1. § 35. Providence.
§ 35. Providence.
. When God on the seventh day had finished his work which He had made, He rested on the seventh day from all his work which He had made, Gen. 2:2, Ex. 20:11, 31:17. Thus Scripture indicates the transition from the work of creation to that of preservation. That this resting of God does not have its cause in weariness, nor does it consist in an idle looking on, is each time clearly and distinctly expressed by Holy Scripture, Jes.
40:28, Joh. 5:17. Creating is for God no work and preserving no rest. The resting of God only makes known that He made an end to the bringing forth of nova genera, Pred. 1:9, 10; that the work of creation in the proper and narrower sense, as productio rerum e nihilo, had been completed; and that He in this finished work delighted himself with divine good pleasure, Gen.
1:31, Ex. 31:17, Ps. 104:31, cf. August., de civ. XI 8. XII 17. de Gen. ad lit.
IV 8 sq. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 15. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 73. Calvin on Gen. 2:2. Zanchius, Op. III 537 etc. Creating now passes over into preserving. Both are in Scripture so essentially distinguished, that they can be placed over against each other as labor and rest. And yet they are also so
intimately related and connected, that preserving itself can be called a creating, Ps. 104:30, 148:5, Jes. 45:7, Am. 4:13. Preservation is, after all, itself also a divine work, no less great and glorious than creation. God is no Deus otiosus, He always works, Joh. 5:17, [2] and the world has no stability in itself. From the moment of its origin onward it exists only in and through and unto God, Neh. 9:6, Ps. 104:30, Hd. 17:28, Rom. 11:36, Col. 1:15,
Hebr. 1:3, Op. 4:11. Although distinct from his essence, it is in its existence never independent; independence would be non-being. The whole world with all that is in it and happens in it, stands under God's government; summer and winter, day and night, fruitful and unfruitful years, light and darkness, everything is his work and is formed by Him, Gen. 8:22, 9:14,
Lev. 26:3v., Deut. 11:12v., Job 38, Ps. 8, 29, 65, 104, 107, 147, Jer. 3:3, 5:24, Mt. 5:45 etc. Scripture knows no independent creature; it would be a contradiction in itself. God cares for all creatures, for animals, Gen. 1:30,
6:19, 7:2, 9:10, Job 38:41, Ps. 36:7, 104:27, 147:9, Joël 1:20, Mt. 6:26 etc., and in particular also for human beings. He sees them all, Job 34:21, Ps.
33:13, 14, Spr. 15:3, forms the heart of them all and pays heed to all their works, Ps. 33:15, Spr. 5:21; they are all the work of his hands, Job 34:19, the poor and the rich, Spr. 22:2. He determines the dwelling of all, Deut.
32:8, Hd. 17:26, inclines the heart of all, Spr. 21:1, governs the steps of all,
Spr. 5:21, 16:9, 19:21, Jer. 10:23 etc. does with the host of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Dan. 4:35. They are in his hands as clay in the hand of the potter, as a saw in the hand of him who draws it, Jes. 29:16, 45:9, Jer. 18:5, Rom. 9:20, 21. Very particularly his providential government extends yet over his people. The whole history of the patriarchs, of Israel, of the church, and of every believer is proof thereof. What human beings have intended for them for evil, God intends
for them for good, Gen. 50:20; every instrument prepared against them shall not succeed, Jes. 54:17; even the hairs of their head are all numbered, Mt.
10:30; all things work together for their good, Rom. 8:28. Thus all that is created stands in the power and under the government of God; both, chance and fate, are unknown to Scripture, Ex. 21:13, Spr. 16:33. It is God who works all things according to the counsel of his will, Ef. 1:11, and makes all things serviceable to the revelation of his virtues, to the honor of his name,
Spr. 16:4, Rom. 11:36. All this Scripture comprehends in a beautiful manner in this, that it time and again speaks of God as of a King, who rules all things, Ps. 10:16, [3] 24:7, 8, 29:10, 44:5, 47:7, 74:12, 115:3, Jes. 33:22 etc.
God is a King, the King of kings and the Lord of lords; a King who in Christ is a father for his subjects, and a Father who at the same time is king over his children. All that is found among creatures, in the animal and human and angelic world, in family and society and state, of care for, of love toward, of protection of the one by the other, is a weak shadowingforth of God's providential ordering over all the works of his hands. His absolute power and his perfect love are the proper object of the faith in providence in Holy Scripture.
To this testimony of Scripture is added that of all peoples. The doctrine of the providence of God is an articulus mixtus, in part known to all men from God's revelation in nature. It is an article of faith in every religion, even in the most degenerate; whoever denies it undermines religion; without it there is no longer any place for prayer and sacrifice, for faith and hope, for trust and love. Why serve God, asks Cicero, Nat. D. I 2, if He does not concern
Himself with us at all? Therefore all religions agree with the word of Sophocles, Elect. 173: ἐστι μεγας ἐν οὐρανῳ Ζευς, ὁς ἐφορα παντα και κρατυνει. And philosophy too has many times acknowledged and defended
this providence of God, e.g. Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. I 4 IV 3. Plato in Timaeus, Leges X 901, Rep. X 613 A. Aristotle in Eth. Nic. X 9. the Stoa in Cicero, Nat. D. II. Seneca, de providentia and de beneficiis, Cicero, Nat. D.
I 2 III 26, Plutachus, de fato, Plotinus, περι εἱμαρμενης and περι προνοιας, cf. also Philo's writing περι προνοιας, Wendland, Philo's Schrift über die
Vorsehung, Berlin 1892. Yet for that reason the doctrine of providence in pagan religion and philosophy was not the same as it is in Christianity.
Among the Heathen the belief in providence was more theory than practice, more philosophical contemplation than religious dogma; it did not reach into distress and into death; it always swayed back and forth between chance and fate. Because God, for example, in Plato was not a creator but only a former of the world, his power found its limit in finite matter, Zeiler,
Philos. d. Gr. II4 928. Although Aristotle expresses his belief in God's providence more than once, this nevertheless [4] for him entirely coincides with the operation of natural causes; the deity as νοησις νοησεως stands in solitary self-contemplation outside the world, without will, without action, and the creature has from it no help or love to expect, ib. III 368 f. 790 f.
With the Stoa the προνοια was identical with the εἱμαρμενη and the φυσις, ib. IV 143; and according to Epicurus providence was in conflict with the blessedness of the Gods, ib. 428. And indeed some, such as Plutarchus and Plotinus, exerted themselves to escape both chance and fate; but in fact fate always rose again behind and above the deity, and chance from below again pressed into the lower creatures and the smaller events; magna Dii curant, parva negligunt, Cicero, Nat. D. II 167. Cf. Pfanner, Syst. theol. gent. c. 8.
Creutzer, Philosophorum veterum loci de provid. divina ac de fato 1806.
Schneider, Christl. Klänge aus den gr. u. röm. Klassikern, 1865 S. 231 f.
2. Of that nature, however, the Christian faith in God's providence is not.
On the contrary, it is a source of comfort and hope, of confidence and courage, of humility and resignation, Ps. 23, 33:10v., 44:5v., 127:1, 2,
146:2v. etc. The faith in providence in Scripture rests absolutely not only on God's revelation in nature but much more on his covenant and promises; it has as its foundation not only God's righteousness but above all also his compassion and grace; it presupposes the knowledge of sin, much deeper than among the Heathen, but also the experience of God's forgiving love; it is no cosmological speculation but a glorious confession of faith. And therefore it looks, through all pain and suffering, again joyfully into the future; even if the riddles are not solved, faith in God's fatherly hand always lifts itself up again out of the depth and even causes one to glory in tribulations. In connection with this it is noteworthy that Scripture does not know the abstract word providence. People have indeed wished to give this word a Scriptural character by appeal to Gen. 22:8, 1 Sam. 16:1, Ezech.
20:6, Hebr. 11:40; a few times the word also occurs of human foresight, Hd.
13:14, Rom. 12:17, 13:14, 1 Tim. 5:8. But all that does not take away that Scripture, when treating of God's providence, uses wholly other [5] words.
It does not sum up the activity of God, expressed by this word, in an abstract concept and does not hold a theological treatise about it. But it depicts it itself in the richest and most vivid manner and lets us see it in history; Scripture as a whole is the book of the providence of God. And thus, depicting that providence, it speaks of creating, Ps. 104:30, 148:5, making alive, Job 33:4, Neh. 9:6, renewing, Ps. 104:30, seeing, beholding, observing, Job 28:24, Ps. 33:13, 15, preserving, guarding, keeping, Num.
