4. Offices

4. Offices

4. Offices

1. How many offices did the Mediator occupy and still occupies in His natures?

Three: the office of prophet, of priest, of king.

2. How do we arrive at this threefold division of offices?

It has been shown earlier how we can derive the necessity of more than one office from the fact that Christ is head of the covenant. The question now is: How do we arrive at three offices? Is this something arbitrary, or does it have a rational ground? This question may be answered as follows:

a)   This division is not arbitrary, inasmuch as it was pictured in the threefold theocratic office. Within Israel there were prophets, priests, and kings. We cannot say here that three offices were attributed to Christ in order to imitate the Old Testament institutions. But, on the contrary, we must confess [that] such offices were established within Israel because the Messiah would occupy these three offices. This division is to be explained by the preparatory and imperfect character of the Old Testament dispensation. So that it would appear that these office-bearers were not the full sun but only radiated reflected light; they did not possess the light in all its colors. Only here and there did they come nearer to the fullness, what can be considered an extraordinary grace (cf. Melchizedek in Genesis 14 and Psalm 110).

b)   There are three spheres in which human beings live and must live: the spheres of truth, of power, and of moral relationship toward God. Because of sin, abnormality has occurred in each of these spheres. Thus the Mediator must restore a state of normalcy in a threefold way. In the sphere of truth, He must be our Prophet; in the sphere of power, our King; and in the sphere of moral relationship between God and us, our Priest.

c)   One can consider man in three kinds of relationships. First, one can descend from God to man; then one can ascend from man to God; and finally one can conceive of man in relation to his environment. Each of these relationships corresponds to one of the offices of the Mediator. He stands for God before us as Prophet, for us before God as Priest, and to our benefit toward our environment as King.

d)   By faith there is a reflection of the Messiah for our consciousness. It is intended by God to cause us to enclose Christ in our hearts from all sides, with all His features in the fullness of His offices. Now it appears, however, that this faith has three sides—namely, knowledge, assent, and trust—of which each corresponds to one of the offices of the Mediator. Through the knowledge of faith it is Christ the Prophet who works on us by teaching and explains Himself in His mediatorial work. Through the assent of faith it is Christ as King who rules over our souls so that we give ourselves captive to His truth. Through the assurance of faith, which we call trust, it is Christ who as Priest ministers reconciliation to us and grants us peace with God or places upon us the blessing of God. Just three offices are necessary here, and there is no place for more than three.

e)   Scripture itself here and there summarizes the different aspects of the mediatorial work of the Lord in this manner; for example, when it speaks of how He has become to us wisdom from God (prophetic office) and righteousness (priestly office) and sanctification and redemption (royal office) [1 Cor 1:30].

3. Is this threefold division of offices an old one in theology?

Yes, it is already found in the church father Eusebius. The Reformed theologians, Calvin foremost, were the first to give it a formal place after the treatment of the doctrine of the two natures in the one person. It was introduced among Lutherans by Johann Gerhard. Only in later times did people begin to entertain doubts about the correctness of this division. Ernesti, a Lutheran theologian, was the first, and his objections have been repeated by Schleiermacher and Schweizer.

4. Are these objections to this division well-founded?

They concern either its correctness or its completeness. It is argued that the offices do not exclude each other and also that they do not comprise in themselves all that Christ does as Mediator. We must grant the first objection, if what is meant is that in the activity of the Mediator no single moment can be pointed out where He acts entirely in the capacity of either prophet, or priest, or king, so that He only functions in one office and the other offices are excluded. It is throughout the one, indivisible Christ, in possession of the threefold office, who speaks. When as Prophet He reveals the counsel of God, He also does this with the authority of a King. And when as Priest He sacrifices Himself to God, He is, at that same moment, working prophetically by His own sacrifice. All this must be granted. The offices interpenetrate each other, and it is in a certain way similar to the unity of the natures in the person of the Mediator. These, too, can never be separated, as is shown by the communicatio idiomatum [“communication of attributes”].

However, if, with the objection mentioned above, one means that the offices are not logically separated and flow into each other, that one office could be removed while retaining completeness, or arbitrarily with equally good right other functions be substituted for it, then this objection is sufficiently refuted by what has been said previously concerning the derivation of the three offices. The other objection, that the classification is incomplete, is the result of ascribing unscriptural functions to the Mediator, as if the incarnation is for the perfecting of mankind and for realizing its ideal apart from sin. With the disappearance of these views, this objection also disappears. Finally, if it is asserted that we are not dealing here with something essential but merely with form, then we should answer that essence and form are closely related. And if we dare to abandon the latter unnecessarily, then we will find how the former has slipped through our fingers unnoticed. All error and heresy begins in this way: with a clamor that form is not essential. This is how the doctrine of the covenants was set aside as outdated, before long with the doctrines of substitution and satisfaction as well.

5. From what does it appear that these offices must be thought of in the closest unity as penetrating each other?

From the fact that the old theologians not only and not always spoke of the offices but of the Mediator’s office, in the singular (officium Jesu Christi Mediatorium).

6. Can one show from the New Testament that the Mediator holds this threefold office?

In part, this is found already in the name Christ, “Anointed,” as was demonstrated above. In part, the offices are explicitly ascribed to Him (cf. Acts 2:22; Rev 1:5; 3:14; John 18:36; Eph 1:7, 20; Col 1:12–20; Phil 2:5–11; Heb 7–9).

7. How is the threefold office related to the reality of sin?

Sin is a darkening of the mind; it is guilt in the conscience; it is, as inherent corruption, a power in the individual and moreover, by organizing itself, a power in the world. To this threefold action of sin corresponds the threefold office of the Mediator. It comes down to the same thing when one begins with the image of God that has to be restored in us. This consists in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, each of which belongs to one of the offices.

8. How can you demonstrate that one-sided or heretical views of the work of the Mediator are related to the failure to appreciate one or more of His offices?

By pointing to:

a)   The Socinians and the Rationalists, who, concerning Christ’s time on earth, only acknowledge a prophetic office. This presupposes that sin consists only in an aberration of the intellect, or at least that the will can be changed by means of the intellect. From this it follows that an incarnation is unnecessary, and that for functioning in this exclusively prophetic office a mere man is sufficient. Compare the way in which Christ Himself corrects the Socinian-Rationalist view of Nicodemus by pointing to His priestly and kingly office (John 3:1, 2–3, 10, 14).

b)   Mystics of various persuasions, who believe that a mystical transformation can be effected within man apart from a due functioning of his consciousness. Antinomians also suffer from this evil insofar as they are satisfied with an atonement for guilt without a correspondingly thoroughgoing sense of guilt in the sinner who is saved.

c)   Romanism and every hierarchical system like it, besides arrogating to itself the rights of Christ as kingly, generally places one-sided emphasis on His kingly office to the detriment of the prophetic office. The external and visible organization of the church is then pushed to the forefront, and knowledge is deemed of secondary importance.

d)   Thus we see that an appreciation of the three offices is the touchstone of the versatility and integrity of our Christianity. Only those who honor Christ as Prophet, Priest, and King have the whole Christ according to the Scriptures.

9. How do the three offices of the Mediator stand in relation to each other?

They have an aspect by which they are subordinate to each other and at the same time an aspect by which they are exercised more independently for completion of the mediatorial work. In the first respect, the prophetic office serves the priestly office, since it lends meaning to the sacrifice of the Mediator and puts it in the proper light. Similarly, the prophetic serves the kingly office, since it proclaims Christ’s kingship and brings it to the attention of men. Conversely, the priestly office, in turn, underlies both of the other offices; for the gift of enlightenment, which Christ imparts as prophet, and the other gifts of grace, which He works with kingly power in those who belong to Him, are all acquired by His priestly self-sacrifice. No less does the kingly office serve both of the other offices; for example, when Christ confirms His teaching with miraculous power or institutes the sacraments with the kingly mediatorial authority.

In the second respect, each of the offices has an independent significance and abiding worth, so that it will not do to make one of them subordinate or secondary. It is not merely to make His priestly activity possible, or to introduce saved souls into the knowledge of reconciliation, that Christ works prophetically. The knowledge of the counsel of God communicated by Him has independent significance. Also, His priesthood is not transitory in nature, for although the work of satisfaction has ended with His stay on earth, still we know that Christ remains forever in a permanent priesthood and ever lives to pray for us (Heb 7:24–25). And His kingly office, too, will never be taken from Him entirely, although He now certainly occupies it in a form that at one time will cease. Even then, when it will be found to be unnecessary for the exercise of the other offices, it will still shine on Him with its own underived splendor.

10. How do the offices stand in relation to each other with regard to order in time and in relation to the states of the Mediator?

a)   For God in His eternity, the completion of the mediatorial work is eternally given, and by the suretyship of the Son it is established from eternity. Every thought as if the Mediator occupied His offices only after His incarnation must therefore be rejected. Rather, we should say that He has occupied His three offices during two dispensations: during the shadowy and the embodied dispensations of the covenant of grace. Believers who were saved during the old day could not have been saved otherwise than by the official activity of the Messiah. Earlier, it was already pointed out that the prophets, priests, and kings in Israel were not only shadows or types but also messengers and representatives of the great antitype. They derived their official authority from the person Himself whom they as office bearers proclaimed in a shadowy fashion. Certainly, it is true that at that time Christ did not yet have a human nature. But His person was still the person of the one anointed from eternity. According to God’s counsel of peace and His own voluntary sponsio (suretyship), He was the Logos incarnandus (“the Logos to become flesh”).

b)   Neither may a distinction be made for the state of His humiliation, as though in this state He would have occupied only a part of His offices and not yet participated in the fullness of the threefold office. Compare what has been said above concerning the Socinians. It is true that Christ in His exaltation received a kingdom that He did not possess before, but the significance of His kingdom is not exhausted in that. He was already King before in a sense in which He always was ever since His appointment as Mediator. Neither is His priestly office excluded from His state of exaltation, for He now appears before God for our benefit. It can be said that in the state of humiliation His kingly power and majesty receded into the background, as was to be expected. But He has always had the three offices and will possess them forever.

c)   The theologians point to a certain succession in the public exercise of the offices by the Mediator (not in the possession, but in the exercise of the offices). First He appeared as Prophet, teaching and preaching, then at the end of His life He offered His sacrifice as Priest in order after the resurrection to receive His reward and to reign as King.

