4. § 38. The Spread of Sin.

4. § 38. The Spread of Sin.

§ 38. The Spread of Sin.

. Sin, already so dreadful in its essence, acquires an even more serious character through the extent of its dominion. Even outside special revelation the absolute universality of sin is acknowledged. The various religions with their priests and altars, their sacrifices and penances are all built on the confession of sin; dogma and cultus, prayer and song, religion and philosophy sometimes express in a moving way the general consciousness of sin.

Ἀνθρωποισι γαρ τοις πασι κοινον ἐστι τοὐξαμαρτανειν. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. Communis hominum labes. Cf.

Pfanner, Theol. gent. IX 7. Bretschneider, Dogm. II4 16. Lamennais, Essai sur l'indifférence III p. 393-408. Hettinger, Apol. d. Christ. III7 30. 412.

Still more clearly this universality of sin is expressed in Holy Scripture, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, 1 Kon. 8:46, 2 Chr. 6:36, Job 4:17-21, 14:4, 25:4-6, Ps.

14:3, 53:2, 130:3, 143:2, Spr. 20:9, Pred. 7:20, Jes. 53:6, 58:1, 59:4, 12 etc., cf. Sir. 8:6, 25:26, Wijsh. 9:6, 13-18, 12:10, 11 etc. Jesus presupposes it, when He calls all without distinction to repentance and connects entrance into the kingdom of God with rebirth from water and Spirit, Mt. 4:17, Mk.

1:15, 6:12, Luk. 12:47, Joh. 3:3, 5. To be sure He speaks of healthy persons and righteous persons, Mt. 9:12, 13, Mk. 2:17, Luk. 5:31, 32, but He does that, without passing a judgment on the nature of that health and righteousness, objectively, according to the opinion of those whom he thus describes. How He Himself thinks about that righteousness appears sufficiently from other passages; over the Pharisees He pronounces His woe, but the weary and burdened He invites to His rest. Likewise the apostles teach that all have sinned, that the whole world lies in the evil one and is condemnable before God, that all have need of the forgiving love of the Father, [105] of redemption through Christ, of renewal by the Holy

Spirit, Rom. 3:9-20, 23, 5:12, 11:32, 2 Cor. 5:19, Gal. 3:22, 1 Joh. 1:8, 5:19.

Furthermore, according to Scripture sin is proper to the human being from youth, from birth, even from conception onward, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, Joh 14:4,

13:26, Ps. 25:7, 51:7, 58:4, 103:14, Jes. 43:27, 48:8, 57:3, Ezech. 16:3, Hos.

5:7, Joh. 3:6, Rom. 7:7v., Ef. 2:3. David in his confession of guilt goes back to the deepest ground of his sinfulness, finds it in the sins of his parents and declares from that that he himself, from his conception and birth onward, stands unclean before God, Ps. 51:7. In Joh. 3:6 Jesus says that the flesh, i.e. the human being as a sensuous being, can bring forth only flesh, that such a human being has no entrance into the kingdom of God and for that needs rebirth from the Spirit, that the human being as such a sensuous being, as σαρξ, is unclean and corrupt from his birth onward. And in Ef. 2:3

Paul declares that Jews and Gentiles are τεκνα φυσει ὀργης; he certainly does not set φυσει here over against actual sins, of which he is precisely speaking, vs. 1-3, but says that they were φυσει children of God's wrath, while they now, after they have been made alive and saved by grace, are objects of His love, and thus indicates that their former condition, their

being dead through sins and trespasses, was a natural condition, a φυσις, which rested in their existence itself, cf. Rom. 2:14, 11:21, 2:15, 4:8. For the rest it is true that Holy Scripture presupposes the universality of sin and the corruption of the human being reaching back into conception far more than it describes it at length and repeatedly. Human beings themselves are everywhere depicted as sinners; not only the generation before the flood and all Gentiles and ungodly persons, but also the people of Israel; and within that people many sins are also related of the pious, of the patriarchs,

Moses, Job, David, Solomon etc., indeed it is precisely the pious who, even where they are convinced of the justice of their cause, nevertheless fall down before God in humble confession of guilt and implore mercy and forgiveness, Ps. 6, 25, 32, 38, 51, 130, 143, Jes. 6:5, 53:4-6 etc. It is the heart of the human being that is corrupt, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, Ps. 14:1, Jer. 17:9,

Ezech. 36:26, Mt. 15:19; from it are the issues of life, Spr. [106] 4:23, from it come all unrighteousnesses and also folly, Mk. 7:22. The understanding of the human being is darkened, Job 21:14, Jes. 1:3, Jer. 4:22, Joh. 1:5,

Rom. 1:21, 22, 1 Cor. 1:18-28, 2:14, Ef. 4:18, 5:8; his soul is guilty and unclean and has need of atonement and repentance, Lev. 17:11, Ps. 19:8,

41:5, Spr. 19:2, 15, Mt. 16:26, 1 Petr. 1:22; his spirit is proud, erring, defiled and therefore must be broken, enlightened, cleansed, Ps. 51:19, Spr.

16:18, 32, Pred. 7:9, Jes. 57:15, 66:2, 1 Cor. 7:34, 2 Cor. 7:1, 1 Thess. 5:23; his conscience is stained and needs cleansing, Tit. 1:15, Hebr. 9:9, 14,

10:22; his desire, inclination and will extend to what is forbidden and are powerless for good, Jer. 13:23, Joh. 8:34, 36, Rom. 6:17, 8:7, 2 Cor. 3:5; and the body, with all its members, eyes, Deut. 29:4, Ps. 18:28, Jes. 35:5,

42:7, 2 Petr. 2:14, 1 Joh. 2:16, ears, Deut, 29:4, Ps. 115:6, 135:17, Jes. 6:10,

Jer. 5:21, Zach. 7:11, feet, Ps. 38:17, Spr. 1:16, 4:27, 6:18, Jes. 59:7, Rom.

3:15, mouth and tongue, Job 27:4, Ps. 17:10, 12:4, 15:3, Jer. 9:3, 5, Rom.

3:14, Joh. 3:5-8 etc. stands in the service of unrighteousness. In one word, sin does not adhere to and around but in the human being and spreads over the whole human being and over all humanity, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 670 f.

Of the passages that are cited for the opposite view, only Rom. 7:7-26 needs some further discussion. At all times the Pelagians have appealed to this pericope as proof that the νους or the πνευμα in the human being has remained free from sin and that this resides only in the σαρξ; in more recent times this exegesis has been almost generally accepted. Augustine, however, in his later period and all his followers both in the Roman and in the Protestant churches, have always contradicted this interpretation and understood verses 14-25 as spoken by Paul as one reborn and concerning the present, an explanation that is still advocated today by Delitzsch,

Philippi, Luthardt, Harless, Thomasius, Umbreit, Kohlbrugge, e. a., cf.

Tholuck in his Comm. zum Brief an die Römer5, 1856 S. 333-369, and further Meyer, Philippi etc. The latter exegesis deserves preference for various reasons. 1o Paul argues in Rom. 7:7-26 that the law, from which the believer, by having died with Christ, has been released, is itself not sinful.

And he does that by pointing out that it first brought the believer to knowledge of his sin and his death, 7-13 and that it now still has the assent of his inner man, even though his flesh resists it, 14-26. In this connection the argument that the law now still has the assent of the believer, even though he has been released from it, is necessary. For for the proposition that the law itself is holy, it is not enough that the unreborn, but it is precisely necessary that the reborn approves it. And thus Paul also speaks from verse 14 onward in the present tense, not out of vividness of representation, but because he precisely as one reborn loves and approves

the law. Because the law indirectly granted him the painful experience of his sin and death, because he in communion with Christ, vs. 4, Gal. 2:19, 20 through the law has died to the law and has been freed from its curse, Gal.

3:13, therefore and thereby he has learned to know it as holy and righteous and good, he bears witness to it and confirms the law through faith, Rom.

3:30. 2o Because Paul according to the course of his argument wants to honor the law in its holy character, he casts all blame on the sin that dwells in him, and he makes a sharp distinction between the center and the periphery of his being. Inwardly, according to his will, according to his inner man he loves God's law, but in his members there dwells another power and another law, namely sin. Such a deep distinction is nowhere assumed in Scripture with the unreborn. With this one there is indeed a knowledge of God and of the law and also a doing by nature of the things that are of the law, Rom. 1:19, 2:14, 15, i.e. thus a struggle between reason and sensuousness, conscience and lust, understanding and heart; but a struggle between flesh and spirit, as Paul depicts it here, exists only with the reborn, Gal. 5:17; only they can say that they love the law of God, approve it, will it with their whole heart. 3o Although Paul as one reborn still calls himself σαρκινος, πεπραμενος ὑπο την ἁμαρτιαν, he nevertheless does not thereby say that he is ἐν σαρκι, 8:8, 9 or walks κατα σαρκα, 8:1, for he calls himself so only because on account of the sin dwelling in his members he cannot do what he wills and thus is held captive by that law of sin in his members. Although wretched, because with the [108] flesh he serves the law of sin, he nevertheless with his νους serves the law of God, vs. 26, and it is precisely this latter that is further worked out in Rom. 8. In Christ he is righteous and he walks according to the Spirit. 4o In addition there is still this, that, if Rom. 7:14v. were to be understood of the unreborn, rebirth

itself would be unnecessary, a helping grace would be sufficient and the whole doctrine of Scripture about sin and grace, about justification and sanctification, about faith and repentance would be overthrown. Rather

Rom. 7:7-25 is a strong proof for the total corruption of human nature; for if the reborn still has so to complain about the power of sin that dwells in him, then the unreborn is wholly and entirely, without knowing it, a servant of sin, being in the flesh and walking according to the flesh, and the minding of that flesh is enmity against God.

This universality of sin is derived in Gen. 3 from the fall of the first man.

True, it is not stated there in so many words; Gen. 3 pays much more attention to the change in the circumstances, which occurs as a consequence of the fall (pain of the woman, curse of the ground, expulsion from the garden), than to the moral reversal which took place in Adam and in his descendants. But it nevertheless relates that immediately after the evil committed shame and fear take hold of them, that the consciousness of guilt awakens, that they flee from God. The punishments, pronounced Gen.

3:16v., relate not only to Adam and Eve but without doubt also to their descendants, and these punishments, according to the whole conception of the O. T., also presuppose common guilt. The first fact that is reported after the fall is Cain's fratricide; history itself becomes another, even without this being said more precisely, it becomes a history of sin, misery, and death.

Man is now by nature evil, Gen. 6:5, 8:21. Likewise the further O. T.

Scriptures do not expressly connect the universality of sin with the fall of the first man. They remain with the fact of the universality of sin or also trace this back to the perishable, sensuous nature of man, Job 4:17v., 14:4,

15:14v., 25:4v., Ps. 78:38v., 103:13v., Mk. 14:38, Joh. 3:6, Rom. 6:7v. etc., cf. above p. 49v. It is only Paul who in 1 Cor. 15:21v., Rom. 5:12v. [109]

explains the universality of sin from Adam's disobedience, cf. also Wijsh.

1:13, 14, 2:23, 24, Apoc. Baruch 23:4, 54:15, 56:5, 9, 4 Ezra 7:68. In 1 Cor.

15:21v. he says that the death of all men has its cause in the man Adam in the same way as the resurrection from the dead in the man Christ. It clearly lies here that the death of all men is not first caused by their personal sins, but has already been pronounced over all men and has passed to all men, solely and only because of the disobedience of Adam; in the same way as the resurrection is not merited by the personal good works, the faith, etc. of believers, but exclusively by the obedience of Christ. Not in and through themselves but in Adam they die; and not in and through themselves do they rise, but only in Christ. How and why that death has passed to all is set forth more precisely in Rom. 5:12v. Since we through the death of Christ have been reconciled as enemies, we are certain that with Him we shall also live eternally; indeed so certain are we that we now already boast through Christ, who granted us the reconciliation, vv. 10, 11. The grace and the life of Christ therefore (δια τουτο, v. 12) far surpass the sin and death of Adam.

This is the theme of the pericope vv. 12-21, and it is worked out and proved in this way. Through one man sin, as a mighty and all-governing principle, has come into the world, and in that way and along that path death also has passed to all men, since all sinned. The little words ἐφ' ᾡ are not to be translated with Orig., Vulg., Aug., etc. by in quo, for they stand too far from ἀνθρωπος to be able to refer back to it, and they also do not mean in whom, although this thought in itself is not unscriptural, Hebr. 7:10, 1 Cor. 15:22, but they are a conjunction, ἐπι τουτῳ ὁτι, eo quod, quia, quandoquidem,

Calvin, Martyr and most newer exegetes; ἡμαρτον does not indicate a sinful state, but an act. Paul therefore says in verse 12: Adam transgressed, thereby sin and death came into the world and reigned over all. The causal

clause ἐφ' ᾡ παντες ἡμαρτον does not make known that Paul seeks the cause of the death of each man in his personal, actual sins, for in 1 Cor.