6:24, Ps. 36:7, 121:7, leading, teaching, ruling, Ps. 25:5, 9, 93:1 etc., working, Joh. 5:17, bearing, Hebr. 1:3, caring, 1 Petr. 5:7. The word
providence is borrowed from philosophy. According to Laertius Plato was the first who used the word προνοια in this sense, cf. Zeller, Philos. der Gr.
II4 929. The apocryphal books already use it, Sap. 14:3, 17:2, 3 Mk. 4:21, 5:30, 4 Mk. 9:24, 13:18, 17:22, alongside διατηρειν, Sap. 11:25, διακυβερναν, 3 Mk. 6:2, διοικειν, Sap. 8:1 etc. And the church fathers adopted it and gave it citizenship in Christian theology, cf. Suicerus. s. v. In doing so, however, the word underwent a not unimportant change.
Originally providence after all means the foreseeing, providentia, or the foreknowing, προνοια, of what will happen in the future. Providentia est, per quam futurum aliquid videtur, Cic. Inv. II 53. Understood thus, the word was absolutely not suitable to encompass everything which the Christian faith confesses in the doctrine of God's providence. As foreknowledge of the future, the providence of God would then belong only to the scientia
Dei and be fully dealt with in the locus on the virtues of God. The Christian faith, however, understands by the providence of God not a nuda praescientia, but confesses that all things are by God not only foreknown but also predetermined and ordained. Therefore providence was soon reckoned not merely to the understanding but also to the will of God, and by Damascenus defined as βουλησις θεου, δι' ἡν παντα τα ὀντα την προσφορον διεξαγωγην λαμβανει, de fide orthod. II 29. Taken in this sense, the providence of God would belong at home in the doctrine of the decrees of God and be dealt with there entirely. But again the Christian faith confesses more than is indicated by [6] the word in this sense. The decrees of God are, after all, carried out; and the creatures, which as a consequence thereof receive their existence, do not exist for a moment of themselves, but they are from moment to moment borne only by God's almighty hand. The arising and the existence of all creatures have their origin, not in a
foreknowledge nor also in a decree but specifically in an almighty act of God. And providence is thus, according to the doctrine of Scripture and the confession of the church, that act of God by which He maintains and governs all things from moment to moment, not only Fürsehung but also
Vorsehung. These different meanings in which the word providence was understood were, however, the cause that the place and the content of this doctrine in Christian dogmatics continually changed and were subjected to all kinds of alterations. Now it is reckoned to the virtues, then to the decrees
(opera Dei ad intra), then to the opera ad extra, cf. deel II 374v.
Damascenus defines it as ἡ ἐκ θεου εἰς τα ὀντα γενομενη ἐπιμελεια, de fide orth. II 29, and treats it indeed after creation but yet in close connection with the praescientia and praedestinatio, II 30. Lombardus discusses it in the chapter on the praedestinatio, but before creation, Sent. I dist. 35. A very clear exposition is given by Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 1; he defines it first in general as ratio ordinis rerum in finem and regards it as principalis pars prudentiae, whose task it is precisely, ordinare alia in finem; but then he says further that ad providentiae curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis, quae dicitur providentia et dispositio, et executio ordinis, quae dicitur gubernatio, cf. also Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 35 and Hugo Vict. S.
Sent. tr. 1 c. 12. Following these and other examples, the doctrine of providence in Roman theology was treated either with the praedestinatio with the will of God, Petavius, de Deo VIII c. 1-5. Becanus, Theol. schol. I c. 13. Theol. Wirceb. Paris 1880 III 175. Perrone, Prael. Theol. II 1838 p.
233. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 158; or only as conservatio or gubernatio separately after creation, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 103-105, c. Gent. III 65 and commentatores on Sent. II dist. 37. Theol. Wirceb. III 497; or entirely in the broadest sense after the locus de creatione, Schwetz, Theol. dogm. I
405. Jansen, Prael. theol. II [7] 329. Simar, Dogm.3 252. Scheeben, Dogm.
II 12. And likewise in the theology of the Reformation providence was now taken as a consilium, according to which God governs all things, Conf.
Helv. post. art. 6. Ursinus, Explic. qu. 27. Zanchius, Op. II 425. Maresius, Syst. Theol. IV § 19. Alsted, Theol. schol. 174, then again as a work of God outwardly, Calvin, Inst. I 16, 3. 4. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 1. Junius,
Theses Theol. XVII 1. 2. Synopsis pur. theol. XI 3. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. VII 3 etc. The difference naturally concerns more the name than the matter, as Alsted, Theol. schol. 175 and Baier, Comp. theol. I 5, 2, rightly remark. If God really maintains and governs the world, then He must know it beforehand (providentia), also will and be able to care for it (prudentia) and in time also in fact maintain and govern everything in such a way that the end proposed by Him is attained. Thus taken in a broad sense, providence comprises 1o an actus internus, which then further was indeed again distinguished into προνωσις, προθεσις and διοικησις, cf. Gerhard,
Loc. VI c. 2, and 2o an actus externus, which was defined as executio ordinis, as conservatio, concursus, gubernatio. The actus internus of this providentia, however, has earlier already been fully treated in the doctrine of the virtues and of the decrees of God; here, after the doctrine of creation, providence can therefore come into consideration only as actus externus, as an act of God outwardly. Although now providence in this sense can never be detached from the actus internus, the προγωσις, προθεσις and διοικησις, nor even be thought without it, it is nevertheless distinguished from it, as the executio ordinis from the ordo itself. The word providence has thereby undergone an entire alteration. And the question can arise whether the word is still suitable for indicating the matter. When formerly providence was still treated in the doctrine of the virtues or of the decrees of God, it retained its
original meaning; but since it is more and more conceived as conservatio and gubernatio and comes up after creation, that original meaning has almost entirely been lost. Providence in this latter, narrower sense is no proper providentia any more, no ratio ordinis rerum in finem, for this precedes it and is presupposed by it; it itself is executio ordinis. This latter was therefore in dogmatics further defined by [8] conservatio or by gubernatio or by both together, Lactantius, de ira Dei c. 10. Thomas, S.
Theol. I qu. 103. 104. Bonaventura, Brevil. ed. Frib. 1881 p. 93. Ned.
Geloofsbel. art. 13. Heid. Cat. X. Zanchius, Op. II 425. Synopsis pur. theol.
XI 3 etc. Between these two there was later still, in order to ward off pantheism and deism, inserted the concursus or cooperatio, which in substance indeed was always treated with the doctrine of providence, e.g. with Aug. de trin. III 4. de civ. V 8-11. Theodoretus, de provid. or. X.
Boëthius, de cons. IV and V. Damasc., de fide II 29. Thomas, S. Th. I qu.
48. 49. 104 art. 2, qu. 105 art. 5 I 2 qu. 19 art. 4 Cat. Rom. I c. 2 qu. 20.
Zwingli, de provid. c. 3. Op. IV 86. Calvin, Inst. I 16. 2. Contre la secte des libertins, C. R. 35 p. 186, de aet. Dei praed., C. R. 36 p. 347-366. Zanchius,
Op. II 449. Martyr, Loci C. p. 56. 59. Wollebius, Theol. c. 30. Synopsis pur. theol. XI 13. Gerhard Loc. VI c. 9 etc., but which later also formally obtained a place of its own between conservatio and gubernatio, Mastricht,
Theol. III 10, 10. 29. Turret., Theol. El. VI qu. 4. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VI 270. IX 210. Brakel, Red. Godsd. XI 6. Marck, Godg. X 9. Quenstedt,
Theol. I 531. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 421. Buddeus, Inst. 409. From this it appears that the word providence was not considered sufficient for indicating the executio ordinis and was further specified by maintenance and government. These too are undoubtedly conceived more correctly, more vivid in representation and more in accordance with the usage of Holy
Scripture. Especially when the word providence is taken abstractly and put in the place of God himself, as Plutarch already began with this, cf. Cremer s. v. προνοια, and the rationalism of the previous century followed this, it is open to objection. Yet the word, which obtained citizenship in the language of theology and of religion, may be retained, provided that the matter which is indicated by it is understood in the Scriptural sense.
