64. To what do the opponents of particular satisfaction appeal?

64. To what do the opponents of particular satisfaction appeal?

b)   God’s requirement cannot simply be set aside and remain unfulfilled. One should bear in mind that the requirement of the covenant contained the natural requirement of perfect keeping of the law. God’s justice must be carried out in man both positively and negatively, both by righteousness of works and by penal righteousness. Thus if God were satisfied with the passive obedience of the Mediator, something would be lacking in the complete carrying out of His justice. And this would be so irrespective of all covenantal relations.

c)   This stands out even more clearly when one bears in mind that those who are in Christ do not only receive acquittal from guilt and punishment but also the right to eternal life. Concerning this acquisition of eternal life, the following four possibilities may be considered:

1.   God makes an essential change in the way in which He grants eternal life to His creatures. At one time, as far as we know, this always happened by a test in which obedience had to be demonstrated. Now He does this otherwise by simply clearing away the ruins of the overturned law, without reestablishing the law itself in all its beauty. This is what it comes down to when we only assume a passive obedience.

2.   If God does not change His conditions, then the possibility can be considered that we are only freed from punishment but remain forever destitute of the blessings of life, that we are not sanctified and glorified but are brought into an in-between state—one that lies between salvation and its opposite but is neither of the two.

3.   The possibility also exists that the passive obedience of Christ only removes legal obstacles, and it is now left to us to carry out what is lacking, to earn eternal life by our own strength. Then we would be accountable for achieving active obedience.

4.   The fourth and final possibility is that Christ not only restores the violated justice in its majesty by suffering but also by obedience earns all the benefits of eternal life for those who are His.

Now it is immediately apparent that the first two possibilities are purely abstract possibilities that cannot be taken into consideration in reality. God cannot grant to fallen sinners, worthy of damnation, what He refused to the holy Adam—namely entrance into eternal life without perfect keeping of the law. This would be an unparalleled violation of the majesty of His law, a relaxation in the bad sense of the word. The second, that the redeemed would remain in an in-between state, is totally unthinkable. Our choice, therefore, remains only between the third and fourth possibilities. And then it is immediately apparent where the rejection of the active obedience of the Mediator ends up: in nothing other than that the covenant of grace is again made into a covenant of works for the sinner, in which he has to earn salvation for himself. Here Arminianism and Calvinism stand opposed to each other. All Arminians, if they thought this through logically, have thrust aside active obedience, at least insofar as it was an imputed obedience. The Roman Catholic theory of joint effort in justification is based on the same idea. Those who vacillate between a full-fledged Arminian and a more Calvinistic position also vacillate on this point (so, e.g., John Wesley). The choice here, therefore, cannot be in doubt.

d)   Scripture teaches and everywhere presupposes the necessity of Christ’s active obedience. It does this as often as it speaks of believers as coheirs with Christ, or gives them a share His mediatorial glory. That Christ Himself received this glory as a reward for His suffering is not subject to doubt (cf. Phil 2:8–9). Now if the glorification of believers is a direct consequence of the exaltation of their Mediator, then that also involves that this glorification was earned by Him. It is the Spirit, obtained by Christ, who effects all the workings of grace in the sinner (Acts 2:33). In Christ, they are blessed with all spiritual blessings (Eph 1:3). He has given Himself up for the church so that He might sanctify and cleanse it and present it to Himself as a church without blemish and without wrinkle (Eph 5:25–27; cf. also Titus 3:5–6, a very clear proof text). The apostle contrasts the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ with each other and declares that by the latter many are made righteous (Rom 5:19). A contrast is also made between the righteousness of God and the self-righteousness of man (Rom 3:20–26). Thus there is something brought about by God Himself that corresponds to what man vainly tries to bring about. As it is witnessed of Christ that He was made sin (i.e., bearer of penal guilt) for us, so it is also said in so many words that He is given to us by God as “righteousness” (1 Cor 1:30).

e)   Finally, reference should still be made to the Old Testament sacrifices. We have found earlier that they were not only types of penal suffering, but just as much of an active devotion to God. Accordingly, it is said of Christ that He gave Himself for us as an offering and sacrifice to God, a “sweet-smelling aroma” [Eph 5:2].

53. How should the objections brought against the active obedience by Piscator and others be answered?

That Christ had need of His active obedience for Himself is a misconception that does not take into account the deity of the person of the Mediator. It has already become clear to us why Christ did not require obedience for Himself.

As far as the other objection is concerned—that God cannot demand suffering and satisfaction at the same time, but only one of these—this rests on a confused conception of the actual state of affairs. The question here is not what God must necessarily have from man so that He Himself might not be in want of something. If that were the case, one could in fact say with Piscator: God must have either one of the two, and with either of them His justice is satisfied. From those who are lost, God does not receive anything other than satisfaction of penal guilt. The question, however, is an entirely different one—namely, what God must have from a person for that person to escape judgment and enter into a reconciled, peaceful relationship to Him. Even if after the fall a covenant of grace were not established, and Christ had borne only penal guilt and had again placed man there where Adam stood—even then, in order now to stand before God on his own account, man would have been in need of an ongoing active righteousness in order to continue sharing in the favor of God. How much more, then, now that there is a covenant!

54. What is the best designation to refer to passive and active obedience together?

The term “satisfaction” (satisfactio) includes both and emphasizes precisely what is common to both. However, the distinction mentioned above between “satisfaction” and “merit” is also found, following Aquinas, in some Reformed theologians. Owen, among others, has adopted it. However, it is less precise.

55. From the fact that satisfaction is a priestly work, does something also follow concerning the persons for whom satisfaction is made?

Yes. A priest does not advocate in general for everyone but sacrifices for a specific family, or tribe, or a specific people, which he represents and for which he is appointed. This causes us to expect that the satisfaction of the Mediator as a priestly act will also apply to a specific people for which God has made Him priest. In other words, we are led to the presupposition that satisfaction is not universal but particular.

56. Is this question whether satisfaction is universal or particular also connected to the conception that one forms of the nature of satisfaction itself?

Yes, it is closely connected. If one maintains with the Arminian that Christ has only borne penal guilt and thereby opened up the possibility for man to obtain the right to eternal life by the obedience of faith, then this naturally entails that satisfaction pertains to all men. Here salvation is not tied to satisfaction, and the inference from all not being saved to not having satisfied for all is unwarranted. If, on the other hand, one considers faith and the subjective application of the merits of Christ in general as a fruit of those merits, then it immediately follows that where this fruit is lacking, the root must also be lacking. That is, Christ cannot have made satisfaction for the person who is not saved. So it is already apparent that particular satisfaction and active obedience in its full meaning stand and fall together.

57. What was the old principle concerning the extent of the satisfaction of Christ?

The old theologians were accustomed to saying: Christ died sufficienter pro omnibus, sed efficaciter tantum pro electis [sufficiently for all, but efficaciously only for the elect]. That is, as far as the sufficiency of Christ’s work is concerned, there was nothing lacking in its intrinsic worth in order to save all mankind. If it had pleased God to apply this satisfaction to the entire world, then it would have not needed to be any different in itself than it now has been. Therefore, every thought that there is a limitation in the worth of the obedience of the Savior—and that the particular character of the satisfaction follows from this limitation—must be rejected as absurd. Those who teach the universal satisfaction of Christ cannot be more copious in praise of the all-sufficiency of the work of the Lord than the most rigorous spokesmen of Calvinist particularism. Turretin, Witsius, Owen, and whomever one reads—they all vie with each other in declaring that the satisfaction of the Mediator was sufficient to save every sinner.

58. Apart from the issue of intrinsic value, is there anything that precludes the satisfaction of the Mediator from being applicable to every sinner without distinction?

No. Not only is the intrinsic value sufficient to save all, but also the mode of satisfaction did not need to be another in order to make it applicable for all. It we presuppose for a moment that God could change His purpose with respect to election, this would not involve any kind of change in satisfaction. Apart from God’s election, from God’s side satisfaction makes possible the salvation of every man. It is not possible, however, that God would be able to change His will.

59. Does the question at issue concern the universality or particularity of the offer of grace?

No, for as proponents of particular satisfaction we acknowledge that this offer is made to all and that it applies to all. Provided that you appropriate it by faith, all the fruits of this satisfaction are yours. Indeed, we hold that this universal offer of grace goes forth not only with the purpose of bringing it to the elect, who are hidden amidst the masses, but also certainly to demonstrate to unbelievers that it is their unbelief and not the lack of a sufficient ransom that causes them to be lost. If the gospel were not offered, many would be able to say in their own blindness, “We would have certainly repented and been saved if only a message of salvation had come to us.” Now a sinner cannot speak to God in this way. If a nonelect person knew how to find a way to acquire faith for himself, God would surely keep His word, and he would not be lost because Christ had not died for him. But this entire supposition naturally belongs to the realm of impossibilities.

60. If we speak of particular satisfaction, is it then our intention to deny that any benefit results from this satisfaction for the nonelect?

This, too, is not our intention. It is self-evident that the destiny of humanity, out of which God calls His elect, and the destiny of these elect themselves cannot immediately be separated from each other. One recalls our exposition of Romans 9:22–23 in our treatment of the doctrine of election [in volume one]. There, Paul infers the forbearance of God toward the vessels of wrath from His merciful purpose with the vessels of mercy. And insofar as this purpose concerning the vessels of mercy rested on, and was related to, the satisfaction of the Mediator, who could not satisfy until the fullness of time—to that extent this satisfaction became a cause of the patience of God in putting up with those who are lost. All that results from the delay of judgment, all external blessings that mankind enjoys, all that befalls them beyond curse and death, the common grace at work throughout, with all the fruits of external righteousness that it fosters—all of this is an indirect result of the satisfaction of the Mediator.

Still, it would be more or less wrong to say that Christ earned these things for the nonelect. The correct formulation would be that these benefits for others result as side effects from His merits for the elect. Earning presupposes a direct, personal connection that obviously is not present here. It is certainly true that all these side effects are intended side effects, for everything that Christ has purposed with His work has actually resulted from it. Its direct purpose, however, did not lie in the well-being of others but in the salvation of believers. All other things are attendant on that purpose, as they are given with it.

61. As a consequence of all these limitations, how should the question be properly formulated?

We should ask: For which persons did God the Father and the Mediator intend His satisfaction as the certain and effecting cause of their eternal salvation? Thus the issue here is one of purpose and nothing else. When we speak of universal and particular satisfaction, the adjectives “universal” and “particular” do not express one or another property that satisfaction must have in itself but simply the relationship in which it stands to the purpose of God. It can perhaps lead to greater clarity if one explains “particular satisfaction” by “particular salvation” in the sense of “particular redemption.” This last expression shows more clearly that it is a question of purpose and not of the intrinsic worth of the ransom (Owen, e.g., contended against the teaching of the Arminians of “universal redemption”).