15:22 he says expressly that all die in Adam; here in verse 14 [110] he declares that death also reigned over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression, and—so may we add—also over the children; and in vv. 15 and 17 he expresses it as strongly as possible that through the trespass of one many have died. Yet on the other hand, with that causal clause it is not silently to be thought that all sinned in Adam. This is in itself already improbable, but it is made impossible by the fact that vv. 13 and 14 precisely deal with the sin which men committed not in Adam but themselves personally, even though they then also did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam. But Paul means to say that through Adam's transgression both sin and death, both in connection with each other, have come to dominion in humanity, that as a consequence of Adam's transgression all men themselves personally have become sinners and all die head for head. He argues this proposition in the following verses thus: the sin which entered the world through Adam's transgression was also there and also reigned in the time from Adam to Moses, when God had not yet promulgated his law; men sinned also then. But—so Paul, as it were, objects to himself—sin is nevertheless not imputed when there is no law; the law of Moses was not yet there, thus sin could then also not be imputed.

And to that he answers: most certainly it could, for death nevertheless reigned from Adam to Moses, even if it is also the case that men then did not transgress a positive law expressly and verbally promulgated by God and thus could not sin in likeness of Adam's transgression. They nevertheless did sin, because they also then had a law which was known to them by nature, Rom. 1:18v., 2:12-15. If death therefore nevertheless

reigned then, then sin must also have reigned then. And it reigned then, not because each person personally transgressed a positive command as Adam and thus each for himself and through himself became a sinner; no, but because through the transgression of Adam sin had come into the world and reigned over all and as a consequence of that also death. Adam is therefore precisely a type of Christ. It goes with sin and death, which come to us from Adam, in the same way as with righteousness and life, which Christ has acquired. There is a difference in intensity, grace is more abundant and life is more powerful, but the modus quo, by which both become our portion, is the same. The trespass of one was the cause of the guilt, the sin, and the death of all men, and so the obedience of one is the cause of the righteousness, acquittal, and life of all. In one all are condemned and have died; in one they are all justified and saved. In both cases a judgment of God, a κριμα, precedes; and from that κριμα are derived on the one hand our sin and death, and on the other hand our righteousness and our life. And thus the thought which Paul develops in this pericope comes down to this:

1o over the one transgression of Adam God has rendered a verdict, consisting in declaration of guilt and condemnation to death. 2o that verdict has been rendered in Adam over all men, because they in one way or another, which Paul does not explain more precisely here but lets be surmised from his line of argument, were included in Adam; all have been declared guilty in Adam and condemned to death. 3o by virtue of this preceding judgment of God all men have personally become sinners and all also in fact die. God thinks and regards, judges and condemns all men in one, and therefore they also all proceed from him as sinners and they are all subject to death. Cf. Moor III 255. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 9. Ontw. v. h.

Ex. v. Tol. X 373. Dietzsch, Adam u. Christus, Bonn 1871. Hünefeld,

Römer 5:12-21, Leipzig 1895. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 524 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. werk I 212. Pfleiderer, Der Panlin. 53 enz.

2. On these data of Scripture the doctrine of original sin was built in the Christian church. From the beginning a certain connection was acknowledged between Adam's sin and that of his descendants, cf. many citations in Vossius, Hist. Pelag. p. 134 sq. Horn, Comm. de sententiis eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Aug. plurimum valuit, de peccato originali, Gott. 1801. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 403 f. Münscher-v. Coelln,

D. G. I 343. 353. Schwane, D. G. II 439. Harnack, D. G. III 38. 151. Insofar the assertion that the doctrine of original sin is an invention of Augustine is wholly incorrect, and he himself could testify: non ego finxi peccatum originale, quod catholica fides credit antiquitus, de nupt. II 12. But yet it is true that [112] theology in the first period, especially in the East, laid the emphasis much more, over against Gnosticism, on free will and personal, actual sin than on original sin from Adam; and where it is acknowledged that a malum animae ex originis vitio antecedit, Tert. de an. 41, the essence of that original sin is nevertheless not more precisely determined and the manner of its propagation not more deeply thought through. Pelagius could therefore with some appearance of right appeal to many predecessors, but he nevertheless went much further than they, taught something essentially different, and denied original sin. According to Pelagius the image of God consisted only in free personality, not in positive holiness, immortality, etc.

Adam's transgression did not take away that image of God and in fact had no harmful consequences at all. There is no original sin. Only insofar did

Adam's transgression do damage to his descendants, as he set a bad example, which, followed by others, made sin into a power in humanity.

Inheritance of sin is a Manichaean error; sin is not a condition but an act,

and always bears a personal character; it would be in conflict with God's righteousness to impute to us alien sins; also propagation in marriage would be impermissible, if the inheritance of sin took place by that way; moreover baptized parents can no longer propagate sin, since it has after all been eradicated in baptism. Sin is therefore not propagated by generation but by imitation. Human beings, whose souls are created pure by God, are even now born in the same condition as that in which Adam found himself before the fall; sickness, suffering, death etc. are no punishments of sin; the human being is still completely free and can of himself know and do the good, he has no need of grace; it is possible to abstain from all sins, and some human beings have in fact also brought it so far, cf. the anti-Pelagian writings of Augustine and the litt., part II 320. Pelagius in this denial of original sin agreed with the Jews, who thought that the souls were created pure by God and were in a position to resist the ‎‏‏יצר הרע‎ dwelling in the flesh and to live sinlessly, Weber, System 217 f. And later the Socinians agreed with him,

Fock, Der Socin. 654 f., some Anabaptists, Cloppenburg, Op. II 151 sq., many humanists and rationalists, Wegscheider, Instit. [113] theol. § 117, and at present also Ritschl and his school. According to Ritschl we may not assume behind the particular, actual sins a general concept of sin, for such a concept is wholly incomprehensible; a passive inherited condition cannot be conceived as sin; Scripture does not teach it, Ps. 51:7 is only an individual confession, Ef. 2:3 refers to the former actual sins of those who are now

Christians, and Rom. 5:12 is too unclear to derive anything from it; original sin would remove all responsibility, make education impossible, do away with the distinction of degree in sins; each human being would then in original sin already have risen to the highest degree of sin and the personal, actual sins would thereby hardly any longer come into consideration. No,

sin is not a unity by virtue of one principle but a collective unity as result of all individual actions and inclinations; and subject of sin is not humanity as a race, which is an abstraction and only a memory-image, but humanity as sum of all individuals. Not first the sinful condition and then the act, but conversely the self-determination of the will is the ground of all sins. Only the will, which always does the evil, does indeed gradually acquire an inclination, a habitus, and this then in turn works upon the acts of will. And thus there does indeed arise in the human being a Gesetz der Sünde, a kingdom of sin, a common sin, but this is quite something other than original sin and was wrongly so named by Schleiermacher. A sinless development of life can therefore also a priori not be denied, the will of children is not directed toward evil, rather there is in them a general inclination toward good, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 311 f. Unterricht in d. chr. Rel. 1886 S. 25. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 256.

This Pelagian explanation of the universality of sin, however, encounters too many and too serious objections for it to be able to find acceptance for a long time and among many. In the previous century, with its rationalism, individualism, and optimism, there was room for it; Rousseau made the thoughts from many a heart public, when he glorified uncorrupted nature and sought the cause of all sin and misery in society. But the historical sense, which awoke after the revolution; the insight into the incalculable value of community, society, and state; the organic view, [114] which has penetrated everywhere; the doctrine of heredity above all, the significance of which, also in the spiritual and moral domain, has been brought to light more than formerly, have put an end to the individualistic and atomistic conception of humanity and of the sin reigning in it. If anything is certain, then it is indeed this, that sin is not merely an accidental phenomenon in the

life of individuals, but that it is a condition and mode of life of the whole human race, a property of the species. The sinful deeds, which do not occur now and then but are proper to all people in all ages and circumstances, point back to a sinful disposition, just as bad fruits presuppose a bad tree and turbid water points back to an impure source. From that, indeed, it alone is explained that all children from youth show a desire for what is forbidden and an inclination to all kinds of evil. To be sure, the Pelagians have many times, with appeal to Jon. 4:11, Ps. 106:38, Mt. 18:3, 19:14,

Luk. 18:17, Joh. 9:3, 1 Cor. 7:14, spoken of the innocence of children. And in a relative sense that is also correct; there is difference in degree between the sins; in connection with age and development, sin in children also has not yet come to its full manifestation and cannot yet present itself in such dreadful forms as at a later age; but the experience of all parents and teachers also teaches, that with the increase in knowledge etc., in the children also the sinful inclination develops. And if we ourselves review our own life, we find sin as far back as we can remember; and the deeper our consciousness of guilt descends, the more it goes back to the sins of youth, yes, of birth and conception, Ps. 25:7, 51:7. The above-mentioned Scripture passages therefore also offer the Pelagians no support; they speak at most of a relative innocence, but do not teach the sinlessness of children.

Furthermore, the assertion that there have been people who have lived without sin or can live without sin, is devoid of all probability and of all ground. Xenophon's testimony concerning Socrates, Mem. I 1, 11. IV 8, 11, is understood by no one in an absolute sense; of the pious in O. and N. Test. numerous sinful deeds are reported to us; those who have advanced farthest on the way of sanctification have in that same measure felt their guilt and imperfection all the more deeply. And so strong and general is the

conviction of the sinfulness of the whole [115] human race, that, if someone came forward with the assertion of being sinless, we all would at once ascribe this to lack of self-knowledge, pride, or insanity, Müller, Sünde II 370. This absolute universality of sin is not to be explained by imitation. It precedes every conscious and intentional act of will, and is in us all a condition, long before it passes over into deeds. That Ritschl does not acknowledge this, is connected in him also with nominalism; humanity is not an organism but the sum of all individuals; sin is not a condition but consists only in acts of will; things in general are, or in any case are only knowable, in their effects. Yet Ritschl himself does not remain faithful to his point of departure; for although he denies inborn sin and teaches the integrity of human nature, he nevertheless, just like Pelagius, ascribes to the bad example and the influence of society such a power, that thereby the universality of sin is explained and there even arises a common sin. Now one of the two: these influences from without work only accidentally and then they explain nothing and the universality of sin is a riddle; or they in fact cause the general sinfulness, but then they are of a much worse nature than the Scriptural doctrine of original sin. Furthermore, Ritschl does indeed combat this doctrine with the claim that it abolishes all degrees in sin, but this rests on misunderstanding; he himself has only two classes of sins, those of ignorance and of definitive wickedness, which certainly do not encompass the many-sidedness of sinful life. And the attempts to remove this doctrine from Holy Scripture, with all their acuteness, nevertheless bear too violent a character for them to be called successful.

Cf. Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl'sche Theologie, in Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1889.

Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 149. Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, London 1897 p. 145.

3. Pelagianism was condemned by the Christian church. From the beginning the church fathers assumed a certain connection between Adam's sin and that of his race. Even if this connection was not yet conceived,

Adam's transgression nevertheless brought about a great moral change for himself and for his descendants. The nature of that moral change, however, was conceived very differently. According to semipelagianism the consequences [116] of Adam's fall for him and for his descendants consisted, besides in death, chiefly in a weakening of moral power. A proper original sin, which would be guilt, does not indeed exist, but there is nevertheless an Erbübel; through Adam's fall man has become morally sick; his will is weakened and inclined to evil; a struggle has arisen in him between flesh and spirit, which makes it impossible that there lives a man without sin; but he can nevertheless will the good, and if he wills this, grace comes to his aid in the accomplishing, Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. II 54-82. On this standpoint stands the Greek church, deel II 319, and although in the West Augustine had much influence, the church nevertheless strayed more and more toward semipelagianism, and taught at Trent, that freedom of the will is indeed weakened but not destroyed and that the concupiscentia in itself is no sin, cf. deel II 322v. Entirely in agreement herewith is the opinion of the Anabaptists, bij Moor III 205, of Zwingli, cf. mijne Ethiek van Zwingli bl. 17. 18, of the Remonstrants, Conf. c. 7 and Apol. Conf. ib.,

Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV sect. 5 c. 2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 2., the Herrnhutters, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. II 213 f., the Supranaturalists,

Reinhard, Dogm. § 81-84, Krabbe, Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 148 f. and many more recent theologians, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 485 f. H. Schmidt bij

Herzog2 15, 31. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 260 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 325.

