CHAP. XIII. The ninth Precept; Thou shalt not bear false witness. And first of Contumely.As touching this place, I judge

CHAP. XIII. The ninth Precept; Thou shalt not bear false witness. And first of Contumely.As touching this place, I judge

CHAP. XIII. The ninth Precept; Thou shalt not bear false witness. And first of Contumely.

A s touching this place, I judge that there be four things to be considered of; first, what is Contumely; secondly, from whence it springeth; thirdly, whether it be sin; lastly, whether it be tolerable. These principal points being examined, we will apply the matter unto David; to consider, whether he did rightly, in bearing therewith in Semei. What it is, we shall by this means know. First, we will note the etymology of the word; after that, we will set forth the definition. Contumely (if we give credit unto

Ulpianus the lawyer, in the Digests, in the title De iniurijs, law the first) is so called, of Contemnendo, Contemning: and in very deed it hath his beginning of contempt. Those, whom we reproach, we despise. Touching the definition, we gather out of the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric's, that this evil hath, for his general word, ὀλιγωρία, that is, Contempt. It is defined what it is; to wit, A certain action about the opinion; and concerneth that thing, which appeareth unto us to be of no value. We in our mind and conceit contemn those things, which seem to be of no value. Of this contempt he maketh three kinds. The first is, καταφρόνησις, that is,

Despising. The second is, ἐπηρεασμός, that is, A certain kind of disprofiting; as if we be so affected against others, that we take pleasure in the hindering of their commodities. There be some lofty minds, which in comparison of themselves, think men unworthy of any good thing. The third is, ὕβρις, that is, Contumely, whereof we now entreat.

The same consisteth in sayings and doings, when we use the bitterer sort of words and deeds, to the defacing of any man's honor, and do take pleasure therein. Wherefore Cicero, in his Oration for Marcus Coelius, said: that Shrewd speeches tend to no other end, but to contumely; which if it be boasted of, after any insolent manner, is named a reproach; but being done merrily, it is called jesting. To perceive it the better, thou must understand, that between reproaching and honoring there is a contrariety. They are under one kind, and yet, as contraries, are furthest off one from another.

They appertain to the signification of honor. If we honor any man, we declare that we think well of him; if we reproach him, we show by some sign, words, or deeds, that we think evil of him. And therefore it behooveth, that if a man either use contumely, or have it used unto him, this manner of signification is always therein. For if we should do anything against the estimation of any man, and yet not signify the ill opinion we have of him, it would not be properly called contumely.

I will show it by examples. A man breaking open another man's door, to steal, to commit adultery, or to kill some man, that breaking in of the gate is heinous; but being not purposely done, to dishonest him, it is injury: if he break it open, to reproach him, he dealeth contumeliously against him.

Absalom abused the wives of his father. If he had done it of lust, it had been incest only, and not contumely: but seeing he did these things without having delight in their love and beauty, only through the hatred he bare to

his father, meaning to dishonor him, it is now called contumely. When in these contumelies, taunts are used against any man; those sometimes are sins, and sometimes no sins. No sins, as if one upbraid another, that he hath the pox, that he is lame or blind: sin, as when Semei calleth David, A man of blood.

2. There is used another distinction. These mischiefs are sometimes true, and sometimes false. In David they were false; he did not covet the kingdom ambitiously, he did not commit wicked murders. Those sins are sometimes manifest, and sometimes hidden. Hereof cometh the grievousness of contumelies. Sometimes they be weighed according to the state of the person: as if he, to whom the contumely is done, be no private, but a public person; as a magistrate, or a preacher. And there is always required therein, an intent and purpose of discrediting the fame and estimation of another man. Which I speak; because, if taunts be not used to this end, but to the intent men may be amended, they be not properly contumelies. Wherefore, if any governors of a school, or ministers of the church, use sharp words to revoke men from their sins; they cannot be called contumelious. Sometimes it is lawful to handle men so for discipline sake. This is gathered by an argument from the greater; If it be lawful to use stripes, it is also lawful to use sharp speeches. So Paul called the Galatians,

Fools. And Christ; O ye fools, and slow to believe. There was a respect unto amendment, and it was no contumely.

Also the prophets do so deal, sometimes they speak very bitterly against Israel, calling her harlot and Sodom; not to the intent they would defame the people of God, but to revoke them from idolatry and wickedness. Paul also, in the first chapter unto Titus, seemeth to inveigh sharply against the Cretans, when he bringeth a verse of Epimenides; The Cretans are always

liars, evil beasts, and slow bellies. It might seem to be hardly done, to note the whole nation of the Cretans with so great an infamy. Howbeit, the apostles speech was not to this end; but he gave admonition unto Titus, whereby he might understand, how earnestly he ought to urge that people.

Nevertheless, pastors and schoolmasters must take heed, that they use not contumelies without judgment: for if they often use the sharper speeches, they which be reprehended, begin to hate them, whom they ought to love; and by this means, admonitions do but smally prevail. Or else another thing followeth; to wit, that they are not moved therewith, but are hardened, if they often hear bitter words. Wherefore Augustine, upon the sermon of the Lord in the mount, saith; that This must be done seldom, and with judgment. Like unto this is that, which is wont to be done with biting speeches, wherein is more bitterness than favor. They, which use them, be of the number of those, which had rather forgo their friend, than a fine saying. There must be heed taken, that men be not hurt rashly. Thus much of the nature, definition, property, and use of contumely.

3. Now in the second place let us speak a few words of the causes: they proceed for the most part of anger, and are a certain kind of revenge, which is ever at hand. For so men easily revenge themselves; especially they of the common sort, and also women: and generally those, which are not able to make their part good with strength and weapons, do use contumelies. In a certain anger, Semei cursed David; he would revenge the injuries, which he supposed that he had brought upon the family of Saul. They also proceed of a certain anger. Some there be, which in comparison of themselves, make no reckoning of other men, and therefore they be ready bent to contumelies.

Therefore rightly said Solomon; Where pride is, there is reproach. The blasphemous speeches, which Rabsaches cast out against God, sprung from

no other fountain. Also they do grow of a certain foolishness. So Nabal the Carmelite cursed David. Solomon saith; It is a man's honor to keep himself from strife, but a fool meddleth with quarrels. Thirdly, we are to consider, whether it be sin. Herein there must be a distinction used. If it have respect unto correction, it is no sin. But if we do it only to defame the honor and dignity of our neighbor, we must confess it to be sin: for it is against the rule of charity. Solomon saith; Hatred stirreth up contentions, but charity covereth the multitude of sins. It taketh all things in good part, it studieth to amend by just means; it hath not recourse unto contumelies.

Charity is a virtue, therefore contumely must needs be a sin. Contumelies or reproaches bring sorrow unto our neighbor, and take away his good name: these be evil. So Christ said in the fifth chapter of Matthew;

Whosoever shall say unto his brother (Racha) shall be guilty of a council; and whosoever shall say, Fool, shall be guilty of hell fire. Reproach is an evil, worse than theft itself: for the weightiness of sins is considered in respect of their objects. Theft is about the goods of fortune; but among these goods, a good name is the most excellent thing. Seeing therefore the contumelious persons take away the good name, they offend more grievously than thieves. Better is a good name (saith the wise man) than great riches. But honor standeth most of all in the excellency of virtue: wherefore they, which take away virtues, as much as in them lieth, (and in their room substitute vices, and oftentimes fain lies,) do sin. Hereunto add, that a good name is scarcely recompensed at any time, with full restitution, of so much as was taken away from it. Some, for the regard they have to a man's honor, may say, that the matter is not so: howbeit, there is evermore some blemish remaining.

4. The fourth point to be considered of, is, whether reproaches are to be suffered; or else presently to be repressed. This first of all I say, that the judgment of suffering contumelies and injuries is all one. That which we speak generally, we understand specially. In the Gospel, Christ commanded that we should suffer injuries; If any strike thee on the right cheek, turn thou also the other; and he that will sue thee at the law, and take thy coat from thee, let him also take thy cloak; and he that will compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain. These precepts other whiles have greatly offended some, which did not rightly understand them. Hereby it was objected to Augustine, that Christian religion did smally profit the common-wealth: that the common-wealth of Rome was by this means greatly diminished.

Augustine answereth, that as concerning the preparation of the mind, godly men ought so to be affected, as that for the name of Christ, they be content to suffer all kind of injuries, so they perceive it to be expedient for the honor of God, and for the safety of their neighbors. But if it tend not to the glory of God, and is hurtful to him that doth the injury, there is no necessity that we bear with the act.

Hereof we have an example in Christ: when he was stricken by the servant of the high priest, he offered not immediately his other cheek, but put him back; because he saw it was not expedient for the glory of God, that he should seem to be ill spoken of. Further, it was not profitable for that servant to be maintained in his sin. They that in such wise suffer reproaches, give stomach unto the wicked, that they dare do greater things, and to persevere in their sins, which we must not commit; we ought rather to cut off sins. Wherefore Solomon saith; He that putteth a fool to silence, doth pacify wrath. Sin may be diminished by repressing thereof. According to which sentence, the same Solomon said; Answer thou a fool according to

his foolishness, least he should seem to be wise. This is for his benefit. But if thou say anything to him, he will persevere in his naughtiness.

Furthermore, if we ought not to suffer contumelies to be done against our neighbor; no more ought we suffer them to be spoken against our selves: for we must love our neighbors even as our selves. And he that contemneth his own good name, is cruel.

So that reproaches must be repressed, for his sake that doth them; that he may acknowledge his fault, and do so no more. Further, for their sakes, which be injured, and for own cause; lest we should forgo that authority, which is profitable to the church and common-wealth. For he that holdeth his peace, seemeth to consent. They that stand by, will judge thee to be such a one. Thy function in the church and common-wealth after that, will be more contemptible. The estimation of public persons is profitable to be kept. In these cases therefore, it is lawful to repress contumelies. But sometimes we ought to suffer them, neither must we requite again with the like; namely, when we perceive that we can nothing prevail; and that perhaps that man is so evil, as by stopping him of his will, he becometh the worse; and when of a small sparkle will be kindled a great fire. For which cause Hezekiah willed, that nothing should be answered to Rabsaches: since he could have profited nothing by any answer.

Contumelies also are borne withal for our own sakes, if we feel our selves moved, and that by rebuking we shall pass our bounds. So must that be understood, which Solomon saith; Answer not a fool according to his foolishness, least thou also be like unto him. Some there be, that while they would repress the fury of another man, become more frantic themselves. If they see them prone hereunto, they ought to abstain, least they offend God.

Which we also shall do, if we perceive that we be not therefore lead unto it,

because it grieveth us that the name of God should be dishonored; but only for that we seek to follow our own appetites. Also we must take heed, that we suffer not such kind of contumely in this respect, that we would aver our adversary the more. There be some, who think it a noble kind of revenge, if they utterly contemn those things that be spoken against them; to the intent he might see, that there is no account at all made of him. There be some, which keep silence and bear; because they think it will redound to their praise. Seneca said, that; To be despised of the wicked, is to be praised. And lastly, we must take heed, that the dissembling of reproach, proceed not of cowardliness. There be many, which make so much of quietness, as they will take nothing in hand, which may be troublesome and joined with danger. This also is to be added, that reproaches must be abidden, when we cannot otherwise choose.

