning thereof is outward; namely, there be winds, waves, and storms: but the wrack would not be, unless that the shipmen themselves would take out of the ship those things which are to be cast away. And they which under a tyrant, are forced to do things that be shameful, they have the beginning of their actions from without; namely, the commandment of the tyrant: but yet those things would not be done, if they themselves would not yield to the doing of them. Wherefore it appeareth, that these things have their beginning outwardly; yet nevertheless that they bring some help thereunto. Others think, that [Doing] is there added in vain: for if the beginning be an outward motion, then should it be enough if he were named a sufferer: for that which is moved, suffereth, but doth not. We answer; It may well be, that the self-same things which are moved violently, may also have a doing, as instruments: for a staff moved by us, doth also move a stone. And in some thick throng, where men be pressed, when a man is

there choked, he is crushed by those which stand about him; so as they are said to thrust against him, although they thrust not of their own accord, but are driven by others, and enforced by the rest of the company. The examples brought by Aristotle are such, as one of them is of a living creature, when against our wills we be carried away by men, in whose power we are. Another is of things which have no life, as when we be carried with the wind whither we would not, which oftentimes happeneth to them that be sailors. If any shall demand, whether voluntary and without constraint, be all one: we will answer, that without constraint extendeth further than voluntary. For without constraint, agreeth even to things that be without life, but so doth not voluntary. Neither is it required, that the first beginning should be a motion in us: for our knowledge cometh of an outward object, albeit that the same motion, wherewith the sense is brought to pass by the object, is of another order. The beginning whereof Aristotle spake, is the cause; yet not any cause ye will, but only the efficient cause.

And that is understood to be the same, which is enough to move by itself.

44. There is moved a question, as touching certain actions, which seem to be as it were mean, and it is doubted whether they be voluntary or not voluntary. And the question propounded may either be simple, or of two parts. It is simple, if thou shalt say; Whether be those things voluntary, which are done for the fear of greater evils, rather than the obtaining of some good and honest thing? And they declare that such a thing happened unto Socrates, who would not obey the thirty tyrants, which required of him to kill a certain citizen of Athens: which he would not do, when nevertheless they threatened him, that they would kill his father and children. And this they sought, to the intent they might make him to be a companion and partaker of their most cruel purposes. The question also

(which liketh me better) might be of two parts; namely, whether those things be voluntary things, which are done for fear of greater evils; or for the obtaining of some honest thing, which otherwise would not be done. As if a lie be spoken, which in his own nature is filthy; it is doubtful whether it be voluntary or not voluntary, when it is made for the defense either of his own life, or the life of another man. Also adultery is a shameful thing, which no man of himself should choose: but if one, for the slaying of a tyrant, should, to win favor with the tyrants wife, have carnal copulation with her, that by her he might have a ready way to kill the tyrant; the question is, whether that adultery should be called voluntary. And all we know what great pains merchant men do take, what things the ambitious sort, and those which delight in pleasure, do endure, that they may enjoy their ends. And they would not abide those things which they do, unless it were for their commodity. Wherefore it is doubted, whether those things be voluntary. But if any man do doubt which be called great evils, let him look on those things which be their contraries, and he shall see that there be greater good things; namely, life, chastity, liberty, and godliness: and he shall perceive that death, breach of chastity, bondage, ungodliness, and such like, are the great evils: which things be so grievous, as many times some shameful things are committed for the avoiding of them.

How detestable things are oftentimes done for the scaping of death, may easily be known. Cato slew himself, because he would not come in subjection. Regulus, least he should break his faith, returned unto his death to Carthage. Virginius rather slew his daughter, than he would suffer her to live violated and a bondwoman. And many such like things have the holy scriptures. Lot rather offered his daughters to be deflowered; than he would suffer his guests to have injury done unto them; on the other side, his

daughters rather defiled themselves by incest with their father, than that the world should want [posterity.] Abraham to shun death commanded Sara to say that he was her brother, and put her chastity in open danger. In like manner Judith, with the danger of her chastity, went to Holophernes for the deliverance of her people. We dispute not here whether these things were well or wickedly done, but we only seek whether they ought to be called voluntary, or not voluntary. And there is a great difference between wicked men, which either to flatter tyrants, or else because they be delighted in shameful and evil works, offer themselves of their own accord to do these things: and between others which for honesty sake cannot be induced to commit these things, unless there be laid before their eyes great and most grievous calamities, or else great rewards. And thou mayest hear of some, which having proposed some great good unto themselves, will say, that for the obtaining thereof, they are constrained to attempt anything. And on the other part it is also said of many (that whereas they cruelly oppress the people, and bear rule for their own sakes only) they are constrained by tyrants to do that which is wicked. And at this day there be a great sort which fall away from the Christian truth, being constrained by the most cruel persecution of tyrants. There is also brought a similitude of the casting forth of things from a ship, which is done when the tempest of weather constraineth; not that this serveth anything at all unto manners, but that by the evidence of the matter, that which is now in question, may the better appear.

45. These actions, which we have rehearsed, are mixed actions: for in respect that they may be omitted, and are not of such necessity as they must in any wise be done, they seem to be Voluntary; but in respect no man could choose them for themselves, they seem, Not voluntary; but rather draw near

to the nature of those things that be voluntary, because in them is a certain comparison of evil things. Two evils are proposed; to wit, either poverty with the loss of goods, or else with those goods a present death: the will chooseth the less evil, and coveteth to avoid the greater. Therefore when the will doth his part in those actions, these things cannot choose but be called voluntary. Besides this, Aristotle in his Rhetoric's admonished, that the less evil hath the consideration of the good, and is greatly to be wished for, since that which is desired, is good: and there is no doubt, but it is the will that chooseth the end. But the end of these actions whereof we dispute, is applied to the consideration of the time. For since the safety which the mariners wish, cannot be had, except by casting their goods into the sea, the will doth choose that casting of them away. Wherefore the time in all this matter must be considered, I mean not that time which is past, or to come,

(for before that chance, no man would choose these doings; and afterward when the mariners have escaped, they are sorry and discontented in their mind for those things which were cast away:) but the matter must be judged of, according to the present time, while it is done. And therefore, since there is then made a choice, and that the matter is called into deliberation, and that the original of the doing is in the doer of it, who either may do it, or may not do it; those things are said to be voluntary. As touching the action, we cannot judge in general, but we must have a respect to the circumstance of the time. And yet simply these things are called, Not voluntary, because for themselves no man would desire them: but nevertheless, since they be not considered simply, but are to be desired in this respect, and he that desireth them, is not without knowledge (for he knoweth what he doth) and his will or desire whereby he chooseth these things is present) therefore be they actions Voluntary. For all things must be judged of according as they

be done; and done they cannot be, but at a certain time, and therefore they must be judged according to that time, and not as they are apprehended by reason, for so are they, Not voluntary. For while they be considered of simply, they are set aside from the consideration of time. Neither is it to be doubted, but that herein cometh the consent of the will: for those things would not be done, unless the will would give her assent. True indeed it is, that no man would those things for their own sakes, but for some other thing: but yet this causeth not, but that they be Voluntary. If they were violent, the doer would not infer any enforcement thereunto: but the original of the doing and of the assenting thereunto is in him that is the doer, and therefore may choose whither he will do it or no. Seeing therefore these be called relatives and are referred unto the will; they must not be judged of simply, but according to the respect they have unto the will.

Wherefore since the will (as hath been declared) hath place in those things, they must be called, Voluntary.

46. By two reasons have these mingled actions been proved hitherto to be voluntary. First, because they must be esteemed according to the nature of the time present, wherein they be done; secondly, for that they be in the power of the doer. For unless the will should move the instrumental parts, in very deed they would not be done. There is a third reason taken from praise and dispraise; Because men are sometime praised, and sometime dispraised in the suffering of these vile and shameful things; Therefore doth this appear to be voluntary: for praise and dispraise speaketh not but of things voluntary. And Aristotle saith; that Men are sometime praised or dispraised herein, because they are not so always, as we shall perceive: for otherwhile praise is not given to these men, but pardon is granted them; but on the other side (saith he) they be dispraised. That same particle [On the other

side] signifieth two things: either men will not abide reproachful things, for the love of great and excellent things; or else they suffer indeed such things, but yet for light and unworthy causes: in which causes they are reprehended. Aristotle only mentioned one of these, the other he kept in silence. These great good and honest things, for the which men must endure grievous and hard haps, are judged to be our country, our parents, children, wife, justice, and such like. Zopyrus the Persian, as Herodotus reporteth, mangled his own nose, his ears, and his lips, that he might betray the city of Babylon unto his king Darius. Ulysses (as it is said of Homer) suffered his body to be beaten, and to be deformed with stripes, and appareled himself in vile clothes, and in that habit, as if he had been a runagate servant, went unto the Trojans, and entering into the city, thoroughly spied out the same.