This order is certainly not to be considered accidental. It is the usual order that God maintained in His dealings with man, which was already prefigured in creation. First, the truth of things and their significance must be brought to light. When this has been done satisfactorily, the elaboration of the moral and legal relations must occur in this light, and only then on this foundation can an enduring fellowship be established. That is also typical for the work of God with the individual sinner, by which He brings the sinner to an awareness of the covenant of grace. Just as in the work of Christ, here prophetic enlightenment, priestly justification, and kingly sanctification and glorification follow one another.

11. What is the prophetic office of Christ?

His activity, which He performs as the authoritative representative of God, to reveal the counsel of God for the salvation of His people in connection with His other mediatorial work.

12. Which biblical words are used to express the term “prophet”?

In Hebrew נָבִיא, in Greek προφήτης. The first word seems to come from an (Arabic) root meaning “to speak.” A nabi, therefore, is a speaker, but not in the sense of someone who speaks of or for himself. Rather, the word must have the meaning of someone who speaks as a representative of others (cf. Exod 4:16; 7:1; Jer 15:19; 2 Chr 6:4). Even clearer is the Greek word προφήτης, provided that one discards the temporal idea of the preposition πρό, which is certainly false in this connection. The prophet does not bear this name because he sometimes foretells certain things. This is only a subordinate aspect of his activity. A προφήτης is someone who passes on the words of another by repeating them in his name. Therefore, two elements belong to the concept of a prophet: (a) an infallible insight into the counsel of God; (b) an authoritative communication of that counsel of God to others.

13. How has the Mediator exercised this prophetic office?

a)   He has done and still does that in two ways, namely by His word and His Spirit, outwardly and inwardly at the same time. Thus the office has an external and an internal exercise. Christ is not a human messenger who has to be satisfied with conveying objectively the words of his commission. He has at His disposal a means to make them powerful subjectively and to cause them to be understood in the hearts of those to whom He is sent. This should especially be noted now that Christ according to His humanity is no longer on earth. The impression could arise that, along with His personal presence, the most glorious aspect of His prophetic ministry has been taken away, as if He who formerly spoke Himself must now let other and lesser persons represent Him. This is not the case, for in reasoning in this way one does not reckon with the Holy Spirit, who is able to make the voice of the Word resound inwardly and apply it such that in His messengers one hears Christ Himself as prophet. In the ministry of His prophetic office, Christ is immanent through the Holy Spirit.

b)   So far as the external ministry of the office is concerned, this, too, has occurred in more than one way. The following modes may be distinguished:

1.   The ministry of the Mediator who must still become flesh. At all times it was of course Christ Himself who was the only Prophet. The difference between earlier and later, before and after the incarnation, is only a matter of clarity. Before the incarnation, this ministry occurred either personally, or mediately but infallibly, or mediately and fallibly. The first was the case when the Mediator appeared in a visible form as the Angel of the Lord or otherwise spoke directly; the second when He let His word be proclaimed by the inspired prophets; the third when He appointed priests and others to expound, officially though fallibly, His words already made known.

2.   After the incarnation we again find this same distinction, with this difference: that now the Messiah appears personally not just now and then, but assumes flesh forever and in that flesh appears on earth to speak as prophet to the church of all ages.

3.   Both before and after the incarnation, the Mediator has also exercised His prophetic office in a particular way by causing the origination of Scripture and all that pertains to that. This Scripture has originated by His Spirit (1 Pet 1:10) and displays His image. Likewise, it is Christ who is at work in the explanation and unfolding of the content of Scripture.

4.   Finally, it must be noted that there is also a prophetic ministry through deeds, as one can distinguish between word and deed revelation. Prophecy through deeds entails the following: (1) Independent deed-prophecy. When Christ arose from the dead, the fact of the resurrection by itself, even without further elucidation through words, is already a disclosure of the counsel of God and a fact with independent significance for all time. (2) Ministering deed-prophecy. When Christ Himself in person, or through His prophets and apostles, works miracles, these are also revelations—that is, they are signs of God. They have something to say to man from God. However, they are not independent but serve only to confirm the truth spoken by words. (3) Ceremonial deed-prophecy. Under the old dispensation of the covenant, Christ spoke in large part through deeds and signs, with which the word of prophetic declaration from the mouth of the priests was associated as well. Under the new dispensation, He still speaks through the sacraments or seals of the covenant. (4) Historical deed-prophecy. Israel’s history did not only have significance for the nation itself; it was also a type of the dealings of God with His covenant people through all ages. So God’s counsel concerning His people was partially manifested in this history. For that reason, in the sectioning of the Old Testament the historical books are also called prophetic, namely, insofar as through history they proclaim the counsel and the plan of God.

14. What is Christ’s priestly office?

His appointment and authorization by God to satisfy for all who are His through sacrifice and intercession before God.

15. Where is it described for us what a priest is?

In Hebrews 5:1: “For every high priest, taken from among men, is appointed on behalf of men in things that pertain to God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sin.”

16. What is included in this description?

a)   That the work of a high priest is not so much to represent God before men as it is to represent men before God. He is appointed for men in those matters that have to do with God.

b)   That therefore this high priest must be taken from among men—that is, must share in human nature, because otherwise he could not represent men.

c)   That his work is twofold: (1) to offer gifts for sin; (2) to bring sacrifices for sin. So what he does is closely connected to the existence of sin.

In all of these respects, the priestly office is evidently distinct from the prophetic office.

17. Is there still another point of difference between these two offices?

Yes, for Christ has also permitted the prophetic office to be exercised by His representatives the office-bearers in an indirect way. It remains true that the source is always in Him and that all prophecy or proclamation of the counsel of God has flowed from Him. But still a mediation for others truly takes place. The same thing cannot be said about the priesthood of the Mediator. There are no true priests besides Him. The Old Testament priests were so in a typological sense and not actually (see Heb 7:23–24). This shows how unbiblical the Romanist conception is, as if the office bearers of the New Testament were priests. This conception rests on the error of transubstantiation. Christ indeed gave some to be apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers (Eph 4:11–12), but He did not give anyone to be a priest, since He himself remains a priest forever.

18. Why is it important at the outset to have this difference keenly in view?

Because it shows the great divide that there is between the modern view of satisfaction and the biblical doctrine. That divide surely consists precisely in a totally different idea of priesthood. Scripture says a priest is appointed in those matters that have to do with God—that is, he exists for God’s sake, because there are in God demands that must be fulfilled, because He is to be reconciled. The modern theories answer in a complicated fashion: because something must be done for mankind, because its well-being demands that certain conditions be satisfied, because it must be reconciled with God. The question, stripped of all side questions, simply reads: In the work of satisfaction, is man there for God, and consequently the sacrifice of Christ is a satisfaction toward God and a reconciliation of God? Or is God there for man, and consequently the entire priestly ministry of the Mediator is a utilitarian measure for the sake of mankind?

Hebrews 5:1 answers this question with absolute finality by teaching us two things: (a) a high priest is appointed on behalf of mankind; (b) in those matters that have to do with God.

19. Can this be demonstrated as well from an explanation of the different terms used in Scripture in connection with the priesthood and the sacrifices?

Yes, the most important of these terms are:

a)   καταλλάσσω and καταλλαγή.

b)   כִּפֶּר, ἱλάσκομαι, ἱλασμός.

c)   ἀγοράζω, λυτρόω, λύτρον.

d)   The usage of the Greek prepositions ὑπέρ and ἀντί.

20. Demonstrate this from the meaning of the words καταλλάσσω and καταλλαγή.

These words are translated with “to reconcile” and “reconciliation.” This can create a misunderstanding. For us, “to reconcile” has the general sense of causing someone to move from a hostile attitude to a friendly attitude. The emphasis thus is on the subjective. This is not the primary meaning of these words as they are used in Scripture. There the verb means “to bring about a change in the legal relationship between two parties by removing legal claims.” This sense can be seen most clearly in 2 Corinthians 5:19–20, “For God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself,” where it is further added how that reconciliation of the world happened: “not reckoning to them their sins.” God reconciled the world, not by moving it out of a hostile attitude into a friendly attitude, but by a non-imputing of sin, by removing the legal demands that He had against the world, and doing this in Christ. This is made abundantly clear by the fact that here a settled fact is spoken of: God was in Christ doing this. Subjectively, the world for the most part was still living in hostility toward God when Paul wrote that. If, therefore, the καταλλαγή was a subjective change, then he would have had to write “God willed in Christ to reconcile the world to Himself,” that is, He had Christ undergo certain things in order to make such an impression on the world that it would allow itself to be reconciled with Him. But this is not the meaning here. Similarly, what follows in verse 20, “Let yourself be reconciled with God”, does not mean “abandon your subjective hostility,” but “accept this legal relationship of reconciliation that God has established.” Hence Romans 5:11 speaks of “having received the reconciliation.” Here the katallagē appears as something completely objective that man can accept and receive.

However, the most conclusive evidence for this original meaning of these words is found in Romans 5:10, “For if, while being enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we will be saved by His life.” As enemies—thus when and while they were enemies—believers are reconciled—that is, transferred into a reconciled relationship. Our result, therefore, is:

a)   God is the subject of the reconciling act.

b)   Mankind is the object of the reconciling act (namely, insofar as they are those who are elect).

c)   What has happened to that mankind, however, is not a subjective change of attitude but an objective exchange of the legal relationship toward God.

d)   The use of this word confirms our assertion that the priestly work of Christ is performed before God, that is, in order to satisfy the demands God has against mankind.

e)   The distinctiveness of the word καταλλάσσειν, by which it is distinguished from other words, is in the fact that it presents God Himself as satisfying and removing these demands. Thus it teaches us the great and important fact that God does not first need to be moved by something external to Him for the exercising of grace, but that grace comes from within Himself and functions precisely that, in order to assert His grace, He sees to a satisfaction of His righteousness and ordains that in Christ.

21. Give an explanation of the Hebrew term כִּפֶּר and the Greek ἱλάσκομαι, ἱλασμός.

The verb ἱλάσκομαι originally means “to make favorable, benevolent, well-disposed.” In pagan Greek usage it occurs for all transactions, especially sacrifices through which one sought to make the deity favorably disposed. Here man is the subject of the action, the deity the object to which it is directed. The fundamental thought in the pagan notion is that the gods of themselves are not favorable toward men (even apart from guilt) and first need to be persuaded by all sorts of means to show favor. This construction of the verb with God as object also occurs occasionally in Scripture, for example in Zechariah 7:2, “to entreat the face of the Lord.”