3. The Christian doctrine of providence as an almighty act of God, whereby He preserves and governs all things, is to be distinguished not only from pagan fate and chance but for that reason also from the pantheism and deism which repeatedly revive in the Christian centuries. For, there are but [9] three alternatives for the sum of existence, chance, fate or Deity. With chance there would be variety without uniformity, with fate uniformity without variety, but variety in uniformity is the demonstration of primal design and the seal of the creative mind. In the world as it exists, there is infinite variety and amazing uniformity, James Douglas in U. B. Smith,
System of Christian Theol. New-York, Armstrong 1890 p. 107. Pantheism knows no distinction between the being of God and the being of the world and, idealistically, lets the world be absorbed into God, or, materialistically,
God into the world. On this standpoint there is no place for creation and therefore, in the proper sense, also not for preservation and government.
Providence coincides with the course of nature; the laws of nature are identical with the decrees of God; and the government of God is nothing but fixus et immutabilis naturae ordo sive rerum naturalium concatenatio,
Spinoza, Tract. theol. pol. c. 3, cf. Strauss Gl. II 384. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 46 and further part II 388-396. Of itself, with that, the miracle, the selfactivity of the causae secundae, personality, freedom, prayer, sin, the whole of religion, falls away. Pantheism, however beautiful and seductive a form
it may present itself in, in fact leads into the arms of a pagan fate. There is then no other being than the being of nature; there is no higher power than that which works in the world according to fixed law; there is no other, better life than for which the data are present in this visible creation; for a time man may flatter himself with the idealistic hope that the world, through immanent development, will perfect itself; soon this optimism turns into pessimism, this idealism into materialism. Over against this pantheism,
Christian theology had to maintain the distinction of creation and preservation, the self-activity of the causae secundae, the freedom of personality, the character of sin, the truth of religion. And it did this by rejecting the fatum and by clearly setting the confession of God's providence in distinction from it in the light. The characteristic feature of the doctrine of the fatum does not consist in this, that all that is and happens in time is grounded and determined in God's eternal counsel, but it lies herein, that all being and happening is determined by a power coinciding with the world, which without consciousness and without will [10] determines everything with blind necessity. According to Cicero, the fatum of the Stoa was an ordo seriesque causarum, cum causa ex se causam gignit, de divin. 1, cf. Seneca, de benef. IV 7. Nat. Qu. II 36. Commonly it was then further distinguished into a fatum mathematicum or astrale, when the events on earth were thought to be determined by the stars, and into a fatum physicum, when they were thought to be determined by the nexus of nature.
In the latter form the doctrine of the fatum now appears with pantheism and materialism; but it is remarkable that also the fatum astrale in the most recent time is renewed and finds warm defenders, cf. Wetensch. Bladen
1896 IV 453. Christian theology now by no means contested that everything was eternally known and determined by God; insofar it even acknowledged
a fatum and some also thought to be able to use the word in a good sense. If we consider, says Augustine, that fatum comes from fari, and if we then thereby designate the eternal, unchangeable word, whereby God bears all things, then the name is to be approved, de civ. V 9. Boëthius spoke of the fatum as inhaereus rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus, de cons. philos. IV pros. 6. And even Maresius thought to be able to connect a Christian sense with the word, Syst. Theol. p. 149. But commonly one was more cautious; belief in fate nevertheless proceeded from the thought that everything happens as a consequence of a blind, irresistible power without consciousness and will, and fatalia were called those events which praeter Dei et hominum voluntatem cujusdam ordinis necessitate contingunt, Aug. de civ. V 3. In this sense the fatum was most firmly contested by all Christian theologians, by Augustine and his people no less than by those who defended free will. Omnia vero fato fieri non dicimus, imo nulla fieri fato dicimus, Aug. de civ. V 9. The only ordinis necessitas on the Christian standpoint is the wise, almighty, loving will of God. Thereby it was not denied, as will later appear, that in the world of creatures there is a connection of causes and effects and that there are fixed ordinances, but the order of nature does not stand behind and above and likewise not outside and over against God's will, but it is grounded in that will of an almighty and loving God and Father, determined by that will, serviceable to that will; and it also does not stand as a [11] blind, coercive power outside and over against our will, for ipsae nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo ejusque praescientia continetur,
Aug. ib. and further comment. on Sent. I dist. 35. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu.
116. c. Gent. III 93. Petavius, de Deo VIII 4. Gerhard, Loc. VI 13. Calvin, Inst. I 16, 8. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 313 sq. Alting, Theol. elenct. nova p. 290.
Heidegger, Corp. Theol. VII 2. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI 2. M. Vitringa II 170. 177-181. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 472 etc.
On the other hand stands deism, which separates God and world; which, after the creatures have once been created, lets them exist and work wholly or partially, and then again for a greater or smaller part, by their own power received along with creation; and thus essentially renews the pagan doctrine of chance. In the sense of the magna Dei curant, parva negligunt,
Hieronymus once expressed that God's providential care did not extend over all small insects, cf. deel II 160. Pelagianism, like Cicero, Nat. D. III 36, ascribed virtue to man's own will and power, and semi-Pelagianism divided the work and ascribed something to both God and man. When later this system penetrated into Roman theology, there arose, concerning God's cooperation in providence, no small difference; the Thomists conceived it as a praedeterminatio physica, an applicatio ad operandum, Thomas, S.
Theol. I 2 qu. 9 art. 6 ad 3. qu. 79. 109. c. Gent. III 67-70. 162; the Molinists, on the other hand, understood by it a concursus simultaneus, mere cooperans, quo Deus cum alio concurrente in eundem actum et effectum influit, cf. Daalman, Summa S. Thomae II 286-314. Theol.
Wirceb. I c. 2. Dens, Theol. I 66 sq. Liberatore, Instit. philos. III c. 4 a. 1, 2.
Scheeben, Dogm. II 22 f. Jansen, Prael. II 334. Socinianism set the infinite and the finite over against each other so abstractly and dualistically, that God could create the world not even out of nothing but only out of an eternal and finite matter; and accordingly it also withdrew a great part of the world from the providence of God and left it to the human being's own insight and judgment. The will is by nature also so free, that God cannot even calculate with certainty beforehand what a human being will do in a given case; only when the decision has fallen does God thereafter direct his
acting accordingly; the free causes therefore stand wholly independently alongside and outside God. The relation of God to the world is like that of a craftsman to the machine; after he has made it and set it in motion, he leaves it to itself and intervenes only when something needs to be repaired,
Volkelius, de vera relig. II c. 7. Crell, de Deo et ejus attrib. c. 2-6. cf. Fock,
Der Socin. 496 f. The Remonstrants likewise were of the opinion that in creation powers had been bestowed on the creatures, on which they could now subsist. Preservation was therefore a negative act of God, whereby He essentias, vires ac facultates rerum creatarum non vult destruere sed eas vigori suo relinquere, quoad vigere ac durare possunt ex vi per creationem ipsis indita, or at least this view was not called incorrect. In connection with that, the concursus as a naturalis quaedam influentia in res omnes ex naturae divinae perfectione emanens was rejected; the predestination of the number of human beings, of the marriages, of the end of life, of the elect and the lost was contested; free will defended and all providentia efficax circa peccatum replaced by a negative permissio or non-impeditio, Conf.
Rem. c. 6, Apol. Conf. ib. Episc. Inst. Theol. IV sect. 4. Limborch, Theol.
Christ. II 25 sq. Arminianism was indeed condemned at Dordrecht and placed outside the Reformed pale, but as a spiritual tendency it found entrance everywhere and penetrated into all Christian countries and churches. The period which began with the middle of the 17th century was characterized by a powerful striving to emancipate nature, world, human being, science, etc. from God and to make them independent over against God, Christianity, church, theology; latitudinarianism, deism, rationalism, pietism, Aufklärung, etc. agree in this. This world is the best possible, the human being is sufficient to himself with his understanding and will; natural law, natural force, natural right, natural religion, natural morality
together constitute a fund of powers given by God to the world at creation and now completely sufficient for existence and development; revelation, prophecy, miracle, grace are wholly superfluous. Deism did not deny the existence of God, nor creation and providence either; on the contrary, it gladly spoke of the Supreme Being and held broad discourses about providence. But the power from this faith was gone. Deism [13] denied in principle that God worked in creation otherwise than according to and through the natural laws and forces; it was anti-supernaturalistic from the outset. The conservatio was enough; a cooperatio or an influxus Dei with every action of the creature was unnecessary, Reinhard, Dogm. § 61.
Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 106. In its 18th-century form this deism now indeed belongs to the past. But in fact it still prevails even now in broad circles, both in theory and practice. Since especially in this century the knowledge of nature has been expanded and the firmness of its ordinances has been recognized, many are inclined to withdraw the pitiless, unchangeable nature from God's government, to let it rest independently in itself, and to restrict God's providence to the religious-ethical domain. But naturally then here too providence cannot be conceived absolutely; it finds its boundary in human freedom, cf. Kreibig, Die Räthsel der göttl.
Vorsehung, Berlin 1886. Schmidt, Die göttl. Vorsehung und das Selbstleben der Welt 1887. Beyschlag, Zur Verständigung über den christl.
Vorsehungsglauben, Halle 1888. No wonder that with such a view the old doctrine of the concursus is no longer understood and is set aside as superfluous or incorrect, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 54. Müller, Sünde I5 318.
Vilmar, Dogm. I 255. Lipsius, Dogm. § 397 f. Oosterzee, § 59, 5. 7, cf. also Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II3 266. Indeed, the inference then lies close at hand, with the ethical moderns in this country, to place the power of nature and
the moral power, as it were, as two Gods in Manichaean fashion alongside and over against each other, at the risk that the domain of the latter, like that of the Red Indians in America, will be more and more curtailed and finally wholly taken possession of by blind, irrational power, cf. deel I 451. For that is certainly the principal objection against deism: by separating God and world, the infinite and the finite, and placing them dualistically alongside each other, it makes both into two competing powers, which are involved in continual struggle and dispute dominion with each other. What is given to God is taken away from the world. The more God's providence extends, the more the creature loses its independence and freedom, and conversely the creature can maintain its self-activity only if it pushes God back and takes dominion away from Him. Peace therefore exists between the two only with complete separation. Deism is in its ground irreligious.
Not in communion with but in separation from God lies the blessedness of the human being; the deist feels at ease only when he is detached from God, i.e. is practically an atheist; and because he realizes that he can never be that, he is a fearful creature, always anxious that a piece of his territory will be taken away from him. Hence there are in deism all sorts of degrees; the boundaries between God's activity and that of the world are drawn differently each time. There are whole, half, three-quarter Pelagians, etc., according as world and human being are withdrawn wholly or for a greater or smaller part from God's government. In principle deism is always the same, it sets God to non-activity, but one walks that path further than another. A deist is a human being who in his short existence has not found the time to become an atheist, Quack, Port Royal 180. That domain now, which by deism is withdrawn from God's government, then comes to stand under the power either of fate or of chance. Also in this respect deism
repeatedly comes into conflict with itself. Especially nowadays, now all are so deeply convinced of the firmness of the natural order, there is in it no place for chance and deism falls back into the hands of the old fate; chance remains chiefly preserved only for the religious-ethical domain. But the doctrine of chance is no better than that of fate. Fatum could at need still have a good meaning in the Christian view of life and the world; but casus and fortuna are through and through unchristian. Something is accidental only in human beings' eyes, because at that moment they do not know the cause. But objectively accidental there is nothing and there can be nothing.
Everything must have a cause and has it in the last instance in the almighty and all-wise will of God, cf. Augustinus, qu. 83 qu 24. c. Acad. I 1. de ord. I 2. de civ. V 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 2. qu. 103 art. 5. c. Gent. III 72. Gerhard, Loc. VI 3. Calvijn, Inst. I 16, 2. 9. Chamier, Panstr. Cathol. II 2, 4 sq. Turret., Theol. El. III qu. 12. Mastricht, Theol. III 10, 30. J. Müller,
Sünde II 34 f. Weisse, Philos. D. I 518. Kirchner, Ueber den Zufall, Halle, Pfeffer 1888. G. Rümelin, Ueber den Zufall, Deutsche Rundschau März
1890 S. 353-364, and furthermore on deism: [15] Lechler, Gesch. des engl.
Deismus 1841 and art. in Herzog2. Pünjer, Gesch. d. chr. Relig. Philos. I 209 f. Hanne, Die Idee der absol. Persönl. II2 76 f. Pesch, Die grossen
Welträthsel II2 534 f. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer v. God 80v.
4. The providence of God, thus distinguished from the knowledge and the decree of God and maintained over against pantheism and deism, is, according to the fine definition of the Heid. Catech., that almighty and omnipresent power of God, by which He still upholds and governs heaven and earth, together with all creatures, as it were with His hand. Even so, the doctrine of providence is still of very wide scope. It properly comprises the entire execution of all decrees which have reference to that which was once
called into existence by creation. If the act of creation is excepted, it is as rich as the scientia libera, as the decrees of God, as all that exists and happens in time. It extends over everything that is further treated in dogmatics after creation and includes within itself both the works of nature and of grace; all works of God outwardly, which follow upon creation, are works of His providence. Only, the locus de providentia does not enter into those works themselves, but describes in general the nature of the relation in which God stands to the created world and which is always the same in spite of the many different works which He brings about in the world in His providence. Therefore it is also not desirable, in this locus, to bring up all kinds of subjects, such as the miracle, prayer, the end of life, freedom of the will, sin, theodicy, etc., for in part these subjects have already been treated earlier in the doctrine of the virtues and the decrees of God, in part they later come up in their own place at length. Not on the locus de providentia alone, but on the whole of dogmatics rests the task of theodicy. The doctrine of providence therefore does not include within itself the material for the following loci, but confines itself to the description of the relation, remaining like itself under all different works, in which God stands to the creatures. That relation is expressed by the words preservation, cooperation, and government, which gradually were conceived as parts of providence.
Whatever God may do in nature and grace [16], He is always the one who preserves all things, flows into them with His power, and governs them.
Preservation, cooperation, and government are therefore not parts or pieces into which the work of providence is split, and which, separated in substance and in time, follow one upon another. Nor do they differ among themselves in such a way that preservation would have reference only to the being of the creatures, cooperation only to the activities, and government
exclusively to the guidance toward the final goal. But they are always connected with one another, they interpenetrate one another at every moment, preservation from the very first beginning is also government, and government cooperation, and cooperation preservation. Preservation tells us that nothing exists, not only no substance, but also no power, no activity, no property, no idea, unless it all exists from, through, unto God. Cooperation makes known to us that same preservation as such a one which does not abolish the being of the creatures but precisely posits and maintains it. And government points out both to us as leading all things in such a way that the end goal established by God is attained. And always, from the beginning to the end, providence is one simple, almighty, and omnipresent power.
When conceived as such a power and act of God, providence stands in the closest connection with, and yet is also essentially distinct from, the activity of God in creation. Pantheism and deism seek the solution of the problem that here presents itself by denying either creation or providence. Theism maintains both and seeks to set their unity and their distinction in the light both for theory and for the practice of life. Always to be a theist in the full, true sense, i.e. to see in everything God's counsel and hand and work and yet at the same time, indeed precisely for that reason, to develop every power and gift to the highest activity, that is the glory of the Christian faith, that the secret of the Christian life. Scripture leads us in this. On the one hand it designates providence as a creating, Ps. 104:30, a making alive,
Neh. 9:6, a speaking, Ps. 33:9, 105:31, 34, 107:25, Job 37:6, a sending forth of his Word and Spirit, Ps. 104:30, 107:26, a commanding, Ps. 147:15,
Lam. 3:37, a working, John 5:17, a bearing, Heb. 1:3, a willing, Rev. 4:11, so that [17] everything without exception is from God and exists through and unto him, Acts 17:28, Rom. 11:36, Col. 1:17. God is never idle. He
never looks on passively. He always works with divine power in nature and grace. Providence is therefore a positive act, not a letting but a causing to exist and to work from moment to moment. If it consisted only in a nondestruere, it would not be God who maintained things, but these would exist in and through themselves, be it then also through a power bestowed at creation. And this is absurd to think; a creature is by itself an absolutely dependent being; what does not exist of itself can also not exist for a single moment by itself. If God does nothing, then there is nothing and nothing happens. Virtus Dei, ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species omnisque natura concideret, Aug. de Gen. ad litt. IV 12. Conf. IV 17, cf. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 104 art. 1-4. c. Gent.