Oosterzee, Dogm. II 278v. Doedes, Leer der Zaligheid n. 27 and Ned. Gel.

art. 15 etc. All agree in this, that Adam's fall also had consequences for his descendants, because they stand in physical connection with him. But the moral condition, which as a consequence of Adam's transgression has entered into the human race, is not a condition of sin and guilt, but of weakness, defect, sickness. In itself this original sin cannot damn man and at most has a poena damni, without poena sensus, as a consequence; it is an occasion for sin but not sin itself in the proper sense. But since the will is weakened, it readily gives ear to the temptation that proceeds from the flesh; and then, when the will consents and the concupiscence yields, original sin becomes personal sin, which renders guilty and makes worthy of punishment. In substance this doctrine concerning original sin entirely agrees with the theory that [117] sin proceeds from sensuousness,

Biedermann, Dogm. II 573.

This Semipelagian conception of original sin, however, is at bottom not much better than that of Pelagius and runs up against equally great objections. 1o. It fails to recognize the character and the seriousness of sin.

Sin, after all, is ἀνομια, dislegalitas. The condition in which human beings are born either accords with God's law or deviates from it; it is good or evil, either not sinful or sinful; there is no third. That condition is good and in all parts accords with God's law, the Semipelagians too do not dare to assert.

Yet they also do not call it sinful in the proper sense. And thus they create an intermediate condition, and speak of original sin as a disease, defect, infirmity, which is not sin in the proper sense but can only be an occasion for sin; or they separate sin and guilt and say, as Rothe and Kaftan, that original sin is indeed sin but no guilt. 2o. Both of these are impossible. Sin and guilt are inseparably connected with one another, Gal. 3:10, Jak. 2:10, 1

Joh. 5:17; if sin is ἀνομια, then it is punishable, and conversely, where guilt

and punishment are, there must be sin. Now, however, original sin is of such a nature that death follows upon it, Rom. 5:14, that it makes the communion of God and his heaven unworthy (Doedes), that it is in itself unclean, that it is the occasion and the source of many sins, it therefore itself must indeed be sin. Otherwise God would be unjust, who with death, the wages of sin,

Rom. 6:23, punishes what is no sin and does not deserve death; the law would lose its absolute validity, for there would be deviation that was not worthy of punishment; communion with God would be withheld without there being any mention of guilt; between heaven and hell, good and evil, light and darkness there would come a condition in, which would be neither of the two, a poena damni without poena sensus; what brings forth all manner of sins would itself be no sin; the tree would be good and yet it bore evil fruits; the source would be pure but unclean the water that flows out of it. 3o. That this inborn sinfulness first becomes sin and guilt when the will consents to it, does not improve the theory but makes it still worse. For one of two: the will then stands, as it were, above and outside that inborn inclination, and then original sin consists in nothing but the inborn sensuous nature and the whole character of sin [118] is lost; or the will itself is affected and weakened by that original sin in greater or lesser degree; it itself is rooted in the sinful nature and arises out of it, and then one loses precisely in that same degree, as one lets the will be weakened, that which one wanted to maintain with this theory, namely, that there is no sin without a free decision of the will. But moreover, even if such a will, which stood wholly or in part outside the inborn sinful nature, were conceivable; it would nevertheless in fact not give what one aims at with it. The first decisions of the will, which consent to the inborn concupiscentia, all fall in the first years, when the will is still weak and powerless. No one is

conscious that with those first decisions of the will he loaded such a guilt upon himself, that he in fact only then fell and became a child of wrath.

Over against whoever asserts this, everyone could excuse himself that he did not know better and could not do otherwise, that for such a weighty decision concerning his eternal weal or woe he was already placed in very unfavorable circumstances; indeed, if original sin is no sin, then all other later sins, which so easily and so necessarily flow from it, can also be no sin. Schleiermacher too therefore rejected the representation that original sin cannot be guilt earlier than before it breaks out into actual sins, indem ja der Umstand, dass es noch an Gelegenheit und an äusserer Anreizung gefehlt hat, den geistigen Werth des Menschen nicht erhöhen kann, Chr. Gl.

I 382. 4o. The Semipelagian theory not only does not solve the problem that lies here, but it does not even touch it with the fingers and deliberately closes its eyes to it. The universality of sin is a fact, which the Semipelagians too acknowledge; they reject the explanation of it from imitation; they assume that an unclean, defective, sick, sinful (even if then also not sinful and punishable) condition precedes the sinful deeds; they acknowledge that that unclean, sick condition in all without distinction leads to sinful, guilty, punishable deeds, so that the weakened free will in fact has very little significance. Well then, how is that dreadful phenomenon to be explained? How is it to be reconciled with God's righteousness, that He, apart now from the covenant of grace, lets all human beings be born in such a condition, which for the children who die earliest in any case brings death and banishment from his [119] communion and for all others eternal perdition? The Semipelagian theory does not at all think this problem through and contents itself with a superficial and insignificant doctrine of free will. Cf. Müller, Sünde II 445 f.

4. To this problem, however, Paul had given an answer, taught by the antithesis of Christ, that through the trespass of one, sin and death had come into the world and had passed through to all men. Gradually, in Christian theology, consciousness opened up for this profound doctrine, cf. Schwane,

D. G. II2 439 f. 480 f. Irenaeus said: in primo quidem Adam (Deum) offendimus, non facientes ejus praeceptum, in secundo autem Adam reconciliati sumus, obedientes usque ad mortem facti, adv. haer. V 16, 3.

Tertullian spoke of a malum animae, which had come to us ex originis vitio and is to be derived from Adam's fall; omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur donec in Christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur, de an. 40. 41, cf. also Cypr. de op. et eleem. 1. ep. 64, 5.

Ambrose speaks most strongly, who more than others before him lays the emphasis on the guilty character of all sin and on the sinful condition in which we are born and traces this back to the fall of Adam; fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes, periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt, Harnack, D. G.

III 45. But yet it was especially Augustine who seized upon Paul's thought and developed it further; repeatedly, especially in his two writings against Julian, he appeals to Rom. 5:12, 1 Cor. 15:22, Ef. 2:3; furthermore he cites

Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory Naz., Chrysostom e. a., in defense of his opinion; then he also sees in the practice of infant baptism a powerful proof for his doctrine of original sin; and finally he points out that the dreadful misery of the human race cannot be explained otherwise than as a punishment for sin. How can God, who is nevertheless good and righteous, subject all men from their conception onward to sin and death, if they are completely innocent? There must rest upon all an original guilt; the grave jugum, which presses upon all children of Adam, is otherwise not to be understood; whoever traces the miseries of human life, from the first crying

of the children up to the last sighs of the dying [120] must with Paul come to the acknowledgment of an originale peccatum. Quoniam Dei non est iniquum judicium, ideo in miseria generis humani, quae incipit a fletibus parvulorum, agnoscendum est originale peccatum, Op. imperf. c. Jul. III 77 and so passim, I 25. 49. II 107. III 44. 202. VI 17. 28 etc. The sin of Adam must therefore be conceived as an act of him and of all his descendants.

Adam was not a private person, not an individual alongside others, but all men were included in him. The manner of this is not completely clear in Augustine; since he, in the question concerning the origin of the soul, refrained from a choice between traducianism and creationism, he also here does not express himself decisively as to whether, in the being-included of the human race in Adam, he thinks only realistically or also federalistically.

On the one hand he repeatedly says that all were in Adam's loins, like the Israelites in those of Abraham, that Adam could bring forth no better than he himself was, that Adam's sin is transplanted by propagation and not by imitation, that the sin of Adam becomes our share by birth in the same way as the righteousness and the life of Christ by rebirth, de civ. XIII 3. Op. imp. c. Jul. I 48 etc. But on the other hand the fact is nevertheless of significance that he does not accept Tertullian's traducianism, and that he repeatedly expresses as strongly as possible that all were in Adam and sinned in him; omnes ille unus homo fuerunt, omnes fuimus in illo uno, de pecc. mer. et rem. I 10. de civ. XIII 14 etc. Original sin is distinguished from actual sins in that it was not personally committed by us, but it is nevertheless sin, because in a certain sense it was again our act. It is both a foreign and a proper sin; aliena enim (sunt peccata originalia), quia non ea in sua vita quisque commisit; nostra vero, quia fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes, Op. imp. c. Jul. III 25, cf. I 48. 57; it is even a peccatum

voluntarium, quia ex primi hominis mala voluntate contractum, factum est quodam modo haereditarium, Retract. I 13. c. Jul. III 5. de nupt. et conc. II 28 etc. The sinful condition in which we are conceived and born is a consequence and punishment of our transgression in Adam, Op. imp. c. Jul.

I 47 VI 17; God often punishes sin with sin, c. Jul. V 3. de nat. et gr. 22.

And it consists in fact in the concupiscentia. Sometimes [121] Augustine takes this word in a broad sense and says that the inherited sinfulness is seated not only in sexual lust but in quocunque corporis sensu cognosci,

Op. imp. c. Jul. IV 28; that the carnalis concupiscentia also has its seat in the soul, ib. V 7, that original sin is not a substance but an affectionalis qualitas, a vitium, languor, morbus, substantiae accidens, de nupt. et conc. I 24. 25 II 34. Op. imp. c. Jul. VI 7 Conf. VII 12 etc. But yet he thinks, with concupiscentia, first of all of sexual lust; in the independent motus genitalium, independent of the will, the corruption of nature especially comes to expression, and shame serves as proof thereof; through sexual drive, then, sin also propagates itself and makes the whole of humanity into a massa corrupta, which is subjected to the misera necessitas non posse non peccandi, cf. especially de nupt. et conc. passim, Harnack, D. G. III 190 f.

Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 107 f. This concupiscentia is better called peccatum originale than naturale, because it is not of divine but of human origin, Op. imp. c. Jul. V 9; it is sin, quia peccato facta est appetitque peccare, ib. I 71, and makes man originaliter reum, c. Jul. VI 5. Children dying unbaptized are lost on account of it; its guilt, however, is taken away in baptism, it itself remains as a stimulus for the struggle, reatus ejus regeneratione solutus est, conflictus ejus ad agonem relictus est, Op. imp. I 71. 101. c. Jul. VI 5. de pecc. mer. et rem. II 4, cf. also Gangauf, Die metaph. Psych. d. h. Aug. 420 f. Scholasticism and Roman Catholic

theology built further on this foundation but nevertheless introduced a not unimportant modification into Augustine's representation. The thought was retained that Adam's transgression was the cause of all men's sin and death.

Original sin consists first of all in the imputation to all men of that transgression which Adam committed, because they all were included in him; it is in the first place guilt, thereafter punishment. Scripture also expressed this clearly, and the church took it up in its confession, conc.

Milev. can. 2. conc. Araus. c. 2. Trid. V 2. Cat. Rom. I 3, 2. Pighius and Catharinus even went so far that they let original sin be wholly absorbed in this imputation of Adam's transgression and wanted to conceive all that followed upon it, loss of original righteousness, corruption of nature etc., only as punishment but not as sin, in Bellarminus, [122] de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V c. 16. But undoubtedly these theologians thereby expressed a thought that followed from the development of the doctrine of original sin in Roman Catholic theology. There arose, namely, soon a difference concerning the character of that moral condition which after Adam's disobedience entered in him and in all his descendants. In Augustine this consisted in the concupiscentia, which then had in sexual drive its principal seat and organ. Lombardus still remained at this, Sent. II dist. 30. 31. But gradually the doctrine of the donum superadditum arose, which was bestowed upon Adam but was lost by his fall. The first consequence of Adam's transgression was thus for him and all men the loss of the gratia supernaturalis (justitia originalis); this was the first, negative element in original sin, to which then the second, positive, namely the concupiscentia, was added. Thus Anselmus already defined original sin, de casu diaboli 27, and was followed therein by Halesius, Bonaventura, Albertus, Thomas.

