5. § 39. The Punishment of Sin.

5. § 39. The Punishment of Sin.

§ 39. The Punishment of Sin.

. The punishment of sin cannot yet be treated fully in this paragraph.

The whole, deserved punishment was indeed threatened beforehand by God upon sin, but after it had been committed it was not executed; nor does it enter in completely upon anyone in this life, indeed it is not yet applied in full even at death; only after the judgment on the last day does it strike the guilty one in its whole weight. In Gen. 2:7 God had expressly said: on the day that you eat of it you shall surely die. This definite threat, however, has not been carried out. An element has intervened between the two, which has moderated and postponed this punishment. Adam and Eve remained alive for many years after the fall; Eve even became the mother of the living; a human race has proceeded from them, which is borne and nourished by the earth. The beginnings of history continue after the fall, even if in a very altered form. All this is not to be ascribed to God's justice, but, as will later become clearer, to his grace. This comes into operation immediately after the fall. It receives the guidance of history, not at the expense of but in connection with the right of God. All consequences and punishments, which

enter in after sin, therefore at once bear a double character. They are not merely consequences and punishments, instituted by God's justice, but all without distinction, under another point of view, also means of grace, proofs of God's longsuffering and compassion. It cannot be objected against this, that God would then have spoken untruth in Gen. 2:7. For there only the true, full punishment is announced, which sin deserves; sin breaks communion with God, is spiritual death and deserves death. That that punishment would be moderated, postponed, even remitted, was by the nature of the case not susceptible of communication before the transgression. God therefore in Gen. 2:7 makes mention only of the one, great punishment of sin, i.e. death. With that, after all, everything ceases at once, life, joy, development, labor, also the possibility of repentance and forgiveness, of restoration of communion with God. Sin [156] deserves nothing other than the whole, full death. All other punishments, which after the fall have in fact entered in and been pronounced, such as shame, fear, hiding from God, curse upon the serpent, upon the earth etc., are indeed punishments but at the same time presuppose that God does not at once and in full carry out his threat, that He still has another plan with humanity and world and therefore lets these continue to exist in his longsuffering and grace. Yet they are under a certain point of view very certainly also punishments and in so far ought here to come under discussion. God's grace expresses itself in them, but also his justice. Punishment, according to the general thought of Scripture, has the intention to restore the right of God, which has been violated by sin. Under Israel it had the tendency to maintain the laws instituted by God and to put away the evil from the midst of the people, Deut. 13:5, 17:7, 12, 22:21v., 24:7, and then further, to prevent such transgressions and to cause Israel in fear to walk in the Lord's statutes,

Deut. 13:11, 17:13, 19:20, 21:21. The purpose of punishment was thus twofold, had reference to the past and the future, had to restore committed transgressions and to prevent future ones. The standard of punishment was not arbitrariness or revenge, Lev. 19:18, Spr. 24:29, but the nature of the crime, Ex. 21:23-25, Lev. 24:19, 20, Deut. 19:21, without, however, the jus talionis always being applied strictly, literally, both qualitatively and quantitatively, e.g. Ex. 21:30v. Pharisaism applied this rule, which applies only to the government, also in private life, in conflict with the O. Test. itself, Lev. 19:18, Deut. 32:35, Spr. 24:29. Against that Jesus rises up, Mt.

5:38; He forbids all lust for revenge, whether one seeks this privately or by public means, and commands patience and mercy. Retribution, however, is throughout the whole of Scripture the objective standard of punishment, not only for the earthly government but also for God himself. Not only does He threaten punishment upon sin, Gen. 2:7, Deut. 27:15v., Ps. 2:9v, 5:5, 11:5,

6, 50:21, 94:10, Am. 6:8, Jes. 10:13-23, Jer. 25:12, Mt. 21:42, 23:13, 24:15, Rom. 2:3, Joh. 8:24, Rom. 6:21, 23, Gal. 6:8, 2 Petr. 2:12, 3:7 etc., but He also determines the measure of punishment according to the nature of the crime and repays each one according to his work, Ex. 20:5-7, Deut. 7:9, 10,

32:35, Ps. [157] 62:13, Spr. 24:12, Jes. 35:4, Jer. 51:56, Mt. 16:27, Rom.

2:1-13, Hebr. 10:30, Op. 22:12.

2. In agreement with this, Christian theology spoke of a justitia judicialis, distinguished into justitia remunerativa and vindicativa, part II 199v., and derived from that the right and the essence of punishment. Indeed, there is no other ultimate and deepest principle from which punishment can be deduced than the righteousness of God. All punishment presupposes that he who pronounces and imposes the punishment is invested with authority over him who transgressed the law. This authority, this right cannot have its

origin in man, nor in his physical nature, for this creates only the right of the strongest, nor in his ethical nature, for all men are sinners and the right to punish never rests in the fact that someone stands morally higher than the guilty person. All so-called relative theories, which have been devised apart from Divine righteousness for the maintenance of penal law, such as the self-defence-, the preventive-, the deterrence-, the improvement-theory, are insufficient to vindicate the right to punish and are also in conflict with the essence of punishment; they may perhaps be moments in, but cannot be principle of punishment; punishment is always in the first place poena vindicativa and only thereafter poena medicinalis and exemplaris. Utility creates no right. All the mentioned theories, which build penal law on the interest of the state, society, the transgressors, therefore all fall back into the theory of the right of the strongest; right is exchanged for power. If there is no moral and legal order, above and independent of man, and if its maintenance has not been entrusted to anyone by a higher authority, then punishing may be useful for some persons, for an accidental majority, but there is no right to it. Atheism is the undermining and destruction of all law and morality; ni Dieu ni maître. Only then is there a right to punish, if there exists a legal order, established by God and in his name to be maintained by the government even at the cost of the life of its transgressors, because it is more precious than any good and far surpasses every creature in value. To be sure, at first hearing it seems strange that the legal order—and behind it the moral order—of [158] is of such incomparable value and demands the good and life of man for its maintenance and restoration. But this moral world-order is no idea of man, no state of affairs produced by him; it is also no independent power resting in itself, of which no one can say what it is; but it is the revelation and operation of the righteousness of God in this

world, it rests in the perfect, holy will of Him who sustains and governs all things; whoever assails it assails God himself. Therefore it stands high above man and is worth more than all creatures together; if it comes to a conflict, man perishes thereby; fiat justitia, pereat mundus; wenn die

Gerechtigkeit untergeht, so hat es keinen Werth mehr, dass Menschen auf Erden leben (Kant). In order to maintain it, punishment has been instituted; it intends restoration of law, maintenance of God's righteousness; if it does not serve that, it becomes coercion and overpowering force. Cf. Lombardus,

Sent II. dist. 36. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 87. Stöckl, Lehrb. d. Philos. III 53. 97. Polanus, Synt. p. 340. Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. I 412. Moor III 329.

Buddeus, Inst. theol. mor. I 612-629. Stahl, Philos. d. Rechts5 II 1 S. 160 f.

2 S. 681 f. Ulrici, Gott u. d. Mensch II 391 f. Dorner, Gl. I 286 II 324.

Kohler, Das Wesen der Strafe, Würzburg 1888. H. Seuffert, Was will, was wirkt, was soll die staatliche Strafe? Bonn 1897. Caro, Problèmes de morale sociale 1887 p. 193. Dale, The atonement, 18th ed. 1896 p. 373. Harris,

God the Creator and Lord of all, Edinb. 1897 II 442. F. C. Domela Nieuwenhuis, Het wezen der straf I Utrecht 1867. H. L. Lindaal Jacobs,

Beschouwingen over straf en straffen, Amst. 1884. Kuyper, Ons Program 1879 bl. 738.

Punishment always consists in a certain suffering, in deprivation of some good, whether of property or freedom, of body or life; it is a malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis. Why the juridical order demands suffering from him who violates it and how it is thereby restored and satisfied, is difficult to say. Arbitrariness and chance this certainly is not. Behind that juridical order stands the living, true, holy God, who by no means holds the guilty innocent; and with Him punishment does not rest on a dominium absolutum in the sense of Duns Scotus, cf. deel II 207. 216, but

on the demand of His justice. If He did not punish sin, He would grant to evil equal rights [159] as to good and deny Himself. In order that God may remain God, the punishment of sin is necessary. As soon therefore as the moral or the juridical order is assailed, it rises up and cries out for restoration. It avenges itself in punishment, both inward and outward, presses the transgressor down and shows therein its incomparable majesty.