62. On what grounds is it possible to deny that the satisfaction of Christ in the sense just described was particular?

a)   One can deny this because one is a consistent universalist. One then assumes that all will be saved or are saved per se by the work of the Mediator, regardless of any further explanation one gives of this work.

b)   One can deny this because one lets the application of the work of Christ depend in part on the working of the Holy Spirit, in part on the attitude of man toward it. In His election, then, God did not sovereignly limit this application, but men themselves limit it by their unbelief and by not cooperating with grace. The purpose of God when He had Christ make satisfaction, and of Christ Himself when He made satisfaction, was to save all if only they would willingly accept it. God did have foreknowledge that only a portion would accept it, but as a mere cognition this could not be of influence on His active purpose. This is the position taken by the Remonstrants.

c)   One can also deny it on the basis of hypothetical universalism, which we discussed earlier. The doctrine of Saumur maintains that the objective satisfaction of Christ stems from a universal ordaining of God’s grace that pertained to all mankind. This initial plan, however, was in vain, since not one person could satisfy God’s command to believe. Seeing this, God then devises a second plan. Out of free grace He decrees to give faith to some. By thus postulating two plans in God, one can say simultaneously that, according to God’s purpose, Christ has died for all without distinction and that it still depends on God’s free decision for whom His satisfaction extends for salvation and will become effective. Objective grace is for all, not only in its offer but also in the actual purpose of God. Subjective grace is for some, not from the beginning but only in the plan devised later.

63. What evidence can be advanced for the position that the satisfaction of Christ is in fact particular in nature?

a)   This follows directly from a proper conception of election. If everything that has been said about this doctrine earlier is correct, then all universalism in the doctrine of satisfaction is cut off at the root. We say that the election of particular persons to save them from sin and death comes first in the work of salvation as the beginning of everything, and that we cannot go back further than this; we can find nothing behind it. This, however, also determines the purpose that God had in all that follows.

Now we can also see why it is of importance to let the counsel of peace follow in order after election. The counsel of peace is at the root of satisfaction, and it cannot suffice to inquire about the purpose of God and Christ in bringing about satisfaction. Rather, one must inquire about their purpose in determining satisfaction. If satisfaction is particular, then the reason for that always lies in the particular suretyship of the Mediator. For whom did Christ become Surety in the counsel of peace? To this no other answer can be given than “for all those whom the Father has given to Him as elect.” Then, however, election must also lie in back of suretyship and not follow it. If one posits the latter, then everything immediately takes on a different shape. Then the counsel of peace did not have in view particular persons; Christ assumed His work without having had particular persons in mind; and everything becomes universal. The acceptance of the suretyship is made universal, and its execution is inseparably joined to this.

It is for this reason that we make salvation and all that belongs with it subordinate to election, but then also permit ourselves to draw the conclusion that the former can no more exceed the limits prescribed for it by election concerning its establishment in eternity than it can concerning its execution in time.

b)   The reverse conception is unworthy of God. If one does not start from Arminian or Amyraldian concepts, then this is truly less dangerous, but one still ascribes to God a manner of determining that is irreconcilable with His perfection. On this viewpoint, taken strictly, one cannot even really say that salvation is universal in intent. As soon as one asserts this, one has already crossed over onto the terrain of Amyraldus, for what was initially universal and has later become particular betrays a change of purpose. If one wishes to put the counsel of peace before election and wishes to do that as a Calvinist, one will have to be satisfied with saying that the former was no more intended to be universal than particular; that it was not at all concerned with either limitation or nonlimitation; that it was undetermined regarding extent; and, humanly speaking, that God had not yet put to Himself this question of extent. One, however, sees immediately that this entire train of thought is based on anthropomorphic thinking.

c)   Nothing needs to be said about the Arminian conception. Amyraldianism lapses into the incongruity of making the suretyship of the Mediator end entirely in fruitlessness, so that it is to be ascribed to a timely measure of God taken subsequently (that is, particular election) that the entire plan did not collapse. Here election becomes the final effort of God to prevent the total failure of His counsel. If such things are possible, then all certainty has disappeared from heaven and earth, and we may certainly fear that even now the outcome of the work of salvation is still uncertain.

d)   The giving of Christ by God and Christ’s giving of Himself appear in Scripture as the acts of supreme love, by which the sinner becomes aware that all other things will certainly be granted to him. If God did not spare His own Son, then nothing can be too great or too difficult for His love. Now, however, the question arises how this surpassing love should be conceived of: as personal or as general. Must this supreme love lack a personal nature and have the nature of a general love of mankind? This is impossible. Every believer is accustomed to value the gift of the Mediator as a gift personally intended for him. He must relate to each other these two most precious of all truths, the majesty of God’s love and its personal intent, and only by doing that does he receive his full salvation. Scripture also brings these two aspects together when it says “by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me” (Gal 2:20).

e)   If Christ’s satisfaction is a general one that obtains for all in the same sense, then He is able to earn the subjective operations of grace for those who receive them. And, on the contrary, if the subjective operations of grace are personal and do not come to pass for everyone, yet have the character of merited benefits, it then follows that Christ has acquired something for some that He did not acquire for all. Now, there can be no doubt regarding the following two considerations: (1) that this subjective grace is not magnified in all but only in some; (2) that it is nevertheless an earned benefit, for it is entirely the result of the work of the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is always presented as a gift earned by Christ. Thus the particular nature of satisfaction is inescapable other than by denying the fact that the Holy Spirit is a gift that was earned. And involved in that denial is a denial in principle of the active obedience of the Mediator, since with the elimination of the Holy Spirit and His gifts there remains nothing for the earning of which the active obedience would be necessary.

f)    If all that has been said above about the nature of satisfaction and its substitutionary character may be deemed to be correct, then no doubt can be entertained about its limited scope. A surety can only make atonement for those who are in fact atoned for by His work, those on whom the wrath of God no longer falls. That Christ would substitute for those who later still themselves have to bear punishment is a contradictio in adjecto [contradiction in terms]. God can establish as a condition that as long as the elect do not actually believe in Christ, He may demand satisfaction from them (although in fact it has already been made), but this is not a punishment in the real sense, and it is not at all equivalent to His requiring satisfaction from the lost themselves. For the latter, a prior satisfaction is excluded. Substitution includes dealing with persons; as there is a specific person who substitutes, there must be one or more specific persons for whom he substitutes. If one denies the personal aspect, the judicial aspect is omitted and one will have to invent a theory of satisfaction other than that found in Scripture, in which it is just the judicial aspect that stands out so prominently.

g)   All deviating views basically come down to this: that Christ’s satisfaction is restricted to removing certain obstacles—that He does not actually save all but enables all to be saved. So He should not be called Savior, but one who makes salvation possible. This, however, goes against the explicit testimony of Holy Scripture, which says of Christ that He came to save what was lost (Luke 19:10), to deliver us from the present evil world (Gal 1:4). His purpose in placing Himself under the law was not to make us redeemable in a general sense but to cause us to obtain adoption as children (see Gal 4:5). When all these expressions are robbed of their force to such an extent that they merely express “making savable,” then one can rightly say that the content of salvation is sacrificed to the extent of salvation. However, nothing of its glory remains.

h)   The high priestly work of the Mediator is a whole, and its different parts may not be separated from each other, including what concerns their purpose for the persons whom they benefit. From this it follows that Christ atoned for all those for whom He intercedes and prays before the Father and for no one else, since the one is simply the completion and fulfillment of the other. Now, it is taught that the Mediator does not intercede for everyone in general but only for His sheep (“I pray for them, I do not pray for the world but for those whom you have given me”; “Neither do I pray for these only but also for those who will believe in me through their word” [John 17:9, 20]). The same consideration is included in the fact that His intercession is efficacious, never without its effect. A priest who intercedes in vain is not a real priest but a suppliant. The work of a priest is infallible, and of Christ we know that He intercedes “as a priest on His throne” [Zech 6:13], that His Father “always hears” Him [John 11:42].

That the high priestly work as a whole makes the salvation of the persons to whom it applies absolutely certain can nowhere appear more clearly than in the reasoning of the apostle in Romans 8:33–35: “Who will bring any charge against God’s elect? It is God who justifies. Who is it that condemns? It is Christ who died, indeed more than that, who has also been raised (that is, justified), who is also at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us. Who will separate us from the love of Christ?” This also agrees with the nature of His intercession, which, as Owen rightly observes, cannot mean a humiliation or abasement of the Mediator with crying, tears, and pleading—indeed, which cannot even be understood as a comprehensible or oral prayer but consists entirely in a presentation of Himself before the throne of grace for our benefit. This intercession is, as it were, only a continuation of the sacrifice. As the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world, so by this presentation it remains slain until the end consummation of the ages, with ever-atoning sacrificial blood.

Finally, one can also reason the other way around, as follows: If the satisfaction of Christ were universal, then this would also have to result in universal intercession—for satisfaction without intercession, sacrifice without the sprinkling of blood, is an incomplete work from which no one gains anything. Although one might say that objectively Christ has died for all persons, still this can only mean that for the first half of His priestly work He included everyone in His intention in order for the second half to lose sight of them forthwith and so leave them without benefit.

i)    If the satisfaction of Christ is given a general scope, then the incongruity arises of a payment of penal guilt of which the results are uncertain. This is conceivable for a monetary debt. One can pay a certain sum for someone else on the condition that certain demands will be met, while it nevertheless naturally remains uncertain whether these conditions will be satisfied. But if they are not lived up to, then there is the possibility for the moneylender to recover the amount paid. It is otherwise for penal guilt. Here, who gives back to the surety the value of his satisfaction? Who reverses all the pain endured, the groaning and tears, the indescribable suffering, the groaning of soul? All that is irrevocably buried in the past and nothing in this world can undo it. Thus for every satisfaction of penal guilt a fixed and certain determination must be made concerning its effectual and infallible working in order to avoid this incongruity. And this determination lay precisely in the fact that in the purpose of God and Christ the priesthood had reference to the elect, whom it also certainly benefits.

j)    All must already admit a certain particularity in the scope of Christ’s satisfaction. If we say that Christ died for the sins of the world, we do not take the word “world” in its broadest sense. Everyone (except the most insistent universalists) excludes the devil and demons. Everyone who holds to Christ’s own words will likewise exclude those who have committed the sin against the Holy Spirit, for which there is no forgiveness and no sacrifice remains. Thus if one must already concede a restriction in the purpose of God on these points, then in principle one cannot entertain an objection against the restriction to the elect. The satisfaction of Christ would also have been sufficient for those who have sinned against the Holy Spirit, but in His sovereign good pleasure God has not foreordained that.

k)   Finally, we can still point to those passages in Scripture in which it is explicitly said that Christ died in an entirely specific sense for particular persons and not for all; compare John 10:15; 11:51–52; 15:13; Ephesians 5:25; Matthew 1:21.