5. But if we shall judge, that contumely is not to be borne withal, there is two ways to deal. Either it is private; namely, that we ourselves rebuke him; or else by suit in law. We may go to the judges (for this is lawful) and provide that our office be not in danger of suspicion. If we deal privately, it is meet to use courteous speech: which the apostle taught unto the Galatians; Brethren (saith he) if a man be suddenly taken with any offense, ye that be spiritual restore such a one with the spirit of meekness, &c. Not but that we may sometimes deal sharply, when we are in hand with opinions and doctrine, when the honor of God, and the true catholic faith is in hazard; or else, when men be so inflexible, as they cannot be reformed with courteous words, then more severe speech must be used. Howbeit, we must take heed, that we allege no false crime against him, which is the author of the contumelies: for then it were a lie. The thing, which is just, must justly be done. But thou sayest, that he himself doth lie: thou must not become

like unto him. If in those cases, which I have expressed, reproach be not repressed; at the least wise we shall declare by living well, and by the deeds themselves, which in words we cannot, that he hath made a lie. Many have been content to use a general reason; namely, that the spirit will teach us when injury is to be suffered, and when not: and that even at the very push, we should take counsel. The Ethnics would say, that we ought to follow wisdom and reason. Howbeit, I thought good to open these points somewhat more particularly.

6. Come we then unto David. He used three reasons, the which must only take place in those cases, wherein injury and reproach ought to be suffered, and not generally: for sometimes they are to be suffered. The first reason was; Hinder ye not the counsel of God, God hath commanded him to curse me, &c. To this we say, that in that case the reason is good; not that we should conclude generally: then there should be no wickedness punished.

We would always say; It is the counsel of God, he will take it away, when it shall seem good unto him. The second reason is; I abide greater things at the hand of my son, and shall I not bear these things? This is a good reason to comfort ourselves in affliction, and to make us circumspect what we do: but generally it is not of force. If the magistrate say; I have borne this, by reason of the necessity of the time, therefore I can the easilier bear evils: he shall leave wickedness unpunished. The third reason also is not universal;

God seeth this affliction, and layeth up good for me in store. This in very deed we ought to think, if we be compelled to suffer contumely; yet are we not always bound to suffer it.

These things have we spoken concerning the reasons of David. Now must we show wherefor he dissembled, and whether he did well therein. In my judgment he did well; and his purpose was allowed unto the soldiers, and

nobility, which he had with him. He was busied about other matters, he was scaping away, he then thought upon his sin, and imputed it to the revenge, which God had foreshowed by the prophet that he should suffer. Doubtless he did not utterly pardon the offense, but deferred the punishment. All things have their time. It was now needful for him to repent, he wept and lamented. Another cause, which might persuade him, was herein; least he should be suddenly drawn to fury, and over-much moved with cruelty: and it was then sufficient for him to keep within his bounds. A third reason: he saw in spirit (for he was a prophet) that God would have him, even at this instant, to suffer this reproach. Thus far have we spoken hereof.

7. Now let us consider, after what sort Paul forbiddeth judgment; seeing we must very oftentimes judge, while we be in this life. For it behooveth, that every man do judge and examine himself, yea and others also, when need shall be; to the intent they may be warned and amended. The church pronounceth sentence of judgment, against those, which are to be excommunicated. There be also political or civil judgments. And in household affairs, we choose unto us wives, maidens, and servants. And in the church there be chosen deacons, curates, and bishops; which kind of election cannot proceed without judgment. Wherefore we answer, that judgments are of two sorts; either private, or public. And those which be public, pertain either to policy, or else unto the church. Civil judgments are not taken away by the Gospel, but rather amended and corrected; as hereafter we shall perceive, when the place serveth. But ecclesiastical judgments cannot be removed by man's authority. For Christ, when he spake of brotherly correction, gave commandment thereof. Private judgments do either spring of charity, and right consideration; or else of ill affections, which are envy and pride: as Augustine hath in his second book

De sermon Domini in monte, while he entreated of those words, which are read in Matthew; Judge ye not, that ye be not judged. By which saying of Christ, the sentence of Paul must be measured.

And in these judgments, which we exercise by charity, we must take special heed, that the sins, which either we judge or reprove, be thoroughly known to us, that we do not rashly give credit to rumors or slanders.

Further, we must not judge without compassion and pity. Away with triumphing, mocking, reproaches. The which shall best be done, if we remember that we ourselves be men, and prone by nature unto those vices: and not yet assured, but that we may at sometime fall into the very same offenses. Therefore Paul said unto the Galatians; Considering thyself, least thou also be tempted. And Augustine in his book of Confessions wrote, that we should not only give thanks unto God, for the sins that he hath forgiven; but also for those, which by the assistance of God we have not committed.

Over and besides, in his 15th epistle to Jerome, when he had lamented for the contentions which had happened between him and Ruffinus, he saith; that he knew not what he himself would have done, if the same things that were written against Jerome, had been written against him. And moreover, in judging there must never be so firm a determination, as though he which is fallen, cannot be restored again.

8. And touching those things, which ought to withdraw us from a light, rash, and hasty judgment, Chrysostom doth make mention. First, seeing our own state is very much unknown to our own selves; we ought to know, that the state of other men is very hardly to be known. Furthermore, there be many circumstances, whereby men's actions are defined; which we cannot always perceive, although we have set before our eyes the thing which is done: so as it is not easy to give judgment of it. Again, the very things that

we see be other whiles so doubtful, as we may understand them, as well in the good part as in the ill. Then it is better to suspend our judgment in a thing that is doubtful. To conclude, he that judgeth, must be spiritual; seeing in the epistle to the Corinthians it is written; The spiritual man judgeth all things. Seeing then we be not led oftentimes by the spirit, but by our own naughty affections; we have more need to be judged, than to use judgment against others.

Augustine, in his tenth book of Confessions, the 23rd chapter, excepteth three things, whereof we ought not to judge, although we be spiritual, and so be accounted. [ 1] The first is; the hidden mystery of God's providence and predestination, together with the counsels of God, touching those same things which we see do happen daily, otherwise than either justice or reason might seem to suffer. Isaiah said; It is not convenient that a potter's vessel should dispute against the maker thereof, why it was made of this or that fashion. Also it is not meet that one pot should dispute with another, whether the potter have done wisely or unadvisedly. Out of which places

Paul took that, which he hath to the Romans; Hath not the potter power over his clay, to make one vessel unto honor, and another to dishonor?

[ 2] Another thing that Augustine taketh away from our judgment, is the book of the holy scripture; the which we must not therefore read, to condemn anything therein, or to wrest it to our mind and desire; but rather to submit ourselves thereunto. Wherefore, he writing in the 19th epistle unto Jerome, saith; If there be anything in the scriptures that displease us, we impute that unto the volume of the book, as being slenderly corrected; or unto the interpreter that hath not so sincerely and profitably translated it, according to the proper form of speech; or else we ascribe it to our own ignorance. [ 3] Lastly, he excepteth from our judgment, those men which be

without, that we should not judge them to be so far past hope of salvation, as they may not return unto it. And least he should seem to be against that he had said; he in the 22nd chapter of the same book, expoundeth the saying of Paul; that A spiritual man judgeth all things: He judgeth all things (saith he) that ought to be judged. The which we have expounded generally to be such, as make for edifying; or else, which may be hurtful for our salvation.

Moreover, it must be considered, that great diligence and discreetness be used in giving of judgment, least we condemn those things, whereof as yet we have no perfect knowledge and trial. In the book of Genesis it is written; that God himself came down to look upon the city and tower which they had built. And it is declared, that he went unto Sodom, to see whether they behaved themselves, according to the report, which had been made unto him. And these things are in such wise showed, to the intent we may be instructed, what diligent examination ought to be there had of the matter, before that sentence be given upon the same.

9. Augustine also, in the second book De sermon Domini in monte, reduceth the kinds of actions into two parts. Some be of that nature, that they may be done as well with a good mind, as with a bad; and of these

(saith he) it is commanded us, that we should not take them in the ill part.

And there be others, which cannot be done with a good mind; as are whoredoms, adulteries, and such like. And in these things we must take heed, that we judge not ill of the author, by determining with our selves, that he cannot be changed. But he referreth the words of Christ, and of Paul,

(wherein judgment is forbidden) unto the first kind of works, which may be done either of good purpose or of bad. And to prove his distinction, which he brought of two kind of actions, he alledgeth the place out of the epistle to Timothy, where it is said; that There be some sins manifest, and which go

before to judgment; but others, which follow after. For there be some so evident, as thou mayest perceive them without trial or examination: and some be therefore said to follow, because they be more secret, and are not tried out, unless it be in examination of judgment.

Albeit the Greek scholies would have the same to be referred to the ordaining of ministers: for the apostle had said; Lay not hands suddenly upon any man, neither be partakers of other men's sins. But if so be his disciple had said; Seeing there be many men's sins, which are hidden from me, how can I beware of them? Furthermore, I cannot shun those, which perhaps will be committed by them after they be ordained. The apostle answereth; Some sins go before, which unless thou weigh and consider with a just judgment, and committest nothing unworthy of the holy orders, thou shalt defile thyself with other men's sins. And there be other sins that follow: for if thou promote any man to orders, whom in thy judgment thou foundest fit; if afterward he happen to fall, that cannot be imputed by right unto thee.

10. Neither must we omit, that Christ, to the intent he might restrain us from rash judgment, added a commination; Judge not (saith he) least ye be judged, for with the same judgment that you judge, ye shall be judged.

Which must not be so understood, as though we should be rashly judged by God, if we ourselves judge rashly. For (as Augustine, in the same place, saith;) The meaning of Christ's words is, that when a man shall judge another man by unjust judgment: he himself shall be condemned by God, and shall therefore suffer punishment, because he judged rashly, and unrighteously. But seeing there be some godly men, which altogether temper themselves in this kind of sin; and notwithstanding that they judge not rashly of others, yet men do very unjustly judge of them: the same

father answereth; that For the most part it doth not so happen; because men are wont to be sore provoked against them, whom they know have a sinister judgment of them, and do endeavor likewise to judge hardly, and to speak ill of them. Wherefore that is wont to be used against them, which is written of Ishmael; His hand against all men, and all men's hands against him.

Howbeit, the answer is more firm, to say; that godly men, which do not rashly judge of others, though they obtain not like right and recompense of men, yet without doubt they obtain it of God, who not only judgeth rightly of them, but also correcteth the ill judgments, which are done unto him by men.

Of suspicions.

12. But here also we may for good cause demand, how far forth we are to favor suspicions. Suspicions do depend of conjectures, through which we inquire, either what is done, or what may come to pass. And suspicion is an obscure knowledge of some evil at hand, from whence springeth fear. And malicious men, and old men, and those which are often hurt, and enemies, are soon brought into suspicion. And sometimes the causes of suspicious are just: as in the Digests De suspectis tutoribus, & curatoribus; He is suspected, who is such in manners. And albeit that he be not such a one indeed, yet it sufficeth, if he seem to be such a one. For though that David were no traitor, yet by that report, which commonly went of him; to wit, that he was a traitor, and desired the kingdom, the Philistines did wisely; who thought good to beware of him. Indeed, we cannot avoid it, but that suspicions will sometimes arise in our minds; seeing they be not in our power: but we must not rashly assent unto them, or judge by them.

Augustine, in the 54th epistle to Macedonius: Men (saith he) of a certain self-love, are easily lead to judge; insomuch as every man is a friend to his

own cogitations, and thinketh that he doth suspect wisely. Yet (saith he) nothing must herein be done rashly, though the cause may seem never so probable: for even many things are credible, and yet false; and again, many things are incredible, and yet true. But thou wilt say; What if a man be a governor of a church, or of the common-weal; shall he not provide in time, if he suspect any evil to be at hand? He ought no doubt: but yet without hatred or harm of another man. So judges must beware, that upon light suspicion they disturb no man: for poor wretches, being oftentimes overcome with grief in punishments, do confess those things, which they never thought. The suspicions of the Philistines arose not of weighty, but even of probable causes; therefore they commanded not David either to be troubled or put to death, but only to be sent away. And this David gained by fleeing unto Achish, that although he were had in honor, yet he came into suspicion of treason. Wherefore we must never depart to the enemies of the faith; since that had never good success. For admit thou canst persuade the prince, that thou art a good man; yet shalt thou never persuade the multitude. And thus much by the way.

Of mocking and taunting.