God cannot tolerate that the sinner, instead of standing under His law and obeying it, exalts himself above it and in principle makes himself equal to God. And therefore He maintains in punishment His divine sovereignty; by suffering He presses the sinner down to the place where he ought to stand, and brings him, where he does not wish to accept it voluntarily, by punishment to the forced acknowledgment that he is the lesser, that he is not God but a creature. He who will not listen must feel. Punishment is a powerful proof that only righteousness has a right to exist, that God alone is good and great. In part punishment flows from sin itself; sin by its nature brings separation from God, and thus darkness, ignorance, error, falsehood, fear, unrest, consciousness of guilt, remorse, misery, slavery; the service of sin is so unspeakably hard. But in part punishment is also added to the transgression from without by the competent authority. Thus it happens in the family, in the school, in society and the state, and thus it is also with the punishments which God lets follow upon sin. Many have denied this latter and in this sphere have wished to know only of natural, but in no case of positive punishments, Spinoza, Eth. V prop. 42, many rationalists in the previous century, cf. in Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 391 and Dogm. I 527.

Strauss, Gl. I 603. Scholten, L. H. K. II 108v. 569v. Vrije Wil 236, cf. also Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 84, Biedermann, Dogm. II 575 f. Lipsius, Dogm.

§. 393. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 397 III2 326 f. Kaftan, Dogm. § 36 etc.

On this standpoint there is actually no reward and no punishment; virtue bears its reward, vice its punishment in itself; a heaven or hell exists only in the mind of man himself; die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht; at most there exists a subjective necessity for the guilty man, to conceive his suffering as punishment. Now the word of the poet is true: Das Leben ist der Güter grösstes nicht, Der Uebel [160] grösstes ist die Schuld. Puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum. Culpam quam poenam plus de ratione mali habere certum est, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 48 art. 6. Guilt makes suffering into punishment; if it is taken away from it, suffering can remain the same and yet wholly change in character. Death as a fact is the same for believers and unbelievers, but for the latter it is a punishment, for the former a passage to eternal life. Therefore also from the suffering that befalls someone one may not conclude to his personal sin, Luk. 13:4, Joh.

9:1; suffering namely in God's hand according to His grace and wisdom serves not only for punishment, but also for testing, chastisement, education; He is so mighty that He can make all things work together for good for those who love Him, Rom. 8:28. But with all this the objective connection between sin and suffering, established by God, is not broken.

Scripture furnishes proofs for it on almost every page. History is indeed not the, but it is nevertheless a world-judgment; it makes facts known to us that compel even the most unbelieving to the confession: this is the finger of God. Though suffering often may not have its cause in a personal sin, it nevertheless does have it in the sin of race, people, or humanity. One's own conscience testifies in every human being that there is a connection and must be a connection between holiness and blessedness, between virtue and happiness. Kant was so convinced of that, that from the disharmony which exists here on earth between the two he concluded to an afterlife. Not for

the reward does the pious man serve God, but he is just as little indifferent to it, as the advocates of an amour desintéressé claim to be; Paul says that believers would be the most miserable of all men, if they were hoping in Christ only in this life. After the fall God has laid between ethos and physis, between moral and natural order, between fallen man and the devastated earth, such a connection that they together are serviceable to the honor of His name and the coming of His kingdom. The positive punishments, which God often already in this life lets follow upon sin, are therefore no arbitrariness but take, even though we do not discern it, their ordered place in the history of human sin and guilt. He who denies them or ascribes to them only a subjective existence, runs the danger of seeing in sin [161] itself no more than an imagination and a delusion; history becomes for him a discord, which is never resolved into a higher chord. Cf. Stapfer, Wederl.

Godg. IV 448v. Bretschneider, Dogm. I 525 f. Van Voorst, Over de Goddelijke straffen, Haagsch Gen. 1798. V. d. Wijnpersse, Over de straffende gerechtigheid, ib. 1798. Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 287 f. II 224 f.

3. The punishments which God has set upon sin in this life are guilt, stain, suffering, death, and the dominion of Satan. Guilt is the first and heaviest punishment. The word, which is connected with zullen, at first indicates only that someone is the agent of something, just as αἰτια, causa. For the most part it already includes the thought that someone is the cause of something that ought not to be or to happen (it is his guilt). In this sense guilt presupposes that we were obliged to do or to omit something; we are guilty to keep the whole law, Luk. 17:10, Gal. 5:3. And if we then have not done that, we stand guilty; because we are the cause of the transgression of the law, we are in a state of accusation (αἰτιασθαι, accusare, reus), the deed is imputed to us, we must answer for it and are obliged to satisfy the law;

we are liable to punishment. Guilt is the obligation resting upon someone on account of transgression of the law, to satisfy the law by a proportionate suffering of punishment. It binds the sinner immediately after his transgression to the law, to its demand for satisfaction and punishment. Man thinks by transgression to become free from the law, but precisely the opposite takes place, he becomes in another way much more firmly bound to its demand. God, who cannot cease to be God, even though he gives man freedom to set himself against Him, never lets man go, and this one never becomes free from God. At the same moment that he places himself outside the law, i.e. outside love, it strikes him with its curse and binds him to its punishment. Guilt is obligatio ad poenam justam sustinendam, subjectio peccatoris ad poenam, Polanus, Synt. p. 338. Moor III 135. Turret., Theol.,

El. IX qu. 3. Mastricht, Theol. IV 2, 7. Müller, Sünde I 264. Vilmar, Moral I 195. Art. Schuld in Herzog2 and Wuttke, Ethik II 97. Scholten, Vrije wil

217v. Hoekstra, Vrijheid 303v. Roman [162] theology makes a distinction between reatus culpae and poenae, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 42. Thomas, I 2 qu. 87 art. 6. Trid. VI c. 14 can. 30 XIV de poenit., c. 8 and can. 12-15.

Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V 19. Theol. Wirceb. VII 27. But this distinction clearly betrays its intention, to justify the satisfactorial punishments for believers here on earth and in purgatory, and is in direct conflict with the nature of guilt and punishment. It is indeed true that the sins of believers, i.e. of those who have received full forgiveness, in themselves always remain sins and deserving of punishment; against the Antinomians, who denied this and therefore considered the prayer for forgiveness for believers unnecessary, the Reformed have always maintained this and made the distinction of reatus potentialis and reatus actualis, Moor III 135. But when the guilt has been taken away from the

sins, then thereby of itself all satisfaction and punishment also lapses, for guilt is nothing other than obligation to punishment. God is then no longer a Judge but a Father; he does indeed chastise the son whom he loves, 2 Sam.

12:13, 14, but does not punish him; and demands no satisfaction from him, for whom the whole righteousness has been brought about by Christ. Thus

Augustine also says of the baptized: omni peccato caret, non omni malo, quod planius ita dicitur, omni reatu omnium malorum caret, non omnibus malis, c. Jul. VI c. 16, cf. Alting, Theol. el. nova XVII 5. Turret., Theol. El.

IX qu. 3. Moor III 136. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 414.

That sin now truly entails guilt is established by the testimony of God in Scripture as well as in the conscience. In Scripture sin, guilt, and punishment are concepts so mutually connected that the words for sin, such as ‎‏‏ָעֹון‎, ‎‏‏ַחָּטאת‎, imperceptibly acquire the meaning of guilt, Gen. 4:13, Ex.

34:7, Lev. 24:15, Num. 9:13 etc. The proper word that designates sin as guilt is ‎‏‏ָאָׁשם‎, Gen. 26:10, Lev. 4:13, 5:2, Num. 5:7 etc., and ὀφειλημα, Mt.