64. To what do the opponents of particular satisfaction appeal?

Mainly to three things:

a)   To the universal offer of the gospel, concerning which all agree.

b)   To a series of Scriptural passages that speak of bearing the sins of the entire world and of dying for all.

c)   To some passages that make mention of a death of those for whom Christ has already died.

65. How should the first of these (the universal offer of the gospel) be judged?

The objection is that the presentation of the gospel becomes a meaningless form for those who do not share in the satisfaction of Christ. If we look more closely, this general objection involves three specific objections that are usually not sharply distinguished from each other, yet are essentially different.

a)   It is irreconcilable with the truthfulness of God that He would offer the gospel and the merits of Christ in it to those for whom He Himself did not intend them. God would thereby give the impression that He wills to do something that in fact He does not will.

b)   On our position, ministers of the gospel, one thinks, lose the right to direct a general invitation to people.

c)   The hearers of the gospel could not have confidence to rely on the suretyship and the satisfaction of Christ as long as they have not received infallible assurance that they personally belong to the elect. My confidence in believing can only rest on the fact that Christ has suffered for me. If He has not suffered for all, then I will first need to know whether I belong among those for whom He has surely suffered before I can have solid ground under me.

66. What may be said to counter the first form of this objection?

a)   That the offer of the gospel is not and does not present itself to be a revelation of God’s secret will or of the will of His decree. If this were so, a contradiction would in fact exist that would detract from God’s love of truth. If the following had to be concluded: God has the firm intention to bring them personally to salvation and now it depends on A or B whether you will meet God’s purpose or disappoint Him—if this was the content of the gospel—then particular election and satisfaction would indeed be excluded. This, however, is not the content of our gospel or of the gospel of Scripture. This gospel does not express itself concerning the secret will of God but speaks of His revealed will. We understand this revealed will to include the command of God that comes to man and in each particular instance is determined by the specific relationship of man to God. Now, there is no doubt that it is the obligation of man to accept the possibility of redemption that is offered to him in the gospel, hopefully and gratefully. God can make that demand, and the gospel comes with that demand to all men.

b)   That the content of the gospel, as it is presented to all without distinction, is a declaration of the will of God that A and B, etc., may personally be saved, but that still in this regard should always be considered a conditional will. It is not only that we are not dealing with God’s secret will; we are also dealing with His revealed will under a specific condition. In God there is no unsatisfied desire that has silence imposed on it by His secret will. The desire of God can be understood as follows: If you believed, then the good pleasure of God would rest upon this act of faith. This conditional character is thus always to be kept in view and kept in the foreground.

c)   It is true that in the sense just described the gospel comes to many for whom Christ has not died. But at the same time it is true that these are precisely those who willfully despise the sacrifice of Christ. It may never be portrayed as if countless sinners who, eager for salvation, are seeking a ransom [and] now have to be dismissed with the explanation, “This ransom was not meant for you.” In doing that, one would be entertaining purely abstract possibilities that under the present circumstances could never become reality. The truth is that not a single instance of this kind can occur. God’s ordaining is such that all those for whom Christ in His purposing has not died are precisely the same as those who reject Christ by their unbelief. Even if satisfaction were universal, this can make no difference regarding their personal attitude toward it. In reality, they would no more share in it then than now.

d)   As noted above, the gospel is intended to deprive man of every excuse and to place the magnitude of his corruption in the clearest light. That is why God does not let the gospel be proclaimed only to the elect but also brings it indiscriminately to all men (as far as it in fact reaches them and, in principle, as far as we can bring it to them). Now a sifting takes place. But now, too, sin in its inner essence comes to full flowering because it becomes unbelief in the face of grace. It belongs to God’s righteousness toward sin that it will also reveal its true character to sinners themselves. The preaching of the gospel contributes to this. This came out most clearly at the time of the appearance of the Mediator on earth in the flesh. Unbelief reacted against Him, the incarnation of grace, in the most decisive way. Naturally, aggravation of guilt is inseparable from this reaction of sin and its related development. However, no one can dispute God’s right to bring man into contact with the gospel, even if by that his judgment becomes more severe. Whoever disputes this right takes an Arminian standpoint and tacitly assumes that God owed satisfaction to man. It is the obligation of man to accept in faith everything that God presents to him. And once this obligation is present, God cannot act unjustly when He punishes the failure to meet this obligation, regardless of whether man is able to fulfill his duty.

e)   Preaching has as its goal to call everyone it reaches: “If you will, take freely from the water of life” [Rev 22:17]; and “If you come, He will by no means cast you out” [John 6:37]. But it has neither the calling nor the right to make of this “willing” something other than Scripture means by it. It is not to be presented in a Methodistic manner as a sudden, uncaused act of will, a kind of experiment that can be independent of all antecedent conditions. The willing to which Scripture alludes is the willing of faith, of saving faith, the deepest act a person can do, in which his entire being shares and concurs—an act that becomes entirely impossible and incomprehensible without a prior attitude of repentance, to which it is linked and from which it in part results. Thus to will, along with putting aside all confidence in one’s self, is to have such a delight in the work of Christ and such an inner conviction of its sufficiency that we reach out for it with all the strength that is in us.

Now, the freest preaching of the gospel must make clear that such a willing is the only means by which we can become partakers of Christ. If one will not be untruthful, then the significance of faith may never disappear. And the preventive against this difficulty is a preaching of the law accompanying the preaching of the gospel. Whoever does not first bring the sinner to an awareness of his lost condition will also not elicit true faith in his heart by preaching. It is simply not true that everyone has a right to Christ who just chooses to believe at whim. The faith to which the recent methods of evangelism incite is something irrational. The faith of Scripture is a faith supernaturally wrought by the Spirit of God but still not an unnatural faith.

67. What should be said concerning the second objection: that with particular satisfaction ministers of the gospel could not have the confidence to bring the offer of the gospel to all?

a)   That, as ordained ministers, they do not have as their charge to carry it out according to their own reasonings and reflections. It is God’s concern to reconcile their calling and His decree with each other. They have only to follow the commission given them. That alone determines the scope of their work. And that reads: “Preach the gospel to all creatures” [Matt 24:14].

b)   The message of the gospel does not entail that one must assure everyone, head for head: God wills your personal salvation with the will of His decree. Then one would be proclaiming an untruth. Rather, it entails:

1.   Setting forth the demands of God on every sinner and the work of Christ as intrinsically sufficient and suited to satisfy for every sinner.

2.   Unfolding the nature of repentance and of faith as that which is necessary to obtain the personal application of the merits of Christ.

3.   Giving certain assurance that everyone who comes to Christ conscious of guilt and in faith may appropriate all the benefits of the covenant of grace as his personal possession.

c)   Inasmuch as God has chosen to have His gospel ministered by men and has not chosen to give them insight in advance into His secret counsel, it is entirely understandable why the gospel must be preached to everyone. The elect are hidden among all these. Universal preaching is also a means of reaching the particular objects of satisfaction.

d)   Also, it may not be forgotten that the gospel does not bypass unbelievers without a trace. It becomes to them a scent of death unto death [2 Cor 2:16]. Its preaching is a crisis in which all the depravity of the heart develops to full fruition and by which the measure of wrath at the day of God’s retribution is made full.

The third objection mentioned above has been sufficiently removed by what has been said.

68. How should we assess those texts that are cited against particular satisfaction and that appear to teach that Christ died for everyone?

a)   To begin with, one should envision the historical conditions of the time when the New Testament was written. A period of particularism, willed by God, had scarcely ended. The limitation of the dispensation of grace was a principle that was resident in the Jews to the bone. Many could not conceive of any other than a particularistic religion. Now, suddenly the dispensation of the New Testament arose with its universalism—that is, with its principle that by grace all ethnic boundaries fall away, that in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek but only a new creature. It was in all respects obvious that under these circumstances all emphasis had to be placed on how Christ has died for all. We should rather wonder that more such passages do not occur. Passages such as 1 John 2:2 (cf. John 11:51–52); Hebrews 2:9 (ὑπὲρ παντός); Titus 2:11; 2 Peter 3:9; etc., are to be considered in this light.

b)   When here and there it is said that Christ has died for the world or is an atonement for the sins of the whole world, then one should be extremely careful about arbitrarily drawing the conclusion: He has made satisfaction for all men. The word “world” has a number of meanings and is certainly not plainly synonymous with “all people.” It can mean the universe, or all people in the world, or all kinds of people, many or the majority of the people, or the Roman world, or humanity as alienated from God and under the curse, etc. It is unnecessary to put forward evidence for all these different meanings. Anyone can open his concordance and be convinced. Therefore, if one wishes to derive a proof for the universality of satisfaction from the expressions mentioned above, then one will only be able to do this by considering the context and carefully demonstrating that in fact a satisfaction of Christ for all, head for head, is taught. And then one will perceive that nowhere is this the case.

c)   Our principle should always be that Scripture is to be explained by Scripture. Now, if we have a series of texts that teach the particular or restricted scope of satisfaction, and beside them a series of texts that seem to mention a universal intention, the one must agree with the other. Now, everyone can see that the texts of the first category lose their meaning and become totally inexplicable when one forces through the universal scope of Christ’s work. But one cannot maintain the reverse. The passages of Scripture with a more universal ring still retain a clear meaning and by no means become inexplicable when they are considered from the standpoint of particular satisfaction.

d)   That these universal-sounding passages may not lead us to conceive of a universal satisfaction appears from the following consideration: They speak not only of a universal satisfaction but also of a universal salvation. “As in Adam all die, so in Christ will all be made alive” [1 Cor 15:22]. Most proponents of universal satisfaction, however, do not maintain that all people are in fact saved by the sacrifice of Christ. Thus in all the expressions referred to here they must subject the general terms themselves to a certain restriction. Not all people are made alive by Christ but all who are entitled to that life, who are born spiritually of Him, as all who are naturally born of the first Adam inherit death from him. This, however, is nothing other than the explanation that we apply to other passages as well. Compare John 12:32; 1 Corinthians 15:22; Colossians 1:20; 2 Corinthians 5:14; Ephesians 1:10; Romans 5:18. When it comes to such passages, Arminians immediately say, “All, all who believe in Christ.”

69. What passages are advanced by the opponents of particular satisfaction to prove that Christ has died for those who are nevertheless lost?