Original sin thus consisted in privatio originalis justitiae and in quaedam

inordinata naturae dispositio (concupiscentia), Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 82 art. 1 and further Schwane, D. G. III 393-413. But with further reflection, difference had again to arise concerning this latter. For the image of God was gradually conceived as a donum supernaturale, part II 518, thus there was also a man conceivable and capable of existing without that image and yet without sin, a homo naturalis; in such a man, however, flesh and spirit would nevertheless by nature stand over against each other and wage conflict with each other; i.e. the concupiscentia, the lust of the flesh against the spirit, is by nature, necessary, by creation proper to man and thus cannot in itself be sin. The image of God had indeed been bestowed upon Adam as a remedium and frenum, but when he lost this, the conflict of flesh and spirit arose of itself again; this lay in his nature, was indeed suppressed but now became free again. The concupiscentia is a morbus seu languor naturae humanae, qui ex conditione materiae oriebatur, part II 527; it can in itself be no sin and thus also can form no part of original sin. The Roman doctrine of the domum superadditum takes its revenge here in a questionable way upon original sin. It is historically to be shown how therefore gradually in Roman

[123] Catholic theology the center of gravity in the doctrine of original sin was shifted from the concupiscentia to the privatio justitiae originalis, from the positive to the negative. Augustine defined the whole of original sin by concupiscentia; the scholastics added to that the loss of original righteousness, but nevertheless still maintained original sin in a positive sense as an inordinata dispositio, languor naturae, habitus corruptus,

Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 82 art. 1. Trent speaks very cautiously; it says that Adam not only lost righteousness but also was changed for the worse in body and soul; that he, after he was defiled, poured out not only death and the punishments of the body but also especially sin upon his descendants;

that the sin of Adam is not by imitation but by propagation proper to each, inest unicuique proprium, and can be taken away only by Christ's merit in baptism, sess. 5. But the Synod intentionally refrained from narrower determinations, Möhler, Symb. 57; the nature of this sin is not further defined; the words in deterius say little; the concupiscentia, which remains in the baptized, is itself no sin but only is ex peccato et ad peccatum inclinat, ib. 5; free will is not lost but weakened, VI c. 5, and can also do good works before faith, ib. 7. Taken all together, it is not to be seen in what, apart from the imputation of Adam's transgression and the loss of original righteousness, original sin could further still consist. Nothing remains for it. After Trent, therefore, the opinion of Lombardus is also expressly contested, later still embraced by Henricus, Gregorius Arim.,

Driedo, that original sin would consist formaliter or materialiter in concupiscentia, in a positive qualitas, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V c. 15. Becanus, Theol. schol., de pecc. orig. qu. 3 and 4. Theol.

Wirceb. VII 84-94. With appeal to Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus etc. original sin is set only in the loss of the justitia originalis; Bellarminus expressed it openly and clearly: non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Adae a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis infirmitate et ignorantia laborat, quam esset et laborasset in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturae non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia neque ex alicujus malae [124] qualitatis accessu sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit, de gr. pr. hom. 5. The condition in which man is born after the fall is completely equal to that of Adam before the fall without the donum superadditum. Of a corruptio or vulneratio naturae there can be spoken only insofar as this

condition ought not to be there, because Adam received the donum superadditum and lost it; the loss of it is guilt. But in substance that condition is not wrong; it is naked naturalness; original sin nothing other than reductio ad statum mere naturalem; supernaturalia amissa, naturalia integra; in baptism this loss is restored by the gratia infusa; after death original sin is punished only with poena damni. Some still attempt to maintain a corruptio naturae, but the supranaturalistic conception of Christianity makes this impossible. Only there is still difference over whether the imputation of Adam's sin, which had as consequence the loss of the donum superadditum for all his descendants, rests on a nexus physicus or on a nexus moralis (foederalis). Some say that all men were indeed not formaliter but yet causaliter, materialiter, seminaliter included in Adam; others think they can explain the imputation no otherwise than by assuming that Adam was not only our progenitor but also our head and our representative; still others connect both representations with each other. Cf.

Anselmus, de conceptu originali et de originali peccato. Lombardus, Sent.

II dist. 30-33 and the comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura etc. Thomas, S.

Theol. II 1 qu. 81 sq. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. V 17-20. Becanus, Theol.

Schol. II tr. 2 c. 9 de pecc. orig. Theol. Wirceb. VII 65 sq. Vasquez, Suarez e. a. in Schwane, D. G. der neueren Zeit 1890 S. 166-198. Schwetz, Theol. cath. II 163-177. Dens, Theol. I 356 sq. Perrone, Prael. theol. III 1839 p.

189. 216-223. Scheeben, Dogm. II 633 f. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. der Menschheit 1887 S. 110 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 616-675. Simar,

Dogm. 351-367. Pesch, Prael. theol. III 111-152 etc.

5. Against this Roman weakening of original sin the Reformation rose in protest. In itself it found no objection to the scholastic definition of original sin as privatio justitiae originalis, homini [125] inesse debitae, provided

only that it was not understood in a purely negative sense. This, however, became more and more the case in Roman theology, and therefore the Reformation laid emphasis precisely on the point that original sin was not only a privatio but that in it there was at the same time a total corruption of human nature. Frequently in the first period this corruption was still designated by the name of concupiscentia, yet then this was not one-sidedly conceived, with Augustine and Lombard, as sexual lust, but as ἀταξια omnium appetitionum, seated as well in the higher as in the lower faculties of man. Calvin says very clearly: they who define original sin as loss of original righteousness do indeed describe it wholly, but do not sufficiently express its power and operation. Our nature, namely, is not only deprived of something good, but it is also malorum omnium fertilis et ferax. If original sin therefore is described as concupiscentia, this is good, provided one adds, quidquid in homine est, ab intellectu ad voluntatem, ab anima ad carnem usque hac concupiscentia inquinatum refertumque esse, aut ut brevius absolvam, totum hominem non aliud ex se ipso esse quam concupiscentiam,

Inst. II 1, 8. Further, the Reformers taught that this lust was sin also in its primoprimi motus; it does not first become sin when the will has consented to it, but it is sin in itself, not first as formata therefore but also already as informis. Calvin again declares that in this point he departs from Augustine; the latter calls the concupiscentia, when in baptism the guilt of it has been taken away, by the name of infirmitas; nos autem illud ipsum pro peccato habemus, Inst. III 3, 10. And finally this corruption of human nature was so total that man by nature is incapable of any spiritual good, inclined to all evil, and for it alone already worthy of eternal punishment. It cannot be denied that one has sometimes, out of reaction against Rome, especially on the Lutheran side, expressed oneself all too strongly. Even if it was not

meant so badly, it was nevertheless certainly liable to serious misunderstanding, when Luther called original sin peccatum essentiale and essentia hominis, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 366 f. Flacius spoke still more strongly of original sin as substantia hominis. And also the Formula

Concordiae said in Luther's own words that man's understanding, heart and [126] will in spiritual matters was prorsus corruptus atque mortuus, capable of nothing more quam lapis, truncus aut limus, ed. Müller 589. 594, cf. also

Frank, Theol. d. Conc. I 138. However much the Romanists therefore tried to accuse the Lutherans of Manichaeism, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. V c. 1 sq. Becanus, de pecc. orig. qu. 2 sq. Möhler, Symbolik S. 66 f., yet they have in the Form. Conc. expressly confessed that sin was no substance, and all theologians agree with that. Yes, although the Lutherans in general had embraced traducianism and although they were therefore inclined to have original sin propagated through the carnalis concupiscentia,

Luther in Köstlin II 367. Melanchton, Loci C. de pecc. orig. C. R. XXI. p 668 sq., cf. Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel I 50 f., yet Melanchthon also says there that he has no objection, natos etiam propter lapsum Adae reos esse; the Form. Conc. declares that original sin is culpa seu reatus, quo fit, ut omnes propter inobedientiam Adae et Hevae in odio apud Deum et natura filii irae simus, Müller, Symb. Bücher 576, and later various

Lutheran theologians say that Adam is not only to be regarded as caput physicum but also as caput morale seu foederale generis humani, and that therefore his transgression is imputed to all, Quenstedt, Theol. II 53. 118.

Hollaz, Ex. theol. 515. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 172 f. The Reformed from the beginning guarded themselves against such strong expressions as the Lutherans sometimes employed; Calvin absolutely did not approve the above-mentioned images, Schweizer, Centrald. I 385. 394. But nevertheless

they too taught that original sin consisted negatively in carentia justitiae originalis but also positively in corruptio naturae, and that it had its cause in the imputed transgression of Adam, Calvin, Inst. II 1, comm. on Ps. 51:7,

Rom. 5:12 etc. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 344. Martyr, Loci C. 68 sq. Polanus, Synt. 336. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 202. Explic. Catech. qu. 7. Zanchius, Op.

IV 30. Junius, Theses Theol. 19 20. Heppe, Dogm. 245 f. On this point there prevailed a very great agreement. Rivetus collected a long series of statements from ecclesiastical confessions and theological works, which all teach the same, Testimonia de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami posteris, Op. III 798-826, for the most part translated into English in Princeton Theol. Essays 1846 p. 195-217. [127] There came, however, opposition to this doctrine from the school of Saumur; Placaeus taught namely in his theses de statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam, Synt. thesium theol. in acad. Salm. ed. 2 1665 p. 205, that the disobedience of Adam was imputed to his descendants only mediately, i.e. only insofar and on the ground that they were born from him already unclean. Formerly it was taught unanimously: corrupti nascimur, quia primum peccatum nobis imputatur; Placaeus reversed this and said: primum peccatum nobis imputatur, quia corrupti nascimur, and explained his opinion still further in Disp. bipartita de imputatione primi peccati Adami 1655. The Synod at Charenton condemned his opinion 1645, Rivetus collected at the command of the Synod his above-mentioned testimonia, various theologians opposed the doctrine of Placaeus, Heidegger, Turretinus, Maresius, Driessen,

Leydecker, Marck, Comrie, Holtius etc. But the time seemed past for the reformational doctrine of original sin. Placaeus found acceptance everywhere, in France, Switzerland, England, America, among theologians such as Wyttenbach, Endemann, Stapfer, Whitby, John Taylor, Roell,

Vitringa, Venema etc. cf. M. Vitringa II 349, and also among the Lutherans, Walch, Bibl. theol. I 85. In America Jonathan Edwards did indeed still write his famous tract Original sin defended 1757, Works II 305-310, against Whitby, but he himself already advocated therein the mediate imputation of Adam's sin and brought the New England Theology of Hopkins, Edwards

Jr., Dwight, Emmons etc. entirely into the line of Placaeus. Pelagianism made its entry everywhere; Protestantism, in the same measure as it became unfaithful to its past, fell back into Romanism; man was good by nature but succumbed very easily in the struggle against sensuality. Even the more recent theologians, who assume an influence of Adam's sin on his descendants, have thereby still only in part returned to the doctrine of the Reformation, Vilmar, Dogm. I 270. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 40. Ebrard,

Dogm. § 340-344. Dorner, Chr. Gl. § 82. 83. Frank, System d. chr. Wahrh. I 460. 482. Müller, Sünde II 426-503 etc. Yet through all sorts of causes the deep meaning of the doctrine of original sin has again become clear to many. In 1845 Gervinus wrote: wir sind der Erbsündenangst entnommen, die wie die Gespensterfurcht nur die Furcht einer abergläubischen

Religionslehre war, in Delitzsch, Christl. Apol. 119. There will [128] not be many who now still agree with this superficial judgment. The philosophy of Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer etc., the doctrine of heredity and of solidarity, the historical and sociological studies have offered the dogma of original sin an unexpected and important support. When theology had rejected it, philosophy took it up again.