6:12, cf. 5:26, Luk. 7:41, 42, 13:4., Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 684 f. God by no means holds the guilty innocent and pronounces the curse upon all who do not remain in the book of the law, Deut. 27:26, Gal. 3:10. Curse, ‎‏‏ָעָלה‎, ‎‏‏ְמ ֵאָרה‎,

‎‏‏ְקָלָלה‎, καταρα, ἀναθεμα, maledictum, is the opposite of blessing, ‎‏‏ְּבָרָכה‎, εὐλογια, benedictio, Deut. 11:26, 30:19. Just as God's blessing assigns to someone all manner of salvation and life, [163] so the divine curse is the surrender of someone to ruin, destruction, death, judgment, Satan. Human beings can only wish blessing and curse, but God's blessing and cursing is always exhibitive; it sends what it wishes. At first God's blessing rested upon creation, Gen. 1:22, 28, 2:3, but that blessing has been turned into a curse, Gen. 3:17. To be sure, later the blessing of God was again pronounced over the earth and humanity, but this flows forth from God's

grace. The heathen therefore do not know the concept of the divine blessing. All the more do they know of the divine curse; classical antiquity is governed by fear of the vengeance of the Erinyes (Moiren, Furiën), the goddesses of the curse. In all pagan religions anxiety (δεισιδαιμονια, religio) far outweighs trust in the gods; religion passes more and more into superstition; everywhere one deems oneself surrounded and governed by ruin-bringing gods, whom one seeks in vain to reconcile by sacrifices and tortures. There truly rests a curse of God upon humanity and world. To wish to explain life and history solely from the love of God is impossible. There is a principle of the wrath of God active in the whole creation, which only the superficial can deny. There is no communion but separation between God and the human being; the covenant is broken; God has a dispute with his creature. All stand guilty and punishable before his face, παντων ἐνοχοι,

Mt. 5:21, 22; Mk. 3:29, Jac. 2:10. The whole world is ὑποδικος τῳ θεῳ, Rom. 3:19; it stands under the judgment of God and has nothing to answer.

Art. Segen in Herzog2, ἀναθεμα bij Cremer. Subjectively this is confirmed by the testimony of God in the conscience of every human being. Guilt and consciousness of guilt are not the same. Whoever wishes to ascend from consciousness of guilt to guilt cuts off for himself the way to understand guilt in its proper meaning and weight. Ignorance can to a certain extent excuse sin, Luk. 23:34, Hd. 17:30, just as conscious and intentional transgression aggravates sin, Luk. 12:47, Joh. 15:22, 9:41, but there are also sins hidden from ourselves and others, Ps. 19:13; and also sins of ignorance are sins, Hd. 17:27-29, Rom. 1:19-21, 28, 1 Tim. 1:13-15. Yet objective guilt reflects itself more weakly or more strongly in the [164] consciousness of the human being. Immediately after the fall the eyes of Adam and Eve were opened and they became aware that they were naked. In this lies that

they also know and acknowledge that they have done evil. Shame is fear of disgrace, an unpleasant painful feeling about something wrong or improper.

And with that shame comes fear of God and the urge to hide oneself from Him. That is, in the human being the conscience has awakened. Before the fall there was in the human being, strictly speaking, no conscience; there was no chasm between what he was and what he knew that he had to be.

Being and self-consciousness coincided. But through the fall separation arises. The human being still retains, by God's grace, the awareness that he ought to be otherwise, that he had to correspond in all parts with God's law.

But reality testifies otherwise; he is not what he ought to be. And this testimony is the conscience. The conscience is therefore not the consciousness of the communion of God with the human being, as Schenkel conceived it, art. Gewissen in Herzog1 and Die christl. Dogm. vom

Standpunkt des Gewissens aus 1858. It is rather the opposite; it is precisely a proof that communion with God is disturbed, that there is a distance and chasm between God and the human being, between his law and our condition. This comes out clearly when the conscience appears accusingly, but also where it excuses in a given case, i.e. in fact is silent, that separation from God lies at the foundation, Rom. 2:14, 15. The conscience is the subjective proof of the human being's fall, the witness of his guilt before the face of God. God does not only accuse the human being; in the conscience the human being condemns himself and takes sides for God and his verdict against himself. The finer and more conscientious the conscience judges, the more it justifies God's thought about the human being in Scripture. The best and noblest of our race have confirmed God's truthfulness and pronounced themselves guilty over their own head. Cf.

concerning the conscience my Beginselen der Psychologie 1897 bl. 111.

203.

4. Another punishment of sin is the stain. Just as with the first sin, so also with sins in general the outward transgression is manifestation and proof of the inward. Sin consists not only in the deed but also in the thought, desire,

[165] inclination, etc. On each of those stages sin is at once both guilt and stain. Adam did not first become guilty when he ate, but he already also loaded guilt upon himself when he desired the fruit of the tree. Guilt and stain are always the two sides of sin, they go together inseparably; where the one is, the other is. Sin is guilt, because it conflicts with God's righteousness; it is stain, because it is opposed to his holiness. Guilt binds us to punishment, stain defiles us. Through guilt the objective relation to God, through stain the subjective communion with God is disturbed. Sin is at once breach of the covenant of works and destruction of the image of God. The first implies that God is no longer man's covenant partner; He cannot turn in favor and love toward the guilty one, and the sinner no longer stands in that covenant, can no longer love and keep the law and thus by this way can no longer acquire life. Out of the works of the law no flesh can any more be justified, Ps. 143:2, Rom. 3:20, 2 Cor. 3:6v., Gal. 3:2, 10. Even if it is also the case that the law of the covenant of works, besides obliging us to restoration of the evil committed by suffering punishment, also still remains obliging us to complete obedience to its commandments, Mt. 5:48,

22:37; although God himself keeps his promise and remains attaching life to the keeping of the law, Lev. 18:5, Mt. 19:17, Luk. 10:28; indeed, even if the covenant of works is in that sense unbreakable, that God in the covenant of grace lays the demand for satisfaction and absolute obedience to the law upon Christ, yet it is broken in this respect, that man is incapable of

entering into life by this way. Paradise is closed to him, the tree of life denied him. Cf. Moor III 105-108. Marck, Hist. Parad. II c. 15. Ex. v. h. ontw. v. Tol. X 478-480. Witsius, Oec. foed. I c. 9. Mastricht, Theol. III 12,

22. And at the same time with that the image of God has been destroyed by sin. Rome understands by that, that the supernatural gifts have been lost and the natural have remained uninjured. The Lutherans originally taught that man had wholly lost the image of God, since it consisted only in the moral qualities, and that man was now like a stick and a block. But the Reformed maintained that the image of God in the narrower sense had indeed been lost and in the broader sense wholly damaged and [166] corrupted, but yet had not been destroyed, Ned. Gel. art. 14. The image of God is not an outward, mechanical addition to man, but is organically connected with his being; it is the health of man. The man who transgresses God's law does not cease to be man; he retains his body, his soul, his faculties, his powers, his understanding, will, etc., but they all stand in the service of sin and work in a wrong direction. As deprivation and disturbance of the image of God, the stain of sin is by nature proper to all men, except Christ; qualitatively there is no difference. But for that reason there is nevertheless quantitative difference. All have indeed turned away from God and by nature walk on the path that leads to destruction. But not all have advanced equally far on that wrong way and are not equally far removed in a quantitative sense from the kingdom of heaven. There is an endless variation and transition between the beginning and the highest development of the sinful life. Men, families, generations, families, classes, estates, peoples also diverge widely in sin.