In the vast majority of cases in Scripture, the word has another construction; for example, Leviticus 5:18, “make atonement for someone on account of his ignorant mistake,” whether this “for” is expressed either by peri or by an objective accusative (Lev 16:33). Also, iniquity is atoned for (cf. 1 Sam 3:14).

Whence this distinction? Why is it not said in Scripture, “to reconcile God” and “God is reconciled”? The answer is because ἱλάσκομαι is the Greek translation of the Hebrew כִּפֶּר, and so has also assumed the constructions of the latter. Now כִּפֶּר means “to cover” either the sinner or his sin by means of sacrificial blood. Hence Scripture says that sin must be atoned for; Hebrews 2:17, “a faithful high priest in the things that pertain to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people.”

Sin or the sinner is covered when something is interposed between God and it or him, so that only what is interposed is visible for God. Atonement, therefore, is payment by means of substitution, whereupon security and forgiveness result for the guilty one.

The subject that makes atonement is the priest. The object upon which it effects covering is the sinner and sin. The reason why this is necessary is because God’s eye sees something in man on which His punitive justice must be exercised if there was no covering between them. In other words, the necessity of atonement lies in a demand of God’s nature; the priestly work occurs for God’s sake.

The difference between καταλλάσσειν and ἱλάσκεσθαι consists in the former being viewed as an act that originates with God, the latter as an act that a guilty man, not in his own person but through a priest, performs toward God. God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, but Christ as High Priest has propitiated sin. Therefore one must always carefully compare the word used in the original, since both verbs are translated the same in our language [verzoenen].

Ἱλασμός means “propitiation,” “covering,” and Christ is so designated since He Himself was a sacrifice, and thus a covering was effected in Him. He is at the same time the act and the means of covering; hence the abstract noun, “And He is a propitiation for our sins” (1 John 2:2).

22. Explain the words ἀγοράζω, λυτρόω, λύτρον.

Ἀγοράζειν means “to purchase something for a price.” Christ is the purchaser according to Acts 20:28; 1 Corinthians 6:20; 7:23. It is God to whom the purchase price was paid. Before God, sinners are like debtors who must pay off a sum due Him—that is, they fall within the scope of His justice and in relation to it represent a certain price. They have to be removed from being under this justice by Christ. For this to happen so that God’s justice suffers no impairment, Christ must pay for them the price that they owe to it. From this it follows that they become the property of Christ, who paid the price for them, and, insofar as He is God’s Son, God’s children are adopted in Him.

All this is more than mere metaphor. Human beings are there for God and must devote their entire lives to Him. If they fall short in this because of sin, their lives must still be offered to God in the sense that they must be manifested as objects of His justice. They then become slaves of God, from whom He, in severity, takes what is His. Should they now cease to be slaves and return to the status of children, then the price that these slaves represent in relation to justice must be paid. Should this be done, then the slaves are freed from all claims of punitive justice. Hence Christ’s work is called not merely an ἀγοράζειν but also an ἐξαγοράζειν, namely, a “buyout,” by which they escape from the curse of the law; Galatians 3:13, “Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us.” Still, on the other hand, this redeeming from God’s curse can also be called a purchasing for God; for example, Revelation 5:9: “You have purchased us for God with your blood.” That is, only by redemption from God’s justice do believers come again into relationship with God as children; Galatians 4:5, “in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive the adoption as children.”

The meaning of λυτρόω in the New Testament agrees with this. It means “redeeming by means of a sacrifice as the price” (1 Pet 1:18–19). Λύτρωσις is the act of ransoming or redeeming, but is only used passively in Scripture as “being redeemed” (Heb 9:12). Λυτρόν is the “ransom” that is paid by Christ. This is more strongly expressed by ἀντίλυτρον, “a ransom in the place of something else” (Matt 20:28; Mark 10:45; 1 Tim 2:6). The affinity between the concept of ἱλάσκεσθαι and that of λυτρόω and ἀγοράζειν can be seen most clearly in the Hebrew כֹּפֶר, for this means “ransom” specifically. It, however, derives from the same root as כִּפֶּר, “atone,” and is originally nothing else than a “covering.” The ransom covers a prisoner or a slave so that the demands of the conqueror or the harsh master can no longer touch him. In the same sense, “to atone” means “to cover someone in such a manner that the punishment of the righteousness of God can no longer touch him.”

23. What can be derived from the use of the prepositions ὑπέρ and ἀντί with reference to the priestly work of the Mediator?

The usual meaning of ὑπέρ with the genitive is “for the benefit of.” Now if, in the New Testament, only ὑπέρ were used to indicate the relationship of Christ’s priesthood to those whose priest He is, that would indeed give the appearance that He did not pay for their guilt before God in a substitutionary fashion, but only did something for their benefit. But now, besides ὑπέρ, ἀντί also appears, which always means “in the place of” (Matt 20:28; Mark 10:45). Obviously, ἀντί in no way excludes ὑπέρ. That Christ gave Himself as a substitute for His own is not only well understandable along with the fact that He gave Himself for their benefit but also directly includes the latter consideration. In addition, moreover, is the fact that in more than one place ὑπέρ itself has the full force of ἀντί (cf. 2 Cor 5:20–21; Phlm 13; 2 Cor 5:14). Here, too, we again have the same result: What Christ did as priest, He did as the substitutionary Surety of believers and, precisely for that reason, did before God and not toward man.

24. What is our first means to determine more precisely in what the official priestly work of the Mediator consisted?

A study concerning the work of the Old Testament priests. It is true that only by a consideration of the body does one learn to distinguish what the shadow is. If, however, one thinks that we wrongly view the body itself, as the Socinians and others claim, it can be useful to go back to the shadow and show how by it the conception of these opponents is already assessed.

25. What may be noted about the origin of the sacrifices?

That the attitude toward them is closely related to the understanding of their significance. If they are viewed as substitutionary, then there is no escaping the conclusion that in one or another way they must have been instituted by God. The notion of substitution is not something that springs up naturally from the guilty human heart. In any case, man does not deserve to appear with it before God on his own initiative. As it is God’s sovereign prerogative to exercise grace, so it is also His prerogative to announce the possibility of demonstrating grace and to have it be presented in ceremonial acts. If it is already said of the priestly ministry that no one should presume on it for himself (see Heb 5:4), then this is certainly also true of the most important part of the priestly task: the offering of sacrifices. Already the first time that we have a report of offering sacrifices, they are presented as being approved by God (Gen 4:3–4). Faith was present in Abel’s sacrifice, and from that it could be inferred that there was a divine revelation on which this faith rested (Heb 11:4). Nothing can be concluded with certainty from Genesis 3:21. The earliest church fathers, Outram, the Socinians, the Rationalists, Maurice, and Bushnell deny the origin of sacrifice from divine revelation. Most orthodox theologians advocate the opposite opinion. So also the Unitarians Priestley and Young.

26. Should the sacrifices be viewed as real expiatory sacrifices, or is their significance found in something else?

The must be regarded as real expiatory sacrifices.

27. What erroneous conceptions about their significance should therefore be rejected?

a)   The view of Hofmann and others that all sacrifices were gifts for the deity. Scripture itself objects against such an anthropomorphistic explanation (Psa 50:12–13). Of course, one need not deny that part of the sacrifices can be viewed as gifts of grateful devotion to God. The law, however, knows to distinguish very carefully between thank offerings and other sacrifices.

This view assumes a slightly modified form with those who, like Spencer, speak of the sacrifices as a feast, which man prepares for God and in which he then deals with God. This, too, makes a single feature into the whole (Psa 50:5).

b)   The opinion of Keil that the sacrifices are symbols for restored fellowship with God. The laying on of hands is explained as a transferring onto the animal sacrifice of the feeling, the attitude, the intention that animates the sacrificer. With some limitation, this could be acknowledged, and one could say that not only the guilt but also the feeling of guilt is transferred onto a substitutionary sacrifice. Keil, however, further denies that the slaughtering of sacrificial animals has the significance of a punishment. It happens in part as a means of obtaining blood and in part to derive the transition from a life of separation to a state of fellowship with God. He weakens the significance of the sprinkling of blood by saying that in and with the blood sprinkled on the altar, the soul of the sacrificer appears in the place where God is considered to be present with His grace. In other words, the blood appears here not as the means of covering (atonement) but as the object to be covered. For Keil, the burning of the parts of the sacrifice is a symbol of the power of holiness that purifies and eliminates what is transitory. The flesh that is burned represents the body of man as the shed blood stands for the soul.

Against this conception, it must be noted that the sacrifices everywhere appear as offerings of penitence and not as symbols of restored fellowship. It is the blood of the sacrificial animals that effects atonement for the soul of the sinner. Keil’s main argument is that it is not the priest, as the representative of God, who slaughters the sacrificial animal, but the sacrificer himself. We reply: It is in all respects natural that the slaughtering is done by the sacrificer. This shows that he realizes that he has forfeited his life. He can do that. However, sprinkling the blood and bringing to the altar and burning the parts of the sacrifice he cannot do, because as an impure guilty person he is unfit to do that. Thus the priest does this for him. Moreover, the entire view that the priest is in the first place a representative of God is wrong. He represents man before God.

c)   The old Socinian opinion, at a later time defended by Bähr. According to it, the death of the sacrifice has no significance in itself but is merely a means to obtain the blood. The sacrifice means nothing more than thankful devotion to God of the entire life of the sacrificer. The blood thereby serves as a symbol for life. This explanation also misses the fundamental significance of the shedding of blood and the slaughtering in the sacrificial ritual.

28. Indicate in its main features the correct view of the Old Testament sacrifices.

a)   In each sacrifice there is substitution, the exchange of what is sacrificed for the person bringing the sacrifice. Therefore, even in the thank offerings those actions from the sacrifices of atonement were repeated in order to demonstrate that there can be no peace and fellowship with God other than on the basis of satisfaction. That the actions in view here signify substitution is shown by the following.