13. By the mocking, wherewith Elias mocked the worshippers of Baal, it appeareth, that godly and sincere men may use pleasant dissimulation, witty conceits, proper nips, and merry speeches; so they use them not to satisfy revenge and hatred against their enemies, but for the condemning and disallowing of wicked religion. The sense of these signs is perceived rather by pronunciation, than by words. The imitation of this kind did Paul use, when in the epistle to the Colossians, he saith under the person of the false prophets; Touch not, taste not, handle not. How pleasantly doth Isaiah, in the 44th chapter, deride the idol-maker; because of the one half of a tree he

maketh a fire to warm himself, and to seeth his meat; and with the rest of the block he frameth an image, before which he afterward falleth down, giveth honor unto it, worshippeth it, calleth upon it, and serveth it. The same did Baruch the scribe of Jeremiah, in the sixth chapter: he pleasantly mocked the idols. Elias, by that witty mirth of his, taught that Baal was no god, that he heard not, felt not, nor regarded any manner of thing. So then, scorning's and mocking's may sometimes serve, very fitly, for the prophets and ministers of the word of God. For how could men be more plainly taught, that they lost their labor in worshipping of Baal? Howbeit, Paul, in writing to the Ephestians, seemeth to forbid this kind of talk in Christians;

Let there not be in you (saith he) αἰσχρότης; that is, filthy and fowl communication; μωρολογία, fond and foolish words; and εὐτραπελία, that is, Urbanity and pleasant jesting, which otherwise is counted a virtue, whereby those that he sad, and in sickness, are sometimes cheered up: because it must not be taken for sin, when it pertains to charity. But it must be understood, that Paul, in that place, by the word εὐτραπελία, doth note βωμολοχία; that is, scurrility, whereby scoffs and railing speeches be rashly cast out against others, rather with offense unto the godly hearers, than with any edifying. It is not lawful for Christians to trifle unadvisedly.

Of Deceit or Guile.

14. To speak first of the word. That which among the Latins is Dolus; that is Deceit, the Grecians call δόλος: so that their word and ours is almost all one: but the Hebrews call it Mirmah, or Remijah. Further, let us understand that guile is there forbidden, where anything lieth secret, which is hidden, least the fraud appear, or be easily seen. Wherefore Plautus said; Guiles, unless they be covered by craft, they be no guiles. Thus much as touching the name. Now let us come to the definition. In the Digests, De dolo malo,

in the first law, Servius the lawyer thus defined ill guile, or collusion; namely, to be a subtle invention or devise to deceive another, when as one thing is done, and another feigned. Wheresoever therefore there is guile, there is deceit by some dissimulation. It is true in deed, that Labeo, an interpreter of the law, reproved the definition brought by Servius, and that by two reasons. Whereof one is, that sometime it may happen, that a man shall be beguiled without dissimulation or collusion. Wherefore the definition should be more strict, than that which is defined. But this all men account as a fault. The other is; because other whiles some by dissimulation do save and defend their own, or other men's, and yet thereby do beguile no man; neither do they hurt any man. So then, the definition must be applied unto other things, besides that which is defined; which also is culpable. For which cause he thus defineth it; Ill guile, or collusion, is all manner of craft, deceit, or subtlety done to beguile, delude, and deceive others.

Ulpian, in the same place, alloweth the opinion of Labeo. But having the authority of so great a clarke, I would say that Labeo did not well, in removing dissimulation from the nature of fraud. And as touching the first argument, which he hath, I deny that which he affirmeth; namely, that men can be circumvented without dissimulation. For unless they were wholly without sense, they would not easily be led to take and receive that, which they manifestly see will be hurtful unto them. Wherefore it is necessary, that there be some show and color added; which can by no means be done without dissimulation. Then, whereas he saith, that there be many, which defend either their own, or else other men's, by dissimulation: I grant that; but yet I affirm, that the same is guile, although it be honest dealing: as afterward I will show more plainly. As touching the nature therefore of guile, it seemeth, that feigning or dissimulation is always joined with it: and

for that cause, the definition of Servius pleaseth me better. Which definition, I myself nevertheless would rather apply unto guile in general, and not to ill guile or collusion, as he did, perhaps being led by that reason; because he understood that deceit, which should be hurtful.

15. Cicero, in his first book of Offices, affirmeth; that Dissimulation or feigning pertaineth chiefly to the nature of guile. For he writeth that Aquilius, his familiar friend, being demanded what was guile, answered;

Where one thing is done, and another thing feigned. Of this mind is Augustine, who in his seventh treatise upon John, expounding these words which Christ pronounced of Nathaniel, (Behold a true Israelite, in whom there is no guile) saith; It is then guile, when one thing is done, and another feigned, &c. And to speak this by the way, it is easily gathered by this place, that Augustine preached his sermon to the people in Latin; because the Aphricans used the Roman tongue, although it were not pure, but in some words corrupt. For there Augustine admonished the people, that Dolus, which is guile, signified not Dolor; that is, Pain: as many do corruptly speak, saying; Dolus illum torquet, that is (as they meant) Grief doth vex him: when as they should have said Dolor. To take away therefore the ambiguity of the word, he saith, that Dolus, which is guile, signifieth feigning, and dissimulation.

And in the same place, to express what guileful feigning signifieth; he addeth, that it cometh of a doubleness of the heart. He alledgeth the 12th

Psalm, in the which place, when mention is made of guileful men; David saith, that they speak dissemblingly in their double heart: that is (as he interpreteth it;) In one part of their heart they do see the truth, and perceive the thing how it is; and in the other they work dissimulation, and deceit. But in those (saith he) is no guile, who perceiving themselves to be sinners, do

so repute themselves, and do not dissemble or boast of righteousness; as did the Pharisee, when he prayed near unto the Publican; and as other hypocrites also do. Nathaniel had no guile in him: but not generally. For every man is a liar, and (as Paul writeth) There dwelleth no good thing in our flesh; seeing it is altogether full of fraud and guile. It might only be said of Christ absolutely, that He alone was without guile. But (as David saith;)

They are blessed, to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose spirit there is no guile. For in as much as they be regenerate, (especially concerning the spirit) that which they do, they do it uprightly and simply: and such a one Christ affirmeth that Nathaniel was.

The same Augustine, in the tenth tome, in his book of fifty homilies, the first homily, expoundeth that which is written by David, in the 34th Psalm;

What man is he that listeth to live, and loveth to see good days? Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile: Then (saith he) it is guile, when one thing is close shut up in the breast, and another is expressed, either by word or by deed. As flatterers use to do, which commend some, contrary to that they think; thereby either to eat their meat, and drink their drink; or else, to get some other benefit at their hands. And that, which he speaketh of flatterers, may also be understood of enemies and backbiters. But that it becometh men to deal plainly and uprightly, the very Ethnics saw. Wherefore Achilles, in Homer, saith; that he hateth those men, as he hateth death, which speak one thing and think another. So then, we think, that for the general definition of guile, there ought to be put, and that not amiss, a devise to deceive a man (when one thing is done, and another dissembled.) 16. Now, after this definition, we must add a distinction. For some guile is good, and some is evil. That we call good, which is not harmful; and when

as it hurteth none, but sometime profiteth: but evil guile is harmful, and always hurteth one or other. These parts may easily be made plain by examples. Nurses do continually use good guile towards their little ones, thereby to please and still them: for with them they both fain and dissemble many things. Physicians also do after the same sort deceive them that be sick, because they would recover them. Yea and Chrysostom, in his first book De sacerdotio, writeth, that a certain Physician so beguiled one that was sick of an ague, as in drinking water, he thought he drunk wine. And the same Chrysostom, in the same place affirmeth, that he himself used a good guile, to deceive Basilius, for the taking of a bishopric upon him; when in no case he was minded that way. David by this kind of guile escaped the hands of the king of the Philistines: for he feigned himself to be a fool, whereby the king judged him unworthy to be punished.

But of ill guile there be very many examples in the holy scriptures: among which is the act of Ehud, which in the book of Judges we have interpreted.

And that is another also, which the Hebrews did, who at their going forth of Egypt, desired to borrow, both of their neighbors, and also of their friends, precious garments, golden and silver vessels: and yet they minded altogether to rob them of the same. To this kind also belonged that, which Chusaie the Arachite did, in deceiving of Absalom. And among these may be reckoned that, which Simeon and Levi committed against Hemor, and against the Sichemits. I might bring a great many of examples more, if I would use needless labor in a manifest matter.

17. Touching the first kind of guile, which is called good and harmless, no man will contend, but that it is lawful to use the same. But of the other kind there is a doubt, whereof if my judgment should be asked, I would think it best to make this answer; that We may not use evil guile with our friends.

Notwithstanding, against our enemies it is not forbidden; because it may be in the stead of armor. Wherefore, if it be lawful to take arms against them justly, it is lawful also to use guile, according to the saying of the poet;

What matter is it against an enemy, whether a man use fraud or force?

Howbeit, this must be considered, that we speak only of those enemies, which either God himself, or the public-wealth, or a just magistrate declareth to be enemies; and not of those, which every private man hateth.

Moreover, I doubt not, but seeing it is lawful to repel violence with violence, when there is no other way to escape; it is also lawful to set guile against guile. For he, which repelleth violence with violence, as the laws do permit, the same man is not to be counted a private person: forsomuch as he is armed by the magistrate. So as it is manifest, that he doth not against the laws; but with the law. Even so, he that is suddenly oppressed, may lawfully escape by evil guile, if he can.

Moreover, the scriptures teach, that this kind of guile is just. For Jerome saith; and it is written in the Decrees, the 22nd cause, the second question, the chapter Utilem, that Jehu did dissemble honestly with the priests of Baal; because he had not been able to have killed them all, if he had begun to put some of them to death. Wherefore, to the end that he might gather them all together, he feigned himself to be much more desirous to worship

Baal, than Ahab was; and by that means he slue them all. But this we ought to regard, that they, which are so destroyed by guile, be worthy of punishment, and (as they be commonly called) are notorious offenders, and such as cannot be punished by ordinary means. For which cause the king of Denmark is by some commended, who through guile destroyed most pernicious thieves, which he could not take. For he feigned a war, and made a proclamation, that as many as would come, should receive wages of him;

and promised pardon unto the thieves, for the wicked acts which they had before committed. But I (for my part) as I shall afterward declare, would not so absolutely allow these kind of examples. Augustine (as may be read in the 14th cause, question the fifth, in the chapter Dixit, and it is a place in his questions upon Exodus) showeth, that the Israelites deceived the Egyptians, when they borrowed of them gold and silver vessels. And yet the same was not to be counted a fault in them, when as yet no man doubted, but that they did it by evil guile.

The same father, in the 23rd Cause, question second, in the chapter Dominus, which is taken out of his questions upon the book of Joshua, rehearseth the place, wherein it is said, that God commanded the Hebrews to fight against the city of Haie, by lying in wait: which without doubt belongeth to guile. Jerome, upon the 17th chapter of Ezekiel, alledgeth this sentence, as a worldly saying; namely, What matter is it against an enemy, whether a man use fraud or force? Howbeit, he agreeth thereunto, although he deny, that it can take any place where an oath is made before. But this I will anon discuss. Ambrose, in the 14th Cause, question the fourth, permitteth guile or gainful fraud against enemies. And after this manner he interpreteth the place of Deuteronomy, where God gave the Jews liberty, to put their money in usury to strangers; namely, that where the war is just, there also usury may take place. For the goods of the enemies are ours, and they may be lawfully taken from them: and whether it be by fraud, or by violence, it forceth not. There be some, which allege that which is written in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, the 12th chapter; When I was crafty, I took you with guile. But that maketh nothing to the purpose, seeing the apostle in that place doth very manifestly use the figure Ironia. For he was accused, as though he had received money of the Corinthians, by the hands

of other, which by himself he refused to receive. Which he straightway disproved.

But those examples, which we brought first, do manifestly prove, that it is lawful to use guile, yea and evil guile against enemies; namely, keeping close our counsels and actions, and using tolerable works and words.