For this they appeal to Romans 14:15; 1 Corinthians 8:11; 2 Peter 2:1; Hebrews 10:29.

70. Do these passages in fact contain what is sought in them?

No. As far as the first is concerned, it does not speak of the nonelect at all. The apostle rouses the stronger believers not to grieve their brothers by what they eat, if these are weaker. He then adds, “And do not destroy by what you eat the one for whom Christ has died.” That is, do nothing that has a destructive tendency or can have destructive consequences for one ransomed by the Lord. Eternal destruction is not in view here but an offense that would hinder the development of spiritual life.

In 1 Corinthians 8:11, mention is made of the perishing of a brother for whom Christ died because he sees another brother with more knowledge go into a temple of idols. The context, however, shows how this perishing, literally “becoming destroyed,” is to be understood. It consists in violation of conscience and moral ruination, but this is not all the same as “being lost forever.” The following verse explains further what is meant by speaking of wounding the conscience of the brother.

Concerning 2 Peter 2:1, there are two explanations. First, one has pointed to the difference between κύριος and δεσπότης. The passage reads, “And there will also be false prophets among you, who will secretly introduce destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them and bringing upon themselves swift destruction.” This first interpretation understands δεσπότης, translated here as “Master,” not as Christ but as God the Father. “Bought” is understood as liberation from idolatry, false teachings, etc. Thus the sin of the false prophets becomes so great because they deny God by false teaching when it is the very same God who had delivered them from error by the light of truth. The other interpretation, however, seems more plausible to us. It has the apostle speaking here from the standpoint of the heretics themselves. They claim that Christ has died for them and has ransomed them. But they deny that same Lord about whom they profess that. Their sin is great precisely because it is committed against the light and better knowledge, in and even within the circle of the Christian church, in the bosom of the congregation. Such persons bring a swift destruction upon themselves. Accordingly, all is clear and unforced, and one does not need, with Turretin and others, to appeal to the difference between κύριος and δεσπότης.

Hebrews 10:29 reads, “How much more severe punishment do you think he will deserve who has trampled on the Son of God, and has regarded as unclean the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified, and has insulted the Spirit of grace?” This, too, should be understood from the standpoint of those who could become apostate. Their rejection of Christ would be a rejection of a ransom that they had first openly accepted. This is worse than scorning the Savior without first confessing Him. There is a greater degree of wickedness inherent in renouncing something in which one has first lived, even if only outwardly, than in not accepting something to which one has not yet had a relationship. And as the wickedness becomes greater, so also the punishment will become more severe. In all these instances, however, it is not at all that such persons have been converted in their heart and so have actually been redeemed from sin by Christ.

71. What aberrant theories concerning satisfaction need to be noted and discussed briefly here?

a)   The distinctive view of some church fathers

b)   The moral or ethical theory

c)   The governmental theory

d)   The mystical theory

72. What was distinctive about the conception that some church fathers had of satisfaction?

The conception of many church fathers since Origen and Irenaeus had a dualistic cast. They presented it as if the ransom did not have to be paid to the righteousness of God but rather to Satan. Thereby the latter came to be a second, independent principle next to God and appeared as a person with whom God must negotiate, who has certain claims that are to be respected. He has man in his power as a prisoner and cannot be forced to let him go unless he receives compensation, a ransom. This has been called a military theory of satisfaction, not without good reason, for it is based on a kind of military law. The notion of the Christian life as military service may have contributed its share to this view.

As far as the details are concerned, a great deal of difference reigns. According to some, Christ took the place of imprisoned men and then broke the bonds of Satan. According to others, He attacked Satan directly and was victorious. According to still others, He broke the power of the evil one by letting Himself be killed by him. Satan was only allowed to kill those who were guilty. By attacking Christ, he overreached himself, exceeded his rights, and forfeited them.

73. What is to be said with this theory in view?

It contains an element of truth and can appeal to passages in Scripture like Hebrews 2:14 and Colossians 2:15. Guilty man has fallen prey to death. With the permission of God, demonic power under the direction of the devil can carry out part of this punishment on man. Both sin itself as well as the consequences of sin are presented in Scripture as servitude to Satan.

The Fathers, however, overlooked to too great a degree that Satan is merely an instrument of God and that we are only freed from his power by its basis in God’s righteousness being removed by the satisfaction of Christ. Furthermore, it appears clear enough from this theory how far removed the Fathers were from a moral conception of satisfaction, according to which only something in man would need to be changed. They agree with the orthodox doctrine insofar as they seek the necessity of satisfaction in something outside of man.

74. What do you understand by the ethical or moral theory concerning the satisfaction of Christ?

That conception according to which the purpose and efficacy of Christ’s priestly work are sought in causing a moral impression on man, more specifically by presenting Christ as an example worthy of imitation, or by having Him appear as an evidence of the love of God, who desires to suffer with the creature. The first view is that of the Socinians. They see the death of Christ as the death of a martyr who by dying has sealed His teaching, providing us with a powerful proof of its truth and leaving us a beautiful example of a love of truth, while at the same time they acknowledge that death for Him was the point of transition to His glorification. The second view is that of Bushnell (1876) in America; Robertson, Maurice (1872), Campbell (1872), Young in England; and Ritschl with his school in Germany. The latter all assume that Christ suffered to convince man by actions that nothing stood in the way of their reconciliation with God. When one further inquires of them how the suffering of Christ can hold good as evidence for the love of God, then the answers are different. Some say that love was manifested by Christ not allowing Himself to shy away from the misery to which He was exposed by entering into a sinful world. Others answer that God wished to impress on man that He felt sympathy for them and could enter into their suffering. By that the heart is softened and made loving. Still others let the significance of Christ’s work consist of feeling remorse for the sin of man, a remorse that was fully sufficient to take away guilt.

75. What objections are to be raised against the Socinian form of this theory?

a)   It rests on Socinian rationalism, which explains the will, sin, divine righteousness, and everything related to these in an entirely superficial way, in conflict with the thoroughgoing witness of Scripture. It is untrue that man only has need of a good example in order to become good instead of evil. He needs to be re-created and so cannot change his own will by imitation. The righteousness of God is a reality and may not be viewed, as the Socinians want, as a form of benevolence. Sin is guilt and not only moral error. On each of these points, the Socinians judge in a Pelagian fashion.

b)   There are elements of the suffering of Christ that cannot be explained as imitative martyrdom. One expects from a martyr that he will bear his suffering cheerfully and heroically. The opposite is seen in Christ. Although He endured patiently and purely, there is not a trace of the martyr’s enthusiasm that transcends the pains. He had to be immersed in sorrows and with cries and groans offer prayers and supplications with tears [cf. Heb 5:7]. Also, being forsaken by God cannot be explained with this theory. It has rightly been observed that whoever regards Christ as a martyr must look for a higher ideal and undoubtedly will be able to find a higher ideal in the history of science or religion.

c)   If the significance of Christ’s work is to be sought in providing an example, then it remains completely unexplained how the emphasis in Scripture can fall on His death instead of His life. To say that Christ’s death occurs as a validation of His life does not resolve this problem, for everywhere it is the fact of the death itself that is presented to us in Scripture as most important and not this fact in relation to something that preceded it.

76. How can you refute the other form of this moral theory?

a)   If, as this theory assumes, only a subjective change in the attitude of man is necessary, then God is powerful enough to bring that about by His Holy Spirit, without Christ having to suffer all those afflictions. Indeed, it would be cruelty in God if He let His Son suffer where this is not absolutely necessary and the goal can be reached in another way.

b)   Now this consideration also removes the foundation to the moral theory. For if Christ did not have to die, and it was God’s free choice to end the hostility of man precisely in this manner, then in the delivering up of Christ one can no longer see an extraordinary gift of love. It is this only if it is necessary for the sake of man and ceases to be that as soon as the thought of possible secondary purposes in God occur to us.

c)   It is established psychologically that tragic suffering does not make an impression on human nature when it has a premeditated character—that is, if one knows that it was brought about with the goal of making an impression. In this respect, the older Socinian theory provided greater advantages than this newer form. In fact, according to Socinus, the suffering of Christ was something unintentional and accidental that befell Him since He was unwilling to vacillate or yield when it came to fulfilling His duty. Such a martyr’s simplicity could make an impression. A tragedy devised in advance, on the other hand, cannot. Now Scripture tells us that Christ’s suffering was in fact conceived and devised in advance, that He would come into the world to suffer. He was delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God [Acts 2:23]. What God’s counsel and hand had determined beforehand would occur [cf. Acts 4:28] happened to Him. Given this, it is impossible to believe in earnest in the suffering of Christ as an impressive tragedy unless one also believes in a divine righteousness that made this tragedy objectively necessary.

d)   Bushnell, one of the leading defenders of this form of the moral theory, had to concede that Scripture always presents the work of Christ as a sacrifice to make satisfaction. This was necessary, as he said, in order that man, for whom the fruit of this work is intended, does not become overly self-assured. That is, this theory naturally entails that the sinner purposefully comes to contemplate the suffering of Christ—adopts various attitudes toward it in order, in doing that, to induce in himself the requisite impression. Thus, not only does the work itself become an exhibition, the appropriation of it by the sinner, too, is time and again in danger of becoming an exhibition. That is why, Bushnell says, the Bible speaks of it more or less covertly, so that we can absorb its impression in a less self-aware manner. This acknowledgement exposes in a striking fashion the weaknesses of the entire theory.

e)   Against the particular form of this theory that seeks the significance of Christ’s work in repentance for the sins of the world, we recall that repentance is precisely what is nontransferable in sin. No one can repent for someone else; certainly one can bear penal guilt for someone else. Only, then, when the substitutionary character of Christ’s satisfaction is acknowledged, could one speak, in a modified sense, of repentance in Him—that is, as of insight and whole-hearted recognition that the punishments that He suffered as Surety were deserved. This, however, is still not repentance in the proper sense of the word. The theory of Campbell is consequently untenable, despite its attempt to understand satisfaction more objectively.