In Leviticus 17:11, it is said in so many words, “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to cover (atone for) your souls, for the blood covers by means of the life.” The animals that were sacrificed were tame animals, those that were closest to man and so could best represent his life. The sacrificial animals had to be without defect and clean, and yet they were called “sin.” This may only be explained by the idea of substitution. The laying on of hands has this significance. Compare Numbers 8:10, 16, where the Levites act as substitutes for the firstborn of the children of Israel, and the people must lay their hands on them to symbolize this. The same also appears from the fact that again and again the person to whom the guilt belonged had to lay on hands. If the individual Israelite trespassed, then he had to perform the laying on of hands; if the entire community sinned, then the elders did it (see Lev 4:15). This principle comes out even more clearly in what took place on the Day of Atonement (see Lev 16:7–22), where the one male goat appears as bearing away the iniquities, and in 16:21 it is said in so many words that the laying on of both hands by Aaron signifies the transfer of the iniquities of the children of Israel onto this animal. Also, the slaughtering of the animal can only be explained satisfactorily from this perspective. That this was truly of the greatest importance for the sacrificial act may already be inferred from the single fact that the altar derived its name from it; in Hebrew it is called מִזְבֵּחַ, “place of slaughter.” Throughout the whole of Scripture, death is the punishment for sin, and therefore here too [it] may not be considered a point of transition into fellowship with God, as Keil thinks. The sprinkling with blood, which in the sin offering followed the slaughtering, had the same significance. The substituting life is thereby brought into fellowship, into contact with God, whether it be on the horns of the altar or on the mercy seat.

b)   While the just-mentioned characteristics (with the exception of the sprinkling with blood) were common to all sacrifices, the burnt offering and thank offering each had their distinctive significance. The idea of total destruction (a continuation of the slaughtering, as it were) was not involved in the burning of the entire burnt offering, nor the thought of a purification associated with destruction (Keil), but rather the dedication of life to God. God must have the best, as is apparent from those portions that are due to Him from the other sacrifices. He must have the whole of life, as the burnt offering shows. The offering ascends by the fire and provides for God a pleasing aroma.

The word used for burning an offering is not שָׁדַד, which indicates a destructive burning, but הִקְטִיר, which means “to go up in fume and smoke.” The fire in which the offerings ascend comes from God Himself (Lev 9:24), and the command is given that this original fire may never go out on the altar. The significance of this is that the fire must be regarded as a fire from God and the burning as a burning by God. That is, depicted in the sacrifices is not only how the entire life is brought to Him, but also how He receives it. From all this it now appears clearly how in the burning of the sacrifices there was a symbol, as a type, of the active obedience of the Mediator, who sacrificed Himself to God as a fragrant aroma.

c)   The thank offerings (according to others, peace offerings) have the distinctive goal of depicting the condition or state of peace in which God and man are after the accomplished reconciliation. This is why they follow, in order, after the sin offering and burnt offering. First come passive and active obedience—the sacrificing of life in death and devotion—then as its fruit comes peace with God. Furthermore, belonging essentially with the thank or peace offering is the sacrificial meal, in which the justified person enjoys his fellowship with God. Therefore, it must be said that this class of sacrifices was typological for the Mediator, namely in the sense that He likewise, through the communication of His own flesh and blood, grants us to enjoy peace with God. After first shedding His blood and offering His life to God, He gives Himself to us, so that we, being personally united to Him, may attain to the awareness of the reconciled relationship into which He brought us as a sin offering and burnt offering.

d)   These sacrifices had a twofold purpose.

1.   They were types, and as such depicted the perfect sacrifice of Christ, which alone could effect true atonement. They did not atone with regard to the moral law. The blood of bulls and goats could not take away actual sin.

2.   They were ceremonial, that is, they also had a significance for the church-state of Israel. In this sense, they brought about a real atonement and were the means ordained by God to maintain a state of external covenant righteousness—or where that was broken, to obtain renewal.

29. Can it be proved from the New Testament that the work of Christ includes sacrifice in this Old Testament sense?

a)   The entire Epistle to the Hebrews is full of this sense. In it, Christ is called “priest” 6 times and “high priest” 12 times. It is said of the Old Testament priests and sacrifices that they were “a shadow of the good things to come” (10:1). The reality, the body, is in Christ. He is a priest after the order of Melchizedek, that is, “not according to physical descent, but according to the power of an indestructible life” (7:16), forever Priest, Prophet, and King together (Psa 110). The same Christ who is High Priest is also the sacrifice, for Hebrews 10:10 speaks of “the offering of the body of Christ accomplished once.” Christ can be priest and sacrifice at the same time because even where His human life enters into death, His divine life still continues, for He offered Himself through the eternal Spirit (9:14). The sacrifice of Christ is a definitive act, which is not to be repeated (7:27). It is comparable to the killing of the sacrificial animal by the typological high priest on the Day of Atonement. It is brought before God because Christ Himself enters into heaven, just as the high priest entered the holy of holies. It corresponds to the covenant sacrifice of Exodus 24, wherefore Christ is called the Mediator of the new covenant (Heb 9:15). That the sprinkling with the blood of Christ was necessary before God is expressed in Hebrews 9:23, such that the heavenly things had to be purified. That is, their guilt is present in the dwelling place of God, before His face, in His tabernacle, and that guilt must be removed from heaven before the people of God can enter into heaven. The transgressions committed under the first covenant demanded atonement by death if the promise of the eternal inheritance would be obtained. That is, the guilt of the covenant of works must first be cleared away before the blessings of the covenant can be imparted. Where there is no sacrifice for sin, there is a fearful expectation of judgment and fury of fire (10:27). During His earthly life, Christ appeared with sin—that is, as a sacrifice upon which sin was transferred—but He will appear again without sin (9:28). The result, finally, of the priestly activity of the Mediator is the taking away of the stains on the conscience, that is, the removal of guilt objectively and of the consciousness of guilt subjectively (9:14; 10:22; 12:24).

If we briefly summarize all this, we obtain as the result that according to the Epistle to the Hebrews, Christ is: the true, only, eternal, kingly, self-sacrificing, atoning-toward-God, substituting, and actually guilt-removing High Priest.

b)   In the letters of the Apostle Paul, we are taught entirely the same in principle, although in them the priesthood of the Mediator as such is not mentioned explicitly. Christ gave Himself freely out of love, and God gave His Son freely out of love (Rom 8:32; Gal 2:20). This was done for the benefit of man and on behalf of man (ὑπὲρ οὗ in Rom 14:15; διʼ ὃν in 1 Cor 8:11); on account of their transgressions (Rom 4:25, διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν); for sin (1 Cor 15:3, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν). This, however, was done no less than by means of substitution, for treating the sinless Christ as a sinner was the means by which treating sinners as sinless was made possible (2 Cor 5:21). If, then, the transmission of righteousness from Christ to us is an act of imputation (which nobody can doubt), then here the transmission of sin to the Mediator must also be an act of imputation, for both are put on par with and directly connected to each other. If one died for all, then they all have died (2 Cor 5:14–15). Concerning the ground of this substitution or of the necessity of the punishment, we are taught that it is to be found in the curse of the law (Gal 3:13). Christ had to die for there to be righteousness, for if there were another way to obtain righteousness, His death must be said to be in vain (Gal 2:21). That is, His dying as a Surety was the only means to establish sinners as righteous before God. The curse of the law, however, is simply a paraphrase for the curse pronounced by God, and God’s curse implies a claim of guilty by the punitive justice of God. In view of this, Galatians 3:13 states, “Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us.” In other words, what Christ did as a Surety was to pay a ransom to God as recompense in order that we might escape the consequences of divine justice. Compare 1 Corinthians 6:20; 7:23: “For you have been bought at a high price, therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God’s.” Here at the same time is confirmed what has been said above. Precisely through redemption by God, believers become the possession of God in the fullest sense of the word. By escaping His justice, they become His beloved children and their bodies and spirits can be called God’s. Indeed, through their redemption (διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως [Rom 3:24]), which is in Christ Jesus, they have moved, justified, into a state of sonship.

In all this, it is true that the idea of sacrifice is not mentioned directly. Still, it is not lacking in Paul. In Romans 3:25, it is said that redemption in Christ Jesus is effected because God has openly presented Him as a means of propitiation (ἱλαστήριον) in His blood through faith, and that (in His blood) in demonstration of God’s righteousness. A propitiation in blood can be nothing other than an atoning sacrifice. Paul says that this was necessary because the sins previously committed under the old covenant had been tolerated without actual satisfaction being made and it could now seem as if God were not just. God’s forbearance was the ground for this tolerance but did not in the least intend that these sins remain unpropitiated. Therefore, before God can justly acquit, there had to be an open display of Christ on the cross as a propitiation. Other places where Paul speaks of Christ as a sacrifice are 1 Corinthians 5:7—“For our Passover lamb has been sacrificed for us, namely Christ”—and 1 Corinthians 11:25, where the institution of the Lord’s Supper shows how the blood of Christ is the basis of the new covenant. The thought of the sparing of the firstborn was clearly present in the Passover, for the name means “passing over,” “sparing.” According to Ephesians 1:7, we have redemption and forgiveness of sin through the blood of Christ. According to Ephesians 5:2, Christ gave Himself for us as an offering and sacrifice to God as “a sweet savor.”

c)   The same is true for the remaining books of the New Testament. In the Gospel of John, Christ appears as the Lamb who takes away the sin of the world, that is, first takes it upon Himself and then carries it away (1:29, in connection with Isa 53:11; cf. also 1 John 3:5; 2:2; 4:10). Caiaphas prophesies the suffering of the Lord as a Surety (11:50).

Particularly clear is John 3:14, where Christ is compared to the uplifted serpent and where the entire doctrine of satisfaction as Surety is summarized in only a few words. (1) The snake pictures sin as a seductive, poisoning, cursed animal. (2) As the snakebite in the desert was cured by the copper snake itself, so sin, which is a curse and an abandonment by God, is cured by the curse and abandonment by God that rested upon Christ. Guilt can only be removed by the principle resident within it being carried out to its full extent. (3) The snake in the desert had to be lifted up; likewise the Son of Man had to be lifted up. The bearing of sin is necessary. God’s righteousness demands it. (4) The snake in the desert was not a snake in itself but was made to be such at God’s command and by His gracious determination. To demonstrate this, Moses did not take one of the many living snakes that were biting Israel but a snake of pure metal, in which the curse of the snake as a species was indeed visible but its fiery venom was not present. Likewise, there is in Christ the likeness and curse of sinful flesh [Rom 8:3] but not the sinful flesh itself. That is, the Mediator was made to be sin, not in a real, personal sense, but in an ideal sense, in the sense of a Surety; guilt was imputed to Him. (5) After this guilt was laid upon Him, He had to bear it. He had to be lifted up on the cross and be displayed as an atoning sacrifice. (6) To be able to serve as an atoning sacrifice, He had to possess a human nature, for it is the Son of Man who had to be lifted up.