But on the other side, all men dispraise Dolo, because he revealed the secrets of his own country, that he might not be constrained to abide any torments. But it is to be considered, that when it is said, we must sometime suffer shameful things, that must not be referred unto wickedness, or unto horrible crimes; for those things must not be committed for any manner of utility or honor: but it is only said, that those things should sometime be suffered, which have some grief and reproach. As if a magistrate should be bidden to run like a servant through the common streets, or to wear openly a woman's garment: if great preferment, and lawful commodity be laid before him, he will not refuse these things. So then, they must be very great matters, for the which the like should be done, if a man will be praised for the same. I do not allow the examples of the Scholies: for when they show, that these vile things must be suffered, they teach that a lie must be made, or else that there must be carnal company with a tyrant's wife, to the intent her husband may be slain. For these be sinful things, neither (as I have said)

doth Aristotle speak of them: neither yet can such things be commended, since that praises do agree with virtues, and dispraises with vices. There be some found of so abject and vile a mind, as they ought for just cause to be dispraised; since for a just and honest matter they will not suffer anything at all. So are soldiers dispraised, which forsake their station, and they that without constraint do yield up castles and strong holds. And in like manner are they dispraised, which are ready to do anything, rather than they will be compelled to pay any sum of money.

47. And it appeareth evidently enough, why Aristotle said; that Sometime praise doth follow the suffering of grievous things, because this cometh not to pass continually. For sometimes, neither praise nor dispraise do in that respect happen unto them which suffer reproachful things, but they are pardoned. And this happeneth, when [by reason of these things] a man doth that which becometh him not: as when tyrants do threaten those things, or else they shall light upon us, unless we suffer such reproaches, as are beyond the power of man's nature: there Aristotle saith, that we pardon him.

It is offered unto men, that they shall be burned, or be cut in sunder: there, if they yield, either in disclosing of secrets, or in suffering of any vile thing, they are pardoned. And some think, that in those cases it is lawful to make a lie. Aristotle addeth, that nevertheless there be certain things, whereunto no man ought to suffer himself to be compelled: he ought rather to abide anything, and when he yieldeth, he shall not be pardoned nor excused.

Wherefore our martyrs be in the right opinion, who have determined rather to endure anything, than to depart from godliness. Aristotle bringeth an example out of the tragedy of Euripides; for Alcmaeon was not pardoned, in that he killed his mother; because she was lead unto so great a wickedness upon a very light or rather ridiculous cause. Since these actions, whereof we

treat, be mixed (as we have said) of Not voluntary and Voluntary: when Voluntary beareth rule, either praise or dispraise followeth them; but if Not voluntary have the overhand, and that a man may seem to have done the thing against his will, he is forgiven. For those actions which be mixed, are so composed of two things; as either the one or the other of those things, whereof they be compounded, may surmount or overcome. And rightly doth

Aristotle make exception of grievous crimes, which shall not be pardoned: for who will forgive him which condemneth an innocent, which committeth adultery, which betrayeth his country, which for the sharpness of torments denieth godliness? These things can or ought by no means to be excused.

Anaxarchus, because he would not pleasure the tyrant, when he was beaten in a mortar with iron pestles, said: Beat on hardly Anaxarchus bag. So far was it off that he would change his will, or yield unto torments. And Zeno in his torments bit off his own tongue, least through the force of grief he should be constrained to bewray the conspirators. Wherefore there be four kinds of men, which Aristotle speaketh of; the first is, of them which are commended in their suffering of grievous things; the second, of them which are dispraised; the third, of them which obtain pardon; the fourth is, of them which obtain no pardon.

48. Aristotle showeth of two difficult and hard things which happen, in suffering or in not suffering of grievous and cruel things for an honest cause. The first belongeth to the faculty of judging; because we are oftentimes ignorant what things ought to be suffered for any cause: whether anything must be suffered in the goods of the mind; whether in the body, or in the goods of fortune; and again, what manner of things they ought to be that we should suffer, or that we should not suffer. And rightly doth

Aristotle say, that this is sometime hard to be judged: for otherwhile, this

difficulty doth not happen. For all men know, that wickedness is not for any cause to be suffered. But Achilles doubted, whether he should rather have wished for long life (but yet without glory) by lurking at home; or else for famous glory, together with short life, by warfaring at Troy. Also a son will doubt, whether he ought to hold his peace; or to betray his father, whom he knoweth to rob his country, to enter into the treasury by secret passages in the earth, and from thence to steal away the common treasure. In like manner David will doubt, whether he ought to counterfeit himself to be a fool; or rather suffer himself to be slain of a barbarous king. The cause is hard to be judged: for sorrowful things are to be compared with dishonest things; neither is it easy for all men to discern between these things. And virtue consisteth in matters difficult. Therefore from hence come praises; or else, if we fly from virtue to vices, dispraises. Here doth variety of the circumstances increase the difficulty, which causeth that we cannot have certain rules in those things. The other kind of difficulty ariseth of the weakness of strength, not of judgment; for when we be out of danger or sorrow, we see what is to be chosen, and oftentimes we discern that which is right. But when we come to the feeling and experience of grief, pains and torments; we are then of another mind. Whereof also it cometh to pass, that when we be in health, we give good counsel unto them that be sick; but yet we do not rightly advise our own selves, when we are sick. And they are very much to be commended, which stand fast in their sound determination, and in their good purpose. And on the other part, they which shall fall from their sound determination, are to be dispraised. Themistocles is marvelously commended, who would rather die, than bear arms against his country. But they on the contrary side are most worthy of dispraise, which would rather deny godliness, than to suffer torments or death.

49. When Aristotle had set down two kinds of the things which be Not voluntary, then he confuted their opinion, which made a third kind of the same. For they said, that the wicked actions, which we commit for attaining of pleasure and profit, are violent: and they made only those to be voluntary actions, which be rightly consenting unto reason. By these reasons they are confuted. [ 1] The first is, because then all our actions would be violent: for whatsoever we do, we do for these causes; namely, for delectation and commodity. [ 2] The second reason is, because that which is violent, is joined with sadness: but they which deal for pleasure sake, are glad, not sad; so as it appeareth that those actions are not violent. [ 3] The third reason is; that then every evil man would excuse his evil actions, transferring his fault unto outward things; that is to wit, such as are pleasant and profitable; and he would say, that he were constrained by these things: which is a matter to be laughed at. [ 4] The fourth reason; There is no greater cause why these men should make themselves authors of honest actions, than pleasant and profitable things to be the cause of shameful actions; because they have in themselves the original as well of these as of those. Briefly, if these men's opinion were true, there would be no sins nor wickedness's of men, which might not be excused under pretense that the same is done against their will, or violently. The reason is alleged; because all men deal for these causes, namely for delight and profit. Which in very deed is true, if also under the word, καλά, thou comprehend honest things: for there be many, which for honesty sake do many things.