77. Give an exposition of the so-called governmental theory.

This theory was first developed in principle by Hugo Grotius in his work A Defense of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ. This apology was directed against the Socinians. Grotius wished to uphold the objectivity of satisfaction—that is, it must serve in support of God’s principles of moral government. Imperceptibly, however, Grotius himself lapsed into the subjectivization he contested in Socinus. Later on, this theory was further elaborated especially in New England around the end of the last century. Its major arguments are the following:

a)   The core of all reasonable religion is benevolence—that is, endeavoring to promote the happiness of others. All reasonable qualities may be reduced to this. When something does not aim at the happiness of others, it is thereby condemned as unreasonable, and when something occurs in God that is seemingly in conflict with the needs of creatures, then we should form a conception of it that avoids this appearance. Punitive righteousness must be explained in such a manner that it resolves into benevolence, into a fitting provision for the well-being of the creature.

b)   The entire relationship between God and the creature must be explained by this principle of benevolence. God seeks the well-being of rational beings, and for Him everything is subordinate to this. That is why He prescribes laws and requires obedience. The basis for this is not that He, as the highest good and eternal Creator, is entitled to our service, but is nothing other than the impulse of His nature to make us happy. Thus, while for us the good in God is love for justice, according to this theory justice is taken up in love and becomes a more or less arbitrarily chosen aid to cause love to prevail.

c)   Certain sanctions were attached to the laws that God prescribed out of love. God deemed that He could best achieve His goal if He connected certain positive punishments to transgression of the law. Punishment is suffering that is attached by God to sin in an extrinsic way, without there being a logical or rational connection between the two. The connection consists entirely in association. Men become aware, by the revelation of God or by experience, that where there is sin, there is also suffering, and that God follows this fixed rule. By this awareness, they will gain an instinctive aversion to evil. Thus God gambles, as it were, on the self-love of men, on their aversion to suffering, and thereby seeks to deter from transgressing the law. All this He does, however, with no other purpose than to promote the well-being of His creatures.

d)   God could have punished all sinners who have transgressed the law. But had this happened, the exercise of punishment would have missed its goal since evil has spread universally. Therefore, for promoting the well-being of the creature it makes no sense to punish transgression of the law, for the goal, namely deterring others, can never be attained. Still, on the other hand, punishment cannot simply be remitted. The majesty of the justice would thereby be lost, and man would lose all reverence for the lawgiver. It is therefore necessary that God at the same time spare the sinner and provide a clear example of the execution of punishment. This was done in Christ. By having Him die, God has shown that He was serious about the maintenance of the sanctions associated with the law.

e)   The suffering undergone by Christ, however, should not be viewed as strictly or literally the same or of equal value as that which sinners themselves would have had to suffer had the threat of the law been carried out on them. It is not, however, a punishment by substitution but something that substitutes for punishment. God had only to see to it that the suffering of Christ would produce the same impression that the personal punishing of the guilty themselves, who now go free, would have caused. Thus a relaxation takes place.

f)    The result of this suffering consists in the possibility that now God may enter anew into a moral relationship with men and can again seek, by the majesty of His justice and the threat of punishment, to move them to doing good. He does not now need to look back on His initial experiment as a failure, for He has carried out His threats in Christ. Justice has lost nothing of its moral gravity. For all, the opportunity is now open anew to earn the eternal life that as a positive sanction was joined to keeping the law. The covenant of grace, which rests on the death of Christ, is nothing other than a new covenant of works. The suffering of Christ is not so much its foundation but is much more a preparatory means to eliminate certain obstacles. It saves no one actually, but makes all salvable.

78. What is our criticism of this theory?

a)   Its foundations are totally unscriptural and, moreover, philosophically untenable. It needs no demonstration that the doctrine of benevolence as the essence of all moral good, described above, is in conflict with Scripture. It is erected on philosophical principles from entirely outside the Bible. Apart from that, however, it must lead to eudaemonism or return to our standpoint. One could pose the following question to its proponents: If the morally good is known by the fact that it wills to promote happiness, does it not then also derive its value, morally considered, from this purpose? It will be difficult to give a negative answer in response. A morally good being must seek the happiness of others. Why must he do this? Because happiness is the highest good in the world; it must be sought for its own sake. That is clearly eudaemonism, the apotheosis of happiness, the reduction of the good to the pleasurable. If, on the other hand, one says that in the first place benevolence should not strive for the happiness of others but for their moral improvement, then one has thereby acknowledged that moral rectitude carries its value in itself and is neither dependent on happiness nor to be identified with benevolence. Then, however, it will also follow that sin carries within itself its own condemnation, which must be carried out not for the sake of happiness but apart from all consequences. That is exactly what we maintain when we say that God must punish sin.

b)   The theory is modeled on a certain conception of the goal of the earthly administration of justice. Since it is within the purpose of punishment administered by earthly civil government to promote the well-being of society and elevate the happiness of its citizens, one thinks that therefore: (1) Punishment must be considered entirely from this point of view; (2) God’s punishing can also have no other significance.

This reasoning, however, is false, both in its premises and in its conclusions. It is false in its premises, for it is not at all the case that government punishes exclusively in order to protect society. The state is more than a utilitarian institution. It has value and significance in itself, and accordingly its administration of justice is also of independent significance. This reasoning is false in its conclusions, for what is true for this earthly and temporal dispensation may not therefore be transferred to what is eternal and final: the administration of justice by God.

c)   The theory rests on an unworthy conception of God and of the manner in which He deals with His creatures. He first tries, by sanctions that threaten personal punishment, to maintain the majesty of justice and to induce fulfilling the law. This experiment, however, is a total failure. If God now willed to carry out His threats, He would achieve precisely the opposite of His intention: the misery instead of the happiness of His creatures. He is therefore compelled to withdraw His threats, insofar as they were personal, to grant a compromise between full enforcement and total violation of the law, and to set an example in Christ. By doing this, reverence for the law among His creatures is salvaged and God can begin with a new experiment. However, what if this also should fail? Is it not natural for transgressors to hope anew for a relaxation in the future? After God did not strictly carry out the threat in the past, who will provide a guarantee that He will do so in the future? The possibility exists that He will no more be deterred by the action of Christ from a third experiment than He was held back by the transgression of the law from showing grace in Christ. All moral seriousness in His tendencies disappears, and the satisfaction of the Mediator leads exactly to the opposite of what it was supposed to effect according to this theory. Additionally, because of this God repeatedly assumes a false attitude toward His creatures. He says, “If you transgress, then you will be punished,” but His deepest thought and intention in this is, “By saying this man will be deterred from transgressing, and if that does not avail, the law can always be relaxed.”

d)   According to this theory, God counts on the self-interest of man. The sanctions attached to the law are effective only insofar as they cause man to fear punishment. Now, it is true that earthly governments can and must also make use of this motive on their sinful subjects to maintain social order and keep sinful tendencies in check. But it is entirely incredible that God, who is not only concerned with outward decorum but with truth inwardly, would settle for observance of the law effected in this way and would make it the foundation for the eternal well-being of creatures.

e)   The defender of the governmental theory, however, could say, “Punishment for sin and the satisfaction of Christ should not be viewed exclusively as a deterrent.” It is not our meaning that God only intends to work on man by fear. We maintain that in the suffering of Christ God has left an impressive statement concerning the abhorrent character of sin. By this execution of punishment, He has not so much said—or at least not only said—what the consequence of sin is but rather what sin is. And by awakening insight into the abhorrent character of sin, satisfaction does its work and God reaches His goal.

Our answer to this should be that if God can show how abhorrent sin is by bringing suffering upon the sinner or upon Christ, then this can only find explanation in a punitive righteousness that must be carried out. In itself, suffering in no way has as its purpose to highlight the abhorrence of sin. If we presuppose that God does not necessarily possess righteousness that works retribution, then there is nothing in the least in the character of physical suffering that proclaims: sin is such a great evil. There are only two ways in which punishment can be related to sin: (1) as a deterrent, and (2) as just punishment. So when the advocates of the theory discussed here speak again and again of the suffering of the Lord as a proclamation of how abhorrent sin is, then they unwittingly take our position and use terms that only have meaning within our system.

The same thing can also be made clear along the following lines. Regarding its relation to sin, suffering can be considered in three ways:

1.   By virtue of God’s unimpeachable righteousness, it is connected to sin by God positively. One then adopts our position.

2.   It is arbitrarily connected to sin by God as a deterrent, so that man, by the force of the principle of association, would be restrained from sinning. God then counts on the fear of man.

3.   It results from sin itself as its natural outworking. Sin yields its own punishment. In Christ, God willed to demonstrate what sin by its nature leads to if it continues. In this case, however, God again counts on the self-centered fear of man. He wishes to move him to cease from sin, not because of its own heinousness but because of the heinousness of its consequences. The lesson of the cross of Christ may then be expressed in the following words: By doing good one gets ahead the furthest, and evil is a disastrous and dangerous principle!

f)    Finally, this theory makes the suffering of our Lord more a display than a reality. It was designed to create an effect, not to satisfy righteousness. In no way is this in accord with what is reported to us concerning the suffering of Christ. With that, the emphasis is always on the sorrow and anguish that Christ lived through in His own consciousness, not on what He appeared to others to be. Think of the struggle in Gethsemane, of the refusal of the Lord to take the wine mingled with myrrh [Mark 15:23].

79. What conception does the mystical theory have of the work of satisfaction of the Lord?

It agrees in one respect with the moral theory already discussed, namely, insofar as it seeks the purpose of satisfaction in a change that must take place in the creature, not in the fulfillment of a requirement of God. However, while the moral theory limits this change to the consciousness of the creature and finds its essence in a change of the subjective state of man, the mystical theory conceives of the situation more deeply and allows for a reversal to take place in an unconscious change. Christ intervenes in life in the organic existence of man, and what occurred through and after the incarnation in Himself, in His human nature, was the beginning of a conversion of human nature. Only as such does His suffering have significance. Sin is to be viewed not as guilt but as power, as indwelling corruption that must be countered and purged. While this grounding is common to all forms of the mystical theory, they differ from each other in their further elaboration.

a)   The Platonizing Greek church fathers spoke of a deification of human nature through the incarnation of the Logos. We have seen how the orthodox doctrine of the two natures in one person can be misused in this way. Deification means, in the first place, removal of perishability, to make immortal. In this view, the element of guilt naturally recedes into the background.

b)   Others, especially in more recent times, put more emphasis on sin itself than on the consequences of sin. Sin is a power resident in the flesh of man, that is, in his corrupt nature. Christ with His human nature, with His flesh, had to take this power into Himself, let it have its effect on Him, and thus abolish it. One can see how this makes it necessary to think of Christ as sinful, for only by having sin within Himself could He expel sin. Instead of being a barrier that would preclude Him from being our Redeemer, for this viewpoint sin becomes an indispensable requirement for Christ to be able to become that Redeemer. This also entails, however, that only overcoming and expelling sin as a stain is at issue, and sin as guilt does not need to be reckoned with. One cannot have both in view at the same time, for precisely by assuming a sinful nature, the possibility ceases for Christ to pay for the guilt of the sins of others. Hence guilt is simply pushed aside. Sin is a poison that has entered man apart from his guilt. All that is required is an antidote that consists in the poison losing its power in someone who lets it subside within himself and at the same time does not succumb to it. This is the theory of Irving in England; of Meuken, Stier, and Strok in Germany. According to Irving, Christ possessed original sin but no actual sin. By the power of the Holy Spirit, he suppressed the flesh and gradually purged it so that finally only spirit remained.

c)   The conception of Schleiermacher. According to Schleiermacher, the work of Christ consists in His taking believers up into the communion of His life—that is, in part into communion with His powerful God-consciousness, in part into the enjoyment of His perfect salvation. The former is called redemption, the latter reconciliation. The suffering of Christ consisted in nothing other than sympathy with human guilt and in patiently bearing the evil that the sinful world inflicted on Him. While He thus suffered with sinners, at the same time He was completely at peace with God.