6. The doctrine of original sin is one of the weightiest but also one of the most difficult subjects of dogmatics. Nothing is more familiar for preaching than original sin, nothing more secret for understanding, Augustine, de mor. eccl. cath. I 22. Chose étonnante, que le mystère le plus éloigné de notre

connaissance, qui est celui de la transmission du péché, soit une chose sans laquelle nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connaissance de nous-mêmes. Car il est sans doute, qu'il n'y a rien qui choque plus notre raison que de dire que le péché du premier homme ait rendu coupables ceux qui, étant si éloignés de cette source, semblent incapables d'y participer.... et cependant, sans ce mystère, le plus incompréhensible de tous, nous sommes incompréhensibles à nous-mêmes. Le noeud de notre condition prend ses replis et ses tours dans cet abîme, de sorte que l'homme est plus inconcevable sans ce mystère que ce mystère n'est inconcevable à l'homme (Pascal). Le péché originel explique tout et sans lui on n'explique rien (de Maistre), and yet it itself needs explanation more than anything. From of old it was designated in theology as peccatum originale, not as though it were proper to man from his origin by virtue of creation, but because in all men it is the origin and source of all other sins. Much misunderstanding is prevented if this original sin is clearly distinguished into peccatum originans (imputatum, culpa) and peccatum originatum (inhaerens, poena). Properly, under original sin, peccatum haereditarium, there is only to be understood that moral corruption which man immediately brings with him at his conception and birth from sinful parents. But this moral corruption, which is proper to all men by nature and does not first arise in them later through their own wrong deeds, must nevertheless have a cause. And this cause, according to Holy Scripture and also for Christian thinking, can be no other than the first transgression of the first man, through which [129] sin and death came into the world. Adam's disobedience is the peccatum originans; Scripture says that clearly, Rom. 5:12, 1 Cor. 15:22; and experience confirms it at every moment, all men are conceived in sins and born in iniquity. This is now conceivable in no other way than that that transgression of Adam concerns

us all in one way or another. If absolutely no connection existed between Adam and us, it would be impossible that we are born in sins, because he transgressed God's commandment. Scripture and history thus together point us to an original, common guilt of the human race. The hypothesis, to be sure, of Plato and others, that every soul had already existed long before its coming into the human body and had already fallen there, has earlier appeared to us for conclusive reasons to be wholly untenable, above p. 70; there lies only the undeniable truth at its foundation, that every man is born under guilt. That guilt has not been brought upon himself by each personally, individually, actually; it rests upon each man on Adam's account; δια νης παρακοης του ἐνος ἀνθρωπον ἁμαρτωλοι κατεσταθησαν oἱ πολλοι, Rom. 5:19. Apart from whether we can make it in any measure intelligible that God immediately through and on account of Adam's disobedience constitutes all men sinners, the fact itself stands firm, on the ground of Scripture and experience. But yet something can be said, in order, if not to explain this manner of acting of God, then at least to remove it from the appearance of arbitrariness. In the first place, for the human race is not an aggregate of individuals, but an organic unity, one race, one family.

The angels all stand independently alongside one another; they were all created at the same time and did not proceed the one from the other; among them a judgment of God, as was pronounced in Adam over all men, would not have been possible; each stood and fell for himself. But it is not so among men. God has made them all from one blood, Hd. 17:26; they are not a heap of souls on a piece of ground, but all related to one another in the blood, bound to one another by all kinds of bonds, and therefore in everything determining one another and determined by one another. And in particular the first man occupies an entirely unique and incomparable place.

Like rami in radice, massa in primitiis, [130] membra in capite, so were all men included in Adam's loins and have they all proceeded from his hip. He was no private person, no loose individual alongside others, but he was radix, stirps, principium seminale totius generis humani, our all caput naturale; in a certain sense it can be said, that nos omnes ille unus homo fuimus, that what he did was done by us all in him; his choice of will and act of will was that of all his descendants. Undoubtedly this physical unity of the whole of humanity in Adam is already of great significance for the explanation of original sin; it is its necessary presupposition, its praerequisitum; if Christ would be able to bear sin for us and make his righteousness partaken of by us, he first had to assume our human nature.

But yet realism without more is insufficient for the explanation of original sin. For, in a certain sense it can indeed be said that all men were included in Adam, but then also only in a certain definite sense; it is repraesentative but not physice true. In the covenant of grace too no one speaks thus. We can and may indeed say that God so appropriates the righteousness of Christ to us, as if we had performed all the obedience which Christ has performed for us, Heid. Cat. vr. 60, but for that reason we are not personally and physice yet those who have satisfied God's righteousness; Christ satisfied for us and in our place. And so it is also with Adam; virtualiter, potentialiter, seminaliter we may have been included in him, but personaliter and actualiter he transgressed the probationary commandment and not we. If realism would not want to acknowledge this distinction, and would want to be consistent to the utmost, then it would make all imputation superfluous both with Adam and with Christ; in both cases it would then have been each man himself who had personally sinned with the deed and had satisfied by his suffering and death. Further, if Adam's

transgression in this realistic sense has been ours, then man is also guilty of all other sins of Adam, of all sins of Eve, indeed of all the sins of his forefathers from whom he was born, for he was included in these just as well as in Adam when he transgressed the probationary commandment; it is then also not to be seen how Christ, who physice, i.e. as far as the flesh is concerned, is from the fathers and from Adam and Eve, could then be free

[131] from original sin; the physical unity on this standpoint nevertheless brings the moral necessity along with it. Further, realism comes into no small embarrassment with the covenant of grace; for if there is no foedus operum, then also no foedus gratiae; the one stands and falls with the other.

If now the righteousness of Christ is not acquired and applied in the way of the covenant, but in a realistic way, then this consists with Christ in that he assumed our nature, and in that case satisfaction and salvation are the portion of all men, for Christ assumed the nature of them all; or it consists in that each first obtains this physical, realistic unity with Christ through regeneration or faith, and then it is not to be seen how Christ could beforehand satisfy for those with whom he first becomes one through faith; then regeneration and faith run the danger of losing their ethical character, the center of gravity is shifted from the Christ to the Christian, and the benefits of the covenant come into being only after and through faith.

Finally, realism does indeed defend an excellent interest, namely the unity of the human race, but in doing so it loses another interest out of sight, which is of no less weight, namely the independence of personality. A man is a member of the whole, very certainly, but in that whole he nevertheless also occupies a place of his own; he is more than a wave in the ocean, more than a passing form of appearance of the general human nature. Earlier, part

II 551f., it has therefore already been remarked that the relations in which

men stand to one another are distinct from those which are found among the angels and among the animals; for related to both, he is nevertheless also different from both; he is a creature with a nature of his own. And therefore physical unity with him is not sufficient; there is added yet another, an ethical, federal one. Cf. against Shedd, who is a strong supporter of realism,

Dogm. Theol. II p. 6 etc., also Arch. Alex. Hodge, The atonement, Philad.

Presb. Board of Publication n.d. p. 99 etc.

As soon as people in the Christian church began seriously to reflect on the connection between Adam's sin and ours, they did not have enough with the physical unity. Shedd does indeed assert that Augustine, the scholastics, the oldest Reformed theologians were all realists, t. a. p. II 37. But this is incorrect; the doctrine of the covenant [132] had not been worked out, but the thought already occurs among the church fathers and the medieval theologians, cf. vol. II 549, above p. 124 and further Schwane, D. G. III 393 f. IV 166 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 711. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. d.

Menschheit 165. 167. Scheeben, Dogm. I 500. Pesch, Prael. III 136 etc. The one fact alone, that they almost all adhered to creationism, says enough, for a creationist cannot be a realist. Federalism therefore does not exclude the truth that lies hidden in realism; on the contrary it accepts it fully; it proceeds from it but it does not stop there; it recognizes a unitas naturae, cui unitas foederalis est innixa. In humanity we encounter all kinds of forms of community, which rest absolutely not only and even not chiefly on physical descent, but on another, higher, moral unity. There are "moral bodies," family, kin, society, people, state, church, and associations and societies of every kind and for every purpose, which lead a life of their own, are subject to special laws, in particular also to the law which Paul formulates when he says: και εἰτε πασχει ἑν μελος, συμπασχει παντα τα μελη, εἰτε δοξαζεται

μελος, συγχαιρει παντα τα μελη, I Cor. 12:26. All the members of such a body can be for one another a blessing or a curse, and that all the more, the more excellent they themselves are and the more weighty a place they occupy in the organism. A father, mother, guardian, caregiver, instructor, teacher, patron, guide, prince, king etc. have the greatest influence on those over whom they are placed. Their life and action decide the fate of their subordinates, raise them up and bring them to honor or cast them down and drag them along to ruin. The family of a drunkard is destroyed and laden with shame because of the sin of the father. The family of a criminal is, in a wide circle and for a long time, reckoned with and condemned with him. A congregation languishes under the unfaithfulness of its minister. A people perishes because of the folly of its prince. Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi. There is among human beings a solidarity in good and in evil; a community in blessings and in judgments. We stand on the shoulders of the preceding generations and inherit what they have amassed in material and spiritual capital; we enter into their labor, rest on their laurels, enjoy

[133] what they have often obtained through struggle and suffering. All that we receive undeservedly, without having asked for it, it all lies ready at our birth, it is bestowed on us by grace. No one who objects to that and rises up in resistance against this law. But when that same law now also comes to rule in evil and makes us participants in the sin and the suffering of others, then the heart rises in revolt and the law is accused of injustice. The son who accepts the inheritance of his father refuses to pay the debt of his father. Thus the Israelites also complained in the days of Ezekiel. There was in the O. T. a law of solidarity, Gen. 9:25, Ex. 20:5, Num. 14:33, 16:32, Jos.

7:24, 25, 1 Sam. 15:2, 3, 2 Sam. 12:10, 21:1v., 1 Kon. 21:21, 23, Jes. 6:5, Jer. 32:18, Klaagl. 3:40v., 5:7 Ezr. 9:6, Mt. 23:35, 27:25. But when Israel in

its supposed righteousness complains about it, the Lord has the prophet proclaim, not what He can do justly, but what He will do, if Israel repents and does not walk the way of the fathers. There is a solidarity of sin and suffering, but God permits it and often grants the strength to break that moral community and oneself to become the beginning of a generation that walks in the fear of the Lord and enjoys his favor. But thereby the solidarity itself is so little abolished that it is rather confirmed by it. Christ has proved the truth of the solidarity of the human race in another and better way than

Adam. If this solidarity could also be broken, not only all compassion, but also all love, friendship, intercession etc. would cease to exist; humanity would fall apart into lifeless atoms; there would be no mystery, no mysticism, no human life any more. Yet it is true what Shedd asserts,

Dogm. Theol. II 187, that this solidarity of suffering does not yet explain the imputation of Adam's sin to all his descendants; to suffer for the sin of another is not the same as to be punished for the sin of another and thus also oneself to be regarded as the perpetrator of that sin; there is suffering without personal transgression, Luk. 13:1-5, Joh. 9:3. But this solidarity, which we see daily, nevertheless takes the argument out of our hand, to accuse God of injustice, if He makes the whole of humanity share in Adam's punishment. Thus [134] He acts at every moment, both in blessings and in judgments. If such a manner of acting is compatible with his righteousness, then this is and must also be the case with Adam's transgression. But in addition there is still the fact that there is a special reason why the above-mentioned law of solidarity in the case of Adam does not apply wholly and entirely nor even can apply. The law of solidarity does not explain the covenant of works and the covenant of grace, but is built upon it and points back to it. It always rules within narrower circles than are

formed by humanity itself. However great the blessing or curse of parents and guardians, of sages and artists, of founders of religions and reformers, of princes and conquerors etc. may have been; there were nevertheless always "circumstances" of place, time, country, people, language etc., which set bounds and limits to it; the circle in which their influence ruled was always enclosed by other and greater ones. Only two human beings have existed whose life and works have extended to the boundaries of humanity itself, whose influence and dominion continues to work through to the ends of the earth and into eternity. They are Adam and Christ; the first brought sin and death, the second righteousness and life into the world.

From this wholly exceptional place occupied by Adam and Christ it follows that they alone are to be compared with one another, and that all other relations, derived from circles within humanity, can indeed serve for elucidation and are of great value, but nevertheless offer only analogy and no identity. That is to say, that Adam and Christ have both been placed under a wholly special ordinance of God, precisely with a view to the special place which they occupy in humanity. When a father plunges his family, a prince his people, a philosopher his pupils, a patron his workers with himself into misery, then we can go back behind their persons and in the solidarity which rules within humanity and its different circles find, to a certain extent, an explanation and satisfaction. But thus we cannot do with Adam and Christ. They do not have humanity behind but before them; they do not proceed out of it but bring it into being; they are not borne by it but bear it themselves; they are not a product but, each in his own way, beginning and root of humanity, caput totius generis humani; they are not [135] explained by the law of solidarity but explain this only by themselves; they do not presuppose, they constitute the organism of humanity. If

humanity were really to remain a unity both in the physical and in the ethical sense, as it was destined to be; if therefore there were really in that humanity not only community of blood, as with the animals, but on that foundation also community of all material, moral, spiritual goods; then that could not be brought about and maintained otherwise than by judging all in one. As it went with him, so it would go with the whole human race. If Adam fell, humanity fell; if Christ remained standing, in him humanity was raised up. Covenant of works and covenant of grace are the forms by which the organism of humanity is maintained also in the religious and ethical sense. Because God is concerned not with a few individuals but with humanity as his image and likeness, therefore it had to fall in one and also be raised up in one. Thus is the ordinance, thus the judgment of God. He declares all guilty in one, and therefore humanity is born unclean and dying out of Adam; He declares all righteous in one, and therefore that same humanity is reborn out of Christ and sanctified unto eternal life. God has shut them all up under obedience in order that He might be merciful to them all. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 9. A. A. Hodge, The atonement p. 78-121. Ch.

Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 192. Princeton Theol. Essays 1846 p. 128-194.

Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 704 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 211. E. Bersier, La solidarité. Paris 1870. Vercueil, Etude sur la solidarité dans le Christianisme d'après St. Paul, Montauban 1894.

7. The consequence of the peccatum originans is the peccatum originatum. Because all are reckoned as sinners in Adam, they are also all born from him in a sinful condition. The hereditary stain is a punishment for the hereditary guilt. From this point of view original sin was first considered by Augustine, which provoked a powerful protest on the part of the Pelagians, cf. August., c. Jul. V 3, as likewise later on the part of the

Remonstrants, Apol. Conf. VII 4. But Scripture speaks many times in that spirit and sees in subsequent sins a punishment for the preceding, 2 Sam.

12:11, 12, [136] 1 Kon. 11:11-31, 22:30, Jes. 6:9, 10, 7:17, 10:5-7, 14:3, Jer 50:6-8, Rom. 1:24-28, 2 Thess. 2:11, 12 etc. The sins too stand under God's governance; the laws and ordinances that apply to the life of sin have been established by God and are maintained by him. And among those laws is also this: Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen That, dass sie fortwährend Böses muss gebähren. Sin has that nature, that it makes the sinner more and more foolish and hardened, entangles him ever more firmly in its snares, and makes him fall ever more quickly along a sloping plane into the abyss. It is true that sin, considered in itself, can never be punishment for sin, for both differ essentially and stand over against each other; sin arises from the will and punishment is undergone by someone against his will; sin is transgression, punishment is maintenance of the law; punishment has God as author but sin does not. But nevertheless a subsequent sin may be called a punishment of the preceding, because it removes the sinner still further from God, makes him more wretched, and delivers him over to all kinds of lust and passion, anxiety and remorse, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 36.

Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 87 art. 2, qu. 75 art. 4. qu. 84 art. 1-4. Gerhard, Loc. VI c. 10 n. 140. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 15. Spanheim, Op. III 12681270. Moor III 332-335. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 71, 2. Müller, Sünde II 589 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. I 489. Christ, Die sittl. Weltordnung S. 59.

According to this law, in Adam and all his descendants a sinful condition followed upon the sinful act. The Pelagians represent it in such a way that some act of will or other leaves absolutely no consequences; the will, which at one moment did evil, can immediately thereafter, if it pleases it, do good again; the will with them never has and never acquires a certain nature, a

definite character; it is and remains neutral, indifferent, without inner inclination, always placed between opposite things and directing itself now to the one side, then to the other, with incalculable arbitrariness. But such a representation meets contradiction from all sides. There had taken place in Adam and Eve, when they transgressed God's commandment, a great moral change; shame and fear of God took possession of them; the rest, the peace, the innocence was gone; they hid themselves from God in the trees of the garden; they cast the blame upon each other; Cain made himself guilty of fratricide; [137] and soon the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, that all the imagination of the thoughts of his heart was evil from his youth. With Adam's transgression a dreadful degeneration of the human race begins. We stand here before a terrible reality, the explanation of which escapes us. How is it possible that one single sinful act had such dreadful consequences and brought a radical reversal in the whole human nature? In general it may be remarked that the relation between an act and its consequences repeatedly appears to us in life very disproportionate. One hour of thoughtlessness can make one weep for years. One small mistake, a single misstep gives to the life of many people a wholly different direction; small insignificant events work on through generations; on a so-called accident our happiness or unhappiness often depends. The one transgression of Adam brought an entire change in the deliberations, dispositions, and inclinations of his nature. For experience teaches that whatever a human being does, in greater or lesser measure works back upon himself and leaves a trace in his character. At bottom nothing is indifferent and nothing passes by us without leaving a trace.

Every act of will, arising from preceding inclinations and desires, works back upon these and strengthens them. Every sin can in that way become a

habit, an inclination, a passion, which rules over the human being like a tyrant. A human being is so changeable, so pliably formable; he adapts himself to all circumstances, he adjusts himself to every milieu, he becomes accustomed to everything and conforms everywhere. He who commits sin becomes at once a servant of sin. A crime, a lie, a theft, a murder is never past with the moment in which it is committed. The disobedience of Adam has changed his whole nature. Moreover, his transgression had not only an outward but also an inward side. It is not so that the sinful act of Adam, consisting in the eating of the forbidden fruit, happened suddenly without any preparation and only thereafter had all kinds of moral changes in his nature as a consequence. In that way, with Adam guilt and stain do not stand in relation to each other. The act of eating was itself already a manifestation of [138] an entire moral change that had taken place in the inner man. Strictly speaking it was not the first sin but the first fully developed sin in the sense of Jak. 1:15. The sinful act was preceded by sinful deliberations of the understanding (doubt, unbelief) and sinful inclinations of the heart (lust, pride), which had their occasion in the temptation of the serpent and were fostered by the will of the human being.

Both before and during and after the eating of the forbidden tree, man's relation to God and to his law was changed. He became, not first the one and then the other, but simultaneously and in connection with each other, both guilty and unclean before the face of his Maker. Guilt and stain are both simultaneous consequences of the one and the same sin, two sides of the same matter. Finally, the change that entered in with Adam did not consist in this, that any sinful principle was implanted in him or any constituent part of his being, of his soul or body, of his faculties or powers, was taken from him. But it consisted in this, that the human being through

his doubt and unbelief, through his pride and lust, and finally through the sinful act itself, increasingly detached himself from God and from his law, placed himself outside his favor and fellowship, and began to use all his gifts and powers precisely against God and his commandment. And then when this happens, when the human being places himself outside God's fellowship and outside God's law, then the sinful condition enters of itself, just as darkness enters when the light disappears. Fieri nequit quin maxime sese amet creatura, quam non absorpserit amor Dei (Melanchton). The human being, withdrawing himself from the fellowship of God in which he was created, is not otherwise conceivable than as a sinner, guilty and corrupt before his face.

That same religious and ethical change, which took place in Adam under and at his fall, is also the lot of all his descendants. These are all born in that same moral condition in which Adam fell through his transgression. This fact is hardly susceptible of any denial. Scripture teaches it not only, but experience and history prove it day by day. If anything is certain, then it is this, that human beings are not conceived and born as righteous and holy but as sinners. That points to the fact that they have one guilt in common with Adam, for guilt and stain in sin always go together. Just as it did not happen in Adam in such a way that he first committed the sinful deed, thereby loaded guilt upon himself, and as a consequence of that now also became morally unclean and corrupt, so also his descendants do not come into the world, as it were, with a double guilt, first with that of Adam's transgression and then also with that of their moral corruption. For this moral corruption is not a later additional, external appendage and not an accidental consequence of the first transgression, but in it an essential element and not to be separated from it. Just as Adam through his

transgression at the same time and in the same measure made himself guilty and became unclean, so also with his descendants the being guilty in him and the being born unclean out of him are two sides of the same thing,

Edwards, Works II 482. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 170. It is incorrect to infer from that with Edwards that the stain precedes the guilt. There is here no before and no after. The uncleanness in which all human beings are born is the reverse side of the guilt of that transgression, which was committed by Adam as caput foederale. Guilt, stain, death stand with Adam's descendants in the same relation as with himself and have thus, in that mutual connection, passed on to all.

8. The way in which this peccatum originatum becomes the portion of all human beings is not that of imitation but of generation. A κριμα, a judgment of God, precedes it, and by virtue of that judgment all human beings are born from Adam guilty, unclean, and dying. They do not first become all this at a later age through their actual sins, but are it from their conception and birth onward. Death is the proof, for this reigns not only over adults but much more strongly over the little children, even the unborn; and that death is according to Scripture not a natural process but a wage of sin. Now this doctrine of original sin, however much it was formerly condemned as unreasonable, has in recent times again found favor in the eyes of so-called science. It proved after all not so foolish and absurd as earlier interpreters of science had displayed it. Scientifically, now precisely the opposite holds of what in a former century counted for that. The doctrine of the innate goodness of man and of society as the cause [140] of all evil has had its day; one now teaches precisely the opposite: man, descended from an animal, remains in his heart an animal; in every man lurks la bête humaine, vitium hominis natura pecoris; and the "holy" society and the "divine" state

are what keep him happily in bonds and compel him to virtue; all vice is innate, all virtue is acquired, cf. e.g. Brunetière, La moralité de la doctrine évolutive, Paris 1896. It is not the newly discovered facts that have brought about this change in the view. For that every species brings forth its like, that children take after their parents, that not only bodily but also all kinds of spiritual properties are inherited, that is no discovery of the 19th century but was, as appears from the doctrine of traducianism, also formerly well known. And that again not all properties are inherited, that each individual is nevertheless something different and something more than the sum or the product of his parents, that too was, as appears from the doctrine of creationism, not unknown to earlier generations. Certainly the knowledge of the facts has been extended and increased, but this was far from being of such a nature that it alone could radically change an entire view. This change is chiefly to be ascribed to the fact that one viewed approximately the same facts from another point of view and with another eye, namely from the standpoint of monism and with the eye of a dogmatist of evolution. In conflict with all sober scientific sense, one has built upon a few facts a series of deeply far-reaching conclusions and has brought these in all manner of ways to the public in popular writings: man—that had clearly appeared—was by no means an independent being, but nothing but a product of existing factors, a plaything of circumstances; to speak of freedom in his case is foolishness, he is a will-less instrument of fate; criminals are a distinct type, who are already born as such and are incorrigible and not responsible; every man must of necessity be what he is.

An army of partly talented writers, such as Zola, Ibsen, Nietzsche etc. have depicted this view in novel and drama for the heated imagination. And whoever now does not sing along in that choir and doubts the scientific

character of this view, is put under the ban. And yet for the sober observer [141] all that science has brought to light in this field comes down to this little: 1o There is not only heredity but also variation, not only unity but also change, not only memory but also imagination. Many properties pass over from parents to children, for all species after all bring forth their like; but yet not all properties pass over, for each individual is something new; no single child resembles his parents exactly. With this nothing new has been said and only an old familiar truth, denied by no one ever, has been repeated. 2o. These two facts are very gladly labeled with the name of laws; but how those laws rule is still as good as entirely unknown. Heredity and variation are continually connected with each other, they work together and cross each other, and hence the explanation of the facts is so difficult. And this difficulty is further increased by the fact that inheritance in all higher beings takes place through the mixing of two individuals (amphimixis, as Weismann called it). 3o. This appears as soon as one specializes somewhat more closely. That species-properties are inherited, i.e., that parents bring forth children of the same species, is certain but does not carry one much further. That raceand variety-properties are constantly transplanted is subject to legitimate doubt; by selection the race, e.g. of animals or plants, can indeed be improved; but this improvement is limited and temporary; after four or five generations the height of the improvement is reached; as soon as one ceases with the selection, the descendants return to the old type; the properties are not taken up into the nature of the creatures, they retain the tendency to revert to the original form. That finally individual, acquired properties pass over from parents to children has indeed been asserted by Darwin et al., but is by A. Weismann, professor at Freiburg, contested as strongly as possible, and his theory nowadays finds ever more assent. 4o.

The attempt to bring together the phenomena that occur here under some laws has not only not succeeded but is for the present to be regarded as very premature. The phenomena are far too numerous and too complicated, as e.g. those of the weather, to be able already now to make us speak of fixed laws. The law of atavism therefore also gives entirely the impression of having been invented [142] merely in order to give a semblance of regularity to the many cases in which the favorable properties are not inherited and thus the "law" of heredity does not hold. Nicht begriffene

Thatsachen scheinen schliesslich bekannt, sobald man sie mit einem bekannten Worte bezeichnet, Dr. Kohlbrugge, Der Atavismus, Utrecht 1897,

S. 3, who therefore, like Emery, holds atavism to be a saga. The hypothesis of Lombroso concerning the criminal type already belongs again to the past.

And statistics, even if it may also indicate a certain regularity in births, marriages, crimes etc., is thereby nevertheless by no means entitled to the conclusion that each man is compelled to his deeds, any more than the fact that the age of a population on average amounts to thirty years compels every thirty-year-old to die, Wundt, Grundzüge der physiol. Psych. II2 397.