There are those who are not far from the kingdom of God; there are also those who drink in sin like water, are given over in unrighteousness, hardened, obdurate, and are incapable of any good impression. And this

quantitative difference among men does not first come about through their personal deeds and individual actions, but is already given with conception and birth. Original sin, which comes to us from Adam's side, is indeed the general presupposition and source of all individual, actual sins, but the sinful deeds of individuals also in turn react upon that inborn moral corruption, strengthen it, and develop it in a particular direction. Just as a sinful deed, repeatedly performed, cultivates in us a sinful inclination, e.g. to drink, sensual enjoyment, lust; so also can sinful morals and customs in family, kin, generation, people strengthen the inborn corruption and develop it toward a particular side. And also that peculiar modification of the inborn corruption often transmits itself from parents to children, from the one to the other generation. Man is no individual. Das Individuum ist eine Fiktion so gut wie das Atom, Natorp, Archiv f. syst. Philos. III 1 S. 81. Man is born out of the community and lives from [167] the very beginning in a particular circle, condition, and time. Family, kin, society, people, climate, way of life, culture, century, etc., everything exercises influence on the individual man and modifies his inborn moral corruption. Sin is therefore essentially indeed always the same, but it presents itself in different persons, families, estates, peoples and in different conditions and times each time in another way and in another form. Each man also as a sinner bears an own physiognomy. The sins in the East bear another character than those in the West, in the hot zone another than in a cold region; in the countryside another than in the cities, in the state of culture another than in a state of savagery, in the nineteenth century another than in the eighteenth, etc. There are family-, generational-, kin-, national-, social sins. Statistics has proved that in certain times and conditions and circles there also prevails a shuddering regularity of crimes, e.g. of homicide, suicide, extra-marital

births, etc., A. von Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik in ihrer Bedeutung für eine Socialethik, 3te Aufl. Erlangen 1882. We all stand on every terrain under the influence of wrong habits, sinful examples, of the spirit of the age and public opinion. Besides properly so-called original sin there is also a Gesammtschuld and Gesammtthat der Sünde. Just as men, so also their sinful inclinations and deeds stand in connection with one another.

Penetrating into the endless richness of all that is created, sin also forms a realm, which, animated by one principle of life, organizes itself in manifold forms and appearances. Cf. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 71. 72. Ritschl,

Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 311 f. Frank, Syst. der chr. Wahrh. I 463 f. H. Schmidt in Herzog2 15, 33 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 158 f. and above p. 96.

5. Besides guilt and stain, according to Holy Scripture suffering too is a punishment for sin. Through it man lost not only true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness but also dominion and glory. This is already evident immediately after the fall and is further confirmed by the whole of Scripture. God sets enmity between man and the serpent and thereby in principle deprives him of the dominion which originally [168] had been bestowed on him over the animal world, Gen. 1:26, 2:19. Further, God pronounces over the woman the punishment of painful pregnancy and of a desire for the man which nevertheless ever torments her. The man himself receives his share of suffering in the curse that is pronounced over the earth and that obliges him to laborious toil for the bread of his modest portion.

With this the history of suffering is opened for humanity and for the whole earth. And all the suffering that befalls human beings here on earth, a short life, a sudden violent death, famine, pestilence, war, defeat, childlessness, painful losses, deprivation of goods, impoverishment, crop failure, death of the cattle, etc., it all has its cause, indeed not always in personal sins, for

there is also a sparing of the ungodly, Gen. 18:26v., and a punishing for the testing of the righteous, Job 1, Luk. 13:21, Joh. 9:1, 11:4, 2 Cor. 12:7, but still in sin in general; without sin there would also be no suffering, Lev.

26:14v., Deut. 28:15v., Ezech. 4:21, Hos. 2:8v., Openb. 18:8, 21:4. Even the irrational creation has been subjected by God, on account of man's sin, to the ματαιοτης and φθορα, and now groans together, as being in travail, awaiting the revelation of the glory of God's children, in hope of then itself also being delivered from the bondage of corruption, Rom. 8:19-22.

Scripture is not pessimistic in the common sense of the word, but it knows and acknowledges suffering and interprets it in the most moving complaints, Gen. 47:9, Job 3, 6, 7, 9, 14 etc., Ps. 22, 38, 39, 69, 73, 74, 79,

89, 90 etc. Eccl., Lam., Mt. 6:34, Rom. 7:24, 8:19v., 1 Cor. 15:19 etc. And such complaints continually rise up from the whole of humanity. Teachers of religion, moralists, philosophers, poets, artists, richly gifted and disadvantaged persons, all speak in the same spirit. The light-hearted and superficial get over it, but all who are serious-minded have always sensed something of the mysterious connection of life and suffering. Greek antiquity also makes no exception to this; the basic mood there was not so cheerful as people formerly thought; it was rather bitter and sad. To live in pain is the lot that the gods have ordained for mortals; only they themselves are free from cares (Homer). Besides God, [169] no one is happy

(Euripides). No mortal remains free from misfortune, no one escapes his fate; man is perishable as a shadow, vain as a dream, his happiness is appearance; the best is not to be born, and if one is born, to die as soon as possible (Sophocles). Death is perhaps the greatest good (Socrates). A sudden death is the greatest happiness, a short life the greatest benefaction, the desire for death the deepest wish (Plinius), cf. Pfanner, Theol. gent. c.

17 de morte. Nägelsbach, Homer. Theol. 310 f. Paulsen, Ethik I 80 f. Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. I3 475-501 II3 464-517. The optimism of the previous century already turned into pessimism with Voltaire, Candide 1759, and Hegel's rationalism made way for the philosophy of Schelling, which elevated not reason but the will to the principle of the world, part II 204.

Reason may be able to explain what and how things are; that they are, is only to be inferred from a will; and this existence of things is the properly positive, is the irrational remainder that in the end remains at the bottom of all that exists. Nach der ewigen That der Selbstoffenbarung ist nämlich in der Welt, wie wir sie jetzt erblicken, alles Regel, Ordnung und Form; aber immer liegt noch im Grunde das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das

Ursprüngliche, sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung gebracht worden. Dieses is an den Dingen die unergreifliche Basis der

Realität, der nie aufgehende Rest, das, was zich mit der grössten Anstrengung nicht in Verstand auflösen lässt, sondern ewig im Grunde bleibt..... Ohne diess vorausgehende Dunkel giebt es keine Realität der

Creatur; Finsternis ist ihr notwendiges Erbtheil..... Alle Geburt ist Geburt aus Dunkel ans Licht, Werke I 7 S. 359 f. For this reason Schelling also had a wholly different view of life and world than Hegel; for the latter everything was rational, but Schelling saw the irrational, the lawless, the darkness, the chaotic lying at the basis of everything and acknowledged the path of suffering of the world-process. Es ist vergebliches Bemühen, aus friedlicher Ineinsbildung verschiedener Kräfte die Mannichfaltigkeit in der

Natur zu erklären. Alles was wird, kann nur im Unmuth werden, und wie Angst die Grundempfindung jedes lebenden Geschöpfs, so ist alles was lebt, nur im heftigen Streit empfangen und geboren. Wer möchte [170]

glauben, dass die Natur so vielerlei wunderliche Produkte in dieser schrecklichen äussern Verwirrung und chaotischen innern Mischung..... anders als im heftigsten Widerwillen der Kräfte habe erschaffen können?

Sind nicht die meisten Produkte der unorganischen Natur offenbar Kinder der Angst, des Schreckens, ja der Verzweiflung? Werke I 8 S. 322, cf. 328.

335 II 1 S. 582. There is even in God ein Quell der Traurigkeit, die aber nie zur Wirklichkeit kommt, sondern nur zur ewigen Freude der Ueberwindung dient. Daher der Schleier der Schwermuth, der über die ganze Natur ausgebreitet ist, die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancholie alles Lebens; Freude muss Leid haben, Leid in Freude erklärt werden, I 7 S. 399. The present world, in which we live, is only to be understood as an aussergöttliche. Of it man by his fall is the cause, II 3 S. 352 f., diese aussergöttliche Welt ist die

Welt des göttlichen Unwillens, alle Menschen, Juden und Heiden, sind τεκνα φυσει ὀργης, von Natur Kinder des göttlichen Unwillens, ib. 372 etc., cf. v. Hartmann, Ges. Stud. u. Aufs. 1876 S. 683 f. All these thoughts return in systematic connection with the philosophers Schopenhauer and von

Hartmann, in poetic form with Rückert, Lenau, Byron, Shelley, George Sand, Alfred de Musset, Leopardi and above all also in the more recent finde-siècle literature; Buddhism, which sees in the will to live, in being itself, the cause of all suffering, is honored as the highest wisdom. Life is suffering, it swings back and forth between pain and boredom, it is not worth the trouble of living. The world with its hospitals, lazareths, surgical torments, prisons, torture chambers, slave stables, battlefields, courts of justice, dwellings of misery, etc., offers a suitable material for the description of hell and is itself a hell, in which the one man is a devil for the other. If it were a little worse, it could not exist from misery. All that exists is therefore worthy that it perish, Schopenhauer, Die Welt u.s.w. I6 366 f. II