But thou wilt say, that the adversaries do not so use that word, as thereby they have noted only delightful and profitable things. I know it. But thus doth Aristotle argue, and saith, that They, which will rather blame delightful and profitable things, than themselves, which yield themselves so readily to

be allured thereby, deserve to be laughed at. This is it that they are justly to be blamed for, that they suffer themselves so soon to be caught by these things, and to be called away from just actions. Why should they attribute unto themselves honest things, and ascribe that which is dishonest unto outward things; seeing that those also are in our power? Even as it appeareth in men that be temperate and continent, which do soon temper themselves from these things. And furthermore it may be wondered at, why they do not in like manner say, that they are constrained by honest things; seeing that they choose them, and since those be no less outward, than be pleasures and commodities. Undoubtedly, if we of good right ascribe to ourselves honest things, the dishonest also shall belong unto us: for contraries do both belong to the self-same general kind, and are to be measured by the self-same rule. Aristotle seemeth to speak those things against Plato: for Plato said, that Good men are not made good by nature; as if he should say, they are good by will, and by their own election. And on the other side, of evil men (in his ninth book of laws) he said, that they are all and in all respects evil; but yet unwillingly. But Aristotle affirmed, that as well good men as evil are led by their own accord, and with voluntary actions. For as well of goodness as of naughtiness there be originals, which do move outwardly; to wit, things which do offer themselves to our understanding: but since they be both in the one and the other, there is a help and aid given thereunto by us, which do choose and discern the same.

50. Now that we have spoken of Not voluntary, which is done by violence; let us see what can be said of Not voluntary, proceeding from them that be ignorant. And first Aristotle taketh away Voluntary, from that which is done by ignorance; for nothing, done by him that is ignorant, can be called Voluntary; seeing this requireth a knowledge of that which is

done. But Aristotle noteth a certain difference of those men, which do anything of ignorance: for some of them, when they have afterward perceived what they have done; it repenteth them: and there be others, which repent them not, but rather confirm that which hath been done. These two kind of ignorant men, because they differ much one from another, do make diverse forms and kinds of ignorance: and because they differ one from another in matter, it is meet also that they be called by sundry names.

Wherefore he that repenteth him, after he hath perceived his error, shall be called ἄκων, that is, One that doth against his will. And he which repenteth him not, shall be said to have done it being not willing: for he retaineth still the name of the general word; to wit, of Not voluntary. At the beginning our actions were divided, that some of them are Voluntary, and some Not voluntary. We began the discourse of the parts of this division, with that which is Not voluntary; and that, Not voluntary, we distinguished again into that which is against the will, or violent which is done by force; and into that which is done by ignorance. Violent was defined to be that, whose beginning is from without us, and wherein that, which is the doer or sufferer, giveth no help thereunto. Now is showed the other part of Not voluntary, whereby a thing is done thorough ignorance: and this is showed to be of two sorts; namely, with repentance, or without repentance. That which is with repentance, is simply against the will; but that which is without repentance, is at the beginning Not voluntary; but after the acknowledging of the fact, because he doth not repent him, he seemeth to be somewhat, yea to be very far from doing of it against his will; nay rather, that he hath somewhat Voluntary therein. These things therefore in name must be thus distinguished. The first shall be called he that doth against his will, and the other shall be called, he that doth not with his will. Oedipus is

said in the fables to have slain his father, and to have married his mother against his will: for understanding what he had done, he so repented him, as he put out both his eyes. And on the other side, Tiberius racked his host of Rhodes ignorantly, whom afterward when he knew, he put him to death.

Wherefore at the beginning, when he racked him ignorantly, he did it not with his will; but because afterward he did not repent him, he could not he said to have done it against his will. And there may be brought another example. He that killeth a man, thinking he had been a wild beast, if he be afterward sorry, he did it against his will. But if any man, to whom brazen money was owing, receiveth gold, and doth not repent him of his error, but rather rejoiceth; he is said to have done it not willing, but yet not against his will. Thus may the reason be made; Whatsoever is done violently, or against the will, it hath sorrow or repentance joined therewith; But not all things that are done by him, which is ignorant, have repentance or sorrow joined therewith; Therefore all such kind of things are not violent or against the will.

51. There is used also another distinction. It is one thing to do through ignorance, and another thing for the doer to be ignorant. They are said to do a thing through ignorance or unwittingly, unto whom ignorance is after a sort the cause that they do. On the other side, many do things being ignorant, who by reason of some grievous perturbation, whereof themselves are the cause, do as it were bring an error unto themselves. These things differ as the general and the special kind, as a thing spread forth, and a thing drawn together. For whosoever doth a thing through ignorance, is ignorant; but not so on the contrary part, whosoever is ignorant, doth a thing through ignorance. Hereof Aristotle bringeth examples, first of drunkenness. Many things are done by drunken men, wherein they know not what they do; yet

are they not properly said to do anything unwittingly, because they might have abstained from too much wine: and they which drink more than is requisite, did bring ignorance unto themselves. Wherefore such a vice causeth not that they should be said to have done against their will. Another similitude is of anger: for they which shall be moved with a great fury of wrath, do oftentimes not know what they do, but yet they deal not against their will: for they ought to have tempered their wrath, and to have attained unto virtue, whereby they might have moderated that perturbation. Which, since they would not do, they are not excused of those things, which they through anger did amiss. And briefly it is said, that ignorance of that kind is the cause not of constraining the will, but of naughtiness; otherwise every wicked man is ignorant, yet is he not therefore to be excused. That evil men be ignorant, this doth prove it; namely, that they know not what to follow, or what to avoid. For they are beguiled of their own lusts, for whose sake they are so deceived, as they perceive not what things are truly pleasant, and truly profitable; and contrariwise, which be truly grievous, and which be truly damnable. Wherefore they are corrupt in their judgment, and know not the nature of the end for the which they work.

52. The reason may be framed thus; Not every evil man worketh through ignorance; But every evil man worketh being ignorant; Therefore to work being ignorant, and to work through ignorance, are things different. The Major proposition is manifest; because evil men (as is said) if they wrought through ignorance, might be excused. And that, as is contained in the Minor proposition, they be ignorant, we have declared a little before. A general ignorance (saith Aristotle) excuseth not. That is called general, which is not of the circumstances; but of the whole thing itself. As if one would say, that he is ignorant that fornication or adultery be sins; he is not excused, because

he ought to have known these things: nay rather, he shall be the more grievously accused for this ignorance. But a particular ignorance, that is to wit, of circumstances, excuseth and deserveth pardon; because the circumstances could not be known. Otherwhile such chances fall out, as no man can for certainty know such circumstances. But contrariwise, the general ignorance obtaineth not mercy; because it was in the power of them that are ignorant, to have learned it. Wherefore if they be ignorant, they themselves are in the fault, that they know not; and they seem to have had a desire to be ignorant. Again, if the excuse of universal ignorance were available, then should no wicked men be accused. The cause of their error is; that they only seek for pleasure and profit, but neglect virtues and honesty: which nevertheless they do unadvisedly.

Whereupon Plato in his treatise Memnon, doth very well expound this.

First he taketh this as granted, that there is no man which would be a miserable and unhappy man. Which being granted, he addeth, that then there is no man which desireth evil things; since to be miserable, and to be unhappy, is nothing else, then to be conversant in evil things, and to be delighted in them. So then it appeareth, that evil men do choose to themselves those things that be evil, unwittingly. And this error (as saith

Cicero) we have sucked together even with our nurse's milk. But the reason why this general ignorance maketh not a man to do against his will, is, for that it hindereth not his choosing of things, nay rather it is joined therewith: for ill men choose rather to steal than to labor, rather to be idle than to exercise any art, rather surfeiting than abstinence. It may be, that otherwhile the whole matter may be generally unknown, and sometime generally known, but unknown privately and particularly. As if any man shall say, he knoweth adultery to be sin; but that he is ignorant particularly, that this

adultery is forbidden: neither of these ignorance's is worthy of pardon. But if any man do not know the circumstances in general, and think that there is no consideration to be had of the end, nor of the place, nor of the time, nor of the matter that he is about to do; whether shall this man be worthy of mercy or pardon? No verily: for he ought to have known this. And this common kind of perceiving belongeth to the universal knowledge, which must in any wise be had: but the ignorance of this or that circumstance particularly may be excused, since no man either may or is able perfectly to know all those circumstances in every particular. Wherefore only the ignorance of them maketh the action to be an action done against the will.

53. And because such circumstances be of great weight (for they obtain pardon and mercy when they are not known,) therefore Aristotle reckoneth them up, that they may be thoroughly tried out and known. They are in number seven or eight: and there is a common verse of them in the schools;

Who, what, where, whereby:

Wherefore, how, and when.