Neither do the civil laws teach otherwise. In the Code De commercijs & mercatoribus, in the law Non solùm: The emperor decreed, not only that no gold should be transported unto the barbarous nations, which were enemies unto the state; but also, that such gold, as they had, should be taken from them by subtle guile or policy. And in the Digests De captiuis postliminio reversis, in the law Nihil interest; It is decreed, that captives, howsoever they returned into their country again, should recover their own goods and old estate, whether they were sent home again, or whether they escaped by violence or by guile. Although afterward, in the law Postliminij, in the Paraph Captinus, it is restrained upon condition; that If they return with a mind to tarry at home. For if they should either promise, or swear unto their enemies to return, they should not enjoy the right of returning. Wherefore

Attilius Regulus enjoyed not the benefit, because he was sent to Rome, to persuade the Senate about the exchange of prisoners. Then, forsomuch as he had promised, and was minded to return, he by the laws might not use evil guile.

18. Hereby also that appeareth to be true, which a little before was said; that we may not use evil guile against our enemy, if there be an oath made between us. And that this may be the more plainly understood, we must distinguish an oath, as the lawyers do; one avouching, another promising: or (as they term it) the one assertive, and the other promissory. For when we swear, either we do affirm, or else deny something to be, or to have been;

(which we never ought to do with evil guile, by adding an oath:) or else we promise to perform something. And forsomuch as faith is to be kept, even with our enemy, the same faith also is not to be broken by evil guile. So as, if those things, which we have sworn unto our enemy to keep and observe, be temporal goods (such as are money, honor, and life of the body) the name of God for these things ought not to be profaned. Wherefore, David, in his 15th Psalm, saith; He that sweareth to do evil, and changeth not. In the Hebrew it is thus written, Nischhab leharah velo jamir. Which place I know that D. Kimhi expoundeth of those, which vow unto God certain sharp and hard things, which serve to the subduing of the flesh, and change not that which they have promised. But the sentence (me thinketh) seemeth more plain, if it be largely taken; namely, of an oath that is hurtful unto us, which a good and godly man will not break or change.

Jerome also upon Ezekiel, the 17th chapter, is of this opinion. For there the Lord saith, that he was very angry with Zedekiah; because he brake the oath which he had made with Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon. For though the Jews counted him as an enemy; yet (as Jerome declareth) he was now a friend, when he had by oath promised his faith unto Zedekiah. Seeing it belongeth unto friends, one to be faithful unto another: so as evil guile ought not there to have been used. And Augustine, in the 32nd cause, question the first, the chapter Noli existimare, writing unto Boniface, admonished him to keep faith even with his enemy. Ambrose also, in the 22nd cause, question the fourth, the chapter Innocens, doth so advise. And the same sentence he hath in his book De officijs, where he bringeth the example of Joshua, towards the Gabaonites; who, notwithstanding that he ought to have made the oath void, and of no force; yet, by the consent of God, he caused it to be kept and ratified. Neither suffered he the Gabaonites

to be slain, whom nevertheless he punished, because of the guile which they used.

But if an oath be given for fulfilling of an unjust or ungodly thing, it must wholly be made frustrate; because an oath ought not to be a bond of iniquity. Neither is it necessary thereunto, that any man should come before a judge, to be absolved of this kind of oath. Which I therefore speak, because the Pope claimeth this right to himself; namely, to release such kind of oaths, and (as they commonly say) to dispense with them. As it appeareth in the 15th cause, question the sixth, where Nicholas absolveth the bishop of Triers. And his pride and arrogancy hath now at length brought his law and power to that pass, that he not only breaketh unlawful oaths; but also abrogateth just and lawful oaths, when it seemeth good to himself. So Pope

Zechariah loosed the French men from their oath, wherein they were bound unto their king; and he deposed the king from his kingdom, and placed

Pipin in his stead. But this is not to be marveled at, seeing it is commonly said at this day in the Court of Rome; that It is not meet for kings and great personages, but for merchants, to keep their oaths.

19. So then, if there be an oath made, guile must not be used; unless perhaps the one party, to whom the oath is made, shall first depart from covenants and conditions: for then the common saying must take place; He that breaketh faith, let faith also be broken with him. Wherefore Jerome to Nepotianus, commendeth the saying of Domitius the Orator, unto Philip;

Seeing thou accountest not me for a Senator, I also do not take thee for a Consul. But hereof we have testimonies also in holy scriptures. For Paul, in the first to the Corinthians, the seventh chapter (as touching faith given in matrimony) writeth; that If an infidel depart, let him depart, a brother or a sister is not in subjection unto such: but God hath called us in peace. And

those things, which are alleged of an oath, I understand them to be of like force in promises and covenants. In which promises and covenants I affirm, that just and godly men ought both to use simple and plain words, and also to live with a good conscience. The Thracians therefore are justly and worthily condemned, who (after truce had been made to continue for the space of thirty days) robbed and spoiled by night, excusing their act, in that, that their truce was made for the day, and not for the night. Neither did the legate of the Romans plainly, but subtly with Antiochus, who having decreed, that she one half of the ships should be given unto the Romans, and the other half unto the king, commanded them all in very deed to be divided and cut in sunder. But he did it, to the end the king might be utterly destitute of a navy for the wars. Therefore, whatsoever a godly man will promise, he ought deeply to weigh with himself before hand, whether he be able to stand to his words and promises. Wherefore Jerome hath written unto Celantia; Whatsoever thou speakest, think that thou hast sworn it.

20. As touching the end of the question, there remain certain doubts to be examined, that the thing may be the more manifest. First, if a man promise armor and succor to any man, for the space of three or four years, and in the meantime he becometh a traitor to his country, and maketh war against it; whether in this case he ought to perform his faith, or else by evil guile to break it? I answer, that neither in this case, nor in the like, is faith to be kept; seeing (as it is evident) a mischievous act happeneth in the meantime, which with a safe conscience we may not aid. And in very deed, neither evil guile or perjury is here committed. For he, which hath sworn, is not changed; but he is changed, to whom the oath was made. For oaths can pluck away or diminish nothing of those bonds, which went before. Seeing then every man is bound to the word of God, and to the preservation of his

country, before he take any oath; that which afterward is sworn, must be understood conditionally: that if the first bonds be kept unviolate. The same also must take place in vows, that be vowed. For although a man vow sole life; yet, forsomuch as he was before bound to the word of God, wherein it is said, that It is better to marry, than to burn: and, They which cannot keep themselves chaste, let them marry: he doth not take away the first bond for the vow, which followeth. Wherefore, if he cannot keep himself chaste, or if he burn, he ought (by the commandment of God) to marry. Neither can any oath or vow that happeneth herein, take away the power and force of the commandment of God.

21. Another doubt cometh to my remembrance, touching those princes, which have given their public faith and safe conduct unto heretics for their coming unto Council's, or to conferences, whether they ought to stand to their promises; or else violating their oath, to keep still the heretics, and to punish them. I answer, that they ought to keep entire and perfect the promise made unto them. But they say; We will easily grant it to be sin, when we give our faith for an evil thing: but if, after we have given it, we keep it, and stand to our promises, we fall into another grievous sin; seeing we do not the duty committed unto us, neither do we obey God. For it is our part (as God hath commanded) to punish and to correct heretics; least they should spoil the church, and proceed in maintaining of their pestiferous doctrine among the godly. Neither doth any man doubt, but that magistrates ought to defend the church. So then it seemeth, that heretics should not be let go, when we once have them in our power.

I answer, that this in deed is the office of kings; to repress and keep under heretics: but that is, when they have them in their power. But if they give them a safe conduct to come unto them, then can they not say, that they

have them in their power: for they came upon trust of the promise, and an oath, otherwise they would not have come. Wherefore, if there be a promise made, it is not lawful to break it. And this is the cause why I said before, that I cannot easily allow the act of the king of Denmark. Neither also would I judge Jehu to be without sin, when he promised that he would worship Baal, thereby to get all the Baalites together; unless peradventure he knew manifestly, that he was stirred up by God to do it. But hereof we will entreat a little after. Let them therefore, which defend the council of Constance, cease to lay for their pretense, that John Hus, with a safe conscience might not be let go; because it is heinous sin in all princes, if they suffer heretics to go free. For this, which they say, is so long true, as the time lasteth that they shall be in their power; but when they are come by a safe conduct, then are they at liberty: neither are they said to be in the power of those princes, which did call them.

22. Others doubt, whether it be lawful to use evil guile against thieves; so that, if a man happen into their hands, and by an oath made unto them, is suffered to go home, upon condition to gather money to redeem himself: whether I say he ought to return unto him with the money, or (if he cannot get it as he hoped to have done) to return without it; especially, in case he were almost assured, either to live in perpetual servitude, or else to be put to a most cruel death? I answer, that in my judgment he ought to return unto them; especially, seeing in this case there is no danger, but as touching goods of this world; namely, of money, of liberty, and of bodily life, which are not so greatly to be esteemed, as for their sakes, an oath, or the name of God should be violated. And the verse of David, before brought, serveth well for this purpose. And this sentence is so firm and true, that even an Ethnic (M. Attilius Regulus, I mean) did acknowledge it. For he returned to

Carthage, when he knew certainly, that either he should be in continual bondage, or else loose his life; and that most cruelly.

Tell me not, that he did foolishly herein. For the Roman laws (as we have before said) De captiuis & postliminio reversis, in the law Postliminium, in the Paraph Captiuus, do ordain, and religiously decree, that he should not be counted as returned by the law Postliminium, which had promised to return again. Besides, the nature of man persuadeth the self-same thing: for it is civil, and delighteth in society. Wherefore, next unto God, and godliness to him-ward, there is nothing, which men ought more to esteem than their faithfulness, which wonderfully furthereth the society of men. For without it, it is impossible for men to live together. Moreover, who will not say, that the money, liberty, and life of one man, is less to be regarded than it is of many? For if covenants and promises be not kept with those thieves, hence-forth they will give credit to no man, whom they apprehend. They would send home none to their own house, to fetch their ransom; but either they will kill as many as they take, or else retain them with them in miserable and perpetual bondage. Lastly, I think it good to give this advertisement; that in taking of oaths, no signs that be added of universality ought to trouble any man.

As if a man promise and swear to his friend, that he will be an helper to him in all things: or if a man promise and swear unto a school or church, that he will do and observe all things, that they shall decree. For all such kind of speeches (as it appeareth by that, which we have said) are to be understood with condition, that if the obedience unto the word of God be kept. And undoubtedly, although that clause, through the nature of an oath, be meant always to be added; yet nevertheless it is the duty of godly men to express it, when they be received into any University, college, office,

corporation, or fellowship: and (according to the custom) are compelled to swear to the observation of statutes, laws, and decrees. It is the sure way (I say) by express words to testify, that they will observe all those things; unless that they shall find, that any of the same be against the word of God.

And of this matter (I think) I have now spoken sufficiently. Ehud practiced evil guile: I grant, but yet against his enemy. Neither doth the scripture make mention of any oath that was made between him and Eglon the king.

And though there had been an oath; yet had he been quit of it, seeing the motion of God, whereby God opened his will unto him, had abrogated the same.

Whether Guile be lawful for the rooting out of Idolatry and heresy; In 2 King. 10:17.

23. Jehu by fraud minded to allure the worshippers of Baal, that he might bring them into the danger of death. He proclaimed among the people, that he would be a notable worshipper of Baal; and that he would, with all speed possible, offer a notable sacrifice thereunto. Wherefore he commanded all the Baalites to come together to the holy assembly, to the end they might be ready with their service, about that sumptuous sacrifice. Some are in doubt, whether Jehu sinned in lying after that sort. They that defend his cause say, that this kind of lie was an officious lie; and therefore not to be condemned.

And an officious lie they define to be that, wherewith none are hurt, and some are holpen. But among other things, we must note, that this lie of Jehu, did not rashly escape from him; seeing in that journey, it was conceived in his mind, and fixed in his heart. And in my opinion, it cannot be called an officious lie, because it did hurt many, by giving an offense.