III 65 sq. Calvin, Inst. I 16, 4. Leydecker, Fax verit. VIII 2. Alsted, Theol. schol. 304 etc. And just as providence is a power and an act, so it is also an almighty and omnipresent power. God is immanent with his being present in all creatures. His providence extends to all creatures; everything exists in him. Scripture states it most emphatically, that nothing, however small, falls outside God's providence. Not only all things in general, Eph. 1:11, Col.
1:17, Heb. 1:3, but even the hairs of the head, Mt. 10:30, the sparrows, Mt.
10:29, the birds of heaven, Mt. 6:26, the lilies of the field, Mt. 6:28, the young ravens, Ps. 147:9 are the object of his care. For what is small or great for him who alone is great? In the coherence of the world the small is just as much in its place as the great, just as indispensable and necessary, and many times of still richer significance and of weightier consequences.
Providence may therefore be distinguished into in generalis, Ps. 104, 148:13, specialis, Ps. 139:15v., Job 10:9-12, Mt. 12:12, Luke 12:7, and specialissima, 1 Tim. 4:10. But it nevertheless extends as God's power to all and to each creature. Habakkuk complains in chap. 1:14 indeed about it,
that God by his chastisement makes men like fishes of the sea, that are caught in the net and ְּכֶרֶמׂש ֹלא־ ֹמֵׁשל, like creeping things, that have no ruler, namely to protect it over against [18] its enemies, but thereby in the least does not express that God's providence does not extend over these creatures. With more appearance of right one appeals for the limitation of God's providence to 1 Cor. 9:9; yet Paul, who everywhere else conceives
God's sovereignty so absolutely, e.g. Acts 17:28, Rom. 11:36, Col. 1:17, here in this place by no means denies that God also cares for the oxen, but only indicates that the reason why this word is included in God's law does not lie in the oxen but in men. God says also this word concerning the oxen δι' ἡμας, v. 10, cf. Rom. 4:23, 24, 15:4, 2 Tim. 3:16, in order that we might learn from it that the laborer in the gospel is worthy of his wages. Thus providence is an act of God just as great, almighty, and omnipresent as creation; it is a creatio continua or continuata; they are both one act and differ only ratione, Aug. de Gen. ad litt. IV 15. Conf. IV 12 de civ. XII 17.
Thomas I qu. 104 art. 2. Quenstedt, Theol. I p. 351. Ursinus, Explic. Cat. qu. 27. M. Vitringa II 183. Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 190.
Thus speaking, earlier theologians nevertheless in no way wished to abolish the distinction that exists between creation and providence, as e.g.
Hodge I 577 fears. Scripture, on the other hand, represents providence as a resting from the work of creation, Gen. 2:2, Ex. 20:11, 31:17 and further as a seeing, Ps. 14:2, as a beholding, Ps. 33:13, as a paying heed, Ps. 33:15, as a watching, Ps. 130:3 etc., which all presupposes the existence, the selfactivity, the freedom of the creature. These data of Scripture also may not be neglected. Creation and providence are not the same. If providence were a creation renewed every moment, the creatures would also be brought forth out of nothing every moment. The coherence, the connection, the ordo
causarum would then be entirely lost, and of development, history there could be no question. All creatures would then exist not really, but only in appearance, and lack all independence, freedom, responsibility; God himself would be the cause of sin. Although many called providence a creatio continua, they nevertheless by no means intended thereby to erase the distinction between the two; rather, they all at the same time conceived providence as a causing to persevere [19] in existence, as a conservatio, which presupposes creation. Thus, e.g. Augustine says that God rested on the seventh day and created no new genera any more, and he then describes the work of providence in distinction from that of creation as follows: movet itaque occulta potentia universam creaturam suam...... explicat secula, quae illi cum primum condita sunt tanquam implicita indiderat, quae tamen in suos cursus non explicarentur, si ea ille qui condidit provido motu administrare cessaret, de Gen. ad lit. V 20. Providence may therefore sometimes be called a creatio, it is always distinguished from the first and proper creation in this, that it is a creatio continua. Both therefore agree with each other in this, that it is the same Divine, almighty and omnipresent power that is active in creation and in preservation; this is no lesser act than that; for both, power, Divine omnipotence is required. Further, creation and preservation are of course also not distinguished in God himself, for in Him, the Eternal, there falls no change nor shadow of turning; He has not passed over from not-creating to creating nor also from creating to preserving; He is unchangeably the same, cf. deel II 411. Creation and preservation are therefore not objectively and essentially, as acts of God, in God's being, but only ratione distinguished. That, however, does not mean that our thinking simply arbitrarily makes a distinction between the two; no, that distinction is indeed well grounded in the revelation of God and
derived from it by our thinking. There is a difference between creation and preservation, but that difference does not lie in God's being an sich, but in the relation in which God places himself to the creatures. One thing is what happens with the things through creation, and another thing what happens with them through preservation. The relation in which through both acts the creatures are placed to God is a different one. This difference is not to be indicated thus, that creation is out of nothing and preservation out of the existing; but creation calls forth the things that are not, that have no other being than that of ideas and decrees in the being of God; through preservation God calls forth with the same power those things that have received an existence distinct from his being and nevertheless are solely and only out of and through and unto God. Creation gives being; preservation, the perseverance [20] in being. The difficulty for thought, to maintain both creation and preservation, lies again and again in this, that creatures through creation have received a being of their own, distinct from God's being, and that yet that being cannot or may not be regarded for a moment as a being independent of God, resting in itself. We stand here before a mystery that far surpasses our understanding, and always we are inclined to do too little to the one or to the other. On that inclination pantheism and deism rest.
Both proceed from the same error and set God and world over against each other as two magnitudes. The first sacrifices the world to God, creation to preservation, and thinks that the being of God is then only a Divine infinite being when the being of the world is denied, dissolved in appearance, swallowed up in the Divine being. And the second sacrifices God to the world, preservation to creation, and judges that the creature comes the more into its right, in proportion as it becomes less dependent on God and removes itself more from Him. The Christian, however, confesses that the
world and every creature in it has received a being of its own but yet in that same measure increases in reality, in freedom, in true being, as it is more dependent on God, and from moment to moment is out of and through and unto Him. A creature stands the higher, in proportion as God dwells in it more and permeates it with his being. Preservation in so far even goes beyond creation; for this gave only the beginning of being, but that is the continuing and ever increasing communication of God to his creatures. The providence is the progressive expression in the universe of his divine perfection, the progressive realization in it of the archetypal ideal of perfect wisdom and love, Sam. Harris, God the Creator and Lord of all, Edinb.
Clark 1897 I 532.
5. In this way the manner has also already been indicated in which God exercises his providence in the world, and which in former times was expressed by the doctrine of the concursus. This is as rich as the diversity which in creation has been introduced into the creatures, Sicut creationis magna est varietas, ita et gubernationis, Alsted, Theol. schol. 315. By creation a world has been called into existence, which at the same time deserves to be called a κοσμος and αἰων [21] and is in both space and time a speculum lucidissimum gloriae divinae, cf. deel II 420v. Providence now serves to lead the world from its beginning on to its final goal; it comes into operation immediately at creation and maintains and brings to development what is given in that creation. Conversely, creation is adapted to providence; the creation gives to the creatures such a being, that in and through providence can be brought to unfolding. For the world was not created in the state of pure potency, as a chaos or mass of mist, but as a cosmos, and man was placed therein not as a helpless wretch but as man and woman; only from such a ready world could development proceed and
thus it was by creation offered to providence. Further, that world was a harmonious whole, in which unity was paired with the richest diversity; each creature received its own nature and therein its own being, its own life and law of life. Just as in Adam's heart the moral law was implanted, as rule for his life, so all creatures bore in their own nature the principia and the laws for their development. All things are created by the word. Everything rests on thought. The whole creation is a system of God's ordinances, Gen.