A. v. Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik3 1882 S. 24 f. Finally 5o. the different theories for the explanation of heredity and variation have all up to the present day proved insufficient. Already the great number that has been set up proves that none of them satisfies. All natural philosophers and biologists have tried their powers on it, without having unveiled this secret of life. The professor at the Sorbonne, Yves Delage, has in his learned work:

La structure du protoplasma et les théories sur l'hérédité et les grands problèmes de la biologie générale, Paris Reinwald et Cie 1895 discussed all theories at length and then comes to the conclusion: après avoir étudié et discuté les nombreuses théories émises pour résoudre les problèmes de

l'hérédité et de l'évolution, nous sommes obligés de reconnaître, qu'aucune ne présente une solution acceptable. Toutes pèchent en quelques points, non pas accessoires mais fondamentaux, et la plupart sont, en outre, appuyées sur des hypothéses gratuites et tout à fait improbables, p. 743. He himself therefore also does not venture to offer the reader a théorie complète; nos connaissances sont loin d'être assez avancées pour que cela soit possible, p.

747; cf. also Hugo de Vries, Eenheid in veranderlijkheid, Album der Natuur 1898 bl. 65-80. Ribot, L'hérédité psychol.5 Paris Alcan 1894. van

Bemmelen, De erfelijkheid van verworven eigenschappen, 1890. R.

Schäfer, Die Vererbung, Berlin, Reuther u. Reichard 1897. Dr. Jonker, Erfel. en Toerekenb. in Theol. Stud. v. Dr. Daubanton 1894 bl. 291-322 etc. With all this [143] we do not, however, deny the facts of heredity nor also its extensive dominion. Christian theology has not the least interest in doing any injustice to these even in the slightest degree; on the contrary it fully acknowledges and respects the laws that have been established in this area by God; the more fixed laws are traced in heredity, the greater becomes the glory of Him who is the Creator of all ordinances and no God of confusion but of order. It is also completely true that we can almost never indicate with accuracy the boundaries that separate personal guilt from common guilt. What Schleiermacher says of original sin is something quite different from what Scripture and church pronounce concerning it, but in itself it is nevertheless completely true of sin in general that it is a Gesammtthat und

Gesammtschuld des menschlichen Geschlechtes, i.e.: the sinful condition and the sinful deeds of each man are on the one hand caused by those of the forefathers and on the other hand again cause of the sinful conditions and deeds of the descendants; sin is in Jedem das Werk Aller und in Allen das

Werk eines Jeden, Chr. Gl. § 71, 1. 2. But however true all this may be, so

long as biology alongside heredity must also acknowledge variation, all right is lacking to deprive man of his independence and freedom and to represent him as a will-less instrument of evil powers. Such a representation does not rest on sound science but is a fruit of sick imagination and, by killing all will-power in man, causes incalculable devastations. And further, even if the support offered by the science of the day to the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin may to a certain extent be gratefully acknowledged, it itself does not become stronger by it any more than it becomes weaker by it if that same science perhaps tomorrow might again please to display it as foolish and nonsensical. Original sin is still something other than what nowadays is understood under heredity. For it is not a species-property that belongs to the essence of man, for it has entered into human nature through transgression of God's command and can through regeneration and sanctification be removed from it again; and on the other side it is also no individual acquired property, for it is proper to all human beings without exception and it is so [144] inherent in human nature that even the regenerate still bring forth children who by nature are children of wrath; justus non generat unde ipse regeneratus sed unde generatus est

(Augustine). Original sin therefore occupies a special place; the present doctrine of heredity may have rid it of its apparent absurdity, but it does not explain it. Formerly this was attempted by traducianism or creationism. But whatever standpoint one may take concerning the origin of souls, the propagation of original sin always remains equally difficult. Original sin is after all no substance that has its seat in the body and can be transplanted by generation; it is a moral quality of man, who lacks the communion with God which he according to his original nature ought to possess and has possessed. Adam's corruption entered of itself and at the same moment

when he in doubt and unbelief, in pride and lust tore himself loose from God. And in the same way moral corruption enters in his descendants from the first moment of their existence onward. As God withdrew his communion from Adam on account of his transgression, so He does this also to all his children. And just as He, while nevertheless sustaining Adam after his transgression, by the withdrawing of his communion did not become the positive cause of his corruption, so neither is He this in his descendants, whether one thinks the origin of souls traducianistically or creationistically. Each man is born under guilt and in stain by virtue of the physical and ethical relation in which he stands to Adam. Est ergo quisque sui individui peccati originalis et proximum principium et subjectum et auctor, Voetius, Disp. I 1104, cf. Martyr, L. C. p. 70. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 3.

Zanchius, Op. IV 50. Voetius, Disp. I 1078 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 12.

Moor III 289. M. Vitringa II 358. Edwards, Works II 478.

9. Original sin is a property of human nature and therefore proper to all creatures that partake of this nature. In Adamo persona corrumpit naturam, in aliis hominibus natura corrumpit personam, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 8 art. 5 qu. 69 art. 3. The Pelagian assertion, that there are men or at least can be men without any sin, is contradicted by Scripture, by experience, by the testimonies of all religions [145] and peoples. To the rule that every human being is a sinner there is only one exception, viz. Christ, but He was also the only-begotten Son of God, the second Adam, head of another and better covenant, and conceived in a special manner by the Holy Spirit. The Roman

Catholics, however, also make an exception for Mary, the mother of Jesus.

The three privileges, gradually ascribed to Mary in Roman theology, viz. freedom from original sin (immaculata conceptio), freedom from all actual sin (perfectio justitiae) and freedom from death (assumptio in coelum) are

simple inferences from the high rank of mediatrix, to which she, on the ground of her virginitas and deipartus, has been elevated by the church.

With respect to the immaculate conception Pius IX determined in the bull Ineffabilis, beatissimam virginem Mariam in primo instanti conceptionis suae fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum

Christi Jesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpae labe praeservatam immunem. It is not implied herein that Mary would not be included under Adam and would not have fallen in him, for Mary was preserved free from original sin only by a special grace of God and with a view to Christ's merits. But it is also not expressed in it that Mary was first conceived in sins and then immediately sanctified, for it is expressly declared that in the very first moment of her conception she was preserved free from original sin. For this dogma, however, not the weakest ground is present in Scripture. Thomas said outright, quod de sanctificatione B.

Mariae, quod scilicet fuerit sanctificata in utero, nihil in Scriptura canonica traditur, S. Theol. III qu. 27 art. 1. The Roman theologians are therefore in no small embarrassment about this, seek all manner of reasons in order to explain this "hiddenness of Mary" in Scripture, and force the strangest texts into an appearance of proof. Thus they appeal to Gen. 3:15, Ps. 45:11v.,

Song of Sol. 1:8-16, 2:2, 3:6, 4:1v., 6:9, Wijsh. 1:4, Luke 1:28, 41, 48, Rev.

12 and to types such as the ark of Noah, the dove with the olive branch, the burning thornbush, etc.; but all these citations and reasonings serve only to cover their poverty of arguments and have no need of refutation, cf. e.g.

Spencer Northcote, Maria in den Evang. Mainz [146] 1889. Schaefer, Die Gottesmutter in der h. Schrift, Münster 1867. Scheeben, Dogm. III 455-472.

Rather, Scripture teaches decisively that all men, except Christ alone, are sinners; for Mary an exception is never made; even though no definite

sinful words or deeds of hers are recorded, not even in Mk. 3:21, John 2:3, yet she rejoices in God her Saviour, Luke 1:47, is pronounced blessed indeed on account of her motherhood of Christ but never on account of her sinlessness, Luke 1:28, 48, is also in this motherhood in itself placed behind those who are Jesus' mother and brothers and sisters in a spiritual sense, Mt.

12:46v., Mk. 3:31v., Luke 8:21, and perseveres with the apostles in praying and supplicating, Acts 1:14. Nor do the church fathers teach either the immaculate conception or also the sinlessness of Mary; Irenaeus, adv. haer.

III 16, 7, Tertullianus, de carne Chr. 7, Origenes, hom. in Luc. 17 etc. speak with respect to her of actual transgressions; and even Roman scholars cannot deny this. Dr. von Lehner, Die Marienverehrung der ersten Jahrh.

Stuttgart 1881 S. 151 says that this was the view prevailing at that time; Schwane, D. G. I2 382 acknowledges that the tradition from that time likewise furnishes no stringent proofs any more than Holy Scripture; and Scheeben, Dogm. III 474, 476 concedes that the person of Mary in the first four centuries recedes into the background and is in relative Dunkelheit. At most it was believed only propter honorem Domini that Mary by special grace had remained free from actual sins, Augustinus, de nat. et gr. 36.

Damasc., de fide orthod. IV 14. Even when since the fifth century the veneration of Mary increased more and more and later still the feast of her conception arose, the principal theologians—just as Canus, Loci VII c. 1,

Scheeben, Dogm. III 541 f. and others also acknowledge—did indeed teach a sanctificatio B. Virginis post animationem et contractionem peccati in anima but contested a praeservatio, which apriori kept Mary free from all original sin, Anselmus, Cur Deus homo II 16. Lombardus, Thomas,

Bonaventura on Sent. III dist. 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 81 art. 3. III qu.

27 art. 1. 2. Comp. Theol. c. 224 etc. But Duns Scotus introduced a change

in this; he argued that, even if Mary was included in Adam, God nevertheless could in the very first moment of her conception bestow upon her the gratia that kept her [147] free from all sin. And because this was more worthy of God, Christ, and Mary and was not in conflict with the authority of Scripture and of the church, he considered it probabile, quod excellentius est attribuere Mariae, Sent. III dist. 3 qu. 1. And thereby the ground is also indicated on which at Rome this dogma rests. It has no support in Scripture nor in the tradition of the ancient church, but it is, like the assumption of Mary, simply an inference from the mediatorship that was gradually ascribed to her. It is not fitting, not conveniens, that Mary was conceived in sin, committed sin, and died. She must be sinless, and therefore she is, even though it is taught neither by Scripture nor tradition.

Cf. Preuss, Die röm. Lehre v. d. unbefleckten Empfängniss 1865. Benrath, Zur Gesch. der Marienverehrung, Stud. u. Krit. 1886. Art. Maria in Herzog2. Bolland, Rome en de geschiedenis, Leiden 1897 bl. 1-53.

10. As extensive as original sin is in humanity, so it is also in the individual human being. It rules over the whole human being, over intellect and will, heart and conscience, soul and body, over all faculties and powers.

His heart is evil from youth on and a source of all kinds of sins, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, Ps. 51:7, Jer. 17:9, Ezech. 36:26, Mk. 7:21; he cannot renew himself,

Jer. 13:23, Ezech. 16:6, cannot understand the things of God, 1 Cor. 2:14, cannot submit to the law of God, Joh. 8:34, 36, Rom. 6:17, 20, 8:7, is dead through sins and trespasses, Ef. 2:1. Regeneration is therefore necessary for entrance into the kingdom of God, Joh. 3:3; the whole salvation is objectively and subjectively a work of God's grace, Joh. 6:44, 15:5, 1 Cor.

4:7, 15:10, Phil. 2:13 etc. Upon these definite statements of Holy Scripture, Augustine and his followers and later the Reformers built the doctrine of

the incapacity of man for good. Because in Adam the whole human nature has been corrupted, nothing truly good can any longer proceed from it, any more than an evil tree can bring forth good fruits. Rather, the human being now finds himself under the dura necessitas non posse non peccandi, his virtues are vitia potius quam virtutes, he is by nature inclined to all evil, inclined even to hate God and his neighbor. This discourse is undoubtedly hard, and it is no wonder that it has at all times met with decided contradiction [148]. The Heathens did not know this deep corruption of sin; however much they also often expressed its general spread, they nevertheless continued to believe in the natural goodness of man and in the possibility of virtue, Sunt ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret, Cic. Qu.

Tusc. II 1. Erras, si existimas, nobiscum nasci vitia, supervenerunt, ingesta sunt, Seneca, Ep. 96. In Pelagianism this paganistic doctrine was renewed; it denied original sin entirely. Through its mechanical conception of the image of God the Roman church came to the doctrine that the homo naturalis after loss of the donum superadditum can still do truly good works, indeed not in a supernatural but yet in a natural sense, Trid. VI can.