The epistles of Peter do not teach anything different. First Peter 3:18; 2:24; 1:19 are three classic texts. Christ was an unblemished and spotless Lamb, completely without sin. This lent to His blood that character by which it could count as a ransom and for which it is called precious blood. It was a sacrifice entirely unique in kind that could not be repeated. Christ has also suffered once (ἅπαξ) for sin. It was a vicarious suffering: for sin, He the righteous for the unrighteous, who Himself carried our sin in His body on the tree. One should take note here of the contrast between “Himself” and “our sins” (τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτός, 2:24). Those sins have been carried onto the (cursed cross-) tree by Christ in or with His body. The goal of this bearing of guilt was to bring us to God, that is, as priest to open up access to God for us. Here this bringing to God should be understood objectively of the atonement, which is brought about by His suffering as Surety.

According to 1 Peter 1:2, the elect are predestined to obedience and sprinkling with blood. This refers back to the establishment of the covenant (Exod 24:7–8). Christ’s suffering is a covenant-sacrifice, and those who enter into the covenant are obliged to obedience and sprinkled with the blood to atone for their guilt.

Finally, these things are taught to us—though not as explicitly and plainly, yet clearly enough—by the words of Christ Himself. A man who has incurred death cannot give anything to redeem his own soul. But the Son of Man has come to give His life as a ransom for many [Matt 20:28; Mark 10:45]. That the guilt-atoning significance of Christ’s suffering is not more prominent in the Synoptic Gospels is to be attributed to the limitations of the apostles and disciples, who even later had to be called ignorant and slow of heart in this respect [Luke 24:25].

30. How is it to be related to each other that Christ is priest (High Priest) and sacrifice at the same time?

The distinction between priest and sacrifice is not original. What man must bring to God is his own life, and of course he can only do that in his own person, so priest and sacrifice truly coincide. In a state of rectitude, it can only be a question of a priesthood in which everyone devotes himself as a living sacrifice of gratitude to God, at best of a representative priesthood of the progenitor of a family. This is not altered by sin as far as the actual priesthood of the Mediator is concerned. The Surety, the Priest, must dedicate Himself to God as an atoning and covenantal sacrifice. It is otherwise with the priesthood that was instituted as a type to prefigure and presage the real priesthood. Here priest and sacrifice had to be separated for the following reasons:

a)   A sacrifice consisting of an animal (or a lifeless object) cannot bring itself. Thus, along with what is brought there has to be someone who brings it, since otherwise the element would be lost in which the offering is a willing sacrifice of life.

b)   However, one could ask, Why does the guilty Israelite himself not bring his sacrifice? In a certain sense, as we have seen, he does in fact do so when he slaughters it, and in doing so acknowledges that he has forfeited his life. He, however, is the guilty one and therefore not fit to bring his sacrifice. To begin with, he is precisely the person who has to be covered by the sacrificial blood or the life of the animal. If, then, he were to come with that sacrificial blood into the presence of God in his own person, then that would involve a contradiction. Furthermore, the sacrifice must be brought not only willingly but also in a state of purity. For these reasons, a priest is necessary. The priest is holy and set apart from out of the Levites. In his life as a whole, he had to conduct himself in such a manner that in him is seen a symbol of the purity that the sacrificer must possess. And when he appears before God with the blood, only then does he effect the covering or atonement by which it becomes possible for the guilty person to draw near as well.

c)   A true sacrifice must be efficacious—that is, the ideal priest, who at the same time is a sacrifice, must also apply the effects of his service. He must do more than sacrifice—not only appear before God but also bring before God. Thus being a priest has a wider scope than being a sacrifice, although they in fact coincide in one person. Now it goes without saying that for this latter part of the priest’s task—the bringing before God, the application of the priestly reconciliation—the sacrifice could not serve to symbolize. For this typological sacrifice loses its life and thereby becomes unsuitable for further representing something. It is otherwise with Christ. In Him was the eternal Spirit; His being a priest was not undone or made impossible by His being a sacrifice. In Him, therefore, what was separated in the ceremonial ministry of the Old Testament is returned to its natural unity.

From all this it appears that we should not be surprised by the union in the Mediator of being sacrifice and being priest. This only appears as strange because we have accustomed ourselves to reason from the usual Jewish or from pagan priesthood, in which priest and sacrifice are separate. This separation, however, is a defect necessitated by human weakness. The ideal union appears in Christ. Even with the separation, the ministry of shadows was not yet able to depict everything faithfully. Even a high priest, no matter how ceremonially clean, remains a morally guilty person, so that he had to make atonement for himself on the Day of Atonement. But all these defects and inner contradictions are not present in his antitype. No matter how inadequate and impossible the shadow may have been, when the body came nothing was seen but perfect harmony.

31. Were the Old Testament priests real priests?

In a ceremonial sense, yes. That is, they were really intermediaries between the people and God. The Israelite could not approach Jehovah in sacrifice or public worship other than through the mediation of a priest. It is essential to a true priest that he is an indispensable intermediary. On the other hand, however, in a moral sense, Old Testament priests were only types of the only priest, Christ. Compare what was said above concerning the double meaning of the sacrifices.

As has already been mentioned in passing, Rome sees its ministers as true priests for the following reasons:

a)   They are indispensable intermediaries between God and man. Apart from the priest, Roman Catholics cannot receive the benefits of salvation over which the Church disposes. The priest has to grant them access to these benefits.

b)   They bring a real sacrifice to God in the Mass. Thus here again the ideal priesthood of Christ, which had reached its unity in Him, is torn in two; priest and sacrifice are again separated from each other, and one returns to the first, weak principles of the world.

c)   They provide people actual acquittal through absolution.

We assert that on all of these three points no one else stands between God and our soul than our only High Priest, Jesus Christ.

32. What is the foundation of the priestly office of Christ?

a)   The merciful consent of God that He take the guilt of the elect upon Himself.

b)   The willing assumption of this guilt from the side of the Mediator Himself.

33. What, viewed from God’s side, is this act called?

The imputation of sin (Isa 53:6). Scripture speaks of an imputing of sin, a making to be sin, a laying of sin on Christ (2 Cor 5:21; Heb 9:28; 1 Pet 2:24). This is connected to the fact that the word “sin” itself has the specific meaning of “guilt,” reatus [liability]. To make someone to be sin, then, does not mean to actually change him into a sinful being or to transmit the blemishes of sin to him but simply to make him personally responsible for the penal consequences of sin. The same thing is meant by the term “imputation.” It occurs with respect to both the penal guilt that the sinner himself has accrued and the guilt transferred to him from someone else. The biblical words for this concept are in Hebrew, חָשַׁב and in Greek, λογίζομαι; Luke 22:37, “[F]or I tell you that this, which is written, must be fulfilled in me, namely, ‘and he was numbered with the transgressors.’ ” This is a quotation from Isaiah 53:12. In Romans 4:3 it is said of Abraham, “He believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness.” In Psalm 32:2, we have a passage where holding someone responsible for his own iniquity is called imputing: “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not impute iniquity.”

34. In how many senses can one speak of the imputation of guilt to Christ?

a)   In a judicial sense, in the judgment of God. This has taken place in the counsel of peace when Christ assumed the suretyship for those belonging to Him. In the judgment of God, He then became responsible for their guilt.

b)   In an effective sense, in the suffering that the Mediator underwent during the state of humiliation and in the demands of obedience that at that time were made of Him by God.

35. Was this imputation of sin to Christ an act of righteousness or an act of grace?

It was both simultaneously:

a)   From the side of God, granting a Surety and the taking over of guilt by the Surety was an act of grace. God could have held every sinner personally responsible. As will be shown in more detail, moral guilt always adheres to the person who has committed evil, and the giver of the moral law is not in the least obliged to remove it from him. If we imagine the possibility that man himself would have been able to find a mediator who can fully satisfy for him in the same sense as Christ has now made satisfaction for him and he were to have come before God with this mediator, it would still remain an act of God’s grace to be pleased with this substitution. However, the act of imputation appears to us as an act of grace in a still deeper sense when we consider that here it is not substitution in general but quite specifically self-substitution. God has not imputed guilt to a third party but to His only begotten Son, who is of one being with Him. Therefore, the Socinian objection that there was no grace in the substitution of Christ lacks all force. This objection functions entirely on the Unitarian position in which Christ is actually a third party. On the Trinitarian position, in contrast, the Judge who transfers the guilt and the Surety who assumes the guilt are, with regard to their being, the same God. That God does not spare His only begotten Son and so gives Himself up and sacrifices Himself for our sin constitutes grace. First John 3:16: “By this we know love, that He gave His life for us.”

b)   Seen from man’s side, it was an act of pure grace inasmuch as by it the person who is reckoned in Christ is himself discharged from all guilt, without he having done anything for that himself.

c)   Seen from God’s side, it was at the same time an act of punitive righteousness.

36. How should this divine righteousness be viewed here?

It is described above as “the natural impulse of God’s holiness to assert itself against sin.” The exercise of righteousness is an essential necessity. His righteousness is an active side of His being that He cannot set aside. Above all, one must guard against identifying it with the love of God or attempting to derive it from that love. Love is certainly compatible with righteousness but yet not identical with it. God’s righteousness is exercised toward the sinner for God’s sake alone apart from all His concern for the well-being of the sinner. It is entirely possible that through the exercise of righteousness some sinners are also benefitted, but that is something derivative that must not be confused with the main purpose.

37. Show that this righteousness of God is compatible with His grace and His love for sinners, from which this grace flows.