Those who become members of the church of Christ receive some of this same life, which knows itself to be at peace with God; they are redeemed and reconciled. Guilt as an objective relationship toward God is not at all taken into account. For Schleiermacher, sin is merely the ascendancy of world-consciousness, or the flesh, over God-consciousness, caused by the fact that the former develops earlier, and if the God-consciousness is awakened, has already gained an influence that prevents the latter from coming to its fullness. The punishment that is linked with sin is not recognized as such by Schleiermacher. Punishment is only the natural consequence of sin. In the exercise of His work as Mediator, Christ has become a partaker in the consequences of sin that was not His own sin. Thus He has become acquainted with suffering as separable from personal sin. Those who are brought into the fellowship of His life also become acquainted with it as such, with the result that they no longer feel it to be a disturbance of their salvation. Their reconciliation consists in this. It is not reconciliation with God but a reconciliation with the suffering of this life.

80. What objections are to be brought against these mystical theories?

a)   That they reverse the scriptural order. This order is that man cannot be delivered from sin as a power if he is not first freed from guilt as a burden outside himself. These theories maintain that guilt cannot be removed other than by the power of sin being broken within man himself.

b)   Everything that belongs to the sinful past of the man delivered in this way is simply consigned to oblivion, as if a just demand of God did not attach to that past. However, if guilt can only be removed by taking away sin, and the sins of the past can no longer be taken away, then the guilt of the past must forever continue to testify against us. One can only get past this consideration by pushing aside the entire scriptural notion of guilt.

c)   All these theories limit the efficacy of the satisfaction of Christ (if His work may still be called that) to the period after His incarnation and suffering. Salvation becomes a mystical process tied to the humanity of the Savior as actually existing. The human life of Christ cannot be effective before it actually existed. Given that, it follows that all generations living before the incarnation of Christ, both in Israel and among the pagans, have died off unredeemed and unreconciled—contrary to the express testimony of Scripture, which assigns a true salvation to God’s covenant people already under the old dispensation based on the suretyship of Christ.

d)   The attribution of an actual sinful nature to Christ makes Him utterly unfit to be able to be our Savior. This is not only the case when one adopts our legal standpoint, but would still have to be the case even on the standpoint of Irving, Menken, et al. By the power of sin in His nature, the person of Christ, too, must become unavoidably sinful. A sinful person, however, cannot save himself. To claim this is equivalent to Pelagianism. To claim the opposite, that the human nature of Christ can be sinful without His person sharing in that sin, amounts to Nestorianism.

e)   This entire conception of the work of the Mediator fits within pantheism, as appears most clearly in the beliefs of Schleiermacher. Here sin, punishment, guilt all become unavoidable conditions. Instead of being an expression of the righteousness of a personal, transcendent God, the suffering in the world becomes a necessary state of affairs in nature. When man is reconciled, this does not consist in a legal acquittal by which he is relieved of suffering for his sins, but in stimulating a fresh consideration of this suffering so that man learns to recognize that suffering is not punishment. This terminology of Schleiermacher, then, is completely misleading. What he calls reconciliation would have much more properly been called redemption.

81. On what important issue do many who otherwise share our view of satisfaction depart from the time-honored doctrine?

On the point of the basis of the imputation of our sin to Christ. We have seen earlier how realism and traducianism, when they are used to explain the transmission of hereditary guilt and hereditary corruption, lead to insurmountable problems in Christology. It is surely well established that Christ assumed our nature from the flesh and blood of the Virgin Mary. If original sin is automatically transmitted with this nature, then it was also transmitted to Christ. As for corruption, one may avoid that by referring to the purification of this nature by the Holy Spirit before it was assumed. For guilt, however, the situation is completely different. That cannot be waived by some act of power, and if it continues to exist, it also makes the purification of the nature impossible. If Christ has sinned in Adam, then God cannot justly purify human nature on His behalf. For if He can do this with Christ, He would also be able do this with every sinner, and then salvation through payment for guilt would be unnecessary.

Despite these substantial objections with which realism and traducianism are burdened, many not only retain these positions, but in more recent times it is claimed from more than one side that they provide the key for understanding the solidarity of the Savior with us. To be able to bear our sins, it is argued, He not only has to possess our human nature but, moreover, has to share in the first act of original sin, so that it can be rightly affirmed that He does not assume sin alien to Him but that of a race in which He shares personally. One sees that this view is considerably different from that of Irving and his followers. According to Irving, habitual sin was inherent in Christ; according to the advocates of this view, there was only adhering guilt. The Holy Spirit purified His human nature such that this hereditary guilt did not result in hereditary corruption. So Christ could suffer for us as sinless, and it could nevertheless be affirmed that it was not an absolutely alien guilt that was imputed to Him—for at one point, the point of His own hereditary guilt, He shared in that guilt personally.

82. Why is this conception utterly untenable?

a)   It rests on a weakened conception of hereditary guilt as the source and root of all evil. One thinks that hereditary guilt can be attributed to Christ and that everything else can be denied to Him. That is to nullify the organic bond there is between hereditary guilt and inherent corruption, not only in a real but also in a legal sense. Whoever keeps this close bond in view, and is deeply imbued with the conviction that no sin of any kind may be attributed to Christ, will instinctively recoil from making the origin of all sin, the guilt of Adam, to adhere to Christ. By this, a dangerous line is crossed. Scripture speaks of that guilt as fully sin, as disobedience, and contrasts it with the obedience of Christ as the second Adam.

b)   Those who champion this opinion think that the close bond between hereditary guilt and inherent corruption can be abolished by an act of God’s power, by the purification of His human nature by the Holy Spirit. This, however, is a fallacy. If the guilt of sin in its consequences can be stopped by such acts of power, the entire work of the Mediator is superfluous. God can then do the same for every sinner and thus render harmless the consequences of guilt. However, He deals with the Surety not according to power but according to justice. Thus a justification must lie in back of the sanctification of human nature. If one goes on to accept that, then it becomes immediately clear to what disastrous consequences this false idea leads. We then have a Surety who must first be justified and sanctified—and that on the basis of his own merits, as it were by their imputation in advance, before He could intervene for us.

c)   The great error of this conception is that one does not take with sufficient seriousness the notion of covenant attribution. This free attribution that unites Christ and us, initially separated, into one body, not only for suffering but for the entire future, must remain the point of departure. The apostle does not teach us that Christ could be made to be sin for us because He was already guilty, but that He who knew no sin was made to be sin for us so that we might become the righteousness of God in Him [2 Cor 5:21]. Because, however, this mystery, which came to pass in the counsel of God, has been lost sight of, all sorts of other means are seized on to fill its vacant place. Then realism and traducianism must serve to eliminate the problems that arise.

And if one looks more closely, one will note that in the end nothing is gained by this. Surely, one will not be able or want to deny that Christ has been a divine person from eternity. If now He is not capable of suffering for our sins by sharing in our nature without partaking in our personal guilt, then we may rightly ask whether in fact He is capable—as purely God, without sharing in our nature—of assuming that nature by a legal act and identifying with us in such a manner that now guilt for Adam’s sin also becomes His own. In other words, there is not only an attribution of Christ to us but also an attribution of us to Christ, and that took place in principle when Christ entered into our nature. Now, if the latter can be free without having to be based on unity in nature, then why not the former as well?

83. Does the priestly work of the Mediator consist exclusively in His satisfaction, or does something else belong to it?

Belonging to it as well is intercession, mediating activity, or being an advocate.

84. Which words in Scripture indicate this intercession to us?

a)   He is said to appear now in the presence of God for us, ἐμφανισθῆναι (Heb 9:24).

b)   It is said that He intercedes for us with God, ἐντυγχάνειν (Heb 7:25).

c)   He is called our Substitute or Advocate. He is α παράκλητος, Paraclete (1 John 2:1). One should note that the word paraclete is used in a double sense in the New Testament. It is originally a passive form and means “someone who is called to help”—that is, an advocate. Since, however, an advocate can also take the place of someone whom he helps, the word at the same time also takes on the meaning of “substitute.” It is so used of Christ in the passage just cited (1 John 2:1): “And if anyone sins, we have an advocate (a substituting intercessor) with the Father.” This is the first meaning.

At the same time, the word is taken in a somewhat different sense when Christ calls Himself “Paraclete” for believers and promises them the Spirit as another Paraclete (John 14:16): “And I will pray to the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may be with you forever.” Here the Paraclete is “counsel-giving advocate.” The Holy Spirit, too, is now called a paraclete in this sense, especially because He fills the place of Christ with believers now that Christ has departed. Of course, the principal work of the Holy Spirit as Paraclete is to bring comfort, but the translation of the word itself as “Comforter,” however common, appears to be incorrect and cannot be justified. Παρακαλεῖν does mean “encourage,” “comfort,” but παράκλητος is a passive, not an active, form. The explanation that most presently give it and that is supported by this active form, namely, “counselor,” is also that of Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Lampe, and many others. The concept “comforter” is too narrow.

85. What is the significance of this intercession of the Mediator?

Already in the Old Testament, the high priest had not finished his work when he had performed the sacrifices. The blood, as the principal part of the sacrifice, had to be presented before Jehovah in the holy place or the holy of holies, and only by doing that was full atonement accomplished so that he could return to bless the people. The sacrifice, once brought, must be kept in remembrance constantly by the sprinkling of blood, and by being kept in remembrance must effect the continuance of the favor of God for the sinful people.