5. 7. Socinians, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, Quakers, Rationalists, etc. fell back to this Roman standpoint. Coornhert took offense at the 5th and 8th question of the Heid. Catechism. Rousseau preached the natural goodness of man. And Allard Pierson testified of himself that he was absolutely not inclined to all evil but indeed to much good, Gids Nov. 1895 bl. 259. To the natural aversion, which involuntarily arises in the heart against the doctrine of the complete moral corruption of man, there is undoubtedly also joined, among its opponents, much misunderstanding. For if this doctrine is clearly set in the light, it is confirmed day by day by everyone's experience and

justified by the testimonies of its opponents themselves. 1o. The doctrine of Scripture and church is, after all, not that every human being lives in all possible actual sins and stands actu guilty of the transgression of all commandments. It speaks only of the deepest inclination, the most inward disposition, the fundamental direction of human nature and confesses that this is not turned toward God, but turned away from Him. If the human being is an organic unity, then one of the two must nevertheless be the case.

Many dispose of it by saying that the human being by nature is neither of the two or both at the same time, Hegel, Werke XII 209 f., but this betrays lack of reflection, is in conflict with the nature of the good and was therefore also very seriously opposed by Kant, Religion, ed. Rosenkranz

23-26. Whoever commits one sin stands in principle guilty of the transgression of all commandments, and whoever possesses one virtue in [149] truth has them in principle all. The human being is at the root of his being either good or evil—there is no third. 2o. Sin, however, is not a substance; it dwells indeed in and on and with the human being, but it is not and cannot be the essence of the human being. The human being has also after the fall remained human; he has retained reason, conscience, and will, can thereby control his lower sensuous impulses and inclinations and thus compel himself to virtue; Augustine, who called the virtues of the Heathens splendida vitia, nevertheless acknowledged this wholeheartedly; many of their deeds are not only no reproach but rather worthy of our praise and our imitation, cf. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 119-123. The Lutherans spoke of the natural human being as a block and a stick in the spiritual domain, but in the so-called lower hemisphere of civil life they nevertheless still ascribed to him all kinds of powers for good, Frank, Theol. der Conc. I 144 f. And more than they all, Calvin and the Reformed have honored the virtues of

unbelievers and have many times set them as an example even to Christians themselves, cf. my address on the Common Grace bl. 27v. The doctrine of the total corruption of human nature, therefore, by no means implies that the sinful inclination, which lies at the bottom of the heart, always breaks out in such deeds as clearly betray enmity and hatred against God and the neighbor. There are various circumstances that intervene between the two and prevent the inclination from expressing itself fully. Not only are many sinful deeds restrained by the sword of the government, civil propriety, public opinion, fear of disgrace and punishment, etc.; but all kinds of factors, such as the natural love still proper to each human being, the moral character cultivated by upbringing and struggle, favorable circumstances of constitution, environment, sphere of work, etc., lead the human being many times to the practice of beautiful, praiseworthy virtues. Only, thereby the sinful inclination of the heart is suppressed but not eradicated; in all kinds of evil deliberations, thoughts, desires it repeatedly comes to the surface; when the opportunity is favorable and necessity presses, it often breaks through all dams and dikes that held it in; and those who in dreadful words and deeds show that they hate God and the neighbor bear no other nature than that which all human beings share. 3o. When it is taught that the human being through sin is incapable of any good and this incapacity is called a natural one, then no physical necessity or fatalistic compulsion is meant thereby. The human being has through sin not lost his will and the freedom implanted in him; the will by virtue of its nature excludes all compulsion and cannot but will freely. But the human being has indeed lost the free inclination of the will toward the good; he now no longer wills to do the good; he now does freely, out of inclination, the evil: the inclination, the direction of the will has been changed; semper est in nobis voluntas

libera, sed non semper est bona, Aug., de gr. et lib. arb. 15, cf. also the Reformed in Heppe, Dogm. 237, 264. The inability for good is in this sense not physical but ethical in nature; it is an inability of the will. Some therefore preferred to speak of moral rather than of natural inability,

Amyraldus, Testardus, Venema bij Moor III 231-233, and especially Jonathan Edwards. Edwards had namely in his days to defend the inability of man against Whitby and Taylor, who denied original sin and considered the human being capable of keeping God's law. They objected to him that, if the human being could not keep God's law, he also did not have to do it and, if he then did not do it, was also not guilty. In order to defend himself against that, Edwards made a distinction between natural and moral inability, and said that the fallen human being did have the natural, but not the moral power, to do the good. And he added that only natural inability was really inability, but moral inability could be so called only in an improper sense. Sin is namely not a physical defect in the nature or the powers of the will; but it is an ethical defect, a defect of affection, love for the good, see his Freedom of the will, Works II 1-190 passim. Now

Edwards did say that the human being could not bestow that affection for the good upon himself and could not change his will; in this respect he stood entirely on the side of Augustine and Calvin. But by his refusal to call this unwillingness for good natural inability, he has fostered much misunderstanding and in fact promoted Pelagianism. The Reformed have therefore before and after spoken of natural inability. This word natural can, however, have different senses. One can thereby have in view [151] the original human nature, created by God in Adam according to His image, as the Protestants said that the image of God was natural,—then the inability for good is not natural. One can also thereby mean the physical substance or

power of any creature, and then too the inability, since all substance and power has been created by God, is not to be called natural. The incapacity for good is no physical impossibility, such as it is for example impossible for a human being to touch the stars with his hand. But one can, speaking of natural inability, also think of the properties of fallen human nature and thereby indicate that the incapacity for good now in the fallen state is "by nature" proper to every human being, is inborn to him from the first moment of his existence and is not first introduced into him from outside by habit, upbringing, imitation. In this sense the name of natural inability is perfectly correct, and that of moral inability is liable to misunderstanding.

For morally impossible is after all often called that which, on the ground of someone's character, habit, upbringing, is held to be impossible for him to do; it is morally impossible that a virtuous man suddenly becomes a thief, a mother hates her child, a murderer strangles an innocent child. That morally impossible nevertheless does indeed occur in some circumstances. It is not so with the incapacity for good. It is indeed ethical in nature and an inability of the will, but it is proper to the human being by nature, it is inborn to him, it is a property of his willing itself. And precisely because the will even now in the fallen state by virtue of its nature cannot but will freely, it cannot will otherwise than what it wills, than that to which it is by nature inclined, cf.

Thomas, S. c. Gent. IV 52. Calvin on Ef. 2:3. Ursinus and other comm. on Heid. Cat. vr. 5. 8. Form. Conc. I 12. Cons. Helv. § 21. 22. Turret., Theol.

El. X 4. 39. Moor III 232. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 257-272. Shedd, Dogm.

Theol. 219-257. III 364-374. 4o. Finally one must keep in view that Scripture and church, teaching the complete corruption of man, thereby apply the highest standard, namely the law of God. The doctrine of the incapacity for good is a religious confession. According to the standard that

people usually use [152] in daily life or also in philosophical ethics, it can be wholeheartedly acknowledged that much good and beautiful is done by human beings. The follower of Augustine can with this standard in hand in the assessment and appreciation of human virtues still be milder and broader than the most convinced Pelagian. There is, however, still another, higher ideal for the human being; there is a divine law, to which he must correspond. Virtues and good works are distinct. Good, truly good, good in the eyes of the holy God, is only that which is done from faith, according to God's law and to God's honor. And tested by this standard, who then dares to say that any work is done by human beings that is completely pure and needs no forgiveness and renewal? With Rome and in part also with the Lutherans to divide the human being in two and to say that in the supernatural and spiritual he can do nothing good but in the natural he can do something completely good, that is in conflict with the unity of human nature, with the unity of the moral law, with the doctrine of Scripture that the human being must always be the image of God, must do whatever he does to God's honor and must love God always and everywhere with his whole heart and understanding and strength. If this now is so, if the essence of the human being consists in this that he is image and likeness of God, then in the human being, as he now lives and works, nothing can stand before God's face. Weighed in the balance of God's sanctuary, all his doing is found too light.

One can differ over this standard, and, in order to arrive at a more favorable conclusion, bring down the law of God from its height and make it ready-made to fit human conduct. But given this standard, no other judgment is possible than that of Scripture, that there is no one who does good, not even one. And this judgment of Scripture is confirmed by all

kinds of testimonies. Let those who do not believe Scripture listen to the voices of the greatest of our race. As soon as one, in oneself or in others, does not remain with the words or deeds but investigates the hidden motives, the secret intentions, the sinful nature of all human striving comes to light. Nos vertus ne sont le plus souvent que des vices déguisés

(Rochefoucauld). L'homme n'est que déguisement, que mensonge et hypocrisie, et en soi-même et à l'égard [153] des autres (Pascal). Homo homini lupus; without the state human society would be a bellum omnium contra omnes (Hobbes). According to Kant, human beings are von Natur böse; there is in him a natural Hang zum Bösen, ein radicales, angebornes

Böse; the terrible facts which the history of humanity makes known to us prove this sufficiently. Ein jeder Mensch hat seinen Preis, für den er sich weggiebt. What the apostle says is general truth: there is no one who does good, there is also not one, Kant, Relig. ed. Rosenkranz 35 f. Diejenigen, welche ein servum arbitrium behaupteten und den Menschen als einen

Stock und Klotz charakterisirten.... hatten vollkommen Recht, Fichte, Syst. der Sittenlehre 1798 S. 265. Das natürliche Herz, worin der Mensch befangen ist, ist der Feind, der zu bekämpfen ist, Hegel, Werke XII 270.

Der Mensch hat sich von Ewigkeit in der Eigenheit und Selbstsucht ergriffen und alle, die geboren werden, werden mit dem anhängenden finstern Princip des Bösen geboren. Dieses ursprüngliche Böse im

Menschen, das nur derjenige in Abrede ziehen kann, der den Menschen in sich und ausser sich nur oberflächlich kennen gelernt hat, ist in seinem

Ursprung eigne That, Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 388. Die Hauptund Grundtriebfeder im Menschen, wie im Thiere ist der Egoismus, d. h. der

Drang zum Daseyn und Wohlseyn. Dieser Egoismus ist im Thiere wie im Menschen mit dem innersten Kern und Wesen desselben aufs genaueste

verknüpft, ja eigentlich identisch. This egoism is indeed restrained by all kinds of bonds of decency, fear, punishment, government, etc.; but when these are removed, that unersättliche Habsucht, that niederträchtige

Geldgier, that tief versteckte Falschheit, that tückische Bosheit spring forth.

Kriminalgeschichten und Beschreibungen anarchischer Zustände muss man lesen, um zu erkennen, was in moralischer Hinsicht der Mensch eigentlich ist. Diese Tausende, die da vor unseren Augen in friedlichen Verkehr sich durcheinander drängen, sind anzusehen als eben so viele Tiger und Wölfe, deren Gebiss man durch einen starken Maulkorb gesichert hat. Even conscience is mostly composed of 1/5 fear of people, 1/5 deisidaemonie,

1/5 prejudice, 1/5 vanity and 1/5 habit, Schopenhauer, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 3e Aufl. 1881 S. 186 f. Welt als Wille u. V. I6

391 f. Parerga u. Paral. II5 229 f. The adherents of evolution have [154] returned to the doctrine of Mandeville, Helvetius, Diderot, d'Alembert etc., that egoism is the basis of morality and the norm of all human action; man is descended from the animals and he remains at bottom an animal, led by egoistic instincts; civilization can tame but never make of man anything other than what he originally is and by disposition is; what we call moral life is an accidental product of circumstances, of the life of human beings in a particular society; under other circumstances and in another society good and evil would have a wholly different content, Darwin, Afst. des menschen, hoofdst. 3-5. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 16e Aufl. 478-492. In his

Ethisch idealisme Amst. 1875 de Bussy makes a great distinction between the moral man, whose egoistic nature has been constrained by the community in its arbitrariness but not destroyed, whose virtues are many times splendida vitia, 22v., and the ethical man, in whom a new principle has been planted. It is truly not Scripture alone that judges harshly of man.

It is human beings who have pronounced the harshest and strictest judgment over human beings. And then it is always still better to fall into the hand of the Lord than into that of man, for his mercies are many. For if God condemns us, then at the same time in Christ He offers us his forgiving love, but if human beings condemn human beings, they many times thrust them away from themselves and give them up to their contempt. If God condemns us, then He has this judgment brought to us by human beings, prophets and apostles and ministers, who do not set themselves above us on high as saints but include themselves with all in a common confession of guilt; but the philosophers and moralists, despising human beings, thereby mostly forget that they themselves are human beings. If God condemns us, then He speaks of sin and guilt, which indeed is great and heavy but which nevertheless can be taken away because it does not belong to the essence of man; but the moralists speak many times of egoistic, animal inclinations, which are proper to man by virtue of his origin and belong to his essence; they do indeed strike him down but do not raise him up; if we are animals from the outset, why then ought we to live as children of God? [155]

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