For on the one part, the people thought that they had gotten a godly and holy king; but on the other side, beholding his proclamation, they suspected

that he had destroyed Ahab and his family; not for religion sake, but for the desire of the kingdom. Wherefore they justly condemned him of hypocrisy.

Others defend the lie, which he uttered [in saying] that it was amended through the good intent of the speaker. But a good intent doth not make a good action, when the nature thereof is evil; and that Evil things, (according to the doctrine of the apostle) ought not to be committed, that good things may come thereof. They proceed further, and say, that it is enough, that God knoweth the heart of him that speaketh. No, neither is that sufficient; because it is not only needful that we approve ourselves unto God; but we must do it even to men also, so much as is possible; To the intent that they, seeing our good works, may praise and glorify the father.

Neither is that of any great weight, when they say, that this lie was to endure but a short time; seeing it should come to pass within a few days, that the mind of him that spake it, should be manifest: insomuch as Jehu was about to slay the Baalites, whereby the people should know how great an enemy he was unto that kind of idolatry. For these men be very much deceived, which imagine, that sins must be measured by a space of time; seeing in a very moment, a horrible crime may be committed. Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Baalites did for the time being, confirm themselves in their perverse idolatry, through that fact of Jehu. Further, they committed great sin, in preparing of themselves to sacrifice; and they were constrained thereunto by the authority of the king, who had called them together by setting forth his edict, who also had commanded the keeper of the vestry, to give unto them the accustomed garments: which they having received, did violate the law of God. By which place it evidently appeareth, that they, in their sacrifices, had garments, which were peculiar and differing from others that were usual and profane. For the devil indevoureth

in all the things he can, to imitate God; who ordained, that Aaron, in ministering before him, should have garments curiously wrought. He commanded also, that his children; to wit, the meaner priests, should wear certain apparel, which he had appointed for them. So likewise did the Baalites provide to be done in their idolatry.

24. Such kind of lying and fraud was used in times past, when Augustine lived, to discover the error of the Priscillianists. These wicked heretics did privily corrupt many, and in the meantime could scarcely be called to place of judgment, or there be condemned; because they dissembled their heresy, and being accused, they utterly detested and denied it by oath; notwithstanding that in their mind they retained still a pestiferous meaning; nor yet did they cease to seduce and beguile. Whereupon, many of the faithful sort taking it grievously, that they should keep themselves close; they, to the intent they might draw them out into the sight of the world, and discover them, would otherwhile have access to some of them, and feign, that they also were favorers of the Priscillianists. So then, they hearing this, showed unto them their secrets. Augustine reproved the Catholics, and persuaded them to abstain from this kind of lying; and for the same cause wrote an excellent book entitled De mendacio to Consentius. Again, they that defend Jehu, object Elias unto us, who seemeth to have provoked the Baalites upon mount Carmel, to do sacrifice unto the idol. But between these things there is no small difference: for Elias did not of himself, and absolutely stir them up unto sacrifice, but provoked them for the accomplishment of a miracle; namely, to put in proof, whether part should cause fire to come from heaven. Further, the Baalites at that time were prepared for their daily sacrifices; yea, and they made oblations unto their god every day, and after a sort called upon him continually. But this

happened not now among the Baalites; seeing they durst not, for fear of the new king Jehu, do sacrifice to their idol.

Wherefore, they which profess the Gospel, must not confirm themselves by these arguments; and in the meantime pollute themselves in popery, by abjurations and wicked masses. It sufficeth not to have a sincere heart only, but God doth also require our outward actions: for he, being the creator of the whole man, doth also challenge the whole unto himself. Wherefore (me thinketh) we should confess it to be very good indeed, that the Achabites and Baalites should be destroyed; but not that all the circumstances used therein should wholly be allowed. Neither should we be very careful to discharge Jehu of sin; since he was otherwise a worshipper of golden calves: neither did he (as the holy scriptures declare) walk perfectly in the law of the Lord. Indeed he was appointed to subvert the service of Baal, but not to promote and dissemble the same. Wherefore, I cannot see, how this kind of lying may be excused; unless perhaps it be said, that he did not lie in respect of his own mind and judgment, but by the motion of God, which stirred him up unto such a lie; even as in like manner he willed the people to borrow costly garments, and gold and silver vessels of the Egyptians; when as yet the Hebrews knew very well, that these things should not be lent, but quite taken away from the owners: but yet God commanded, that so it should be; as we read in Exodus. But of Jehu this cannot be affirmed.

Indeed the Baalites deserved thus to be seduced by fraud, seeing they deceived the people, and that in a most weighty matter. And they, which had solicited and incensed kings and a queen against the prophets, and men of God; now they themselves also deserved to be circumvented by fraud and guile. Howbeit, Jehu in the meantime is not excused from pernicious lying.

I am not ignorant, that there is both good guile, and ill guile, and that it is

lawful sometimes to use good guile. But this, whereof we now entreat, I affirm to be ill guile; and therefore unlawful. Indeed the law commanded, that the idolaters should be slain; but it willed not, that by this kind of lying and legerdemain it should be done.

25. Jehu setteth forth his service of Baal by a comparison. Ahab seemed in that religion to be most superstitious; but it is said, that in comparison of Jehu, he worshipped Baal but a little. This is even as if he should say; Those things were but sport and play, in comparison of those same, which I am minded to give. The holy scriptures testify, that he did these things fraudulently; to the intent he might gather all the Baalites into one, and slay them all together; because he might not otherwise have brought his purpose to pass. For very many of the Baalites, having intelligence of the slaughter of Ahab and Ochozias, and also the children of Ahab, and kindred of Ochozias, fled away for fear, and hid themselves in secret places.

Wherefore, Jehu feigned these things, and made proclamation that he did marvelously favor the Baalites. Moreover, he perhaps feared, least if he should deal violently and openly, a sedition might be raised among the people, to take in hand new matters. But the Baalites, being invited by such fair and courteous endeavors, came in, and of their own accord cast themselves headlong into the danger of death; whereas otherwise they were both subtle and crafty. But after this manner God doth infatuate such men, and taketh them tarde in their own wiliness. Even as we also perceive, that it came to pass in Pharaoh; who willfully, and of his own accord entering into the red sea, was drowned, and all his whole host with him.

This kind of guile and lying, in times past Constantius, the father of Constantine the great used; who, having embraced Christ, set forth an edict, which was far contrary unto his will, as though he would not suffer any

Christian to live in his Court. So as he commanded by his edict, that they, which would profess Christian religion, should surrender the offices, which they had received, and should be discharged from the wars. They, which sincerely embraced Christ, despised courtly dignities, and departed from the Emperors train: on the other side, they, which only bare the name of Christians; because they would keep their former place and degree, departed from Christ. But the matter fell out otherwise: for the Emperor called home those that went their way, and commanded, that they should enjoy their former offices and commodities; and he put away those from him, which had forsaken Christ. And he used this reason; If they were not faithful to that power, that is Christ, whom they worshipped; neither will they be faithful to me: nor yet faithfully labor and endeavor for the defense of me and mine empire. But Julian, whom they call the Apostate, who revolted from Christ, made another manner of lie. For (as Ammianus

Marcellinus reporteth) when he led his army against Constantius his brother by the fathers side, fearing least he should offend his soldiers, of whom the most part were Christians, feigned himself to worship Christ also; when as he was already revolted from him. Wherefore, upon a solemn feast day of Epiphany, he entered into the temple, together with the Christians. And there be very many dissimulations, as touching religion, to be found out in the histories.

Of Dissimulation.

26. But what shall we set down as touching dissimulation? I say, that the same is of two sorts. [ 1] One, which hath respect only to deceive; the which, seeing it differeth not much from a lie, undoubtedly it is sin. If one, being wicked, do fain himself to be honest and godly, the same man is a hypocrite; and in that he dissembleth, he sinneth grievously. Whosoever

also, having a malicious and envious heart against any man, flattereth him, and feigneth to be his friend, is not without sin; yea, he is infected with a detestable dissimulation. [ 2] But there is another kind of dissimulation, which tendeth not to the deceiving of any man; but serveth only to keep counsel secret, least they should be hindered: and this dissimulation is not to be refused, or condemned as sin, seeing (as we have already declared) it is not always required, that we should open whatsoever truth we do know.

Socrates was praised, although he were a very great dissembler. Howbeit, he said he knew nothing, [meaning] in comparison of the knowledge of God. So doth Plato excuse him in his Apology. Also he compared those things, which he knew, with those things which he knew not; and being so compared, they might be accounted nothing. Besides this, his mind was not to deceive; but rather to show unto others, which boasted that they knew many things, how very little or nothing they knew.

So Christ, being most innocent, took upon him the flesh of sin, and hid his innocence and divine nature: the which he did, not to deceive mortal men, but that he might suffer for the salvation of men. For if he had been known to be the Lord of glory, they would never (as saith the apostle) have crucified him. Moreover, Christ feigned also before two of his disciples, that he would have gone further: this he did not, because he would deceive them; but he therefore opened not himself unto them for a time, because he would reprove them of their incredulity, and instruct them by testimonies of the scriptures. Therewithal also he signified, how far he was from their hearts: or (as Augustine interpreteth it) he shadowed unto them his departure into heaven. Wherefore it evidently appeareth, that in those dissimulations, there was no lie; seeing his words well agreed with the thing signified.

27. And David, when he fell into a most perilous danger, being with Achish the king of Geth, changed his countenance, and feigned himself a fool: and by means that he seemed to be such a one, he escaped. Here some say, that he dissembled not; but that God, to deliver him, strake such a fear into him: and that his senses being taken from him, he might do those things which be spoken of him in the first book of Samuel. Wherefore, in his psalm, which beginneth; I will always give thanks unto the Lord, he gave

God thanks for so great a benefit. Togither also with this his act, he, by the inspiration of God, showed what Christ should suffer for our sakes; namely, to be counted as a fool and a mad man. Or else it may be answered, that David is not wholly to be excused of sin; if he, as being a man, more afraid than was meet, sought for this kind of help. But if he, by the motion of God, did it wittingly and with knowledge, we will not accuse him of sin, though we may not imitate his example.

Neither is it lawful, that any man should feign himself to have committed any crime, which he hath not done: though Gregory saith; that It is the part of good minds, there to acknowledge a fault, where none is. Of this matter,

Augustine, in his 29th sermon De verbis apostoli, hath taught more soundly and truly. For he writeth; By feigning on this wise, if thou wast not a sinner before, thou shalt become a sinner; namely, in saying that thou hast committed that, which thou hast not committed. Indeed it is lawful for every man to confess himself generally to be a sinner, but this or that crime specially (having not committed the same) no man ought to take upon him.

Moreover, we must note this to be true; to wit, that it is not required of us to open the truth at all times, and in all places to speak all that we know.

Howbeit, in judgment, the case is otherwise: for there, while we be

examined as witnesses, we are bound to testify that, which we know to serve unto the thing, whereof we be at that time demanded.

Of Truth, and of a Lie: which place is treated of In Judges 3, and also in 1. Sam. 21:12.

28. Now let us treat of another question; namely, whether it be lawful for a good and godly man to lie. But before I speak of a lie, I think best to speak somewhat of truth; which doubtless is an excellent virtue. Truth (as saith Tully in his book De inventione) is that, whereby things which are, have been, and shall be, are spoken without alteration. Wherein we will first note, that it consisteth in words: for he saith, that they are spoken. Not that I am ignorant, but that dumb men, and others, do sometimes speak by signs.

But because (as saith Augustine in his first book De doctrina christiana) among other signs, words are the principal and most plain. Further, we be taught hereby, that truth is not only to be considered as touching one difference of time; but as touching three differences. For he saith, that both those things which are, which have been, and which shall be. These things be then spoken truly, when they be set forth without alteration; that is, even as they are, and by speaking made neither more ample, nor less than they be. The very self-same thing in a manner hath Augustine said, in his book

De vera religione, the 36th chapter, where he writeth; that Truth is, whereby that which is, is signified. And it is a virtue; because by it men are made prone and ready to speak that, which is true.