The difficulty in grasping the compatibility of these two lies in our own psychological experience. In our limited minds, attitudes of anger and love at the same time with regard to the same subject generally exclude each other. Even in the most favorable case conceivable, that of a loving father toward his child, we do not have complete likeness to what is present in God. A father can indeed be angry and punish his child and at the same time love his child. His punishing, however, is not an exercise of justice in the same sense as the punishing of sinners is for God. It is rather a chastising that he administers to the child precisely because he loves it in his heart and seeks its well-being, although a God-given paternal authority is also expressed in this chastisement. Also, if we imagine the case of a judge passing sentence on his son, whom he loves, it is not completely the same, for the judge does not pronounce judgment of himself as if both love for his child as well as the impulse to sentence and to punish came from his own heart in the same sense. It is rather the case that his sense of justice arises from his sense of official responsibility toward God. He pronounces judgment before God; he loves of himself.

With God, on the other hand, both love and the impulse for righteousness flow directly from His own being and not from any relationship to something else. He loves, is merciful, gracious, kind—and at the same time, with equally the same spontaneity, He is angry with the sinner and in His righteousness wishes to punish him. That this is so incomprehensible for us stems not only from the fact that we cannot find a perfect parallel for it in our own experience; it stems much more from the fact that evidence against this concurrence seems to occur again and again in our sinful experience. When we feel angry toward someone, then there is not room in us for favor toward him. Self-centered, human anger cannot coexist with it. Our anger “does not work bring about the righteousness of God” (Jas 1:20). That is precisely because it is an anger that occupies our entire spirit and with the mist of passion clouds our vision so that we can no longer see and judge impartially. The anger of man is always so little a holy anger that, once inflamed, it derives new strength from the entirety of the object against which it is directed. Every virtue that we note in our enemy can incite us to new rage. That was the case with the Jews and Christ.

For all these reasons, we have to be very careful not to think of God’s righteousness in a worldly fashion. In Him, it is not something that in any respect would need to exclude love and mercy. God did not first need to be made disposed toward being merciful and loving by the Surety and satisfaction of the Mediator. He was that toward His people from the beginning. That He was appears most clearly by the fact that He Himself devised the plan of salvation. God who is angry toward sinners is also the God who Himself ordains a satisfaction for His wrath. Every thought of bloodlust in a wrong sense must be excluded here. It is quite true that God desires blood—not in the mad passion of human anger but rather with the resolute energy of His holy will. He wills to maintain both sides of His being: both His righteousness as well as His love. He had to maintain His righteousness; He could sovereignly withhold or communicate His grace toward sinners as He pleased. The wonder of grace is not that God abandoned His righteousness but that at the cost of His own Son He maintained His righteousness so that it would not strike down man. Scripture itself teaches us to emphasize this truth and consider the matter from this perspective: “God has reconciled us to Himself through Jesus Christ”; “God was reconciling the world to Himself in Christ” (2 Cor 5:18–19). It has pleased the Father to reconcile all things to Himself through the blood of the cross of Christ. In this work of reconciliation, God is therefore subject and object at the same time. And both must be maintained—the latter so that we may avoid the error of seeking the meaning of satisfaction in something subjective; the sacrifice of Christ above all affected God, not man. We must maintain the former so that grace in its costliness might be preserved for us and satisfaction might be seen to come from God.

38. To what extent can one say that the transfer of this guilt to Christ corresponds to assigning a debt in a commercial sense, that is, of a monetary debt?

Scripture itself leads us to make this comparison. The discussion of the term λύτρον above showed that the suffering borne by Christ is viewed as a ransom by which believers were redeemed from the servitude of punishment. Now it only comes down to finding the tertium comparationis [point of comparison] in this comparison, emphasize it, and guard against transferring other traits that do not possess any similarity. The essence in a pecuniary debt is the following: (a) It means the obligation of one person to pay its monetary value to another person; (b) it represents an intrinsic monetary value, that is, there exists a certain proportion. The way in which the debt was incurred determines its size and the manner of payment.

In both respects, penal guilt and pecuniary debt accord with each other: (1) Where sin has been committed, there is an obligation of the sinner toward the lawgiver to pay something. That this payment consists of monetary value here, of suffering there, is beside the point. In both cases, something has to be done or produced. (2) The penal guilt as well as the pecuniary debt is proportional. To the extent the sin is more or less severe, there exists an obligation to lighter or more severe suffering.

However, besides these points of agreement, there are also several points of difference. The most important are the following:

a)   In the case of a monetary debt, what has to be paid is originally in the possession of the creditor, has been transferred by him to the debtor, and so a relationship of debt is created. If A owes 50 dollars to B, this means that B first had 50 dollars or something representing the value of 50 dollars, and that through a transaction with A this sum is subtracted from him and that the obligation now rests on A to repay this same sum to B.

This is not the case with moral penal guilt. When the sinner transgresses God’s law, God does not thereby change. He does not lose anything or become poorer in any respect. It simply means that God is deprived of the occasion, through the keeping of the law by man, to express His holiness in a positive sense, and that now, in order to compensate, an implementing and carrying out of God’s holiness in a negative sense—that is, of his punitive retributive justice—will have to take place. God did not lose something, but rather an action in a certain direction originating with God is stopped and the broken balance must now be restored as the same action moves in another direction. Despite this difference, however, here, too, the point of correspondence remains that an obstacle has occurred. This, then, is common to the origination of penal guilt and pecuniary debt. The difference is that in the former instance the obstacle took place with regard to a passive, receptive activity; in the latter instance, with regard to an active, transitive activity.

b)   In a monetary debt, it is completely indifferent who pays the amount due, whether it be person A who incurred the debt or someone else. All that need be done is the repayment to B of the sum that was received from him. Here the debt is related solely to what is received and not in any way to the person receiving it. If a guarantor, who offers to pay the debt, appears for the debtor, then the creditor has no right to refuse this guarantor and to insist that the debtor amass the requisite sum by his own effort. His rights extend to the repayment of the sum and not an inch further.

Again, it is entirely different with penal guilt. It cannot be separated from the person in the same manner. In moral matters, every personal being stands in a personal relation to the lawgiver and accordingly has a personal guilt. Accordingly, here it is not merely a matter of “God must receive a certain amount regardless of whether He receives it from me or from someone else,” but “God must receive this amount from me, and I am personally accountable for it.” It should be noted that by this it is not being maintained that God must punish the person himself who has transgressed. If this were true, the suffering of Christ as a Surety would be an impossibility. All that is being maintained is that God can punish the transgressor himself and is not obligated to accept a Surety. Moral guilt has a personal significance, and God has every right to keep this significance strictly in view regarding the collection of the debt. Of this personal aspect, we accordingly say that it belongs to righteousness, but we do not go so far as to maintain that it must be considered to be the immutable essence of righteousness. God can perhaps exercise His righteousness in such a manner that He foregoes this personal aspect, and we know from experience that He has actually willed to do this. He has permitted the sinner, who must pay personally, to do that through His Surety. However, it follows from what has been said that this was an act of mercy, which the debtor could not have claimed as his right. Furthermore, there are two other things that follow: (1) If God can set aside the personal character of guilt, then this cannot happen arbitrarily. If we entertain the possibility that the debtor himself was in a position morally to bear his own penal guilt and to satisfy anew the covenantal conditions imposed on Adam, then it could hardly be called just if God, overlooking this possibility, simply transferred the guilt to the Surety. One senses that as long as the possibility of a personal satisfaction exists, the guilt must also remain with the person. Only where this possibility does not exist, as in the case of sinful man who cannot at all make satisfaction for himself, can this personal imputation of guilt be removed. (2) Even when the transfer of guilt from one person to another is permitted, certain conditions must still be met. It must be ensured that the personal origin of the guilt will never entirely disappear from the awareness of the guilty person. So the guilt is never simply required of the Surety and the original guilty person left to his lot. It is brought to the awareness of the latter that he is the guilty one, that the Surety suffers on his behalf, and that the transfer from person to person is an act of grace. Likewise, this relationship is communicated to the awareness of the Surety so that he knows that he is suffering as a Surety. Christ was aware that a world of iniquity, not His own, brought the pains of suffering upon Him. The punishment did not strike Him as a blind destructive blow of fate but was borne in light of the real relationship involved. Thus, although the guilt is not borne by the person who incurred it, still it is borne with that person kept in view and mind. The personal tie between him and his guilt is never entirely lost by being forgotten.

This is what theologians have meant when they spoke of two kinds of guilt, namely, of a reatus culpae [“liability to guilt”] and a reatus poenae [“liability to punishment”]. By the latter is meant the obligation to suffer, insofar as that can be detached from the original debtor and transferred to the Surety; the former reminds us of the original personal obligation to punishment, which can never be entirely lost. Therefore they said that the reatus culpae could not be transferred from the sinner to the Surety, that is, that the fact cannot be undone that the sinner and not the Surety committed sin and would therefore have to repay for the guilt to God if the Lord had wished to require that. The stain of the original guilt incurred could not be transferred to the Surety. He could not be made to be sin in that sense, as if God, and He Himself, and those for whom He suffered, would forget that here is a suretyship permitted by grace and thereby think that they no longer had anything to do with enduring this guilt. In heaven, a sinner, even after he is completely cleansed and glorified, will still realize that it was his personal sins for which Christ suffered as a Surety. And far from finding the remembrance of this obligation as something painful, by it he will be continually reminded of the grace of God. Likewise, it can never be erased from his consciousness that it was the personal merits of Christ that earned eternal life for him. There, too, the fact that the Surety, not he himself, was the original meriting person, cannot be annulled. The reatus poenae, on the other hand, is removed from the sinner and transferred to Christ, and likewise the legal entitlement to eternal life is, in turn, transferred from Christ to the elect.

c)   A third point of difference consists in the fact that whether or not the monetary debt is collected is at the pleasure of the creditor. If he demands payment of the debt, then this is his right; but if he waives repayment, he does no wrong by doing so. This follows from what is specific to the notion of monetary debt, which represents something that the creditor may receive: his property. Someone can do as he pleases with what he possesses.