1:26, 28, 8:22, Ps. 104:5, 9, 119:90, 91, Pred. 1:10, Job 38:10v., Jer. 5:24, 31:25v., 33:20, 25. He gave to all creatures an order, a law, which they do not transgress, Ps. 148:6, cf. deel I 259, 287v. It rests in all its parts on the counsel of God, and this comes out in the small and in the great; it all proceeds from the Lord of hosts, He is wonderful in counsel, He is great in deed, Jes. 28:23-29. Thus Scripture teaches us to understand the world, and thus also Christian theology has understood it. Augustine said that in the creatures semina occulta, originales regulae, seminariae rationes had been implanted, which, hidden in the secret womb of nature, are the principia of all development. Quaecunque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi primordia, et incrementa debitae magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus tamquam regulis sumunt, de trin. III 7. de Gen. ad lit. IV 33. The world is therefore pregnant with the causes of beings; sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic [22] ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium, quae in illo non creantur, nisi ab illa summa essentia, ubi nec oritur nec moritur aliquid nec incipit esse nec desinit, de trin. III 9. It is an arbor rerum, which brings forth branch and blossom and fruit out of itself, de Gen. ad lit. VIII 9. God nevertheless so preserves the things and so works in them, that they themselves as causae secundae cooperate. That does not say that one must stop with these second
causes; we must always ascend to the cause of all being and motion, and that is only the will of God; voluntas conditoris conditae rei cujusque natura est, de civ. XXI 8, cf. de trin. III 6-9. Insofar providence is not only a positive, but also an immediate act of God. His will, his power, his being is immediately present in every creature and in every event. Everything exists and lives together in him, Hd. 17:28, Col. 1:17, Hebr. 1:3. Just as he created the world by himself, so he also sustains and governs it by himself.
Although God also works through the causae secundae, this is not to be interpreted with deism in such a way that they would stand between God and the workings with their consequences and remove these from him.
Immediate Deus omnibus providet, quoad ordinis rationem, Thomas, S.
Theol. I qu. 22 art. 3. qu. 103 art. 6. qu. 104 art. 2. c. Gent. III 76 sq.
Therefore a miracle is also no breaking of the law of nature and no intervention into the order of nature from without. It is on God's side an act which has no more immediately and directly God as cause than every ordinary event, and in the counsel of God and in the world-idea it takes an equally ordered and harmonious place as every natural phenomenon. In the miracle God only brings a special power into operation, which, like every other power, works in accordance with its own nature and law and thus also has its own product as consequence, cf. deel I 289. But at creation God laid in the things his ordinances, an ordo rerum, by which the things themselves stand mutually in connection with one another. God does not depend on those causes, but the things do depend on one another. That connection is manifold; although in general it can be called causal, causal in this sense is nevertheless by no means to be identified with mechanical, as materialism wishes. The mechanical connection is only one manner in which a part of the things in the world [23] stands in relation to one another. Just as the
creatures in creation received their own nature and differ mutually, so there is also distinction in the laws according to which they work, and in the relations in which they stand to one another. These are distinct on physical and on psychical terrain, in the intellectual and in the ethical world, in family and society, in science and art, in the kingdoms of the earth and in the kingdom of the heavens. It is the providence of God, which in connection with creation maintains and brings to full unfolding all these distinct natures, powers, ordinances. In providence God does not destroy but rather respects and develops what he called into existence in creation.
Thus he sustains and governs all creatures in accordance with their nature, the angels otherwise than men and these again otherwise than animals and plants. But insofar as God now in his providence maintains the mutual relations of things and makes the creatures mutually serviceable to one another's existence and life, it can be called mediate. Immediate Deus omnibus providet, quoad ordinis rationem, quoad executionem ordinis vero per aliqua media providet, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 3. Thus he created the angels all at once but lets men proceed from one blood; thus he preserves some creatures individually, others as species and genus; thus he repeatedly makes use of all kinds of creatures as means in his hand, in order to carry out his counsel and to reach his goal.
Christian theology did not deny this; on the contrary, following the lead of Scripture, it has always emphatically maintained the order of nature and the causal connection of phenomena. It is untrue that Christianity, with its supranaturalism, would be hostile to a natural order and would make science impossible, as Draper's history of the struggle between religion and science, 2e uitg. Haarlem 1887, with evident pleasure tries to demonstrate.
Much more correct is the judgment of Du Bois Reymond, when he said: die
neuere Naturwissenschaft, wie paradox dies klinge, verdankt ihren Ursprung dem Christenthum, Kulturgesch. und Naturw. Leipzig 1878 S. 28, cf. also Lange, Gesch. des Mater. 1882 S. 129 f. and others in Martensen
Larsen, Die Naturwiss. in ihrem Schuldverhältnis zum Christenthum, Berlin 1897. In any case Christianity [24] made science, specifically that of nature, possible and prepared the ground for it. For the more the phenomena of nature, as in polytheism, are deified and regarded as visible images and bearers of the Godhead, the more impossible a scientific investigation becomes, which of itself acquires the character of sacrilege and disturbs the mystery of the Godhead. But Christianity has distinguished God and world and, by its confession of God as the Creator of all things, has detached God from the nexus of nature and placed Him high above it; investigation of nature is no longer an assault on the Godhead. Furthermore, by that it has at the same time made man free from and placed him independently over against nature, as the beautiful contemplation of nature among psalmists and prophets, with Jesus and the apostles, so clearly proves; for the believer nature is no longer an object of worship and fear; while in deep humility he bows before God and is absolutely dependent on Him, he has precisely the calling to rule the earth and to subject all things to himself, Gen. 1:26.
Dependence on God is something quite different from convenienter naturae vivere and accommodating oneself to circumstances. Many reason in such a way that they either ascribe all things and events to God's will and consider resistance unlawful, or that they limit God's providence and place many things in the hands of man, cf. e.g. Beyschlag, Zur Verständigung über den christl. Vorsehungsglauben 1888 S. 24 f. Yet Scripture warns us against both this antinomianism and this pelagianism and cuts off at the root all false, fatalistic resignation and all arrogant self-confidence. Bowing before
the power of nature is something wholly different from submitting to God in a childlike way; and ruling the earth is a serving of God. The captain who, during a storm, went into his cabin to pray and read in the Bible, did indeed submit to the power of the elements but not to God, Harris, God the Creator and Lord of all I 545. There is much more true piety in Cromwell's word: trust God and keep your powder dry. Next, it is the confession of God as the Creator of heaven and earth which at once brings with it the thought of the one, absolute truth, never divided against itself; of the harmony and the beauty of the counsel of God; and thus also of the unity of the worldplan and of the order of the whole of nature. [25] Wenn in freier und grossartiger Weise dem einen Gott auch ein einheitliches Wirken aus dem
Ganzen und Vollen zugeschrieben wird, so wird der Zusammenhang der Dinge nach Ursache und Wirkung nicht nur denkbar sondern er ist sogar eine nothwendige Consequenz der Annahme, Lange, Gesch. d. Mater. 130.
Scripture itself leads us in the recognition of such a natural order, of all kinds of ordinances and laws for created things. And the miracle makes so little breach in that, that it rather presupposes and confirms that fixed natural order. The Christian church and theology have at all times gladly acknowledged such an ordo rerum; Augustine repeatedly appealed to the word in Wijsh. 11:20, omnia mensura numeroque et pondere ordinasti.
They have at least in the first period powerfully resisted the dreadful superstition which in the third and fourth century rose to an extraordinary height, and in particular also combated astrology, Aug. de civ. V 1-8.
Thomas, S. c. Gent. III 84 sq. Calvijn, Contre l'astrologie, C. R. 35 p. 509544. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 2. Moor II 435. M. Vitringa II 180 etc.
The struggle that often broke out was not waged between Christianity and natural science; the parties were grouped quite differently; it was mostly a
struggle between old and new world-view, in which there were believing Christians on both sides, cf. deel II 465.
This principially correct view of nature, which theology advocated, is evident nowhere more clearly than from its doctrine of the concursus and the causae secundae. In pantheism and in deism this doctrine cannot come into its own. There there are no causae and here no causae secundae any longer. In pantheism the causae secundae, i.e. the causes of things lying alongside one another within the circle of the created, are identified with the causa prima, that is God. There is between the two no distinction of substance and operation; God is materialiter and formaliter the subject of all that happens, thus also of sin; at most the so-called second causes are occasions and passive instruments for the operations of God. Formerly occurring only sporadically, this doctrine came to dominance in the newer philosophy of Cartesius and thus led to the idealism of Berkeley and Malebranche and to the pantheism of Spinoza, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Chr.