These are seven, but yet one wanteth, that is, Whereabout; under which word is signified the matter or subject of action. And when it is said of Aristotle, Wherein, there be signified two things; namely, place and time.

So that, if we will have the just number, there be eight; of which number this reason may be alleged. Because either we respect the causes of the action, or else we consider the nature or substance of the action. The cause, if it be efficient, then is it named of this circumstance, Who. If it be the end, then we account it of the circumstance, Wherefore. Or if it be the matter, then we add to it the circumstance, Whereabout. Or if it be as touching instruments, or the organs, we refer it to the efficient cause [which before we called, Who.] But if so be we consider the action itself, the nature

thereof is expressed by the circumstance, Whereby. But when we consider the measure thereof, then have we the circumstance of time and place, which we call, When and Where. And last of all, we regard the proportion of the manner, which is a thing belonging to quality, and is the circumstance that we named, How. No man (saith Aristotle) is ignorant of all these circumstances (he meaneth) of them all at once. A man may be ignorant of one or other of them particularly, but none can be ignorant of them altogether, unless he be a very fool: for how shall a man have no knowledge of himself? This is not generally true, because a man may easily be ignorant of the cause efficient. If himself be that efficient, I confess it is the harder, not to know himself. But even this also may haply come to pass, that one, sometimes minding another matter, may stir a ship; and yet marketh not that which he doth. But that we now speak of, is to be understood for the most part. Howbeit, this subtle point falleth not out in things that are moral. The matter is made plain by examples.

What did the circumstances excuse Aeschylus the tragical Poet? He in a tragedy did seem to reveal certain sacred mysteries of Ceres, which thing raised so great a tumult in the theater, as he was well near slain. He fled unto the altar of Bacchus, from thence he was brought to the judgment of the Areopagits: he pleaded his cause, he excused himself, that he knew not those things to be mysteries; and because he knew not what he did, he was quit. Also another man made a certain engine or instrument of war, which did cast stones: the effect whereof when he was minded to show, he discharged the piece, and by a stroke killed a certain man: he excused himself that he knew not what he did. The circumstance, Whereabout, which is the matter or subject of action, appeareth by the example of Merope. She lay in wait for her son, and killed him, thinking that he had

been her enemy, when he was her son. Heer the error was in the circumstance, Whereabout. And this example is said to be in Euripides, in the tragedy of Crespontes, which is not extant. Sometimes we know not: and that is called the circumstance, Wherewith; as if a man think he runneth with a blunt spear, and the same shall be armed with a sharp head. Or a man thinking that he doth throw a pumice, when he hath thrown a stone, whereby somebody is hit, or wounded, or slain. Otherwise we are ignorant of the end. A man for health, or for recovery from sickness, letteth blood, giveth a medicine, or lanceth the flesh, and there followeth a contrary effect; for either the party dieth, or he is hurt: the ignorance of the end doth excuse him.

Also the manner of the action: as when a man doth a thing and would not, it holds him excused. They which contend one with another, with all the strength of their hands or fingers, (which is a kind of wrestling) and one mindeth to teach the other, and thinking to strike but lightly, striketh grievously: he is excused. Since that there is an ignorance in those things, that which is done shall be counted against his will, especially, if those circumstances, which are the more principal, be hidden from us. And these circumstances be, Wherefore, Whereabout, or Wherein. But Aristotle in his example seemeth to have omitted the circumstance of place, and time, [that is, Where and When.] Which is no marvel, since they might seem to be known well enough, as those which needed no examples. Neither is it required, that when many things of one sort be expounded, examples should be brought of all things. For it sufficeth, that some things be showed so to be: for the examples, which make plain some of those things, do serve also for the declaring of other things. But least there should be found a lack of them, we say it may be, that some man knoweth not that the place wherein

he committeth any evil is holy: and otherwhile also the circumstance of the time; namely of a festival day, or of a holy day, or of a birth day, may be unknown.

54. If that which is done against the will, ought to be ascribed to the actions which are done unwittingly, while we be ignorant of these particular circumstances, there is required moreover, that the error being known and discovered, the action should be grievous, and we should be sorry for that which happened to us unawares. For if this grief should not ensue upon it, the action may be called, not voluntary, yet shall it not be against the will.

But here it is worth the seeing, how ignorance can be called the cause of a thing done against the will. This is therefore, because it depriveth us of knowledge, which if it had been present, that which is now done, had not been committed; or if it had been committed, it had made the action voluntary. Wherefore, either it depriveth us of the knowledge, whereon voluntary doth depend, or else it depriveth us of that knowledge; which, if it had been present, the action had not followed. And it may be, that he which doth unwittingly, hath ignorance joined together with the act which he doth; and yet he is not unwilling to that which is done, but rather desireth it: whereupon there followeth no sorrow afterward, when the thing is known.

And this kind of ignorance doth not excuse him, nor yet maketh him to have done it against his will. As when a man, thinking to kill a heart, killeth his enemy, whom he before wished to have been slain; and now being slain, rejoiceth, notwithstanding he then knew not what he did. There is moreover, a certain ignorance, which some of set purpose would have: for they desire and choose, that they may be ignorant, least by knowledge they should be withdrawn from sinning, or from pleasures. And this kind of ignorance is greatly to be accused, much less excused. There is another ignorance, which

is so done, as a man knowing what is right and meet, when he cometh to the action, neglecteth that cogitation of honesty and right; and rather considereth his profit and pleasure. And this cometh to pass, either of a vehement perturbation of the mind, or else of some ill habit. Neither also doth this ignorance excuse, for he that so is ignorant for lack of consideration, he doth not that which he might and ought to have done.

Now and then, ignorance cometh hereof, that a man will neglect to learn, or else for that he shunneth labor, or because he useth no study and diligence.

For every man ought to know the general laws. Since therefore even this man doth not that which he can and ought, he is not to be excused.

Howbeit, in these actions there is something that is Not voluntary, for this ignorance preventeth actions, or the motion of the will, which motion if it were present, knowledge would not follow. The last ignorance is that, whereof we treat: this excuseth, it obtaineth pardon and mercy; because the circumstances are not known, and for that after the action, sorrow and grief do follow.

Of that which is Voluntary.

55. As touching Voluntary, the definition standeth of two parts. First (saith Aristotle) the beginning thereof must be inward. Secondly, the circumstances must be known: for if voluntary be contrary to that, which is against the will; and that which is against the will, consist of two parts: then is it necessary, that the contraries to them must be placed in the definition of voluntary. Hereupon we see the excellent method of Aristotle: for except he had before hand showed the nature of violence and ignorance, he could not so easily have defined what voluntary was. Moreover, Aristotle was the rather moved to write of these things, because that those things, which are done of angry men, or men that are moved with desire, are comprehended

in the definition of voluntary. For both the original of the doing is in the man himself, which is the doer, and they do understand and very well know the particulars: for they use deliberations, and sharp judgment, either to revenge or to compass that which they desire: which would not be done if they were ignorant of the circumstances. Whereupon it is concluded, that those things are voluntary; and that those do err, which have thought such things to be done against the will. And what moved them to think, that those things are against the will, it may easily be perceived. They saw that it was altogether difficult, to resist those two affections; namely, anger and desire, as those which are more violent than the residue; and therefore they thought that men are constrained by them. Wherefore Heraclitus said, χαλεπόν θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, that is, It is hard wrestling against anger. And Plato in his second book De republica, saith; ἄμαχόν τε καί ἀνίκητον θυμός, that is;

Anger is neither to be striven with, nor to be subdued. But if there can be no striving against the same, nor that it can be conquered, it seemeth to compel, and to make that the actions be done against the will. For which cause the same Plato in his ninth book De legibus saith, that An angry man, ὅμοιος τῷ ἀνουσίῳ, that is to say, Is like to one that doth against his will.

He saith not that he doth altogether against his will, but like unto him. And Cato the Censor said, that he which is angry, differeth from a mad man only in time. Yea and other men, as Euenus, have been bold to say, that Wrath is much worse than madness. But Plato in his treatise of Cratylus, writing of desire, compared the same to a very strong bond. Wherefore we also doubt not, but that these two affections are vehement, and of great force; but yet that they are not so strong, as they cannot be bridled by reason. Which we see come to pass in temperate men, and those which be endued with meekness, and other virtues. But yet would I not deny, that those actions are

more voluntary, which be done without the enforcement of such affects: which nevertheless is no cause, that these should be excluded from the number of them.