If thou demand what is the general word of truth; It is equality: whereunto is joined, for difference sake; namely, of words, about the things which are signified. And as it is well known to all men, all virtues do aim at the mean, and eschew extremities. Wherefore, in the kind of speaking, thou shalt perceive two faults; namely, if thou speak more than the thing will permit,

or less than the thing is. Neither is virtue content only with the mean: for we must add circumstances, which use commonly to follow it. So as the truth must not always be spoken to every man, neither at all times, nor yet of everything: and yet we must not lie. But it is wisdom sometime to keep secret those things, which for just cause we will not have known. He, which should vaunt abroad every-where, and to all men, the gifts of God given unto him; should be counted foolish and fond. As contrariwise, he which should boast of a crime, whereinto by man's infirmity he hath fallen, ought justly and worthily to be reproved. Wherefore, truth requireth, that what we have within us, as touching our sense and will, that should prudently be signified by us as it is. Further, the virtue, whereof we speak, hath simplicity most of all joined with it: and it is very contrary unto doubleness.

Besides this, it is a part of justice: for both unto things it giveth the proper words; and unto a neighbor the truth which is due unto him: without the which, man's fellowship cannot stand. For, if a man should continually suspect himself to be deceived by any man, he would never give any credit unto him: by means whereof, all trades and societies among men would decay. Aristotle, in his Ethics, affirmeth; that Truth declineth somewhat toward the defect; especially when any man speaketh of himself. For this wisdom requireth, that a man boast not of himself. Whereupon Paul, in his second epistle to the Corinthians and twelfth chapter, wrote; If I will boast of myself, I shall not be unwise, but I will forbear, lest any man should think of me more than that he seeth in me, or that he heareth of me. By these words he reproveth them as foolish and unwise, which do boast and glory, even of those good things, which they have: and he saith, that he will abstain from it. Neither (saith he) do I require, that any man should think more of me, than either he seeth in me, or heareth of me. And he, which

speaketh less of himself, than he is, is not straightway to be accused as a liar. For that, which is the more, comprehendeth and containeth in it the less. For whosoever hath fifty, he may truly say that he hath twenty; although he speaketh not of all that he hath. Howbeit, if the same man should affirm, that he hath but twenty only; or else should deny that he hath any at all, out of doubt he should lie: the which must not be committed, either for modesty sake, or (as they say) for humility.

29. Concerning testimonies out of the holy scriptures, which do stir us up to speak the truth; doubtless very many might be alleged: but a few shall suffice. In the ten commandments, it is written; Thou shalt not bear false witness. Which commandment must be observed, not only in judgment, but in all things, which in our talk we testify, to be either true or false.

Moreover, God is set before our eyes to be followed; whom the scriptures in every place pronounce to be true. Wherefore we also ought to be most fervent lovers of the truth. And for that cause Jethro, in the 18th chapter of Exodus, counseled Moses to set such men to be rulers over the people, as did fear God, men of courage, lovers of the truth, and those, which hated covetousness. Also David saith; Behold, thou hast loved truth, and therefore thou hast made me to understand wisdom in the inward and secret parts of my mind. These things sufficiently declare, that we are taught of God both by inward inspiration, and also by outward doctrine; because he is a lover of the truth: neither doth he suffer, that his children should either err, or be deceived by lies. In Zechariah, the eighth chapter, it is written; Speak ye the truth every man to his neighbor. Which self-same sentence Paul useth to the Ephesians: and he commandeth the same to the Colossians. But in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, he saith of himself, and of the other apostles, that they can have nothing against the truth. Yea and the Scribes and Pharisees,

being joined with the Herodians, on this wise flattered Christ (whom they went about to entrap in his speech;) Master, we know that thou acceptest no persons, yea thou teachest the way of God in truth. Hereby they declared, that it is a singular virtue for a noble and notable man, to prefer the truth before all things. But let these testimonies of the holy scriptures be sufficient at this time.

30. It remaineth, that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the speech. And undoubtedly, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrary position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrary to that, which Tully affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which have been, and which shall be, are said to be unaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrary. This vice is so hurtful, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to rejoice, and be glad in falsehood. The general word of truth, is equality; and the general of this vice, inequality. And as truth is very near joined with simplicity, so a lie belongeth to doubleness. Truth is a part of justice, but a lie is a part of injustice. By truth, the society of man is preserved; but by lying, it is hurt and overthrown. But return we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceive speaketh that, which is false: and that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liars speak another thing than they have in their mind.

But the desire to deceive is utterly against justice, love, and amity; which we mutually owe one towards another. So then there be three things in a lie; first, to speak that which is false; secondly, his will in speaking; and thirdly, a desire to deceive. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts pertain unto the form.

31. A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. And this division cometh of no other thing, but of the effects, or of the ends. For this is evermore true, that the ends themselves may have the nature both of the cause, and of the effect: seeing lies do either profit, or delight, or else hurt. The end of a pernicious lie, is to hurt; the end of a sporting lie, is to delight; and the end of an officious lie, is to profit. But, forsomuch as in virtue, Aristotle hath respect chiefly unto the mean, if then in speaking thou exceed that mean, he calleth it boasting: but if thou come short, he nameth it dissimulation or mocking. And in this evil, that most of all hurteth; because an evil or false opinion is engendered in the mind of our neighbor. For which cause it seemeth, that the same Aristotle said well; that Lieng is a wicked thing, and must be avoided. Which we may prove by testimonies of the holy scriptures. For hereunto belong all those things, which we rehearsed before, for provoking of us to speak the truth. And there be many other places dispersed here and there, which detest lying.

David saith; Thou shalt destroy all those which speak lies. There be reasons also, which persuade the same: whereof one is, that in a lie there is an abuse of signs. And for so much as it is not lawful to abuse the gifts of God: a lie also is understood to be forbidden.

Moreover, as it is before said; a lie is enemy unto the society of man. For in lying, the understanding of the mind is not communicated unto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, seeing by nature man is made unto society and communication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striveth against his own nature. And (as Augustine saith;) Faith herein is harmed, because he which heareth, believeth those things which are spoken.

Wherefore, that faith, which he giveth unto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, every

man by lying loseth his own credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be ever after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to help his neighbor. So the fault that is in a lie, not only respecteth the loss or hurt of our neighbor, but it is in it of his own kind: as manifestly appeareth by that, which we have already said. But among lies, that seemeth to be most heinous, which is in matter of religion, doctrine, and godliness: for in no other thing can guile be more hurtful and pernicious. For if we shall err therein, we be cast from everlasting felicity.

Wherefore Augustine, in his Enchiridion, the 18th chapter, hath very well written; that They indeed sin grievously, which deceive traveling men, in showing them a contrary way. But they be much more detestable, which in lying about matters of religion, do bring men into error.

32. If the three kinds of lies should be compared together, I mean the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should justly be counted the more detestable. Because in it are two evils: one is, the abuse of signs; another is, the hurt of our neighbor, and that both of the mind that is deceived (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supply of the help. And indeed, a sporting lie hath in it but a small and slender nature of a lie: for so much as the falsehood is straightway found out, neither can it be long hidden from the hearers. Yea Augustine writeth, that such lies are not to be counted for lies. But as touching an officious lie, the judgment thereof is more hard and obscure; seeing some deny it to be sin: for they say it hath a respect unto helping of our neighbor, whom we ought in words and deeds to relieve as much as we can. So as they think that therein is no abuse of the signs: forsomuch as all our doings ought to

have respect to the commodity of our brethren. Neither do they think, that therein is offense committed against man's society: because through this kind of lie, men are made safe, and kept harmless.

Further, they say, that whereas it is written in the holy scriptures; that God will destroy all those that speak lies: the same is not to be understood of every kind of lie; but of a pernicious lie only. Which Augustine also, in his

Enchiridion, the 18th chapter, seemeth to grant. They allege also the opinion of Plato, in his book De Repub. who, as he did fray the common people from lies; yet he gave magistrates liberty to lie: especially in making of laws. But in my judgment, the thing is far otherwise. Neither can I easily grant, that an officious lie is without the abuse of the signs. For Aristotle, in his book περί ἑρμηνείας, in defining of words, saith; that They are notes of those affections, which we have in our mind. Whereby it followeth, that all they abuse words, which signify things to be otherwise, then they think in their mind. Further, that reason, which they bring of love, is very weak. For we ought to help our neighbors; but that must be by just and honest means: otherwise we will suffer ourselves to steal, to the intent to bestow it in giving of alms. But the sentence of the apostle must stand fast, which is; that Evil must not be done, to the intent that good may come thereof.

Neither do I think it to be true, that by those kind of lies, the society of man is not hurt: seeing that, if fidelity be taken away, there remaineth no dealing of one man with another.

33. But as touching that sentence of the holy scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt destroy all them that speak lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not universally spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and joining together with Christ endureth; so long those sins are not imputed: which otherwise of their own nature would be our destruction.

And this also I may easily grant touching officious and sporting lies: because they are not so much against charity, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can deny, but that in making of a lie, we deal against faith. And we must wholly grant, that he which lieth, doth loose his own credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitably admonish, reprove, or fruitfully give counsel, as he ought to do. For they, which hear him, will soon think that he lieth officiously; to call them again into the way, and not that the thing is so in very deed.

Certainly, this was the cause that Augustine was against Jerome, who in a manner fathered an officious lie upon the holy scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authority of the holy scriptures would soon be impaired; for the readers thereof would soon say, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the keeping of men in their duty. Neither ought the authority of Plato to move us much; seeing in that place he erred greatly, granting, that in things pertaining to God, they might feign fables, which should serve to bring forth and keep a good opinion of them. Doubtless we must not least in divine matters. Further, the law of God is equal, and evermore one: and as it will not have the common people to lie; so doth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot justly be accused of a lie, which in their talk be far from double meaning. For otherwhile it cometh to pass, that some speak that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true.

Among which men they also are to be excused, who have given a promise to do a thing; which afterward they be not able to perform: because at the beginning, when they promised it, they were fully minded to do that, which they had promised: and therefore they have not lied. If they afterward do not accomplish those things, which they spake, the same happeneth by some other occasion.

And otherwhile it cometh to pass, that he which delivereth his sword to a man to keep, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custody of the sword, ought not to redeliver it unto him; because (as the lawyers say) a new case requireth a new help. After the very same sort is Paul excused, who said, that he would go into Spain; when as nevertheless he went not thither. Paul also promised to the Corinthians, that he would come unto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: because, when he spake those words, he was minded so to do: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22nd cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Undoubtedly, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolveth all bonds: as it is written in the 19th cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.

34. But what shall we say touching the hyperbolical speeches, which are in the holy scriptures, which at the first sight seem to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence keep not a mean in respect of quantity; yet, as touching the manner, it doth. For those excessive speeches amplify a matter, because their nature is not only to set forth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that manner of speech they most commodiously attain unto. Neither have lies any place there, forsomuch as they breed not in the minds of the readers and hearers any false or corrupt sense. A mean therefore must there be kept; undoubtedly, not of the thing, but of the manner. The evangelists also are not to be holden as liars, when as they, setting forth the acts of Christ, do not all use the selfsame words. For it is sufficient unto the truth, that a thing be set forth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the self-same words. Yea, it is oftentimes done through the goodness of the holy Ghost, that the manner of

the narration should differ. For by such means, those things, which are not sufficiently expressed by one, are more plainly showed by another.