657 f. Parerga II5 303 f. v. Hartmann, Philos. d. Unb. II 273-390 etc., and further literature on pessimism in Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. d. Philos.8

1897 S. 183 f. 481. Concerning origin and goal of suffering the reflections have been many. Philosophy is almost always intent on casting the blame for it, as also for sin, directly or indirectly [171] upon God. Suffering is then derived from an independent, evil principle (Parzism, Manichaeism), from an originally evil being (Daub), from a dark nature in God (Böhme,

Schelling), from the blind, alogical will to be (Buddhism, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann), from the self-objectification and Entäusserung of God

(Hegel), from matter (Plato, Aristotle, Philo), from natural necessity (Weisse, Rothe), from the finitude of the creature (Leibniz), from the developmental state of the world (Ulrici), from the sinful consciousness of man, which conceives the in themselves necessary imperfections of the world as evil (Schleiermacher, Lipsius, Ritschl) etc. That, however, suffering is not to be ascribed to God in that sense that it was given with creation itself, stands firm on the ground of the doctrine of Holy Scripture, of the testimony of our conscience, and the essence of religion, which most closely connects holiness and blessedness. Yet an existence and development of world and humanity without suffering seems to be an impossible thought. Of a history without sin and misery we can form no conception; as soon as we think these away, there remains in the empty framework of time and space no event any longer. To the physical organism pain and death seem by nature, necessarily, to be proper; impassibilitas is a property that cannot be conceived in a sensuous creature. For human beings this already holds, much more still for plants and animals; modern natural science has shown us everywhere in organic and inorganic nature a struggle

for life, in which all creatures stand hostile toward one another and have set their aim on one another's death.

And yet, however natural pain and suffering may seem, against the preceding consideration the following may with good reason be urged: 1o.

If we could once remove from world and humanity all suffering that without any doubt has been caused directly or indirectly by sin, then at once by far the greatest and heaviest suffering would have disappeared and the problem of suffering would have been reduced to very small dimensions.

No one can deny that there exists a very closest connection between sin and misery; many sins, in everyone's judgment, drag along all kinds of dreadful consequences after them, not only spiritual, such as fear, regret, shame, disgrace, remorse etc., but also material, such as sickness, misery, pain, poverty, [172] brutalization etc. And not only is this the case with carnal sins, such as sensual pleasure, drunkenness, lust etc., but also with such sins as bear a more spiritual character, such as idolatry, superstition, unbelief, lying, greed, vanity, pride, hatred, envy, wrath etc. They all, in greater or lesser degree, also act upon the body and bring devastations upon it. A stream of spiritual and bodily misery in individual persons, in families, households, generations, peoples, in state, church, society, science, art takes its origin in sin. Take this away, and according to everyone's agreement almost no suffering remains. Die Welt ist vollkommen überall, wo der

Mensch nicht hinkommt mit seiner Qual (Schiller). Die Hauptquelle der ernstlichsten Uebel, die den Menschen treffen, ist der Mensch selbst, homo homini lupus, Schopenhauer, Die Welt II6 663. 2o. Yet, however much truth may lie in Schiller's word, it is not entirely true. Even if we think away the suffering that in everyone's judgment has its cause directly or indirectly in sin, the world would nevertheless not at once thereby become perfect. There

would still remain all those disasters which befall man from without and do not, for everyone's consciousness, stand in connection with sin, such as earthquake, storm, thunderstorm, flood, famine, plague, railway accident etc. Here too, according to the testimony of Scripture, there is connection with sin, but it is nevertheless different than with the above-mentioned suffering. Pharisees and Motazilites also sought the explanation of that in personal sins, but Jesus judged otherwise, Luk. 13:4, Joh. 9:1. Not in personal sins, but in the sin of humanity, the disharmony and enmity of nature has its cause. God, because of the sin of man, struck the earth with the curse and subjected all creation to vanity and corruption. Fallen man no longer belongs in a paradise; with his condition the earth corresponds, which stands between heaven and hell. Man has, together with knowledge and righteousness, also lost dominion and glory; the forces and elements of nature stand many times hostile over against him; he can now subject them to himself in no other way than through laborious, strenuous work. In its entirety humanity is worthy of no better place than this earth; and for its

[173] development, education, preservation there is also no better possible.

Of particular disasters we can almost never indicate the intention with which God sent them, although they certainly are never absolutely speechless for the one whom they strike. But all the more presumptuous is it, with Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, to take the scales in hand, in them to weigh against each other the joy and the sorrow of the whole world, in order then to draw up the judgment that the punishment very far exceeds the joy. For every creature and every human being, even the most accomplished pessimist, in fact gives preference to painful being over painless non-being and strives to persist in his existence. And humanity as a whole has, in the struggle with nature, found a stimulus for its energy, a material for its labor,

a spur for its development. The curse over the earth has, by God's grace, been turned for it into a blessing. 3o. That the whole of nature shares in the fall of man stands firm not only on the ground of Scripture, but flows, as of itself, from the central place which man occupies in creation, and is also, with a view to contemporary natural science, more than probable. There has sometimes been reasoned very strangely about the condition of the world before the fall and about its change by and after the fall, part II 548. 549, but the Reformed have here in general observed a wise sobriety, ib. 559.

560, and followed the golden rule, that indeed the forma of things has been changed by sin but the materia has remained the same. Sin is, after all, no substance and can neither increase nor diminish the substance of things, which has God alone as author. Just as man after the fall has essentially remained man, so it is with the whole of nature. No new species have been added in the plant or animal kingdom; thorns and thistles have not been newly created by a word of God like the grass and the herb and the trees on the third day, Gen. 1:11; and creeping and wild animals also already existed before the fall, Gen. 1:24. But just as in man the same faculties and powers, corrupted by sin, went to work in another direction, so it is also with the whole creation, after it was struck by God with the curse. Left to itself, emancipated from the dominion and the care of man, burdened with God's curse, [174] nature has gradually run wild and degenerated and has brought forth thorns and thistles, all kinds of vermin and ravenous beasts. The possibility of such a degeneration is by the newer natural science raised above all doubt. Palaeontology supplies only very few fossils of ravenous animals; the great animals of the oldest time, rhinoceros, mammuth, mastodon were all plant-eating. Of the so-called saurians, which one takes for lizards, it is uncertain; but even the whales live in part on plants. Insects

are all plant-eating; only there are some which in an undeveloped state, such as caterpillars, larvae, ichneumon wasps (ichneumon) feed on the constituent parts of animal beings, but beetles, ants, bees, butterflies etc., all live on vegetable food. Among the birds there are indeed many that use animal food, but they can nevertheless also live on plants. To the ravenous animals belong the three genera of felis (lion, tiger, cat, panther, leopard etc.), canis (dog, wolf, fox) and ursus (bear etc). But of all these animals it is at least doubtful whether flesh-eating belongs to their nature. Darwin has, in his in this respect too for theologians very instructive work, Het varieeren der huisdieren en cultuurplanten, trans. by Dr. H. Hartogh Heys van

Zouteveen, Arnh. Nijm. Cohen, proved that animals can become accustomed to changed nourishment and for that adduces various examples,

II 344v. And likewise, by running wild branches can change into thorns, and by cultivation thorns into branches, II 361. Nature is now in many respects become an antithesis of man, 2 Kon. 17:25, Job 5:22, 23, Hos. 2:20, Jes.

11:6v. 7:23, 65:20v., Ezech. 14:15, 21, Op. 21, Sir. 39:32v.; plants and animals have become living images of human sinful inclinations and passions; fear of animals and veneration of animals prove the abnormal relation of man to the world around him. But the wondrous power over the animals still occurring now and then among men; the many changes which, as palaeontology shows, have entered into the plant and animal kingdom; domestication and the slow variability in plants and animals supply proofs in abundance that a condition such as Isaiah in chapters 11 and 65 depicts for us by no means belongs to the impossibilities. There is nothing absurd in [175] the thought that, just as with man, so also with nature as a consequence of the judgment of God an important change has entered in. In any case Scripture is far more rational than what is sometimes brought to

market under the name of science; according to Lindenschmitt men had formerly been ravenous animals, who had to protect themselves against each other by pile-dwellings built in the water, but the beasts of prey had then been highly innocent creatures, with Weiss, Apol. II3 497. 4o. Besides, finally, let one not forget that, theologically speaking, creation itself in a certain sense was infralapsarian, Delitzsch, Genesis 1887 S. 67. The fall has for God been no surprise and no disappointment. He foresaw it, had included it in his counsel and already took account of it in creation. This therefore took place in such a way that the whole world, in case man as its head fell, could become such as it now is. The condition of man and of the whole earth was before the fall a provisional one, which could not remain so. It was of such a nature that it could be led up to higher glory but also, in case of man's transgression, could be subjected to vanity and corruption.