56. Aristotle saith, that none of the rest of the living creatures do anything against their wills, no not children. The proposition is to be confirmed;

Those things that are done by enforcement or by desire, be voluntary. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reasons added hereunto, whereof the first is this; If they were actions against the will, neither brute beasts nor children should do anything of their own accord;

But those do many things of their own accord; Therefore those things are done against the will. The argument is conditional of the consequent, taken to overthrow the antecedent. The conclusion is proved; Because brute beasts and children, since they be without reason, whatsoever they do, they do it through those affects. But how absurd the consequent is, hereby it appeareth; insomuch as we see, that these living creatures and children do certain things against their wills. As when they be overcome and shut up in any place: but on the other side, when they be loosed and set at liberty, they do many things willingly and of their own accord. They choose themselves meat, when they will they enter into chambers and dens, and from thence, when it seemeth good, they go forth. They defend their young ones, they fly to their nests; and infinite such other things they do willingly and of their own accord. They rejoice in liberty, and on the other side, when they be constrained to anything, it grieveth them, and they are not a little disquieted.

Alexanders horse Bucephalus admitted no man to sit upon him but Alexander, which without doubt he did not by constraint. The elephants do love their masters, they obey them, yea they kneel down when they be commanded. But what should we speak of elephants? Dogs in a house do

fawn upon their masters, but do bark at strangers; they hunt cheerfully, they follow those which feed them: and all these things certainly they do of their own accord. Many things belonging to this matter might be rehearsed of birds, fishes, and other brute creatures, which are so wonderful things, and are done of them with so great an inclination; that sometimes many have thought, that in brute beasts there is a will, whereby they choose those things which like them most, refusing other things, which do displease them. Yea and some men have ascribed some reason unto them, because they see that those things which they do, they do them with great industry.

Which we would not grant, albeit as we have said, we must affirm, that they do those things of their own accord. But and if thou wilt say, that they be called wild beasts, because they be led after a certain violent sort, we will not deny it; and yet will we affirm, that they are not without an inward appetite, whereby they are moved: wherefore the actions which spring from them, must be said to be of their own accord. And it is no marvel, if Aristotle in this matter joined children together with brute beasts: for those also, by reason of the infirmity of age, have not the use of reason, but are only moved with the affects, especially with anger and desire. And yet who will deny, that they do those things willingly? They run abroad, they play, they skip, they make sport, and they fawn on their parents. But if they did not things of their own accord, they should have great injury done them, when they be beaten of their school-masters. For what other thing do they seek, but that they should abstain from those things, from which they know they are able to refrain? And as concerning the appetite, we must understand that the same is of two sorts: for one followeth the sense, and another the reason. Brute beasts and children are moved with that appetite, which followeth the sense; howbeit such appetite is not all one in both of

them. Hereupon ariseth the difference; because brute beasts are altogether destitute of reason, and therefore their desire is never obedient unto reason: but children have reason, yet not in act, although in power. Therefore, when through age, reason breaketh out into act, their desire may be obedient unto reason. We must also consider, that this Greek word τό ἑκούσιον is more large than Voluntary: for it is extended both unto brute beasts, and to children, unto whom Voluntary doth not properly appertain, seeing (if we shall speak properly) they have no will.

57. Moreover, whereas some which were against Aristotle, affirm that those things which are done by anger or lust, are done against the will; then it would follow, that either all such things should be done against the will; or else that good things are with the will, and evil things against the will.

Howbeit, neither of these things may be granted. But this did Aristotle overthrow, and saith; Is it not a ridiculous thing to affirm, that these things are done with the will, and those by constraint and against the will; seeing that shameful acts, which are done through anger or lust, have no less the self-same beginning that honest acts have, which proceed of the self-same affects? No doubt but those things, which have all one beginning, must be accounted of the self-same order. And further he saith, as touching anger, that this, by the law of honesty and justice is required at our hands, that we should be angry against some; namely, against vices, and against wicked men, whom unless that private men should rebuke, and magistrates should punish, they were to be blamed. Also there be many things, which if a man do not desire, and by great endeavor procure to himself, it is a great offense; as for example: health and doctrine. Shall we therefore say, that the law of honesty and justice doth require of us, things to be done against our will and by constraint, and such things as we are not able to perform; or from the

which we are not able to abstain? This would be absurd as touching civil laws. And again, whatsoever things are done against the will, they bring grief and sorrow with them. But those things that are done through anger and lust are delightful, so far is it off, that they bring trouble and heaviness with them. As concerning lust, there is no doubt thereof. But as for anger, it may be doubted, because Aristotle in his Rhetoric's entreating of those things which bring pleasure, in describing the affection of wrath, bringeth in the verse of Homer, which saith, that Anger unto Achilles was even as honey that melted under his tongue. Neither indeed is anger any other thing than a desire of revenge. Moreover (saith Aristotle) what difference is there between those things to be done against the will, which are according unto reason, or which be wickedly done according to wrath, since either of them are things that may be avoided? This reason seemeth to stand on the nature of sin: for seeing that sin consisteth in those things, which ought or can be avoided; and that this estate is found as well in those things, which are done amiss by reason, as in those, which are naughtily done of anger with a desire; they ought to be both called voluntary. Why then are these things, rather than those other, accounted of the adversaries to be done against the will?

58. And as concerning human affections, Aristotle doth thus argue; Because the unreasonable affections, which we have, be human, and those be human affections, which do arise of anger or desire, therefore are they also voluntary, and are done without constraint. For whatsoever is human, is voluntary. But there is no man will say, that desires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, even as reason is in the self-same men.

Wherefore, if actions, which flow from reason be human, because reason is a part of our mind; so likewise shall those be human, which proceed from

anger or desire. For the powers of anger, and of desire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be objected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or desire, proceed from the part unreasonable. True it is (saith

Aristotle) but yet these be powers of a human mind, and therefore shall the acts proceeding from thence be human. And these powers, although by essence they have no reason, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the same: which thing cometh not to pass in brute beasts. Again, these affections and actions are the first beginnings done with the will; for they may be restrained by the will. And it standeth not with them, as it doth with the power that nourisheth and increaseth, which worketh even whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is absurd to affirm, that these things are done against the will, or by constraint.

59. Now let us see, how these things, which we have here treated of, do agree with the holy scriptures. Aristotle said, that he would treat of Voluntary, and Not voluntary; because praises and dispraises, rewards, punishments, and mercy, do accompany those things which be voluntary.

Even so, in the 111th Psalm, the faithful are praised, because they be a willing people. Also Eunuchs are commended, not those Eunuchs which are so become through violence, or be so born; but they which shall willingly chasten themselves for the kingdom of heaven sake. A hewer of wood, which by chance killeth his fellow, is forgiven; because that action was not voluntary. The devil is constrained to speak a truth, is compelled to depart from them which were possessed; but yet he deserveth no praise or rewards at all. Balaam is of the angel compelled by the sword, that he should not curse the people of God; he hath no praise at all, because he did it not willingly. The definition of violent, as it hath an outward beginning, so doth it not give any help, as a thing that worketh or that suffereth. And it

declareth, that original sin is no violent thing, because it is an inward corruption in us: and we further it by that naughtiness, which daily we add thereunto. But and if any man will say, that we are without knowledge and understanding, when the same is gotten; and that it cometh by occasion of the first naughty motions of our mind wherein is given no choice or deliberation: we answer, that those things which Aristotle saith, must be understood as touching moral and actual doings: for these sins did not he know. Howbeit, this sufficeth us, that such things cannot be called violent, seeing they have their beginning from within. Also we grant, that there be mingled actions; and we affirm that they ought to be reckoned among those which be voluntary: and therefore the holy scriptures do exhort us unto them, persuading us, that we must endure anything, rather than to run into sin. Paul saith; We must never do evil, that good may come of it. We must rather obey God than men. And we are called To take our cross and to follow the Lord. And he is said, to have found his soul, which hath lost the same. Neither hath the denial of a man's own self any other respect. These actions be of the mingled sort, because no man would choose these things, except by chance: but these things we will and we do, partly to avoid sins, and partly to be joined unto the Lord.