35. But they use to object the midwives of the Hebrews, which although they lied, yet God rewarded them. The same also happened to Rahab the harlot, or vitler. Augustine answereth, that it was not the lie which the midwives made, but the faith and fear that they had towards God, and the mercy showed unto the Israelites, that pleased the Lord: which the holy history by express words doth testify. And no otherwise must we think of Rahab. But I never like of the opinion of Gregory, who saith; that for the lie which they made, their eternal reward was turned to a temporal reward: because it is said, that God, for their everlasting blessedness, built them houses. But I judge, that by reason of the true faith, which was effectual in them, in such sort, as it brought forth in them both love and the fear of God,

(which be lawful and just fruits of that faith) the lie, which they made through infirmity, bereaved them not of eternal felicity.

36. Abraham also is objected, who said, that Sara was his sister. Howbeit, therein (as Augustine teacheth) he lied not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not all the truth. And that is of no man required, to utter all that he knoweth to be true. He did not say that she was his wife: yet, because she was his kinswoman, he might (according to the manner of the Hebrews) truly say that she was his sister. Notwithstanding, he seemeth not to be holden altogether excused: for although he lied not in calling of her sister; yet it appeareth that therein he fell, because, by not revealing that she was his wife, he put her in danger of losing her chastity; since he left her void of that help, whereby only she might have been defended from falling into the love of strangers. Neither is it needful, that I should endeavor to excuse

Abraham altogether: for he was a man, and by too much fear might easily

do amiss. Howbeit, Augustine mentioneth; that Abraham was then in danger two manner of ways: the one, least he should be killed himself; the other, the adultery of his wife. The first he might shun, in calling her his sister: the other; namely, least she should be polluted, he was not able to repel. For although he had said that he was her husband, that would not have served, to deliver her from the shameful lusts of the Egyptians. Wherefore, that which he himself was not able to shun, he committed unto God: and in that, which was in his own power, he would not tempt him. This seemeth to be the judgment of Augustine. But what I judge, I have before declared.

37. But did not the same Abraham lie, when he said unto his servants; Tarry here, and we will return unto you: when nevertheless he was minded to sacrifice his son? Which if he had done, he might not have returned, having his son with him; but should have returned alone without him. Jacob also by express words lied, when he said unto his father; I am Esau thy son.

Paul also (as it is written in the Acts) saith, that he knew him not to be the chief priest, which commanded him to be stricken; when for all that (as Augustine testifieth in his sermon of the Centurions son, and as it is written in the 23rd cause, question the first, chapter Paratus) he knew him well enough. Paul (saith he) was brought up among the Jews, he had learned the law at the feet of Gamaliel: wherefore he very well knew the chief priest from other men. Jehu also lied manifestly, when he said, that he would worship Baal. Augustine writeth, that there be two kinds of men mentioned in the holy scriptures. For that there were some so perfect, as although they were not without sin, yet we may not rashly judge evil of them; but rather seek how we may defend those things, which in their works have a show of sin. They oftentimes were so moved by the holy Ghost, that God by their words and acts might make certain secrets known. And so we must believe,

that oftentimes they both spake and did certain things by prophesy. So Abraham, when he said; We will return unto you, prophesied unawares, that which should come to pass: for he safely returned from the mountain with Isaac.

And Jacob, in saying; I am Esau, meant to declare nothing else, but that he was the man, to whom the degree, blessing, and dignity was due: which seemed to pertain unto Esau, who was the first born. Paul also prophesied, what should at the length become of the high priest; namely, that as a painted wall, and a thing altogether feigned and hypocritical, he should be taken away. Further (saith Augustine) there were other men, not so perfect, but were evil; which are spoken of in the Old Testament, either to have lied; or else to have done something, that might seem to be sin. But he thinketh, that we should not so greatly endeavor to defend the good name and opinion of those men. Of this sort of men was Jehu: for although that murder, which he executed upon Ahab, and his family, and also his weeding out of Baal, and the worshippers thereof, pleased God: yet nevertheless, he was a wicked king; neither forsook he the worshipping of golden calves.

Wherefore it shall be lawful to confess, that in lying he committed sin. But in my judgment (and as I noted before) by this only distinction we may easily dissolve this doubt; namely, that those men were stirred up to lie, either by the spirit of man, or by the motion of God. When they did it as men, we will not deny, but that they sinned: but when they spake so by the inspiration of God, we marvel at their sayings and doings. But we will not take it as an example and president to follow.

Whether it be lawful to lie, for preserving the life of our neighbor.

38. But there ariseth a harder doubt; namely, whether it be lawful to make a lie, for the preservation of our neighbors life? Augustine, De mendacio ad

Consentium, saith; If a man should be in great peril of death, and the same man should also know, that his son were in extreme danger; who happening to die, thou having knowledge thereof, if the father ask thee; Doth my son live? And thou art sure that he also will die, if thou show him that his son is departed, what wouldest thou do in this case? Whether thou sayest, he liveth; or whether thou sayest, I cannot tell: thou liest. But if so be thou answer that he is dead, all men will cry out upon thee, as though thou haddest committed man-slaughter; and as though thou, by thy heavy news, haddest been the occasion of the death of this father, being sick, and lying at the point of death. Augustine granteth that the case is hard; neither denieth he, but that (as a man) he should be moved; and perhaps it might so chance, that affections would not suffer him to speak that, which is just and right.

But at the length he concludeth, that he ought not to lie.

And he addeth moreover, that if thou know, that any unchaste woman loveth thee inordinately, which also threateneth to kill herself; yea and will do it indeed, except thou assent to her wicked lusts, whether herein thou oughtest to commit any shameful things against chastity? I think not. So likewise (saith he) thou oughtest not to offend against the truth, for saving of thy neighbor's life. And moreover, what a window should be opened unto lying, if we should determine to do otherwise? For that, which one should think to be lawful in respect of life, another would judge that he may do the same for money; another for estimation, or for defending of lands and possessions. And so it would come to pass, that there would be no measure nor end of lying. We may not suffer (saith Augustine) that any man should kill his own soul for the bodily life of another man. No, nor that it is lawful to lie for the salvation of any man's soul. Every lie (saith John) is not of God. But we ought not to speak those things, which are not of God.

39. What if a man were sought out of murderers to be killed, and that thou knewest that the man lieth there hidden, where thou presently art; and they demand of thee if thou knowest whether he be there or no? He answereth, that if thou be of a valiant courage, and as becometh a Christian, thou must say; Where he is I know, but I will not utter it, do you what ye will.

Notwithstanding, when the matter cometh to this point, that for the defense of any man's life thou must make a lie: know thou, that thou oughtest to commit the matter unto God, and that thou hast no more there to do. Either thou must answer, that thou wilt not betray him, or else thou must hold thy peace. But by thy silence the murderer will suspect that he is in thy house, and then thou shalt seem to have given an occasion of his apprehension. But in very deed, thou hast not given it; for thou canst not let him to think what he will. Wherefore, the matter must rather be committed unto God, than to make a lie. Howbeit, thou must temper thy words with singular consideration; namely, that thou speak in such sort, as thou utter not all, and yet speak not falsely. For in these cases, I think it is not forbidden; nay, I rather think it most lawful to speak doubtfully. And, as touching this question, this is sufficient.

Whether for modesty sake it be lawful to lie; upon 2 Samuel 9:8.

40. There be some so importunate men, as although God have heaped his benefits upon them, yet are they always complaining; We have borne the burden and heat of the day, and yet doest thou make us equal unto them?

Some also be so modest, as even in prosperity they humble themselves.

Others be broken with misery, and are become more humble. But they, which in their losses and afflictions retain still the fierceness of nature, be too insolent and obstinate. Humility is like a bridle, wherewith the insolency of our nature must be held in his duty. And men be most of all

reclaimed unto modesty, when they begin to consider how very little they have of themselves. Howbeit, the same humbling of our selves ought to be joined with the acknowledging of God's benefits. For many, while they be either ignorant thereof, or else dissemble it, become like unto beasts; as they, which cannot one whit understand, with what benefits they be endued by God. But there must be a special regard had, that we do not counterfeit that modesty; and that the same consist not only in words, but in the mind also.

Yet to retain that virtue, it is not lawful for thee to make a lie upon thyself for modesty sake. For Aristotle himself, in his Ethics, reckoneth a lie among dishonest things. And (as Paul saith; We must not do evil, that good may come of it. Augustine, in his 8th epistle to Jerome, touching this matter, citeth the words of Paul to the Corinthians;) If Christ be not risen, in vain is our preaching, and your faith also is in vain. For we be found false witnesses of God, when we say, that God raised up Christ from the dead; whom he raised not up, if the dead do not rise again. But here (saith

Augustine) a man might say unto Paul; Why doest thou so much detest lying, since the same tendeth to the setting forth of the glory of God? And he maketh Paul to answer, that he doth detest such lies, and that it is no less evil, to commend things that be not true concerning God, than not to believe things that be true of him. Hereby we gather this argument; If it be not lawful to lie for the honor of God, it is much less lawful to lie for the retaining of any virtue. Yea, and it is no less evil to ascribe to thyself evil, which thou hast not committed, than to arrogate unto thyself any good, which thou hast not done.

41. Contrariwise nevertheless, Paul unto Timothy seemeth somewhat to make a lie of himself; Christ (saith he) came to save sinners, of whom I am

the chief. For Paul was not the chief, or the greatest sinner. And in the 30th chapter of the Proverbs, the prophet Agur, whether he were Solomon himself, or some other man; I am (saith he) more foolish than all men, and the wisdom of man is not in me; I have learned no knowledge, neither have

I the understanding of holy things. Yet was he both a prophet, and a wise man, and answered prudently unto questions. And Christ himself, of himself; I am (saith he) a worm and no man, a very scorn of men, and the outcast of the people. Some defend these speeches on this wise, saying; that They, which have thus amplified their sins, they only respected their own strength, which they themselves had by themselves, and a certain natural inclination of their own unto evil. For they themselves saw, that they should grievously have fallen, unless God had stayed them. These in very deed be no small provocations, to make us judge humbly and lowly of our own selves. But it is one thing for a man to say that he is prone and ready bent unto evil; and another thing to confess that he hath done some evil, which he hath not done. For there is as much difference between these, as there is between act and power. Certainly, we may every one of us slip, yet no man ought to say that he hath slipped, when he hath not. We ought all to confess ourselves to be sinners, but none ought to ascribe unto himself any sin by name, which he hath not committed.

I say therefore, that those speeches, which I have made mention of, if they be thoroughly weighed, they be true. For some be uttered after that sort, because absolutely they be so; some, for that they be extolled by an excessive speech; some, because they be compared with another thing by contention. Paul calleth himself the principal sinner, either because he was the first that came unto Christ, among those that persecuted the church of God; or because he judged himself in very deed to be chief and greatest of

the sinners. Not as if there had been no man that had sinned more heinously (for there were such as had sinned against the holy Ghost, there were those which had sinned without any repentance:) but because that among all them, which were redeemed by Christ, and had obtained the mercy of God, he thought himself to have sinned most grievously. For some had sinned of infirmity, some of plain error and incredulity; some had proceeded so far, as they crucified Christ, who nevertheless were afterward, by the preaching of the word of God, called home unto repentance. Therefore saith Peter in the Acts; I know brethren that ye did it by ignorance, even as did your rulers.

But Paul had no recourse unto the sermons of the apostles: there was need of greater bonds for the drawing of him unto Christ. Whereupon Christ spake thus unto him from heaven; Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?

With these men therefore he compareth himself: and of these he saith he is the principal.

And so Chrysostom, upon this place, saith; that These words be against other words of his in the epistle to the Philippians. For there he saith, that he was conversant in the Jewish religion, without crime, and without complaint. But these things (saith he) are nothing repugnant. For even they themselves, which had performed the righteousness of the law, yet were they sinners nevertheless. And although Paul spake those things modestly of himself, yet did he not ascribe an untruth unto himself. For, notwithstanding he granteth himself to have been a persecutor, and a blasphemer; yet he saith not, that he was an adulterer, or a fornicator, or a thief; seeing these things should not have been true. The things objected out of the Proverbs, touching Agur the prophet, were true by way of comparing them unto those things, whereof a demand was made. He saith that he had no wisdom; not in respect that the wisdom which he had, was no wisdom; but because the

same, being compared unto so great matters, might seem to be none. So Socrates was wont to say; This only I know, that I know nothing: because that knowledge, which he had, would be nothing, in comparison of the multitude of those things that he knew not. So Christ called himself a worm, and a reproach of the people; because men so accounted of him, by reason of his afflictions and cross. Also in speaking, there happeneth sometime an excessive or hyperbolical speech; such indeed as is not joined with a lie, but which may serve for the better setting forth of the matter.