Through sin and the curse of God there came to appearance everywhere from beneath and from behind the harmony the lawless, the chaotic, the demonic, that confuses and frightens us. Over the whole creation a Schleier der Schwermuth has been spread. Πασα ἡ κτισις συνστεναζει και συνωδινει. Cf. Naville, Le problème du mal, Genève 1868. Delitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Apol. 1869 S. 141 f. Ebrard, Apolog. I 275 f. Pressensé, Le problème de la douleur, Etudes évang. 1867 p. 1-168. Keppler, Das Problem des

Leidens in der Moral, Freiburg Herder 1895. Sterling Berry, Das Problem menschl. Leidens im Lichte des Christ. Aus d. Engl. Heilbronn 1895.

Holliday, The effect of the fall of man on nature, Presb. and. Ref. Rev. Oct.

1896 p. 611-621. Paul Cadène, Le pessimisme légitime, Montauban 1894.

James Orr, Christian view 217. 495. Harnisch, Das Leiden beurteilt vom theist. Standpunkt, Halle 1881. Kübel, in Herzog2 15, 702 f. Lamers, Het probleem des lijdens, Theol. Stud 1896. Illingworth, The problem of pain,

3d essay in Lux Mundi ed. by Ch. Gore, 13 ed. 1892 p. 82-92. Henry Hayman, Why we suffer and other essays, London 1890 p. 1-109. [176]

6. This suffering is completed in that other punishment for sin, which is called death. Many are of the opinion that Scripture, except in a few places, does not regard death as consequence and punishment of sin. Indeed, in Gen. 2:17 the sudden death, entering in immediately, is threatened as punishment for sin, and this is also always regarded as a calamity and a punishment. But death in itself is much more natural and is given of itself with the material organism of man, Gen. 3:19, 18:27, Job 4:19, Ps. 89:48v.,

90:3, 103:14v., 146:4, Eccl. 3:20, 12:7. Thus formerly already the Pelagians, Socinians, Rationalists judged, and thus still many theologians judge, such as Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 59 Zusatz. Lipsius, Dogm. § 414.

Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 308 f. Smend, Altt. Rel. 504. Marti, Gesch. d. israel. Rel. 193. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 233 f. Matthes, Theol.

Tijdschr. 1890 bl. 239-254 etc. There lies in this representation some truth.

In Gen. 2:17 indeed it is not death in general, but specifically the death entering in immediately after the transgression, that is threatened upon sin.

Gen. 3:19 therefore also does not relate the full execution of the threatened punishment; but modifies it and postpones it. Consequently the O. T. sees precisely in sudden death, entering in in the bloom of years, a punishment for sin, Gen. 6:3, Num. 16:29, 27:3, Ps. 90:7-10, just as also the death penalty is conceived thus. This view is connected with the then economy of the covenant and with the pedagogy of the people of Israel. God attached to the keeping of his commandments in the days of the O. T. a long and happy life and set upon transgression all kinds of punishments on this side of the grave. Thus the eye of the righteous was especially directed to the lot of this life and limited within the circle of earthly existence; only rarely did it

penetrate to the other side of the grave. The distinction between righteous and ungodly therefore lay not first of all in death as such, for this was the same for all, but in the different dispensation of the lot that preceded death.

And if that dispensation also often differed so little, then the distinction between the righteous and the ungodly was sought in the different intention that suffering had for the former and the latter, Deut. 8:2v., Hos. 2:5v. Isa.

1:25v., Jer. 5:3, 9:7, 31:18, Lam. [177] 3:27v., Ps. 119:67, 71, 75, Prov.

3:11v., Job 1 etc. The righteousness of God, which visits the sins, becomes for pious Israel again principle of deliverance and salvation, part II 197v.

But from this it by no means follows that death itself was regarded as natural and necessary. For the view that death is consequence of the material organism of man by no means excludes that that death is punishment of sin. Only for that reason can for man the punishment of sin consist in death, because he is dust and taken from the earth. Paul likewise teaches that Adam is earthly from the earth and that nevertheless death has come into the world through sin. And all Christians speak in the same way; man is dust, flesh, perishable, and yet his death is consequence of sin.

Further, there is no people that has felt the dreadfulness and the unnaturalness of death more deeply than Israel; man is dust and must return to dust again, but natural this is not, sin has gradually weakened the lifeforce of men, Enoch and Elijah have escaped death, it is in conflict with the inner nature of man, Job 14:1-12, righteousness and life are intimately connected, Lev. 18:5, Deut. 4:1, 30:15, Jer. 21:8, Hab. 2:4, Ezek. 33:16, Ps.

36:10, Prov. 3:2, 18, 4:4, 13, 22, 8:35 etc., in the perishableness of life a judgment of God becomes manifest, Ps. 90:7-12, cf. Krabbe, Die Lehre v. d.

Sünde u. v. Tode 1836. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 690 f. Oehler, Theol. d. A. T. § 77. In the apocryphal and Jewish literature, Sir. 25:26, 39:29, 40:9, Enoch

69:11, Wijsh. 1:12v., 2:24, 4 Ezr. 3:7, Apoc. Bar. 23:4, Weber, System 238 f., and in the N. T., John 8:44, Rom. 1:32, 5:12, 6:23, 1 Cor. 15:22, 55, 56,

Heb. 2:14, 1 Pet. 4:6, Jas. 1:15, 5:20, Rev. 20:14, 21:4 etc., it is then clearly expressed that death is wages of sin. There is therefore least of all for those who always exalt the N. T. at the expense of the O. T. reason to deny the connection of sin and death. Yet this happens many times on the ground of testimonies of history and pronouncements of natural science. There are namely many who seem to have overcome all fear of death and fall asleep very calmly; others by suicide even put an end to life; Rousseau asserted that the natural men all die in peace and without fear; Lessing thought that the ancients held death for a brother [178] of sleep and saw nothing terrifying in it; romanticism often raved in a sentimental way about death.

And yet, even if some in stoic apathy have brought it so far that they see death with calmness as a fate, fear of death is innate to all that lives. We do not believe in the ground that we must die. Death plays such a great role in human life that philosophy can rightly be called a μελετη θανατου,

Schopenhauer, Die Welt I 324 f. II 528 f. Death has always been for man the last and greatest enemy; all finally recognize in it an unnatural power and flee it as long as possible. Indeed natural science has often called death natural and necessary; Lauvergne said e.g., la mort de l'homme est une conséquence logique et naturelle de son être. Tout prend fin, dura lex sed lex, in Delitzsch, Apol. 132, cf. also H. Wagner, De dood toegelicht van het standpunt der natuurwet, Utrecht 1856. But speaking thus, science has asserted more than it could justify. Death is a mystery in the full sense.

According to natural science matter and force are, and according to Weismann and others also the unicellular protozoa are immortal. Why then is the physical organism mortal, which is composed of such substances and

forces and cells? That organism moreover according to science in a man is renewed every seven years; it is from day to day nourished and strengthened; why can this process not continue and does it already cease after some tens of years? Let one not speak of old age and decline of powers, for these are names that indeed indicate the phenomena but do not explain them, and themselves precisely have need of explanation. Weshalb die Zellen sich abnutzen und dahinsiechen, weshalb sie im Alter

Veränderungen unterliegen, von denen sie in der Jugend bewahrt bleiben, das ist uns bis jetzt noch verborgen, H. de Varigny, Wie stirbt man? Was ist der Tod? Uebers. von S. Wiarda, Minden z. j. 52. Many plants and animals moreover surpass the life-span of man up to sometimes by hundreds of years; why is the life-force in man so quickly exhausted and does he bring it at most to seventy or eighty years, if he is very strong? To that there comes still, that death by decline of powers occurs as good as never, neither in men, nor in plants and animals. Almost [179] always death enters in as a consequence of a disease, a disaster, an accident etc.; even if a single time a man so-called dies of decline of powers, death nevertheless still bears a pathological character and is caused by one or another disturbance of certain cells in the body. What then is the reason that death takes away almost all men before the time and often even in the strength of years, in the bloom of youth, in the first hours of their existence? Science does not know the cause which makes death into a necessity, de Varigny 18. That man dies, therefore says Prof. Pruys van der Hoeven in his Studie der Christ.