Gl. § 46, [26] Strauss, Gl. II 384 etc. Thus Malebranche, e. g., says, qu'il n'y a qu'une vraie cause parce qu'il n'y a qu'un vrai Dieu, que la nature ou la force de chaque chose n'est que la volonté de Dieu, que toutes les causes naturelles ne sont point de véritables causes, mais seulement des causes occasionnelles. A true cause can be God alone, because He alone can create and cannot communicate this power to any creature; if creatures could really be cause of motions and phenomena, then they themselves would be
Gods, but toutes ces petites divinités des payens et toutes ces causes particulières des philosophes ne sont que des chimères, que le malin esprit tâche d'établir pour ruiner le culte du vrai Dieu, De la recherche de la vérité, l. 6 p. 2 ch. 3 cf. also Eclaircissement 15. There are thus only phaenomena, representations, and the only reality, power, substance, that
hides behind them, is that of God himself, cf. also Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit II2 336-347. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 592. Conversely, in deism the causae secundae are separated from the causa prima and made independent; the causa prima is wholly restricted to creation, to the giving of the posse, and in the velle and facere wholly excluded, as in original pelagianism; or the two causae are conceived as causae sociae, which work alongside and with one another, as two horses draw a wagon forward, even if the one is then perhaps stronger than the other, as in semipelagianism and synergism; the creature here becomes creator of his own acts. Now, however, Scripture says, both that God works all things, so that the creature is only an instrument in his hand, e. g. Jes. 44:24, Ps. 29:3, 65:11, 147:16, Mt. 5:45,
Hd. 17:25 etc., and that providence is distinct from creation and presupposes the existence and the self-activity of the creatures, e. g. Gen.
1:11, 20, 22, 24, 28 etc. In accordance with that, Christian theology teaches that the causae secundae are absolutely subordinated to God as prima causa and yet in that subordination remain genuine, true causae. A few indeed deviated here sideways, such as the nominalist Biel in the Middle Ages,
Zwingli in the time of the Reformation, who wrongly considered the second causes so called and preferred to call them instruments, de provid. Op. IV 95 sq., and the American theologian Emmons in later time, cf. Strong, Syst.
Theol. New-York 1890 [27] p. 205. Hodge I 594. H. B. Smith, Syst. of christ. Theol. 1890 p. 103. But nevertheless it was the constant doctrine of the Christian church, that the second causes, though wholly and entirely dependent on the first cause, are at the same time nevertheless also true, essential causes. God flows with his almighty power into every causa secunda and is with his being present in it at its beginning, progress, and end. He is the one who posits it and brings it to action (praecursus), and
further also in its operation accompanies and leads it up to its effect (concursus); He works the willing and the working according to his good pleasure. But this influence of the causa prima in the causae secundae is so divinely great, that He precisely thereby brings those causae secundae to their own activity. Providentia Dei causas secundas non tollit sed ponit,
Wollebius in Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 191. The concursus is precisely the cause of the self-activity of the second causes; and these, borne by God's might from the beginning to the end, work with a propria et insita virtus. So little does the activity of God nullify the activity of the creature, that the latter becomes the more powerful, the more richly and fully the former reveals itself. The causa prima and secunda thus remain two distinct causes; the first does not destroy the second but precisely bestows reality upon it, and the second exists only through the first. Nor are the causae secundae merely instrumenta, no organa, no sticks and blocks, but genuine, essential causes, with their own nature, power, spontaneity, operation, and law. Sathan et les mechans ne sont pas tellement instrumens de Dieu, que cependant ils n'operent aussi bien de leur coste. Car il ne faut pas imaginer, que Dieu besongne par un homme inique comme par une pierre ou par un tronc de bois, mais il en use comme d'une creature raisonnable, selon la qualité de sa nature, qu'il luy a donnée. Quand donc nous disons, que Dieu opere par les mechans, cela n'empeche pas que les meschans n'operent aussi en leur endroict, Calvin, C. R. 35, 188. With respect to God the causae secundae can be compared with instruments, Jes. 10:15, 13:5, Jer. 50:25,
Hd. 9:15, Rom. 9:20-23; with respect to their effects and products they are causae in the proper sense. And precisely because the first and second cause do not stand and work dualistically alongside one another, but the first works through the second, therefore the operation that [28] proceeds from
both is one, and the product also is one. There takes place no division of labor between God and his creature, but the same operation is wholly and entirely operation of the causa prima and likewise wholly and entirely operation of the causa proxima; and the product is in that same sense wholly product of the first and wholly product of the second cause.
Because, however, the causa prima and the causa secunda are not identical but differ in essence, therefore the operation and the product are indeed realiter wholly and entirely operation and product of both causes; but formaliter they are nevertheless only operation and product of the second cause. The wood burns, and it is God alone who causes the burning, but formally the burning may not be ascribed to God but must be ascribed only to the wood as subject. Man speaks, acts, believes, and it is God alone who causes him to speak, act, believe, yet not God but man is the formal subject of all these acts. And thus it is also God alone who grants the sinner all life and power which he needs for the committing of a sin; but sin has not God but man as subject and author. In this way Holy Scripture draws the lines within which the reconciliation of God's sovereignty and of man's freedom must be sought.
6. In providence, conceived as preservation or as cooperation, government is already included. He who so maintains things that he bears not only their being but even their powers and operations by his will and his being, he is absolutely sovereign, king in the true sense. Government is therefore no new element that is added to preservation and cooperation; it is, like each of these two, in itself the whole providence, only now considered from the standpoint of the final goal, toward which God leads all that is created through his providence. It is a beautiful, rich thought when Holy Scripture repeatedly calls God King and describes his providence as a government.
There are many in this time who reject every concept of sovereignty in family, state, society and want to know of nothing but democracy and anarchy. Under the influence of these views there are also those who in theology find the representation of God as King Old-Testament and antiquated [29] and at most still want to speak of God as Father. But this judgment is superficial and untrue. First, the name Father for God is not New-Testament but was already customary in the Old Testament and even among the Heathen; the N. Test. may have conceived its meaning more richly and more deeply, it did not first give that name to God, cf. part II 113.
Conversely, the name of King for the Divine being occurs not only in the Old, but also in the New Testament repeatedly, Mt. 6:10, 13, 33, 1 Tim.
1:17, 6:15, Op. 19:6 etc. And secondly, the designation of King is no less worthy of God than that of Father. All πατρια in heaven and on earth is named from Him, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Ef. 3:15. All relations that exist among creatures between superiors and inferiors are a likeness of that one original relation in which God stands to the works of his hands. What a father is for his family, what an educator is for the youth, what a commander is for the army, what a prince is for his people, all that and so much more is God in an entirely original way for his creatures. Not one, but all his virtues come to manifestation in the world and therefore ought to be honored by us. And now especially also kingship is a glorious
Divine institution. It gives to the people not only a personal unity, but, as hereditary kingship, also assumes the character of originality, exaltedness, independence, and immutability. In all this it is a beautiful, though indeed weak, image of the kingship of God. All sovereignty on earth is borrowed, derived, temporal, limited, many times not for blessing but for curse. But God is King in an absolute and in a true sense. The government of the world
is not democratic and not aristocratic, not republican and not constitutional, but monarchical. God's is the one, undivided, legislative, judicial, and executive power; his sovereignty is original, eternal, unlimited, rich in blessing. He is the King of kings and the Lord of lords, 1 Tim. 6:15, Op.
19:6. His kingdom is the entire universe. His are heaven and earth, Ex.
19:5, Ps. 8:2, 103:19, 148:13. He possesses all nations, Ps. 82:8, rules over the Heathen, Ps. 22:29, 47:9, 96:10, Jer. 10:7, Mal. 1:14, and is the Most
High over the whole earth, Ps. 47:3, 8, [30] 83:19, 97:9. He is King forever, Ps. 29:10, 1 Tim. 1:17; no opposition has anything to signify over against Him, Ps. 93:3, 4. His kingdom surely comes, Mt. 6:10, 1 Cor. 15:24, Op.
12:10; his glory shall be revealed and his name shall be feared from the rising to the setting of the sun, Jes. 40:5, 59:19; He shall be King over the whole earth, Zach. 14:9. Also in this government God deals with each thing according to its nature. Deus regit res, naturae ipsarum convenienter,
Alsted, Theol. schol. 301. And therefore that government of God is also presented in Scripture in different ways and called by different names.
Through his government He keeps the world standing and establishes it, so that it shall not totter, Ps. 93:1; He disposes the light and the darkness, Ps.
104 vs. 19, 20, commands the rain and holds it back, Gen. 7:4, 8:2, Job 26:8, 38:22v., gives hoarfrost and snow and ice, Ps. 147:16, rebukes i.e. reproves and stills the sea, Nah. 1:4, Ps. 65:8, 107:29, sends curse and destruction, Deut. 28:15v., everything does his word, Ps. 148:8. Equally mighty and sovereignly He rules in the world of rational creatures, He rules among the Heathen and possesses all nations, Ps. 22:29, 82:8, counts the peoples less than nothing and vanity, Jes. 40:17, does with the inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Dan. 4:35, and guides every heart and thought, Spr. 21:1.