Howbeit thou wilt say, that these things have an outward beginning; wherefor they be rather violent. For unless the Lord did these things in us, none of us would do them. We grant, that the beginning, whereby our wills are changed, is from without: but our wills being changed by the spirit of God, are inward unto us, and at their commandment we are moved unto these actions, and therefore they ought to be called voluntary, for they are not done of God without us. Yea and we be praised and dispraised for these mingled actions: for Christ saith, that He will deny before his father, those

which shall deny him before men. Neither (saith he) will I be ashamed of him, which is not ashamed of me before men. And they in very deed are commended, which for Christ his sake do suffer grievous vexations;

Blessed (saith he) are they, which suffer persecution, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. In such things as these (saith Aristotle) is pardon given.

As when David, that he might not be slain, feigneth himself before king Achish, to be mad. But there be certain things, which we should never be led to commit. And what be those? They be sins. And it is an old saying;

Usque ad aras; that is to wit, Saving a man's conscience and religion. Job is an example unto us, who in adversities could never be driven, either by the reproachful speaking, or bragging of his wife, to blaspheme God. And they which are driven unto these things, so far is it off, that they find mercy, as they rather fall from the hope thereof: as in the epistle to the Hebrews, it is said of them which departed from the known truth. So did it happen to Spiera the Italian, and to those which slew themselves, when they had abjured the Gospel. Aristotle propoundeth two things very hard. The one is, what a man should suffer for anything. The answer is easy; We must suffer anything, rather than we should depart from Christ and his holy commandments. What availeth it a man if he gain all the world, and suffer loss of his own soul? Fear ye not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, (saith the Lord.) Of the other difficulty we have experience in our own selves: and we often see followers which only believe for a time.

Again, The spirit is ready, but the flesh is weak. But on the other side, we comfort ourselves, because All things are possible to him that believeth.

And Paul said, that He was able to do all things through Christ, which strengthened him. Justly moreover did Aristotle reprove them, which thought that honest and just things are voluntary; but affirmed, that

dishonest things are not voluntary: for we must not think so in any wise.

Paul said; I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.

Yea, and if we have anything that is good, that must be altogether transferred unto God. For unto the Philippians we read, that It is God which worketh in us both to will, and to perform.

60. Now let us see what is to be said touching ignorance. There is a certain ignorance, after which repentance doth forthwith follow, upon the perceiving of the error; and sometime no repentance at all doth follow. As touching the latter member, the Lord saith; Forgive them, for they know not what they do. The same thing did Stephan pray. Among those nevertheless, for whom prayer was made, some did otherwhile repent, and some did never repent. Also Jonathan tasted honey, being ignorant what his father decreed; and knowing his father's decree, he sorrowed not, but rather was angry with him. But Paul, when he perceived his error, sorowed. In like manner sorowed they, of whom Peter said in the Acts; I know that they did it of ignorance. And that they sorowed, those words which they speak, do declare; Men and brethren, what behooveth us to do? The sorrow which followeth, doth not always show that there happened no sin; for both they, which crucified the Lord, sinned; and also Paul sinned: for these men were ignorant of that which they ought to have known. But if there had happened to have come a certain ignorance of the circumstance, which could not have been known; as in Noah, when he was drunken, who had not seen the wine before, neither knew the strength and property thereof. And as it happened unto Jacob, when he lay with Lea in the place of Rachel: for both of them were ignorant what to do, and were excused. But he that knoweth not the general and principal points of the laws, is not excused. Therefore is it said of Paul, in the first epistle to the Corinthians; He that is ignorant, let him be

ignorant. And this ignorance, which doth not excuse, is sometime laid upon men by God as a punishment, while he punisheth sins with sins. Unto the Thessalonians, the second epistle it is written; Because they have not received the love of the truth, that they might be saved, therefore will God send upon them strong delusion, that they should believe lies. And in Ezekiel; If the prophet be deceived, I have deceived him. Also Ahab was seduced by the evil spirit, God being willing thereunto. Thus then we see what ignorance doth excuse, and what ignorance doth not excuse. Aristotle addeth, that Those things, which be done by drunkenness and anger, are voluntary; the which also we do affirm: For as touching those things we have received a law; Be angry, but sin not. Let not the sun go down upon your wrath. And we forbid to say unto any man; Thou fool. And as touching drunkenness, it is said of the Lord, Beware that your bodies be not oppressed with surfeiting and drunkenness. Also Paul; Be ye not drunken with wine, wherein is excess. These things therefore, which are done by anger and drunkenness, do not excuse; seeing these things might either not be admitted or be bridled. But that all the wicked and ungodly sort are ignorant, though they be not excused, the scriptures do everywhere plainly declare; The foolish man hath said in his heart, that there is no God. In the seventh chapter of the Proverbs, as touching them which are lead with lust, and with pleasures; He is led as an ox unto the slaughter, and like as it were a fool, which in fetters is led to his punishment. In the epistle to the Romans; They which called themselves wise, became fools, and the foolish heart of them was blinded. Unto the Ephesians; Ye shall not walk as other gentiles walk, in vanity of their mind, being strangers from the life of God, thorough the ignorance that is in them, and the darkness of their heart. Yea and as Isaiah saith, and all the Evangelists testify; They seeing shall not see,

and hearing shall not hear; seeing they be in the darkness, they know not whither they may go.

But among the circumstances, which being unknown do excuse, Aristotle doth specially reckon up the end, and Whereabout. And this in very deed is true. David sent away Absalom to go into Hebron, but to what end, or to what purpose he did it, he could not know: he is excused. Also Abimelech had another man's wife, but he knew not what she was, with whom he was conversant: therefore might he say unto God, that he did it in the simplicity of his heart, and that it was unknown unto him. Also, that Simon Magus was baptized, the church is excused; because it knew not of his ill and fraudulent counsel. Howbeit, in those ignorance's which do excuse us, if there follow no sorrow, we are guilty: we allow not that which is done. He which shot an arrow, and by thence slew king Ahab, if he had been witting of the deed, he would not have sorrowed, neither would it have been perceived, that that which was done, was done against his will. Again,

David sorrowed for the death which followed of Absalom; also of the death of Abner and Amazias: whereupon it appeareth, that such things happened unto him against his will and mind. Voluntariness comprehendeth two things; both, that the beginning be from within, and that there be not an ignorance of that which is done. Original sin hath his beginning from within, and we know, that such a corruption is against God and righteousness, although that of our own choice we call not for the same: and therefore it is voluntary. Yet is it in young children, where there is a want of knowledge. But this maketh no matter, because we mean here, of actual sins. Neither can Aristotle, or moral faculty attain unto that kind of sin. That those moreover be voluntary sins, which are done through lust and wrath, it hath been showed by diverse reasons. The which thing we do admit: for we

have received laws concerning either of both vices; Thou shalt not lust.

Again, we are commanded, that we should not be angry with our brother without a cause. Aristotle in his arguments affirmed, that brute beasts do things of their own accord Isaiah likewise said; The ox hath known his owner, and the asse his master's crib. And Jeremiah said, that The stork knoweth his appointed time: chapter eight. And the same opinion are we of touching children: for in the time of Elisha, they were punished by bears.

Also Isaac, while he was oppressed by Ishmael, was commanded to be cast forth by Sara. And further, Aristotle affirmeth, that it is required and otherwhile exacted of us, that we should be angry. The zeal of thy house hath even eaten me. And Phinehas is commended by God, because he was revenged upon the impure fornicators. And where it is said, that those things, which be done against the will, have sorrow joined with them, Paul to the Romans testifieth the same; Unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? But whereas Aristotle saith, that those things, which are committed through wrath and lust, and also those things, which are done by the reason and will, are to be avoided: this we correct, on this wise; That avoided indeed they may be, if God's grace be applied thereunto: for without the same, who can beware of the motions of anger and lust? No doubt but we may temper ourselves from outward actions, but these motions of the heart are not in our power. Also we agree that they be men's actions, which proceed from lust and wrath: for even of them also we shall yield an account.