Anthropologie, is a riddle that can only be explained by the degeneration of his nature, in Delitzsch, Apol. 126. Le mystère de la mort reste aussi intact que celui de la vie, Delage, La structure du protoplasme etc. 1895 p. 354.

771, and cf. further Sabatier, Le problème de la mort, 2 ed. 1896. Bourdeau,

Le problème de la mort, ses solutions imaginaires et la science positive, 2 ed. Paris 1896. Newman Smyth, The place of death in evolution, London

Unwin 1897.

7. The last punishment of sin to be discussed here consists in this, that the world in an ethical sense has come into the power of Satan and his angels.

Since Satan has seduced man and brought him to a fall, Joh. 8:44, 2 Cor.

11:3, 1 Tim. 2:14, Op. 12:9, 14, 15, 20:2, 10, the world is in his power and lies in the evil one, 1 Joh. 5:19, he is the prince of the world and the god of this age, Joh. 12:31, 16:11, 2 Cor. 4:4. Even if it is the case that the devils after their fall have been cast into hell, to be kept for judgment, 2 Petr. 2:4,

Jud. 6; they have nevertheless not yet been struck by that judgment, Mt.

8:29, Luk. 8:31, Jak. 2:19. They still come into the assembly of the angels, Job 1, Luk. 10:18, Op. 12:7, keep themselves in the air, Ef. 2:2, 6:12, wander about, dwell and work on this earth, and have great power here.

Especially the heathen world is the territory of their activity, Hd. 16:16, 26:18, Ef. 2:2, 6:12, Col. 1:13, 1 Cor. 10:20, 8:5, Op. 9:20; but when Christ came to earth, they also within the boundaries of the people of God entered into the struggle against Him. Satan ruled and worked in the Christ-hostile

Jews, Joh. 8:44v., [180] tempted Jesus, Mt. 4:1-11, sent unclean spirits, entered into Judas, Luk. 22:3, Joh. 6:70, 13:2, 27 etc.; it was then his hour,

Luk. 22:53, Joh. 14:30. But Christ was the stronger, Luk. 11:22, fought against him his whole life, Luk. 4:13, overcame him and cast him out, Luk.

10:18, Joh. 14:30, 12:31, 16:11, Col. 2:15, Hebr. 2:14, Joh. 3:8, and in principle withdraws the territory of the church from his dominion, Hd.

26:18, Col. 1:13, 1 Joh. 2:13, 4:4, Op. 12:11. Yet he still always works into the church from without; he wanders about over the earth, Job 1, tempts the believers and works against them, Luk. 22:31, 1 Cor. 12:7, 1 Thess. 2:18,

seeks to seduce them and bring them to a fall, 1 Cor. 7:5, 2 Cor. 2:10, 11:3, 13-15, 1 Petr. 5:8, 1 Thess. 3:5, Op. 12:10, so that the church is called to fight against him continually, Mt. 6:13, Ef. 6:12v., Rom. 16:20, 1 Petr. 5:9,

Jak. 4:7, Op. 12:11. Once at the end of the days he raises himself up once more in all his power, Mt. 24, Mk. 13, Luk. 21, 2 Thess. 2:1-12, Op. 12v.; but then he will also be overcome by Christ and with all his angels be cast into the lake of fire, 2 Thess. 2:8, 1 Cor. 15:24, Op. 20:10, cf. Litt. above p.

91.

Belief in evil spirits occurs among all peoples and in all religions.

Sometimes the fear of the evil spirits has almost entirely displaced trust in the good, Roskoff, Gesch. des Teufels 1869 I 20. And in almost all pagan religions physical evil is ascribed to one or more spiritual beings, who in nature and rank are equal to the good gods, ib. 24-175. Scripture, however, teaches otherwise, and in the first period Christianity in all kinds of ways subdued and opposed Jewish and pagan superstition; church and state made all kinds of regulations against sorcery, soothsaying, etc., and yet, down to the thirteenth century, applied to those who were guilty of it nothing other than disciplinary punishments, ib. I 287. 293. Even when later one had recourse to the death penalty, one nevertheless actually had in view thereby the extermination of pagan superstition. It is therefore not permissible, without more, to hold the Christian religion and church responsible for all the superstition that has also prevailed among Christians, and especially from the 13th to the 18th century. There cooperated thereto [181] all kinds of causes, the wretched conditions in state and society, the dreadful visitations of famine and plague, the gross ignorance of the people, the defective knowledge of nature, the magical, kabbalistic direction among the practitioners of natural science, etc., ib. II 314 f. Yet the church does not go

free in this. Many a time it adopted pagan superstition in theory and practice. Already among the church fathers that emerges. Just as every human being has his guardian angel, so he also has his daemon. Outside

Christianity the devil has almost unlimited dominion. Redemption in Christ is in the first place a deliverance from the devil. All physical evil in the world, sickness, crop failure, famine, plague, death, is ascribed to Satan. He is the invisible cause of all idolatry, magic, astrology, heresy, unbelief; superstition rests on a daemonic reality. When the in many respects superficial conversions of the peoples of Europe, under a Christian varnish, caused all kinds of pagan doctrines and practices to live on, there was added in the Middle Ages the belief that the devil, in all kinds of forms, of tomcat, cat, mouse, goat, swine, werewolf, could appear, create all kinds of vermin, as incubus or succubus make himself guilty of whoredom, induce people to a covenant sealed with blood, bewitch them, enter into them, ride through the air with them, change them into animals, and also in nature could bring about all kinds of mischief. Rome has always taken the daemonic reality of this superstition under its protection, not only in the Middle Ages (bull of Innocentius VIII 1484. Malleus maleficarum 1487), but also after the Reformation down to the present day; in Roman theology, e.g. of Suarez,

Vasquez, Lessius, Liguori, Görres, e. a., belief in the power of the devil occupies an extraordinarily broad place, cf. Graf Paul von Hoensbroech,

Religion oder Aberglaube, Berlin Walther 1897 S. 56 f.; and how much superstition lives on in practice among Roman Christians has only recently come to light in a sad way in the notorious history of Leo Taxil, cf. H.

Gerber, Leo Taxil's Palladismusroman, 2 Th. Berlin 1897. For Rome all that exists falls apart into a lower, unconsecrated and a higher, consecrated domain; in the first Satan rules with almost unlimited power, the second

must by sign of the cross, holy water, conjurations, etc., be secured against his influence and operation, [182] De Harbe's Verklaring der Kath. Geloofsen zedeleer, bew. en verm. door B. Dankelman, Utrecht IV 1888 bl. 598v.; the Roman Christian sees himself threatened everywhere by the devil and must take all kinds of measures in order to drive him away, Kolde, Die kirchl. Bruderschaften, Erlangen 1895 S. 47. It is true that Protestantism in the first period left this Roman and at bottom pagan superstition almost entirely untouched; belief in witches and witch trials were defended by the Protestants just as strongly as by the Roman Catholics and later were opposed by the Roman Catholics (Spina, Molitor, Loos, Tanner, von Spee) just as well as by the Protestants (Weier 1563, Godelmann 1562, Reginald

Scott 1584, van Dale 1685, Bekker 1691, Thomasius 1701); following Luther's lead, the Lutherans ascribed a very great power to the devil, derived all evil from him and maintained exorcism, Köstlin, Luthers Theol.

II 351 f. Müller, Symb. Bücher 477. 483. 771, cf. Roskoff, t. a. p. II 364 f.

Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 341. But nevertheless the Reformation, especially in its Calvinistic branch, did indeed bring about an important change in belief in the devil. Going back to Scripture and remaining with its data, confessing the absolute sovereignty of God, it could in Satan and his angels, however powerful, nevertheless see nothing other than creatures, who without God's will can neither stir nor move. The Reformation was not rationalistic. It maintained that there were evil spirits, who act upon human beings, especially upon their imagination, and could even degrade them to their instrument. But this power of Satan over humanity was nevertheless always subject to God's providence; it was in the first place ethical in nature and had its origin in sin; it was moreover limited within narrow bounds; not Satan, but God is the Creator of the light and the darkness, of the good and

the evil; sickness and death are sent to us by Him, Jes. 45:7. Hebr. 2:7 says only that Satan has the power of death, because through sin he has brought death in the world to dominion and thus is a murderer of men from the beginning, Joh. 8:44. Our life and end of life is not in Satan's but in God's hand. Luk. 13:11, 16 and 2 Cor. 12:7 give no right to ascribe all sickness and ailment to Satan. And furthermore Satan cannot create [183] and bring forth something out of nothing, he can produce children neither as incubus nor as succubus, he can change no human beings into animals, put them to death or call them back to life; he cannot act immediately upon understanding and will, he cannot change the substance and the quality of things, etc., Voetius, Disp. I 906 sq., and further Polanus, Synt. V c. 12.

Zanchius, Op. III 167-216. Synopsis pur. theol. XII 36 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. VII qu. 5. Mastricht, Theol. III c. 8. Brahe, Aanm. over de vijf

Walch. art. 1758 bl. 195v. Moor II 328. M. Vitringa II 117 sq.

Only through such a faith, which closely adheres to Holy Scripture, is superstition to be overcome, which has struck such deep roots in the human heart and, in spite of all so-called intellectual development, keeps coming up again and again. Rationalism first combated the influence of evil spirits upon human beings and thereafter their existence; and the result has been that indeed faith in Scripture has been abandoned, but superstition has not been eradicated. On the contrary, this now, under all kinds of forms of magnetism, hypnotism, telepathy, spiritism, astrology etc., makes its entry precisely in the circles of unbelief; occultism, which has flourished through all centuries and among all peoples, cf. Kiesewetter, Gesch. d. Occultismus,

3 Bde, Leipzig 1891, A. Lehmann, Aberglaube und Zauberei, Stuttgart 1898, counts also in the last decades of this century its adherents by millions and is even glorified in art and science as the highest wisdom. Also

over against this modern superstition the foolishness of God is wiser than men. For not only is there nothing reasonable to be brought in against the existence of fallen spirits, but also the possibility that they can seduce human beings cannot be disputed on any single ground. Just as human beings by word and deed, by example and conduct exercise influence upon others, so there is nothing absurd in the thought that also from the fallen world of spirits a seductive power proceeds upon the imagination, understanding, and will of human beings. It is indeed objected against this that then the human being can always cast his guilt upon the devil; but this is also the case if someone is seduced by his fellow human being; furthermore, temptation always takes place in an ethical way and does not remove one's own guilt; and in the circles where the existence of [184] fallen angels is believed, the sense of guilt is usually not weaker than there where their existence is denied. Faith in the devil at the same time maintains the dreadful seriousness of sin and the capacity of the human being for redemption; entweder ein Teufel ausserhalb der Menschheit oder

Tausende von Teufeln in Menschengestalt, Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. II3 519.

There manifests itself in human beings sometimes such a savage, wellconscious, intentional hatred against God and all that is divine, ib. 574-587; children of God, and among them not the weakest and the smallest, but the most advanced, such as stand in the forefront in the struggle, who live most closely in communion with God, they complain many times of such terrible temptations and assaults, they speak of such godless thoughts and inclinations, which suddenly rise up in their heart, that it is a privilege to be allowed to believe in the existence of devils. There are βαθη του σατανα, which in Scripture, in the history of humanity, in the struggle of the church of Christ, in the experience of believers are sometimes uncovered for a

moment. And besides, let one consider that the sinful power forms a kingdom and in its combating of God and his kingdom proceeds systematically. Whoever could survey it entirely would without doubt discover in the history of its struggle a plan of attack and defense. There is in the sinful life of the individual human being, but much more still in that of families, generations, peoples, humanity through all centuries, a wellconscious, planned combating of God and all that is God's. And the leadership of this struggle rests with him who in Scripture is called the prince of this world and the god of this age. Thus he has already immediately appeared at the temptation and the fall of the first human being. In Heathendom he has organized a power which stands hostile over against all true religion, morality, civilization. When Christ appeared on earth, he has concentrated his power against Him, not only by attacking

Him personally and restlessly persecuting Him, but also by surrounding Him on every side with daemonic powers and thus holding back and breaking off his work. The δαιμονιζομενοι in the N. T. were not ordinary sick persons, although symptoms of illness, such as deafness, dumbness, epilepsy, insanity etc., also occur with them. For they are repeatedly clearly distinguished from ordinary sick persons, Mt. [185] 4:24, 8:16, 10:1, Mk.

1:32, 3:15, Luk. 13:32. The special thing with the possessed is that out of them another subject speaks than they themselves are, that that subject recognizes Jesus as the Son of God, stands wholly hostile over against Him, and does not leave the sufferer except at his command, Mt. 1:34, 8:29, 31,

Mk. 1:26, 3:11, Luk. 4:34, 41, 5:41, 8:2, 30, Hd. 16:17, 19:15. This obsessio now, however dreadful also, is so little impossible that we in hypnotism, whereby the one human being is subjected to the thought and will of the other, see an analogous phenomenon appear; that even today such cases of

possession present themselves; and that whoever deems it impossible would also have to deny all influence of the soul upon the body, and of God upon the human being and the world. Satan imitates everything; God reveals himself through theophany (incarnation), prophecy, miracle; the daemonic caricature thereof are obsessio, mantics and magic, to which Scripture therefore many times ascribes reality, Gen. 41:8, Ex. 7:12, 22, 8:7, 18, 19,

Num. 22, Deut. 33:4, Jos. 24:10, 1 Sam. 6:2, 7, 28, 2 Chr. 33:6, Jes. 47:912, Jer. 39:13, Nah. 3:4, Dan. 1:20, 2:10, Hd. 8:9, 13:6-10, 16:16 etc., which it most firmly condemns and forbids, Ex. 22:18, Lev. 20:27, Deut.

18:10, Jer. 27:9, 2 Chr. 33:6, Mich. 5:11, Gal. 5:20, but which once again toward the end of the days will be revealed by Satan in all their seductive power, 1 Thess. 2:18, 2 Thess. 2:8-11, Op. 9:1-11, 13:13-15, 19:20. Cf. besides the literature already earlier mentioned concerning daemonology, above p. 91, Ebrard, art. Dämonische in Herzog1. Joh. Weiss, in Herzog3.

Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych.2 293. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 445 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III2 334 f. Kahnis, Dogm. I 445 f. Beck, Vorles. über Chr. Gl. II 390 f. Weiss, Leben Jesu I 454 f. Justinus Kerner, Geschichten Besessener neuer Zeit, nebst Reflexionen von C. A. Eschenmayer über Besessensein und Zauber 1834, and with that Strauss, Charakteristiken und Kritiken 1830

S. 301. Demon Possession and allied themes, being an inductive study of phenomena of our own times, by Rev. John L. Nevius D. D. for forty years a missionary to the Chinese. With an introduction by Rev. F. F. Ellinwood

D. D. 2 ed. New-York, Chicago and Toronto, Fleming H. Revell Company 1896. Hafner, Die Daemonischen im N. T. 1894. [186] Laehr, Die Daem. des N. T. Leipzig 1894. Zimmer, Sünde oder Krankheit, Leipzig 1894. J. A.

H. van Dale, Possession and Insanity, Heusden 1896. Florenz Chable, Die

Wunder Jesu, Strassb. Theol. Stud. II 4. 1897 S. 45 f. Bodelschwingh, Die Mitarbeit der Kirche an der Pflege der Geisteskranken, 1896 S. 13 f.

CHAPTER VII. On Christ.

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