It is entirely different, on the other hand, with penal guilt. The judge is not free to choose whether he demands reparation for criminal guilt. It must be compensated. Righteousness is a transitive attribute that must work outwardly and will assert itself no matter what happens. In relation to it, guilt represents an effect and not a possession. Therefore, it is vain to ask if God could have redeemed sinners without satisfaction. The possibility for something like that presupposes that God is able to set aside or contain His righteousness. If that were so, then Christ would have died in vain and grace is no longer grace (Gal 2:21).

d)   Yet another difference concerns the acquittal that must follow the payment of a pecuniary debt or recompense for penal guilt. For the former this is unconditional and immediate; for the latter it is conditional and mediate. If the satisfaction of Christ had been a commercial payment of a monetary debt, then acquittal should have immediately followed in the conscience of all sinners, as in paying a sum of money a receipt is handed over immediately. The sacrifice of the Lord would then have had to apply also to all the world, since one who pays the debt for a group of people thereby, ipso facto, releases the entire group from obligation for the debt. We see now, however, from God’s Word and from experience that both of these things do not happen. The entire world is not relieved of guilt by Christ’s sacrifice, although in a certain sense one may say that His death showed how God exercised righteousness toward the guilt of the world. Neither does this death immediately remove from the elect the accusation of conscience. Rather, they realize that, as long as they have not consciously accepted the merit of Christ by faith, God demands the satisfaction of guilt from their hands. Thus here the recompense for guilt by the Surety was of such a nature that under certain circumstances it did not exclude the demands of guilt from the initial debtor.

e)   As noted above, every monetary debt is proportional, equal to the amount received when the debt was incurred, and corresponds in this respect to penal guilt. However, there is a difference in the manner in which the proportionality is measured and determined. For monetary debt, only the intrinsic value of the money comes into consideration and is not calculated by some extrinsic consideration. Monetary debt is based on quid pro quo, so much for so much, and although one does not repay the same coins that one received, it must still be something that represents completely the same amount. Whether it be an emperor or a day laborer who pays the sum, the intrinsic value remains the same.

For penal guilt, it is different. Here intrinsic value is only one of the factors taken into account. Equally reckoned with must be the person who makes restitution for guilt and the manner in which restitution is made. If the atoning Surety is the eternal God Himself, then by that an infinite value attaches to the punitive suffering, and the guilty person cannot and need not bear the same identical suffering that all sinners together for whom He suffered would have had to endure. This suffering includes elements for which there is no room in a divine being, such as pangs of conscience, sinful despair, and so forth. Thus what Christ has paid is not the same, but of equal value for God’s righteousness as what sinners themselves would have had to pay. In His grace, God not only permitted that the Surety takes the place of the first guilty person. In connection with that, He also permitted that the one manner of payment takes the place for others. Nevertheless, in this regard it should be maintained that the value has remained the same. What Christ paid was a full equivalent. Grace consists in that, not that God accepted as full what in itself was not full. In the meting out of punishment—and in determining the form that the punishment assumed for the Surety—not grace but righteousness was determinative. It is not possible for us to measure this righteousness and show in detail how Christ’s suffering was a full equivalent. This was only possible for an omniscient God. But we know that no matter how much the form of suffering might have been changed, God has provided a complete equivalent.

Finally, that the satisfaction of guilt by Christ did not have a commercial character is immediately clear when one considers that in this way God would have paid Himself what was owed. In the case of a monetary debt, this would have been a meaningless display. Thus here the distinction between pecuniary debt and penal guilt is sensed clearly. That for sinners Christ (that is, God) satisfied God’s righteousness was not a mere spectacle but a necessity if they were to be saved.

39. Is not the difference between pecuniary debt and penal guilt that for the former, but not for the latter, payment can be made by another party?

No, properly formulated one must say: For pecuniary debt, payment by another must be accepted as legitimate; for penal guilt, that need not be but can be permitted by grace.

40. On what basis can this be if, as we have seen, guilt has a personal significance?

In answering this question, the criticism of those who reject atonement by the Surety should especially be kept in view. They insist that punishment, if it is necessary, is inseparable from the person of the transgressor. It is unjust and absurd that an innocent person should be punished for what someone else has committed. This conflicts with all principles of justice and morality. Conversely, the actual guilty party cannot benefit from what someone else has suffered for him. He must offer personal satisfaction to God, not that of someone else who is a stranger to him. This objection against the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction has been introduced in various forms. It is found among Unitarians and Trinitarians, in Socinus, Crellius, Bushnell, and many others. Although here we are not yet discussing deviating theories, still this objection should be addressed with an eye to them.

The following may be noted against this objection:

a)   Guilt is a relationship in which a sinner stands to God, something that clings to the sinner—neither something that clings within the sinner, like a stain, nor something, as in the Manichaean conception of sin, constituting his essence. If either of these latter positions were true, then it would immediately follow that only the person to whom guilt clings or whose essence consists in guilt could be punished. Guilt, then, would be completely inseparable from the transgressor. However, since guilt is a relationship with respect to God, one cannot assert a priori that it is nontransferable, that God cannot transfer this relationship from one person to another.

b)   If God’s righteousness were like human, impassioned anger, if it included rancor and hate toward the sinner, then substitutionary atonement would be impossible. The element of passion is always personal and loses its significance as soon as it may move from one person to another in its operation. As we have already seen above, God’s righteousness is free from all such passions and is nothing other than the calm resolute energy of His holy will to address Himself to evil and maintain Himself against evil. Who then will argue that such an expression must necessarily be directed toward the person of the transgressor himself, that it is incompatible with substitution?

c)   Concerning the first part of the objection—that it is highly unjust to impute sin not one’s own to the one who is punished in the place of another—it may be granted that under normal circumstances this would be so. To punish an innocent person instead of a guilty person is indeed contrary to every sense of justice. However, it should be kept in mind that it is entirely different if the substitute undergoes this suffering not unwillingly but willingly, if he takes it upon himself freely. Then there can be no question of injustice against him. Now, this was the case with Christ. He was completely willing in accepting the role of Surety, in putting Himself in the place of sinners. No injustice of any kind occurs when the righteousness of God causes Him to suffer for these sinners.

d)   In the abstract, one can grant that where no unity of any kind exists between different persons, there is no place for substitution with regard to criminal law. If a citizen of Michigan, who has broken the law by committing murder and is sentenced to lifelong forced labor, has a savage brought out of the heart of Africa in order to send that person to prison as his substitute, everyone senses that this is absurd. There is not the slightest communal connection between him and the savage. One would not be able to consider this arrangement a satisfaction of the law. Any unity on which to base substitution is lacking.

If, on the other hand, such a unity exists, the matter assumes an entirely different form. This unity is not lacking between Christ and those He represents. It is grounded in the eternal agreement between the divine persons in the counsel of peace. There Christ and believers were united as one body, not only legally with regard to guilt-atoning suffering but also for their entire destiny for all eternity. In reality, ever after they form a single organism that, by a mystical union, keeps all its members joined with each other, and in which the one member cannot be treated apart from the other.

This mystical union, as it is called because of its mysterious nature that cannot be completely clarified by human analogies, comes out in everything that happens with the believer. In Scripture, it is pictured by all kinds of metaphors: as a foundation and what is built on it (1 Pet 2:4–6); as a tree and its branches (John 15:4–5); as a body and its members (Rom 12:4–5; 1 Cor 12:12, 27; Eph 5:30, 32). Its result is that what took place for them objectively in Christ repeats itself subjectively in believers in a meaningful way as a kind of symbolism. They are buried with Christ in baptism (Col 2:11–12), raised with Him through the power of the Spirit (Rom 6:4), are seated with Him in the heavenly places (Eph 2:5–6); indeed, they were chosen in Him before the foundation of the world (Eph 1:3–5). So if one objects to the satisfaction of Christ as Surety, one will have to attack the issue at its roots and reject the mystical union, which is rooted in eternity. One will have to say that the divine persons did not have the right to bind the destiny of Christ and believers together such that Christ could satisfy for them. But who will prescribe to the triune God what is right and how He should have acted in His eternal counsel?

e)   From what has been said, it follows that, although satisfaction takes place in Christ, this satisfaction is nevertheless applied to the consciences of those for whom it is intended in such a manner that any appearance of injustice vanishes. Believers are not left with the illusion that personally they have always been free of guilt and that Christ is really the sinner. In the cross of the Mediator, they see the exercise of God’s justice against their sins and in their minds identify with the crucified Savior. They behold in His perfect obedience the sacrifice that God could require of them. Thus by the mystical union provision is made that all false notions to which substitution could lead are avoided. That is, the order of salvation [ordo salutis] is so arranged that the believer applies to himself personally what is done for him in Christ, his Surety.

41. If, then, substitution is permissible in the penal justice of God, how is it that it is not allowed in earthly penal justice?

Because of the following reasons:

a)   If a person would undergo the death penalty for another, he would thereby evade the performance of other duties that are incumbent upon him personally. He has his own place in society, his own duties in this life toward God. He would not be able to fulfill these if he put himself in the place of another.

b)   Nobody is able to put himself in the situation of another with a complete sense of guilt. His love for his fellow man may be strong enough to sacrifice himself for him. As a sinful person, he does not possess that moral sensitivity demanded of a surety pleasing to God. Satisfaction in this way would not become a true satisfaction, but a kind of martyrdom that was accepted and endured in a heroic animation.

c)   A surety under normal earthly penal justice would not be able to arouse a profound acknowledgment of this satisfaction in the person whose place he took. A hardened criminal would perhaps admit that another person suffered for him and yet not in the least be consumed by this self-sacrifice and would remain devoid of any deeper insight into the essence of righteousness. Earthly authorities may bear the sword on God’s behalf, but they do not have the inward power that God has over minds. In the case of a potential substitution, they are unable to ensure that in that substitution the guilty party will acknowledge justice toward himself. It is true that they cannot ensure that with absolute certainty even when the offender is punished in his own person. Still, it is usually the case that where penal suffering and accusation of conscience coincide, the subjective sense arises that is essential to the exercise of justice. But it is not usually the case that this is brought about by the concurrence of remorse and witnessing another’s suffering.

d)   The earthly dispensing of justice should be distinguished from God’s absolute dispensing of justice. The former is not final, not decisive. If a criminal is punished for murder here, it does not mean that justice is thereby satisfied. He still must give an account of himself to God in the judgment and will receive from God what he deserves according to his deed. He has paid for his crime only insofar as his relation to civil society is concerned. God as highest civil lawgiver has exercised His wrath against him (by the agency of the government), but He has not yet dealt with him as moral lawgiver. It is easy to see, then, how the partial and provisional administration of justice that takes place in the civil sphere has its own characteristic demands, and that in it not everything applies that applies to God’s final administration of justice. In the former, substitution may be impossible or unadvisable, while in the latter it is still entirely in order.