This is also the essence of the significance of the intercession of the Mediator. It is not the case that His sacrifice, once brought, was a forgotten or lost fact by which God in the past removed some obstacles but whose power no longer continues. Such a view would fit the governmental theory of satisfaction but not a system based on Scripture, in which satisfaction retains its full validity. God’s righteousness, which is an always-active impulse in His being, rests now and rests forever in Christ as the meritorious sacrifice. For the divine consciousness, the memory of satisfaction is continually present, and the demands of righteousness and the sacrifice of obedience continually come together in the person of the Mediator. That Christ ascended into heaven and appeared in the place where God’s glory dwells means that He presented His sacrifice to the Father, and on the part of the Father that He received it, accepted it as well pleasing. Christ did not come there as an isolated person who had left behind Him what had taken place on earth. The entire priestly activity that He had performed here below clung to His person. He came in a strictly official capacity. And as the Father’s consciousness of justice now rests on Him in this official capacity with satisfaction, so Christ in His priestly consciousness comprises all the past experiences, all the struggle endured, all the accomplished merits of the priestly ministry in order to place them before God. This is in Him an act that continues permanently, is not interrupted for an instant, and His divine omniscience enables Him to perform it. All of the gifts that come to believers from God result from the harmony of this twofold consciousness. They are claimed by Christ on the basis of His merits and granted by the Father on the basis of those merits.

But there is more than this. Christ not only presents His own work in the abstract, but the specific needs and prayers of believers are also included in His consciousness, so that all that is impure and imperfect in them is removed and they appear as sanctified before God. That is why they pray only in the name of their Lord Jesus Christ, which means more than that they appeal to His past. They also rely on His living activity for the present. Therefore, they expect every blessing and every gift through their Lord Jesus Christ, which again means more than that they find the basis and effective cause for this in His historical work of satisfaction. They also believe in a presently existing causality for it, joined with the former. One is dealing here with realities, and should avoid every appearance that these are merely abstractions or ideal relationships. Scripture takes these matters with full seriousness and derives from them a compelling reason to approach the throne of grace with complete confidence. We can do that, not only because Christ’s work once completed is behind Him and its fruits now follow of themselves, but much more because He now still lives and works to produce its fruits. That our weaknesses will find pardon and strengthening is likewise derived from this. Christ is a compassionate High Priest, who still carries the memory of weakness and suffering in His human consciousness, who can therefore put Himself in our circumstances and can have the merciful compassion for us that is entirely unique in its kind (Heb 4:15–16).

86. How then can you paraphrase this intercession of Christ?

It is the steadfast will of the Mediator by which He presents His satisfaction to the Father and keeps it in His remembrance, and by which He claims its particular application for all the members of His body.

87. Do we know much about the specific manner in which this intercession is made?

As good as nothing of this has been revealed to us, and we can also say very little about it because of our faulty conception of heavenly things in general. In this regard, one must again be on guard against two extremes. On the one hand, there have been those who, from the impossibility of giving concrete content to the idea of intercession, have drawn the conclusion that they were dealing here only with an abstraction. Accordingly, it is said that “Christ intercedes for us” is the expression in Jewish ceremonial form of the idea that the fruits of His merits benefit us. This, however, is an undue nominalism, for in the things of God it is the case that realities correspond to such ideas. God does not comfort us with abstractions; and when we pray on the basis of the intercession of our Mediator, that is not self-deception. And God does not accommodate Himself to our limited comprehension, but reality corresponds to our conception. If one will not acknowledge a real intercession, then everything that we are taught about the high priestly sympathy of the Mediator becomes meaningless. And once it has become permissible to let this matter evaporate into an idea, then one will also be able to presume this same right with regard to many other things of which we also cannot form a concrete conception. One can certainly ask why it is still necessary for Christ to present His merits and recall them to the Father, since the Father surely knows from eternity what these merits are and from eternity is disposed to grant their validity. With equal right, however, one could ask why it is necessary for the Father and the Son to negotiate formally with each other in the counsel of peace, since for them each other’s thoughts are clear and open from eternity. Whoever indulges in such questions and considerations will quickly see his concept of God harden into the rigidity of pantheism. He is left with a God through and in whom nothing more occurs. Our first thought, therefore, should not be, “What is necessary for God?” Reasoning in such a way, we could set aside intercession along with many other things. Rather, we should ask, “What is becoming and appropriate for God?” Then Scripture teaches us that there is a heavenly existence of forms, in which the thoughts of God are majestically embodied. Heaven is the place where all that is humanly faulty and untrue remains banned but from which, nonetheless, in no way does what is true and purely sensory about those forms—which are also prevalent among us men—need to be excluded. Thus we must not form an all-too-spiritual and meaningless conception of the things of God.

All this, however, is not said to cause one to lapse into the other extreme, where the Lutherans have ended. They think they have to insist that this intercession is vocalis, verbalis, et oralis—that is, with voice, words, and mouth, concerning which many other things are assumed. We have no right to go so far—not because such things are impossible in themselves, or unworthy of God, but simply because Scripture makes no mention of them. In what has been said above, we think we have given the sense of the biblical data correctly. We do not know how exactly these things occur, and it is of relatively little importance as long as our conception of the heavenly things must also remain vague and nebulous in other respects.

88. Can you show from some Scripture passages that something like what is described above in fact takes place?

Romans 8:33–34, “Who shall bring any charge against the elect of God? God is the one who justifies. Who is He that condemns? It is Christ who died … indeed, who also intercedes for us” (ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν).

Acts 2:33, “Being therefore exalted to the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He has poured out this, which you now see and hear.” Here the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is linked with the fact that Christ appeared before the Father in heaven. Only when He entered the holy of holies through the torn veil could the great gift, acquired by His sacrifice, be distributed.

Luke 22:31–32, “Simon, Simon, behold, Satan greatly desired to have you that he might sift you like wheat, but I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail.” This is an instance of particular intercession.

Isaiah 53:12, “Because He poured out His soul to death and was numbered with the transgressors, and He bore the sins of many, and interceded for the transgressors.”

89. In how many ways has Christ exercised this work of intercession?

Two different ways are usually distinguished, corresponding to the two states of the Mediator.

a)   Intercession made here on earth, which through the nature of His entire work in His state of humiliation was itself also given the form of a humiliation. Christ prayed then on the basis of His merits, made eternally certain by His suretyship, but at the same as a supplicant who humbles Himself, both in His inner mood and in His outward gestures.

b)   The intercession made in heaven since the ascension of the Lord, which is no longer accompanied by humiliation but by majesty and regal glory.

90. Who are the persons whom this intercession benefits?

Lutherans are accustomed to make a distinction between the universal intercession of the Mediator, which applies to all people, even those who are lost, and His particular intercession, in which only believers share. They mainly appeal for this to the prayer of Jesus on the cross for His enemies (Luke 23:34). Of course, this view is closely connected with the entire Lutheran system. In the specific sense, Christ can only make intercession for the elect, for His intercession is not a mere beseeching where it remains uncertain if it will be heard, but it is an ever-active steadfast will, which the Father is always ready to oblige. Therefore, intercession extends as far as the saving fruits of satisfaction reach. This, of course, does not exclude that Christ otherwise has also prayed for those who are excluded from this specific intercession. Compare with the text mentioned above, John 17:9–20, where the scope of intercession is indicated for us both positively and negatively: “not for the world … for those who are sanctified by Him, and for all who will believe in me through their word.”

91. Can anyone other than Christ make intercession for us?

No. If His intercession is nothing other than the continuation of His priesthood and its ideal conception, then it will immediately follow that one who is not a priest also cannot make efficacious intercession before God. Only the one who has sacrificed may appear in the sanctuary. Since now, however, the Roman Catholic church has repristinated the priesthood and has the sacrifice of Christ repeated, it has by analogy with that also invented a multitude of intercessors. It canonizes certain so-called saints, to whom it attributes a degree of excess in merits and refers to them as intermediaries able to influence God. With the basis on which this doctrine rests, the dogma of the opera supererogationis [works of supererogation], the doctrine of the intercession of the saints itself also falls. It is true that Scripture stirs believers to pray for each other and to intercede before God—and the Hebrew word for “pray,” הִתְפַּלֵּל, even means “intercede”—but by this is not meant an official act of an office, only an intercession by brothers, who are equal, for each other. One can request the intercession of a brother but may never interpose him as a mediator between God and one’s own soul. This would be deification of man. There is but one Mediator, who can bring our prayers before God, and every notion as if there were others who could do something like this unavoidably leads to clothing these persons with divine attributes. The Roman Catholic public actually conceives of its saints as omniscient, omnipresent, etc.

92. By what is the priestly office of the Mediator in intercession distinguished from the work of the Holy Spirit as Paraclete, as that is described especially in the Gospel of John?

Both activities, that of Christ and that of the Holy Spirit, are designated with the same words (e.g., Rom 8:26–27, “The Spirit Himself makes intercession for us with inexpressible groanings [ὑπερεντυγχάνει στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις]; “because the Spirit intercedes for the saints with God [ὅτι κατὰ θεὸν ἐντυγχάνει υπὲρ ἁγίων]).” Still, there is a great difference between the two. The intercession of the Holy Spirit is not an intercession that takes place outside of believers, but one that is made by them in themselves. They themselves pray by the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit prays from within them. The work of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation is precisely to identify with believers and to dwell within them. It is otherwise with the intercession of Christ, which takes place outside the believers and remains sharply separated from their own prayers. Therefore, we do not pray to the Holy Spirit but to Christ, and not by Christ but by the Holy Spirit.

King

93. What is the kingly office of the Mediator?

His official appointment and activity on behalf of God to rule and protect His church.

94. Is Christ already king apart from His mediatorship?

Yes. As sharing in the Divine Being, He also possesses from eternity the royal power over all creation that belongs to God. This continues with His true deity through all that befalls Him. In a strict sense, however, one cannot speak of this as a munus regium, a “kingly office.” After all, an office always presupposes delegated authority exercised in the name of another. Divine kingly power is absolute. Hence one was accustomed to speak of a regnum essentiale, an “essential rule,” and place next to it the regnum personale, the “personal rule.” The latter, then, means the official kingship of the Mediator.

95. Can one delineate further within the mediatorial kingship itself?

Yes; it includes more than one aspect.

Dominion over the church that the Mediator exercises by His word and Spirit. He prescribes laws by virtue of His office. He sees to it that these laws are lived up to by the working of His Spirit. All office-bearers in the church derive their authority from Him and receive their appointment from Him. Nothing can be done with authority without this authority being granted by Him. Christ received this kingship when He was appointed as Mediator in the counsel of peace. As far as its essence is concerned, it was not tied to the actual performance of His suretyship, for this essence has existed from the first beginnings of the church on up to the incarnation as well as afterward. It is called the regnum spirituale, the “spiritual kingdom,” because it is established by spiritual means and is governed by spiritual power alone. “Spiritual” here, however, is to be understood in a deeper sense. The act of regeneration is also a spiritual act and one of the spiritual means by which Christ rules as King. Nowadays, people have become too much accustomed to an excessively ethical conception. Concerning this regnum spirituale, the following can be distinguished:

1.   Its basis. This consists in the salvation or redemption of believers by Christ. He has paid the ransom for them, and through this they enter into a wholly unique relationship with Him. They are no longer their own possession but with body and soul the possession of Jesus Christ. Faced with His will, they have none but only unqualified submission. Whether they live or die, they are the Lord’s. In this way, the believer stands in a totally unique relationship to Christ, unlike the relationship in which He stands to the Father and the Holy Spirit, and which ultimately can only be explained by the deity of the Mediator.