And this government of God over his rational creatures extends not only to the good, of which He is the Giver both in nature and in grace, Jak. 1:17, and also not only to his favourites, whom He elects, calls, preserves, cares for, and leads to eternal salvation, but it also extends to the evil and to those who love and do the evil. Indeed it is established throughout the whole of Scripture that God hates sin with his whole being, Deut. 32:4, Ps. 5:5-7, Job
34:10, 1 Joh. 1:5 etc.; and his government, by the prohibition of sin in law and conscience, by its judgments and sentences, bears an incontrovertible testimony to that. But nevertheless the whole of Scripture at the same time teaches that sin from beginning to end stands under his Divine regiment, cf.
Clemen, Die christl. Lehre von der Sünde, Göttingen 1897 I 123-151. At its beginning God sometimes intervenes preventively; He prevents someone from sinning, Gen. 20:6, 31:7, destroys the [31] counsel of the ungodly, Ps.
33:10, grants power to remain standing in temptation, 1 Cor. 10:13, and in so far always restrains sin, insofar as He forbids it and curbs the sinner by some anxiety and fear in the conscience. But this impeditio is by no means the only form in which God governs sin. Many times He permits it and does not prevent it. He gave Israel over to the good pleasure of his heart, Ps.
81:13, let the Gentiles walk in their own ways, Hd. 14:16, 17:30 and gave them over to a reprobate mind, Rom. 1:24, 28; and thus it can be said that God permitted the fall of Adam, the murder of Abel, the unrighteousness of men before the flood, Gen. 6:3, the sale of Joseph, Gen. 37, the condemnation of Jesus etc. But this permissio is so little negative that sin also in its very first beginning stands under God's governing power and sovereignty. He creates and orders the occasions and inducements to sin, in order to test man and thereby either to strengthen and confirm or also to punish and harden, Gen. 2:7, 2 Chr. 32:31, Job 1, Mt. 4:1, 6:13, 1 Cor.
10:13. Although sin at first seemed nothing other than an arbitrary act of men, it nevertheless later appears that God had his hand in it and that it happened according to his counsel, Gen. 46:8, 2 Chron. 11:4, Luk. 24:26,
Hd. 2:23, 3:17, 18, 4:28. It is even, in its beginning, though not formaliter and subjective but yet materialiter, ascribed to God. God is the potter and man is the clay, Jer. 18:5, Klaagl. 3:38, Jes. 45:7, 9, 64:7, Am. 3:6; He hardens, makes obstinate, blinds, Ex. 4:21, 7:3, 9:12, 10 vs. 20, 27, 11:10,
14:4, Deut. 2:30, Jos. 11:20, Jes. 6:10, 63:17, Mt. 13:13, Mk. 4:12, Luk.
8:10, Joh. 12:40, Hd. 28:26, Rom. 9:18, 11:8; He turns the heart so that it is hateful and disobedient, 1 Sam. 2:25, 1 Kon. 12:25, 2 Chron. 25:20. Ps.
105:24, Ezech. 14:9. He sends an evil spirit, a lying spirit, Richt. 9:23, 1 Sam. 16:14, 1 Kon. 22:23, 2 Chron. 18:22, incites David by Satan, 2 Sam.
24:1, 1 Chr. 21:1, makes Shimei curse, 2 Sam. 16:10, gives men over to their sins, lets the measure of their iniquity become full, Gen. 15:16, Rom.
1:24, sends a power of delusion, 2 Thess. 2:11, sets Christ for a fall and rising, for an odour of death and of life, Luk. 2 vs. [32] 34, Joh. 3:19, 9:39,
2 Cor. 2:16, 1 Petr. 2:8 etc., cf. deel II 315v., 369v. And not only at the beginning but also in the progress God keeps sin under his almighty government; many times He restrains it, limits it, checks it in its course and by judgments and sentences brings it to an end, Gen. 7:11, Ex. 15 etc., Mt.
24:22, 2 Petr. 2:9, but also where He lets it continue, He governs it, Spr.
16:9, 21:1, and in its end, whether He forgives it or punishes it, against its will and intention, He makes it subservient to the execution of his counsel, to the glorification of his name, Gen. 45:7, 8, 50:20, Ps. 51:6, Jes. 10:5-7,
Job 1:20, 22, Spr. 16:4, Hd. 3:13, Rom. 8:28, 11:36. Just as sin, the malum culpae, so also suffering, the malum poenae, stands under the dominion of God. He is the Creator of the light and the darkness, of the good and the
evil, Am. 3:6, Jes. 45:7, Job 2:10. Death is his punishment and entered in by his command, Gen. 2:17, and all disasters and adversities, all pain and suffering, all visitations and judgments come to men from God's almighty hand, Gen. 3:14v., Deut. 28:15v. etc. Already under Israel, however, the disharmony was noticed that in this life exists between sin and punishment, holiness and salvation, Ps. 73, Job, Pred. Faith wrestled with this dreadful problem, but from it it nevertheless again lifted up its head triumphantly, not because it saw the problem solved, but because it continued to cling fast to the kingly power and the fatherly love of the Lord. The prosperity of the ungodly is only appearance and in any case only temporary, and the righteous, even in the heaviest suffering, are still partakers of God's love and favour, Ps. 73, Job. The suffering of the pious has many times its ground not in their personal sin but in the sin of humanity, and its goal in the salvation of humanity and in the honour of God. Suffering serves not only for retribution, Rom. 1:18, 27, 2:5, 6, 2 Thess. 1:9, but it also serves for testing and chastisement, Deut. 8:5, Job 1:12, Ps. 118:8, Spr. 3:12, Jer.
10:24, 30:11, Hebr. 12:6v., Op. 3:19; for strengthening and confirmation, Ps. 119:67, 71, Rom. 5:3-5, Hebr. 12:10, Jak. 1:2-4; for testimony to the truth, Ps. 44:23, Hd. 5:41. Phil. 1:29, 2 Tim. 4:6; for the glorification of God, Joh. 9:2. In Christ justice and grace are reconciled with one another;
[33] suffering is the way to glory, the cross points to the crown, lignum crucis arbor vitae. The end to which all things are led by the providence of God is the establishment of his kingdom, the revelation of his virtues, the honour of his name, Rom. 11:32-36, 1 Cor. 15:18, Op. 11:15, 12:13 etc. In this comforting way Scripture deals with the providence of God. Enough riddles remain, both in individual life and in the history of world and humanity; dogmatics from now on occupies itself with nothing else than
with the mysteries which the providence of God in sin, freedom, responsibility, punishment, suffering, death, grace, reconciliation, prayer etc. has set before us, and therefore does not need here to enter into all those subjects. But over all those riddles and mysteries God lets the light of his
Word shine, not to solve them, but so that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope, Rom. 15:4. The doctrine of providence is not a philosophical system but a confession of faith, a confession that, in spite of the fact that the appearance of things often speaks against it, yet no Satan and no man and no single creature but God and He alone by his almighty and omnipresent power upholds and governs all things. Such a confession is able to preserve us both from a superficial optimism that fails to recognize the riddles of life, and from a proud pessimism that despairs of world and fate. For the providence of God extends over all things, over the good not only, but also over sin and suffering, pain and death; for if these were withdrawn from God's guidance, what would then still remain in this world for his government? It reveals itself not only and not chiefly in the extraordinary events and in the miracles, but equally in the fixed order of nature and in the ordinary occurrences of daily life; for what poor faith would it be that saw God's hand and counsel from afar in a few weighty events, but did not perceive it in one's own life and lot? And it leads all these things, not against but in accordance with their nature, not apart from the means but through these; for what power would be hidden in a faith that praised stoic indifference or fatalistic resignation as true piety? Thus, however, as the almighty and [34] omnipresent power of God, it makes us thankful in prosperity and patient in adversity; it causes us with childlike submission to rest in the guidance of the Lord and yet at the same time rouses us from our sloth to the highest activity; and it grants us under
everything a good confidence in our faithful God and Father, that He will provide us with all the necessities of body and soul, and that He will turn to our benefit all the evil that He assigns to us in this vale of tears, since He is able to do so as an almighty God and also wills to do so as a faithful Father.