42. Have no cases of substitution occurred in earthly penal justice?

Yes, such cases have in fact occurred. However, for the reasons mentioned above, they cannot be considered legitimate—not, however (and one should note this), because substitution in criminal cases is wrong in principle but simply because the sinful person is not a proper object for substitution as he figures in the earthly administration of justice. Jurists have never recognized such cases as valid. Grotius, world famous as a jurist, fully recognizes the principle of substitution when he says that it belongs essentially to the notion of punishment that it is imposed for a sin, but does not belong essentially that it is imposed on the same person, if, namely, such a unity exists between the Surety and those represented that the imputation of their guilt to Him can be justified by that unity.

43. Should allowing for a surety be considered a relaxation of law or of justice or, rather, as a matter of strict justice?

[It should be considered] as an act of grace and, as such, not as an act of strict justice toward the initial guilty person. Insofar as He is concerned, God has let go something of His justice—not, however, insofar as it concerns the law that was violated, for nothing of the punishment that is due is diminished. The direction in which justice is directed is changed, but its action is not reduced in strength. This is what is meant by the theologians who called permitting a surety a relaxation. Owen, for example, does this.

However, those who speak in this way mean something entirely different than what the Scotists, and later Grotius, meant by the same term relaxation. According to the last named, God drops something of the content of the punishment itself and, by a sovereign decree, declares something to be complete that does not possess full value. That, of course, diminishes the righteousness of God. It has rightly been observed that if God can drop a part of the punishment in this manner, He can also drop the entire punishment, and so in principle the necessity of satisfaction is abandoned.

44. Is there a basis to deny the designation of penal suffering to the suffering of a surety?

Some have argued this. They assume that one can only speak of punishment with respect to a personally guilty person—that is, with respect to a person in whom reatus culpae [liability to guilt] in the above-mentioned sense is found. The subjective element of a personal sense of guilt must thus constitute the essence of punishment. This goes directly against Scripture, which declares of Christ, “The punishment that brought us peace was upon Him” [Isa 53:5]. So we may say that the purpose of the suffering is sufficient to stamp it as punishment. All suffering that has the aim of satisfying the demands of divine righteousness we call punishment, regardless of whether it is accompanied by a subjective sense of personal guilt. That this is so also appears from the following consideration: There is no other name by which we could designate this suffering than penal suffering. It is distinguished by its aim from discipline and from a blind calamity. All suffering, however, must belong to one of these three categories. Thus, if one denies that it is penal suffering, one furthers the impression that it belongs to one of the other two categories. It is therefore dangerous to deny this name to the suffering of Christ. The addition “substitutionary” sufficiently guards against the misunderstanding that Christ’s suffering is to be considered a punishment personally deserved by Him.

45. Has the Mediator stood in the place of the elect only by discharging penal guilt or also by keeping the law for them?

He has also kept the law for them; besides His passive obedience there is also an active obedience.

46. How in this distinction is the term “passive obedience” used?

Not in the sense that Christ in His passive obedience would have been merely receptive (passive) and did nothing Himself. His suffering included in itself an activity that was voluntary. Here “passive” should be understood as “pain-enduring.” Thus by the passive obedience of Christ we designate all those experiences in which He, according to His humanity, endured pain to satisfy the punitive righteousness of God.

47. How do you define this active obedience?

As everything that Christ has done in perfectly keeping the law; as the stipulation of the covenant to which the promise of eternal life was tied.

48. What is included in this definition?

a)   Active obedience consists in an actively assertive act, the object of which is the law of God. Passive obedience consists in an actively receptive act in which the law—that is, the punitive righteousness of God—is also at work. In passive obedience, the law acts on Christ with its curse; in active obedience, Christ acts on the law.

b)   Here the law is not kept insofar as it is the natural demand of God’s holy nature on all moral creatures. If Christ had taken away that demand by substitution, then it would follow that believers no longer stand under the requirement to keep God’s law and do His will. That would be antinomianism. A rational being can never be free of this moral duty regardless of what state he is in. What Christ has kept is the law as a covenantal requirement—that is, as the means, sovereignly ordained by God, for obtaining eternal life that cannot be lost.

c)   Accordingly, one must distinguish three kinds of relationships in which man stands to the law:

1.   The natural relationship of a rational being. No due possession can be earned from God by this relationship. Even if a person in this relationship does all that is demanded from him, he is still an unprofitable servant [Luke 17:10].

2.   The covenantal relationship. God can, out of voluntary favor, enter into a covenant with man and make the keeping of the law, under specific conditions, a means to obtain eternal life. This second relationship does not annul the first just mentioned but gives it a specific character for a period of time. When it ceases, the first still remains, regardless of the cause of the cessation—be it the fulfillment of the covenant or its breaking. The natural demands of the law come both to believers as well as those who are lost.

3.   The penal relationship. Man enters into this relationship as soon as he breaks the law. This brings to an end the covenant relationship but not the natural relationship. God still demands of a transgressor that he keep the whole law, but He is no longer obligated to tie that demand to the promise of eternal life that cannot be lost.

49. What is the nature of the distinction between passive and active obedience?

It must be strongly emphasized that we are dealing here with a logical distinction and with a distinction in purpose. In concept, passive and active obedience are not, and cannot be, identical in concept, but they also divide in the purpose for which they are intended. The concepts have been discussed above. The distinction in purpose has likewise been highlighted. The stability disrupted by sin is restored by passive obedience; eternal life is gained by active obedience. Neither of the two would be sufficient in itself to save the children of God.

If now, however, we wish to attempt to extend this distinction in logic and purpose into its realization, it will soon become clear that this is completely impossible. No single instance in Christ’s state of humiliation can be pointed to in which He made satisfaction in a way that was either exclusively passive or exclusively active. The assumption of a weak human nature was already a suffering for His person, and this already covers the entire state of humiliation so that no place remains for a deed of purely active obedience. However, one must go even further. Not only are both coincident and accompanying each other at every point, they are also necessary for each other, and at no point can they do without each other. Without active obedience, passive obedience would not have been acceptable to God as satisfaction of His punitive righteousness. Imagine that Christ had borne His punitive suffering without for a time actively keeping the law perfectly. What would have been the consequence? Simply that penal satisfaction would have had to be obtained for His own sin that He committed by this lack in active obedience. It would then not have made satisfaction for others.

One can likewise reason in the opposite direction. If Christ had kept the law perfectly, and that had occurred without suffering, then His active obedience would ipso facto have lost its worth because of this deficiency—for perfect obedience in the Surety requires that He enters fully into all relationships in which the sinner stands in relation to the justice of God and that He is entirely of one will with God, even in this demand that God’s punitive righteousness should have its free course. An active obedience without suffering accompanying it would betray a lack in moral rectitude in concurring with the justice of God. So from both directions we reach the same result: that passive and active obedience cannot do without each other.

50. In what respects was active obedience necessary to make passive obedience acceptable to God?

a)   Active obedience was in itself a humiliation for the Son of God, and—to that extent—suffering. For a human person, it is not a humiliation to keep the law of God, for law-keeping befits his status as a creature. For Christ, it was different. Although He possessed a human nature, it nevertheless stands in relationship to the law through the person; and this is the person of the Son of God. God’s Son, as very God, is not subject to the law but is Himself the eternal foundation of all law and justice. Thus for the lawgiver it is a humiliation to become a law-keeper. So then, one should also judge that Christ’s incarnation and His submission to the law are two conceptually distinct acts. His incarnation can be logically conceived of without being tied to a submission to the law. For even in his human nature, He always remained the Son of God. We also see, then, that the Apostle Paul distinguishes between these two concepts: “God has sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the law, so that He might redeem those who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption as children” (Gal 4:4–5).

b)   Active obedience was necessary to enable Christ to make satisfaction for others in passive obedience, as has already been shown above.

c)   Active obedience also lent to passive obedience that quality by which it became a sacrifice well pleasing to God. Those who are lost are also the objects of God’s punitive righteousness, but, unlike Christ, not in such a sense that God’s good pleasure can rest on them. They suffer as evildoers and not in full assent to the demands of God’s justice. Hence their sacrifice (if one would so designate it, for it cannot properly be called a sacrifice; Heb 10:26–27) is not accepted, and they never escape punishment. In contrast, the passive obedience of Christ is accepted in its entirety by God as a sacrifice well pleasing to him. Here is an exercise of righteousness that accordingly, despite every similarity, is nevertheless distinguished at this one point from the righteousness that will strike down the one who is himself guilty.

51. Have all acknowledged that the satisfaction of the Mediator has these two aspects?

Although it was already present in substance very early in the faith-consciousness of the church, the clear, theoretical distinction was first made by Thomas Aquinas. He gave the passive obedience the name satisfactio, “satisfaction,” and the active obedience the name meritum, “merit.” One can object to these designations because meritum is at the same time satisfactio. Nevertheless, this is exactly what was meant when later Protestant theology adopted this distinction in its confessions.

Later, however, reservations arose here and there. On the Reformed side, it was above all Johannes Piscator (professor at Herborn, 1546–1625), who opposed the active obedience of the Mediator as substitutionary. He was followed among the theologians by Paraeus, Scultetus, Alting, Cameron, Blondel, Capellus, and others. In this dispute, Piscator started from the proposition that Christ owed His active obedience for Himself and so could not accomplish it for us. He appealed to Philippians 2:9–10. From that, he further drew the conclusion that man also has no need of active obedience; or, stated differently, that God demands only one of the two, keeping the law or punishment but not both at the same time. Reformed theology, however, has not let itself be led off course by these objections but has maintained this distinction as legitimate and necessary.

52. Show that the active obedience of the Mediator is necessary for the salvation of those He represents.

a)   Everyone will have to agree that for Adam, perfect keeping of the law for a fixed period of time was the means to acquire eternal beatitude that cannot be lost. When the covenant of works was broken, God could have rescinded this promise. He was no longer bound to honor it. Nevertheless, He allowed the promise and the condition to stand and repeatedly be published anew, especially by the proclamation of the Sinaitic law (Lev 18:5, “The one who does them will live by them”; cf. Rom 10:5, “For Moses describes the righteousness that is by the law,” etc.; Gal 3:12). Fulfillment of this condition from man’s side was no longer conceivable; thus the repetition must have had a different significance. This significance can only be that after the fall God gave His covenant of grace, in which the same demand and promise are fulfilled in the Mediator.

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