2.   Its nature. It is a spiritual kingdom, but that notwithstanding, a real kingdom. That is, no external physical force is used, as is the case with the kingdoms of this earth. But neither does everything in it happen according to the dictates of a permissive love. There is authority, power, and sovereignty—in the first instance in Christ and then entrusted by Him to His servants.

It is most necessary to keep this in view in order to avoid wrong conceptions concerning the essence of the visible Church. It does not originate from a voluntarily arrived-at contract that its members enter into mutually until its termination at a later point, so that in time one can withdraw from it. That theory is not applicable to the state, much less to the Church. One does not join the Church from desire or inclination but as a subject of the kingdom of the Lord, conscious of one’s obligation to have fellowship with other subjects and to acknowledge the servants of the Lord. This position, if it is well thought out and consistently applied, is naturally rich in its implications. Among other things, it includes that the Church does not lose its power over a person if this person deliberately leaves its bounds. In an earthly kingdom, nobody would think a subject is free to terminate its dominion. The state does this, not the individual. Neither is one free to withdraw from the Church arbitrarily. The Church retains its power (within the limits prescribed to it by God) as long as it has not loosed the subject of the Lord, and it cannot relinquish the exercise of its discipline. Whether the secular government is willing to acknowledge this right is irrelevant. Christ has granted to His Church an independent right that does not first need to be enacted by secular law. It is better for the Church to violate the command of secular government than to leave unfulfilled the commandments of its own King.

3.   Its scope. To the spiritual kingdom of the Lord belong all those whom He has redeemed or if according to the rule of the word of God we have to assume that to be the case; therefore, all believers. Still, not all of them stand in the same relation to Christ the King. All of them are subjects and, to that extent, equal. But some of them are more than subjects; they are also servants with official authority. However, this authority of the servants in the kingdom of God is not a magisterial but a ministerial power. That is, it is not absolute but bound to certain regulations that God has revealed in His word and illuminates by His Spirit. Only Christ Himself has absolute power—that is, the right to act as He sees fit—for He is the only King. But within these limits, the servants of the kingdom still have real authority with all its aspects. They have not received this authority from the people, although the people choose them. This power descends from above and does not arise from below. One must guard against being led astray by the prevailing ultrademocratic ideas concerning the source of civil authority into making the Church into an absolute democracy. That the Church is not. Its servants are accountable not to the Church as such but to Christ. The Church is a kingdom.

4.   Its significance. The kingdom of the Savior may never be viewed as a utilitarian institution that exists entirely for the individual. This conception of the state is also widespread and sometimes transferred to the kingdom of Christ. The state, however, is much more than that sort of institution. It is one of the independent organisms that God has created, a body that, like all bodies, has meaning in itself. The state exists to realize certain things that cannot be achieved by the individual: to administer justice, to represent visibly God’s virtues as ruler. The same may be said about the kingdom of the Mediator. It may not be viewed solely as a well-organized association set up entirely for the expansion of power but apart from that is lacking any positive value in itself. The Church exists to embody and represent in visible form the dominion of King Christ. On the basis of God’s Word, it must organize itself and prescribe certain laws. It does not have the freedom to live without restraints, without there being something of the resemblance of a kingdom in its visible form. It is not permitted to organize its laws according to the changeable conditions of the world. The principal features of its government are given in Scripture and outlined in the organization of the apostolic church, and that pattern has binding authority. Within those principal features there may be a certain latitude, but they themselves may not be eliminated.

5.   Its duration. Christ did not first acquire His rights as King over all believers by the actual act of redemption but already by assuming His work as Mediator. Hence this spiritual kingdom also reaches back to the first days of creation. As soon as there were believers, the exercise of dominion by the Mediator began. Although the form of that dominion may have changed according to the different dispensations of the covenant of grace, its essence was the same. Also, for the future, this kingdom will remain the same for all eternity as to its essence. It cannot cease to exist any more than believers can cease to be the property of their Savior. As Christ is Priest and Prophet forever, so also will He be King eternally (Psa 89:4, 36–37; Luke 1:33; Dan 2:44–45).

6.   Its instruments. Ultimately, its instruments are the Word and the Spirit. Through both, Christ is present in His church. Here attention should be paid to the fact that the Spirit works along with the Word. When the dominion of Christ is exercised by His servants, that does not mean that the Mediator Himself is at a distance in a deistic manner and absent from His place of jurisdiction, for it is He who engenders both authority and respect, both in ministers and in subjects of the kingdom.

7.   Its epochs. A distinction is made between the regnum gratiae and the regnum gloriae, the “kingdom of grace” and the “kingdom of glory.” The latter begins on the day of judgment. It will be distinguished by the fact that it includes all believers in the same state of glory and none but believers, since the separation between wheat from chaff will have taken place. Christ will no longer rule by providing Himself with servants but will exercise His kingly power in His own person. His power will be perfected in His subjects, and nothing more will be lacking in the full unfolding of the kingdom of heaven.

96. What is the connection between the two concepts of Christ’s headship and kingship over the church?

a)   Headship is the term for the mystical union that exists between Christ and believers. It expresses an inward relationship between Christ and those who belong to Him. Kingship is the term for the legal unity present between Christ and believers by authority and obedience. It thus expresses an outward relationship.

b)   Headship also concerns the church as a whole, but is nevertheless established in such a manner that each of the members is connected to Christ with a separate bond and only through Christ joined to the brothers. The peculiarity of kingship, on the other hand, lies in the fact that one stands before Christ the King only as a fellow-subject in connection with the brothers. A multitude of subjects is essential to the idea of a kingdom.

c)   Headship is not an official but an organic concept. Christ is King on behalf of the Father, so that the outlook of His kingship is upward as well as downward. On the other hand, He is the Head not so much in relation to the Father but in relation to the members of His body.

d)   Nevertheless, both things are not to be separated from each other. Headship serves kingship, for precisely because Christ is organically one with His people He can govern and rule them outwardly. Conversely, this outward dominion also serves to implement His headship until finally it will become fully realized, and all those who were reckoned in Christ will be brought in as members of the body. Also, in the Old Testament the word “head” occurs with both meanings: (1) organic head; (2) royal ruler.

97. In how many senses does Scripture use the expression “kingdom of heaven” or “kingdom of God”?

It is well known that the designation βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν, “kingdom of heaven,” usually occurs in Matthew’s Gospel. In Mark and Luke, one only finds βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, “kingdom of God.” The latter designation is also found in John and Paul. The addition “of heaven” serves to indicate the heavenly origin and the heavenly character of this dominion. The Mediator, who was anointed as King, was in heaven from eternity and has returned to heaven, and heaven is the center of all His activities. This corresponds to the fact that the coming of the kingdom is equated to the coming of Christ. He also possessed this dominion earlier, but in secret, and only let it be represented by kings—David’s descendants—as types. He was only known as the future King. As the covenant of grace had indeed already long existed and yet can be said to have been instituted by the coming and sacrifice of Christ, so too for the kingdom of heaven these things do not exclude each other. From out of heaven, as it were, the king has brought His royal worth with Him in order to reveal it (cf. Gal 4:26, “But the Jerusalem that is above is free, which is the mother of us all”).

Furthermore, the word βασιλεία can have three meanings:

a)   Kingly worth or kingship. Compare 1 Corinthians 15:24, “when He will have delivered over the kingdom to God and the Father,” and Matthew 16:28, “until they will have seen the Son of Man coming in His kingdom” (i.e., “with His kingship”). “Your kingdom (= kingship) come!” [Matt 6:10; Luke 11:2].

b)   The kingly realm extensively, thus kingdom in the proper sense. This is meant when speaking about entering into the kingdom of heaven or being cast out of it.

c)   The sum of the obligations and privileges that come with being a subject in this kingdom. So it is said that we must seek the kingdom of God, that it can be possessed by us, that it is a treasure, a pearl of great value, etc.

98. What kingdom has Christ received besides this regnum spirituale [spiritual kingdom]?

The regnum potentiae, the kingdom of power. This extends over the entire universe. According to Matthew 28:18, to Him has been given all authority in heaven and on earth. The apostle says that God has seated Christ at His right hand in heaven, far above all rule and authority and power and dominion and every name that is named, not only in this but also in the coming world (Eph 1:20; cf. further Phil 2:9–10; and Psa 8, with Heb 2:6–9). Concerning this kingdom of power, we should note:

a)   That Christ has not always possessed it but first received it after His ascension, when He went to sit at the right hand of God. The spiritual kingdom has always existed from the first beginning of the church; this kingdom of power began with the third stage of Christ’s exaltation. From this it follows, in the second place:

b)   That it will cease when its goal is reached. This is taught by the apostle in 1 Corinthians 15:24, 28. In the end, the Son will hand over the kingdom to the Father when He will have destroyed all dominion and authority and power, in order then also to be subjected Himself to the One who has subjected all things to Him, so that God may be all in all.

c)   The specific purpose of this all-encompassing kingship is found in the spiritual kingship that Christ has over His Church; Ephesians 1:22, “and gave Him as Head over all things to the church.” This entails: (1) Christ is the Head of the Church; (2) as such He is above all things, exercises unlimited dominion.

d)   More specifically, this unlimited dominion is necessary to protect the Church from its enemies. The Church is in the midst of the world and still has the evil of the world in its own bosom. So, if it is to be secure, then its Head must have dominion over the world. Its history is intertwined with the history of the world. Consequently, only who governs the latter will be able fully to lead the former. Christ has therefore assumed dominion over the world for the benefit of His Church. He exercises it on behalf of God, for this kingdom of power, too, is and remains an official kingdom.

e)   That Christ received this kingdom of power at the same time had consequences for His spiritual kingdom, since, as the exalted God-man, He can now by His Spirit also work everywhere in order to assert even the power of His exalted humanity.

f)    Also, for Christ Himself this royal power has the significance of a reward, which He received for His redemptive work. Scripture calls it an inheritance, which the good pleasure of the Father assigned to Him as Son (Heb 1:2). It was the person of the Mediator who, according to both His natures, received this kingly majesty: according to His human nature, because it was perfectly glorified; according to His divine nature, because it can now radiate all its splendor unhindered by His humanity, which previously had been the cause of its concealment.

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