Of man's Election, or making of choice.

61. Aristotle saith; that making of choice is most proper to virtue. For in the definition, which he made of virtue, first was placed the general kind, namely the habit; then he added the difference, to wit, mediocrity; after that

were joined together the two properties; namely, that through virtue we do things of our own accord; and then, that we do them by making of choice.

Howbeit, of these two properties, making of choice is the more proper: neither only, if it be compared with that, which is of our own accord, but also if it be compared with the other properties of virtue, which no doubt are many. For this cause are the actions proceeding from virtue commended, because they come from the making of choice. Manners (saith

Aristotle) are more judged by making of choice, than by actions. True indeed it is, that manners are known by actions, as a tree is by the fruit: but yet that judgment is deceivable; for hypocrites do very oftentimes make a counterfeit show, and otherwhile we see things done of a far other purpose, than it is meet they should be. The Manichees abstained from wives; also from the eating of flesh: not because they were given to chastity or sobriety; but because of their erroneous and blasphemous opinions. Tyrants do sometimes deal courteously with their subjects, but to beguile them. And wicked men do sometimes abstain from wickedness, but that is for fear of punishments, not for the love of justice. Evil men forbear to sin for the fear of punishment. Wherefore in judgments, when the fact is apparent, there is oftentimes inquiry made of the will, mind, and purpose of him that doth it.

Neither at any time is the making of choice subject to fortune, as is action.

Yea rather, they, which are found in any crime, are oftentimes accustomed to say, that they meant to have done otherwise, and that they purposed not in their mind, that such things should happen. And we easily grant, that the actions are more apparent, since they are laid open to every man's eyes; but yet they make not the judgment either surer, or more certain. Men do judge of manners, by that which followeth, namely by the work: but the judgment of choosing proceedeth from the cause, and (as they use to speak) from that

which went before. And sometimes it happeneth, that a man doth no action; so as it cannot be judged by his actions, whether he be good or evil: but immediately, so soon as he showeth what choice he hath made, although he do no action, yet men give a judgment of him, either as touching his naughtiness, or his goodness. But how can it be said, that young children, and also brute beasts want the making of choice, when as they choose one meat before another; play before discipline; and shun some things more than other things? We must answer, that making of choice is of two sorts.

One is common, whereby one thing is either preferred before another, or else is more eschewed than another: and this kind of choice neither brute beasts nor children do want. The other is the very proper choice, which hath counsel going before, and is directed by the judgment of reason. And this kind of making choice can neither brute beasts nor children have: for when they pursue one thing before another, or avoid one thing rather than another, they are not led by reason; but by sense. Also those things, which we do in hast, and upon the sudden, are without making of choice, not that we want reason while we commit those things, but because we admit no space of time to deliberate on them. Also the counsel, and the judgment, and deliberation of reason is hindered by the vehemency of the perturbation.

Wherefore there be reckoned up three things, that want the making of choice. First, brute beasts, because they are not capable of reason. Secondly, young children; which although they be endued with reason, yet can they not use the same, because of their tender age: in the third place are counted sudden and hasty motions of the mind: wherein, although men have reason enough and also years, yet do they want time of deliberation. Wherefore they, which do anything by the force of any affection, are wont to say, that they did it not of purpose, or advisedly. Since that making of choice doth

belong unto the mind, it is either of the power of knowing, or the power of appetite. All appetite is divided into three parts. Either it is of the more noble part of the mind, and is joined with reason, and is called the will; or else it is of the grosser part, and then it is divided into the desiring power, and into the angry power. Hereupon Aristotle said, that some thought choice to be the will, others thought it to be anger, others thought it to be desire: but if it belong unto the knowledge, then come they which affirm choice to be an opinion, who perhaps were the Stoics. But first Aristotle treateth of desire and anger, and reasoneth that their opinion is fond, because that then we should yield, that brute beasts have choice: for they are moved both with desire and anger, which he rejecteth, as an absurd and unworthy thing.

Wherefore it plainly appeareth, that Aristotle did utterly remove desire from choice, because we may not by any means say, that desire is choice: which cannot so be judged of, as touching willingness. Indeed willingness differeth from choice, but it cannot be sundered from the same; seeing every choice is according to the will. And the argument which he used is this; If desire were choice, whatsoever thing worketh by desire, should (no doubt) work by choice; But not everything that worketh by desire, doth work by choice. The overthrow of the consequent appeareth in this, because an incontinent man worketh by desire, but not by choice; for that he followeth it not. He determined to do well, but he stood not to his determination; therefore he dealt not according to the choice, which he had conceived in his mind. Choice is an appetite, which is a counselor; but the incontinent man, while he is carried away by desire, heareth no counsel.

And on the other side, the continent man giveth no ear to desire, but followeth his right choice. And this reason may be applied unto anger; for he also that doth anything by anger, doth it not by choice: and this we may

see in angry men. And herein it shall suffice to have said, that an incontinent man is not altogether without choice; but yet he followeth not that which he hath in his mind.

He is compared to a man that sleepeth, to him that is drunken, and to a city wherein good laws are not regarded. Here Aristotle reasoneth; Choice is contrary to desire; But desire is not contrary to desire; Ergo desire is not choice. This argument is in the second figure. The reason is this; Those things that agree in one third, they also agree in themselves: Even so those things that do not oppose themselves against one third, do not agree together at once themselves. But there ariseth a doubt: because desire seemeth to be against desire. Some man desireth fame, and to have his name renowned, and the same man is much desirous of money; one of these desires is repugnant to another. Augustus desired sovereignty, and yet was desirous to imitate Silla, in giving up of sovereignty. These things seem to be repugnant. Pamphilus longed to be with his lover Glycerie, and yet was desirous not to offend his father. These things declare, that desires be contrary. The answer is many ways to be made. Contraries must always be contrary: but these things are not always contrary, as appeareth in the Sophister, which at one time hath both these desires; namely, the desire of glory, and the desire of money. Moreover, it behooveth that contraries have respect to one and the self-same thing: but the one of these desires respecteth fame, the other money. Those things that respect one thing, after a quite contrary manner, are very contraries, and cannot be both at once together. As, to desire to have fame, and to desire not to have fame; to be noble, and not to be noble; to be maintained, and not to be maintained: these be contrary desires, and cannot be both at once together. Aristotle was not of the mind, that among desires there is no contrariety, but that contrary

desires cannot be together at once in one man. But evil desire is always an enemy to sound choice in one and the self-same man, and at one and the self-same time. Neither is every choice always an adversary to every desire: for the desire of theft is not against the choice, whereby a man determineth to become rich, though it be by unjust means. And the desire of slaughter is not against the choice, which a tyrant hath made. But a sound choice (as it hath been said) is evermore against an evil desire. But what manner of contrariety is this of desire and choice? No proper contrariety, but such as is of contrary winds, or of two enemies. For it behooveth that these contrarieties, which be proper contrarieties, be in one and the self-same subject, and that from thence they drive away one another; as white and black, cold and heat: which thing agreeth not with choice and ill desire, for they be placed in diverse parts of the mind. For choice is placed in the mind or reason, but desire in the grosser part of the soul.

Another argument is gathered from the objects, the which being contraries, do cause that the powers themselves are not the very same.

Desire is carried unto those things which be pleasant, and which be unpleasant; namely, to obtain the one sort, and to avoid the other. But choice hath not respect unto these things, but regardeth only that which is shameful and honest, profitable and hurtful. Howbeit, here there is a doubt; because the choice seemeth to be of things pleasant, and of things grievous.

Before young men there is set virtue and pleasure, and they are said to be set as it were in the point of two ways; that when they shall be come unto the years of man's state, they may bend either to the right hand, or to the left. Whereupon they are at their choice, to choose whether way they will.