Whether faith must be kept toward him that breaketh his promise.

42. In the beginning of the ninth chapter of the second book of Samuel, David demandeth; Is there any man left alive of the family of Saul, to whom I may do good for Jonathan's sake? When he speaketh of Jonathan, he excludeth not God; nay rather, that which he did for Jonathan's sake, he did chiefly for God and godliness sake. So God saith, that he would do well to the people of the Jews, for the covenant which he had made with Abraham; yet doth he not exclude his own goodness. Nay rather, he chiefly includeth the same therein; seeing that covenant proceeded of the mere goodness and mercy of God. But thou wilt demand, why David saith that he will do good unto any of the house of Saul, for Jonathan's sake; and not for Saul's own sake. For in the 24th chapter of the first book of Samuel, what time as he had cut off the skirt of Saul's cloak, he being enforced by Saul to swear, promised, that he would not root out his seed. Whereby he was bound, not only unto Jonathan, but also unto Saul. Some answer, that David was now discharged of his oath; because Saul kept not promise with him, but had done him exceeding great wrong. For he that breaketh his faith (say they) let faith be broken with him. And Cicero, in his third book of Offices, citeth a verse out of Accius an old Poet; Hast thou broken thy faith? Atreus,

whom he bringeth in to speak, answereth; Neither have I given neither do I give my faith to any faithless person.

But this is no sure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and false of promise: yet oughtest not thou for that cause to shrink from thy promises; seeing God doth oftentimes keep promise even with us that do evil. He promised, that he would continue the kingdom, or else some great honor in the family of David, even unto Messias. He promised that he would give a son which should redeem mankind. Men undoubtedly were evil, unfaithful, and unworthy to have the promises kept with them: yet did he perform these things to them, according to his excellent faithfulness. Some answer on this wise, that faith in deed must be kept with an evil and unfaithful man, if he be unfaithful towards other, so he be no such towards us; or else, if he do hurt us, so it be not in the self-same thing, wherein it was agreed upon between us. Nay rather, if he fail even in the very same thing which is agreed upon, yet must we keep promise: if by that means, neither his naughtiness be increased; nor a greater power to do hurt be given unto him.

We be therefore loosed of our promise, if the thing cannot be, which we have promised; or else, if it should fall out ill unto himself, to whom the promise is made: as if thou deliver a sword unto a furious man, which thou didst promise unto a man of sobriety; or if he wax worse and worse, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reap a benefit of his unfaithfulness: or else, if thou shalt promise such a thing, as is against the word of God, or the profit of the Church or Common-wealth. Therefore it is written in the 22nd cause, question second; In evil promises break thy faith.

But most of all, we be at liberty of our promise, if we being circumvented by any fraud, have promised anything that we ought not to have done; or else, if the things themselves be now changed. Some have added; If thou

being compelled either by force or fear, doest promise anything that thou wouldest not. But it can scarcely be perceived, how so great a fear and compulsion can happen unto a courageous and good man, that he should promise that, which might be against either his duty, or the word of God.

Howbeit, if a man be fallen in such wise, he is at liberty. But above all, we must take heed, that we do not craftily color our promises, and seek by fraud and counterfeit means to unwind ourselves out: seeing fraud (as Cicero very rightly said) doth not undo perjury, but it tieth it fast. David, when as perhaps he might have invented many things to break his promises; yet would he do no such thing. For being a godly prince, he was rather minded to follow truth and faithfulness.

43. Certainly, the nature and consideration of these two virtues; [namely, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogether the self-same: wherein they do agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare. Truth is a virtue, whereby we are ready to speak those things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind do express: for hereby, because we speak those things which we think, are we called faithful and true of our word. And faith is a virtue, whereby is brought to pass, that our deeds be answerable to our promises. There is some conformity on both parts. In truth there is a conformity of words with the meaning of the mind, and in faith a conformity of deeds with promises. So as lying is contrary unto truth, and falsehood unto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is so called, because that is done which is spoken. And he defined the same after a sort on this manner; Faith is a constancy of words and of covenants. In another place he saith, that Faith is the truth of a man's word.

But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reason, whereby we are ready to do those things that we have

promised. This definition (as I have said) is more perfect, and it consisteth of a general word, and of a difference. For faith appertaineth unto justice, and it causeth us to yield unto every man, that which pertaineth to him; seeing what thou shalt promise to any man, that is now become his, to whom thou hast promised. And the same unless thou perform in time, thou withholdest that, which is another man's. And so great is the force of faith, as it comprehendeth in one all the parts of man's life: because neither matrimony, neither the bargains which citizens have among themselves, neither any part of the Common-wealth can consist without faith. It differeth (as I said) from truth, although with the same it hath many things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we speak, are either true or false; whether they be past, whether they be present, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to do only in promises: nevertheless, those promises must be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is evil, or a hindrance to good: otherwise they ought not to be firm.

Wherefore, faith should have the very same companions joined therewith, that an oath hath; namely, truth, righteousness, and judgment. So as he, that breaketh his promise, doth not only sin in so doing; but he must also make amends for the hindrance, which through his unfaithfulness the other party receiveth, to whom the promise is made. David, being singularly adorned with these virtues, would not depart from the promises. For he made the promise of his own accord, being not forced thereto by any fear or violence: and that, which he promised, was neither repugnant to the word of God, nor yet hurtful to the Common-wealth. For is was a matter of good example, that so notable a king did fulfill his promise: neither was there any danger, least they, to whom he had promised, should become the worse by his

promise: for they were already dead. Wherefore, there was no cause, why he should shrink from it. And because he would perform his promise unto

Saul, therefore he demanded, whether any of his family were remaining, whom he might do good unto. But he speaketh of Jonathan by name, because he was bound unto him; not only by the bond of promise, but also of friendship, and most near acquaintance. Undoubtedly, he that faileth of his faith, is unworthy to have faith kept with him. Howbeit, we must have a special regard unto these circumstances; least for the naughtiness of another, we also should become naught ourselves, and seek corners for perjury.

Of a Fable and Apology.

44. They say that an apology is a kind of fable: and a fable they define to be a narration of a false thing, devised for commodity or delight sake. Or (as Augustine, in his second book, and 11th chapter De soliloquijs saith;) A fable is a lie, made for delectation sake, although properly it cannot be called a lie. For the falsehood of it is straightway found out, and especially in apologies. For in them are brought in insensible and unreasonable creatures talking one with another, and entreating of very weighty matters.

And so soon as the hearer perceiveth this, he straightway understandeth, that the matter is feigned, and not so done [as it is uttered.] And doubtless some fables are likely to be true, and some are far from probability. For it is very likely, that once there fell a contention between Ajax and Ulysses for the armor of Achilles, which at the length was judged unto Ulysses: and that Ajax took so great displeasure thereat, as becoming mad, he slue himself.

But contrariwise, it is without all probability, that a woman was turned into a plant, or into a stone: so as an apology may be likened to a fable that is not likely to be true.

45. The kinds or sorts of a fable, are comedies, tragedies, satyrs, and narrations of harping and heroical poets, and also apologies. But which of these feigning's be lawful, and which be not lawful, may thus be defined.

Those, which have unmannerliness and scurrility; that is, a mirth joined with dishonesty, ought not to be admitted. But those, which are written honestly, and with shamefastness, so that they can refresh the mind with some pleasure, and are also profitable to teach good manners, are not to be despised. That such, as be uncivil, must be put away, it is confirmed by two testimonies of the apostle. To the Corinthians he writeth; Evil talk corrupteth good manners. And unto the Ephesians, the fifth chapter, it is written; Let not whoredom, nor any uncleanness, nor covetousness be named among you, as it becometh saints. Then is added αἰσχρότης, filthiness; μωρολογία, foolish talking; and εὐτραπελία, jesting; which are not comely. By these words he reproveth all communications, which are defiled either with dishonesty or scurrility.

The very same saw Plato, in his third book De Repub. where he excludeth poets that spake of gods, as though they should speak of men: because they, in so writing, do both dishonorably treat of the nature of God, which is the best and most excellent; and also excuse the sins of common men, when as they testify, that both the gods, and also noble men, did things alike. Which certainly we may perceive in the comedy of Eunuchus in Terence, where

Chaerea, a wicked young man, beholding a wanton table in the harlots house (wherein was painted Jupiter coming into Danae by a shower) began to have a pleasure in himself; seeing he, being but a silly man, did those things, which he perceived by that table, that the chief god in old time had committed; I did it (saith he,) yea I did it with good will. Also, Cicero saith,

that Homer feigned these things, and translated human things unto the gods.

But I would rather they had transferred divine things unto us!

46. Augustine, in his second book of confessions, the 15th and 16th chapters, complaineth and soroweth, that he being a child and a young man, learned profitable words, but yet in vain things. I would to God (saith he) I had been instructed in profitable writings! I heard Jupiter thundering, and therewithal committing adultery. The minds and affections of men are prone enough unto vices. Wherefore it is wickedly done, that children and young men should in that age be stirred up to sin, by vile and filthy fables. But apologies are profitable, which consisting both of honest words and good arguments, do rightly instruct that first age. Aesop, the ancient writer, happily exercised himself in this kind: although some do ascribe his fables unto Hesiodus, who was before Aesop's time. But this one apollogie

(whereof we now treat) was written long before the time of Aesope and Hesiodus. For the time of the Judges, and namely of Gideon, was a hundredth years and more, before the war of Troy. There is another apology also in the second book of kings, the 14th chapter, where Amasias obtaining victory of the Edomits, provoked the king of Israel to make war with him.

Unto whom king Joash answered thus; The thistle of Libanon sent unto the cedar that is of Libanon, and said; Give thy daughter to my son to wife. And a wild beast went out of Libanon, and trod down the thistle. By which apology he showed, that he was so much greater than Amasias the king of Judah, as the cedar tree excelleth the thistle: and gave him warning, that he should, after that sort, be trodden down and oppressed by his host, as the thistle perisheth that is trodden down by wild beasts.

47. These things have I therefore rehearsed; because the Greek and Ethnic writers should not be thought to be the first inventers of these profitable

devises. All men agree, that the use of apologies is then to be added, when we have to deal with rude persons. [ 1] For they understand not what a perfect argument or an imperfect meaneth; neither are they able to perceive inductions: so that of particulars they might gather universals. And they pass not upon the examples of noble personages; because they themselves are abject and base. Wherefore, seeing they be smally instructed by those means, there remain feigned narrations: where they being allured with the strangeness of the matter, give great heed to the things that are spoken, and are other whiles at length persuaded. [ 2] Moreover, they are good to help memory: for things, that are so new and pleasant, do very much delight; and those things, that be so pleasant, be not easily forgotten. [ 3] Furthermore, men can sooner abide themselves to be reproved by apologies, than by evident speeches. For the plain truth engendereth hatred, but being covered with apologies or dark speeches, it may be abidden. At the beginning, the hearers know not whereunto the matter tendeth: therefore being ignorant what will be spoken, they tarry out the end, and perhaps be persuaded at the length. Christ finished the whole parable of the vine, and at the end, the Scribes and Pharisees perceived, that it was spoken against themselves. So also among the Romans, Menenius Agrippa, by an apology wan the common people, which had divided themselves from the Senators, to join themselves again with them. For these causes are the parables, dreams, and visions of the prophets very much used in the holy scriptures.

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