Thus have Pythagoras scholars and the Poets described the matter. And to Paris there was a choice given; Pallas offered him learning and good arts;

Juno offered him civil honors, and a happy government of the commonwealth; finally, Venus offered him the grosser sort of pleasures: wherefore the choice was in Paris, and he rather chose that which was pleasant. Yea, and our savior Christ setteth before us a broad and a narrow way, a wide and a strait gate: so as it seemeth, that the choice is both of that which is grievous, and that which is pleasant. We answer: If by choice, thou understand the action of the mind, whereby one thing is preferred before another; we cannot deny, but that choice is both of that which is pleasant, and that which is grievous, seeing we prefer pleasantness before grief. But deliberation concerneth not properly pleasant and gross delights: for to those we are not born. Wherefore those which prefer such pleasures before severe honesty, or sometimes before a grievous sense, are not said to choose, but rather to be led and violently carried by the desire. Yet is it not to be denied, but that it may sometimes be, that the honest and profitable things, which we choose, may be pleasant: howbeit, that happeneth at all adventures, (or as the common sort speak) accidentally. Wherefore choice is exercised about that which is good, and about that which is evil: for this by our choice we seek, even to obtain good things, and to avoid evil. But if a man demand, whether there can be a choosing of evil? We will answer, that this cannot be, because we never make choice of that which is evil: for it behooveth, that that which is chosen, either be good, or at the least wise have in itself a show and resemblance of goodness. But thou wilt say; Are not the less evils oftentimes chosen before the greater? I grant they are: but Aristotle in his Rhetoric's saith, that the less evil in that case, hath a consideration of good. Finally, Aristotle said, that anger pertaineth much less to choice; because those things seem not to be done deliberately, which be done in anger.

Neither is the choice, saith Aristotle, our will, although it have an affinity thereunto. In which words he propoundeth two things; the one, that will hath an affinity with choice: for both of them are placed in the chiefest part of the mind. And moreover, the common people say, that they will those things which they choose. And yet nevertheless, how near so ever they be, they differ one from another: for the will is more at liberty, and stretcheth further than choice and election doth. For will extendeth unto many things, whereunto the choice doth not attain: as unto the end, unto things impossible, and to those things which by us cannot be performed. By common sense it is manifest, that choice pertaineth not to things impossible: for he should be counted a mad man, that would choose such things, as can by no means be compassed. That the will extendeth to such things, it appeareth, because that thou mayest find many men, which would not die: which in nature is impossible. Also there be, which would be monarchs of all the world, and bear rule over all men: which also is a thing impossible. Moreover, the will is the end, but the choice is rather of those things which belong unto the end, and therefore they differ. Because the end, especially the chiefest end is of that nature, that forthwith, so soon as it is set before us, it cannot be refused. Therefore since it is not in our power to slip from the same, it belongeth not to the choice: for that concerneth those things which are in our power. But yet we must understand, that there is a choice of such ends as consist between two extremes: for many times is set before a young man the choice of good learning, or of chivalry, or of ecclesiastical function, or of the administration of the common-wealth.

First, they choose to themselves one of these things which liketh them best; then also they choose the means, whereby they may excel them. But we answer, that choice in those ends hath no place, as they be ends, but as they

be certain means unto felicity. For an end, so far forth as it is an end, is (as Aristotle saith) no choice.

Finally, to prove that choice is not opinion, which was set down in the fourth place, the reason is drawn from the objects. Opinion is of all things;

But choice is not of all things; Therefore choice is not opinion. The argument is in the second figure, taken from the nature of relatives: for the power is referred unto his object. Now let us see what is opinion; It is an assent of the mind, whereby we take upon us to maintain the one part of a thing that is gainsaid: yet we avow it not without all fear, but somewhat doubting, least perhaps the other part of the contradiction should be found true. And herein opinion differeth from knowledge: for knowledge is a most sure and immovable assent. Therefore let no man go about to persuade one that hath knowledge, or is a professor of the Mathematical sciences, that a thing is otherwise than he knoweth it to be: for it is impossible to persuade him thereunto. But chiefly do Orators endeavor to root opinions out of the minds of men, when they see that judges, or hearers do otherwise judge, than they themselves would have them. Aristotle proveth, that opinion is of all manner of things; because men hold opinion even of things eternal. For men have opinion of many things concerning God, concerning angels, concerning heaven, and such like things, which of the philosophers are holden for eternal. Also men have an opinion of those things, which cannot be; to wit, that there be Chimeras, Centaurs, and such like monsters: and that the diameter is equal to the side lines of the quadrangle, which cannot possibly be. Also things necessary be otherwhile subject unto opinion: for it may be, that what one hath perceived by knowledge, another believeth by opinion. But when it is said, that opinion is as touching all things, this must not be understood as concerning simple motions, or single words; but as

touching propositions, which consist of many motions or words, and do show, that either a thing is, or is not. Neither yet is there opinion of all these things: for there be certain things, which even of themselves are known either to the sense, or to the mind. As, that fire is hot, we certainly know by experiment of the sense, we have not an opinion thereof; and that the whole is greater than the part thereof; or that we pronounce of everything, either that it is, or is not (which things be called principles) we are not led by opinion, since of themselves they are known to our understanding. Opinion therefore is of all things; that is to wit, of all propositions, which of themselves are not known unto us. Also opinion is distinguished from divine faith: for faith signifieth a firm assent given unto the word of God, by the persuasion of the holy Ghost; so that it neither staggereth nor wavereth as doth opinion. The Minor proposition of the argument aforesaid is thus proved; Because choice is only of those things, which may be done of us, wherefore it is not of all things, as opinion is.

Aristotle hath another argument drawn from the parts. These two whole things, choice and opinion, have not the same parts, whereinto they might be divided; Ergo they are not all one. For the parts of choice are evil and good; but the parts of opinion are false and true opinion. And yet this argument may seem to be weak; for we commonly say, that there be many evil opinions; as if a man think that our souls are mortal, or that God doth not by his providence care for men's actions. Whosoever think these things, are said to have ill opinions, First we answer hereunto, that ill is here understood as it belongeth to manners: and therefore Aristotle saith, that opinion is neither evil nor good, because it is not reckoned among manners.

But the common sort do call opinions, evil; because that which is false, is evil; even as that which is true, is good. For those things, which are

commonly called transcendent, are so joined one with another, that true, is good; and false, is evil. Also these opinions may sometimes be called good or evil in a moral sense; because thorough those false or true opinions, men are stirred up either to good or unto evil manners. The next argument is taken from the effects, to prove that it cannot be particularly said, that any kind of opinion is all one with choice. Here we have to deal with the particular part, because it hath been already declared in the whole, that opinion and choice do differ. Wherefore, least any man might say; They differ generally, and yet it may be, that some opinion is a particular choice;

Aristotle proveth, that this cannot be: because (saith he) this is the effect of choice, that through a just cause we shall become men denominated of that quality; to wit, just men. But this happeneth not in opinion; and therefore they are by no means all one. Those things, which be here spoken, are most evident in an incontinent man: for he, because he maketh an ill choice, is said to be an evil man, whereas in other matters he may hold an opinion right enough. For as touching virtues, he judgeth rightly; and thinketh, that it is good to temper himself from unchastity and drunkenness, and yet doth not choose this: he is not called a good man. But yet none can deny, but that even by conceiving an opinion, we are become endued with some certain kind of quality, since opinion itself is a quality, and even of opinions do arise some affects of the mind. But Aristotle is to be understood as touching that quality, whereby we conceive an opinion, and do make our choice: for in choosing of chaste things, we become chaste; by choosing of strong things, we become strong; by choosing of just things, we become just. But it is not likewise true in general, as touching opinion: for in conceiving an opinion of eternal things, we are not made eternal; nor yet in conceiving an opinion of anything touching justice, are we made just. Howbeit this is true,

that by true opinions we become more apt unto virtues; and through false opinions, more prone unto vices. But opinion itself doth straightway of itself, so soon as it is present, communicate unto us such forms or denominations; but yet it behooveth that there be a choice had therein.

Moreover, choice is occupied in pursuing or flying, but so is not opinion: for when anything is offered unto us, we begin to conceive an opinion what it is, what commodity may be gotten thereby, and how it must be used. But we do not so much conceive in our opinion, whether the thing should be shunned or followed: for that rather appertaineth to choice. Yea rather, between these things there seemeth, that there should be a certain order set: for first (as I said) we conceive in opinion what it is, what profit it bringeth, and how it will serve our turn. Which things being conceived in opinion, then we proceed either to pursue, or to eschew the matter.

↑ Back to top